NOTES
Chapter One The Mitrokhin Archive
1. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 10, 1996; Reuter reports, December 10, 1996.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of Mitrokhin’s career is based on his own recollections. Because of concern for his relatives in Russia, he is reluctant to reveal details of his family background. The SVR is still ferociously hostile to KGB defectors, whatever their motives. Most, even if—like Oleg Gordievsky—they betrayed not Russia but the now discredited Soviet one-party state through ideological conviction, remain under sentence of death. Though their relatives no longer face the overt persecution of the Soviet era, many understandably prefer not to have them identified.
3. For personal reasons, Mitrokhin does not wish to make public the location of this foreign posting, where he operated under an alias.
4. On the fall of Beria, see Moskalenko, “Beria’s Arrest”; Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 185-93; Knight, Beria, ch. 9.
5. The FCD Archives, known in 1956 as the Operational Records Department (Otdel Operativnogo Ucheta), were subsequently renamed the Twelfth (later the Fifteenth) Department.
6. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 194.
7. Fleishman, Boris Pasternak, chs. 11,12; Levi, Boris Pasternak, chs. 8, 9.
8. Knight, The KGB, pp. 64-5.
9. k-9,183.
10. Medvedev, Andropov, p. 56.
11. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 434-5, 483-4; Arbatov, The System, p. 266; Dobbs, Down With Big Brother, p. 13.
12. k-25,1.
13. k-1,191. Because of the dissidents’ contacts (both real and imagined) with the West and the expulsion of some of their leaders, FCD archives included material on them from both the Second (internal security) Chief Directorate and the Fifth Directorate, founded by Andropov to specialize in operations by domestic ideological subversion.
14. Mitrokhin later found evidence of similar plans to end the dancing career of another defector from the Kirov Ballet, Natalia Makarova.
15. The approximate size of the FCD archive c. 1970 is given in vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.
16. When FCD Directorate S at the Lubyanka asked to consult one of the files transferred to Yasenevo, Mitrokhin was also responsible for supervising its return.
17. k-16,506.
18. Blake, No Other Choice, p. 265.
19. While working on the notes at the dacha, Mitrokhin kept them hidden at the bottom of a laundry basket, then buried them in the milk-churn before he left. He was not the first to bury a secret archive in a milk-churn. In the Warsaw Ghetto in 1942-3 Emanuel Ringelblum buried three churns, rediscovered after the Second World War, which contained a priceless collection of underground newspapers, reports on resistance networks, and the testimony of Jews who had escaped from the death camps. One of the milk-churns is among the exhibits at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington.
20. Mitrokhin’s archive is in four sections:
(i) k-series: handwritten material filed in large envelopes
(ii) t-series: handwritten notebooks
(iii) volumes: typed material, mostly arranged by country, sometimes with commentary by Mitrokhin
(iv) frag.-series: miscellaneous handwritten notes Endnote references to Mitrokhin’s archive follow this classification.
21. Solzhenitsyn’s letter of complaint to Andropov and Andropov’s mendacious report on it to the Council of Ministers are published in Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 158-60. See also Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf, pp. 322-3, 497-8; Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, pp. 739-43.
22. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, pp. 48-50.
23. Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf, p. 1.
24. Shentalinsky, The KGB’s Literary Archive, pp. 80-1. In 1926 the OGPU had confiscated Bulgakov’s allegedly subversive diary. Though Bulgakov succeeded in getting it back a few years later, he himself subsequently burnt it for fear that it might provide evidence for his arrest. Happily, a copy survives in the KGB archives.
25. “Some aspects of the political and moral-psychological situation among members of the Moscow Theatre of Drama and Comedy on the Taganka.” Report submitted to Andropov in July 1978 (k-25, appendix).
26. Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf, pp. 2-4.
27. See below, chapter 19.
28. The Afghan War will be covered in volume 2.
29. A characteristic example was a plan (document no. 150/S-9195) for agent infiltration into Russian émigré communities to monitor and destabilize dissidents abroad, signed jointly by Kryuchkov and Bobkov (head of the Fifth Directorate), submitted to Andropov on August 19, 1975, and approved by him a few days later; vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6. Kryuchkov now improbably maintains that he “had nothing to do with the struggle against dissent” (Remnick, Resurrection, p. 322).
30. vol. 10, ch. 3, para. 23.
31. vol. 6, app. 2, parts 3, 4; k-2,323; k-5,169.
32. Since he does not wish to reveal some details of his departure from the Soviet Union to the present Russian security service, Mitrokhin is unwilling to identify the Baltic republic in which he contacted SIS.
33. Kessler, The FBI, p. 433. Despite its limitations, the story confirms Kessler’s well-deserved reputation for scoops.
34. Michael Isikoff, “FBI Probing Soviet Spy Effort, Book Says,” Washington Post (August 18, 1993).
35. “Fun and Games with the KGB,” Time (August 30, 1993).
36. The British media also assumed that the KGB defector had gone to the United States. See, for example, “Top US Officials ‘Spied For KGB,’” The Times (August 19, 1993); “KGB Recruited ‘Hundreds’ of American Spies,” Independent (August 19, 1993).
37. The first exposure of Hernu’s alleged role as a Soviet Bloc agent was the article by Jérôme Dupuis and Jean-Marie Pontaut, “Charles Hernu était un agent de l’Est,” L’Express (October 31, 1996).
38. “Le contre-espionnage français est convaincu que Charles Hernu a été un agent de l’Est,” Le Monde (October 31, 1996). For British versions of the Hernu story, see, inter alia, the reports in the Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Independent and The Times on October 31, 1996, and in the Sunday Times and Sunday Telegraph on November 3, 1996.
39. Since Mitrokhin’s notes, though voluminous, are not comprehensive, the absence of any identifiable reference to Hernu is not proof of his innocence, especially as his initial contacts were, allegedly, with Bulgarian and Romanian intelligence. Hernu’s family insist that he is innocent of the charges against him.
40. Focus (December 1996, March 1997). Focus’s report in December 1996 provoked the vigorous SVR denunciation quoted at the beginning of this chapter.
41. Andreas Weber, “Die ‘Grot’ geschluckt: Die Lagepläne zu den KGB-Waffen- und Spreng-stoffdepots in Österreich sind überaus präzise,” Profil (May 26, 1997).
42. t-7,65.
43. See below, chapter 22.
44. Focus (June 15, 1998). Other errors in the Focus story included the claim that the defector had “worked at KGB headquarters until the early 1990s.”
45. Focus (June 15, 1998). Roger Boyes, “Defector Says Willy Brandt was KGB Agent,” The Times (June 16, 1998).
46. ITAR/Tass interview with Yuri Kobaladze, June 19, 1998. Butkov’s memoirs, so far available only in Norwegian, contain much of interest (including KGB documents) on his career in the FCD from 1984 to 1991, but include no reference to Brandt. In 1998, while living in Britain, Butkov was jailed for three years for his involvement in a confidence trick which persuaded companies in Russia and Ukraine to pay 1.5 pounds to enrol employees in a bogus business school in California. “Conman from Suburbia is KGB Defector,” Sunday Times (April 26, 1998).
47. k-26,88.
48. See below, chapter 26.
49. vol. 6, ch. 11, parts 26, 28, 41.
50. Scott Shane and Sandy Banisky, “Lipka Was Wary of FBI’s Spy Trap,” Baltimore Sun (February 25, 1996); William C. Carley, “How the FBI Broke Spy Case that Baffled Agency for 30 Years,” Wall Street Journal (November 21, 1996).
51. Julia C. Martinez, “Accused Spy Admits Guilt,” Philadelphia Inquirer (May 24, 1997).
52. Joseph A. Slobodzian, “18-Year Sentence for Ex-Soviet Spy,” Philadelphia Inquirer (September 25, 1997).
53. The first edition was published in New York by Reader’s Digest Press.
54. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 54.
55. vol. 6, app. 1, part 28.
56. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4.
57. Some of the KGB documents obtained by Gordievsky, all covering the period 1974 to 1985, were later published in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre and More Instructions from the Centre.
58. Unattributable information. Since Mitrokhin had retired six years before the publication of the history by Andrew and Gordievsky, he had no access to KGB files on it.
59. Order of the Chairman of the KGB, no. 107/OV, September 5, 1990.
60. Costello later told Andrew and Gordievsky that he received the first order of KGB material shortly after the press conference to launch their book, at which he made an engagingly boisterous appearance to denounce their identification of John Cairncross as the Fifth Man as a plot by British intelligence. He subsequently changed his mind after seeing material from Cairncross’s KGB file which confirmed that identification.
61. Costello, Ten Days to Destiny.
62. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. vi-vii. Costello’s untimely death in 1996 has been variously attributed by conspiracy theorists to the machinations of British or Russian intelligence. While Costello was somewhat naive in his attitude to the SVR, there is no suggestion that either he or any of the other Western authors (some of them distinguished scholars) of the collaborative histories authorized by the SVR have been Russian agents.
63. The collaborative volumes so far published are, in order of publication: Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions; Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin; Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”; West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels; and Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood. Further publication details are given in the bibliography.
64. Extracts from the Philby file appear in Costello, Ten Days to Destiny; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions; Borovik, The Philby Files; West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels.
65. See below, chapter 9.
66. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 248. The authors rightly describe the SVR’s claim that it has no file on Kopatzky/Orlov as “obviously disingenuous.” The SVR’s selection of documents for the most recent of the collaborative histories (on espionage in the USA in the Stalin era) shows some similar signs of archival amnesia on embarrassing episodes. It claims, for example, that “available records” do not indicate the fate of Vasili Mironov, a senior officer in the New York residency recalled to Moscow in 1944 (Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 275). In reality, his fate is precisely recorded in SVR files. After his recall, Mironov was first sent to labor camp, then shot after attempting to smuggle details of the NKVD massacre of Polish officers to the US embassy in Moscow.
67. See below, chapter 9.
68. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii. The editor, Tatyana Samolis, is spokeswoman for the SVR. One striking example of this volume’s reverential attitude towards the pious myths created by the KGB is its highly sanitized account of the frequently unsavory career of Hero of the Soviet Union Stanislav Alekseyevich Vaupshashov.
69. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki. Three volumes were published between 1995 and 1997. They are based, in part, on formerly classified articles in the KGB in-house journal KGB Sbornik, some of which were noted by Mitrokhin.
70. Though the former head of the SVR, Yevgeni Primakov (who in 1998 became Russian prime minister), was given the honorary title of “editor-in-chief” of Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, his role can scarcely have been much more than nominal. As “literary editor,” Zamoysky is likely to have played a much more significant role. During the 1980s he regularly expounded his belief in a global Masonic-Zionist plot during briefing trips to foreign residencies. Oleg Gordievsky heard him deliver a lecture on this subject during his visit to the London residency in January 1985; Zamoysky was then deputy head of the FCD Directorate of Intelligence Information. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 42.
71. “Freemasons,” Zamoysky claimed, “have always controlled the upper echelons of government in Western countries… Masonry in fact runs, ‘remotely controls’ bourgeois society… The true center of the world Masonic movement is to be found in the most ‘Masonic’ country of all, the United States… Ronald Reagan has been characterized as an ‘outstanding’ Mason.” Zamoysky’s explanation of the Cold War was startling in its simplicity:
The first ever atomic attack on people, the use of atomic weapons for blackmail and the escalation of the arms race were sanctioned by the 33-degree Mason Harry Truman.
The first ever call for the Cold War was sounded by Mason Winston Churchill (with Truman’s blessing).
The onslaught on the economic independence of Western Europe (disguised as the Marshall Plan) was directed by the 33-degree Mason George Marshall.
Truman and West European Freemasons orchestrated the formation of NATO.
Don’t we owe to that cohort the instigation of hostility between the West and the Soviet Union…?
(Behind the Facade of the Masonic Temple, pp. 6-7, 141.)
An important part of the explanation for the survival of some old KGB conspiracy theories into today’s SVR is the continuity of personnel.
72. The third and latest volume of the SVR official history, which ends in 1941, concludes that Soviet foreign intelligence “honorably and unselfishly did its patriotic duty to Motherland and people.” Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, conclusion.
73. That is why the SVR selected as the first subject for a collaborative history between one of its own consultants and a Western historian a biography of Aleksandr Orlov, a senior foreign intelligence officer who, despite being forced to flee to the West from Stalin’s Terror, allegedly kept “faith with Lenin’s revolution” and used his superior intelligence training to take in Western intelligence agencies for many years. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions.
74. See below, ch. 5.
75. See below, chs. 15, 16, 19, 20, 29, 30.
76. See below, ch. 18.
77. On the destruction of KGB files, see Knight, Spies Without Cloaks, p. 194.
Chapter Two From Lenin’s Cheka to Stalin’s OGPU
1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 56-63.
2. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 52-3.
3. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3, n. 2; k-9,218.
4. Leggett, The Cheka, p. 17.
5. k-9,67.
6. Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924, pp. 92-3.
7. k-9,67,204.
8. Tsvigun et al. (eds.), V.I. Lenin i VChK, no. 48.
9. Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty, ch. 1.
10. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 69-75. On the evidence for Lenin’s involvement, see Brook-Shepherd, Iron Maze, p. 103.
11. Brook-Shepherd, Iron Maze, p. 107.
12. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 79.
13. Before his execution, Kannegiser was twice interrogated personally by Dzerzhinsky. Though he had formerly been an active member of the Workers’ Popular Socialist Party, he claimed—perhaps to protect other supporters of the Party—that, “as a matter of principle,” he was not currently a member of any party. Kannegiser said that he had carried out the assassination entirely on his own to avenge those shot on Uritsky’s orders as “enemies of Soviet power.” According to his father, one of those shot had been a friend of Kannegiser. The family maid, Ilinaya, claimed that Kannegiser “was linked with some suspicious people who often came to see him, and that he himself would disappear from his house at night, returning only during the day.” Rozenberg, another witness interrogated by the Cheka, claimed that Kannegiser had told him of his plan to overthrow the Bolshevik regime. Mitrokhin noted, after reading the Cheka interrogation records, that the conflicts in evidence had not been resolved. vol. 10, ch. 4.
14. The record of Kaplan’s interrogation was published in 1923; Pipes, The Russian Revolution, p. 807.
15. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 75-81.
16. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, pp. 48, 54.
17. Though the KGB files examined by Mitrokhin do not record Filippov’s fate after his arrest by the Petrograd Cheka, he was never heard of again. k-9,67,204.
18. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 237.
19. Leggett, The Cheka, p. 417 n. 21. Conquest, The Great Terror, pp. 325-7.
20. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 5. Buikis subsequently wrote two brief memoirs of his early experiences in the Cheka in Rozvadovskaya et al. (eds.), Rytsar Revoliutsii, and Lyalin et al. (eds.), Osoboie Zadanie.
21. See, for example, Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty, ch. 1.
22. For the text of the official document certifying Ulyanov’s “rights to hereditary nobility” (suppressed during the Soviet era), see Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, p. 19.
23. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, pp. 3-5, 138-9.
24. Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 11-12.
25. vol. 1, app. 3. Cf. Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 12-14.
26. Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 77-9. It is possible that Stalin’s determination about changing the day of the month as well as the year of his birth in official records may have reflected the fear that Okhrana records contained some reference which had been overlooked to an agent, otherwise identified only by codename, who had his date of birth.
27. On June 11, 1919 the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party stated: “[ We] have noted Comrade Dzerzhinsky’s announcement concerning the necessity of leaving illegal political workers in the areas occupied by the enemy… It is proposed that: (a) An Illegals Operations Department be created in the organizational office…” (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 1).
28. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1 and n. 1; vol. 7, ch. 1.
29. k-27,305.
30. Leggett, The Cheka, appendix C.
31. There is little doubt that The State and Revolution represented Lenin’s innermost convictions. Had it been otherwise, he would scarcely have chosen to publish it in February 1918, at a time when the Cheka was already in existence and it was only too easy for Lenin’s opponents to point to the contradictions between his words and his deeds. Its publication at such a difficult time was an act of faith that the regime’s difficulties were only temporary and that he would live to see the fulfillment of his revolutionary dream.
32. Report from the Cheka of the town and district of Morshansk in the first issue of the Cheka weekly, dated September 22, 1918 (k-9,212).
33. Mitrokhin noted the following report (k-9,210) of an inspection by Cheka headquarters of Cheka operations in Dmitrov in 1918:
Kurenkov, aged 18, operates as the chairman of the Dmitrov town Cheka of Moscow province. All his colleagues are young people, but young people who are competent, battle-tested and who work with energy.
However, the work of the Cheka was carried out in a primitive manner. Searches were carried out without elected observers and without representatives of housing committees being present. Confiscated food stuffs were not handed over to the food department, and inventories were not drawn up.
34. Melgounov, The Red Terror in Russia. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, pp. 646-9. The files for the period noted by Mitrokhin (mostly on foreign intelligence) make only indirect references to the atrocities of the civil war.
35. Speech by Lenin, December 23, 1921; text in Tsvigun et al., V.I. Lenin i VChK, pp. 534f.
36. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War, p. 424. The Dzerzhinsky Archive is Fond 76 in the All-Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern History in Moscow.
37. Volkogonov, Lenin, p. 239.
38. Tsvigun et al (eds.), V.I. Lenin i VChK, no. 198. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 69.
39. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, pp. 127-9.
40. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1, n. 1.
41. Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, pp. 416-19.
42. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 99-100; Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 142-3; West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 5.
43. Tsvigun et al (eds.), Lenin i VChK, no. 390. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 91-4.
44. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 5.
45. Tsvigun et al. (eds.), V.I. Lenin i VChK, no. 437.
46. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War, pp. 334-56. Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 334-8, 464-6.
47. k-9,87.
48. The first of five foreign intelligence priorities set out in INO instructions of November 28, 1922 was “The exposure on the territory of each state of counter-revolutionary groups who are waging both active and passive activity against the interests of the RSFSR and also against the international revolutionary movement.” vol. 7, ch. 1.
49. Mitrokhin’s handwritten note (k-9,87) makes it difficult to determine whether the date was June 16 or 26. Since Zavarny crossed into Romania on June 15 to negotiate details of Tutyunnik’s return with him, it seems highly unlikely, particularly in view of earlier delays, that this could have taken place as early as June 16. Because CASE 39 was run by the internal departments of the OGPU, the file was kept in the special archival collections of the Second Chief Directorate, to which Mitrokhin did not have access. He was, however, able to note a classified history of the operation which was based on, and quoted, the CASE 39 file.
50. k-9,87. During the 1930s an illegal residency in Germany, headed by I. M. Kaminsky (codenamed MOREZ and MOND), specialized in operations against Ukrainian émigrés (vol. 7, ch. 9, paras. 1-2; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1). The Administration for Special Tasks also carried out the assassination of several leading Ukrainian nationalists (Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, chs. 1, 2).
51. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
52. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 1. Though Mitrokhin read a number of classified studies of the TREST and SINDIKAT operations, he did not have access to the files on them. Since the operations were run by the internal departments of the OGPU, their files—like that for CASE 39—were kept in the special archival collections (spetsfondi) of the Second Chief Directorate.
53. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 111-12. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 33-4.
54. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1. On the previous careers of Syroyezhkin and Fyodorov, see Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 138-40, 147-9.
55. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 112-13.
56. k-4,199.
57. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 35.
58. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 114.
59. The complex use of multiple aliases for the same individual in the 37-volume TREST file, together with the baffling mixture of fact and invention recorded in it, confused a number of the KGB officers and historians who studied it over the years.
60. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 115-17.
61. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 35-41 (based on partial access to the KGB TREST file); and photograph (following p. 258) of Reilly’s corpse on display in the Lubyanka sickbay. Cf. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 2, pp. 121ff. The brief SVR biography of Syroyezhkin identifies him as “especially prominent in the arrests of the subversive White Guard organization of B. Savinkov” and “an active participant in operation TREST during which the British agent S. Reilly was detained and arrested in September 1925.” Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 139.
62. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 118-21; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 40-2.
63. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 1. Italian-Soviet diplomatic relations, broken after the Revolution, were not resumed until 1924, when the first legal residency was founded within the newly established Soviet diplomatic mission. The residency officer credited by KGB files with Constantini’s recruitment was Sheftel, codenamed DOCTOR. Mitrokhin’s notes give no further details on him. In 1997-8 the SVR gave privileged access to selected parts of Constantini’s file to the authors of two histories of Soviet intelligence operations: Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 13; and West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, ch. 5. Primakov et al. do not reveal Constantini’s real name; West and Tsarev mistakenly refer to him as Costantini.
64. KGB files radically revise previous interpretations of leaks from the Rome embassy. A 1937 inquiry conducted by Valentine Vivian, head of SIS counter-intelligence, considered only leakage of classified documents to Italian intelligence. Though it was later discovered that some information had also gone to the OGPU/NKVD, the Foreign Office seems never to have realized that the original penetration was by the OGPU.
65. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 1.
66. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 13.
67. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 94-9. Though Litvinov did not become Commissar for Foreign Affairs until 1930, Izvestia later noted that he had been “de facto head of our foreign policy from 1928.” Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-33, p. 10.
68. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 126. On the Crémet spyring, see Faligot and Kauffer, As-tu vu Crémet?
69. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 126-7.
70. Professor Matsokin was succeeded at a date not recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes by another Japanese specialist, Kim Roman, an ethnic Korean from Nikolsk-Ussuriysk (k-9,73). Neither is mentioned in the account of the Tanaka memorandum episode in Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 2, ch. 32.
71. k-9,73.
72. k-9,119. The official SVR history does not refer to ANO.
73. k-9,73. On the publication of the Tanaka memorandum, see Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, pp. 52-3. The published version of the memorandum has been regarded by some scholars, unaware of the OGPU’s success at this period in intercepting Japanese communications in Harbin and Seoul, as a forgery fabricated by the OGPU. The KGB record of its interception, however, describes it as genuine. It is possible, though Mitrokhin discovered no evidence of this, that the published version was doctored to improve its propaganda value.
74. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 2, p. 257.
75. Article by Stalin of July 23, 1927, in Degras (ed.), Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. 2, pp. 233-5. The article also reflected alarm at the massacres of Chinese Communists by their former allies, the nationalist Kuomintang.
76. vol. 7, ch. 9, item 1. There is interesting detail on the Ilk-Weinstein residency in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, ch. 3. The authors do not, however, appear to have had access to all the files seen by Mitrokhin, and conclude that the residency of Ilk and “Wanshtein” (sic—presumably a literal retransliteration from the Cyrillic) was “extremely effective” and pay tribute to “Ilk’s great organizational skill.” This judgment is somewhat at variance with the authors’ acknowledgement that the quality of the residency’s abundant British intelligence “left much to be desired”; the documents which they cite on Ilk’s attempts to excuse the quality of the intelligence probably deserve a less charitable interpretation. Both Ilk and Weinstein are conspicuous by their absence from the biographies of seventy-five foreign intelligence heroes published by the SVR in 1995 on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Cheka’s foreign department. Since the “Great Illegals” of the inter-war period are included, the SVR evidently accepts that Ilk and Weinstein were not among them.
77. Trotsky, My Life, pp. 539ff; Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 2, pp. 392-4; Volkogonov, Trotsky, pp. 305ff.
78. A “special courier,” whom he refused to identify in his memoirs, delivered an additional eight or nine secret batches of correspondence from Moscow which, he claimed, kept him informed of “everything that was going on” in the capital. Trotsky replied to his Moscow informants by the same secret channel (Trotsky, My Life, p. 556). The KGB archives identify the “special courier” as a member of the carters’ cooperative which transported freight between Alma-Ata and the nearest railway station in Frunze. OGPU surveillance teams reported that the carter would meet Trotsky’s wife or elder son in the Alma-Ata market place, unobtrusively slip into their shopping baskets messages which had arrived at Frunze by the Trans-Siberian Express and collect the replies. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1.
79. Volkogonov, Trotsky, p. 312. Menzhinsky became head of OGPU on Dzerzhinsky’s death in 1927.
80. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1.
81. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, pp. 1-3.
82. k-4,198.
83. Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty, ch. 2. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 170. In this instance, the published KGB version of events (summarized by Ostryakov) agrees with its archival record (vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1). Volkogonov suggests that Blyumkin “was guilty of nothing more than having visited Trotsky” (Trotsky, p. 329), but overlooks the fact that Trotsky himself later acknowledged that Blyumkin was “trying to establish a connection between Trotsky and his co-thinkers in the USSR.” Article signed “G. Gourov” [Trotsky] in La Voix Communiste, October 30, 1932; Vereeken, The GPU in the Trotskyist Movement, p. 13.
84. There is a sanitized version of Gorskaya’s career in Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 53-5.
85. Agabekov, OGPU, pp. 202-3, 207-8, 219-21, 238-40. Poretsky, Our Own People, pp. 146-7. Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes, pp. 200-3. There are minor discrepancies between these memoirs, based on the authors’ varying personal knowledge of the affair. All agree, however, on Blyumkin’s meeting with Trotsky, Gorskaya’s involvement and Blyumkin’s execution. The records noted by Mitrokhin contain no details of Blyumkin’s recall to Moscow or of his interrogation; they mention only Blyumkin’s attempt to set up “a line of communication for Trotsky with the Trotskyites in Moscow” and his subsequent execution. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1.
86. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 165-6.
87. k-4,198,206.
88. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 32, 58. On its foundation in 1926, the Administration for Special Tasks had been intended chiefly to prepare for and execute sabotage operations behind enemy lines in time of war. On post-war “special tasks,” see chapters 22-3.
89. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 439, n. 37.
90. k-4,198,206; the Kutepov operation is referred to in these files as “the liquidation of G.”
91. k-4,199.
92. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 166-8.
Chapter Three The Great Illegals
1. vol. 7, ch. 9.
2. vol. 6, ch. 12.
3. In 1930 there was no legal residency in the United States and only one illegal residency, staffed by four OGPU officers and four illegal agents. Much of the Centre’s interest in the USA at this stage lay in the possibilities for operations against Germany and Japan offered by its large communities of expatriate Germans and Japanese. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1.
4. vol. 7, ch. 9. The aim in 1930, never completely fulfilled, was to establish several illegal residencies in every major target country. By contrast, no country in the 1930s contained more than one legal residency.
5. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 4.
6. vol. 7, ch. 9.
7. The most recent and best-documented biography of Sorge is Whymant, Stalin’s Spy. Though a Fourth Department (later GRU) illegal, Sorge was still being cited by the KGB in talks with Western Communist leaders during the 1970s as representing the kind of illegal it wished to recruit.
8. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 46-50. See the forthcoming study of Tsarist diplomacy by Barbara Emerson, the first historian to gain full access to the dossiers secrets of decrypts in the archives of the Tsarist foreign ministry.
9. See above, chapter 2.
10. As with many other inter-war operations, the record of Bystroletov’s foreign intelligence missions is incomplete. The main documents seen by Mitrokhin were a post-war memoir written by Bystroletov, some contemporary correspondence on his operations exchanged between the Center and residencies, and the 26-volume file on one of his leading agents, Ernest Holloway Oldham (ARNO). Though Bystroletov’s memoir is colorfully written, some—but not all—of the main events recorded in it can be corroborated from other sources. The SVR has given partial access to its records on Bystroletov for the writing of two books co-authored by the former KGB officer Oleg Tsarev (now an SVR consultant) and Western historians: Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions; and West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels.
11. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 19-21. The account of Bystroletov’s career in the 1997 SVR official history also omits much that is of importance about it, including the identities of his main British agents. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, ch. 22.
12. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 16. The file noted by Mitrokhin identifies LAROCHE, in Cyrillic transliteration, as Eliana Aucouturier, born 1898. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, says simply that Bystroletov “successfully cultivated a secretary at the French embassy who had access to secret correspondence and ciphers of the French foreign ministry” (p. 19), but does not give the secretary’s name or codename, or refer to her seduction.
13. vol. 7, ch. 9.
14. The accounts of Bystroletov’s career published by the SVR in 1995 and 1997, as well as the material supplied by the SVR for two books co-authored by the former KGB officer Oleg Tsarev and Western historians, do not mention that Bystroletov was not an OGPU/NKVD officer. Mitrokhin discovered, on examining Bystroletov’s records, that he was simply an agent (vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 38). Even when fully rehabilitated in 1956, after spending sixteen years in prison from 1938 to 1954 as an innocent victim of the Stalinist terror, Bystroletov was denied a KGB pension on the grounds that he had never held officer rank. Since the SVR now portrays him as one of the main pre-war heroes of Soviet foreign intelligence, it is evidently embarrassed to admit his lowly status.
15. Though based in Berlin, Bazarov’s residency operated against a number of countries, including—from 1929—Britain. Other illegals in the residency included Teodor Maly and D. A. Poslendy, vol. 7, ch. 1.
16. vol. 7, ch. 9, paras. 24-30. De Ry later also came to the attention of the French Deuxième Bureau as “un trafiquant de codes” with access to Italian ciphers (Paillole, Notre espion chez Hitler, p. 223).
17. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 26. Though not present at this first encounter with ROSSI, Bystroletov was given details of it by the Paris residency in order to help track him down.
18. In Bystroletov’s account (vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 26), the official who spoke to the walk-in at the Paris embassy is identified only as “a senior comrade.” Other fragmentary accounts of the same episode indicate that the comrade was Vladimir Voynovich, aka Yanovich and Volovich: Bessedovsky, Revelations of a Soviet Diplomat, pp. 247-8; Corson and Crowley, The New KGB, pp. 433-5; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 198.
19. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 27. The photographer of the ciphers was identified as Voynovich’s wife by the defector Grigori Besedovsky, then a senior diplomat in the Soviet embassy. Bessedovsky, Revelations, p. 247.
20. vol. 7, ch. 9. Corson and Crowley, The New KGB, pp. 140ff confuses the de Ry and Oldham cases, and claims that Oldham too was successfully defrauded. The authors, who had no access to KGB files, do not identify de Ry by name or codename and refer to Oldham as “Scott.” Andrew and Gordievsky, (KGB, pp. 195-6) identify Oldham but follow Corson and Crowley in suggesting that he was defrauded by Voynovich. Surprisingly, Costello and Tsarev, despite their access to KGB documents, make no mention of de Ry and claim inaccurately in their paragraph on Oldham that he “was thrown out on his ear” by Voynovich, who “evidently suspected a British provocation plot” (Deadly Illusions, p. 198).
21. Besedovsky’s memoirs, Na Putiakh k Termidoru, were published in Russian, French and German in 1930; an abridged English translation (in which the author’s name is transliterated as “Bessedovslay”) appeared in 1931. His insulting references to Stalin make the hypothesis that he was a bogus defector planted on the West untenable. There is, however, some indication that in the course of a sometimes bizarre life in exile, Besedovsky did co-operate to some degree with Soviet intelligence after the Second World War.
22. vol. 7, ch. 9.
23. The corrupt Italian diplomat was successively codenamed PATRON, CARTRIDGE and PATTERN by Soviet intelligence; vol. 7, ch. 9.
24. vol. 7, ch. 9.
25. vol. 7, ch. 9.
26. The only real post with which the non-existent position of head of intelligence at the Foreign Office might conceivably have been confused was that of head of political intelligence in SIS and liaison officer with the Foreign Office. The holder of that post from 1921 to early in the Second World War, however, was Major Malcolm Woollcombe.
27. vol. 7, ch. 9.
28. Mitrokhin found no note in the file querying the story.
29. vol. 7, ch. 9.
30. vol. 7, ch. 9, paras. 30-1. French intelligence records provide corroboration of both Lemoine’s friendship with de Ry and their common interest in obtaining foreign diplomatic ciphers; Paillole, Notre espion chez Hitler, p. 223.
31. On Lemoine’s career with the Deuxième Bureau and recruitment of Schmidt, see Paillole, Notre espion chez Hitler, p. 223.
32. French cryptanalysts were unable to exploit the intelligence on Enigma provided by Schmidt. The first steps in the breaking of Enigma were made by Polish military cryptanalysts with whom the Deuxième Bureau shared Schmidt’s cipher material. The results achieved by the Poles were passed on to the British on the eve of the Second World War, Garlinski, Intercept, chs. 2, 3; Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 628-32.
33. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 30. Neither Lemoine’s name nor his codename, JOSEPH, appears in Bystroletov’s 1995 SVR hagiography, which, however, confirms that “In the period between 1930 and 1936, whilst working with another agent, Bystroletov… established operational contact with a member of French military intelligence. He received from him Austrian cipher material and later Italian and Turkish cipher material and even secret documents from Hitler’s Germany.” (Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 20.) It is clear from this censored account that Bystroletov’s fellow illegal Ignace Reiss (alias Ignace Poretsky), with whom he shared the running of JOSEPH, remains an unperson in SVR historiography because of his later defection; he is referred to only as “another agent.” There is no mention of JOSEPH in the account of Bystroletov’s career in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels.
34. The file noted by Mitrokhin identifies OREL only as Lemoine’s boss in the Deuxième Bureau; the Center may not have known his real identity (vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 30). Reiss was known to Lemoine and Bertrand as “Walter Scott.” A Deuxième Bureau photograph, almost certainly taken without Reiss’s knowledge, shows him at a meeting with Lemoine and Bertrand at Rotterdam in 1935 (Paillole, Notre espion chez Hitler, illustration facing p. 161).
35. vol. 7, ch. 9.
36. Paillole, Notre espion chez Hitler, p. 132. Which side provided what is generally unclear. Mitrokhin’s notes, however, record that OREL (Bertrand) handed Reiss a new Italian cipher in November 1933.
37. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 18. The decision to award Bystroletov his inscribed rifle is recorded in KGB files as order no. 1042 of September 17, 1932.
38. The date of Oldham’s resignation is given in his “Statement of Services” in the 1933 Foreign Office List.
39. vol. 7, ch. 9.
40. vol. 7, ch. 11, para. 56.
41. vol. 7, ch. 9.
42. Foreign Office List, 1934. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 196.
43. vol. 7, ch. 9.
44. See below, chapter 3.
45. vol. 7, ch. 9.
46. Foreign Office List, 1934. Oake’s “Statement of Services” underlined his humble position. Whereas such statements for established staff gave full name, date of birth and a career summary, those for “temporary clerks” such as Oake gave only surname, initials and date of entry into the Foreign Office.
47. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 20.
48. Foreign Office List, 1934.
49. Cornelissen, De GPOe op de Overtoom, pp. 156-7.
50. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 22. King may or may not have believed Pieck’s story that the money he received for his documents came from a Dutch banker anxious for inside information on international relations; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 197.
51. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 94.
52. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 1; k-4,200.
53. Agabekov, OGPU, pp. 151-2, 204, 237-40.
54. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 1; k-4,200. Akselrod had previously used an Austrian passport in the name of “Friedrich Keil” (Agabekov, OGPU, pp. 240-2) and may well have used the same false identity in Italy. Significantly, the SVR version of Akselrod’s early career omits all mention of his membership of Poale Zion. The KGB tradition that Soviet intelligence heroes were untainted by Zionism appears to be preserved by SVR historians. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 158-9.
55. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 13. The original text of the Foreign Office records of the talks with Hitler, Litvinov, Beck, Benes and Mussolini are published in Medlicott et al. (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 12, pp. 703-46, 771-91, 803-10, 812-17; vol. 13, pp. 477-84; vol. 14, pp. 329-33. The version of the record of Simon’s and Eden’s talks with Hitler given to Stalin consisted of translated extracts rather than the full Foreign Office document. The same probably applies to the records given to Stalin of Eden’s talks with Litvinov, Beck, Benes and Mussolini, which are not yet accessible.
56. Constantini may well not have been the only source for the document. The Foreign Office record of Simon’s and Eden’s talks with Hitler, also in March 1935, was provided by both King and Constantini.
57. Eden’s meeting with Stalin took place in the Kremlin on March 30, 1935, following his talks with Litvinov during the previous two days. His telegram on the talks to the Foreign Office records that a copy was sent to the Rome embassy. Medlicott et al. (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 12, pp. 766-9.
58. Medlicott et al. (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 12, p. 820.
59. On Eden’s policy on the Soviet Union and collective security, see Carlton, Anthony Eden, p. 63.
60. See below, chapter 3.
61. The report by a committee headed by Sir John Maffey concluded that British interests in and around Ethiopia were not sufficient to justify opposition to Italian conquest. Mussolini’s decision to publish it in February 1936, at a time when the British government was considering oil sanctions against Italy, caused predictable embarrassment in the Foreign Office. Dilks, “Flashes of Intelligence,” pp. 107-8. Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 567-8. There is no mention of the Italian publication of the Maffey report in the two accounts of Constantini’s career based on authorized access to selected material from his file: West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, ch. 5; Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 13.
62. According to Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, Francesco Constantini lost his job at the British embassy in 1936 (vol. 7, ch. 14, item 1). The current SVR version of his career claims that Constantini was sacked in 1931. (West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, ch. 5; Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 13.) In Mitrokhin’s notes Constantini’s codename appears as DUDLEN—probably an error of transcription for DUDLEY.
63. Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 568-9.
64. [Valentine Vivian], “Report on Measures to Enhance the Security of Documents, etc., in H. M. Embassy, Rome (February 20, 1937), PRO FO 850/2 Y775. This report, though not its authorship, was first revealed in Dilks, “Flashes of Intelligence,” pp. 107ff. On Vivian’s investigation in Rome and his authorship of this report, see Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 568-71, 771 n. 102.
65. Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 571-2.
66. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Lord Gladwyn (who, as Gladwyn Jebb, had served at the Rome embassy in the years up to the Ethiopian war), broadcast on Timewatch, BBC2 (July 10, 1984).
67. Andrew, Secret Service, p. 572.
68. The exact nature of the Centre’s confused suspicions about Francesco Constantini at the height of the Great Terror in 1937 are unclear. Mitrokhin’s one-sentence summary of the suspicions recorded in DUNCAN’s file reads as follows: “He was in contact with the OVRA [Italian intelligence], was engaged in extortion, and the documents were probably supplied by the Special [intelligence] Services” (vol. 7, ch. 14, item 1. Cf. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, ch. 5; Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 13).
69. “Mrs. Petrov’s Statement Concerning Her Past Intelligence Work” (May 15, 1954), CRS A6283/XR1/14, Petrov papers, Australian Archives, Canberra.
70. As chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, Boky reported on October 15, 1918 that 800 individuals had been shot and 6,229 arrested. k-9,218.
71. Petrovs, Empire of Fear, pp. 129-31.
72. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 13.
73. An official Soviet collection of intelligence documents for the period 1938 to 1941 includes a limited and far from comprehensive selection of (mainly German, Italian, Japanese and Turkish) intercepts; Stepashin et al. (eds.), Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine: Sbornik Dokumentov, vols. 1 and 2.
74. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 237-42.
75. British interwar codebreakers were able to break all French diplomatic ciphers until 1935 (Andrew, Secret Service, p. 375). Given the classified French diplomatic cipher material supplied to Bystroletov by LAROCHE, it is barely conceivable that Boky’s unit was entirely defeated by French diplomatic traffic.
76. Degras (ed.), Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. 3, p. 224. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 194-5. Though unusual, such public allusions to codebreaking were not unknown between the wars. In the 1920s, two British foreign secretaries and several other ministers had referred publicly to British success in breaking Soviet codes. Andrew, Secret Service, chs. 9, 10.
77. Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 471, 573.
78. Orlov, A Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, p. 10. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p.
90. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 66.
79. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 6, 161, 245.
80. The Foreign Office record of the meeting, held on March 25-6, 1935, is printed in Medlicott et al. (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 12, pp. 703-45. In the course of the meeting Hitler suggested an Anglo-German naval agreement with a 100:35 ratio in favor of the Royal Navy. This formed the basis of an agreement concluded in London on June 18, 1935.
81. The abbreviated Russian translation of the Foreign Office record of the talks is published as an appendix to Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 461-7. An editorial note (appendix, n. 111) asserts that, by his statement on Austria, Simon “opened the path to the Anschluss.”
82. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 6.
83. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 155.
Chapter Four The Magnificent Five
1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 214. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 19.
2. “Nationale für ordentliche Hörer der philosophischen Fakultät”: entries for Arnold Deutsch, 1923-7; “Rigorosenakt des Arnold Deutsch,” 1928, no. 9929, with cv by Deutsch; records of Deutsch’s 1928 PhD examination. Archives of University of Vienna.
3. vol. 7, chs. 9, 10.
4. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 214-15.
