The Triple Agent

A NOTE ON SOURCES

This book is the result of a year’s worth of conversations with men and women who, by necessity, live and work in the shadows. A great many of the primary sources were either active members of intelligence agencies—chiefly the Central Intelligence Agency and Jordan’s General Intelligence Department, but also others—or members of the military Special Forces units. Some were trusted sources developed over years of reporting on intelligence matters for the Washington Post. Others were current or former senior officials in intelligence agencies who agreed to discuss the Khost tragedy and the larger war on terrorism on the condition that they not be quoted or identified directly as sources. The insistence on anonymity, while unfortunate, could be broadly justified by the classified nature of the events and programs at the center of the story. The Khost base, its primary mission, and even the identities of many of its operatives are protected under U.S. government secrecy provisions. Moreover, America’s use of unmanned aircraft to strike terrorist targets in Pakistan, though a well-known fact in both countries, is officially a classified program that cannot be publicly acknowledged by CIA or White House officials. Finally, in addition to government sources, several relatives of slain officers asked not to be associated by name with specific anecdotes and facts. These requests were driven by concern that the speaker might unwittingly divulge sensitive information or complicate ongoing interactions with intelligence agencies.

Because so many sources are anonymous, I have gone to great lengths to separately corroborate each of the essential facts in this narrative, conducting more than two hundred interviews in the places where the events occurred—Afghanistan, Jordan, Turkey—and in various locations in the United States. Memories and documents, including private e-mails and texts, were shared by intelligence officials and operatives from three countries. Other recollections and important contextual details were provided by current and former members of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, as well as diplomatic officials and U.S. military personnel who either served at the Khost base or were colleagues or friends of the fallen officers. Relatives and friends of each of the individuals killed in the Khost attack provided critical, and often enthusiastic, support. In attempting to understand the thoughts and motivations of Humam al-Balawi, I relied on interviews with family members and former colleagues of his at the Marka clinic or elsewhere, as well as a large body of interviews, essays, and video statements by Balawi himself. I also spoke directly, or through my assistants in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with members of the Taliban and other jihadist groups who either met with Balawi or were personally informed about his activities during his ten months in the Pakistani tribal region.

Despite the diversity of viewpoints, the sources agreed in most cases on the essential details. On the rare occasions when differing accounts could not be reconciled, I made judgments based on which source appeared to have a clearer view of the facts in question. Where sources could not be named in the text or footnotes, I sought to explain the source’s relationship to the characters and events as clearly as possible while honoring promises not to reveal identifying details.