5. Sharaf, Fury on Earth.
6. Wilhelm Reich, Sexualerregung und Sexualbefriedigung, the first publication in the series Schriften der Sozialistischen Gesellschaft für Sexualberatung und Sexualforschung in Wien, carries the note “Copyright 1929 by Münster-Verlag (Dr. Arnold Deutsch), Wien II.” When he later wrote a classified memoir for NKVD files, Deutsch seems to have considered it imprudent to mention his previous close association with the sex-pol movement and Reich, who by then was engaged in a somewhat bizarre program of research on human sexual behavior. There is no mention of Reich either in Mitrokhin’s notes on the Deutsch file or in the two works by authors given some access to it by the SVR: Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, and West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. The 1997 SVR official history also makes no mention of Deutsch’s involvement with Reich or the sex-pol movement in its hagiographic chapter on him; Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 1.
7. Viennese police reports on Deutsch of March 25 and April 27, 1934, ref. Z1.38.Z.g.p./34, Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes, Vienna.
8. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 10; ch. 10, para. 1. The illegal resident under whom Deutsch served in France was Fyodor Yakovlevich Karin, codenamed JACK.
9. Deutsch’s address and profession as “university lecturer” are given on the birth certificate of his daughter, Ninette Elizabeth, born on May 21, 1936. Further information from residents of Lawn Road Flats.
10. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 10. London University Archives contain no record of Deutsch as either research student or lecturer, probably because he was involved only on a part-time basis.
11. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 214-15. vol. 7, ch. 9.
12. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 24.
13. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 1. The files noted by Mitrokhin make clear that Deutsch was the first to devise this recruitment strategy.
14. A similar stroke of chance explains why Cambridge produced more British codebreakers than Oxford in both world wars. The Director of Naval Education in 1914, Sir Alfred Ewing, was a former professor of engineering at Cambridge. He recruited three Fellows of his former college, King’s, who themselves became recruiters a quarter of a century later. In the Second World War, one third of the King’s fellowship served in the wartime SIGINT agency at Bletchley Park—a far higher proportion than those recruited from any other Oxbridge college.
15. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 2. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 209-13. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 125-30.
16. Page, Leitch and Knightley, Philby, ch. 5; Knightley, Philby, ch. 3.
17. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 11; ch. 10, para. 2. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, fail to identify EDITH as an agent recruited by Deutsch.
18. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 11. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 133-7.
19. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 136.
20. vol. 7, ch. 10.
21. The text of the report on Deutsch’s first meeting with Philby, sent to the Center by the London illegal resident, Ignati Reif, is published in Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 38-40. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 137.
22. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 29.
23. The exception was Philby, whose lack of attention to his studies earned him a third in part I of the Historical Tripos, followed by an upper second in part II Economics. Burgess gained a first in part I History but was ill during part II and awarded an aegrotat (the unclassed honors awarded to those unable to sit their examinations for medical reasons).
24. Cairncross, When Polygamy was Made a Sin.
25. Cairncross quotes Greene’s letter to him in a postscript to his book La Fontaine Fables and Other Poems.
26. vol. 7, ch. 9 confirms the names of the illegal residents identified (with photographs) in Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions.
27. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 132 and passim.
28. This claim appears in Orlov’s file; vol. 5, ch. 7. In reality, Orlov did not meet Philby until Deutsch introduced him in Paris in 1937, a few months before Orlov’s defection; West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 110.
29. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, ch. 15. Though containing valuable material from KGB archives on the recruitment of British agents in the 1930s, this SVR-sponsored volume not merely inflates Orlov’s importance but is also misleading in some other respects. It omits James Klugmann (agent MER) from the list of early Cambridge recruits, and even implies that he was not recruited because of his open Party membership. It also wrongly identifies the agent who provided the first intelligence on the plan to build an atomic bomb in 1941 as Maclean rather than Cairncross. (Since Cairncross, alone of the Five, was still alive at the time of publication in 1993, the intention may have been to limit the material on him to aspects of his career already admitted by him. The SVR now acknowledges that the atomic intelligence supplied by the London residency in 1941 came from Cairncross, not Maclean.) Among other examples of misleading mystification is the claim that agent ABO was a Cambridge contemporary of the “Magnificent Five,” who had never been identified as a Soviet spy. In reality, ABO was Peter Smollett, who graduated from Vienna, not Cambridge, University; his career as a Soviet agent had already been discussed in Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 334-9.
30. This is acknowledged, though somewhat lost sight of, in Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions. In a number of respects the detailed evidence advanced by this volume is at odds with its overstatement of Orlov’s importance by comparison with Deutsch. The 1997 SVR official history upgrades Deutsch’s role to that of “the man who started the ‘Cambridge Five’”; Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 1. Cf. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 103ff.
31. West and Tsarev (The Crown Jewels, pp. 103ff) give greater emphasis to Deutsch’s role by companion with Orlov’s than Costello and Tsarev, Dangerous Illusions. Their analysis, however, does not take account of the published material on Deutsch derived from the Vienna University Archives, the Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes, the work of Wilhelm Reich published by Deutsch and the information obtained by Oleg Gordievsky during his career in the KGB (see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, ch. 5).
There is a considerable overlap between the KGB documents on Deutsch noted by Mitrokhin and those cited in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. Each set of documents, however, contains material missing from the other. West and Tsarev do not, for example, appear to have seen Deutsch’s important memorandum on the recruitment of student Communists. However, Mitrokhin did not note the interesting documents on Deutsch following his recall to Moscow late in 1937 which are cited by West and Tsarev.
32. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 8.
33. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 223-6.
34. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 186-8.
35. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 206-8.
36. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 224.
37. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 225.
38. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 216-19.
39. In this, as in other instances in this chapter, Mitrokhin’s notes confirm the codename given by Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions.
40. vol. 7, ch. 10.
41. Boyle, The Climate of Treason, p. 114.
42. Rees, A Chapter of Accidents, pp. 122-3; Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 94-5, 142.
43. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 144-5, 159.
44. vol. 7, ch. 10, paras. 8, 9.
45. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6. The only foreigners to achieve officer rank were some central European interwar illegals, such as Deutsch, who were used as agent controllers and recruiters.
46. Philby, My Silent War, p. 13. Emphasis added.
47. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 24.
48. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., para. 2. On the misleading references to Klugmann in Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, see above, note 29.
49. Blunt, “From Bloomsbury to Marxism.”
50. Boyle, The Climate of Treason, p. 72.
51. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., para. 2.
52. The first reference to Klugmann’s recruitment based on material made available by the SVR is in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 206, 294.
53. See below, chapter 17.
54. Deutsch, who was a decade younger than both Orlov and Maly and had joined the OGPU only in 1932, was evidently considered too junior for the post of resident.
55. Though some of his agents believed Maly had been a Catholic priest, his operational file shows that he had only deacon’s orders when he volunteered for the army. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 113-14.
56. Poretsky, Our Own People, pp. 214-15; Cornelissen, De GPOe op de Overtoom, ch. 11.
57. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 211-13, 229-30. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 199ff.
58. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 3.
59. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 6.
60. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 101-3, 120-1. The NKVD officer who met Straight did not identify himself, but Straight’s description of him as stocky and dark-haired identifies him as Deutsch rather than the tall Maly, whose height earned him the nickname “der Lange.”
61. Details of Cairncross’s academic career are in the archives of Glasgow University, Trinity College, Cambridge, and Cambridge University.
62. Trinity Magazine, Easter Term 1935 and Easter Term 1936.
63. Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, p. 42.
64. Colville, The Fringes of Power, p. 30 n.
65. vol. 7, ch. 10, item 1.
66. vol. 7, ch. 10, item 23.
67. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 214. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 207.
68. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 23.
69. Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, pp. 61-2. Cairncross’s account of the sequence of his initiation into the NKVD in successive meetings with Burgess, Klugmann and Deutsch agrees with KGB records both as noted by Mitrokhin and in the documents cited in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. The Enigma Spy is, none the less, a textbook case of psychological denial. At almost every stage of his career as a Soviet agent (save for a heroic year at Bletchley Park in 1942-3, when he claims that the intelligence he provided on the eastern front was instrumental in “changing the course of World War Two”), Cairncross seeks to diminish or deny the significance of his role. His version of his career as a Soviet agent, save for the year at Bletchley Park, is comprehensively contradicted by the evidence of the KGB files.
70. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 208.
71. Minute by Cairncross, March 23, 1937, PRO FO371/21287 W7016. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 230-1.
72. There are very few references to such documents either in Mitrokhin’s notes or in the material from KGB archives made available by the SVR for West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels.
73. Though there is no positive evidence that this document was provided by Cairncross or Maclean, other sources can be excluded. The Center had recently broken contact with the two other agents who provided it with Foreign Office documents, Francesco Constantini and Captain John King. Since Halifax’s record of his meeting with Hitler was not apparently sent as a telegram, the NKVD copy of it cannot have been obtained by SIGINT. The text of Halifax’s record, together with details of its despatch to the Foreign Office, is published in Medlicott et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 19, pp. 540-8.
74. Roberts, “The Holy Fox,” p. 70.
75. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 6, 162.
76. Medlicott et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 19, pp. 540-8; Roberts, “The Holy Fox,” pp. 70-5; Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, pp. 98-100.
77. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 216, 232-3.
78. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 233. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 80.
79. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 4.
80. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 90-2.
81. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 234.
Chapter Five Terror
1. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901-1941, p. 259.
2. For the text of the “Ryutin platform,” see Izvestia (1989), no. 6; Ogonek (1989), no. 15.
3. Volkogonov, Stalin, p. 212.
4. k-4,198.
5. Volkogonov, Trotsky, p. 343.
6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, ch. 4.
7. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 171-2; Volkogonov, Trotsky, pp. 334-6. Remarkably, a 1997 SVR official history makes a partial attempt to justify the anti-Trotskyist witch-hunt:
[Trotskyist] criticism, though apparently aimed at Stalin personally, was essentially defamatory of everything Soviet. Largely thanks to the Trotskyists, a phenomenon developed abroad which became known as anti-Sovietism, which for many years hurt the USSR’s domestic and foreign policy pursued at that time, as well as the international workers’ and communists’ movement… The Trotskyists were a fruitful agent base for the [Western] intelligence services.
Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 90.
8. k-4,198,206. Doriot’s emotionally charged oratory caused him to perspire so profusely that after every major speech he was forced to change not merely his shirt but his suit as well. Brunet, Jacques Doriot, pp. 208-9.
9. k-4,198,206. A recent biography of Eugen Fried, the secret Comintern representative in the leadership of the French Communist Party, reveals that Comintern instructions were that the campaign against Doriot should go through three phases: “maneuverer, isoler, liquider.” Without access to KGB files, the authors assume—reasonably but wrongly—that only “political,” rather than “physical,” assassination was intended. Kriegel and Courtois, Eugen Fried, p. 228.
10. On Doriot’s break with the Communist Party and move to fascism, see Brunet, Jacques Doriot, chs. 9-12; Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, chs. 5, 9.
11. k-4,198,206.
12. There are a number of examples in the VENONA decrypts of the use of the KHORKI (“Polecat”) codename for the Trotskyists.
13. k-4,206. The codename of the task force appears in vol. 7, app. 3, n. 15.
14. k-4,206.
15. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, pp. 348-9.
16. vol. 7, appendix 3, n. 15.
17. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, p. 349.
18. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, pp. 125-6.
19. Minute by R. A. Sykes, October 23, 1952, PRO FO 371/100826 NS 1023/29/G.
20. vol. 6, ch. 12.
21. Among the growing number of studies of the Terror, the classic account remains that by Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment. There is, however, vigorous controversy over the numbers of the Terror’s victims. In 1995 Colonel Grashoven, head of the Russian security ministry rehabilitation team, estimated that in the period 1935-45 18 million were arrested and 7 million shot. Olga Shatunovskaya, a member of Khrushchev’s rehabilitation commission, gave the figure of those “repressed” (imprisoned or shot) from 1935 to 1941 as 19.8 million (a statistic also found in the papers of Anastas Mikoyan). Dmitri Volkogonov arrived at a total of 21.5 million (of whom a third were shot) for the period 1929-53. Conquest’s own revised estimates are of a similar order of magnitude (Conquest, “Playing Down the Gulag,” p. 8). Recent studies based on incomplete official records suggest considerably lower, but still large figures. Stephen Wheatcroft, one of the leading analysts of the official figures, believes it “unlikely that there were more than a million executions between 1921 and 1953. The labor camps and colonies never accounted for more than 2.5 million prisoners.” What is striking even in the official records is the enormous rise in executions during the Great Terror: 353,074 in 1937 and 328,618 in 1938, as compared with a total of under 10,000 for the five year period 1932-6 (Wheatcroft, “The Scale and Nature of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930-45”). Controversy over the level of incompleteness in the official records (which do not, of course, include deaths in the camps or the millions who died from famine) will doubtless continue.
22. vol. 6, ch. 12.
23. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 149-61.
24. Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 371.
25. vol. 6, ch. 12.
26. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 281.
27. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 1; vol. 7, app. 3, n. 15.
28. On Wollweber, see Flocken and Scholz, Ernst Wollweber.
29. k-4,206.
30. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 267.
31. See below, chapter 5.
32. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, chs. 10, 11.
33. vol. 5, ch. 7. All these episodes are conspicuous by their absence from the official SVR hagiography: Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 21-4.
34. Castelo’s personal file, archive no. 68312, registration no. 66160, once in the files of the FCD Fifteenth Department of the First Chief Directorate was transferred to the Eighth Department of FCD Directorate S. vol. 5, ch. 7.
35. After the defection of Orlov in July 1938, Eitingon succeeded him as resident.
36. vol. 5, ch. 7.
37. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
38. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 177-8.
39. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
40. k-4,198.
41. There is, however, one later reference to him being “killed”; vol. 6, ch. 12.
42. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 179-80. Volkogonov, Trotsky, pp. 359-60. Costello and Tsarev, Dangerous Illusions, pp. 282-4.
43. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, pp. 405-10. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 319-21.
44. vol. 6, ch. 12.
45. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, pp. 407-8, 419-20. Sylvia Ageloff later described how, at an apparently “accidental meeting,” the “handsome and dashing” Mercader, posing as a Belgian journalist, had “swept her off her feet with his charm, gallantry and generosity.” Hook, Out of Step, p. 242.
46. k-4,198,206.
47. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2, n. 4.
48. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2, n. 4. Albam’s file does not record his wife’s arrest, so her denunciation of him may have saved her. Acquaintance with Albam was also among the evidence which led to the arrest of the military intelligence officers who had recruited him some years earlier: S. P. Uritsky and Aleksandr Karin. At the time of their arrest in 1937 they were, respectively, head and assistant head of military intelligence. Both were shot.
49. k-9,75.
50. k-9,76.
51. k-9,83. Bukharin was tried and sentenced to death in the last of the great show trials in February 1938.
52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1.
53. Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crime, pp. 235-7. Though he had only deacon’s orders when he gave up the monastic life, Maly was regarded within the NKVD as a former priest.
54. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 1. Cf. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 166.
55. Information from the son of the late Oscar Deutsch, David Deutsch, who recalls meeting Arnold Deutsch at sabbath dinners in Birmingham.
56. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
57. The two most detailed accounts of the assassination of Poretsky, which disagree on some points of detail, are: Poretsky, Our Own People, pp. 1-3, chs. 9, 10; Krivitsky, I was Stalin’s Agent, ch. 8.
58. vol. 7, ch. 9.
59. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 22.
60. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 233.
61. Rees, A Chapter of Accidents, pp. 110-11.
62. Rees, Looking for Mr. Nobody, pp. 87-90.
63. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 7.
64. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 245. Blunt had left Cambridge for the Warburg Institute in London, but returned for meetings of the Apostles and other occasions.
65. The files noted by Mitrokhin suggest that the intelligence supplied by Rees was of slender importance—items such as information on the correspondence of the Czech newspaper editor Hubert Ripka (later a member of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London) and the unsurprising news that the former British secret agent Sir Paul Dukes was still in touch with SIS. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 7.
66. Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crime, pp. 237-8. An alternative version has it that Slutsky was smothered in his office; vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 37. The pretense was maintained that he had died from natural causes in order not to alarm other enemies of the people being recalled from foreign postings to retribution in Moscow.
67. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 156.
68. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 37.
69. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 17.
70. Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 417.
71. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 36.
72. Dates of dismissal and arrest from KGB file cited by Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 459, n. 63.
73. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 36.
74. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 37.
75. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 207. Mitrokhin’s notes mention SAM but do not record the month of his arrival in London.
76. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 2.
77. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 208-10.
78. Foreign Office to Sir Eric Phipps (March 11, 1938), Phipps papers PHPP 2/21, Churchill College Archives Center, Cambridge.
79. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 209. Cairncross claimed in his memoirs (The Enigma Spy, p. 69) that, after Deutsch’s recall to Moscow, he “provided no further data until after the Germans invaded Russia”—one of numerous falsehoods comprehensively demolished by his KGB file which Cairncross must have supposed would never be revealed.
80. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 79-80.
81. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 23.
82. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 23. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 210.
83. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 15. ADA remained in Paris until Maclean departed with the rest of the British embassy in the summer of 1940, just before the arrival of the victorious German army.
84. vol. 7, ch. 10, paras. 15, 20. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 216-17.
85. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 301-2. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 239-40. Cf. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 8.
86. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 16.
87. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 135.
88. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 15.
89. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 131.
90. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 132-3.
91. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 8. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 241-2.
92. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 9. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 242.
93. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 4. On Smollett’s wartime career, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 334-7.
94. Rees, Looking for Mr. Nobody, pp. 273-7.
95. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 7.
96. Rees, A Chapter of Accidents, p. 191.
97. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 140-1.
98. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 16.
99. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 149.
100. Mitrokhin notes that “In 1940, when there was no contact with Burgess, he handed over material for the CPGB through MARY [Litzi Philby] and EDITH [Tudor Hart]”; vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 4. He appears to have had little success. During a visit to the United States in the summer of 1940 he sought Straight’s help in re-establishing contact, telling him, “I’ve been out of touch with our friends for several months” (Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 142-3).
101. Sudoplatos, Special Tasks, pp. 58-9. Though sentenced to death, Serebryanksy escaped execution. He was reinstated by the NKVD after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and given the job of recruiting German POWs. He was re-arrested in 1953 as an alleged co-conspirator with Beria and died in prison in 1956.
102. Sudoplatos, Special Tasks, pp. 21-8, 68. Sudoplatov himself narrowly escaped arrest in the winter of 1938-9. His formal appointment as head of the Administration of Special Tasks occurred only in 1941. On the complicated administrative history of “special tasks” during the Second World War, see Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 126-9.
103. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 65-9. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 181-3. The somewhat confused account of the assassination in Volkogonov, Trotsky, bizarrely suggests “the possibility that the American special services were following, and perhaps in some sense influencing, events” (p. 454). On the gaps in the KGB files on operation UTKA, see Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 8.
104. Levine, The Mind of an Assassin, p. 221. Though acknowledging Eitingon’s “deserved reputation as a man of many affairs with women,” Sudoplatov argues unconvincingly that his “close” relationship with Caridad Mercader did not involve sex, since this would have been a breach of regulations; Special Tasks, p. 70, n. 2.
105. On the codenames of Caridad and Ramón Mercader, see Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, ch. 8. After his arrest, Ramón’s codename was changed to GNOM; there are a number of references to him under this codename in the VENONA decrypts.
106. Levine, The Mind of an Assassin, chs. 1-4. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, ch. 4.
107. k-2,369; k-16,518.
108. k-4,206; t-7,12; k-16,518. A sanitized account of Grigulevich’s career in the Spanish Civil War appears in the 1997 SVR official history of pre-war intelligence operations. No reference, however, is made to his role in the first major attempt to assassinate Trotsky, doubtless for fear of tarnishing his heroic image. Though the chapter on Trotsky’s assassination refers to FELIPE, it gives no indication that FELIPE and Grigulevich were one and the same. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, chs. 8, 12.
109. t-7,12.
110. See below, chapter 10.
111. k-16,518.
112. k-2,354.
113. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 100-1.
114. k-2,369. The head of the Mexican secret police, General Leandro Sánchez Salazar, later reached the same conclusion. Though able to identify Grigulevich only as FELIPE (his codename within the assault group), Sánchez Salazar described him as “the real instigator of the attack.” Sánchez Salazar believed the multilingual Grigulevich to be “a French Jew,” partly as a result of discovering some of his underwear, which had been purchased in Paris on the Boulevard Saint Michel. Sánchez Salazar, Murder in Mexico, pp. 48-9.
115. Sánchez Salazar, Murder in Mexico, p. 45.
116. k-2,369.
117. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 74. Cf. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, p. 488.
118. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, pp. 487-9.
119. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 101.
120. Released on bail, Siqueiros escaped from Mexico with the help of the Chilean Communist poet Pablo Neruda. Sánchez Salazar, Murder in Mexico, pp. 211-14.
121. k-2,369,354; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1.
122. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 183-5.
123. Levine, The Mind of an Assassin, chs. 5-9; Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, ch. 5.
124. Note by Enrique Castro Delgado, the Spanish Communist Party representative at Comintern headquarters, on a conversation with Caridad Mercader, in Levine, The Mind of an Assassin, pp. 216-22.
125. See below, chs. 22, 23.
Chapter Six War
1. k-27,app.
2. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 247.
3. The visiting lecturers included Academicians I. M. Maisky, A. M. Deborin and A. A. Guber, and ambassadors A. A. Troyanovsky, B. Ye. Shteyn and Shenburg. k-27,appendix.
4. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 248.
5. On June 5, 1943 SHON was reorganized as the Intelligence School (RASH) of the NKVD First (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, and the training course extended to two years. By the end of the war about 200 foreign intelligence officers had graduated from it (k-27,appendix). During the Cold War it was known successively as the Higher Intelligence School (codenamed School no. 101), the Red Banner Institute and the Andropov Institute. In October 1994 it became the Foreign Intelligence Academy of the Russian Federation (Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 23).
6. Slutsky, Pasov and Shpigelglas had been liquidated during 1938. Beria’s acolyte, Vladimir Georgyevich Dekanozov, who briefly succeeded Shpigelglas, became Deputy Foreign Commissar in May 1939.
7. Fitin’s career is summarized in Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 153-5, which acknowledges that he owed his promotion to “the acute shortage of intelligence personnel.”
8. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 1. A somewhat inaccurate hagiography of Gorsky’s career (which, inter alia, attributes intelligence supplied by Cairncross to Maclean) appears in Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 31-2. There is no mention of Gorsky’s disgrace in 1953 (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 304). The SVR historians, however, indirectly give some indication of the extent of the disgrace when they acknowledge that they have been unable to establish the date of Gorsky’s death.
9. Interview with Blunt cited in Cecil, A Divided Life, p. 66.
10. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 173-7.
11. See above, chapter 5.
12. Borovik, The Philby File, pp. 153-4, 166-7. On SOE see Foot, SOE.
13. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 303-12. Though the identity of ELLI appears not to have been established by British intelligence for many years after the Second World War, it was in fact one of a number of somewhat transparent Soviet codenames of the period. In Russian ELLI means “Ls,” an appropriate codename for Leo Long, whose initials were LL.
14. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 22. The defector was Walter Krivitsky, codenamed GROLL. On King’s arrest, see Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 606-7.
15. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 272.
16. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 214-17; Michael Smith, “The Humble Scot who Rose to the Top—But Then Chose Treachery,” Daily Telegraph (January 12, 1992). Cairncross’s KGB file corroborates the recollection of a former head of the Centre’s British desk that he provided “tons of documents” (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 272). Confident that his file would never see the light of day, Cairncross denied that he provided anything of significance to the London residency until after the Soviet Union entered the war. He admitted, however, that he had “no difficulty in having access to the secret papers in Hankey’s office” (Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, pp. 90-1). When new War Cabinet regulations in June 1941 limited the circulation of diplomatic telegrams to Hankey, Cairncross as well as Hankey complained personally to the Foreign Office. The restrictions were quickly lifted. (G. L. Clutton (Foreign Office) to Cairncross (June 6, 1941); Sir Alexander Cadogan to Hankey (June 17, 1941). Hankey Papers, Churchill College Archives Center, Cambridge, HNKY 4/33.)
17. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 7.
18. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 63-5. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 78-81. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 266. (Costello and Tsarev wrongly compute the period when the Center was out of touch with Harnack as fifteen rather than twenty-eight months.)
19. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 64; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 82-5; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 266-7; Tarrant, The Red Orchestra, chs. 17-19.
20. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 286.
21. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 64.
22. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 154. Some of the intelligence warnings of the preparations for BARBAROSSA are printed as appendices to Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3.
23. The report and Stalin’s comment on it were published in Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU (April 1990). Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 86.
24. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 275, 282. Prange et al., Target Tokyo, chs. 42-7.
25. JIC(41)218(Final), CAB 81/102, PRO. On Churchill’s warnings to Stalin, see Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps’ Mission to Moscow 1940-42, chs. 2-4. Exactly which JIC reports reached Stalin, and in what form, cannot be determined at present. But, given both the volume of highly classified intelligence from London and the numerous JIC assessments which contradicted Churchill’s belief that Hitler was planning an invasion of Russia, Stalin must surely have been aware of the JIC view. The files noted by Mitrokhin show that Stalin had access to at least some of the telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office and the British ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 10.
26. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 274.
27. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 11.
28. Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa, pp. 223-4, 241-3. An important new study by Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia, was published just as this volume was going to press. It performs a valuable service by demolishing the main conspiracy theories (in particular those surrounding Hess’s flight to Britain and Stalin’s alleged preparations for an attack on Germany) which have confused some recent interpretations of the background of operation BARBAROSSA. Though there are some gaps in his analysis of Soviet intelligence, Professor Gorodetsky also adds much interesting detail from newly accessible Russian archives. His portrait of Stalin as “rational and level-headed” is, however, difficult to reconcile with, inter alia, Stalin’s obsessive pursuit of Trotsky and his foreign supporters. Grand Delusion is, none the less, a major work.
29. Vaksberg, The Prosecutor and the Prey, p. 220.
30. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin records that Zarubin had been appointed deputy director of INO in 1937 (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2). Over the next two years, three successive heads of INO were liquidated, and Zarubin only just escaped a similar fate. It is not clear precisely what position he held in the Center at the beginning of 1941.
31. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. On December 18, 1940 Hitler had ordered the completion of preparations for BARBAROSSA by May 15, 1941.
32. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
33. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 154.
34. See below, chapter 7.
35. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992). Even in the year before the abortive coup of August 1991, both the public rhetoric and inner convictions of the KGB leadership were influenced by crude anti-Western conspiracy theories. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Center, pp. 218-22. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from the Center, pp. 125-8.
36. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 249-50, 281-3. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” pp. 11-13. PURPLE had been introduced in 1939. Soviet codebreakers had also broken the earlier and less complex Japanese RED cipher. On the breaking of PURPLE by US military cryptanalysts, see Kahn, “Pearl Harbor and the Inadequacy of Cryptanalysis.” Mitrokhin did not have access to the archives of the KGB Sixteenth Directorate, which—together with those of the GRU—contain the main SIGINT files of the Great Patriotic War.
37. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, p. 329; Overy, Russia’s War, p. 118.
38. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 282.
39. On recruitment to Bletchley Park, see Hinsley and Stripp (eds.), Codebreakers; Andrew, “F. H. Hinsley and the Cambridge Moles”; Smith, Station X.
40. See below, pp. 156, 159. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 312-13.
41. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 130. After the German invasion, Sudoplatov’s Directorate for Special Tasks and Guerrilla Warfare (officially entitled Diversionary Intelligence), the successor of the pre-war Administration for Special Tasks, was officially removed from the NKVD First (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate as a new Fourth Directorate. Though the two directorates remained formally independent until April 1943, there was a constant interchange of personnel between them. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 28-9.
42. The official Soviet guide to the Museum of Partisan Glory is Balatsky, Museum in the Catacombs. At the time of writing, the Museum is still open daily with guided tours in Russian and Ukrainian catacombs.
43. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 101.
44. For details of the reconstruction, see Balatsky, Museum in the Catacombs.
45. vol. 5, sec. 13.
46. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 102-3. This account of Molodtsov’s capture and execution is neither confirmed nor contradicted by Mitrokhin’s notes on the Odessa file.
47. vol. 5, sec. 13.
48. vol. 5, sec. 13.
49. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1.
50. Dear and Foot (eds.), The Oxford Companion to the Second World War, pp. 1240-1.
51. Dear and Foot (eds.), The Oxford Companion to the Second World War, p. 1240. Probably the best study of the eastern front, by Professor Richard Overy, concludes that, “…Where the NKVD did intervene the effect was to wound the war effort, not to invigorate it.” One part of the complex explanation for increasing success of the Red Army was the demotion, under the pressure of war, of the political apparatchiks at the front in the autumn of 1942 and the new freedom given to officers to take decisions without being constantly checked for political correctness. Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 329-30.
52. There was no legal residency in Argentina. At the outbreak of war no Latin American state had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In October 1942 Cuba established diplomatic relations with the USSR. By the beginning of 1945 another eight Latin American republics had followed suit. Argentina did not establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until 1946.
53. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. Mitrokhin’s notes, which identify ARTUR as Grigulevich, provide the solution to a major unsolved problem in the VENONA decrypts. Though the decrypts contain frequent references to ARTUR, his identity was never discovered by NSA or the FBI (Benson, VENONA Historical Monograph #5, p. 5).
54. Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, vol. 1, pp. 154-6.
55. Macdonald, “The Politics of Intervention”; Newton, “Disorderly Succession.”
56. Wartime Soviet agents with access to US policy documents on Argentina included Laurence Duggan, a Latin American expert in the State Department, and Maurice Halperin, chief of the Latin American division in the OSS RA branch (Peake, “OSS and the Venona Decrypts,” pp. 22, 25-6).
57. k-16,477.
58. k-13,370.
59. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1; k-16,477.
60. Argentina did not declare war on Germany until March 1945.
61. Grigulevich’s couriers to New York included the Chilean Communist Eduardo Pecchio and a member of the Latin American section of the Columbian Broadcasting Service, Ricardo Setaro (GONETS). VENONA decrypt, 2nd release, p. 26; 3rd release, part 2, p. 101.
62. VENONA decrypts, 5th release, pp. 11-12, 14-17, 20-1, 24-6, 31-2.
63. k-16,477.
64. See below, chapter 22.
65. The Center instructed the Montevideo residency on February 4, 1956:
Do not re-establish contact [with Verzhbitksy]. Arrangements for his entry to the USSR must be made under MFA auspices in the usual way; do not get involved in the process and make no promises, including financial ones. Make a one-time payment of 1,500 pesos and we will then make no further monetary payments.
(k-16,477)
66. k-16,477.
67. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 259-64.
68. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 259-64; Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 232-3.
69. Volkogonov, Stalin, pp. 444-7.
70. k-4,204. The total number of sources was substantially greater than those accorded agent status by the Center. According to KGB files, the nationality of the agents was: 55 Germans; 14 French; 5 Belgians; 13 Austrians, Czechs and Hungarians; 6 Russians; and 16 others. The principal leaders, according to the same files, were: Belgian section: Leopold Trepper; German section: Harro Schulze-Boysen; French section (except Lyon): Henry Robinson; Lyon: Isidor Springer; Dutch section: Anton Winterinck; Swiss section: Sandor Rado.
71. Central Intelligence Agency, The Rote Kapelle; Milligan, “Spies, Ciphers and ‘Zitadelle’”; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 285-9.
72. Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War; Jukes, “The Soviets and ‘Ultra’”; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 289.
73. Beevor, Stalingrad, pp. 166-75, 201.
74. Under lend-lease agreements with Britain and the United States in 1941, the Soviet Union was supplied with 35,000 radio stations, 380,000 field telephones and 956,000 miles of telephone cable. Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 193-4.
75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 315-20; Milligan, “Spies, Ciphers and ‘Zitadelle.’”
76. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 14.
Chapter Seven The Grand Alliance
1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 241-2. At least in the early 1930s, the Fourth Department was probably primarily interested in the United States as a base from which to collect intelligence on Germany and Japan. Mitrokhin did not have access to Fourth Department files on its American agents and did not note references to these agents in KGB files. The case against Hiss, which has been strong but controversial ever since his conviction for perjury in 1951, is now overwhelming as a result of new evidence revealed during the 1990s from the VENONA decrypts, KGB files made available to Weinstein and Vassiliev which refer to his work for military intelligence, and Hungarian interrogation records of Hiss’s fellow agent Noel Field. These sources also do much to vindicate the credibility of Hiss’s principal public accuser, the former Fourth Department courier Whittaker Chambers. The best accounts of the Hiss case are the 1997 updated edition of Weinstein, Perjury, and Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, chs. 2, 12.
2. Wadleigh, “Why I Spied for the Communists,” part 7, New York Post (July 19, 1949).
3. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1, n. 2.
4. Massing, This Deception, p. 155. The fact that Massing defected from the NKVD in 1938 makes her tribute to Bazarov all the more impressive.
5. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
6. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
7. The details in Mitrokhin’s notes on “19” (date of birth, work in the Latin American division of the State Department, later transfer to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) clearly identify him as Duggan; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. By 1943, at the latest, however, Duggan’s codename had been changed to FRENK (or FRANK); VENONA, 2nd release, pp. 278-9.
8. Weinstein, Perjury, pp. 182-3.
9. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
10. See above, p. 84.
11. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 110, 122-3, 129-36; Newton, The Butcher’s Embrace, pp. 20-2.
12. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 240-3, 290. On Whittaker Chambers, see his memoir, Witness, and the biography by Sam Tanenhaus, Whittaker Chambers.
13. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
14. Others recalled from the United States to be interrogated and liquidated in Moscow included the illegal CHARLIE, whose file was destroyed and whose identity is now unknown. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 180-1.
15. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Significantly, material on Morozov’s denunciation of two successive residents was among that excluded from the documents selected by the SVR for the recent study of Soviet espionage in the United States in the Stalin era by Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood. While obliged to acknowledge the purge of many loyal foreign intelligence officers, the SVR is generally reluctant to reveal cases where they were denounced by their own comrades. Despite such examples of SVR censorship, for which Weinstein and Vassiliev are not, of course, responsible, The Haunted Wood is a very valuable contribution to the history of Soviet intelligence operations.
16. It is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether or not Akhmerov was given charge of an independent illegal residency before Bazarov’s recall. However, Hede Massing’s memoirs strongly suggest that both Bazarov and Akhmerov were members of the same illegal residency until at least 1937. Massing, This Deception, pp. 187-8, 191.
17. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1. Significantly, the list of names noted by Mitrokhin did not include Samuel Dickstein, a Democratic congressman from Manhattan (codenamed CROOK), who had volunteered his services to the NKVD in 1937 but demanded a high price for his intelligence. Over the next two years, the NKVD oscillated between pride at having an agent in Congress and suspicion that Dickstein was recycling publicly available information. In June 1939 Ovakimyan denounced him in a message to the Center as “a complete racketeer and blackmailer.” Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, ch. 7.
18. On Duggan’s codenames, see above, n. 7.
19. MORIS is described in Mitrokhin’s note as an “archivist” at the Justice Department (vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1); this may, however, mean simply that he had access to department files and archives.
20. On the careers of Morros (who became an FBI double agent early in the Cold War), Martha Dodd Stern and William E. Dodd, Jr. (both of whom failed to live up to the Centre’s high early expectations), see Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, chs. 3, 6.
21. KHOSYAIN is identified as Buchman in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2, but the spelling of his name (“Bukman” in Cyrillic transliteration) is uncertain.
22. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
23. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 143-4.
24. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 7, ch. 10, app. 6.
25. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. The claim in an SVR official history that Akhmerov was recalled in mid-1939 is difficult to reconcile with Straight’s account of a meeting with him in late October. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 15.
26. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 15. On Ovakimyan’s role in preparations for Trotsky’s assassination, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 183-4. The Centre’s obsession with the pursuit of Trotskyists in the United States continued even after Trotsky’s assassination.
27. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 135-7. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 177-8. There were two New York chemical institutes; the SVR histories do not make clear which is referred to.
28. vol. 6, ch. 6.
29. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 169-71; Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 177. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 173.
30. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1. The VENONA decrypts of NKVD wartime telegrams from the United States include the codenames of approximately 200 agents (about half of whom remain unidentified). Since these telegrams represent only a fraction of the wartime communications between the Center and its American residencies, the total NKVD network must have been substantially larger. Mitrokhin’s notes give no statistics for the size of the network after 1941. The occupational breakdown for the network in April 1941 is highly incomplete. Apart from the forty-nine “engineers,” Mitrokhin gives the occupations of only thirty-six others, of whom twenty-two were journalists. Many of the agents were immigrants and refugees. In 1940-1, sixty-six Baltic recruits emigrated to the United States (vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1).
31. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 173.
32. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 178.
33. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 290-1. Weinstein, Perjury, pp. 292-3. KGB files cited by Weinstein and Vassiliev (The Haunted Wood, pp. 106, 159, 161-2) identify Lauchlin Currie as the agent PAGE referred to in a number of the VENONA decrypts. Mitrokhin’s notes do not mention Currie.
34. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 53.
35. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 50-3.
36. In 1929 Zarubina (then Gorskaya) had been used to seduce the pro-Trotskyist illegal Blyumkin and lure him back to execution in Moscow.
37. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
38. vol. 6, ch. 12.
39. vol. 6, ch. 12. Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, ch. 7.
40. A number of VENONA decrypts refer to Lee’s work as a Soviet agent. Other important agents in OSS identified by VENONA include Maurice Halperin (HARE), J. Julius Joseph (CAUTIOUS) and Donald Niven Wheeler (IZRA). (For examples, see VENONA, 2nd release, pp. 118, 178-9; 3rd release, part 2, p. 196.) Soviet agents at OSS headquarters were probably well into double figures. Communists (not all of them agents) have been identified in the Russian, Spanish, Balkan, Hungarian and Latin American sections of OSS’s RA division, and in its operational German, Japanese, Korean, Italian, Spanish, Hungarian and Indonesian divisions. Peake, “OSS and the Venona Decrypts”; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 294-5; Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, pp. 276-8.
41. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 450-1.
42. Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, pp. 234-6.
43. vol. 6, ch. 12.
44. VENONA, 2nd release, part 2, p. 58.
45. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 451.
46. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
47. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
48. Akhmerov told the Center in April 1944, “For your information: I have never met RULEVOY [Browder].” VENONA, 3rd release, part 1, pp. 26-8.
49. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
50. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 167-8.
51. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Fearful that State Department security officers had discovered his earlier connection with Soviet intelligence, Duggan was less forthcoming during the war than he had been earlier. In June 1944 he left the State Department to join the newly founded United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as diplomatic adviser. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 16-19.
52. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
53. We are indebted for information on Henry Wallace’s plans for Duggan and White to Professor Harvey Klehr.
54. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
55. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 103-4, 115.
56. When Moscow changed control methods later in the War, the New York residency reported to the Center: “In ALBERT [Akhmerov]’s opinion our workers [Soviet intelligence officers] would hardly manage to work with the same success under the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [Communist Party] flag. We may possibly set up direct liaison with [members of the Silvermaster group], but it is doubtful whether we could secure from them the same results as ROBERT [Silvermaster], who, constantly dealing with them, has many advantages over us.” The residency also reported that Silvermaster “did not believe in our orthodox methods.” VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 2.
57. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 68-9, chs. 7, 8. Codenames from vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2 and VENONA decrypts. The sanitized SVR account of Golos’s career makes no reference to his sexual indiscretion. “Russian [intelligence] operatives,” it concludes, “will always honor and take pride in him.” Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoy Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 16.
58. vol. 6, ch. 12. The VENONA decrypts indicate that Belfrage was also codenamed UCN/9.
59. On BSC, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 96, 102-3, 127-30.
60. vol. 6, ch. 12. The KGB file noted by Mitrokhin confirms the main features of the account, contested by Belfrage during his lifetime, in Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 139-40—notably his espionage links with Golos and with V. J. Jerome, a close associate of Browder.
61. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
62. On the woeful limitations of the intelligence on the Soviet Union available to Roosevelt early in the war, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 132-3.
63. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 340-1; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 23.
64. vol. 6, ch. 12. Hopkins had been personally briefed by Hoover on Zarubin’s visit to Nelson (Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, document 9). Hoover would doubtless have been outraged had he known that Hopkins had informed the Soviet embassy.
65. The source of the information on the talks between Roosevelt and Churchill was codenamed “19”—an example of the Centre’s confusing habit of sometimes recycling the same codename for different people. Laurence Duggan had formerly been codenamed “19,” but by now had the codename FRANK; he cannot, in any case, have provided this information. A detailed, meticulous and persuasive study by Eduard Mark concludes that it is “probable virtually to the point of certainty that Hopkins was 19.” Mark, “Venona’s Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of 1943.”
66. Andrew, “Anglo-American-Soviet Intelligence Relations,” pp. 125-6. Crozier, Free Agent, pp. 1-2.
67. Hopkin’s efforts to avoid US-Soviet friction also included securing the removal of officials he judged to be anti-Soviet: among them the US ambassador in Moscow, Laurence A. Steinhardt; the military attaché, Major Ivan D. Yeaton; and Loy W. Henderson, head of the Soviet desk in the State Department. When Soviet foreign minister Molotov visited Washington in May 1942, Hopkins took him aside and told him what to say to persuade Roosevelt of the need for an early second front in order to contradict contrary advice from the American military. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 297-300, 341; Mark, “Venona’s Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of 1943,” p. 20.
68. Bohlen, Witness to History 1919-1969, p. 148.
69. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, OM, 1938-1945, p. 582.
70. Cited by Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 412. On relations between Churchill and Roosevelt at Tehran, see also Kimball, Forged in War, pp. 237-55.
71. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 342.
72. The use made by Stalin of intelligence from Britain during the Tehran Conference remains more problematic, given the Centre’s unwarranted suspicion at that time of its main British sources.
73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
74. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 2; appendix 3, n. 21.
75. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 5.
76. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 15.
77. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 49-50, 67-8.
78. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 5.
79. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 196-7. On SIS’s lack of a Moscow station in the 1930s, see Andrew, Secret Service, p. 573.
80. The text of the report was first published, along with other KGB documents on atomic espionage, in Voprossi Istorii Estestvoznania i Tekhniki (1992), no. 3. This issue was withdrawn shortly after publication, but the documents are reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 2. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 218.
81. According to the minutes of the Scientific Advisory Committee, Cairncross briefly served as its joint secretary; SAC (DP)(41), CAB 90/8, PRO. In his memorably mendacious memoirs, Cairncross denied that he ever held this post. Even if he is correct in this instance (and Whitehall committee secretaries were, almost invariably, capable of ensuring that their names were correctly recorded), this would not have affected his access to SAC minutes since, by his own admission, he “had no difficulty in having access to the secret papers in Hankey’s office.” Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, pp. 9-10, 88-92.
82. The revelation that Cairncross, thanks to his access to Scientific Advisory Committee papers, was the first to warn the Center of the plan to construct the atomic bomb first appeared in 1990 in Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 321. Probably because Cairncross was then still alive, a series of KGB/SVR-sponsored publications suggested that the report of the Scientific Advisory Committee had come instead from Maclean. (See, e.g., Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 218; Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 31, 60.) Following confirmation by Yuri Modin, who was given responsibility for Cairncross’s file in 1944 and became his controller in 1947, that the Scientific Advisory Committee report came from Cairncross, the SVR changed its tune. In 1998 it released documents from Cairncross’s file proving that he supplied the report and giving further details of his role as the first of the atom spies. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 228-9, 234; Michael Smith, “The Humble Scot Who Rose to the Top—But Then Chose Treachery,” Daily Telegraph (January 12, 1998).
83. The text of Beria’s report of March 1942, first published in Voprossi Istorii Estestvoznania i Tekhniki, 1992, no. 3, is reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 2, pp. 439-41. On the background see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 82-4.
84. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 84-9.
85. vol. 6, ch. 6. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed verbally on unrestricted exchange of information on the atomic project, but did not commit the agreement to writing. The Americans in charge of the MANHATTAN project afterwards claimed to be ignorant of the agreement. Not till the Quebec agreement of August 1943 was “full and effective collaboration” between Britain and the United States agreed in writing.
86. vol. 6, ch. 6.
87. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 85.
88. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 321-2.
89. West and Tsarev, Crown Jewels, pp. 231-3.
90. Fuchs preferred meeting in London Underground stations. He later complained to Markus Wolf that Kremer’s habit of constantly looking over his shoulder to see if he was being followed “seemed to attract more attention to us than simply getting on with it.” Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 322-4; Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 230. The best biography of Fuchs is Williams, Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy.
91. The references to FIR in Mitrokhin’s notes, including her involvement with Fuchs, identify her as SONIA (vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17). She is not to be confused with a British NKGB agent also codenamed FIR, an official of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) recruited in China in 1943 (k-24,126).
92. Werner, Sonya’s Report, pp. 250-3; Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 230.
93. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 229.
94. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17. It is just possible, though not probable, that an even stronger candidate for either of these titles is identified in files not seen by Mitrokhin. Like most, if not all, British agents recruited in the 1930s who were still active after the Second World War, Norwood had more than one codename in the course of her career. Though Mitrokhin’s notes refer to her only as HOLA, her codename in 1945, shortly after she returned from GRU to NKGB control, was RITA. Extracts from KGB files made available by the SVR to Weinstein and Vassiliev, though not mentioning Norwood by name, identify RITA as an employee of the Non-Ferrous Metals [Research] Association (Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 194; cf. the reference to RITA in VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 2, p. 247.)
95. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
96. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
97. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 59-61. Cf. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1.
98. vol. 6, ch. 6. In March 1943 Kurchatov sent similar reports to M. G. Pervukhin, Deputy Prime Minister and commissar of the chemical industry. The text, first published in Voprossi Istorii Estestvoznania i Tekhniki (1992), no. 3, is reprinted in translation in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 2, pp. 446-53.
99. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s notes do not reveal the identity of MAR.
100. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 1-4.
101. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s note does not identify the recipient of Kurchatov’s top secret report. Given its importance, however, it was probably addressed, like his report of March 7 (also quoted in vol. 6, ch. 6), to Beria. Cf. Kurchatov’s report to Pervukhin of July 3, 1943 in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 2, pp. 454-6.
102. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 104.
103. vol. 6, ch. 6.
104. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, p. 5. Cf. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 103.
105. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 103.
106. There is some indication that later in 1944 FOGEL/PERS was providing intelligence from the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, laboratory of the MANHATTAN project. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 10, 29. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 190-1; Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 319.
107. Suggestions to the contrary derive chiefly from two sources: a fabricated version of the career of PERS (renamed PERSEUS), apparently devised by the SVR for purposes of mystification, perhaps to protect Theodore Hall (cf. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 271; Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 190-1n.); and the fallible memory of Pavel Sudoplatov, far less reliable on atomic espionage than on the “special actions” to which he devoted most of his career (cf. Holloway, “Sources for Stalin and the Bomb”). The New York residency was dismayed to learn early in 1945 that FOGEL/PERS had declined an offer of employment as a construction engineer at Los Alamos, probably owing to a mixture of family pressures and fear of exposure. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 192.
108. vol. 6, ch. 6.
109. vol. 8, ch. 12, para. 1.
110. vol. 6, ch. 6.
111. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
112. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 4
113. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 313-14. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 396. Early in the war, Philby had tried and failed to enter Bletchley Park.
114. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 3.
115. Haslam, “Stalin’s Fears of a Separate Peace 1942,” pp. 97-9.
116. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 273-4, 305; Schmidt, “Der Hess-Flug und das Kabinet Churchill”; Schmidt, “The Marketing of Rudolf Hess.”
117. Record of dinner conversation at the Kremlin, October 18, 1944, FO 800/414, PRO.
118. Some of the Hess conspiracy theories were examined in the BBC2 documentary, Hess: An Edge of Conspiracy (presenter: Christopher Andrew; producer: Roy Davies), first broadcast January 17, 1990.
119. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 216-18.
120. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 334-7.
121. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 216.
122. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 217n.
123. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 154. At a meeting with Christopher Andrew in August 1990, Cairncross admitted that he did supply intelligence from Bletchley Park to the NKGB before the battle of Kursk but declined to give details.
124. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 314; Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 396. 125. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 218.
126. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 1.
Chapter Eight Victory
1. As late as 1990 Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the Central Committee, which was largely responsible for determining foreign intelligence requirements, claimed that intelligence reports in 1943 showed that some in Washington as well as in London were considering “the possibility of terminating the coalition with the Soviet Union and reaching an accord with Nazi Germany, or with the Nazi Generals, on the question of waging a joint war against the Soviet Union”:
Therefore when we talk about Stalin’s distrust with regard to Churchill, at a certain stage towards those surrounding Roosevelt, not so much towards Roosevelt himself, we should pay attention to the fact that he based this mistrust on a very precise knowledge of specific facts.
The “facts” produced by the Center were, in all probability, mere conspiracy theories of the kind which, in greater or lesser degree, distorted Soviet intelligence assessment throughout, and even beyond, the Stalinist era. (Interview by Christopher Andrew with Valentin Falin in Moscow for BBC2, December 12, 1990.)
2. On CPUSA operations against Trotskyists and heretics, see Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism; quotation from p. 89.
3. vol. 6, ch. 12. On the FBI bugging of Nelson, see also Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, pp. 216-17. The disappointingly discreet account of Nelson’s career, Steve Nelson, American Radical, by Nelson, Barrett and Ruck, makes a brief reference to his work on the secret Party control commission (p. 242).
4. vol. 6, ch. 12. On Hopkins, see above, chapter 7.
5. See above, chapter 7.
6. Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, p. xviii, n. 30 and document 10. The authors suggest the author of the letter to Hoover “might have been” Mironov. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin makes Mironov’s authorship virtually certain. While imprisoned by the NKVD in 1945, Mironov tried to smuggle to the American embassy in Moscow information about the massacre of the Polish officer corps similar to that contained in the letter to Hoover in 1943 (vol. 5, section 11). A study of the letter by Ben Fischer, written without access to Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, seeks to make sense of Mironov’s bizarre claim that Zarubin and his wife were working for, respectively, Japanese and German intelligence, as a way “to grab FBI attention” and ensure that Hoover acted against them. But Mr. Fischer also acknowledges evidence that Mironov “may have been mentally disturbed” (Fischer, “‘Mr. Guver,’” pp. 10-11.). KGB files suggest both an obsessional hostility to Zarubin from Mironov and a determination that the West should learn the truth about the massacre of the Polish officer corps. In the letter to Hoover, Mironov claimed that his real name was Markov; Mitrokhin’s notes, however, refer to him as Mironov.
7. Zarubin to Center, June 3, 1943: VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 157-8. Zarubin moved to Washington during June.
8. Following the corrupt governorships of Huey and Earl Long, Sam Jones established a reputation for scrupulous honesty. On his term as governor, see Dawson, The Louisiana Governors, pp. 255-9.
9. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. The US “military intelligence officer” may have had knowledge of the information on Zarubin’s involvement in the massacre of Polish officers contained in Mironov’s letter to Hoover.
10. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
11. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 196-7.
12. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
13. Samolis (ed.) Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 53-5. This SVR hagiography predictably makes no mention of Zarubin’s various misadventures in the United States.
14. vol. 5, sec. 11. Sudoplatov wrongly claims that Mironov was simply “hospitalized and discharged from the service” on the grounds of schizophrenia; Special Tasks, p. 197.
15. VENONA decrypts, 4th release, part 4, pp. 115-16.
16. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, app. 2, part 7. Zarubin’s immediate successor as resident in New York in the summer of 1943, probably on a temporary basis, had been Pavel Klarin (codenamed LUKA); VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 180ff. On Abbiate’s previous career see above, chapter 4.
17. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, pp. 205-6.
18. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 175. The telegram from the Center appointing Abbiate as resident refers to him by his codename SERGEI, identified in the NSA decrypt as Pravdin (Abbiate’s alias in the USA). Apresyan’s transfer to San Francisco was not necessarily a demotion in view of the forthcoming organizing conference of the United Nations, attended by NKGB agent Harry Dexter White and presided over by the GRU agent Alger Hiss.
19. vol. 7, ch. 2, 1; app. 3, n. 21.
20. Among the documents Philby passed to the NKGB were the German foreign ministry documents obtained by OSS in Switzerland and probably also supplied by NKGB agents in OSS. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 84-6; Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 141-2.
21. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 232-3.
22. Philby, My Silent War, ch. 6; Cecil, “The Cambridge Comintern.” On Krötenschield, see Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 103-4, 124-5.
23. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 114. From 1944 to 1947 Modin was responsible for the files of the Five at the Center, before being posted to London to act as their controller.
24. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 314.
25. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 397.
26. Cecil, A Divided Life, pp. 74-5.
27. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 9.
28. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 309-12; Cecil, “The Cambridge Comintern.”
29. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., para. 2.
30. See above, chapter 7.
31. There are a number of references to Fuchs’s codenames in the VENONA decrypts. Fuchs said later that he never knew which branch of Soviet intelligence he was working for. During his interrogation after his arrest in 1950 he claimed to have been previously unaware that more than one branch existed. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 323.
32. vol. 6, ch. 6. The GRU did, however, keep control of its agents in the Anglo-Canadian atomic research center at Chalk River; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 325-6.
33. Norwood ceased contact with SONYA (referred to in KGB files as FIR) in 1944. However, the first contact between Norwood and her new (unidentified) controller recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes took place in 1945. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
34. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
35. VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 2, p. 249. Norwood’s codename at this period was TINA.
36. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 234.
37. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 8-9.
38. FBI FOIA 65-58805, file 38, p. 7.
39. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 8-9.
40. FBI FOIA 65-58805, files 38, 40.
41. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 25, 27.
42. Gold’s evidence to the FBI on renewing contact with Fuchs is reprinted in Williams, Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy, pp. 206-12.
43. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1.
44. The agents in Rosenberg’s ring included the scientist William Perl (GNOME), who provided intelligence on jet engines, and the military electronics engineers Joel Barr (METRE) and Alfred Sarant (HUGHES), both of whom were radar experts; VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 12, 18-19, 47, 51. On the origins of the Rosenberg spyring, run initially — according to Semenov — “on the principles of a Communist Party group,” see Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 177-9.
45. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 15, 36, 45-6.
46. Radosh and Milton, The Rosenberg File, ch. 3.
47. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 44-5; 3rd release, pp. 255-6, 261-6. Hall explained his belief that his atomic espionage had been a way “to help the world” in the BBC Radio 4 documentary VENONA (presenter: Christopher Andrew; producers: Mark Berman and Helen Weinstein), first broadcast March 18, 1998.
48. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
49. VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, p. 424.
50. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 160-1. The first VENONA decrypt in which Akhmerov reports intelligence from Bentley is dated December 11, 1943; VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 430-1.
51. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 163-5. Bentley’s story is, once again, largely corroborated by VENONA and other evidence. Cf. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, pp. 26-8; and Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, pp. 312-15.
52. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Doubtless through a slip of the pen, Mitrokhin also refers to Perlo in this note as PEL. VENONA and other sources make clear that PEL (also codenamed PAL and ROBERT) was Greg Silvermaster. The other members of Perlo (RAIDER)’s group, all described as Communists, were Charles Kramer, Edward Fitzgerald, Harry Magdoff, John Abt, Charles Flato and Harold Glasser.
53. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, pp. 26-8.
54. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 166-7. Once again, VENONA confirms the substance of Bentley’s version of events.
55. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, p. 272.
56. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 173-7.
57. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, part 1, p. 14; 3rd release, part 2, pp. 139, 152, 196.
58. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 179-80.
59. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, pp. 17-18. In January 1945 White was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
60. Romerstein and Levchenko, The KGB against the “Main Enemy,” pp. 111-12. George Silverman, to whom (according to Bentley) Currie rushed to deliver his warning “sort of out of breath,” is identified by the VENONA decrypts as a Soviet agent (codenamed ELERON [AILERON]). Currie himself may well be the agent codenamed PAGE to whom there are a number of references in the decrypts. Though denying that he had ever been a Soviet spy, Currie later acknowledged that he been entertained at Gorsky’s home. Senior White House officials such as Currie were among the very small group privy to the highly classified information that OSS had obtained a charred NKGB codebook. There is no reference to Currie in Mitrokhin’s notes.
61. The senior FBI agent who took part in the early analysis of the VENONA decrypts, Robert Lamphere, wrongly claims in his memoirs (The FBI-KGB War, pp. 87ff) that the NKGB codebook was later used to assist the process of decrypting. National Security Agency, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations, p. 8.
62. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 295.
63. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 22.
64. vol. 6, ch. 6.
65. Holloway, “Sources for Stalin and the Bomb,” p. 5.
66. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 19.
67. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 121-7.
68. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, ch. 15. The career of Morris and “Lona” Cohen is summarized in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
69. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 138-9.
70. NKGB report to Beria, July 10, 1945, first published in Kurier Sovietski Razvedke (1991); extract reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 4, pp. 474-5 (Sudoplatov misidentifies MLAD as Pontecorvo).
71. The story of Lona Cohen’s trip to Albuquerque is briefly told in the short biography of her in Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 71. See also Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, ch. 17.
72. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Unsurprisingly, this remarkable tale improved with the telling. In some recent Russian versions, Mrs. Cohen hid the documents in a box of Kleenex. The less elaborate account noted by Mitrokhin appears more reliable. He does not, however, identify the Los Alamos scientist who supplied the documents.
73. vol. 6, app. 2, part 5. The first VENONA reference to Yatskov’s responsibility for ENORMOZ dates from January 23, 1945; VENONA decrypts, 1st release, p. 60.
74. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 169-71.
75. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, p. 268.
76. Though Mitrokhin’s notes include references to most of the best-known, as well several hitherto-unknown, Soviet spies in the wartime United States, all refer to NKVD/NKGB agents. There is thus no reference to Hiss, who worked for Soviet military intelligence.
77. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 207.
78. k-27,appendix, para. 21.
79. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 343-8.
80. Kimball, Forged in War, p. 318.
81. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 207. A footnote to this decrypt, added by NSA in 1969, identifies ALES as “probably Alger Hiss.” The corroborative evidence now available puts that identification beyond reasonable doubt. Of the four Americans (other than US embassy staff) who went on to Moscow after Yalta, only Hiss fits Gorsky’s description of ALES (Moynihan, Secrecy, pp. 146-8). Gordievsky recalls a lecture in the Centre in which Akhmerov referred to his wartime contact with Hiss. Hungarian intelligence files on the Noel Field case show that Field also identified Hiss as a Soviet agent. Whittaker Chambers, the ex-GRU agent who exposed Hiss, testified that, as indicated by Gorsky’s telegram, Hiss first began supplying intelligence to Moscow in 1935. Both Chambers and Bentley, like Gorsky, implicated some of Hiss’s family, as well as Hiss himself, in Soviet espionage. Further evidence pointing to Hiss came from the Soviet defector Igor Guzenko in 1945. Though the statute of limitations prevented Hiss’s prosecution for espionage in 1950, the evidence used to convict him of perjury in that year, for lying about providing government documents to a Communist spyring, remains compelling. See, inter alia: Breindel, “Hiss’s Guilt,” New Republic (April 15, 1996); Schmidt, “The Hiss Dossier,” New Republic (November 8, 1993); Weinstein, Perjury; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB. ALES, in the Cyrillic alphabet, looks like a contraction of “Alger Hiss”—one of a number of Soviet codenames at this period which contain clues to the identity of the agent concerned.
82. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 347. On the basis of Akhmerov’s contact with Hiss (very unusual in the case of a GRU agent), Andrew and Gordievsky wrongly deduced that Hiss was by now an NKGB agent, in common with other leading American GRU agents of the late 1930s.
83. vol. 5, sect. 4. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 350-1. In 1946 SMERSH was reorganized on a peacetime basis and returned to the control of the MGB, the post-war successor of the NKVD.
84. Bethell, The Last Secret; Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta; Tolstoy, Stalin’s Secret War, ch. 17; Knight, “Harold Macmillan and the Cossacks”; Mitchell, The Cost of a Reputation, chs. 1, 3, 5. Tolstoy provides the most detailed and moving description of the forced repatriation of the Cossacks, but, as Knight demonstrates, exaggerates the personal responsibility of Harold Macmillan, minister-resident in Italy and political adviser to Supreme Allied Commander Field Marshal Alexander. Mitchell also concludes that Macmillan’s “responsibility for what ultimately occurred must be adjudged as small.” Tolstoy’s charge that Lord Aldington (formerly Brigadier Toby Low) had committed war crimes in connection with the repatriation led to the award to Lord Aldington in 1989 of 1.5 million pounds damages for libel.
85. The fourth White general on Smersh’s “most wanted” list, Timofei Domanov, was a former Soviet citizen whose fate, unlike that of the other three, had been sealed at Yalta.
86. vol. 5, sect. 4. A senior British officer reported, “All relations with Soviets most friendly with much interchange WHISKY and VODKA”; Knight, “Harold Macmillan and the Cossacks,” p. 239.
87. vol. 5, sect. 4, paras. 2-4.
88. For legal reasons, six words have been omitted from the first sentence of Mitrokhin’s note; they do not contain the name of the lieutenant-colonel. vol. 5, sect. 4, para. 5. The memoirs of the Deputy Chief of the Red Army, General Sergei Matveyevich Shtemenko, make no reference to bribery but confirm part of the sequence of events in the KGB files: “The Soviet government then made a firm representation to our allies over the matter of Krasnov, Shkuro, Sultan Ghirey, and other war criminals. The British stalled briefly; but since neither the old White guard generals nor their troops were worth much, they put all of them into trucks and delivered them into the hands of the Soviet authorities” (Tolstoy, Stalin’s Secret War, p. 298).
89. Alexander instructed on May 22, 1945, “All who are Soviet citizens and who can be handed over to Russians without use of force should be returned by 8th Army. Any others should be evacuated to 12th Army Group.” It has been argued that 5 Corps, the section of the Eighth Army which handed over the Cossacks, subsequently concluded that it had none the less been given “freedom of action” to use force if necessary. Controversy continues. Mitchell, The Cost of a Reputation, pp. 49-54. Brigadier Low left for Britain on May 22 or 23, some days before the “repatriation” began. There is no suggestion that, if bribery occurred, he was in any way cognizant of it.
90. Knight, “Harold Macmillan and the Cossacks,” pp. 248-52.
91. Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta, pp. 182, 188, 193, 266-8. The execution of the generals was announced in a brief note in Pravda on January 17, 1947.
Chapter Nine From War to Cold War
1. vol. 8, ch. 2.
2. The large literature on the Gouzenko case includes Bothwell and Granatstein (eds.), The Gouzenko Transcripts; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, ch. 3; Sawatsky, Gouzenko; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, ch. 21. Christopher Andrew interviewed Mrs. Gouzenko and her daughter (both of whom live under other names) in Canada in November 1992.
3. VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 3, pp. 206-7.
4. vol. 8, ch. 2. Burdin served as resident from 1951 to 1953. In the records of the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs his name is transliterated as Bourdine. In 1952 Burdin recruited Hugh Hambleton, who later became one of the KGB’s most important Canadian agents; see below, chapter 10.
5. vol. 8, ch. 10, paras. 7-8.
6. VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 2, pp. 263-5, 272-3, 275.
7. The most reliable account of this episode is in Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, ch. 4, which corrects a number of inventions in Philby’s version of events.
8. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 114-15.
9. vol. 5, ch. 7.
10. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 379.
11. Philby, My Silent War, p. 120.
12. vol. 5, ch. 7.
13. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 6.
14. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 137, 155; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 86-8.
15. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 375-6.
16. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 377, 396.
17. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 222.
18. Letters from Geoffrey A. Robinson to Christopher Andrew, October 19, 1997, September 14, 1998. Cairncross’s memoirs are as unreliable about his post-war career as about his earlier work as a Soviet agent. He claims that he had virtually no access to secret material in the Treasury (The Enigma Spy, pp. 124-7). According to Robinson, though, “That is totally untrue. The TUBE ALLOYS [nuclear weapons] files themselves were many inches thick, let alone all the other Secret and Top Secret files.”
19. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 150. Cf. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 222-6; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 406.
20. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 4.
21. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 1.
22. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the exact dates of the surveillance team’s presence at the London residency. It arrived late in the war and remained “for several years.” vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 1; ch. 6, para. 5.
23. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 11.
24. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 398-9; Boyle, The Climate of Treason, pp. 305, 341, 346-8. Mayhew, Time to Explain, p. 109.
25. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 397. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 201. Modin was unable to reveal Rodin’s real name and refers to him by his alias “Korovin.”
26. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, pp. 150, 153.
27. Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, pp. 61-71. Hoover did not identify Bentley as his source. “At the present time,” he wrote, “it is impossible to determine exactly how many of these people had actual knowledge of the disposition being made of the information they were transmitting.”
28. Weinstein, Perjury, p. 357.
29. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 204-7, 266-7.
30. If the Centre believed Gorsky to have been compromised by Gouzenko’s defection, he would probably have been recalled earlier. By March 1946 the FBI was convinced that Bentley’s defection was known to Silvermaster. Bentley, Out of Bondage, p. 267.
31. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. On Bentley’s contact with Pravdin’s wife, see Bentley, Out of Bondage, p. 329.
32. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
33. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 133.
34. See below, chapter 9.
35. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 383.
36. See above, chapter 2.
37. Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, introduction. Two further studies of the decrypts were published just as this volume was going to press: Haynes and Klehr, VENONA; and West, VENONA.
38. Interview by Christopher Andrew with the late Dr. Cleveland Cram, October 2, 1996. Dr. Cram was one of the first CIA officers to be indoctrinated into VENONA in November 1952. Some of his recollections were included in the BBC Radio 4 documentary VENONA (written and presented by Christopher Andrew; producers: Mark Burman and Helen Weinstein), first broadcast on March 18, 1998.
39. Andrew, “The VENONA Secret.”
40. Weisband had been recruited in 1934. From 1945 to 1947, however, contact was broken with him as part of the security measures which followed the defection of Elizabeth Bentley. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 291.
41. Interviews with Cecil Phillips and Meredith Gardner broadcast in the BBC Radio 4 documentary VENONA (March 18, 1998).
42. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 388-9; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 87-8.
43. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. Though initially made subordinate to the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Information was transferred to the Foreign Ministry in 1949; Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 40-1.
44. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 4.
45. The most detailed available account of the organization and development of the KI is a 24-page report based on information obtained during the debriefing of Vladimir and Yevdokia Petrov, following their defection in 1954: “The Committee of Information (‘KI’) 1947-1951” (November 17, 1954) CRS A6823/XR1/56, Australian Archives, Canberra.
46. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, appendix 2, part 7.
47. Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant, p. 138.
48. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 389. Panyushkin was ambassador in Washington from 1947 to 1951 and head of the FCD from 1953 to 1956.
49. Gromyko, Memories, pp. 318-19.
50. “The Committee of Information (‘KI’) 1947-1951” (November 17, 1954) CRS A6823/XR1/56, Australian Archives, Canberra.
51. “The Committee of Information (‘KI’) 1947-1951” (November 17, 1954) CRS A6823/XR1/56, Australian Archives, Canberra. According to vol. 7, ch. 11, para. 7, the GRU illegal section was not withdrawn from the KI until 1949.
52. t-7,187; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4, n. 8; vol. 7, ch. 11, para. 5.
53. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1; vol. 7, ch. 11, para. 7; vol. 7, app. 3, n. 62. On Korotkov’s pre-war career, see Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 48. The official SVR version of Korotkov’s career makes no mention of his post-war role as head of the Illegals Directorate; Samolis (ed., Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 63-5.
54. Officers are not to be confused with agents, such as Philby.
55. His name appears on his birth certificate as Wilhelm August Fisher. His father, though Russian, came from a family with German origins. On the family background, see Saunders, “Tyneside and the Russian Revolution,” pp. 280-4. Fisher’s true identity was not revealed until after his death in 1971, when Western journalists noticed the name carved on his tombstone.
56. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2 and n. 6. Cf. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 156-9.
57. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2 and n. 6. Fisher’s entry in Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii (pp. 156-9) refrains from mentioning any of the charges made against him.
58. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
59. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 1, 2.
60. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
61. Recollections of MARK’s New York friend and fellow artist, Burt Silverman; Bernikow, Abel, pp. 7-20.
62. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
63. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 68-70. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 179-85.
64. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. (Mitrokhin’s note mistranscribes MLAD as MLADA.)
65. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 176-8.
66. Tchikov and Kern, Comment Staline a volé la bombe atomique aux Américains, p. 205.
67. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
68. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 158-9.
69. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 159.
70. OREL was Sixto Fernandes Donsel; FISH was Antonio Arjonilla Toriblo. vol. 6, app. 1, part 41.
71. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
72. Interviews with Ted Hall and former FBI agent Robert McQueen, first broadcast in the BBC Radio 4 documentary VENONA (written and presented by Christopher Andrew; produced by Mark Burman and Helen Weinstein, March 18, 1998). Albright and Kunstel cite information from “confidential sources” that Hall had four or five meetings in New York with a Soviet agent whom he knew as “Jimmy Stevens” in 1952-3, before finally breaking contact with Soviet intelligence (Bombshell, ch. 25). Hall acknowledges that he had several meetings with a Soviet contact, but insists that he provided no information during this period (interview with Christopher Andrew, March 11, 1998).
73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
74. See below, chapter 17.
75. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2. Kopatzky later claimed to have been born in Kiev on New Year’s Day, 1922 (Wise, Molehunt, p. 183).
76. Wise, Molehunt, p. 184. Save for recording Kopatzky’s date and place of birth, Mitrokhin’s notes from his file contain nothing before 1946.
77. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.
78. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 182-3, 199.
79. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 248. The SVR made available to the authors (David Murphy, head of the CIA Berlin station, 1959-61; Sergei Kondrashev, former deputy head of the FCD; George Bailey, former Director of Radio Liberty) a substantial number of files on KGB operations in Berlin before the building of the Wall. Its statement that no Kopatzky file exists—rightly dismissed by the authors as “obviously disingenuous”—is thus all the more extraordinary. The SVR claims that its only record of Kopatzky concerns his visit, under his new name Orlov, to the Soviet embassy in Washington in 1965 when he inquired about possible asylum in the USSR and complained that the FBI was “attempting to obtain an admission that he collaborated with Soviet intelligence while he was in Germany during the 1940s and 1950s.”
80. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.
81. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2. On Kopatzky’s recruitment by the CIA, see also Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 110-12.
82. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.
83. See below, chapter 11.
84. Kopatzky’s case officers were Komarov, Galiguzov, Krasavin, V. V. Grankin, Krishchenko, Borisov, Komev, Fedorchenko, Melnikov, Chaikovsky, P. A. Shilov, Govorkov, Ye. P. Pitovranov, V. G. Likhachev, V. M. Biryukov, A. Ya. Zinchenko, Ya. F. Oleynik, M. I. Kuryshev, Yu. I. Arsenev, G. G. Fedorenko, Makarov, Myakotnykh, Sevastyanov, and the illegal DIMA. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.
85. Andrei Zhdanov told the founding meeting of Cominform (the post-war successor of Comintern) in September 1947 that “the principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the USA. Allied with it are Britain and France.” Zhdanov, The International Situation.
86. k-11,112-13; k-7,84.
87. Buton, Les lendemains qui déchantent; Mortimer, The Rise of the French Communist Party, chs. 9, 10; Wolton, La France sous influence, chs. 1, 2.
88. vol. 9, ch. 1.
89. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 15.
90. vol. 9, ch. 1.
91. k-11,112-13; k-7,84.
92. vol. 9, ch. 1.
93. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 86. Mitrokhin’s notes contain very little information on the content of reports from the post-war Paris residency.
94. Dewavrin had resigned as head of SDECE in February 1946.
95. Vosjoli, Lamia, ch. 6; Porch, The French Secret Services, ch. 11.
96. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 17.
97. k-6,91. WEST’s other “contacts” in the DGER/SDECE, included members of the Italian and Spanish sections, and PASCAL who in 1946 was posted abroad.
98. k-6,92.
99. Recollection of the KGB defector Peter Deriabin: Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, p. 237n.
100. Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 78-9; Buton, Les lendemains qui déchantent, p. 259.
101. t-1,24; t-2,25. Manac’h’s other case officers were M. M. Baklanov, Tikhonov, Kiselev, Nagornov and S. I. Gavrilov.
102. k-4,32,176,179; t-1,42.
103. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 6.
104. vol. 9, ch. 1, paras. 18-19.
105. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 31.
106. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 51. The Paris residency, however, complained of continuing staff shortages. In 1948 the Paris residency had a total of eighteen operational officers and technical support staff. Nine further intelligence officers whom the Centre had intended to send to Paris were refused visas. Attempts were made, with only limited success, to make good the shortfall both by setting up a new illegal residency and by coopting residency translators and typists as well as staff from the Soviet embassy, trade and other missions for operational intelligence work. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 50.
107. See below, chapter 27.
108. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 159, 165. 109. Rees, A Chapter of Accidents, p. 7; Penrose and Freeman, Conspiracy of Silence, pp. 324-7.
110. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 9.
111. vol. 7, ch. 10.
112. Cecil, A Divided Life, chs. 6, 7.
113. The Times (January 2, 1951).
114. Minute by Maclean (December 21, 1950), PRO FO 371/81613 AU 1013/52.
115. Philby, My Silent War, p. 134.
116. Though six telegrams in 1945 referred to Philby under the codename STANLEY, they appear not to have been decrypted until some years later; VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 1, pp. 263-7, 272, 275-6. A total of thirty telegrams exchanged between the Centre and the London residency, mostly in 1945, were eventually decrypted in whole or in part by Anglo-American codebreakers.
117. Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, pp. xxvii-xxviii.
118. Fuchs told his interrogator that his last contact with Soviet intelligence had been in February or March 1949. That may have been his last meeting with his controller. Williams, Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy, p. 186. See also Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, ch. 12.
119. Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, pp. xxvii-xxviii. The US government lacked the evidence to prosecute Weisband for espionage, but he was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for contempt after failing to attend a federal grand jury hearing on Communist Party activity.
120. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 7.
121. Philby, My Silent War, p. 146.
122. See above, chapter 9.
123. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. It is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether Philby refused contact with the legal residencies from the moment of his arrival in the United States in 1949 or in the following year. Unsurprisingly, Philby made no mention in his memoirs or published interviews of the failings of the American residencies.
124. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 186-7.
125. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 151-2. Burgess arrived at the Washington embassy as second secretary in August 1950. On Philby’s house at 4100 Nebraska Avenue, NW, see Kessler, Undercover Washington, pp. 93-5.
126. Newton, The Butcher’s Embrace, pp. 305-11; Knightley, Philby, pp. 167-8.
127. According to HARRY’s KGB file, the out-of-date passport in the name of Kovalik was no. 214595, issued by the State Department in Washington on April 29, 1930. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
128. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
129. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. On the use of the Batory to transport Soviet agents to the United States, cf. Budenz, Men Without Faces, pp. 19, 64, 68.
130. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
131. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. There is no suggestion that either Senator Flanders or his family were aware that HARRY was a Soviet illegal.
132. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
133. Newton, The Butcher’s Embrace, p. 281.
134. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
135. Newton, The Butcher’s Embrace, pp. 281-2.
136. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 152-4.
137. Cecil, A Divided Life, p. 118.
138. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, pp. 240-1.
139. This is acknowledged by Yuri Modin (Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 199).
140. Philby, My Silent War, p. 156. The KGB claim that the escapades which led to Burgess’s recall were pre-planned is not corroborated by Mitrokhin’s notes; they were much in line with similar, unpremeditated “scrapes” over the previous few years.
141. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
142. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 199-201.
143. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 202-3.
144. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 203-4; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 338-9.
145. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 404; Cecil, A Divided Life, pp. 135ff.
146. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 16.
147. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 17.
148. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 19.
149. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 251.
150. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 19.
151. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 18.
152. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
153. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 157-9.
154. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
155. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. In 1953 the illegal VIK also lost a hollow coin containing a microfilm message.
156. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 19.
157. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 406; Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 213-18. Modin is apparently unaware that Colville had recorded his 1939 meetings with Cairncross in his diary, and is wrongly skeptical of his ability to identify Cairncross as the author of a note describing one of those meetings, found in Burgess’s flat.
158. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 221-4, 229-32; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 406-7. Blunt finally confessed in 1964 in return for a guarantee of immunity from prosecution. He was not publicly identified as a former Soviet agent until 1979.
159. Philby, My Silent War, ch. 12; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 407-8; Knightley, Philby, pp. 147-8; Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 224, 228-32.
160. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 284.
161. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6.
Chapter Ten The Main Adversary Part I
1. t-7,12; k-13,267; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. Mitrokhin’s notes omit to record Grigulevich’s alias as a Costa Rican diplomat, but the other details he provides (for example, the fact that on May 14, 1952 Grigulevich presented his letters of credence as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Rome to the Italian president, Luigi Einaudi) clearly identify Grigulevich as “Teodoro B. Castro.” The members of the Costa Rican delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly are listed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings, p. xiv.
2. See above, chapter 6.
3. k-13,370.
4. k-13,267; k-26,194. The two other leading members of the Costa Rican delegation to Rome were Francisco Orlich, Minister of Public Works, and Daniel Oduber, ambassador in Paris (later president of Costa Rica from 1974 to 1978, and in 1980 deputy chairman of the Socialist International). Grigulevich appears to have won their confidence, too; his wife was received by them when she visited Costa Rica in 1952. On Figueres’s role in restoring constitutional government in Costa Rica, see Bird, Costa Rica, ch. 10.
5. k-13,267.
6. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 580-1.
7. k-13,267; t-7,12; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly Sixth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 20.
8. k-13,267.
9. See above, chapter 9.
10. The VENONA decrypts led to very few arrests of Soviet spies, largely because SIGINT was considered too secret to be used in court, even in closed session. Even had it been used, it would have been open to a variety of legal challenges.
11. See above, chapters 7-8.
12. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, ch. 4.
13. See above, chapter 9.
14. The Illegals Directorate planned a network of 28 “documentation agents” in Austria, 24 in East Germany, 24 in West Germany, 15 in France, 13 in the United States, 12 in Britain, 12 in Italy, 10 in Canada, 10 in Belgium, 9 in Mexico, 8 in Iran, 6 in Lebanon and 6 in Turkey (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4). The large number of agents in Germany and Austria reflected the high proportion of Soviet illegals posing as refugees from East Germany.
15. Operations officers specializing in illegal documentation were posted to the legal residencies in New York, Washington, Ottawa, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, Vienna, Athens, Istanbul, Tehran, Beirut, Calcutta, Karachi and Cairo. Those posted to New York were M. N. Korneyev, V. N. Danilin and A. M. Tikhomirov. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4.
16. See above, chapter 9.
17. vol. 7, ch. 11, item 2.
18. vol. 8, ch. 8.
19. Sawatsky, For Services Rendered, p. 34.
20. vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 5-6.
21. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 7.
22. Sawatsky, For Services Rendered, p. 34.
23. Soboloff’s father had left Canada to work at Magnitogorsk in 1931. David and his mother followed in 1935. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 7.
24. Sawatsky, For Services Rendered, pp. 38-40.
25. Though the KGB file noted by Mitrokhin names HART’s lover, it seems unfair to identify her.
26. vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 14, 18.
27. Sawatsky, For Services Rendered, pp. 44-53, 66-7. Interviews by Christopher Andrew with Terry Guernsey in Toronto, October 1991.
28. vol. 8, ch. 2. On the Centre’s criticisms of the Ottawa residency see above, pp. 180-1.
29. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 9.
30. Sawatsky, For Services Rendered, pp. 53-4.
31. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 9. On EMMA, see also k-8,82.
32. On Hambleton’s career prior to his recruitment, see Heaps, Hugh Hambleton, Spy; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, ch. 8; Barron, KGB Today, ch. 9.
33. vol. 8, ch. 8; vol. 8, app. 1, item 87.
34. See below, chapter 12.
35. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
36. vol. 8, ch. 8; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
37. vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 11, 20.
38. Sawatsky, For Services Rendered, pp. 64-71.
39. vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 10,20.
40. Sawatsky, For Services Rendered, p. 27.
41. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 14.
42. vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 10, 12.
43. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 13.
44. vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 15, 20.
45. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 16. Remarkably, HART survived fifteen years’ imprisonment (five in solitary confinement, three in a normal prison cell and seven in labor camp), and was later exfiltrated to the West by SIS. He now lives in Canada.
46. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 20. In January 1964 a KGB officer traveling to Winnipeg with a scientific and cultural delegation and the Igor Moiseyev Folk Dance Group tried to reestablish contact with Morrison, but without success. An investigation by agent ANTHEA then established that he had moved house. The Centre later planned to involve Morrison in the hunt for two illegals, Yevgeni Runge (MAKS) and Valentina Rush (ZINA), who defected to the CIA in Berlin in 1967. But though attempts by the Ottawa residency to locate Morrison continued intermittently until 1974 they were unsuccessful (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5; vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 21). In May 1986 Morrison was sentenced to eighteen months in jail for offenses against the Official Secrets Act (Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, p. 149).
47. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 19.
48. k-4,207; k-11,130. From 1961 to 1964 Grinchenko worked in Cuba as a consultant to the illegals directorate of the DGI; k-11,130.
49. On Fisher, see above, chapter 9.
50. Olavi Åhman (codenamed VIRTANEN) was a veteran of the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; k-27,451.
51. Bernikow, Abel, chs. 2-3.
52. The message was finally decrypted in 1957, with the assistance of cipher material given by VIK to the FBI and other material discovered by the Bureau in MARK’s flat after his arrest. Lamphere, The FBI-KGB War, pp. 270-1, 274-5.
53. k-3,80; k-8,83. ORIZO’s main motivation seems to have been financial. In Paris, he had been paid 40,000 francs a month; Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate how much he was paid in New York.
54. k-8,91.
55. k-3,80. ORIZO continued work as a Soviet agent until 1980.
56. Bernikow, Abel, pp. 171-2.
57. Bernikow, Abel, chs. 3-4. Even after his arrest, MARK failed to realize that VIK had never been under surveillance by the FBI. He told his lawyer that “he now believed that Hayhanen had been secretly apprehended in December [1956] by the FBI and had met [him] thereafter on orders from Federal agents” (Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge, p. 39).
58. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
59. Bernikow, Abel, pp. 86-95.
60. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
61. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
62. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2, n. 11.
63. Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge, pp. 179-80; Bernikow, Abel, pp. 242-4.
64. Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge, p. 257.
65. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
66. Bernikow, Abel, pp. 223-4.
67. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
68. Also on February 10, 1962 Frederic L. Pryor, a Yale student accused of espionage in East Berlin, was released at Checkpoint Charlie.
69. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
70. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
71. Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge, p. 418.
72. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
74. While in New York “Abel” had sent to Moscow, at the GRU’s request, large-scale maps of American cities. Though this was not a very demanding assignment in the United States, similar maps were unobtainable for Soviet cities.
75. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
76. Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge, pp. 275, 414.
77. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
78. The SVR, which still propagates the heroic “Abel” myth, claimed in 1995 that, “Secrecy requirements do not yet allow the disclosure of many of the operations in which MARK participated.” Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 156-9.
79. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 141-2.
Chapter Eleven The Main Adversary Part 2
1. See above, chapter 9.
2. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.
3. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.
4. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 186-7.
5. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 245-6.
6. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.
7. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 188-9.
8. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2. The Gallery Orlov, originally in South Pitt Street, Alexandria, later moved to King Street in the Old Town (Kessler, Undercover Washington, pp. 125-6).
9. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 191-4.
10. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.
11. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2. Mrs. Orlov said later that her husband had told her the Soviet embassy had agreed to his request for asylum for them and their two young sons (Wise, Molehunt, p. 192).
12. Wise, Molehunt, ch. 13.
13. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 17, 41.
14. Kessler, Undercover Washington, p. 126.
15. k-4,136.
16. Barron, KGB, ch. 10. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 464-6.
17. k-4,136.
18. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 465-6.
19. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 144.
20. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11.
21. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, pp. 134-40.
22. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11.
23. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 141.
24. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11. From 1960 to 1963 the GRU had an important agent-in-place at NSA, Staff Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap (like Mitchell and Martin, a walk-in). In 1963 Victor Norris Hamilton, a former employee of NSA who had been forced to resign in 1959 because of mental illness, defected to the Soviet Union and gave a press conference much like Mitchell’s and Martin’s in 1960. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 462-4. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, pp. 151-4.
25. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 77.
26. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, pp. 142-3.
27. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11. Mitrokhin’s notes on the 500 rouble monthly allowance are taken from Mitchell’s file and refer only to him. However, two years later, Martin told a reporter from The New York Times, whom he met in a chance encounter in a Leningrad café, that he had been given the same allowance. Theodore Shabad, “Defector from US Resigned to Soviet Union,” The New York Times (June 24, 1962). Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 148. When Mitchell got a job, he was paid 100 roubles as a monthly salary and another 400 as a subsidy; vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11.
28. Information on Mitchell from vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11; on Martin from Shabad, “Defector from US Resigned to Soviet,” The New York Times (June 24, 1962).
29. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11.
30. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 149. Martin died in Moscow of acute leukemia in 1986.
31. The source of the alarmist KGB report of Pentagon plans for a nuclear attack was “a document sent by a[n unidentified] liaison officer with the CIA to his own government” (Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” pp. 51-2). Though General Curtis LeMay, the belligerent head of Strategic Air Command, privately used the language of the pre-emptive strike, this never had any prospect of becoming the policy of the Eisenhower administration. Such language, however, caused some concern among the United States’ NATO allies. The British JIC, though believing it “highly unlikely that, with her democratic method of government and her close ties with other Western nations, [the USA] would ever provoke a war,” concluded in 1954 that it was “just possible that given (a) a more extreme government in the US, (b) increased US lack of confidence in some or all of her Western allies owing to political development in their countries, (c) some sudden advance in the USA in the sphere of weapons, etc., the counsels of impatience might get the upper hand.” JIC(54) 37 (I owe this information to Alex Craig of Christ’s College, Cambridge, currently completing a groundbreaking PhD on the JIC in the early Cold War).
Recently declassified US documents indicate that, under specified emergency conditions, senior American commanders had “predelegated” presidential authority to use nuclear weapons (Paul Lashmar, “Dr. Strangelove’s Secrets,” Independent, September 8, 1998). It is possible, but by no means certain, that a report of this from the KGB’s source, together with LeMay’s apocalyptic rhetoric, fueled the Centre’s fear of an American first strike.
32. Feklisov, Za okeanom i na ostrove, pp. 199-201. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 236-40.
33. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 257ff.
34. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 242.
35. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 267ff.
36. Shelepin to Khrushchev, memorandum no. 1861-Sh (July 29, 1961). Decree no. 191/75-GS. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Cf. Zubok, “Spy vs. Spy,” pp. 28-30; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 253-5.
37. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 278-9; Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 52-4.
38. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” pp. 155, 168. On American covert action against Castro, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 271-2, 274-6, 280.
39. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” ch. 9.
40. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 282-90.
41. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 285-95; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 258-66; Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 52-4.
42. See above, chapters 7, 8.
43. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Mitrokhin’s notes add nothing to this admirable analysis, based on privileged access to SVR files, of KGB sources of political intelligence in Washington during the missile crisis. There is no indication in files noted by Mitrokhin to which Fursenko and Naftali did not have access, notably those on illegals, of any significant source which they have overlooked.
44. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 65.
45. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 237-8. Sakharovsky’s melancholy expression is clearly evident in the photograph which accompanies his official SVR hagiography (Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 133-5).
46. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 66, 75, 85n.
47. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 266-7. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” ch. 14. On October 26, Feklisov, the Washington resident, had two, now celebrated, meetings with the ABC diplomatic correspondent, John Scali, whom he knew had good access to the White House, to discuss ways to end the crisis. Kennedy was convinced that Feklisov spoke for Khrushchev personally. The KGB archives, however, show that he did not. Feklisov played no role either in Khrushchev’s proposal on October 26 to resolve the crisis by an American guarantee of Cuban territorial integrity, or in his attempt on October 27 to trade US bases in Turkey for Soviet missile sites in Cuba. It is possible that Shelepin, who—unlike Semichastny—was a member of the Presidium, had encouraged Semichastny to use a meeting between Feklisov and Scali to try to extract a US proposal to settle the crisis which would make the Soviet climbdown less humiliating. Because of the incomplete nature of KGB files on this episode, together with the conflict of oral evidence between Feklisov, Scali and Semichastny, it may never be possible to establish what led up to the meeting on the Soviet side. Fursenko and Naftali, “Using KGB Documents”; Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 80-3.
48. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 267. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” pp. 284-6.
49. The fullest account of Penkovsky’s career is Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World.
50. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.
51. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
53. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.
54. vol. 2, app. 3.
55. On Golitsyn’s impact on Angleton and the CIA, see Wise, Molehunt, and Mangold, Cold Warrior.
56. vol. 1, app. 3; vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1. On the US embassy’s decision to return Cherepanov’s documents, see Wise, Molehunt, pp. 121-3.
57. See below, chapter 22.
58. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; Nosenko’s codename appears in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
59. vol. 2, app. 3.
60. The VPK also tasked the GRU, the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), a secret unit in the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for External Economic Relations (GKES). Most of the ST it received came from the KGB and GRU. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 622-3.
61. k-5,476.
62. k-5,473.
63. URBAN may be a post-war codename for the unidentified wartime agent PERS referred to in the VENONA decrypts. On KGB/SVR attempts to confuse identification of PERS, see Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, pp. 156, 271.
64. Mitrokhin’s note, in Russian, identifies BERG’s employee as “Consolidated Vacuum.” This is probably a reference to Sperry-Rand (UNIVAC); it is known that UNIVAC computers were high on the list of ST targets (Tuck, High-Tech Espionage, ch. 11).
65. vol. 6, ch. 6.
66. Romerstein and Levchenko, The KGB against the Main Enemy, pp. 266-7; Richelson, A Century of Spies, pp. 279-82.
67. vol. 6, ch. 6.
68. Judy, “The Case of Computer Technology.”
69. vol. 6, app. 1, part 27.
70. k-5,473.
71. k-5,369.
72. vol. 6, app. 1, part 39.
73. k-5,475.
74. On the time lag between US and Soviet computer technology, see Judy, “The Case of Computer Technology”; and Ammann, Cooper and Davies (eds.), The Technological Level of Soviet Industry, ch. 8.
75. Judy, “The Case of Computer Technology,” p. 66.
76. k-5,476.
77. vol. 6, ch. 6.
78. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1; vol. 10, ch. 2, para. 7.
Chapter Twelve The Main Adversary Part 3
1. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. The KGB Collegium also proposed establishing networks of illegal residencies to take over the main burden of intelligence operations in Canada, Mexico, West Germany and China.
2. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. Unusually, Mitrokhin’s notes from KONOV’s file do not record the real name of either himself or his wife.
3. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. No details are available of KONOV’s ST.
4. vol. 8, app. 3a.
5. ALBERT’s and GERA’s KGB files record that they were issued with Belgian passports nos. 26862/37/41 and 26861/36/41 valid until April 8, 1961. vol. 8, app. 3a.
6. vol. 8, app. 3a.
7. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.
8. vol. 8, app. 3, item 7.
9. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.
10. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 294-320. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1. During his interview with Barron, Valoushek used the cover name “Zemenek.”
11. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 320-7; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 154-5.
12. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.
13. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 3.
14. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 388-90; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 170-1.
15. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 5; vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 3, 4. In 1975 alone Hambleton had meetings with Pyatin in Washington, with V. G. Matsenov in New York, with S. S. Sadauskas in Vienna and with A. Rusakov in Prague. His other foreign missions took in Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.
16. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give IVANOVA’s name.
17. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 330-1.
18. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1; vol. 8, app. 8, item 87.
19. k-8,78; k-19,158; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify LENA.
20. k-8,78.
21. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
22. vol. 6, app. 2, parts 3, 5.
23. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. It is not clear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether Feder was a “live” or a “dead double.”
24. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
25. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3. Like other Steinway customers, Governor Rockefeller can, of course, scarcely be blamed for failing to realize that his piano tuner was a KGB illegal. There is no evidence in Mitrokhin’s notes that Rudenko had contact with him.
26. Dobrynin, Anatoly, In Confidence, p. 377.
27. Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 90-3.
28. Kramer and Roberts, “I Never Wanted to be Vice-President of Anything!,” pp. 8-9.
29. Schonberg, Horowitz, chs. 15-17. Mitrokhin’s notes, probably like the KGB file on which they are based, do not make clear exactly how great a part RYBAKOV played in tuning Horowitz’s pianos. The CD 186 was originally tuned by the Steinway chief technician, Franz Mohr.
30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
31. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; t-7,304.
32. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. RYBAKOV’s file gives his Moscow address as 108 Mir Prospect, apartment 120.
33. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 375.
34. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. The main regional priorities for the establishment of illegal residencies in the period 1969-75, apart from North America, were the major states of western Europe, China and the Middle East. With the exception of the United States, where it was intended to establish ten residencies, no state was to have more than two.
35. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 3.
36. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 335-6.
37. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.
38. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 337-41, 349-51. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.
39. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 355-71.
40. Though not identified by Mitrokhin, LUTZEN was probably the defector Rupert Sigl, who had worked for the KGB in Karlshorst from 1957 to 1969.
41. vol. 6, ch. 13, part 1.
42. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 3.
43. Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 176, 179-83.
44. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 4.
45. Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 151-4, 184-5. In June 1986 Hambleton was moved to a Canadian jail and released under mandatory supervision in March 1989.
46. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, app. 2, part 1; k-16,89.
47. The fullest published account of the Koecher case is in Kessler, Spy vs Spy (based in part on interviews with the Koechers after their return to Czechoslovakia in 1986). There are some further details in Earley, Confessions of a Spy, ch. 6, and Kessler, “Moscow’s Mole in the CIA,” Washington Post (April 17, 1988). Karl Koecher’s early career is summarized in k-8,110.
48. k-19,96.
49. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 52-63. Kessler, Undercover Washington, pp. 33-4.
50. k-19, 96. Hana Koecher was given the rather obvious KGB codename HANKA.
51. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 60, 245.
52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 2; k-8,110.
53. t-7,306; vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), part 2. Ogorodnik appears to have been recruited by the CIA while serving in Bogotá in 1974, and to have supplied microfilm copies of hundreds of secret Soviet documents, summaries of which were circulated by the CIA to the White House, the National Security Council and the State Department. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 428-9.
54. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 139-44, 152-8, 233-6; Kessler, “Moscow’s Mole in the CIA,” Washington Post, (April 17, 1988).
55. Hana Koecher sued the journalist, Egon Lansky, who had published the story about her and her husband. The case was dismissed and costs awarded against her. Tom Gross, “Spy’s Wife Gets a Job with Our Man in Prague,” Sunday Telegraph (March 5, 1995).
56. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.
57. vol. 6, app. 2, part 4.
Chapter Thirteen The Main Adversary Part 4
1. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1n.
2. See below, chapter 15.
3. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 209-10, 513. According to Dobrynin, “Andropov was cautious enough not to interfere in Gromyko’s everyday management of foreign policy, and Gromyko for his part respected Andropov’s growing influence in the Politburo.”
4. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 85, n. 7. FCD intelligence analysis, however, seems to have remained comparatively undeveloped by the standards of the British JIC, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence and other major Western assessment agencies.
5. See below, chapters 15 and 19.
6. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 322. The letter contained simply routine proposals for strengthening the role of the CPSU.
7. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 257. During the final months of Brezhnev’s life, however, Andropov began to circulate stories about the corruption of Brezhnev’s family and entourage as part of his strategy to eliminate rivals to the succession. Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, p. 426.
8. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 130.
9. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 6-8; Chazov, Zdorov’ye i Vlast, pp. 115-44.
10. vol. 6, app. 2, part 6.
11. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 3; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 12, 41.
12. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 83. Kalugin does not give Lipka’s name or codename and refers to him only as “a ‘walk-in’ who came to us in the mid-1960s, explaining that he was involved in shredding and destroying NSA documents.” A later analysis by the Centre singled out 200 documents from NSA, the CIA, State Department and other federal agencies as of particular value. Mitrokhin’s notes, alas, give no details of their contents.
13. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 3; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 12, 26, 28, 41; k-8,78. Lipka’s file includes his and his father’s addresses during the 1970s, as well as details of his wife’s work at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, together with her telephone number at the hospital.
14. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 84-9.
15. Studies of the Walker case include Barron, Breaking the Ring; Blum, I Pledge Allegiance.
16. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 83.
17. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 89. The fact that Walker’s file was held by the Sixteenth Department, separately from most other FCD files, explains why Mitrokhin never saw it. There are probably other Sixteenth Department agents of whom he was also unaware.
18. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, pp. 7-8.
19. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 89.
20. The KGB officers who took part in running MAREK were P. V. Yatskov, B. P. Kolymakov, Ye. N. Gorlitsyn, V. F. Perchik, Ye. V. Piskarev, G. N. Pustnyatsev, V. M. Bogachev, Ye. A. Belov, V. N. Gordeyev, A. V. Bolshakov, S. V. Sychev, V. N. Melnikov, A. A. Alekseyev, S. Ye. Muzhchinin, V. S. Miroshnikov, V. A. Revin, N. V. Medved, I. K. Baranov, V. I. Kucherov, V. S. Loginov, V. I. Shpakevich, I. S. Pakhmonov, V. V. Makarov, A. M. Gvosdev and L. K. Kostanyan. Even after Agee revealed that MAREK was a plant, some in the Centre did not regard the evidence as conclusive.
21. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, pp. 91-2.
22. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 111-12. Though Mitrokhin does not identify Sedov by name, he confirms the access to Kissinger by an “operations officer.”
23. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 117.
24. t-7,321.
25. Dobrynin, In Confidence.
26. Barron, KGB, pp. 25-7. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 240-3. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 19, 40.
27. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40. There is no evidence in Mitrokhin’s notes that the cultivation of Waldheim was successful.
28. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, pp. 331-2.
29. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 4, 19; t-3,69, k-24,228.
30. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4, n. 1.
31. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.
32. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 3, 41; t-2,258.
33. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2; vol. 6, app. 1, part 41.
34. vol. 6, app. 1, part 16. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper Malkin Sesi reported on May 18, 1985 that, according to intelligence supplied by Washington to the Turkish government, Ozgur had worked as a Soviet spy from 1974 to 1977.
35. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
36. vol. 6, ch. 4; k-8,103,447.
37. vol. 6, app. 1, part 38.
38. vol. 6, app. 1, part 4; t-3,56.
39. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 11, 39; k-22,71.
40. vol. 6, app. 1, part 33.
41. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2. Mitrokhin does not give REM’s identity. As was frequently the case, the same codename was given to several other agents. None of the others seems to fit the Washington REM.
42. k-22,207.
43. t-1,75.
44. vol. 6, ch. 4; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 16, 19.
45. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.
46. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
47. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2, n. 2.
48. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
49. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 72-5.
50. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 103.
51. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 355.
52. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
53. Kramer and Roberts, “I Never Wanted to be Vice-President of Anything!,” p. 23.
54. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
55. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 377-8.
56. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
57. In 1977 Lomov returned to New York with his deputy director, Yuri Mikhailovich Zabrodin, for a three-month visit. His main KGB mission on this occasion was to investigate research on interrogation techniques which, the Centre hoped, would cause those it interrogated to have no subsequent memory of their replies to questions. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 5.
58. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
59. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.
60. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.
61. See below, chapter 17.
62. vol. 6, ch. 7. Mitrokhin identifies VLADIMIROV as deputy director of the institute, but does not give his name. Cf. Barron, KGB Today, p. 265.
63. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 6.
64. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 112.
65. vol. 6, app. 1, part 6.
66. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 485.
67. vol. 5, section 10.
68. vol. 6, ch. 3, parts 2, 3.
69. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 306-7.
70. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1, n. 3.
71. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.
72. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 302-3. Kalugin considered the tone of Andropov’s cable “paranoid.”
73. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 351.
74. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 523.
75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582-603. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.
76. Shvets, Washington Station, pp. 29, 74-5. Shvets had access to Androsov’s reports as a member of the FCD First (North American) Department from 1982 to 1985, and was then posted to Washington as a Line PR officer in Androsov’s residency.
77. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 591-605.
78. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 471-7.
79. Izvestia (September 24, 1991).
80. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” pp. 226-7.
81. vol. 6, ch. 6.
82. See, for example, Kryuchkov’s 1984 analysis of “the deepening economic and social crisis in the capitalist world.” Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 33-4.
83. vol. 6, app. 1, part 41. Mitrokhin did not record the statistics for the San Francisco residency.
84. vol. 6, ch. 6.
85. Mitrokhin’s notes give the recruitment dates of fifteen ST agents who began work for the KGB in the 1970s: ANTON (1975), ARAM (1975), CHEKHOV/YAYKAL (1976), MAG (1974), MIKE (1973), OTPRYSK (1974), SARKIS (1974), SATURN (1978), SOFT (1971), TROP (1979), TURIST (1977), UGNYUS (1974), ZENIT (1978) and two others whose codenames cannot be published (recruited in 1975-6). VIL appears to have been recruited earlier. Other ST agents active in the USA during the 1970s, whose recruitment dates do not appear in Mitrokhin’s notes, were LONG, PATRIOT and RIDEL. Mitrokhin also identifies five trusted contacts recruited during the 1970s: KLARA (1972), KURT (1973), TSORN (1977), VELLO (1973) and VEYT (1973). In the case of a further eight members of the ST network in 1970s (FOGEL, FREY, IZOLDA, OZON, ROZHEK, SPRINTER, TEP-LOTEKNIK and VAYS), it is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes which were fully recruited agents and which were trusted contacts. The notes give no dates for the activities of another eight ST agents and trusted contacts probably active in the 1970s: ALGORITMAS, AUTOMOBILIST, CHARLES, KLIM, LIR, ODISSEY, PAVEL and RUTH. Mitrokhin’s notes on all those listed above are relatively brief, varying in length from a few lines to a paragraph. A majority of both agents and trusted contacts are identified by name. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 38, 39; k-14,171; k-18,380-2; t-1,138, 290,294-5,297-301; t-2,109,161-2; t-7,77.
86. FREY was an agent and PAVEL a trusted contact in IBM (vol. 6, app. 1, parts 5, 27). Agent SATURN occupied a senior scientific post in McDonnell Douglas (vol. 6, app. 1, parts 27, 32). Agent ZENIT was a scientist in TRW (vol. 6, app. 1, part 27).
87. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 2, 32.
88. vol. 6, app. 1, part 38. The case of another scientist at one of the best-known US universities cannot be referred to for legal reasons; vol. 6, app. 1, part 32.
89. vol. 6, app. 1, part 33.
90. vol. 6, app. 1, part 31. DARCOM has since become the Army Materiel Command (AMC).
91. The latest date for which Mitrokhin provides statistics on the total numbers of ST agents run by the New York and Washington residencies is 1970; he provides no statistics on the agents run by the San Francisco residency.
92. Lindsey, The Falcon and the Snowman. Boyce escaped from prison in 1980, but was recaptured a year later and sentenced to an additional three years for escaping and twenty-five years for robbing seventeen banks while on the run (Lindsey, The Flight of the Falcon).
93. vol. 6, app. 1, part 27. Mitrokhin’s brief note on ZENIT’s recruitment gives no details of the intelligence he supplied. Other important intelligence on satellite surveillance included the operating manual for KH-11, the most advanced US SIGINT satellite. Early in 1978 William Kampiles, who had been briefly employed by the CIA Watch Center, presented a copy of it to the KGB residency in Athens. He was unaware, however, that the KGB officer who received it, Sergei Ivanovich Bokhan, had been recruited several years earlier by the CIA. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, p. 120.
94. This calculation appears to have been based on the estimated saving in imports paid for in hard currency. Brezhnev was informed that the economic benefit of ST for the Soviet defense industry had not been calculated. vol. 6, ch. 6.
95. Similar reports on ST successes were sent to Kosygin, the prime minister, and Ustinov, the Defence Minister.
96. vol. 6, ch. 6.
97. t-7,105.
98. vol. 6, ch. 6.
99. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 622.
100. In 1965 the United States had accounted for over 90 percent of the VPK’s requirements.
101. Documents supplied by the French agent in Directorate T, Vladimir Vetrov (codenamed FAREWELL); cited by Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260. On Vetrov, see Andrew and Gordievsky, Le KGB dans le monde, 1917-1990, pp. 619-23. For the text of some of Vetrov’s documents, see Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage. Vetrov’s documents and Mitrokhin’s notes complement each other.
102. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage, p. 31.
103. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s notes identify 106 of the KGB’s agents within the Soviet scientific community; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 6.
104. vol. 6, ch. 6.
105. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 2, 32.
106. vol. 6, app. 1, parts 27, 32.
107. vol. 6, ch. 6.
108. Kessler, Spy vs Spy, pp. 167-8.
109. Also targeted by western European residencies were the US Atomic Energy Commission, the Battelle Memorial Institute, Dow Chemicals, Dupont de Nemours, GTE, Arthur D. Little Inc., Litton Industries Inc., the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and RCA. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate which—if any—residencies had particular responsibilities for these targets; k-5,424. The National Institute of Health was targeted because of its research on the effects of chemical and biological warfare; vol. 6, ch. 6.
110. vol. 6, app. 1, part 1; t-7,8,77.
111. vol. 2, app. 3.
112. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, p. 338.
113. US government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology
114. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.
115. vol. 2, app. 3.
116. k-5,504.
117. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage, pp. 10, 23.
118. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 182.
119. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 641-2.
120. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 37, 49-50.
121. Recollections by Oleg Gordievsky of Gorbachev’s address; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 621.
122. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” pp. 228-9.
123. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.
124. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 40-9, 115-17.
125. The fullest account of the Ames case, and the only one to benefit from interviews with Ames himself, is Earley, Confessions of a Spy. On the agents betrayed by Ames, see pp. 143-5. According to the SVR, several of the Western agents named by Ames had already been identified from other leads.
126. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
127. Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 424-6.
128. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 212-17. Operation RYAN was not finally canceled until Primakov became head of foreign intelligence in October 1991; Richelson, A Century of Spies, p. 421.
129. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 627-8. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 217-18.
130. Shebarshin’s foreign postings had included a term as main resident in India from 1975 to 1977.
131. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 620-1.
132. “Intelligence Service Divorces from the KGB,” Izvestia (September 24, 1991).
133. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
134. On the Soviet economy in the Gorbachev era, see Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, ch. 5.
135. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/0955 (December 24, 1990), C4/3ff; SU/0946 (December 13, 1990), B/1.
136. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
137. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/0946 (December 13, 1990), B/1. Much the same conspiracy theory had been expounded in a secret circular to residencies almost six years earlier; Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 152-9.
138. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 218-22; More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 125-8.
139. Kryuchkov continued to advance this preposterous conspiracy theory and to complain that, though he submitted a file on the case to Gorbachev, he repeatedly reneged on a promise to look into it. Remnick, Resurrection, p. 86.
Chapter Fourteen Political Warfare
1. Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, no. 11.
2. “Chief Conclusions and Views Adopted at the Meeting of [FCD] Heads of Service,” ref. 156/54 (February 1, 1984); Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 30-44.
3. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 629.
4. On Modin, see chapter 9.
5. See above, chapters 9 and 12.
6. An extract from the report appears in Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, pp. 307-8.
7. Golson (ed.), The Playboy Interview, p. 135.
8. Posner, Case Closed, p. 371; Summers, Conspiracy, p. 36.
9. Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, p. 124.
10. Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, p. 308.
11. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 111.
12. Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, p. 308.
13. The best and fullest account of Oswald’s period in the Soviet Union is in Mailer, Oswald’s Tale. Mailer had access to many of the voluminous KGB files on Oswald, which include transcripts of conversations in his bugged flat in Minsk and surveillance reports from KGB personnel who followed him wherever he went, even spying on him and his wife through a peephole in the bedroom wall to record their “intimate moments.”
14. Childs’s warning about Oswald’s letter was cited in a report by KGB chairman Semichastny to the Central Committee on December 10, 1963, of which an extract appears in Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, p. 307. Yeltsin identifies the CPUSA informant as “Brooks,” but does not reveal that this was the CPUSA alias of Jack Childs. For the text of Oswald’s letter to the CPUSA of August 28, 1963, see Mailer, Oswald’s Tale, pp. 594-5.
15. Posner, Case Closed, disposes of many of the conspiracy theories. Norman Mailer, the author of the best-documented study of Oswald, admits that he “began with a prejudice in favor of the conspiracy theorists” but finally concluded both that Oswald “had the character to kill Kennedy, and that he probably did it alone.” The most difficult unsolved question is not whether Oswald shot the President but why he did so. Oswald was both a self-obsessed fantasist and a compulsive liar. There is general agreement, however, that he had no personal hostility to Kennedy himself. The best clue to Oswald’s motives is probably that provided by the Intourist guide who first introduced him to Russia. “The most important thing for [Oswald],” she recalls, “was that he wanted to become famous. Idea Number One. He was fanatic about it” (Mailer, Oswald’s Tale, p. 321). In Dallas on November 22, 1963 Oswald seized the opportunity to become one of the best-known Americans of the twentieth century.
16. Marzani was born in Rome in 1912 and emigrated with his parents to the United States in 1923. After graduating from Williams College, Mass., in 1935, he worked for a year in publishing, then studied at Exeter College, Oxford, from 1936 to 1938. According to his KGB file, while at Oxford University (perhaps during the 1937 long vacation) he served in an anarchist brigade in the Spanish Civil War, then joined the Communist Party. On his return to the United States (probably in 1938), he became a member of the CPUSA, using the Party alias “Tony Wells.” In 1942 Marzani joined the Office of the Co-ordinator of Information (shortly to become OSS, which contained a number of other Communists and Soviet agents). When OSS was closed in September 1945, Marzani’s section was transferred to the State Department. According to his KGB file, Marzani was first recommended to the New York residency by its agent, Cedric Belfrage (CHARLIE), who during the Second World War worked for British Security Co-ordination in New York (vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2). On his transfer to the State Department, Marzani signed a sworn statement that he did not belong to, or support, “any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government by force or violence.” When later discovered to be a member of the CPUSA (officially considered to advocate that policy), he was sentenced in 1948 to two and a half years’ imprisonment. Marzani gave some details of his pre-war and wartime career in testimony to the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws on June 18, 1953, but cited the Fifth Amendment and declined to answer the main questions put to him.
17. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
18. Boffa, Inside the Khrushchev Era, p. 227.
19. The total advertising budget funded by the KGB during the seven-year period 1961-8 was 70,820 dollars. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2.
20. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 45. Marzani published over twenty books and pamphlets, written either by himself or by authors he had selected, on subjects chosen by the KGB. Several concerned the Vietnam War. Other active measures organized by Marzani included an attempt to discredit Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva (codenamed KUKUSHKA), after her flight to the United States in 1967. The KGB helped to refinance Marzani’s publishing house after it was seriously damaged in a fire in 1969. During the early 1970s, however, the KGB became increasingly dissatisfied with Marzani. According to Mitrokhin’s later notes on his file:
The [New York] Residency began to notice signs of independent behavior on the part of NORD. He began to overestimate the extent to which the Residency depended upon him, and deluded himself in thinking that he was the only person in the country capable of carrying out Soviet intelligence tasks.
Since 1974 NORD has been living in Puerto Rico; it has been difficult to communicate with him there, and he lost many intelligence opportunities.
(vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2)
21. Joesten, Oswald, p. 4. (Page references are to the English edition.)
22. Joesten, Oswald, pp. 119, 149-50.
23. Joesten, Oswald, pp. 143, 145. In the second edition, Joesten acknowledged “substantial aid” from Marzani in the “research and writing” of an appendix criticizing the Warren report (Joesten, Oswald, p. 159n.).
24. Even the sympathetic Mark Lane later wrote somewhat critically of Joesten’s book: “I had met with Carl Marzani, read proofs of the book at his request, and made some few suggestions. It was a very early work, written before the Warren Commission’s evidence was released; therefore, while timely, it was of necessity somewhat flawed and incomplete” (Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 44n).
25. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.
26. Joersten, Oswald, p. 3.
27. Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 23.
28. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3. There is no evidence that Lane did realize the source of the funding.
29. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3; t-7,102. Borovik doubtless did not identify himself to Lane as a KGB agent.
30. Lane, Plausible Denial, pp. 4, 19. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 414-15.
31. Posner, Case Closed, p. 453.
32. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.
33. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 454-5.
34. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3. Mitrokhin gives the text of the forged letter in Russian translation. For the original version, see Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, pp. 235-6. On Oswald’s dyslexia, see Mailer, Oswald’s Tale, appendix.
35. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.
36. Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, p. 236. Hurt refers to the letter as the most “singular and teasing” document to have emerged relating to the period immediately before the assassination.
37. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 3.
38. Lane, Plausible Denial, p. 187. KGB active measures probably encouraged, rather than accounted for, the Howard Hunt conspiracy theory.
39. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 311-12.
40. Also influential was the report of the House Select Committee on the JFK and King assassinations. Its draft report in December 1978 concluded that Oswald acted alone. Flawed acoustic evidence then persuaded the committee that, in addition to the three shots fired by Oswald, a fourth had been fired from a grassy knoll, thus leading it to conclude in its final report of July 1979 that there had been a conspiracy. It pointed to mobsters as the most likely conspirators. Posner, Case Closed, pp. 475-86, appendix A.
41. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 401-7, 410-11, 421. In private Church later admitted that his study of CIA assassination plots convinced him that the real rogue elephants had been in the White House: “The CIA operated as an arm of the presidency. This led presidents to conclude that they were ‘super-godfathers’ with enforcers. It made them feel above the law and unaccountable.”
42. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.
43. On Agee’s resignation from the CIA, see Barron, KGB Today, p. 228.
44. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 191-2. The KGB files noted by Mitrokhin describe Agee as an agent of the Cuban DGI and give details of his collaboration with the KGB, but do not formally list him as a KGB, as well as DGI, agent. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.
45. Agee, Inside the Company, p. viii. (Page references are to the Bantam edition.)
46. vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.
47. Agee, Inside the Company, p. 659.
48. The London residency eventually became dissatisfied with Cheporov, claiming that he “used his co-operation with the KGB for his own benefit” and “expressed improper criticism of the system in the USSR.” k-14,115.
49. vol. 6, app. 1, part 22.
50. Agee, On The Run, pp. 111-12, 120-1.
51. Agee, On The Run, p. 123.
52. vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 46.
53. The defense committee also took up the case of an American journalist, Mark Hosenball, who had also been served with a deportation order. Unlike Agee, however, Hosenball had no contact with the committee and took no part in its campaign. In the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin there is no mention of Hosenball, save for a passing reference to the work of the defense committee.
54. Agee, On The Run, chs. 7, 8; Kelly, “The Deportations of Philip Agee”; vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 45.
55. On the residency’s tendency to exaggerate in its influence on protest demonstrations, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 586.
56. At a private meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party on February 17, 1977, however, the Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, implied a KGB connection. Tony Benn’s diary vaguely records that the gist of Rees’s comments was that Agee and Hosenball “had been in contact or whatever with enemy agents or something.” According to Benn, Rees “got quite a reasonable hearing from the Party.” Benn, Conflicts of Interest, pp. 41-2.
57. vol. 6, ch. 14, parts 1, 2, 3; k-8,607.
58. Agee, “What Uncle Sam Wants to Know about You,” p. 113. (Page references are to the 1978 reprint in Agee and Wolf, Dirty Work.)
59. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1; vol. 7, ch. 16, para. 46.
60. Agee, “What Uncle Sam Wants to Know about You,” p. 114.
61. Agee, On The Run, pp. 255, 280-1.
62. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
63. Agee, On The Run, p. 255. Codenames of some of the RUPOR group in vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. Mitrokhin’s notes record that the group included “former CIA employees” apart from Agee, but do not identify Jim and Elsie Wilcott by name.
64. Agee, On The Run, pp. 276-82.
65. The document was also sent anonymously to the British journal Leveller, which published extracts from it in August 1979. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
66. Agee, On The Run, p. 304.
67. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
68. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
69. Agee, On The Run, p. 306.
70. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
71. Agee, On The Run, chs. 13-15.
72. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
73. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
74. “Miss Knight Pens Another Letter,” Washington Post (August 4, 1966).
75. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1. On Hoover’s contacts with Knight, cf. Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, p. 409.
76. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
77. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, ch. 4.
78. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 62.
79. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
80. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, ch. 9. The expurgated text of Sullivan’s anonymous message to King, opened by his wife Coretta, is published in Theoharis, From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover, pp. 102-3.
81. See below, chapter 17.
82. King, Why We Can’t Wait; Colaiaco, Martin Luther King, Jr., ch. 5.
83. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. The other civil rights leaders selected as targets for active measures were A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young and Roy Wilkens.
84. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
85. Colaiaco, Martin Luther King, Jr., p. 183. Moscow disapproved, however, of the Black Panthers (whom Carmichael joined in 1968), the Black Muslims and other black separatist groups who lacked what it believed was a proper sense of solidarity with the worldwide struggle against American imperialism.
86. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 247.
87. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2.
88. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. The file noted by Mitrokhin does not record the outcome of operation PANDORA. On present evidence, it is impossible to be certain which, if any, of the attacks on black organizations blamed on the Jewish Defense League were actually the work of the KGB.
89. vol. 6, ch. 10; vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1. The Soviet Union boycotted the Los Angeles Olympics in retaliation for the American boycott of the Moscow Olympics four years earlier.
90. US Department of State, Active Measures, p. 55.
91. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 176.
92. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 539. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 235-6.
93. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 256; Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 612. On the KGB targeting of Jackson and Perle, see vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
94. Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 612-15.
95. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 269.
96. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
97. On the Centre’s short-lived hopes of using Brzezinski’s Soviet contacts to exert influence on him, see above, chapter 8.
98. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 433.
99. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 375.
100. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
101. vol. 5, section 10.
102. vol. 5, section 10.
103. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 455. Vance resigned as Secretary of State after opposing the unsuccessful mission to rescue the Teheran hostages in 1980. 104. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
105. Reagan, An American Life, p. 33.
106. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 1.
107. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 459, 470, 523. Cf. above, ch. 8. On RYAN, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 583-605, and Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.
108. Order of the KGB Chairman, no. 0066 (April 12, 1982). vol. 4, indapp. 3, item 47.
109. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 590-1.
110. Reagan, An American Life, pp. 329-30.
111. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3. As well as deceiving Sekou Touré, Seliskov also made an unsuccessful attempt to recruit the CIA station chief during his visit to Conakry.
112. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 3.
113. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 630. Active measures in the Third World will be covered in more detail in the next volume.
114. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 630-1.
115. Interview with Shebarshin after his retirement, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
116. Order of the Chairman of the KGB, no. 107/OV. (September 5, 1990).
117. Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, appendix B, pp. 306-9. Among those former KGB officers who continue to propagate the old JFK conspiracy theories is Oleg Nechiporenko, who twice met Oswald in Mexico City in October 1963 and was later concerned with active measures involving Philip Agee. After his official retirement from the KGB in 1991, Nechiporenko made a number of appearances on the American lecture circuit, published his memoirs in English and was interviewed by Dan Rather in a CBS special on the JFK assassination. Nechiporenko, however, has become confused by the distinction between the original version of the KGB conspiracy theory of the assassination involving oil magnate H. L. Hunt and a later version which targeted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt. His book, Passport to Assassination, which argues that the “billionaire E. Howard Hunt played a special role” in the assassination, confuses the two Hunts. Nechiporenko also claims that the CIA was probably involved. Passport to Assassination, p. 135.
Chapter Fifteen Progress Operations Part 1
1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, ch. 9.
2. Leonhard, Child of the Revolution, p. 303. Leonhard accompanied Ulbricht back from Moscow.
3. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, ch. 9.
4. Szász, Volunteers for the Gallows, p. 105.
5. Flocken and Scholz, Ernst Wollweber.
6. After being expelled from the Party in 1958, Wollweiser lived in obscurity until his death in 1967. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 64-5.
7. Kopácsi, Au nom de la classe ouvrière, pp. 119-22. Mikoyan and Suslov, who also arrived secretly in Budapest at the beginning of the revolution, reported to Moscow on October 24, “One of the most serious mistakes of the Hungarian comrades was the fact that, before twelve midnight last night, they did not permit anyone to shoot at participants in the riots” (“Soviet Documents on the Hungarian Revolution,” p. 29).
8. Kopácsi, Au nom de la classe ouvrière, pp. 122, 240-8.
9. The best account in English of the repression of the Hungarian Revolution, based on full access to Hungarian archives and limited access to Soviet sources, is contained in a volume edited by Professor György Litván, Director of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
10. k-19,136.
11. t-7,299.
12. k-19,136.
13. t-7,299.
14. k-19,136.
15. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 313.
16. Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, p. 16. In March 1968 Novotný was also forced to resign as president.
17. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 485-6.
18. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, p. 139.
19. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 179.
20. Pikhoya, “Chekhoslovakiya 1968 god,” part 1, pp. 10-12.
21. See below, chapter 15.
22. Litván, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, p. 58.
23. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 104.
24. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 434-5.
25. k-16,250. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. vol. 7, ch. 7, 68.
26. k-19,299.
27. t-7,280.
28. Their names are listed in k-20,93,94.
29. GROMOV was Vasili Antonovich Gordievsky, who at different times assumed the identities of Kurt Sandler, Kurt Molner and Emil Frank (t-7,279). SADKO was an Estonian, Ivan Karlovich Iozenson, who posed successively as a Canadian of Finnish origins, Valte Urho Kataja, and as the Germans Hans Graven and Pobbs Friedrich Schilling (vol. 8, ch. 8; k-8,23,167,574). SEVIDOV’s real name is not recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes. When traveling in the West, he usually carried a West German passport in the name of Heinrich Dremer or Kurt Ernst Tile; he also possessed an Austrian passport in the name of Dremer. At one stage a Swiss passport was also held in reserve for him at the KGB residency in Vienna. When traveling in Poland, he posed as the East German Willi Werner Neumann (k-16,455). VLADIMIR was a Soviet ethnic German, Ivan Dmitryevich Unrau, who obtained his first West German passport under an assumed identity in 1961; he used at least two different names, Hans Emil Redveyks and [first name unknown] Maykhert. His wife Irina Yevseyevna was the illegal BERTA (k-16,61). VLAS was a Soviet Moldavian (real name unrecorded) who posed as the West German Rolf Max Thiemichen. His wife LIRA was also an illegal (k-11,6; k-8,277). The aliases of all five illegals, like others, were noted by Mitrokhin in the Cyrillic alphabet; their retranslation into the Roman alphabet may in some instances produce spelling errors.
30. GURYEV was Valentin Aleksandrovich Gutin, who posed in Czechoslovakia as a businessman (alias not recorded), probably from West Germany; he accompanied GROMOV to Prague (k-19,655). YEVDOKIMOV’s real name is not recorded; he used the alias Heinz Bayer (k-20,94; t-2,65).
31. The first list of illegals selected for postings in Czechoslovakia contains the name of PYOTR, also known as ARTYOM. Later records reveal that his wife ARTYOMOVA, also an illegal, played an active role in Czechoslovakia, but Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to operations by PYOTR/ARTYOM. ARTYOMOVA was a MGIMO graduate (real name unknown) who held a West German passport in the name of Edith Ingrid Eichendorf, but posed in Czechoslovakia as an Austrian businesswoman (alias unknown) (k-8,44; k-20,176). DIM (or DIMA) was V. I. Lyamin; he traveled to Prague on an Austrian passport (alias not recorded) (vol. 5, sec. 14; k-20,85). VIKTOR was a Latvian, Pavel Aleksandrovich Karalyun, who obtained a Brazilian passport in 1959 and later assumed Austrian nationality (vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 4; k-16,483).
32. Mitrokhin notes that BELYAKOV used British identity documents but does not record either his real or his assumed name (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4). USKOV was [first name not recorded] Nikolayevich Ustimenko, who used successively Irish and British passports (aliases not recorded). VALYA was USKOV’s Norwegian-born wife, Victoria Martynova, who took Soviet citizenship on her marriage in 1961; like her husband, she used a British passport in Czechoslovakia (vol. 7, ch. 7; k-20,190).
33. ALLA was Galina Leonidovna Vinogradova (later Linitskaya and Kaminskaya), a Yugoslav woman whose first marriage was to a GRU illegal, Vladimir Ivanovich Vinogradov. In 1954 she obtained an Austrian passport in the name of Maria Machek. After her husband was dismissed from the GRU on charges of “political immaturity and ideological instability” in 1955, ALLA married the KGB illegal INDOR, then operating in Switzerland as Waldemar Weber, and acquired Swiss citizenship as Maria Weber. Her marriage to INDOR was dissolved “for operational reasons” in 1957 and she began a relationship with an Egyptian (codenamed PHARAOH) whom she met in Switzerland. Mitrokhin’s notes on ALLA’s bulky file record that she operated in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as Maria Werner. It is unclear whether ALLA had actually changed her alias from Weber or whether the apparent change is due to a clerical error related to the transliteration of her pseudonym to and from the Cyrillic alphabet. vol. 4, indapp. 3; vol. 4, pakapp. 3; k-20,187.
34. SEP was Mikhail Vladimirovich Fyodorov. From 1945 to 1951 he worked in Polish military intelligence under the alias Mikhail Lipsinski. In 1952 he and his wife ZHANNA (also an illegal) obtained Swiss passports. From 1953 to 1968 he was illegal resident in Switzerland; Mitrokhin’s notes do not record his alias. k-20,94,201; vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 7, app. 3.
35. YEFRAT was a Soviet Armenian, Ashot Abgarovich Akopyan, who assumed the identity of a living Lebanese double, Oganes Saradzhyan, who had migrated to the Soviet Union and obtained, successively, French and Lebanese passports. His wife, Kira Viktorovna Chertenko (TANYA), was also an illegal. k-7,9; k-16,338,419.
36. ROY (also known as KONEYEV) was Vladimir Igorevich Stetsenko, who assumed the identity of a Mexican citizen, Felipe Burns, allegedly the son of a Canadian father and Mexican mother. His wife PAT (also known as IRINA) was also an illegal. vol. 8, app. 3a.
37. The assumed nationality of the illegal JURGEN is not recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes.
38. k-20,93.
39. k-19,331.
40. k-20,93.
41. k-20,86. On Bárak’s imprisonment in 1962, see Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945, p. 35.
42. k-20,87,189; vol. 3, pakapp. 3.
43. Gustav Husák, who was to succeed Dubček as First Secretary in April 1969, accused Bárak of personal responsibility for his brutal interrogation and trial on trumped-up charges in 1954. Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, p. 380.
44. k-20,93.
45. k-20,96.
46. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, p. 150; Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 231, 879.
47. k-20,79. Strougal lost his position in the CPCz secretariat during the April reshuffle. In January 1970 he succeeded ˇCerník as prime minister.
48. August and Rees, Red Star over Prague, pp. 126-7; Dubček, Hope Dies Last, pp. 145-6; Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, p. 63.
49. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, p. 160.
50. k-19,655. k-20,95.
51. In April 1968 GROMOV was awarded the “Honoured KGB Officer” badge for his part in exfiltrating FAUST (Yevgeni Ivanovich Ushakov, who had assumed the identity of a “dead double,” Olaf Carl Svenson). k-16,501; k-20,94. Cf. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 188.
52. k-19,655.
53. k-19,655.
54. Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, pp. 69, 568, 576, 696.
55. The KGB file noted by Mitrokhin records that the Service V thugs chosen to assist GUREYEV in kidnapping Černý were named Alekseyev and Ivanov; Petrov and Borisov, also from Service V, were to help GROMOV make off with Procházka (k-19,655).
56. k-19,655; k-20,95.
57. k-20,155,156,203.
58. k-20,89.
59. August and Rees, Red Star over Prague, p. 129; Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968, pp. 63-4. k-20,203.
60. Pikhoya, “Chekhoslovakiya 1968 god,” part 2, pp. 35ff; Gardner, “The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia.”
61. August and Rees, Red Star over Prague, p. 129; Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968, pp. 63-4.
62. August and Rees, Red Star over Prague, pp. 140-1. Mitrokhin notes that KGB plans “to carry out special assignments on nine people” in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 were canceled by the Centre, but gives no further details (k-20,203).
63. k-19,644.
64. This is the interpretation of Frantisek August, an StB officer who later defected to the West. According to August, Frouz was “a Soviet agent” (August and Rees, Red Star over Prague, p. 128).
65. Interviews with Kalugin in Komsomolskaya Pravda (June 20, 1990) and Moscow News, 1990, no. 25; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 487-8; Kramer, “The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” part 2, p. 6.
66. The minutes of the Politburo meeting of August 15-17, 1968, which agreed the final details of the invasion, are not yet available.
67. Littell (ed.), The Czech Black Book Prepared by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, pp. 64-70; August and Rees, Red Star over Prague, pp. 134-5.
68. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, p. 183.
69. Littell (ed.), The Czech Black Book Prepared by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, p. 70.
70. Kramer, “The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” part 2, p. 3.
71. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, chs. 22-25.
72. An Outline of the History of the CPCz, p. 305.
73. k-19,644.
74. k-19,644. It is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether PATERA was an StB or KGB codename or an alias.
75. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 107. Kalugin was “deeply moved by the resident’s words.”
76. Fourteen illegals were sent to Czechoslovakia in August 1968 (k-20,182); most had almost certainly been on previous short-term missions during the Prague Spring. The total sent, usually on more than one mission, to Czechoslovakia in 1968-9 was twenty-nine (k-20,203).
77. k-19,246.
78. k-20,181.
79. k-16,329; k-20,150,187.
80. k-16,329; k-20,176.
81. k-16,329; k-19,158.
82. k-16,329; k-19,158.
83. k-19,384.
84. vol. 8, ch. 8 and app. 1. ERNA, previously codenamed NORA, who had been born in France of Spanish parents in 1914, became a Communist militant and commanded a machine-gun company during the Spanish Civil War. In 1939 she moved to Russia, took Soviet citizenship and joined the NKGB in 1941. She worked as an illegal in France (1946-52) and Mexico (1954-57) before moving to Montreal in 1958. Despite her criticisms, ERNA told her shocked comrades in Budapest that she remained a committed Leninist. By the mid-1970s, however, she had become so disillusioned that she broke contact with the KGB.
85. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 81-2.
86. k-19,158.
87. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.
88. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 187.
89. k-8,78; k-19,158,298,415,454; vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.
90. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 172-3; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 491-2.
Chapter Sixteen Progress’ Operations Part 2
1. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, pp. 225-6.
2. The Ministry of the Interior existed at both federal and national levels. There were thus Czech and Slovak ministers in addition to the Czechoslovak minister.
3. Dubček, Hope Dies Last, pp. 236-9.
4. k-20,149.
5. k-20,189,177.
6. k-20,154. On Pachman, see Hruby, Fools and Heroes, ch. 4.
7. k-19,643.
8. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945, p. 98.
9. Jakeš’s contact in the KGB liaison office was G. Slavin (first name and patronymic not recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes; k-19,575).
10. k-19,552.
11. k-19,643.
12. k-19,615.
13. Mitrokhin’s notes do not provide complete statistics for the purge of security and intelligence personnel. In 1970, however, 1,092 officials were dismissed from the central apparatus of the interior ministry and 3,202 individuals deprived of Party membership (k-19,551). During 1970 more than a hundred StB agents defected to the West (k-19,559).
14. k-19,566.
15. The KGB liaison office report cited as an example of the full and frank intelligence provided by Kaska the fact that he “told us all that he knew about Indra’s behavior in connection with his visit to the GDR…” Mitrokhin’s notes give no further information on this episode (k-19,645).
16. k-19,555.
17. k-19,576.
18. Sinitsyn reported that both Kaska and Husák had wanted to make further enquiries about KGB records on individuals “whose behavior in 1968-9 gave rise to doubts”; k-19,587.
19. Indra was seen by Husák as a potential rival, and his move in 1971 from his position as Party secretary to the prestigious but not very influential post of chairman of the National Assembly was probably intended to curtail his influence within the CPCz. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945, pp. 111-12.
20. k-19,554.
21. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 157-8.
22. k-19,554. On the problems of calculating the final total of the purge of the CPCz, see Kusin, From Dubček to Charter 77, pp. 85-9.
23. k-19,554.
24. k-19,541. The probable date of the meeting was April 1972.
25. k-16,329. k-19,158. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give FYODOROV’s real identity.
26. k-19,609.
27. k-19,600.
28. k-19,601.
29. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, pp. 100-1.
30. k-19,603.
31. k-19,606.
32. k-19,62.
33. k-19,68.
34. k-19,62,92,643.
35. Kusin, From Dubček to Charter 77, p. 194.
36. Dubček describes his surveillance and harassment by the StB in Hope Dies Last, ch. 29.
37. t-7,272,297. Dubček makes no mention of this episode in his memoirs.
38. k-19,330.
39. k-19,75.
40. k-19,77.
41. k-19,76.
42. The KGB team sent to Czechoslovakia “to help with the investigation of the Grohman case at a higher professional level” consisted of A. A. Fabrichnikov and V. A. Pakhomov of the Second Chief Directorate, and “others from the KGB Investigation Department.” During the investigation, Bil’ak claimed that Grohman “was a close contact of Štrougal.” k-19,67. On Grohman’s subsequent trial, see: “Former Prague Minister on Spying Charge,” The Times (January 5, 1977); “Viele Mitarbeiter des BND haben Angst vor Verrat,” Die Welt (January 27, 1977).
43. k-19,77.
44. t-7,263,280,281. k-19,451.
45. Probably the KGB’s main source on Moczar’s active measures against Gierek and his bugging of much of the PUWP leadership was Szlachcic, later Polish Minister of the Interior. t-7,243.
46. For an analysis of the December 1970 protests, see Kurczewski, The Resurrection of Rights in Poland, ch. 5.
47. k-19,333.
48. k-19,322.
49. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 359-60.
50. t-7,243.
51. The other targets of cultivation assigned to BOGUN were W. Klimczak (not identified); the economist G. Nowakowski; the writer K. Busz, described as “leader of the Kraków intelligentsia”; and S. Kozinski, a photographer with “contacts in the Party and state apparatus” (k-19,415). The contact established by BOGUN with Bardecki was later continued by the illegal FILOSOV. Like others targeted by PROGRESS operations, Bardecki cannot be blamed for speaking to Western visitors whom he had no means of identifying as KGB illegals.
52. In addition to the seven illegals used for operations in East Germany, others were based there but operated elsewhere. k-19,399,415.
53. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the specific objectives of the illegals sent to Bulgaria.
54. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 354-5.
55. k-19,487.
56. k-19,455.
57. k-19,415,456.
58. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 350-2.
59. k-16,273; k-19,429. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details on the content of the reports.
60. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 359-60.
61. k-19,287.
62. k-19,264.
63. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, pp. 357-8. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 77.
64. k-19,264.
65. k-19,270.
66. t-7,264.
67. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 82. A KGB file, apparently for the period 1976-7, gives the total size of Stasi personnel as “over 60,000” (k-19,271). This is consistent with documents in the Gauck [Stasi] Archive, which record a rise from 59,500 in 1975 to 75,000 in 1980.
68. k-19,273.
69. t-7,184.
70. k-19,430.
71. k-19,458.
72. k-27,78.
73. k-19,627.
74. k-27,243.
75. t-7,94.
76. k-19,209.
77. k-26,162. The KGB file on the drug test incident identifies the Soviet player concerned, but, since he was never tested, it is unfair to mention his name.
78. k-26,162.
79. k-19,235.
80. Kusin, From Dubˇcek to Charter 77, pp. 304-25; Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, pp. 128-47; Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 384.
81. Cited in Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945, p. 102.
Chapter Seventeen The KGB and Western Communist Parties
1. vol. 9, ch. 1, para. 17.
2. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. Though the earliest reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to Plissonnier’s collaboration with the KGB dates from 1952, it may well have begun earlier.
3. Robrieux, Histoire intérieure du Parti communiste, vol. 4, pp. 450-2. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 19, 21.
4. k-3,65,115. k-8,182.
5. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. Boumedienne was president of Algeria from December 1976 until his death in December 1978.
6. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, pp. 84-7.
7. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 171-2.
8. Mitrokhin’s notes do not include any examples of the intelligence obtained by DARIO and his female recruits from the foreign ministry.
9. At various stages in his career as a Soviet agent, DARIO was codenamed BASK, SPARTAK, GAU, CHESTNY and GAUDEMUS. He appears to have switched from GRU to MGB control immediately after the Second World War. k-10,109.
10. k-10,101-3,107,109. Mitrokhin’s notes imply that in 1956 DARIO was also instrumental in the recruitment of MAGDA, a typist in the foreign ministry press department (k-10,100,103). Mitrokhin’s notes also record the recruitment in 1970 of an agent in the Foreign Ministry, codenamed STRELOK, by Georgi Pavlovich Antonov. STRELOK subsequently became “reluctant to cooperate” (k-4,80,158; k-2,221,231,268).
11. k-10,109. See below chapter 18.
12. k-7,4,193; k-16,338,419; k-18,153; k-20,94.
13. Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, chs. 1-4; Barker, Austria 1918-1972, part 3.
14. Barker, Austria 1918-1972, p. 178.
15. k-18,52.
16. k-18,52.
17. k-16,214,216; vol. 5, sect. 6, paras. 5,6 and n.
18. k-14,722; k-2,175; t-7,1.
19. k-2,81,145,150.
20. k-13,55,61.
21. t-7,1.
22. The SKP fought elections as part of the Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto (SKDL), mainly composed of Communists and fellow travelers.
23. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 118-19, 131-2.
24. Mitrokhin’s notes unfortunately contain nothing on the Communist role in the post-war coalition governments and little on Finland before the Brezhnev era. Given the willing assistance given to the KGB by the SVK chairman (later honorary chairman), Ville Pessi, in the 1970s (k-26,191,211,228), it is scarcely conceivable that such assistance was not forthcoming earlier. Pessi was already a powerful figure as SVK secretary after the Second World War. The earliest post-war example of SVK assistance to Soviet intelligence operations noted by Mitrokhin was the help given in 1949-51 to the illegal VIK in adopting the identity of the Finn Eugene Maki. The first KGB agent in the Finnish police force referred to in Mitrokhin’s notes is ZVEN, a CID officer recruited in 1959 (k-5,309).
25. Upton, The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland, part 2, chs. 6, 7. Upton quotes from one of the few surviving copies of Leino’s 1958 memoirs, Kommunisti sisäministerinä, withdrawn on the eve of publication.
26. Upton, The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland, p. 405.
27. See above, chapter 7.
28. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, ch. 4. This admirable volume omits the role of the undeclared Party members after 1958.
29. See above, chapter 10.
30. See below, chapter 24.
31. Mitrokhin’s notes give the names of two Canadians who assisted in obtaining the passport in the name of “Robert Callan,” no. 4-716255. The Centre also doctored a genuine Canadian passport, no. 4-428012, in the name of Vasili Dzogola (?Dzogol), inserting a photograph of “Abel” and changing the eye color and other particulars to match his. Because of “Abel’s” arrest, this passport too was never used. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
32. k-27,451.
33. k-3,122.
34. Since non-Soviet citizens could not normally qualify for officer status in the KGB, it was intended that the new recruits should become illegal agents rather than illegal officers.
35. k-26,331.
36. k-26,332.
37. k-26,333.
38. k-3,65,115; k-8,182.
39. k-26,327.
40. vol. 8, ch. 13. Mitrokhin’s note on the meeting with Kashtan does not say explicitly that he was asked to talent-spot illegal agents. Given the previous role of the CPC in helping to fabricate illegals’ legends, however, it is barely conceivable that Kashtan, unlike the other Western Communist leaders mentioned in the files noted by Mitrokhin, was asked to recommend only conventional agents.
41. k-26,217.
42. KGB Chairman’s Decree no. 0099/OV of August 7, 1972, entitled “Measures for the Further Activation of Illegals Intelligence Activity and Increasing Its Role in the Foreign-Political Intelligence System of the KGB Under the USSR Council of Ministers,” envisaged the recruitment of illegal agents recommended by the Communist Parties of the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina for operations in North America; by the Communist Parties of Belgium, Britain, France, the FRG and Spain for operations in Europe; by the Communist Party of Japan for operations in Asia; and by the Communist Party of Israel for operations in the Middle East. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4.
43. k-26,227.
44. k-26,94-5,308.
45. Soares, Portugal’s Struggle for Liberation, p. 24.
46. k-26,108. In Angola, once the richest of Portugal’s colonies, the end of Portuguese rule was followed in 1975 by full-scale civil war between the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the rival, non-Marxist FNLA and UNITA. Cunhal also promised “to do everything possible to give assistance to the MPLA, including using illegal channels to send people drawn from among experienced military cadres,” though the PCP’s assistance was dwarfed by that from the Soviet Union and Cuba. k-26,205,209.
47. Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, pp. 69-70. According to Maxwell, the PIDE/DGS archives also revealed that “the PCP had some embarrassing skeletons of its own, not least the secret police informers within its own ranks.”
48. k-26,4.
49. k-26,4. For examples of PIDE/DGS documents which appeared in the press, probably as a result of KGB active measures, see Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, p. 70. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of these active measures. In 1994 the PIDE/DGS archive was opened to researchers, subject to a series of restrictions, at the Lisbon National Archive.
50. Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, chs. 7-9.
51. Recruitment leads from the PCP leadership during the mid- and late 1970s included: the government lawyers BORETS and ZNATOK (k-16,180,182); the trade union lawyer ZHAK (k-16,179); MARAT, a registrar of births, deaths and marriages who was able to provide documentation for illegals (k-18,345); KAREKA, a newspaper editor used for active measures from 1977 to 1982 (k-14,272); and EMIL, a journalist with the ANOP agency (k-14,404). Some of the other Portuguese cultivations, agents and confidential contacts of which details are given in Mitrokhin’s notes probably also stemmed from PCP leads.
52. k-18,345. Cf. k-26,210.
53. Pessi had further discussions on agent recruitment in both Moscow and Helsinki during 1978 and 1979; k-26,211,228,191.
54. k-8,79. Mitrokhin identifies the Dublin resident only by his codename KAVERIN; his real name (Shadrin) is given in Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, appendix D3.
55. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 53-6. Kryuchkov’s circular to residencies of April 6, 1978 referred to previous circulars of March 28, 1975 and June 17, 1976, apparently written in similar vein.
56. k-19,7. The main Asian Communist Parties mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes as taking part in the recruiting drive were those of the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan and Japan. KGB relations with Third World Communist Parties will be covered in more detail in Volume 2.
57. It is possible, however, that a latter-day Sorge remains concealed in a file not seen by Mitrokhin. It is also possible that one or more of the recruits of the 1970s and early 1980s developed into an illegal of major importance after Mitrokhin ceased to have access to the files.
58. k-27,99. Mitrokhin’s notes give Maria’s full name, but it seems unfair to identify her.
59. k-14,519; k-18,409. Mitrokhin’s notes reveal the identity of LIMB, DANA and MARCEL.
60. See below, chapter 18.
61. The FCD communication to Ponomarev of October 20, 1980 was numbered 2192-A/OV. The basic subsidy paid to Kashtan in the late 1970s was 150,000 US dollars, paid in two annual installments, with some supplements. By the 1980s the CPC had a membership of only about 4,000, and was thus receiving a subsidy of about $40 dollars per member. Subsidies were also paid to the Canada-USSR and Quebec-USSR Societies, and to the Severny Sosed (“Northern Neighbour”) journal. In addition, subsidies were sometimes channeled through the CPC to the Haitian Communists, and perhaps other Parties. vol. 8, ch. 13.
62. Haynes and Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?” pp. 281-4; L. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 414. Mitrokhin’s notes provide numerous examples of “Moscow gold,” especially during the 1970s, but no figures for the total subsidies received by any Communist Party.
63. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 4; the aliases of Morris Childs (born Chilovsky) are given in vol. 6, ch. 12. (On Child’s earlier career in the CPUSA, see Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism, pp. 257-71.) Barron’s account is based on interviews and other material from Childs, his wife Eva and FBI agents concerned with his case. Operation Solo somewhat exaggerates the importance of the intelligence he supplied to the FBI after his trips to Moscow (see Draper, “Our Man in Moscow,” New York Review of Books (May 9, 1996)). Mitrokhin’s notes from KGB files, however, largely corroborate, as well as making important additions to, Barron’s account of Childs’s role in channeling Soviet funds to the CPUSA. Mitrokhin, unlike Barron, rarely gives annual totals for the Soviet subsidies. But those he provides are compatible with, though not identical to, Barron’s figures. According to the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin, the “allocations” to the CPUSA were 1.7 million dollars in both 1975 and 1976 (vol. 6, ch. 12). Barron gives figures of 1,792,676 dollars for 1975 and 1,997,651 dollars for 1976 (Operation Solo, appendix B); one possible explanation for the discrepancies is that, as sometimes happened, additional allocations were made in the course of the year.
64. vol. 6, ch. 12.
65. vol. 6, ch. 12.
66. The instructor’s congratulations were reported by Friedman to the FBI. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 144-5.
67. vol. 6, ch. 12.
68. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 144-5. Mitrokhin’s notes and Barron’s book neatly complement each other. Mitrokhin summarizes the account of Friedman’s career in KGB files (vol. 6, ch. 12); Barron describes his career as known to the FBI, though he omits his real name and identifies him only by his FBI codename, CLIP.
69. vol. 6, ch. 12.
70. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 156-7.
71. vol. 6, ch. 12.
72. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 3.
73. vol. 6, ch. 12.
74. Barron, Operation Solo, ch. 3; Draper, “Our Man in Moscow,” New York Review of Books (May 9, 1996)
75. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 263.
76. vol. 6, ch. 12. Instead of Jackson, Dobrynin asked Hall to bring with him to meetings at the embassy Arnold Johnson, director of the CPUSA Information and Lecture Bureau, once improbably eulogized by Lee Harvey Oswald as “the Lenin of our country” (Posner, Case Closed, p. 149).
77. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, pp. 213-14; Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 262-3. FBI reports to the White House said that Levison had been identified as a secret CPUSA member by “an informant who has furnished reliable information in the past as a secret member of the Communist Party,” presumably Jack Childs. Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 124, 136-7.
78. Garrow, FBI and Martin Luther King Jr., ch. 1; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 23-8.
79. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 263; DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 214; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 25-6, 133-5. Though he denied current membership of the CPUSA, O’Dell resigned from King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1962. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no specific reference to O’Dell but reveal that the magazine Freedomways, with which he became actively involved after leaving the SCLC, had been founded with active Soviet support, continued to receive secret Soviet subsidies and was “close” to the CPUSA. vol. 6, ch. 12.
80. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. 265-6.
81. DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI, p. 214-15; Friedly and Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. 36-43.
82. vol. 6, ch. 12.
83. vol. 6, app. 1, part 34.
84. vol. 6, app. 1, part 4; t-3,76. Mitrokhin had access only to reports in FCD files based on intelligence provided by the agent, not to the agent’s file itself—probably because he had been recruited by the Second (rather than the First) Chief Directorate during a visit to the Soviet Union. Within the United States he seems to have been run from the San Francisco residency.
85. The transliteration of these names into the Cyrillic alphabet in the KGB report of the meeting makes identification difficult. vol. 6, ch. 12.
86. vol. 6, ch. 12.
87. vol. 6, ch. 12.
88. Barron, Operation Solo, pp. xiii, 312-14, 329-31.
89. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, pp. 173-4.
90. Haynes and Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?”; Klehr, Haynes and Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism, pp. 149-64.
91. Barron, Operation Solo, p. 300.
92. Healey and Isserman, Dorothy Healey Remembers, p. 273. Dorothy Ray Healey left the Party in 1973.
Chapter Eighteen Eurocommunism
1. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 254-6.
2. k-26,187, 252, 288, 295, 296.
3. k-26, 258.
4. k-26, 229.
5. k-26, 59.
6. k-26, 60.
7. The Centre concluded that the forgeries had probably been included in the money handed to the PCI in either April or July 1972. k-26, 299.
8. k-26, 306. From 1969 to 1976 the PCI emissary most frequently used to collect Soviet subsidies from the embassy was Barontini (codenamed CLAUDIO); other emissaries referred to in KGB files were Marmuggi (codenamed CARO) and Guido Cappelloni (codenamed ALBERTO). k-26, 256, 267, 270, 291, 300, 302, 303, 305, 306.
Smaller subsidies also went to the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) and the San Marino Communist Party. In 1974 the San Marino general secretary sent Brezhnev a Capo di Monte marble clock, via the Rome residency, in gratitude for Soviet financial assistance. k-26, 260, 283, 306.
9. k-26, 246.
10. k-26, 252, 311. The supply of the SELENYA radio system to the PCI by the KGB had been approved in principle by Politburo decision no. P 91/3 of May 17, 1973, but it was agreed that, “The two-way radios must be handed over to our Italian friends [the PCI] only when there is a real need to organize radio communications, bearing in mind that if kept in store for a long period the radio stations require periodic checks, maintenance and repairs.”
11. Berlinguer’s articles, first published in the autumn of 1973, are reprinted in Valenza (ed.), Il compromesso storico, pp. 14-31.
12. k-26, 229. Agostino Novella, a veteran member of the PCI Direzione, strengthened the case against Amendola, Pajetta and Ingrao by telling Ambassador Rhyzov that all three had tried to prevent Longo seeking medical treatment in the Soviet Union. k-26, 230.
13. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, ch. 8. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943-1988, ch. 10.
14. k-26, 237.
15. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, ch. 8.
16. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 283-4, 290.
17. k-26, 257. The KGB files noted by Mitrokhin do not record what use was made of its intelligence on Berlinguer’s allegedly dubious building contracts.
18. k-26, 264.
19. k-26, 256. Mitrokhin gives no details of payments after 1976.
20. k-26, 259, 261. In 1998 a receipt by Cappelloni, dated June 27, 1976, for one million dollars from the CPSU for the 1976 election campaign was published in the Italian press. “Pci, ecco le ricevute dei miliardi di Mosca,” Il Giorno (April 30, 1998).
21. The training was authorized by Politburo decision no. SG 143/8 GS of January 17, 1979. k-26,2.
22. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 138.
23. k-26, 158.
24. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, 1943-1988, pp. 384-5.
25. k-26, 158.
26. The PCI decision to dismantle the radio stations was reported by Kryuchkov to Ponomarev, head of the Central Committee International Department, in a communication of June 22, 1981, published in the Italian press in 1998. “Servizio segreto,” L’Avanti (May 16, 1998).
27. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, ch. 9; Cossutta, Lo strappo; “Cossutta Sempre Più Isolato,” La Repubblica (January 2, 1982).
28. Hellman, “The Difficult Birth of the Democratic Party of the Left,” p. 81.
29. Though details of the payments to Cossutta and other “healthy forces in the PCI” were passed by Moscow to the Rome Prosecutor’s Office in 1992, they were not made public until 1998. “Pci, ecco le ricevute dei miliardi di Mosca,” Il Giorno (April 30, 1998); “Ecco la Tangentopoli rossa,” Il Tempo (April 30, 1998).
30. t-7, 12.
31. Pike, In the Service of Stalin, p. 49; Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 535.
32. Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, pp. 107-9. After their expulsion, Gómez, García and Líster went on to found unsuccessful pro-Soviet splinter groups. Cf. k-3,12.
33. k-3, 16.
34. Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, ch. 6.
35. k-2, 65; k-3, 13, 15, 22; k-26, 410.
36. k-3, 18.
37. Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, pp. 126-7.
38. k-3, 17.
39. Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 9.
40. Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, pp. 127-31.
41. k-3, 20.
42. k-5, 879.
43. k-26, 406.
44. In January, October and December 1980, Gallego was given payments of 10,000 dollars by the Madrid residency. k-26, 405.
45. k-26, 407.
46. The anti-Eurocommunist Catalan Communist Party, the PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya), split away from the PCE.
47. Krasikov, From Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 188. His book, originally published in Russian as Ispanskii Reportazh, was translated into a number of languages.
48. k-3, 98.
49. Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, pp. 337-8.
50. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 19-20; Roy, Somme tout, pp. 156-7.
51. k-3, 65, 115; k-8, 182.
52. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, p. 240.
53. k-3, 140.
54. See below, chapter 27.
55. k-3, 140.
56. k-3, 140.
57. Adereth, The French Communist Party, pp. 208-13.
58. The text of the letters was later published in Cahiers du Communisme (October 1991).
59. k-8, 148.
60. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 153-4, 164-5.
61. k-3, 123.
62. k-3, 140.
63. L’Express (July 27, 1970).
64. k-3, 140.
65. Robrieux, Histoire intérieure du Parti communiste, vol. 2, pp. 657-65; vol. 3, pp. 344-5, 406-14.
66. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 154-6, 217-30. Though the Socialists won an overall majority at the 1981 legislative elections and did not depend on PCF support, four Communist ministers served in a Socialist-dominated coalition until 1984.
67. Urban (ed.), Moscow and the Global Left in the Gorbachev Era, pp. 5, 52-3.
68. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 75.
69. Urban (ed.), Moscow and the Global Left in the Gorbachev Era, ch. 2. While Gorbachev was publicly aligning himself with the PCI’s reformist leadership, however, the International Department continued to subsidize the PCI old guard until 1987. In 1989 the PCI, led since 1988 by Achille Ochetto, changed its name to the PDS (Partito Democratico della Sinistra), the Democratic Party of the Left. A breakaway movement established itself in 1991 as the Partito della Rifondazione Comunista.
70. In 1987 the PCE, Gallego’s PCPE, the Progressive Federation (founded by another former PCE member, Ramón Tamames), Pasoc (a breakaway Socialist group) and a number of independents combined to form the Izquierdo Unida; the PCE accounted for about two-thirds of the total membership.
71. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 116; Grachev, Kremlevskaya Khronika, p. 247.
72. Marchais’s message was delivered by Gaston Plissonnier, who for the past twenty years had been the French conduit for the secret subsidies to the PCF. Dobrynin to Gorbachev (June 20, 1987); text in Stepankov and Lisov, Kremlevsky Zagovor, appendix.
73. Politburo decision of July 3, 1987, in Stepankov and Lisov, Kremlevsky Zagovor, appendix. Between 1981 and 1991 subsidies to the PCF totaled about 24 million dollars. Burke, “Recently Released Material on Soviet Intelligence Operations,” p. 246; Albats, The State within a State, p. 222.
74. Haynes and Klehr, “‘Moscow Gold,’ Confirmed at Last?”, p. 283.
75. Hellman, “The Difficult Birth of the Democratic Party of the Left,” p. 81.
Chapter Nineteen Ideological Subversion Part 1
1. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 551.
2. vol. 10, ch. 3.
3. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, p. 91.
4. vol. 10, ch. 3.
5. vol. 10, ch. 3. Cf. Zamoyska, “Sinyavsky, the Man and the Writer,” p. 61.
6. vol. 10, ch. 3.
7. Aucouturier, “Andrey Sinyavsky on the Eve of His Arrest,” p. 344.
8. Geli Fyoderovich Vasiliev, codenamed MIKHAILOV, had worked abroad as an illegal under the name Rudolf Steiner in Austria and Latin America. On returning to Moscow, apparently unable to stand the strain of life as an illegal, he began work in the Novosti Press Agency (k-16,446). Though the probability is that Vasilyev was the stoolpigeon placed in Sinyavsky’s cell, it is just possible that the KGB used another agent with the same codename—though there is no identifiable record of such an agent in Mitrokhin’s notes.
9. vol. 10, ch. 3.
10. vol. 10, ch. 3.
11. Mitrokhin’s notes record simply that Remizov gave his interrogators “evidence against Sinyavsky.” At the trial this evidence included an admission that he had delivered one of Sinyavsky’s manuscripts to Hélène Zamoyska. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, p. 153.
12. vol. 10, ch. 3.
13. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, p. 306.
14. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, pp. 196, 198, 209.
15. Asked if he had sent his manuscripts abroad “illegally,” Sinyavsky replied, “No, unofficially.” Sending manuscripts abroad was not illegal. But in his final address, the state prosecutor again claimed—inaccurately—that the defendants had sent their manuscripts to the West “illegally.” Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, pp. 185, 308.
16. Labedz and Hayward (eds.), On Trial, pp. 253-4.
17. vol. 10, ch. 3; vol. 7, nzch. TANOV later took part in PROGRESS operations in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, using Austrian and forged Canadian passports, and carried out other intelligence assignments in Pakistan, India, France, the Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait and Spain. In 1982 he was recalled to Moscow on the grounds that he was producing little intelligence and had greatly overspent his budget (vol. 3, pakapp. 3).
18. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, pp. 614-16.
19. vol. 10, ch. 3.
20. k-27,370
21. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. xxv, 7, 41. This important collection of documents on “the Solzhenitsyn case,” declassified by order of President Yeltsin in 1992, includes a number of KGB reports to the Central Committee and Politburo but not the KGB operational files to which Mitrokhin had access.
22. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 487-8.
23. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 492.
24. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 138-41.
25. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. xxix, 161-3.
26. Andropov instituted judicial proceedings against Shchelokov in December 1982, only a month after Brezhnev’s death. Two years later, before his case had come to trial, Shchelokov committed suicide. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 330, 348.
27. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 194-210.
28. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 615.
29. k-21,30.
30. k-21,17; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. The spelling of Boucaut in the Roman alphabet is uncertain; it appears in Cyrillic transliteration as “Buko.” Mitrokhin’s notes do not identify Nikashin’s first name and patronymic.
31. k-21,114.
32. Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 359, 369-70; Grigorenko, Memoirs, pp. 387-8.
33. Article by G. Kizlych and P. Aleksandrov on the Yakir and Krasin cases in the classified in-house quarterly, KGB Sbornik, no. 73; k-25,124.
34. vol. 10, ch. 5.
35. Protocols of Krasin’s interrogation; vol. 10, ch. 5.
36. On Savinkov, see above, chapter 2.
37. Article by G. Kizlych and P. Aleksandrov on the Yakir and Krasin cases in the classified in-house quarterly, KGB Sbornik, no. 73; k-25,124.
38. vol. 10, ch. 5.
39. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 807; Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf, p. 522.
40. Grigorenko, Memoirs, p. 388.
41. Article by G. Kizlych and P. Aleksandrov on the Yakir and Krasin cases in the classified in-house quarterly, KGB Sbornik, no. 73; k-25,124.
42. Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks, pp. 212-15.
43. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 256-74, 340-6, 350-3.
44. Solzhenitsyn describes his forced departure from Russia in The Oak and the Calf, pp. 383-453.
45. k-21,123.
46. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 886. Though the woman who came to Solzhenitsyn’s door on his first day in Zurich has never been identified, her Russian origins and the fact that within a few weeks, if not days, Valentina Holubová had established herself as his secretary and assistant make it probable that she was the caller. It is unlikely that a genuine native of Ryazan had tracked him down so rapidly. In reality, Holubová came not from Ryazan but from Vladivostok (k-21,123).
47. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 886. The fact that Dr. Frantiˇsek Holub was, like his wife, working for the StB, is implied rather than specifically stated in Mitrokhin’s notes. For example, he records that the Holubs jointly recommended to Solzhenitsyn another StB officer posing as a Czech dissident, Tomáš Řezáč (k-21,123). It is inconceivable that the StB or the KGB would have allowed a husband and wife team to operate in this way unless both were working for them.
48. k-21,123,124. On Solzhenitsyn’s first meeting with Krause, see Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 886.
49. See above, chapters 2, 5.
50. k-21,124.
51. Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 387-90.
52. k-21,25.
53. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, pp. 887-8, 890-3, 987-90; Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 431-2, 451-3. Rezác’s scurrilous volume, The Spiral of Solzhenitsyn’s Betrayal, described by the author as “an autopsy of the corpse of a traitor,” appeared in Italian in 1977 and Russian in the following year, but failed to find a British or American publisher. While in Russia, Rezác also interviewed Sahkarov, who was unaware of his background (Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 591).
54. k-21,25.
55. Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 428.
56. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 890.
57. k-3(b),27. Mitrokhin copied or noted sections 1-5, 8, 9, 11, 16-19 of the 19-point “plan of agent operational measures.”
58. k-3(b),27.
59. k-25,212.
60. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 955.
61. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
62. k-25,29.
63. There is a vivid description of Solzhenitsyn’s address and its reception in Thomas, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, pp. 460-3.
64. k-25,29. The New York Times and the Washington Post comments on the Harvard Address are quoted in Thomas, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 462.
Chapter Twenty Ideological Subversion Part 2
1. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 346, 390.
2. k-21, 16.
3. Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 429. The Nobel Peace Prize, presented in Oslo, is awarded by the Nobel Committee appointed by the Norwegian parliament. The other Nobel prizes, presented in Stockholm, are awarded by Swedish committees.
4. k-21, 69. Before being passed for signature to Kryuchkov, head of the FCD, and Andropov, this document (reference no. 155/2422) was initialed by B. S. Ivanov, Kryuchkov’s deputy, Oleg Kalugin, head of Counter-intelligence, and V.P. Ivanov of Section A. The alleged “criminals” who supported Sakharov were mostly, if not entirely, dissidents sentenced on trumped-up charges.
5. On the fabricated KGB claim that Sakharov supported the Pinochet regime, see Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 389, 426.
6. k-21, 64.
7. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, p. 893.
8. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
9. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 260-1.
10. k-21, 104.
11. k-21, 104.
12. Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 585-92. On the KGB’s use of Yakovlev to attack Solzhenitsyn, see Scammell (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. 394, 398, 409, 426-30.
13. k-21, 1. Cf. Bonner, Alone Together, p. 46. YAK was used for a variety of active measures. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin records that in 1976 he was paid 500 dollars (probably per month). The same file records that Russkiy Golos had a circulation of only 1,500. k-21,106.
14. k-21, 1. Bonner, Alone Together, pp. 37-8.
15. “CHI E” ELENA BONNER? Artifice di piu assassinii la moglie dell “accademico Sakharov,” Sette Giorni (April 12, 1980). Cf. Bonner, Alone Together, pp. 31-2.
16. k-21, 104. Cf. Bonner, Alone Together, pp. 37-8.
17. k-6, 114; k-21, 1, 105.
18. “CHI E” ELENA BONNER? Artifice di piu assassinii la moglie dell “accademico Sakharov,” Sette Giorni (April 12, 1980). k-21, 1, 82.
19. k-21, 1, 105; k-6, 114. Sette Giorni also published an attack on Solzhenitsyn, based on an interview with his first wife (k-21, 82).
20. k-21, 82.
21. k-21, 104.
22. k-21, 104.
23. Bonner, Alone Together, p. 30.
24. Bethell, Spies and Other Secrets, p. 73.
25. Memorandum by Andropov and State Prosecutor Rudenko, no. 123-A (January 21, 1977); Albats, The State within a State, pp. 178-9.
26. k-21, 153.
27. Bethell, Spies and Other Secrets, pp. 98-9.
28. The sentence was thirteen years. Shcharansky, Fear No Evil, pp. 205-6, 224-5.
29. k-21, 157, 159.
30. k-21, 164.
31. k-21, 156. Makarov was informed that the file recording the residency’s success in preventing the award of the prize to Orlov had been passed to Andropov.
32. k-1, 98.
33. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.
34. Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 510-16.
35. k-21, 80.
36. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 296.
37. Bethell, Spies and Other Secrets, pp. 315-16.
38. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 37. In public, in order not to alienate a majority on the Politburo, Gorbachev stuck to the official line. He declared in an interview with L’Humanité in February 1986: “Now about political prisoners, we don’t have any… It is common knowledge that [Sakharov] committed actions punishable by law… Measures were taken with regard to him according to our legislation. The actual state of affairs is as follows. Sakharov resides in Gorky in normal conditions, is doing scientific work, and remains a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is in normal health as far as I know. His wife has recently left the country for medical treatment abroad. As for Sakharov himself, he is still a bearer of secrets of special importance to the state and for this reason cannot go abroad.” Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 607.
39. Grachev, Kremlevskaya Karonika, pp. 94-104; Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 165.
40. Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 615.
41. Cited in Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 252-3.
42. Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 295.
43. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 253-64; Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, ch. 19.
44. Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, p. 282.
45. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 7-10.
46. k-21, 76.
47. k-21, 153.
Chapter Twenty-one SIGINT in the Cold War
1. Andrew, “Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War.”
2. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, seeks to assess the varying interest taken by US presidents in SIGINT.
3. Mitrokhin had no direct access to the files of either the Eighth Directorate or the Sixteenth (SIGINT) Directorate, founded in the late 1960s. He did, however, see some documents from both directorates in FCD files.
4. KGB to Khrushchev, “Report for 1960” (February 14, 1961), in the “special dossiers” of the CPSU Central Committee; cited by Zubok, “Spy vs. Spy,” p. 23.
5. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” p. 228.
6. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War.”
7. Samouce, “I Do Understand the Russians,” pp. 52-3, Samouce papers, US Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 237-40.
8. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, pp. 154-7. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 454-6. Kennan was declared persona non grata in October 1952, though chiefly for reasons unconnected with the bugging incident.
9. Bohlen, Witness to History 1919-1969, pp. 345-6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 456-7.
10. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 357.
11. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 456. Remarkably, Nosenko’s information was not sufficient to convince his CIA debriefers that he was a genuine defector.
12. vol. 6, ch. 9. For illustrations of some of the espionage equipment supplied by the FCD OT Directorate, see Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book.
13. k-18,342.
14. k-1,160. On KGB penetration of the Orthodox church, see below, chapter 28.
15. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 44.
16. k-24,299; vol. 7, ch. 5.
17. Philby’s career as an SIS officer had ended after his recall from Washington in 1951. Philby’s later account to Borovik of his years in Beirut contains a number of inaccuracies, due partly to his attempt to discredit Lunn (transcribed by Borovik as “Lan”—an error derived, as in the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin, from the conversion of “Lunn” into Cyrillic). Philby attributes his successful escape in 1963 largely to Lunn’s incompetence and adds that “amazingly, three or four years later [Lunn] received a high honour—the Cross of St. Michael and St. George” (Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 354). In reality, as Philby had correctly informed the KGB after his defection, Lunn was awarded the CMG a decade earlier, in 1957 (vol. 7, ch. 5).
18. Lunn was the author of High-Speed Skiing (1935), A Skiing Primer (1948) and The Guinness Book of Skiing (1983). His father, Sir Arnold Lunn (1888-1974), was one of Europe’s leading ski pioneers, as well as a leading Catholic apologist and a vocal opponent of both Nazism and Communism. His 63 books included 23 on skiing and 16 on Christian apologetics (Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980, pp. 522-3).
19. Lunn’s recent Who’s Who entries give the date of his entry into SIS. Earlier entries make no reference to his intelligence career.
20. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of operation RUBIN is based on k-24,299 and vol. 7, ch. 5.
21. k-26,223.
22. k-26,223.
23. The file noted by Mitrokhin does not reveal what the measures were.
24. On Philby’s depression in the late 1960s and partial recovery during the 1970s, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6, 544-5, and Knightley, Philby, pp. 234-7.
25. One of the CIA officers on whom intelligence was gathered during operation RUBIN was selected by Andropov as the target of an attempted abduction.
26. k-18,342.
27. vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), parts 1, 4; k-27,242. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of what intelligence was obtained by bugging the CIA officer’s flat. VERA’s file records that the KGB lost contact with her in 1975 as a result of the Lebanese Civil War.
28. k-27,239.
29. KGB operations in Africa will be covered in volume 2.
30. Details of operation REBUS in k-17,49,59,185; vol. 6, ch. 10. On November 16, 1981 operation PHOENIX succeeded in bugging the residence of the US ambassador in Conakry. The agent responsible was a Guinean (probably a domestic servant) codenamed MURAT (k-17,145; k-8,519). The KGB also succeeded in intercepting the communications of US embassies in a number of other African capitals, among them Bamako and Brazzaville (vol. 6, ch. 10; k-17,168).
31. The last, reforming chairman of the KGB, Vadim Bakatin, appointed after the failed coup of August 1991, outraged his staff by giving the American ambassador blueprints of the highly sophisticated bugging system (Albats, The State within a State, pp. 311-13). There were several security alerts within the existing US embassy in Moscow during the 1980s. In 1984, however, bugs were discovered in electric typewriters in the US embassy in Moscow which had been in use for some years (Lardner, “Unbeatable Bugs”). In 1986 two marine guards admitted giving KGB agents access to the US embassy. Because of improved security procedures, however, the KGB do not seem to have gained access to the cipher room or other sensitive areas (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 611).
32. k-22,135,232. The GRU already had posts in a number of its residencies designed to intercept US and NATO military communications.
33. vol. 6, ch. 9.
34. vol. 6, ch. 9.
35. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 92. The POCHIN files noted by Mitrokhin confirm Kalugin’s list of intercepted communications (vol. 6, ch. 9).
36. vol. 6, ch. 9.
37. See above, chapter 11.
38. See above, chapter 11.
39. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 2; vol. 6, ch. 9. There was a further operation to bug UN Secretariat offices in 1963 (k-8,138).
40. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 2.
41. After leaving GCHQ in 1977, Prime broke off contact with the KGB for the next three years. He had further meetings with his case officer in Vienna and Potsdam in 1980 and 1981. His work as a Soviet agent came to light after he was arrested for sexually molesting little girls in 1982. He was sentenced to thirtyfive years’ imprisonment for espionage and three for sexual assault (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 526-8, 530-1). A senior GCHQ officer was later quoted as saying, “On the political side, there was a time up to the mid-1970s when we used to get useful [Soviet] political and high-level military communications. But that dried up, partly as a result of Prime.” (Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, p. 6.) Because Prime was a Third Directorate, not an FCD, agent, Mitrokhin did not have access to his file. The latest study of Prime, by the detective chief superintendent in charge of his case, is Cole, Geoffrey Prime.
42. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the date of foundation of the Sixteenth Directorate, but indicate that it was in existence not later than 1968; k-22,232.
43. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 529. vol. 6, ch. 9.
44. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 3.
45. vol. 6, ch. 9. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record ANTON’s real name.
46. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1179.
47. vol. 6, ch. 9.
48. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1192.
49. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 92.
50. For illustrations of some of the complex antennae on the roofs of Soviet missions in the United States and elsewhere, see Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 49-68.
51. vol. 6, ch. 9.
52. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, p. 359.
53. Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 357-8.
54. vol. 6, ch. 9.
55. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2.
56. vol. 6, ch. 9.
57. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1.
58. vol. 6, ch. 9. On the crisis over the Soviet “combat brigade” in Cuba, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 444-7. Mitrokhin’s notes on POCHIN files also record that “during the crisis in Lebanon the [Washington] residency was able to make a correct evaluation of the unfolding situation and inform the Centre on a timely basis that the United States had no plans for military intervention” (vol. 6, ch. 9). It is unclear which Lebanese crisis is referred to. Since the other material in this section of Mitrokhin’s notes deals with the mid-1970s, however, the reference is probably to 1974, when Israel made a series of air attacks against villages in southern Lebanon, which it suspected of harboring terrorists.
59. vol. 6, ch. 9.
60. The FBI shortwave radio communications channels monitored continuously by the RAKETA post during the 1970s were:
• the radio link between surveillance vehicles and the six FBI posts responsible for observing the movements of Soviet personnel (167.4625 megahertz);
• the channel used by surveillance vehicles and observation posts monitoring the movements of members of Middle Eastern and some Western missions to the UN (167.2125 megahertz);
• the channel used for communications between the FBI department investigating bank robberies and surveillance vehicles (167.6887 megahertz);
• the channel used by those investigating other federal crimes (167.3756 megahertz);
• the channel used for communications between the FBI despatch centers in New York and New Jersey (frequency in the 167 megahertz band not recorded);
• the channel used for other communications between the New York dispatch center and FBI vehicles (167.7760 megahertz)
vol. 6, ch. 9).
61. vol. 6, ch. 9.
62. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4, n. 1.
63. The running costs for the main intercept posts in KGB residencies around the world in 1979 were as follows (figures in thousands of hard currency roubles):
Washington (POCHIN): 26.0
New York (PROBA): 29.4
San Francisco (VESNA): 6.7
Ottawa (codename not recorded): figures unavailable (5.8 in 1977)
Montreal (VENERA): 3.3 (plus 3.5 for purchase of motorcar)
Cuba (TERMIT-S): 18.8
Brazil (KLEN): 4.8 (increased to 8.2 in 1980; 13.3 in 1981)
Mexico (RADAR): 3.5 (increased to 4.6 in 1980)
Reykjavik (OSTROV): 2.3
London (MERCURY): 7.1
Oslo (SEVER): 7.2
Paris (JUPITER): 10.1
Bonn (TSENTAVR-1): 11.3
Cologne (TSENTAVR-2): figures unavailable
Salzburg (TYROL-1): 1.3
Vienna (TYROL-2): 3.3
Berne (ELBRUS): 2.8
Geneva (KAVKAZ): 2.3
Rome (START): 15.0
Athens (RADUGA): 4.2
Ankara (RADUGA-T): 9.5 (plus supplementary 2.2)
Istanbul (SIRIUS): 5.3
Teheran (MARS): 5.0
Beijing (KRAB): 4.5
Tokyo (ZARYA): 10.4 vol. 6, ch. 9; 1977 figures for Ottawa from vol. 8, ch. 5)
Because of the KGB’s curious accounting methods, these figures doubtless do not represent the full running costs of the intercept posts. They do, however, give an approximate indication of the relative level of activity at each post. Other significant intercept posts, probably less important than those listed above, included Lisbon (ALTAY), Nairobi (KRYM), Cairo (ORION),The Hague (TULIP), Brussels (VEGA), Belgrade (PARUS), Hanoi (AMUR), Jakarta (DELFIN) and Damascus (SIGMA). Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the budgets for these posts.
64. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 27-9; Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” pp. 723-5.
65. vol. 6, ch. 9.
66. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 27-9.
67. vol. 2, app. 3.
68. k-22,136. Shorter reports were submitted by each intercept post at least once a month.
69. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 2.
70. vol. 6, ch. 6.
71. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 3; vol. 6, ch. 6; vol. 6, app. 2, parts 4, 5.
72. On the origins of the UKUSA agreement, see Andrew, “The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance”; on its subsequent development, see Ball and Richelson, The Ties That Bind and Hager, Secret Power.
73. t-7,131.
74. t-7,130.
75. k-19,435.
76. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 5.
77. See above, chapter 6.
78. vol. 2, app. 3. The names of the head and deputy heads of the Sixteenth Department are given in k-22,134.
79. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993. When Oleg Gordievsky became resident-designate at the London residency early in 1985, the Sixteenth Department officer told him that there was currently no British source providing high-grade cipher material (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 610).
80. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” pp. 20-3.
81. Interview with Gurgenev (identified only by his first name and patronymic), Izvestia (September 24, 1991).
82. On March 25, 1985, for example, the London residency received an urgent telegram asking for British reactions to Gorbachev’s meeting with the executive committee of the Socialist International. Sooner than report that the event had failed to excite great interest in Britain, the residency simply concocted a favorable reply without contacting any of its limited range of sources. (Recollection of Oleg Gordievsky, then resident-designate.)
83. See above, chapter 21.
84. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Viktor Makarov, 1993; Viktor Makarov, “The West Had No Aggressive Plans against the USSR,” Express Chronicle (February 19, 1992), p. 5.
85. Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, ch. 19.
86. Ball, Soviet Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Ball and Windren, “Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint).”
87. Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” p. 726.
88. Andrew, “The Nature of Military Intelligence,” p. 5.
89. Rosenau, “A Deafening Silence,” pp. 727, 732 n. 6.
Chapter Twenty-two Special Tasks Part 1
1. Djilas, Tito, p. 29; Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 106-7; Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 399.
2. k-20,272; Ranković’s codename is in k-20,287.
3. Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 82-3, 105-6.
4. k-20,281.
5. k-20,276.
6. k-20,290,292. Tishkov’s cover name (Timofeyev) is given in Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 82-3, 105-6.
7. k-20,279.
8. k-20,289,290.
9. Djilas, Rise and Fall, pp. 84-5, 92, 95, 98-9, 105-6; Dedijer, Tito Speaks, p. 268.
10. k-20,292.
11. k-5,707.
12. Djilas, Rise and Fall, chs. 14, 15; Djilas, Tito, pp. 84-7; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 371-2. VAL is identified by Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 338.
13. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 415-17.
14. See above, chapters 5, 6, and 10.
15. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Izvestia (June 11, 1993); reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 336-7, and “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” p. 137.
16. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Izvestia (June 11, 1993).
17. “Stalin’s Plan to Assassinate Tito,” p. 137.
18. Wolff, “Leadership Transition in a Fractured Bloc,” p. 1.
19. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 335-8.
20. k-13,267. Some examples of Grigulevich’s works, published under his own name, the pseudonym I. R. Lavretsky and the hybrid Grigulevich-Lavretsky, are included in the bibliography.
21. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 249, 252-3.
22. Khokhlov, In the Name of Conscience, part 3; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 430-1.
23. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.
24. t-7,267.
25. t-7,267.
26. Each target file (obektovoye delo) had to give the following information:
1. The role of the target in peacetime and wartime, and its place in the enemy’s military-industrial capabilities. Documents, photographs, films, maps and diagrams giving details on its location, work schedule, security system, personnel, neighbors, populated areas nearby and methods of approaching the target.
2. Detailed descriptions of the target’s vulnerable points, methods of attacking each of them, estimates of the likely damage, and the type of personnel to be used in sabotage operations (agents, illegals, etc.).
3. Opportunities to reconnoitre and sabotage the target. This section of the file contains individual reports (spravki) on every information source available on the target, and on each combat agent (agent-boyevik) selected for operations against it.
4. Details of the special equipment needed for operations against the target, the precise use to be made of it, dead drops, storage arrangements and the role of each of those entrusted with its use.
5. Arrangements for giving instructions to those responsible for attacking the target, together with the codewords for the “special action” to begin. (This part of the file was placed in a sealed package.)
If information on any of the subjects listed above was missing, a note was added to the file on the action being taken to obtain it. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, n. 2.
27. k-16,255.
28. t-7,311.
29. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
31. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 211-12.
32. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.
33. Barron, KGB, pp. 421-6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 467.
34. The fullest account of Stashinsky’s career is in Anders, Murder to Order.
35. Anders, Murder to Order, p. 107.
36. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 468. See below, chapter 15.
37. Richard Beeston, “KGB Refused to Kill Khrushchev” [interview with Semichastny], The Times (December 23, 1997).
38. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 481-2.
39. The text of Khrushchev’s secret speech of August 3, 1961 did not come to light until 1993. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 252.
40. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
41. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Fonseca was co-founder of the FSLN. Initially it was called the National Liberation Front. “Sandinista” was added, chiefly at Fonseca’s insistence, in 1962 in honor of the “anti-imperialist” hero, General Augusto César Sandino. Volume 2 will give more detail on KGB links with the FSLN and on other operations in Latin America.
42. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
43. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
44. vol. 8, ch. 10.
45. t-7,173.
46. It was planned to put the Wilhemshaven-Wesseling oil pipeline out of action where it crosses the Lippe river and the Seitenkanal; t-7,277.
47. t-7,65; k-16,380.
48. k-2,186.
49. t-7,163,165,170-2. For examples of radio caches, see this chapter, appendices 2, 3.
50. k-5,483.
51. On the MOLNIYA device, see this chapter, appendix 1. Mitrokhin’s notes do not always identify clearly which caches are booby-trapped.
52. See this chapter, appendix 2.
53. Reuter report (January 18, 1999).
54. k-5,382. The Belgian caches turned out not to be booby-trapped.
55. In 1968-9, the Thirteenth Department had one illegal, PAUL, assisted by his wife VIRGINIA, and two pairs of German illegal agents, on whom Mitrokhin’s notes give no further details; vol. 3, pakapp. 3. There may have been others in files not noted by Mitrokhin.
56. The fullest account of PAUL’s career is in vol. 7, ch. 7; there are a few further details in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. On RAG see also k-11,17. PAUL’s file, on which Mitrokhin made detailed notes, gives little indication of the nature of the assistance provided by VIRGINIA.
57. vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 8, ch. 9; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Among other illegals seconded for shorter periods to Thirteenth Department operations was Vasili Gordievsky (GROMOV), who on a mission to Spain in the winter of 1964-5 selected seven landing sites and eight arms caches for DRG operations. Rodin, the head of the Thirteenth Department, requested the Illegals Directorate to give him an award to mark the success of his mission; t-7,279.
58. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.
59. See above, chapter 11.
60. Deryabin and Rastvorov defected in 1954 to the CIA in, respectively, Vienna and Tokyo. In the same year the Petrovs defected in Canberra.
61. vol. 5, sec. 7n.; vol. 2, app. 3.
62. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.
63. vol. 2, app. 3; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
64. See above, chapter 11.
65. Wise, Molehunt, ch. 11; Mangold, Cold Warrior, ch. 12.
66. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
67. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. The KGB also sought, unsuccessfully, to use its agent in the Canadian RCMP, Jim Morrison (FRIEND), to track down Runge.
68. vol. 2, app. 3.
69. Nureyev, Nureyev, pp. 96-7.
70. Percival, Nureyev, pp. 55-6.
71. vol. 2, app. 3.
72. Sheymov, Tower of Secrets, pp. 92-3. Probably because of the deep lingering hostility to Nureyev among the KGB old guard, he was not rehabilitated in Russia until September 1998, five years after his death in exile. See “Russia reinstates Nureyev,” The Times (September 23, 1998).
73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
74. Percival, Nureyev, p. 99.
75. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
76. vol. 2, app. 3. Both Nureyev and Makarova were also the targets of numerous KGB active measures designed to discredit them.
77. k-10,155.
78. k-10,154.
79. Ministère Public de la Confédération press release (January 18, 1999). The Swiss press release made no reference to the documents from Mitrokhin’s archives used to locate the cache.
80. k-5,382.
81. k-10,156.
82. k-10,158.
83. k-10,157.
84. k-10,158.
Chapter Twenty-three Special Tasks Part 2
1. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.
2. The earliest reference to Department V (the letter “V,” not the Roman numeral) noted by Mitrokhin was contained in order no. 00197 of October 7, 1965 instructing other FCD departments with agents suitable for use in time of war or international crisis to hand them over to Department V. The Department had probably been founded not long before. vol. 2, app. 3.
3. vol. 3, pakapp. 3.
4. k-16,408.
5. k-26,317.
6. The earliest subsidies recorded by Mitrokhin were 135,000 dollars in February 1968, followed by 100,000 dollars in March. Mitrokhin’s notes on Greek Communist Party files for 1967, however, are very thin and it is likely that the first subsidies to the underground Party were handed over in Budapest during the later months of 1967. k-26,319.
7. k-16,69.
8. See above, chapter 18.
9. k-27,61.
10. k-16,69.
11. k-27,61.
12. k-3,28.
13. k-3,23,24,29.
14. k-3,28; k-26,315,318,323,325,326,384,387,390,394.
15. k-26,322. The Iraqi Communist Party also deposited its archives in the Soviet Union for safekeeping; see volume 2.
16. k-14,531. The location for operation ZVENO was studied by the illegal YAKOV and the agent ROBBI of the Vienna residency. YAKOV was Gennadi Mikhailovich Alekseyev, based in Switzerland, who had assumed the identity of a Swiss man, Igor Mürner, who had died in the Soviet Union. In 1973 YAKOV was arrested by the Swiss authorities, who were unable to prove charges of espionage against him. He served two years in prison for using false identity documents (k-5,193; k-24,236). Mitrokhin is unable to identify ROBBI. Other KGB officers (at least three, and possibly all, from Department V) involved in preparations for operation ZVENO were Yu. V. Derzhavin, A. D. Grigoryev, B. N. Malinin, Ye. S. Shcherbanov, B. S. Olikheyko, A. S. Savin, Kovalik, and Ye. A. Sharov (k-14,531).
17. k-16,408.
18. vol. 7, ch. 15
19. vol. 3, pakapp. 3. Vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 35 gives the location of PEPEL as Istanbul, but neither reference identifies the type of special action employed in PEPEL. Mitrokhin did not see the PEPEL file. The 1969 report also noted that the 1955 requirement for the Thirteenth Department to steal Western military technology was out of date; this had become the primary responsibility of FCD Directorate T (Scientific and Technological Espionage).
20. O’Riordan’s history of the Irish members of the International Brigades, Connolly Column, was printed in East Germany (though published in Dublin), and gratefully acknowledged the assistance of the Soviet agent and British defector to East Germany, John Peet.
21. The text of O’Riordan’s appeal for weapons for the IRA is published in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 311-16. In December 1969, shortly before the split which led to the emergence of the Provisionals, a secret meeting of the IRA leadership approved a proposal by Goulding to establish a National Liberation Front including Sinn Fein, the Irish Communist Party and other left-wing groups. Coogan, The Troubles, p. 95.
22. Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, p. 88.
23. Eight memoranda on the subject by Andropov on the IRA appeal for arms are published, in whole or part, in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 311-16.
24. vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 8, ch. 9; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
25. On the FLQ, see Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, pp. 206-10.
26. vol. 8, ch. 14.
27. Even Granatstein and Stafford, two of Canada’s leading historians of intelligence, conclude that the CIA document, “if authentic… does suggest strongly that the CIA was operating in Quebec”; Spy Wars, p. 209.
28. vol. 8, ch. 14.
29. k-24,365.
30. “Soviets Protest to Argentina After Envoy Foils Kidnaping,” Washington Post (March 31, 1970).
31. vol. 4, indapp. 3.
32. Rob Bull, “Defector Bares ‘Secret’ Past,” Vancouver Sun (April 5, 1976).
33. vol. 4, indapp. 3.
34. Interview with Robert Gates by Christopher Andrew (March 14, 1994).
35. See above, chapter 22.
36. k-24,365.
37. k-24,365.
38. k-24,365.
39. See below, chapter 24.
40. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 524-5; Barron, KGB, pp. 110, 431ff; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, pp. 197-9.
41. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 131-2.
42. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, pp. 388-9.
43. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 184.
44. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, pp. 337-43, 359.
45. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 3, vol. 1, p. 389n.
46. Barron, KGB, pp. 413-15. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, p. 81.
47. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 131-2.
48. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 184.
49. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. It is, of course, impossible to exclude the possibility that plans to cripple Baryshnikov were contained in a file not seen by Mitrokhin.
50. Studies of the split between Officials and Provisionals include Bell, The Secret Army, ch. 18; Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, chs. 7-8; Coogan, The IRA, chs. 15-17; Coogan, The Troubles, ch. 3; Taylor, The Provos, ch. 5-6.
51. Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, pp. 88-90.
52. O’Riordan’s letter to the Central Committee and Andropov’s memorandum on operation SPLASH are printed in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, pp. 314-16. According to Yeltsin, the file on SPLASH in the archives of the General Secretary does not indicate whether it was implemented. The files noted by Mitrokhin, apparently withheld from Yeltsin, show that it was and identify the boat used in the operation. vol. 7, ch. 15, para. 2.
53. vol. 7, ch. 15, para. 2.
54. O’Riordan informed the Central Committee, “I will take no part in the transport operation, and my role will only involve transferring the technical information about this to Seamus Costello.” Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, p. 314.
55. Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, pp. 221-2; Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, p. 90; Coogan, The Troubles, pp. 276-80. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), founded as the military wing of IRSP, became arguably the most violent of the republican paramilitary groups. Its victims included Airey Neave, MP, Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland, killed in 1979 by a bomb, activated by a mercury tilt switch, which was planted in his car in the Palace of Westminster car park.
56. k-27,393; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
57. Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution, p. 228.
58. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. On Piñeiro, who in 1974 became head of a new Departamento Americano of the Cuban Communist Party’s Central Committee, which took over responsibility for assistance to Latin American revolutionary movements, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 514.
59. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
60. Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, p. 58. Shelton’s reports were widely regarded in diplomatic circles as reflecting only Somoza’s views. On at least one occasion, his political officer, James R. Cheek, used the State Department’s “dissent channel” to contradict his chief. Jeremiah O’Leary, “Shelton being Replaced as Ambassador to Nicaragua,” Washington Star (April 19, 1975).
61. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, p. 39.
62. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
63. Booth, The End and the Beginning, p. 142, Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, pp. 116-17. Shelton was replaced as ambassador in April 1975.
64. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.
65. On the three main factions within the FSLN which emerged in 1975, see Booth, The End and the Beginning, pp. 143-4; Hodges, Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution, pp. 233-55.
66. On Fonseca’s link with the USSR, see volume 2.
67. k-27,393.
68. The file seen by Mitrokhin records only Fonseca’s request to visit Moscow. Though he saw no file on the trip itself, it is unlikely that the request was rejected.
69. Pezzullos, At the Fall of Somoza, pp. 117-19. On KGB relations with the Sandinistas, see volume 2.
70. t-7,135; vol. 2, appendix 3.
71. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 111-12.
72. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 238-9.
73. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 152-3.
74. vol. 2, app. 3.
75. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 152-9. Cf. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 195-7.
76. vol. 2, app. 3. The Line KR officer Vladimir Nikolayevich Yelchaninov (codenamed VELT), posted to the New York residency in 1978, also spent much of his time trying to track down defectors; vol. 6, app. 2, part 5.
77. Bereanu and Todorov, The Umbrella Murder, pp. 34-7, 70-3.
78. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 178-83; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 644-5. Bereanu and Todorov, The Umbrella Murder, adds usefully to previous accounts of Markov’s murder but also introduces some implausible speculation. For an illustration of an earlier version of the weapon used to kill Markov, a KGB poison pellet cane of the 1950s, see Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book, p. 152.
79. Interviews with Alpha group veterans, broadcast in Inside Russia’s SAS (BBC2, June 13, 1999).
80. vol. 1, ch. 4.
81. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 130. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 11-12.
82. See above, chapter 15.
83. vol. 1, ch. 4. Mitrokhin’s account contains only a brief allusion to the attempts to poison Amin’s food, which appears to have been the Eighth Department’s preferred method of assassination. According to Vladimir Kuzichkin, who defected from Directorate S a few years later, the first choice of assassin was an Azerbaijani illegal, Mikhail Talybov, who was bilingual in Farsi and had spent several years in Kabul with Afghan identity papers forged by the KGB. Equipped with poisons from the OTU laboratory, Talybov succeeded in gaining a job as a chef in the presidential palace. But, according to Kuzichkin, “Amin was as careful as any of the Borgias. He kept switching his food and drink as if he expected to be poisoned.” Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, pp. 314-15; Kuzichkin, “Coups and Killings in Kabul,” Time (November 22, 1982); Barron, KGB Today, pp. 15-16. A further, unsuccessful attempt to poison Amin took place at a lunch given by him for his ministers on December 27 (Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 19).
84. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 130.
85. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989,” p. 159.
86. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A,’” p. 131. The invasion plan was approved by the Politburo on December 12.
87. vol. 1, ch. 4.
88. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 18-19.
89. vol. 1, ch. 4.
90. vol. 1, ch. 4.
91. vol. 1, ch. 4.
92. vol. 1, app. 2.
93. vol. 1, ch. 4.
94. On Kikot’s previous career, see k-24,87,89; k-12,376; k-8,590.
95. vol. 1, app. 3.
96. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 138-40, 156-7; Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 206-7; Wolf, Man Without a Face, pp. 271-81. On Carlos’s contacts with the KGB, see volume 2.
97. vol. 7, ch. 15.
98. Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 338-9.
99. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 82-5. 100. Accounts of the August coup include those in Stepankov and Lisov, Kremlevsky Zagovor; Albats, The State within a State; Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb; and Gorbachev, The August Coup. Though Kryuchkov and other leading plotters were arrested after the coup, their trial was repeatedly postponed. By early 1993 all had been released. They were given formal amnesties by the Russian parliament elected in December 1993. 101. k-16,408.
Chapter Twenty-four Cold War Operations against Britain Part 1
1. There is no support in any of the files seen by Mitrokhin that for the implausible theory that a major Soviet agent remained at work in MI5 after the demise of the Magnificent Five. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to Sir Roger Hollis, director-general of MI5, the most senior of the MI5 officers wrongly accused of being a Soviet agent. The Hollis story is now thoroughly discredited (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 27).
2. On Norwood’s early career, see above chapters 7 and 8.
3. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
4. Hennessy, Never Again, p. 269.
5. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17. Myakinkov’s name was wrongly transcribed by Mitrokhin as Mekin’kov. (CBEN)
6. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
7. For legal reasons neither HUNT’s real identity nor the government departments for which he worked (included in Mitrokhin’s notes) can be identified. HUNT’s first controller was V. E. Tseyrov (then also Norwood’s controller), followed by B. K. Stolenov and Yu. Kondratenko. After the mass expulsion of KGB and GRU personnel from London in 1971 HUNT was put on ice for several years as a security precaution. Contact was resumed in 1975 by MAIRE, an agent of the Paris residency. Following MAIRE’s death in 1976, the London residency resumed control in 1977. HUNT’s last two case officers were V. V. Yaroshenko and A. N. Chernayev. In 1979, following HUNT’s establishment of a small business, his wife was recruited as a courier. By 1981, however, the Centre was dissatisfied with the quality of HUNT’s intelligence and apparently fearful that he was under MI5 surveillance. Contact with him seems to have been broken at that point. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 16.
8. Blake, No Other Choice, chs. 2-5. Cf. Hyde, George Blake. Though acknowledging his affection and admiration for Curiel, Blake unconvincingly downplays his influence on him. According to Kalugin, Blake “already held far-leftist views at the outbreak of the Korean War” (Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 141.). For examples of other distortions in Blake’s memoirs, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 755-6, n. 117); Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 217, 482-3, n. 36.
9. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 214-15 (an account based on partial access to KGB files and on the recollections of Kondrashev). Rodin was London resident from 1947 to 1952 and from 1956 to 1961; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 663.
10. See below, chapter 26.
11. k-9, 65.
12. Blake, No Other Choice, pp. 207-8. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 141. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 755-6, n. 117.
13. The best account of the Berlin tunnel operation, based both on material made available by the SVR and on newly declassified CIA files, is Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, ch. 11 and appendix 5, which corrects numerous errors in earlier accounts. Mitrokhin’s brief notes on the Berlin tunnel add nothing to Battleground Berlin.
14. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 442. On Goleniewski see Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 342-6.
15. Blake, No Other Choice, chs. 11, 12.
16. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 142.
17. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3. Driberg had joined the Communist Party while at public school but was expelled in 1941 when, according to his entry in the Dictionary of National Biography, the Party leadership “discovered that he was an agent of MI5, to which he had been recruited in the late 1930s” (Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-1980, p. 251). Though Driberg undoubtedly gave information to Maxwell Knight, a leading MI5 officer, much remains obscure about the relationship between them. According to Knight’s personal assistant, Joan Miller, he was a bisexual who, for a time, was “crazy” about Driberg. In her view, Driberg was only “a casual agent” who would “turn in a bit of stuff” when Knight put pressure on him. (Interview with Joan Miller, Sunday Times Magazine (October 18, 1981); Miller, One Girl’s War; Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 521-2.
18. Driberg, Ruling Passions, pp. 228-9.
19. Wheen, Tom Driberg, p. 309.
20. Vassall, Vassall; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 442-4. Andropov considered Vassall one of the KGB’s most valuable agents.
21. Driberg, Ruling Passions, p. 235.
22. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3. Mitrokhin’s notes on Driberg’s file record that he was “recruited in Moscow… chiefly on the basis of compromising material which recorded his homosexual relations with an agent,” but give no further details of the “compromising material.”
23. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3.
24. Watkins’s comments are quoted in Wheen, Tom Driberg, p. 328.
25. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3.
26. Wheen, Tom Driberg, pp. 292-315. Francis Wheen’s very readable and entertaining biography of Driberg dismisses all suggestion that his book on Burgess was influenced in any way by the KGB. Though shocked by the “stench” from the “acrid piss” of stories planted in the press by MI5 and MI6 (Tom Driberg, p. 317), Mr. Wheen failed to detect any unwholesome aroma emitting from the vast array of KGB active measures. Despite the SCD’s addiction to compromise operations, it also does not occur to him that the KGB might have exploited Driberg’s sexual adventures in Moscow lavatories.
27. Driberg, Ruling Passions, p. 229.
28. Driberg, Guy Burgess.
29. According to Mitrokhin’s summary of Driberg’s KGB file, he was used for “the publication of KGB themes in the British press,” and “sent to the United States and other Western countries with a [KGB] brief”; vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3.
30. Wheen, Tom Driberg, p. 337.
31. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 313.
32. Wheen, Tom Driberg, pp. 353-4.
33. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3.
34. Wheen, Tom Driberg, pp. 362-8, 400.
35. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 313.
36. Frolik also identified three other Labor MPs whom he claimed had been in the pay of the StB: Will Owen, John Stonehouse and agent GUSTAV (not so far reliably identified); Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 523-4.
37. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 2.
38. Fletcher, £60 a Second on Defence, pp. 132-3.
39. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 2.
40. Fletcher claimed that MI5 had shown his wife intercepted letters in 1969 showing that he had had an affair during a visit to Hungary. Dorril and Ramsay, Smear, p. 197.
41. Dick Crossmann was less impressed, telling his diary that Wilson had done “a magnificent job of blowing out his information” in order to pose as a Soviet expert. Ziegler, Wilson, pp. 89-94.
42. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.
43. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 91.
44. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.
45. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 94.
46. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.
47. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 97-9. Mangold, Cold Warrior, pp. 95-7.
48. Wright, Spycatcher. Wright later disowned most of his own conspiracy theory and said in a Panorama interview that there had been only one serious plotter (BBC1, October 13, 1988).
49. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 15. In view of the connection of the future Labor leader, Michael Foot, with Tribune and the allegations made against him by the Sunday Times in 1995, for which he received libel damages, it seems appropriate to add that Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to him.
50. Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, 1947-1984, p. xi.
51. Crankshaw, Russia by Daylight, p. 12.
52. Dictionary of National Biography, 1981-1985, p. 101.
53. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 42.
54. Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, p. 13.
55. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 42.
56. Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, p. 81.
57. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 42.
58. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 17.
59. Barron, KGB, pp. 343-5.
60. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 17. The KGB file on operation PROBA disproves suggestions that Courtney was the victim of a plot by MI5 rather than the KGB. Dorril and Ramsay, Smear, p. 107.
61. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 13. There is no record in Mitrokhin’s notes of any major hemorrhage of information by any seduced member of the British embassy staff after Vassall.
62. See above, chapters 10 and 12.
63. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 103-5. Though the main features of Molody’s career as illegal resident in London, much of which came out at his trial in 1961, are already known, the files noted by Mitrokhin add some important details.
64. vol. 8, ch. 8. SVYASHCHENNIK had previously been used to “check” Hambleton before his recruitment by the KGB; vol. 8, app. 1.
65. vol. 8, ch. 8.
66. Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, p. 119.
67. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.
68. k-11, 19.
69. Microdot letter found in BEN’s possession after his arrest in 1961. Bulloch and Miller, Spy Ring, ch. 11; West, The Illegals, pp. 175-7.
70. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3.
71. Agranovsky, “Profession: Foreigner.”
72. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. A KGB file for 1953 describes LONG as a “valuable agent” of the Paris residency; k-4, 99. According to their passports, “Peter Kroger” had been born in Gisborne, New Zealand, on July 10, 1910 and “Helen Kroger” had been born in Boyle, Alberta, on January 17, 1913; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Their colleagues in the British book trade believed both to be Canadian.
74. Snelling, Rare Books and Rarer People, p. 208.
75. Blake, No Other Choice, p. 265.
76. Agranovsky, “Profession: Foreigner.”
77. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
78. vol. 7, ch. 12.
79. Houghton, Operation Portland, Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 446-7.
80. Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 137-8; Rositzke, The KGB, pp. 76-7.
81. vol. 7, ch. 12.
82. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
83. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.
84. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 68-72.
85. Blake, No Other Choice, pp. 264-5.
86. vol. 7, ch. 12.
87. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 447-8.
88. vol. 7, ch. 12.
89. vol. 7, ch. 12.
90. RAG had been recruited in 1955; his work as a Soviet agent was known to at least one leader of the Belgian Communist Party. k-11, 17.
91. vol. 7, ch. 13. At the time of Koslov’s recall, the Centre does not appear to have decided whether his final destination was to have been Britain or the United States.
92. Bagrichev later became head of the first department in Directorate S; a file noted by Mitrokhin records him as holding that post in 1975. vol. 7, ch. 8, para. 6.
93. Lopatin became acting resident, following Chizhov’s sudden recall to Moscow in 1966 after he had apparently suffered a brain hemorrhage; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 773, n. 121. Chizhov appears to have recovered. In the mid-1970s he was resident in Mogadishu. k-12, 452.
94. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 517.
95. Frolik, The Frolik Defection, p. 82.
96. From 1964 to 1968 Savin was Lyalin’s predecessor as the Thirteenth Department officer at the London residency; he later became head of Line N in Finland. vol. 7, app. 2, paras. 61, 84.
97. West, A Matter of Trust, p. 171. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 198.
98. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 517-18. In 1971 sixteen Line X officers were operating under official cover in London: one (Sherstnev) as embassy first secretary; three as third secretaries; one as attaché; eight in the trade mission; one in Mashpriborintorg (International Machine Tool Trade Organization); and one as a trainee. Additional Line X officers were being selected for positions in the Moscow Narodnyy Bank and in an (unidentified) Anglo-Soviet organization. The number of Line X officers was seriously reduced as a result of the mass expulsion of September 1971. k-2, 124.
99. vol. 7, app. 1, item 65; k-2, 124. For legal reasons, it is not possible to include the names or other identifying details of the Line X agents contained in Mitrokhin’s notes.
100. vol. 7, app. 1, item 51.
101. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 24; k-2, 120.
102. vol. 7, app. 1, item 70; k-2, 124.
103. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 4.
104. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 16.
105. vol. 7, app. 1, item 64; k-2, 124
106. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 36; k-2, 124.
107. vol. 7, app. 1, item 69; k-2, 124. The engineer DAN is not to be confused with the Tribune journalist with the same codename.
108. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 15; k-2, 124.
109. vol. 7, app. 1, item 96.
110. k-2, 124
111. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 31.
112. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 518; West, A Matter of Trust, pp. 115-19.
113. Reports of the Security Commission in June 1965 (Cmnd. 2722) and November 1968 (Cmnd. 3856); Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, pp. 421-3, 463; West, A Matter of Trust, pp. 127-9, 161-2.
114. vol. 7, app. 2, item 64.
115. vol. 7, app. 2, item 31.
116. vol. 7, app. 2, item 14.
117. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6. 118. Philby, My Silent War, p. 17.
119. vol. 6, app. 1, part 37
120. Philby’s original codename had both Russian and German forms, respectively SYNOK and SÖHNCHEN, both meaning “Sonny.”
121. vol. 6, app. 1, part 37
122. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 525-6.
123. See above, chapter 23.
124. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 184.
125. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 131.
Chapter Twenty-five Cold War Operations against Britain Part 2
1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6. Knightley, Philby; pp. 234-7.
2. Izvestia (October 1, 1971).
3. See above, chapter 7.
4. SIS officers stationed in Beirut since Philby’s defection in 1963 had been identified by the bugging of the British embassy and SIS station in operation RUBIN; vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 38.
5. Izvestia (October 1, 1971). Robert G. Kaiser, “Soviets Name 7 Britons as Mideast Spies,” Washington Post (October 2, 1971).
6. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 29. Al Zaman editorial (May 8, 1972).
7. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/3823/i (October 27, 1971). Al Zaman editorial (May 8, 1972).
8. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 36.
9. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 29.
10. L’Orient-Le Jour (Beirut) (May 13, 1972); The Times (April 7, 1973). When later questioned by Knightley about the KGB’s renewed contact with him in the early 1970s, Philby was “a little vague” (Knightley, Philby, p. 237). Philby could scarcely have forgotten the long interview in Izvestia on October 1, 1971, which marked his partial return to favor, but plainly preferred not to talk about it.
11. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 133-41. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 544-5.
12. vol. 7, app. 2, item 82.
13. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 199; West, A Matter of Trust, pp. 171-2.
14. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 525-6.
15. vol. 7, ch. 6.
16. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 526.
17. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 9. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the date at which the bugging of the trade delegation was discovered. In 1989, however, the Soviets publicized their discovery of the bugs some years earlier. Christopher Andrew, Simon O’Dwyer Russell and Robert Porter, “Battle of the Bugs on the Wall,” Sunday Telegraph (June 4, 1989).
18. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 514.
19. vol. 7, app. 2, item 7. KGB agents in the London embassy on January 15, 1973 were Ivan I. Ippolitov (minister-counselor), Ralf Bernkhardovich Mikenberg (second secretary), V. I. Solovev (third secretary), Andreï Sergeyevich Parastayev (first secretary), Grigori Petrovich Dremlyuga (aide to naval attaché), Andrei Filippovich Pekhterev (senior assistant military attaché), Nikolai Nikolayevich Pleshakov (interpreter), I. A. Bardeyev, (assistant naval attaché), A. A. Abramov (attaché), I. M. Klimanov, Dmitri Alekhin (duty office keeper), Leonid A. Moskvin (third secretary), Vasili A. Tolstoy (duty office keeper), Viktor Mikhailovich Gribanov (trade attaché), Vladimir Petrovich Molotkov, Stanislav Pokrovsky, Lev. A. Konev, Viktor Mikhailovich Ivanov (trade representative) and Tamara Tikhonovna Nikulina.
20. vol. 7, ch. 3, para. 12; vol. 7, ch. 3, paras. 6-7.
21. vol. 7, app. 3; k-27, 453.
22. k-4, 154.
23. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 16.
24. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.
25. k-2, 124.
26. See above, chapter 24.
27. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 4.
28. vol. 7, ch. 3.
29. vol. 7, app. 3, n. 8. It does not follow that the KGB succeeded in sending agents or trusted contacts to all these colleges.
30. vol. 7, app. 2, item 77. Because of his difficulty in combining a career as a distinguished research scientist with work as an operational intelligence officer, Lednev was later allowed to leave the KGB, though he was no doubt expected to retain an association with it. According to KGB files, in 1981 he was deputy director of the Institute of Biological Physics in the city of Pushchino. vol. 6, app. 2, part 5.
31. vol. 7, app. 2, item 4. In 1979 Lopatin was succeeded as head of Directorate T by Leonid Sergeyevich Zaitsev, who had also begun specializing in ST while at the London residency in the 1960s. vol. 3, pakapp. 3, items 294-5; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 622.
32. k-2, 124. vol. 7, app. 1, item 66.
33. COOPER, who worked in the new products department of a pharmaceutical company; a virologist; a research scientist in a pharmaceutical company; and an engineer at a British nuclear reactor. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 31; k-2, 124; vol. 7, app. 1, item 96.
34. Meetings between STARIK and his controller took place in Paris, those with DAN in Western Europe. In 1975-6 contact with HUNT was maintained by an agent of the Paris residency. Other cases were run by the Copenhagen and Helsinki residencies (k-2, 124; vol. 6, app. 1, part 39; vol. 7, app. 1, items 65, 68).
35. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.
36. John Steele, “25 years for the Spy Who Stayed in the Cold,” Daily Telegraph (November 18, 1993).
37. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), chs. 2-4.
38. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.
39. On the information about Smith passed by MI5 to EMI in 1978, see “Phone Call that Trapped a Spy,” Independent (November 19, 1993).
40. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.
41. The Security Commission later concluded that Smith had held on to some of the classified documents he had obtained at Thorn-EMI and given them to the KGB some time after he lost his security access in 1978. One or more of the payments recorded in his file may thus refer to a period after his loss of access. Since Mitrokhin’s notes end in 1984, the details of KGB payments to Smith cannot refer to his later years as a Soviet agent.
42. “‘Boring’ Idealist Who Spied for Russia Gets 25 Years,” The Times (November 19, 1993).
43. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), pp. 8-9. “Dear Maggie, Please Let Me Spy for the KGB!,” Daily Mirror (September 21, 1993). Laurence Donegan and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Spy Who Slipped Through the Net,” Guardian (November 19, 1993).
44. See below, chapter 25.
45. Britain ranked fourth in ST collection.
46. Klöckner INA Industrial Plants Ltd was a British-based subsidiary of the West German firm Klöckner Co., Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien.
47. The KGB officers who received commendations for their part in the operation were A. B. Maksimov, V. G. Goncharov, V. A. Andryevskaya, A. I. Baskakov, A. N. Belov, V. P. Varvanin, A. N. Kosarev, A. V. Smirnov, A. A. Shishkov, S. A. Agafonov, V. K. Gavrilov, S. Yu. Demidov, B. I. Danilin, O. I. Bukharev and V. A. Sedov. vol. 7, app. 3, n. 15.
48. See above, chapter 21.
49. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 14.
50. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18. On Parastayev, see also vol. 7, app. 1, items 7, 42.
51. Ziegler, Wilson, p. 503.
52. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.
53. Ziegler, Wilson, pp. 508-9.
54. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 18.
55. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 129.
56. vol. 7, ch. 16, items 54, 62.
57. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 62.
58. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 129-30.
59. See above, chapter 24.
60. Information from Oleg Gordievsky.
61. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 50.
62. Morning Star (October 31, 1975).
63. De-la-Noy, Mervyn Stockwood, pp. 214-15.
64. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 50. Tony Benn was also invited to dinner but declined because “Mervyn Stockwood is such an old gossip that he’d tell everybody that he’s had a dinner party for the Secretary of the Communist Party and myself.” Benn, Against the Tide, p. 482.
65. De-la-Noy, Mervyn Stockwood, p. 212.
66. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 51.
67. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 53.
68. Alasdair Palmer, “How the KGB Ran the Guardian’s Features Editor,” Spectator (December 10, 1994). Interview with Richard Gott, Guardian (December 12, 1994).
69. Mitrokhin did not note either Gott’s KGB file or references to other Guardian articles by him. His notes thus do not clarify the nature of Gott’s relationship with the KGB. Gott acknowledges having met KGB officers in London, Moscow, Vienna, Athens and Nicosia, but claims that the only money he received from them was to pay travel expenses to and in the last three locations. Interview with Richard Gott, Guardian (December 12, 1994). Cf. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 281-2.
70. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 66. Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, House of Commons Official Report, Session 1977-78, vol. 944, col. 1200.
71. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 506-8.
72. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 101-2, 138-9.
73. Observer duly reported American claims that the document was forged but gave greater weight to evidence for its authenticity (Observer, January 22, 1984).
74. “A Girl’s Best Friend,” New Statesman (November 5, 1982).
75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 630.
76. vol. 6, app. 1 (misc.), part 1; k-12, 51.
77. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 130-7.
78. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 118.
79. There is, for example, no reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to Geoffrey Prime, the agent in GCHQ, who was—unusually—recruited and run outside the UK by the KGB Third Directorate, to whose files Mitrokhin did not have access.
80. vol. 7, app. 1, item 77. There is another tantalizing one-sentence reference to a SIGINT official (apparently British) codenamed ZHUR (JOUR), contacted in 1963 for the first time since 1938. Mitrokhin gives no indication whether or not the contact had any result. It is also possible that the reference was garbled, since the longest-serving agent providing intelligence on cipher systems, an employee of the French foreign ministry, was codenamed JOUR. vol. 7, app. 1, item 122.
81. vol. 5, ch. 14.
82. The Times (November 29, 1969, March 31, 1994).
83. vol. 5, ch. 14, para. 1; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 74.
84. vol. 5, ch. 14, n. 4; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 74.
85. vol. 5, ch. 14, para. 2 and n. 4.
86. vol. 7, ch. 7, paras. 73, 74; k-2, 171; vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 2, 3, 7.
87. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 5, 6; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 75. Since there is no indication that VERA behaved improperly, it would be unfair to reveal her identity or precise job in the Moscow embassy, both of which are recorded in Symonds’s file.
88. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 7-9.
89. vol. 5, ch. 14, n. 6.
90. It was also considered too risky for Symonds to use his forged British passport to apply for an Australian visa; entry to New Zealand did not require a visa. From New Zealand he would need only Everett’s birth certificate to gain entry to Australia. Symonds, however, was unable to book a direct flight from Tokyo to New Zealand and was forced to use his bogus British passport as a transit passenger in Sydney. When flying from New Zealand to Australia later in the year, he used the same passport with an Australian visa obtained in Wellington, fearing that if he used Everett’s birth certificate an immigration service computer might detect that he had previously possessed a British passport containing the same name and date of birth. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 10-11.
91. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 12-44.
92. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 45-6.
93. vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 76.
94. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 51-2.
95. “The Fugitive Detective and His Secret Trips to Britain,” The Times (April 15, 1981).
96. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 53-4.
97. “Bribes Trial Man Says He was Told to Flee,” The Times (April 7, 1981). “Detective in ‘Morass of Corruption’ is Jailed,” The Times (April 15, 1981). “Confessions of a Bent Copper,” The Times (March 31, 1994).
98. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 526. Lukasevics was unable to claim credit for Prime and Symonds, two of the KGB’s most notable British agents of the 1970s; both had been recruited abroad.
99. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 585-7; Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 249-52.
100. vol. 7, app. 2, item 69.
101. vol. 7, app. 2, 71. The file noted by Mitrokhin refers to Guk by his codename, YERMAKOV.
102. Zamuruyev was succeeded as head of Line N by Aleksandr Igorevich Timonov. vol. 7, ch. 7, para. 10; app. 2, para. 50.
103. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 599. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 269-70.
104. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582-605. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.
105. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 19.
106. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 586.
107. vol. 7, app. 2, item 73.
108. vol. 7, app. 2, item 72.
109. Earley, Confessions of a Spy, pp. 139-45, 176-9.
110. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 28-35, 609; Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, chs. 1, 14, 15.
111. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 12.
112. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), p. 10.
113. Report of the Security Commission (Cm 2930) (July 1995), pp. 13-14, 32-3. “Phone Call Hoax that Trapped a Spy,” Independent (November 19, 1993); “Vital Clues to a Traitor,” Daily Mail (November 19, 1993).
114. Some indication of the intelligence provided by Kuzichkin and Butkov is provided in their memoirs. On Makarov, see Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War.” Butkov’s memoirs have so far appeared only in Norwegian.
115. Pasechnik, one of the scientific directors of Biopreparat, the world’s largest and most advanced biological warfare research institute, made contact with SIS during a visit to France in 1989 and was exfiltrated to Britain. Interview with Pasechnik by Christopher Andrew in the 1995 Radio 4 series New Spies for Old? (presented by Christopher Andrew; produced by Dennis Sewell).
Chapter Twenty-six The Federal Republic of Germany
1. See above, chapter 12.
2. In 1977 the KGB apparat at Karlshorst was training seven East German illegals and investigating another fifty-two potential recruits, most of whom would probably not make the grade; k-5, 774.
3. On its foundation in 1952, the Stasi’s foreign intelligence arm was known as Hauptverwaltung XV (Main Department XV); it was renamed the HVA in 1956.
4. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 122-3.
5. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. xii.
6. k-16, 522. The residencies in Cologne and Hamburg were subordinate to that of Bonn, whose head had the title of Chief Resident.
7. k-19, 247.
8. The leader of the snatch squad was another German agent, WAGNER (later renamed FLORA). For this and other special actions, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. While WAGNER was stationed in Belgium from 1964 to 1967, SERGEYEV acted as courier to him. k-5, 88; k-16, 212.
9. k-5, 88.
10. k-5, 283.
11. k-5, 284.
12. k-9, 65.
13. Höhne and Zolling, The General was a Spy, ch. 12. Rositzke, The KGB, pp. 189-94. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 412, 452-3; Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 430-9. Mitrokhin’s brief notes on Felfe contain no detailed examples of the intelligence he provided; they confirm, however, that Felfe’s memoirs, Im Dienst des Gegners, contains disinformation fabricated by Service A (k-5, 284).
14. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1, n.
15. Peet, The Long Engagement, pp. 3, 101-3, 184-5, 229-31.
16. Peet, The Long Engagement, ch. 30. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 145-6.
17. The best account of the Otto John case is Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, ch. 10. Mitrokhin saw no file on the case.
18. Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Braunbuch and Graubuch.
19. Schmeidel, “Shield and Sword of the Party,” pp. 146-7.
20. k-26, 88. The fact that Brandt was given a codename is not, of course, evidence that he was an agent. Even Churchill and Roosevelt were referred to by codenames in wartime Soviet intelligence cables.
21. Brandt, My Road to Berlin, chs. 2-4.
22. k-26, 88. On Rein, see Brandt, My Road to Berlin, pp. 79-80.
23. The British also had ULTRA intelligence on the movements of the Tirpitz. After several unsuccessful British attacks, the battleship was finally sunk in November 1944 with the loss of 1,204 lives.
24. TERENTY was the Czech Communist journalist Walter Taube. Mitrokhin’s note identifies VANYA as Vanek, a former Czech intelligence officer now working for the British. It is unclear whether “Vanek” is a forename or surname (k-26, 88).
25. k-26, 88.
26. k-26, 88.
27. k-26, 86.
28. Colitt, Spy Master, p. 97.
29. Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 47-8.
30. Operations against major foreign statesmen normally required the approval of the political leadership.
31. k-26, 88.
32. Mitrokhin’s notes on Brandt’s file go only to 1962. They do, however, include later references to Brandt from other files.
33. Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 102-3. Abrasimov, later accused of behaving like a Soviet pro-consul, was ambassador in East Berlin.
34. Wolf, Man without a Face, ch. 9; Colitt, Spy Master, ch. 4; Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, p. 300.
35. Probably the best study of Ostpolitik is Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name.
36. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 156.
37. k-19, 248, 250.
38. Prittie, Velvet Chancellors, pp. 170-1.
39. Marshall, Willy Brandt, pp. 86-7.
40. k-2, 52.
41. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, p. 261.
42. Marshall, Willy Brandt, pp. 88-90.
43. k-2, 52.
44. “Bank pay-in Slip Published in Bonn Bribes Scandal,” The Times (June 20, 1973). “Steiner Tells of Work as an Agent,” Daily Telegraph (August 8, 1973).
45. Wolf concludes that “it is impossible to establish whether [Steiner] was paid twice over for his services”—by Wienand as well as the HVA directly. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, p. 261.
46. “Bonn Bribery Allegations ‘Not Proven,’” The Times (March 28, 1974).
47. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 197-201.
48. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 157-65. Wolf identifies a number of boastful inaccuracies in Guillaume’s own account of his career.
49. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 201-2.
50. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. xi, 171-2.
51. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 124.
52. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 238-40, 442-4, 456-7, 611.
53. The identity of Wolf’s first “Romeo spy,” codenamed FELIX, who began operations in the early 1950s, remains unknown. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 124.
54. k-5, 30, 31.
55. k-5, 31.
56. Barron, KGB, pp. 198-9.
57. k-16, 139. The alias “Franz Becker” is not recorded by Mitrokhin, but was later revealed at Höke’s trial.
58. k-10, 56; k-16, 139.
59. k-10, 56; k-16, 139.
60. k-16, 65.
61. k-16, 139; k-5, 19.
62. k-16, 65.
63. k-16, 139; k-5, 19.
64. k-10, 56; k-16, 139.
65. RENATA was married to RYBACHEK, a Czech illegal based in Switzerland, who was also working for the KGB. k-16, 94, 139; k-12, 5; k-8, 25-6; k-2, 46, 84.
66. “Russia May Have Learned War Secrets,” Observer (September 1, 1985); “Bonn Spy Knew Army Secrets,” Observer (September 8, 1985); “Glamour Spy’s Love Ends in treachery,” Observer (December 14, 1986); “Spionage: Wie ein Helmspiel,” Der Spiegel (December 29, 1986); “KGB Lover Led Shy Secretary into Treason,” Daily Telegraph (September 1, 1987).
67. Mitrokhin’s notes on ROSIE do not give her real name. Press reports after her arrest in December 1976 identify her as Heidrun Hofer.
68. k-8, 7, 177; k-18, 385. According to k-8, 177, ROSIE was recruited in October 1971; according to k-16, 108, she was recruited in 1973. The two dates probably refer, respectively, to the point at which she began to supply information to ROLAND, and to her meeting with VLADIMIR in February 1973, after which the importance of her role as an agent appears to have increased.
69. k-16, 61. From 1970 to 1982 VLADIMIR was an illegal trainer based in Karlshorst, who performed various assignments in the GDR, FRG and Austria. His wife, Irina Yevseyevna (BERTA), was also an illegal.
70. “Bettgeflüster Nach Dienstschluss,” Quick (January 13, 1977).
71. k-5, 20.
72. “Bettgeflüster Nach Dienstschluss,” Quick (January 13, 1977). “Hat Spionin Hofer den BND auf Jahre gelähmt?,” Die Welt (January 14, 1977).
73. k-16, 70; k-18, 5, 145. Details of the lonely hearts column and the alias used by GEORG (though not his real identity) were revealed at Falk’s trial in 1989. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 160.
74. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 160.
75. k-16, 70; k-2, 374.
76. k-19, 357. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 160.
77. k-18, 145.
78. Childs and Popplewell, The Stasi, pp. 160-1.
79. vol. 6, app. 1, part 5; k-14, 747, 748; k-11, 91; k-12, 435.
80. k-14, 747.
81. k-11, 91.
82. t-1, 45, 135; k-5, 193; k-24, 236; vol. 6, app. 2, part 3.
83. k-14, 237; k-8, 72.
84. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 142-8; Colitt, Spy Master, pp. 128-34. Gast was arrested on September 29, 1990, four days before the reunification of Germany, betrayed by a former senior official of the now defunct HVA.
85. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 188-94; Colitt, Spy Master, pp. 197-205, 235-7. In February 1992 Kuron was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment and fined 692,000 marks—his total earnings from the HVA.
86. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 198-201; Colitt, Spy Master, pp. 203-4. Wolf ludicrously maintains that the prostitutes he employed to provide sexual services for Tiedge and other defectors “were not prostitutes but down-to-earth women, Party members and loyal to their country, who were prepared to do this in return for… a preferential flat or an advance up the waiting list for a car.”
87. “Wienand zu zweieinhalb Jahren Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (June 27, 1996); “Politik: Wegen langjähriger Spionage für die DDR: Karl Wienand zu zweieinhalb Jahren Haft verurteilt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung (June 27, 1996); Imre Karacs, “Cold War Agent Jailed,” Independent (June 27, 1996).
88. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 188.
89. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 186-8. After a conversation with the former Soviet ambassador in Bonn, Valentin Falin, in 1992, Brandt wrote, “Since 1975, Karl W[ienand] committed himself to working for the services over there.” Falin later denied having made a specific reference to Wienand. Roger Boyes, “Brandt Papers Revive Spy Claims,” The Times (February 11, 1995). The files seen by Mitrokhin contain no reference to a KGB attempt to recruit Wienand.
90. Observer reported from Bonn on July 3, 1994 that Wehner was “now widely suspected of having been a Stasi spy.”
91. k-3, 63.
92. Colitt, Spy Master, p. 250.
93. k-3, 63.
94. k-3, 63.
95. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 169. Wolf’s claims are not confirmed (or denied) by Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin’s detailed notes on Wehner’s file stop in 1941.
96. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 185, 210-11. Most of the section of Wolf ’s memoirs on Wehner, like much else dealing with German politics, is omitted from the English translation.
97. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, pp. 199, 321-2, 533-4.
98. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, pp. 207, 209.
99. k-2, 53. Wolf then took his revenge on Van Nouhuys by leaking the story to Quick’s rival Stern, which published it on October 25, 1973. A long court battle followed, eventually decided in favor of Stern. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 237-8.
100. In 1994 Brandt’s widow caused a political storm by referring publicly to his suspicions of Wehner.
101. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg, p. 218.
102. k-12, 505-6.
103. k-2, 162.
104. k-2, 165.
105. k-2, 179; k-10, 135-6.
106. k-5, 787.
107. Brezhnev’s visit, however, led to enormous expenditure of KGB time and effort. Security procedures were overseen by a committee including the heads of no less than seven KGB directorates (Kryuchkov among them). Twenty-nine KGB and GRU operational groups were assigned to supervise Brezhnev’s security during the visit. k-5, 788-9.
108. k-8, 104. Soviet-FRG negotiations on the natural gas pipeline from Siberia were successfully concluded in November 1981. According to Sir Percy Cradock, later Mrs. Thatcher’s foreign policy adviser, the Reagan administration “found in the Polish crisis [of December 1981] a convenient pretext for sabotaging an agreement they did not like. Their action was at first confined to US companies, but in June 1982 it was extended, with little thought for the consequences, to US subsidiaries and foreign companies as well.” After vigorous protests by Mrs. Thatcher as well as by Schmidt, the United States backed down in November 1982 in return for NATO acceptance of greater restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, p. 56.
109. k-8, 104.
110. Mitrokhin did not have access to the SCD files which reveal the agent’s name.
111. k-13, 44. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record any response by the Schmidt government.
112. k-19, 282. The active measures against Strauss give the lie to Wolf ’s suggestions since the publication of his memoirs that Strauss was an HVA informant.
113. k-5, 718, k-19, 282. Inge Goliath had been withdrawn to the GDR in 1979. Mitrokhin’s notes summarize, but give few details about, a series of other KGB active measures designed to compromise the BND and BfV: operation JUNGLE, conducted jointly with the HVA from 1978 onwards to discredit the BND and disrupt its relations with other Western intelligence services (k-13, 61, 82, 102-3); operations ZHAK-RUZH, ROZA, BURGUNDER, OSMAN and PANTER (1978), designed, again in co-operation with the HVA, “to expose and impede the activity of the FRG special services in Europe and in the Near East” (k-13, 61); operation ONTARIO (1978), “to cause disagreements between the CIA, the SDECE and the BND” (k-13, 79); operation JAMES (1980), “to exacerbate disagreements between the BND and the CIA” (k-13, 102); operation KLOP (1981), to discredit the BfV (k-13, 85); operation ORKESTR (1981), to discredit West German journalists who were alleged to be BND officers or co-optees (k-13, 86); and operation DROTIK (1981), to compromise Western businesses allegedly used by the CIA and the BND as cover and for other operational purposes (k-13, 87).
114. k-5, 718, k-19, 282.
115. k-6, 102; k-19, 32.
116. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 320.
117. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 222.
118. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 38-9.
119. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage; US Government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.
120. RICHARD was first deployed in the FRG in 1964; k-16, 110, 129.
121. k-18, 441.
122. k-10, 39.
123. t-2, 34.
124. vol. 6, ch. 6.
125. Even when restrictions on the export of Western computers were relaxed during the Gorbachev era, fears that they were bugged or deliberately infected with viruses continued. Nikolai Brusnitsin, deputy chairman of the State Technical Commission, complained in 1990 that the software in a West German computer sold to a Soviet shoe-making factory had been deliberately pre-programmed to self-destruct. There had, he claimed, been a whole series of such incidents. Brusnitsin, Openness and Espionage, pp. 28-9.
126. Line X agents identified in the files seen by Mitrokhin include (in alphabetical order) BORIS, the manager of an electronics factory (k-18, 230); DAL, a laser technology and plasma specialist (k-10, 38); DYMOV, a computer programmer at a research center in West Berlin (k-12, 442); EBER, an employee of a major company (k-14, 570); EGON, an East German illegal working as an engineer (k-16, 112, 296); EMIL, an employee of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (k-10, 37); ERICH, a chemical engineer (k-5, 232); FOTOGRAF, a scientist employed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (t-2, 54); FRIMAN, a rocket technology specialist (K-10, 32, 47); GUTSUL, the owner of a dye company (k-18, 318); HANS, an agent with access to two large engineering firms (k-14, 698); KARL, an expert in electro-magnetism who for part of his career worked as an agent of the Paris residency against French targets; KERNER, a polymer chemist (k-10, 48; k-12, 414; k-16, 120-1); KEST, head of a research group at a medical institute (k-5, 341); KLEIN, a nuclear physicist (k-14, 429); LEONID, a computer scientist in a multinational chemical company (k-18, 277; k-27, 323); LETON, a trade official specializing in radio electronics (k-12, 129); LOTTS, who held a senior position in an aerospace research institute (k-10, 41, 44); MORZH, a Yugoslav who supplied embargoed chemical products (k-5, 9); MOST, founder of an electronics company (k-12, 87); PAUL, owner of an electronics company (t-2, 18); RASPORYATIDEL (“Organizer”), a company director who supplied equipment for assembling integrated circuits (k-14, 570); ROBERT, a rocket engineer (k-10, 35); SHMEL, head of a computer company (k-18, 283); TAL, a designer of chemical factories and polymer plants (t-2, 1); TART, who worked for the giant chemical company Bayer (k-14, 670); TSANDER, a polymer chemist (k-10, 48; k-12, 414; k-16, 120-1); VILON, a company director who supplied embargoed goods (k-5, 10); VIN, director of an electronics company (k-5, 216); YUNG, an aircraft computer systems engineer (k-2, 70, 120); WAGNER, an employee of a major petrochemical company (k-10, 33, 46).
127. Die Welt (July 17, 1986). 128. “Ex-KGB Agent to Return to West,” Guardian (November 26, 1987).
129. k-10, 37.
130. “East Seen Escalating Drive for West’s Industrial Secrets,” Washington Post (October 24, 1986).
131. k-10, 37.
132. “Ex-KGB Agent to Return to West,” Guardian (November 26, 1987). “Red Spy Returns for His Pension,” Today (November 26, 1987).
133. Wolf, Man without a Face, ch. 1.
Chapter Twenty-seven France and Italy During the Cold War
1. k-4, 91-9, 101. The 1953 list of “valuable agents” in Paris also includes the codename MES, but gives no indication of his or her occupation. The only codenames which can be identified on the basis of information in Mitrokhin’s notes are PIZHO (Georges Pâques) and LONG (Paddy Costello). It is quite possible, however, that the other “valuable agents” include some of those recruited under other codenames during the few years after the Liberation. Pâques’s most important period as a Soviet agent almost certainly came while he was working at the French general staff from 1958 to 1962.
2. vol. 9, ch. 1.
3. See above, chapter 9.
4. “Security Aspects of Possible Staff Talks with France.” (February 24, 1948), JIC(48)5, CAB158/3, PRO. We are indebted for this reference to Alex Craig of Christ’s College, Cambridge.
5. During the 1960s the FRG, as a result of penetration by both the HVA and KGB, became an even more important source of intelligence than France. See chapter 26.
6. “Miscellaneous Soviet Personalities Who Have Served Abroad,” (September 29, 1954), CRS A6283/XR1/144, Australian Archives, Canberra.
7. vol. 9, ch. 1. For other examples of classified French documents on Berlin and the German question obtained by the Paris residency, see Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 68-9, 75-7, 82-4, 95, 145. Though the authors were given access to some reports from the Paris residency, they were not allowed to see the files on agent penetration in France noted by Mitrokhin.
8. On JOUR, chapters 9 and 27.
9. Though given to no access to KGB files on JOUR, Fursenko and Naftali confirm KGB access during the Cuban Missile Crisis to diplomatic traffic between the Quai d’Orsay and French embassies in Moscow and Washington; “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 70-1.
10. Wolton, Le KGB en France, pp. 204-6; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 466.
11. vol. 9, ch. 6.
12. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 70.
13. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 47.
14. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 43. Some doubt remains as to whether the FCD officer who calculated this total took fully into account the transition from “old” to “new” francs.
15. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 70.
16. vol. 9, ch. 1.
17. k-4, 2-4. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the intelligence supplied by GERMAIN, but the award of the Order of the Red Star is a reliable indication of its importance.
18. k-7, 178. After her false flag recruitment, ROZA was controlled by a female agent, JEANNETTE, who doubtless posed as a member of the fictitious “progressive” group.
19. LARIONOV joined the foreign ministry from the army in 1960; k-4, 112.
20. k-4,18.
21. FRENE became a commissaire de police in Paris in 1960; k-4, 114.
22. DACHNIK was recruited during a visit to the USSR in August 1962 by the Fourteenth Department of the FCD “for material reward”; k-14, 1.
23. ADAM was a chemist at the CNRS (Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques) recruited in 1959; k-4, 25.
24. SASHA was recruited in or before 1960. In that year he went to study electronics in Washington; k-4, 113.
25. k-4, 18.
26. Barron, KGB, pp. 169-82. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Yuri Nosenko (November 15, 1987); Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 374-9. Because these were SCD operations, they do not appear in the FCD files seen by Mitrokhin.
27. k-4, 131. The LOUISA case, unlike those of Dejean and Guibaud, figured in the FCD files seen by Mitrokhin because of the unsuccessful attempt by the Paris residency to renew contact with her.
28. NN’s name is not recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes but can be identified from the biographical detail contained in them as Saar-Demichel; vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5. Saar-Demichel later admitted his links with the KGB; Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 247. According to Wolton, his original KGB codename was ALEKSEI.
29. Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 247-50.
30. Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 374, 379, 411-12, 416-17, 426n., 437.
31. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5.
32. vol. 9, ch. 4, para. 8.
33. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 43-5.
34. Mitrokhin’s notes contain no reference to the radical (later socialist) politician Charles Hernu, who was to become defense minister from 1981 to 1985. It has been alleged that Hernu was recruited by the Bulgarian DS in 1953, later had contact with the Romanian Securitate and became a KGB agent in 1963. Dupuis and Pontaut, “Charles Hernu était un agent de l’Est.”
35. k-6, 80, 128; t-1, 61. For legal reasons GILBERT’s identity, though recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, cannot be published. There is some indication that at one point GILBERT avoided contact with his case officer.
36. For legal reasons DROM’s identity, though recorded in Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, cannot be published. His file fills seven volumes. DROM’s controllers were, successively, Spartak Ivanovich Leshchev (codenamed LARIN) from 1960 to 1964; Vladimir Filippovich Yashchechkin (YASNOV) from 1964 to 1967; Yuri Konstantinovich Semyonychev (TANEYEV) from 1967 to 1972; and Anatoli Nikolayevich Tsipalkin (VESNOV) in 1972-3. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 30-1; t-1, 58, 68; k-4, 27, 58.
37. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 33.
38. vol. 9, chs. 2, 4
39. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 5.
40. Myagkov, Inside the KGB, p. 24.
41. In the course of 1965 Saar-Demichel seems to have lost his influence at the Élysée. De Gaulle is reported to have said to a member of his entourage, “Saar-Demichel is a Soviet spy. He doesn’t, of course, steal secrets to hand over to them, but he tells them everything he knows.” Wolton, La France sous influence, pp. 382, 424-6.
42. Wolton, La France sous influence, p. 426.
43. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 33, 40.
44. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 11.
45. During the period 1963-6 three unidentified French intelligence officers were members of the GRANIT group, and one of the BULAT group. BON, a former head of department at the Sûreté Générale, worked as an agent recruiter; k-27, 242. The latest reference in Mitrokhin’s notes to penetration of SDECE is to the presence there of a KGB agent (not identified) in May 1969; k-4, 81.
46. k-4, 33, 34, 38.
47. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 30.
48. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 10. Mitrokhin’s notes give few details of the regular (non-bonus) payments to these agents.
49. Mitrokhin’s notes on his file do not specify what proportion of the large sums paid to him were in the form of a regular salary or retainer, but they do make clear that he received very substantial bonuses for particularly important items of S (k-5, 460).
50. t-1, 47; k-4, 34.
51. k-4, 35, 65; k-14, 93; vol. 6, app. 1, part 33; t-1, 264-5.
52. k-5, 281; k-11, 87; t-1, 266.
53. t-1, 42.
54. Wolton, Le KGB en France, pp. 242-3; Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, pp. 271-2.
55. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 20.
56. k-4, 176.
57. The six cipher personnel under cultivation were codenamed ALMAZOV, GROMOV, GUDKOV, KRASNOV, LAPIN and VESELOV. Mitrokhin gives details of only two. The cultivation of LAPIN began in 1980 and plans were made for it to continue after he was posted abroad in 1982. With the assistance of JOUR, an investigation was undertaken of KRASNOV’s finances, home and leisure pursuits, and he was secretly photographed. At the end of 1981 an (unidentified) illegal began to cultivate him under false flag. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record which, if any, of the cultivations ended in recruitment; k-4, 177.
58. t-1, 46; k-7, 145.
59. k-3, 81; t-1, 32.
60. t-1, 34; vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7.
61. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 41-53; k-6, 3-5; t-1, 57.
62. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 16; k-25, 120.
63. t-1, 27; vol. 3, pakapp. 1, 21.
64. t-1, 43; k-4, 180.
65. t-1, 44; k-14, 100.
66. t-1, 36; k-27, 292.
67. t-1, 46.
68. k-7, 145.
69. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 17.
70. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7.
71. k-7, 145.
72. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7. Giscard d’Estaing’s codename is given in k-3, 81.
73. For the two years 1976-7, BROK was paid a total of 217,000 francs: 72,000 francs basic salary, 83,000 bonuses, 62,000 expenses. From January to November 1978, the last period for which details of payments to BROK are available, he received a total of 182,000 francs: 55,000 francs salary, 83,000 bonuses, 62,000 expenses. k-3, 81.
74. Mitrokhin does not identify BROK’s case officer(s) for the period 1946-51. Thereafter, his controllers were Ye. R. Radtsig (1951-7); V. K. Radchenko (1957-9); E. N. Yakovlev (1959-63); I. F. Gremyakin (1970-2); L. I. Vasenko (1972); R. F. Zhuravlev (1972-6); R. N. Lebedinsky (1974-5); Ye. L. Mokeyev (1976-8); and Ye. N. Malkov (1978-9). k-3, 81.
75. M. S. Tsimbal, A. I. Lazarev, A. V. Krasavin, V. P. Vlasov and N. N. Chetverikov; k-3, 81.
76. k-3, 81.
77. See above, chapter 12.
78. vol. 9, ch. 3, paras. 5, 6; t-7, 219.
79. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15,24.
80. Raymond Aron, “Il n’y a pas de quoi rire,” Le Figaro (June 23, 1975). Aron, Mémoires, pp. 599-60. Other prominent critics of Le Monde included Pierre Nora and Jean-François Revel.
81. Le Monde (July 3, 1975).
82. Le Monde (September 12, 1975). This claim was subsequently withdrawn, but Le Monde’s critics complained that it continued, in its reporting on Solzhenitsyn, to “prodiguer impunément quelques insultes sous le couvert de l’objectivité.” Legris, Le Monde tel qu’il est, p. 32.
83. A major operational plan for 1975, jointly signed by the heads of the First Chief, Second Chief and Fifth Directorates, aimed “to discredit PAUK [Solzhenitsyn]… through mass information media abroad.” k-3b, 27.
84. Legris, Le Monde tel qu’il est.
85. Jacques Thibau’s analysis of Le Monde in the 1970s concludes: “…il repose à la fois sur ce que ses adversaires ‘de gauche’ appellent l’ordre, et ses critiques ‘de droite’ la subversion. L’équilibre est difficile à tenir. Il requiert de la prudence et de la pratique de la casuistique, mais globalement il correspond à la fonction du journal.” Thibau, Le Monde, 1944-1996, p. 433.
86. However, at least one regular Paris-based contributor to Le Monde in the 1970s, KRON, is identified as a KGB agent (k-24, 153). Mitrokhin’s notes also identify MONGO, one of Le Monde’s African correspondents, as a KGB agent, but do not give his identity or the dates when he was posted in Africa (k-6, 116).
87. t-1, 46, 58; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15, 24. Most of Mitrokhin’s notes on influence operations directed against Le Monde are both brief and general. He identifies only two active measures articles by both author and exact date of publication. One is described as “entirely written on KGB themes” by a leading Le Monde journalist; the other was an article “using KGB arguments” by a leading socialist politician. Both were published in 1980. vol. 1, ch. 8; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15, 24; k-8, 522; k-24, 153.
88. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 23.
89. The same disproportion in the treatment of KGB and CIA active measures is evident, on a somewhat smaller scale, in the generally valuable history of Le Monde by Jacques Thibau. Thibau concludes, for example, that one notorious forgery published by Le Monde, the so-called “Fechteler report,” which purported to reveal outrageously belligerent US designs in the Mediterranean, was almost certainly fabricated by the CIA and French intelligence. He does not consider the far more probable hypothesis that it was a KGB forgery (Thibau, Le Monde, 1944-1996, pp. 214-18). For an assessment of the revelations in the mid-1970s of malpractice by the US intelligence community, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, ch. 10.
90. SIDOR was recruited in 1956 but later suspected of working for the DST (k-14, 3). JACQUES, an AFP correspondent in a number of Asian countries, was a KGB agent from 1964 to 1973; during that period he had seven different controllers (k-6, 53). MISHA was recruited during a visit to the Soviet Union in 1965; Mitrokhin’s notes do not reveal how long his work as an agent continued (vol. 2, app. 1, para. 46; vol. 2, appendix 2, para. 68). LAN was an agent from 1969 to 1979, mostly—if not exclusively—in France (k-4, 85; k-27, 291). MARAT was an agent in Paris and abroad from c. 1973 to 1982 (k-6, 42). GRININ was recruited in 1980 (k-14, 379).
91. PIERRE, a confidential contact in the 1960s (k-14, 111, 134), and JOSEPH, a confidential contact from 1974 to 1977 (k-6, 84).
92. k-27, 291.
93. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 33.
94. Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, p. 134.
95. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 40.
96. Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 135-49.
97. k-5, 560.
98. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 37, 39-40. Sakharovsky was referred to at Pathé’s trial by his alias, “Kuznetsov.” The Paris residency believed that the DST had not succeeded in identifying him as the son of the former head of the FCD; k-5, 560.
99. Like DURANT, NANT, VERONIQUE, JACQUELINE and NANCY are identified in Mitrokhin’s notes, but cannot be named for legal reasons; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 43-9; k-6, 3.
100. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 11.
101. vol. 9, ch. 4, para. 33.
102. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 28; vol. 9, ch. 2, paras. 25-30; vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 13-15.
103. L’élection présidentielle, 26 avril-10 mai 1981, p. 34. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 18.
104. vol. 9, ch. 3, para. 20. The “affair of the diamonds” had begun with the publication by one satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaîné on October 10, 1979 of an order placed by Bokassa six years earlier for the purchase of a diamond plaquette for Giscard d’Estaing. The Élysée tried to fend off this and similar stories over the next year and a half until it finally announced on March 23, 1981, just over a month before the first round of the presidential election, that diamonds given to Giscard in 1973, 1974 and 1975 had been valued at 115,000 francs and that this sum had been donated to the Red Cross and other good causes in the Central African Republic.
105. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 31.
106. Le Monde reported during the campaign, “C’est incontestablement le parti socialiste qui a la meilleure image de marque dans l’électorat juif.” L’élection présidentielle, 26 avril-10 mai 1981, p. 73.
107. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 31.
108. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the inside information provided by GILES; k-6, 128.
109. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 3.
110. k-3, 81. BROK was not the only French journalist on whom the KGB radically revised its views. In 1979 the Centre concluded that LAN was providing “material not qualitatively different from material published in the press,” and broke off contact with him. k-27, 291.
111. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 3.
112. The statistics for Line X operations in European residencies in 1975 were as follows (figures for Line X officers certainly refer to 1975; those for agents are for approximately—probably exactly—1975):
Residency Line X Officers [k-5, 420] Line X Agents [k-5, 423]
Belgrade 3 ? Berne 3 ? Bonn 15 9 Brussels 7 4 Copenhagen 6 7 Geneva 3 2 The Hague 3 1 Helsinki 6 2 Lisbon 2 ? London 9 9 Oslo 3 0 Paris 22 22 Rome 9 10 Stockholm 7 1 Vienna 19 29
These statistics were compiled by the Second Department of FCD Directorate T, which was responsible for Line X operations in the residencies listed above. The figures for the Bonn residency account for only a part of Line X operations in the FRG; Line X operations were also run from Cologne. Line X in Karlshorst, which came under a different department of Directorate T, had fifty-nine agents in 1975 (k-5, 416). A probable majority of Line X operations in Vienna (which Mitrokhin’s notes do not make it possible to quantify) were directed at non-Austrian targets.
113. k-5, 383, 386, 406. Though Mitrokhin’s notes give no later statistics, it is possible that the 1977 record was subsequently surpassed.
114. Mitrokhin’s notes give the following incomplete statistics of Line X officers stationed in European residencies for all or part of the period 1974-9:
Belgrade 4 Berne 6 Bonn 9 Brussels 10 Cologne 13 Copenhagen 13 Geneva 7 The Hague 6 Helsinki 10 Lisbon ? London ? Oslo ? Paris 36 Rome 17 Stockholm 19 Vienna 38 (k-5, 459)
115. Line X in Paris also succeeded in penetrating an unquantifiable number of US companies and subsidiaries in France.
116. k-5, 460.
117. Though Mitrokhin’s note merely records that Andropov recommended the award of the Order of the Red Star, it is barely conceivable that the recommendation was turned down. Kesarev’s assistant, Yuri Ignatyevich Rakovsky, was recommended for accelerated promotion. k-5, 470.
118. Mitrokhin noted the following payments to ALAN which were recorded in his file: 409,000 francs for the period 1973 to 1976 (probably his basic salary with additional sums for particular items); 100,000 francs (undated) for information on the design of infra-red detectors; 40,000 francs (also undated) for samples of the detectors; 50,000 francs in September 1973 for two samples of missileguidance systems; payments of 71,000 and 100,000 francs in 1974 for technical documentation; 40,000 francs in 1974 or 1975 for unidentified technical samples; 89,400 francs (purpose unspecified) in 1975; 110,000 francs in 1977 for documentation on missile guidance; 60,000 francs and approximately 200,000 francs (30,000 convertible roubles) in December 1977 (purpose unspecified); and 200,000 francs (purpose unspecified) in mid-1978. On the assumptions that these were all separate sums and that there were no other payments unrecorded by Mitrokhin, this would make a grand total of 1,429,400 francs. k-5, 460.
119. k-5, 460.
120. Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, p. 97.
121. Bourdiol was arrested in 1983 and later sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, as a result of intelligence provided by the French agent FAREWELL. Wolton, Le KGB en France, p. 245; “Ariane: un ingénieur français incarcéré pour l’espionage,” Libération, (December 2, 1983); Early Warning (March 2, 1984); Reuter reports (June 16, 1987). There is no identifiable reference to Bourdiol in Mitrokhin’s notes.
122. Mitrokhin’s incomplete notes on payments to KARL record that from January to November 1979 he was paid a monthly salary of 13,200 francs and an additional sum of 32,000 francs; and that from January to October he was paid 12,000 francs a month plus a single payment of 34,000 francs. KARL worked as a KGB agent from 1972 to 1982. k-5, 367-9.
123. k-5, 367.
124. On the FAREWELL case, see Wolton, Le KGB en France, part 5, and Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, ch. 17. FAREWELL was first identified as Vetrov in Andrew and Gordievsky, Le KGB dans le monde, pp. 619-23.
125. Raymond Nart, head of the DST Soviet section, writing under the pseudonym Henri Regnard, gave the first public account of what had been learned from the FAREWELL operation in December 1983 in an article published in the journal Défense Nationale.
126. President Mitterrand, whose mind turned naturally to conspiracy, subsequently began to suspect bizarrely that the FAREWELL information might somehow have been planted on the DST by the CIA “as a way of testing socialist France and me personally,” in order to see whether he would hold it back or pass it on to the Reagan administration. Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, pp. 94-8, 271-3.
127. Mitrokhin’s notes contain the following comparative figures for the numbers of agents run by KGB residencies controlled by the FCD Fifth Department:
On January 1, 1975 the Rome residency had 23 agents (18 of them active) and 6 confidential contacts, as well as 4 agents in the Soviet community. A year later it had 21 non-Soviet agents (16 active), 7 confidential contacts and 9 Soviet agents (k-13, 135).
128. See above, chapter 17.
129. See above, chapter 17.
130. Mitrokhin’s notes do not include any examples of the intelligence obtained by DARIO and his female recruits from the Foreign Ministry.
131. k-10, 101-3, 107, 109. Mitrokhin’s notes imply in 1956 that DARIO was also instrumental in the recruitment of MAGDA, an employee of the foreign ministry press department; k-10,100,103. Mitrokhin’s notes also record the recruitment in 1970 of an agent in the Foreign Ministry, codenamed STRELOK, by Georgi Pavlovich Antonov. STRELOK subsequently became “reluctant to co-operate” (k-4, 80, 158; k-2, 221, 231, 268).
132. k-16, 285. Mitrokhin notes that by 1965 LEDA “had lost her intelligence access.”
133. k-10, 97, 109.
134. k-10, 109.
135. See above, chapter 17.
136. k-10, 63. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the date at which the various ciphers and surveillance lists were handed over by QUESTOR. In view of the Centre’s dissatisfaction with the declining amount of intelligence obtained from QUESTOR by YEFRAT in the later 1950s, however, the bulk of the material was probably handed over in the mid-1950s.
137. Mitrokhin interpreted YEFRAT’s file as placing the responsibility for the bankruptcy of the Italian firm on his mismanagement (k-7, 4, 193; k-16, 338, 419; k-18, 153; k-20, 94). In addition to being assisted by his wife TANYA, YEFRAT was given as deputy resident the illegal Aleksandr Vasilyevich Subotin (codenamed PIK), who had gained an Italian passport in the name of Adolfo Tolmer (k-16, 98, 285).
138. YEFRAT also cultivated CENSOR’s wife, KAPA; Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the outcome of the cultivation (k-16, 419; k-18, 153).
139. YEFRAT later took part in PROGRESS operations. In 1962 DEMID recruited his brother TIBER, who worked in the accounts department of the interior ministry, to act as radio operator for SAUL, a Lithuanian Catholic priest and KGB agent then studying at the Vatican. DEMID, CENSOR and QUESTOR continued to provide intelligence until at least 1963 (k-16, 419; k-10, 63; k-5, 688-91). After YEFRAT’s departure, his former deputy, PIK, worked for the legal Rome residency until 1965, acting as LEDA’s controller from February 1962 to September 1963 (k-16, 285).
140. k-2, 66. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of whether IKAR continued to work as a KGB agent after his return to Italy.
141. k-5, 102.
142. k-9, 23; k-10, 126.
143. k-12, 516. IKAR, PLATON, ENERO and ARTUR were not the only SCD recruits in the Italian embassy in Moscow. Mitrokhin’s notes also refer to the case of POLATOV (or POLETOV), an assistant service attaché, recruited by the SCD in the late 1970s, but give no details (k-10, 124). There may have been further embassy agents not mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes.
Other Italians recruited by the SCD in Moscow included an official in the legal department of the Italian interior ministry, recruited with the assistance of VERA, a swallow from the Polish SB (k-2, 273); and RITA, a female employee of the Fiat company recruited in 1976 (k-10, 132).
144. k-27, 240.
145. k-22, 72; k-26, 66; t-2, 158.
146. k-5, 256.
147. Cf. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 459.
148. k-14, 262, 383. BUTIL broke contact in 1979 after his firm had failed to win Soviet contracts.
149. k-5, 420, 423.
150. The Italian businessmen identified in Mitrokhin’s notes as Line X agents in the 1970s and/or early 1980s were CHIZ (k-14, 567), ERVIN (k-7, 37), KOZAK (k-14, 174), METIL (k-14, 383), PAN (k-12, 593) and TELINI (k-12, 389). It is unclear whether SAUST, a business consultant cultivated by the KGB, was actually recruited (k-14, 568).
151. Mitrokhin’s notes identify a total of seventeen Line X officers stationed at the Rome residency for all or part of the period 1974-9 (k-5, 459).
152. k-5, 353, 425. The Soviet ambassador in Rome, N. S. Rhyzov, had opposed the establishment of a Soviet consulate in Milan in order to provide cover for a KGB residency in northern Italy, but the foreign ministry in Moscow gave way to pressure from the Centre (k-5, 422).
153. k-5, 353, 357.
154. k-5, 357.
155. Mitrokhin’s notes give few details on MARIO save that he was recruited in 1972 and usually met his controller in the Soviet Union (k-6, 192).
156. k-14, 264; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40. As in other countries, Line X agents in Italy were also used to obtain ST from US sources (k-5, 236).
157. vol. 6, app. 1, part 39. Mitrokhin’s notes identify KULON and his research institute.
158. k-5, 425. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate what happened to UCHITEL and Kuznetsov’s other agents after his expulsion. It would have been normal practice for them to have been put on ice.
159. k-2, 415.
160. k-2, 217; k-3, 112.
161. k-2, 225, 243; k-20, 348.
162. k-2, 250, 275; k-4, 71; k-10, 52; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 39, 41.
163. k-2, 230, 242; k-13, 133; k-20, 347; k-21, 34; k-26, 68.
164. k-2, 274. Mitrokhin’s notes transcribe his codename alternately as ACHERO and AGERO. The most likely codename is ACERO, pronounced “achero”—the Italian for “steel.”
165. k-7, 126.
166. k-7, 48.
167. k-2, 212, 216, 220, 224, 229, 257-8; k-21, 32.
168. k-2, 211, 249.
169. k-2, 240, 271; k-25, 188. METSENAT’s controllers in the Rome residency were, successively, Vladimir Yevgenyevich Strelkov, Anatoli Yegorovich Abalin, Valentin Mikhaolovich Yatsura and Konstantin Kazakov.
170. k-1, 1; k-2, 214, 222, 244; k-13, 143; k-14, 687.
171. k-13, 153, 148.
172. k-13, 148. The active measures statistics were much in line with those for the previous two years. In 1975 the Rome residency reported that “3 documentary [forged document] operations were carried out; 10 conversations of influence were held; 1 press conference, 1 conference [were arranged]; 4 oral reports were disseminated; 48 articles were published; 6 questions were asked in Parliament; 1 delegation was assembled and sent out; 4 appeals were drafted; 4 mailing operations were carried out; an Italy-Spain committee was set up; 2 leaflet operations were carried out and 2 anonymous letters were sent out” (k-13, 135). The active measures statistics for 1976 were as follows:
articles placed [in the press]: 63
conversations of influence: 6
appeals made: 9
working group organized: 1
booklet distributed: 1
leaflet operation carried out: 1
anonymous letters distributed: 2
demonstration held: 1
parliamentary questions: 2
question in the Senate: 1
“Round Table” meeting held: 1
Of the total number of articles printed, 28 of the press articles were designed to discredit the Main Adversary; 21 alleged CIA interference in Italian affairs. The residency also claimed to have made “active use” of the “Italy-Spain” committee. Four active measures operations were intended “to discredit Maoism as an anti-socialist tendency.” k-13, 151.
173. Mitrokhin’s notes probably contain only an incomplete record of new agents recruited by the Rome residency during the period 1977-83. Among them, however, were ARO, who worked for the Ansaldo company in Genoa and was recruited at some point between 1978 and 1981 (k-14, 439); CLEMENT, a member of the international department of the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI), recruited in 1978 but put on ice in 1981 after he had failed to supply intelligence of much significance (k-14, 395); KARS, an Italian physicist who worked as a Line X agent in both Italy and the United States in the early 1980s (k-14, 264; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40); KOK, a sinologist recruited in 1977 for operations against the PRC (k-13, 153); and KOZAK, the owner of an Italian engineering company, who was recruited not later than 1978 (k-14, 174).
174. k-14, 687.
175. k-7, 48.
176. k-10, 109; k-25, 188.
177. k-7, 126.
178. k-13, 112.
179. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 10.
180. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 19-20.
181. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 629-31.
182. “Order of the Chairman of the KGB,” no. 107/OV, September 5, 1990.
Chapter Twenty-eight The Penetration and Persecution of the Soviet Churches
1. Lenin, Works, vol. 35, pp. 89-90; Shipler, Russia, pp. 270-1. KGB persecution of Islam and Judaism will be covered in volume 2.
2. Stalin may also have been influenced by the desire not to alienate his Anglo-American allies by continued religious persecution at a time when he was pressing them to open a second front. Pospielovsky, “The ‘Best Years’ of Stalin’s Church Policy (1942-1948) in the Light of Archival Documents.”
3. The work of Michael Bourdeaux and his colleagues at Keston College has impressively documented the vitality of religious life in the post-war Russian Orthodox Church, despite continued persecution and a mostly subservient hierarchy. See, inter alia, Bourdeaux, Risen Indeed.
4. Luchterhandt, “The Council for Religious Affairs.”
5. vol. 5, sec. 9.
6. Meerson, “The Political Philosophy of the Russian Orthodox Episcopate in the Soviet Period,” p. 221.
7. Revesz, The Christian Peace Conference, pp. 1-4.
8. k-1, 232.
9. k-1, 214.
10. Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” pp. 61-2.
11. Mitrokhin did not see the file on the 1961 WCC Central Committee meeting. Another file noted by him, however, identifies ADAMANT as Nikodim; vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 28.
12. “WCC Gives Eight-point Lead to Member Churches,” Church Times (August 29, 1969).
13. “Elusive Goal” (leader), Church Times (August 29, 1969).
14. Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” pp. 61-2. On Buyevsky’s role in the Moscow Patriarchate’s foreign relations Department, see Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 266.
15. Letter from the Bishop of Bristol to the Church Times (September 7, 1973); Smith, Fraudulent Gospel, pp. 2-3.
16. Babris, Silent Churches, p. 472.
17. Document cited by Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” p. 62.
18. KGB Church records temporarily accessible to journalists after the disintegration of the Soviet Union indicate that, at some stage after Nikodim’s death in 1978, Yuvenali was given his former KGB codename ADAMANT. (It was not unusual for KGB codenames to be recycled.) Michael Dobbs, “Business as Usual for Ex-KGB Agents,” Washington Post (February 11, 1992).
19. Pawley, Donald Coggan, pp. 244-8.
20. k-1, 24.
21. Polyakov, “Activities of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1991,” p. 152.
22. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 226-9.
23. Daily American (September 8, 1978). On September 29, 1978, less than a month after Nikodim’s death in the Vatican, John Paul I also died suddenly, thus becoming the shortest-lived pope since Urban VII died of malaria twelve days after his election in 1590.
24. See above, chapter 28.
25. k-1, 30.
26. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 215-16. On the authenticity of the report, see Oppenheim, “Are the Furov Reports Authentic?”
27. “His Holiness Patriarch Pimen’s Address Before Panikhida in the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Epiphany in Moscow,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1984), no. 3.
28. See, for example, Pimen’s telegram to Brezhnev of December 17, 1976 in Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1977), no. 2, pp. 3-4.
29. “Soviet Peace Fund Awards,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1976), no. 4.
30. “His Holiness Patriarch Pimen Awarded by the World Peace Council,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1976), no. 6.
31. “World Conference: Religious Leaders for Lasting Peace, Disarmament and Just Relations among Nations,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1977), no. 7, pp. 2-3 and no. 8, pp. 17-64.
32. k-1, 23; vol. 6, ch. 10. The Patriarchate was also involved in another KGB-sponsored production in 1982, the World Conference of Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe, which again attracted about 600 participants.
33. “Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Conferring the Order of the Red Banner of Labor upon Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All Russia,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1977), no. 9, p. 3.
34. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 217.
35. The full text of the letter from Yakunin and Regelson was published in Religion in Communist Lands, vol. 41 (1976), no. 1.
36. Lefever, Nairobi to Vancouver, pp. 64-5; Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 355-68; Hudson, The World Council of Churches in International Affairs, pp. 286-7.
37. Norman, Christianity and the World Order, pp. 1-2, 90 n. 62.
38. Lefever, Nairobi to Vancouver, p. 65; Babris, Silent Churches, p. 475.
39. vol. 6, ch. 10.
40. Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” p. 63.
41. vol. 6, ch. 10.
42. “Interview Given by Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Gallich to a Novosti Press Agency Correspondent,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1976), no. 5.
43. vol. 6, ch. 10.
44. Smith, Fraudulent Gospel, p. 68.
45. The text of the founding declaration of the Christian Committee was published in Religion in Communist Lands, vol. 6 (1978), no. 1. On the work of the committee, see Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 373-81.
46. k-21, 203.
47. Documents of the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers’ Rights in the USSR, 12 vols. (Vol. 3 consists of English translations; the remainder contain reproductions of the original Russian texts.) See also Scarfe (ed.), The CCDBR Documents: Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers’ Rights in the USSR.
48. k-1, 65. On Varsonofy’s resignation from the Christian Committee, cf. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 379.
49. k-27, 488.
50. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 379.
51. k-1, 50. On Fonchenkov’s public career, cf. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 380-1.
52. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 428.
53. Albats, The State within a State, p. 46.
54. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 422ff.
55. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 430-9.
56. It is impossible, however, to rule out the possibility, that Fonchenkov had become genuinely sympathetic towards Yakunin. Mitrokhin’s notes on his career as agent DRUG are limited to the 1970s.
57. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 439-41.
58. Lefever, Nairobi to Vancouver, pp. 3-5, 67-70, 73, 75, appendix A.
59. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 20.
60. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 197.
61. vol. 6, ch. 10, n. 1.
62. Mitrokhin’s notes on the file of agent VORONOV, for example, record that during his period in New York State in the late 1970s and early 1980s, he “was tasked to identify among his parishioners people who had a progressive and sympathetic view of the USSR—government workers, political party [members], union members, workers at scientific research institutes, diplomatic personnel, immigration officials, clergymen and church employees who were involved in the registration of births, marriages, and deaths [for assistance in the documentation of illegals] and agents of Zionist and anti-Soviet organizations” (vol. 6, app. 2, part 4).
63. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 197.
64. vol. 6, app. 2, part 4
65. vol. 6, app. 2, part 4.
66. vol. 8, ch. 6, paras. 16-17.
67. vol. 8, app. 3, para. 20.
68. Albats, The State within a State, p. 46. Confirmation of DROZDOV’s identity was provided by the release early in 1999 of a 1958 report on his recruitment, allegedly on “patriotic” grounds, by the Estonian KGB. Though the report refers to the agent only by his codename, his year of birth and career details are identical with those of Aleksi. James Meek, “Russian Patriarch ‘was KGB spy,’” Guardian (February 12, 1999).
69. “Metropolitan Aleksiy’s Speech at the Founding Conference of the ‘Rodina’ Society,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1976), no. 2.
70. Albats, The State within a State, p. 46.
71. Bociurkiw, “Suppression de l’Église gréco-catholique ukrainienne;” Pelikan, Confessor between East and West, ch. 8; Floridi, “The Church of the Martyrs and the Ukrainian Millennium,” pp. 107-11; Tataryn, “The Re-emergence of the Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church in the USSR,” pp. 292-4.
72. k-1, 246.
73. The intelligence agencies of the USSR, Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania were represented by heads and deputy heads of directorates (k-1, 106).
74. k-1, 106. Mitrokhin’s notes do not make clear which, if any, of the KGB representatives at the conference came from the FCD.
75. Though seeking confirmation of the report, the Centre took the alleged Vatican conspiracy seriously and drew up plans for a press exposé of it, if further details could be obtained (k-1, 2).
76. k-1, 71.
77. Babris, Silent Churches, pp. 149-50.
78. APOSTOL, RASS and SLUGA are not identified in Mitrokhin’s notes (k-1, 2).
79. k-1, 3, 110. It is unclear whether the PETROV who studied at the Russicum was the cleric with the same codename later sent to North America.
80. k-1, 81-2, 109. ANTANAS arrived in Rome in January 1968; Mitrokhin does not record the date of arrival of VIDMANTAS.
81. k-1, 83-4. A KGB file also records that in October 1969 DAKTARAS visited Rome to attend “a gathering of bishops” (k-1, 2).
82. k-1, 2. Dudás appears in KGB files, in Cyrillic transliteration, as Dudast.
83. k-1, 2.
84. k-1, 133.
85. k-1, 133.
86. k-1, 36, k-5, 11, k-19, 82.
87. Unlike the similar 1967 conference, the 1975 conference was attended by the Cubans. On this occasion, however, there was no delegation from Romania. k-1, 13.
88. k-1, 13.
89. k-1, 246.
90. Borecky, Bishop Isidore, “The Church in Ukraine-1988;” Tataryn, “The Re-emergence of the Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church in the USSR;” Polyakov, “Activities of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1991,” p. 152.
91. k-1, 146. The KGB estimate may have been too low. Published estimates for 1990, admittedly at a time when active persecution had almost ceased, were significantly higher; see Ramet (ed.), Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, pp. 355-6.
92. k-1, 73.
93. k-1, 146.
94. Ellis (ed.), Three Generations of Suffering; Bourdeaux, Gorbachev, Glasnost the Gospel, p. 121.
95. k-1, 214.
96. Penton, Apocalypse Delayed.
97. k-1, 241.
98. Recollections of one of the deportees, Vasili Kalin, cited by James Meek, “Cult-busters Fight ‘Sins of False Witness,’” Guardian (February 12, 1999).
99. k-1, 91.
100. Among the evidence ignored by the KGB conspiracy theorists who saw the Jehovah’s Witnesses as vehicles for American ideological subversion was the fact that, from the First World War to the war in Vietnam, they consistently represented the largest group of Americans imprisoned for conscientious objection. In 1918 their leaders were imprisoned for contravening the American Espionage Act, though their sentences were overturned on appeal. Penton, Apocalypse Delayed, pp. 55-6, 142. Sadly, some of the conspiracy theories survived the collapse of the Soviet system.
101. k-1, 241. In reality, Jehovah’s Witnesses behave in many ways as model citizens. Since 1962 they have been instructed to obey all human laws not directly in conflict with those of God. Penton, Apocalypse Delayed, p. 140.
102. Antic, “The Spread of Modern Cults in the USSR,” pp. 257-8.
103. k-1, 92.
104. k-1, 91. There is no reference in the files noted by Mitrokhin to any successful KGB penetration either of the Jehovah’s Witnesses” Brooklyn headquarters or of its west European offices.
105. k-1, 91.
106. k-1, 73.
107. Antic, “The Spread of Modern Cults in the USSR,” p. 259.
108. Polyakov, “Activities of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1991; p. 147; Van den Bercken, “The Russian Orthodox Church, State and Society in 1991-1993,” p. 164.
109. Walters, “The Defrocking of Fr. Gleb Yakunin,” pp. 308-9.
110. Yakunin, “First Open Letter to Patriarch Aleksi II,” pp. 313-14. Father Gleb was in dispute with the Patriarch over the decision by the Holy Synod in October 1993 that Orthodox clergy would no longer be allowed to stand as candidates for political office. He went ahead with his candidature in the elections two months later, was elected and then defrocked. Walters, “The Defrocking of Fr Gleb Yakunin,” p. 310.
Chapter Twenty-nine The Polish Pope and the Rise of Solidarity
1. k-19, 515.
2. See above, chapter 16.
3. k-19, 516.
4. On the arrests, see Karpiński, Poland since 1944, pp. 196-7.
5. Cywiński later read Wałęsa’s acceptance speech for the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize at the ceremony in Oslo which Wałęsa was unable to attend.
6. k-19, 516.
7. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 126.
8. See above, chapter 16.
9. k-19, 429. Bardecki cannot, of course, be blamed in any way for receiving, among his Western visitors, two men whom he had no possible means of identifying as KGB illegals.
10. k-19, 516.
11. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 127.
12. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 264.
13. k-19, 516.
14. Karpiński, Poland since 1944, pp. 200-1.
15. k-19, 473.
16. k-1, 45.
17. k-19, 515.
18. k-19, 506.
19. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 289.
20. The KGB claimed in 1982 that there were 26,000 Catholic priests in Poland (k-19, 506).
21. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 403.
22. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 321.
23. k-1, 11.
24. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 285.
25. k-1, 11.
26. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 184.
27. vol. 8, ch. 8; vol. 8, app. 3. Tischner cannot, of course, be blamed in any way for receiving, among his Western visitors, an apparently well-recommended Canadian publisher seeking his help for a book on Polish missionaries, whom he had no possible means of identifying as a KGB illegal.
28. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 373.
29. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 299; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 191.
30. k-20, 208.
31. k-20, 163.
32. k-20, 211.
33. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 217-18.
34. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 310-12; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 308.
35. k-1, 19.
36. k-20, 245.
37. k-20, 245.
38. k-20, 220.
39. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” p. 116.
40. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 246.
41. k-20, 221.
42. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 246.
Chapter Thirty The Polish Crisis and the Crumbling of the Soviet Bloc
1. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 117, 129-30.
2. k-20, 221.
3. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 48-9.
4. k-20, 342.
5. k-20, 34.
6. k-20, 35.
7. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 247-8.
8. k-16, 409.
9. vol. 8, app. 3. Neither Bardecki nor Mazowiecki can be blamed in any way for receiving, among their Western visitors, someone whom they had no possible means of identifying as a KGB illegal.
10. t-7, 156.
11. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 250.
12. k-20, 10, 26.
13. k-19, 29.
14. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 254.
15. k-20, 28.
16. t-7, 154. On January 22 Mikhail Zimyanin returned to Moscow from a fact-finding mission in Poland and gave an equally gloomy report to the Politburo (Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 255-6).
17. k-19, 511.
18. t-7, 155.
19. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 271-4.
20. k-20, 309.
21. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 276-84.
22. k-20, 110.
23. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 130-1.
24. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, ch. 24. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 293-307.
25. At the time, opinions within the Centre were divided on whether the KGB had been involved in the assassination attempt. About half the FCD officers with whom Oleg Gordievsky discussed the attempt were convinced that the KGB would no longer contemplate such a risky special action, even if it were subcontracted to the Bulgarian intelligence service. The other half, however, suspected that Department 8 of Directorate S, which was responsible for assassinations, had been involved; some told Gordievsky they only regretted that the attempt had failed. (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 639.)
26. k-20, 101, 104.
27. k-20, 104.
28. k-20, 102. Olszowski was regarded as a KGB co-optee (k-19, 26).
29. k-20, 103. On June 7 Aristov, Kulikov and Pavlov telegraphed the Politburo to urge “the necessity of a direct dialogue with S. Kania about his departure from the post of the First Secretary” (k-20, 57).
30. k-20, 105.
31. k-20, 53.
32. k-20, 52.
33. k-20, 55.
34. k-20, 54.
35. k-19, 385.
36. k-20, 54, 102, 112.
37. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 97-8.
38. k-19, 110.
39. k-19, 115.
40. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 94-5.
41. k-19, 115.
42. k-19, 115.
43. k-19, 117.
44. k-19, 113.
45. k-19, 102.
46. k-19, 106.
47. k-19, 105.
48. k-19, 103.
49. k-19, 104.
50. Kramer (ed.) “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 132-3.
51. CPSU Secretary K. V. Rusakov told Honecker after Kania’s sacking, “We noticed that lately a difference began to appear between Kania and Jaruzelski in their approaches to basic questions. Jaruzelski began to show more and more readiness to accept violent measures in dealing with counter-revolution. We began to work with Jaruzelski. When doing this, we were influenced by the fact that Jaruzelski possessed greater authority in the army and also enjoyed the support of the ministers” (k-20, 338).
52. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 315-16.
53. k-20, 303.
54. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 133-4.
55. k-20, 311.
56. k-20, 327.
57. k-20, 307.
58. k-20, 304.
59. k-20, 327.
60. k-20, 308.
61. Ustinov denied, not wholly convincingly, that Kulikov had actually referred to the possibility of Soviet military intervention; Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 134-7.
62. k-20, 315, 316.
63. k-20, 340.
64. k-20, 315.
65. k-20, 325.
66. k-20, 293.
67. k-20, 324.
68. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 334, 339.
69. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 106-7.
70. k-20, 329.
71. k-20, 297.
72. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 107.
73. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 336-7.
74. k-20, 297.
75. k-20, 316.
76. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 337-9.
77. k-20, 323.
78. k-20, 296.
79. k-20, 298.
80. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 343-4.
81. k-19, 53.
82. k-19, 321.
83. k-19, 23.
84. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 108; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348.
85. k-20, 249.
86. k-19, 23.
87. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348.
88. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 307-9.
89. k-20, 249.
90. k-19, 261.
91. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 117.
92. k-19, 381.
93. k-19, 380.
94. k-19, 411.
95. k-19, 312.
96. k-19, 252.
97. k-19, 253.
98. k-19, 257.
99. k-19, 258.
100. k-19, 261. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the content of Brezhnev’s message to Jaruzelski. On prosecutions after the declaration of martial law, see Swidlicki, Political Trials in Poland 1981-1986.
101. k-19, 642.
102. k-19, 311.
103. k-19, 324.
104. k-19, 326.
105. k-19, 328.
106. k-19, 337.
107. k-19, 339.
108. k-19, 128.
109. k-19, 124.
110. k-19, 143. Kiszczak expressed his thanks for material and technical assistance already received; Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the nature of this assistance.
111. k-19, 143.
112. k-1, 15.
113. k-19, 135.
114. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 376-7.
115. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 388-9.
116. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 131.
117. k-19, 143.
118. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 381-2.
119. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 132-3.
120. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 117, 134-6.
121. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 117, 136-7.
122. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 137-8.
123. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 395-6; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 387-8.
124. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 388-9; Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 396-7.
125. k-16, 500.
126. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 249.
127. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 265-9; Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989, ch. 6.
128. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 288.
129. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).
Conclusion. From the One-Party State to the Yeltsin Presidency
1. Jukes, “The Soviets and ‘Ultra.’” Though Jukes’s conclusions are debatable, his 1988 article remains a pathbreaking study.
2. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991. Dr. Kennedy-Pipe’s otherwise valuable book is only one example of the continuing underestimation of the role of Soviet foreign intelligence even in some of the most recent work by leading Western scholars.
3. The significance of SIGINT was made clear by David Kahn’s pioneering The Codebreakers, published in 1967. Though a bestseller, however, its contents appeared to stun, rather than to inspire, most historians of international relations.
4. A growing minority of international relations, history and other departments in British universities now offer courses on intelligence, though on a much smaller scale than in north America. There is a flourishing British Study Group on Intelligence, with a largely academic membership, and an increasing number of similar groups in north America and continental Europe.
5. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 7.
6. Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union, p. 219.
7. Two of the leading historians of the Bolshevik Revolution, Orlando Figes and Richard Pipes, agree on describing the Cheka as “a state within a state.”
8. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 73-4.
9. Conquest, The Great Terror, pp. 468-70. It was a sign of the difficulty encountered by many Western historians in interpreting the Terror that Conquest’s was the only full-scale history of it published during the life of the Soviet Union.
10. Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty, p. 258.
11. k-25, 78. On the punitive use of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, see Bloch and Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals.
12. k-25, 79. There is no suggestion in Mitrokhin’s notes that Voloshanovich was working for the KGB.
13. See above, chapter 20.
14. frag. 1,7. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the precise charges leveled against Korobov or of the length of his sentence.
15. k-3b, 136.
16. I am grateful to Dr. Clarissa de Waal of Newnham College, Cambridge, for these recollections of Tirana in 1992.
17. A further 3 percent were KGB co-optees.
18. t-7, 284.
19. t-7, 286. The behavior of the informers should not, in most cases, be harshly judged. Those who refused invitations to inform were likely to incur the ill will of the KGB towards themselves and their families.
20. frag. 5, 3.
21. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 287-98.
22. See above, chapter 20.
23. Kissinger subsequently acknowledged that Senator Pat Moynihan had been an exception. “Your crystal ball,” he told him, “was better than mine.” Moynihan, Secrecy, p. 6.
24. For example, the Russian sections of Eric Hobsbawm’s brilliant history of the twentieth century, Age of Extremes, include no mention of any of the heads of the Cheka and its successors, save for a passing reference to Andropov’s career before becoming General Secretary as “chief of the security apparatus” (p. 476).
25. There is, however, a one-line reference to Andropov’s subsequent emergence as Soviet leader in Vance’s reflections on the period after his resignation (Vance, Hard Choices, p. 421).
26. Gorbachev, however, acknowledged that, eighteen months or two years earlier, the coup might have succeeded.
27. Remnick, Resurrection. The American edition of this generally admirable study appeared in 1997.
28. k-13, 268.
29. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991, is the most recent of the many studies of Soviet foreign policy which make no mention of these aspects of it.
30. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 149-52.
31. Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 346.
32. VENONA, BBC Radio 4 documentary written and presented by Christopher Andrew (producers: Mark Burman and Helen Weinstein), first broadcast March 18, 1998. Andrew, “The VENONA Secret.” The Centre received progress reports on VENONA from Weisband until 1950 and from Philby from 1949 to 1951.
33. See above, chapter 9.
34. DARIO had already served in the Italian foreign ministry before the Second World War, and was reemployed there afterwards.
35. See above, chapter 21.
36. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 29-40.
37. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 65-6.
38. See above, chapters 6, 7, and 15.
39. See above, chapter 26.
40. Izvestia (September 24, 1991).
41. The foreign intelligence reports submitted to Stalin and Khrushchev and the more elaborate assessments supplied to their successors will one day be a major source for the study of Soviet foreign policy. Thus far, however, very few are available for research.
42. k-9, 122; vol. 2, app. 3.
43. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 145-7.
44. See above, chapters 11, 13, and 21.
45. Pentagon estimate cited by Tuck, High-Tech Espionage, pp. 108-9.
46. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 33.
47. Gorbachev’s speech was reported in Pravda on March 26, 1986.
48. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 134-5, 139.
49. See above, chapter 25.
50. Report of the House Committee, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox, of which a declassified version was published as this volume was going to press in May 1999.
51. k-3b, 137. Though this residency circular was sent out in 1977, it merely reiterated priorities formulated in previous instructions from the Centre.
52. k-25, 186.
53. See above, chapter 20.
54. See above, chapter 18.
55. See above, chapter 22.
56. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; k-25, 56; k-21, 74, 96, 99.
57. vol. 6, ch. 10. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the names of the operational officers assigned to the Karpov-Korchnoi match. Korchnoi’s official “second,” the British grandmaster Raymond Keene, believed that the head of the Soviet delegation at the championship, V. D. Baturinsky, was a KGB colonel (Keene, Karpov-Korchnoi 1978, p. 32). Korchnoi gives an account of his defection and career up to the 1978 world championship in his autobiography, Chess is My Life.
58. Keene, Karpov-Korchnoi 1978, pp. 56, 147-9, 153-4. During the rematch between Korchnoi and Karpov at Merano, Italy, in 1981, the KGB established a dedicated cipher communication circuit to report on the progress of matches and arranged a shuttle service between the Rome residency and the KGB operational group covering the World Chess Championship. No fewer than fourteen active measures were implemented in an attempt once again to ensure Korchnoi’s defeat (k-5, 921). The undercover KGB advance party at Merano claimed to be monitoring the drinking water, the climate, noise levels, even levels of radioactivity (Kasparov, Child of Change, p. 76). Korchnoi, then past his best and, at fifty, a relatively elderly challenger for the world title, lost by eleven points to seven.
59. Karpov’s eventual conqueror in the 1985 world championship, Gary Kasparov, has made much of the obstacles placed in his path by the Soviet establishment. He himself, however, owed much to the support of the head of the Azerbaijan KGB, Geidar Alyev. Lawson, The Inner Game, p. 17; Kasparov, Child of Change, p. 79.
60. See above, chapter 28.
61. See above, chapter 29.
62. The text of the appeal of the “State Committee for the State of Emergency,” dated August 18, 1991, was published in The Times (August 19, 1991).
63. Gorbachev, The August Coup, p. 31.
64. Knight, Spies Without Cloaks, pp. 130-1. Trubnikov is a former senior FCD officer who made his reputation during operations in India, which will be covered in volume 2.
65. Unattributable information from Russian sources.
66. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 17.
67. Unattributable information from Russian sources.
68. Remnick, Resurrection, p. 370.
69. Unattributable information from Russian sources.
70. Knight, Spies Without Cloaks, pp. 89-91, 106-8. Remnick, Resurrection, pp. 276-7. Anna Blundy, “Return to Grace of the Baby-faced Hawk,” The Times (May 13, 1999). Stepashin is the only one of the original supporters of the war to admit his mistake.
71. Davies, Europe, pp. 328-32, 464-5.
72. The classic, though possibly overstated, analysis of the faultlines between cultures is Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
73. Pulled westward by a Western-educated élite often out of tune with its own population, Greece remains something of an anomaly as an Orthodox member of NATO and the EU. Stefan Wagstyl, Kerin Hope and John Thornhill, “Christendom’s Ancient Split,” Financial Times (May 4, 1999).
74. Haslam, “Russia’s Seat at the Table,” p. 129.
75. Vujacic, “Gennadiy Zyuganov and the ‘Third Road.’”
76. Unusual but not unique. As a result of the divisive legacy of the Spanish Civil War, Spain also has no words to its national anthem. The Soviet Union found itself in a similar situation in 1956 after Krushchev suppressed the existing words to the Soviet national anthem as too Stalinist. New words were not devised until 1977.
77. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 3-4.
78. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, conclusion.
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