The Triple Agent

NOTES

Chapter 1: Obsession

1. The man was called Osama al-Kini: The details of the CIA’s operation against al-Kini were provided in author interviews with two current and two former agency officials with direct knowledge of the events.

2. “This is now a bona fide threat to the homeland”: Author interview with former U.S. government official present at the White House meeting.

3. “If you had to ask for permission”: Ibid.

4. “simultaneous notification”: The basis of the new U.S. policy was described to the author in interviews with two former senior intelligence officials involved in the policy discussions, and confirmed separately by a congressional official briefed on the policy change at the time.

5. a massive truck bombing: For details on the Marriott Hotel attack, see Bill Roggio, “Bombing at Islamabad Marriott Latest in String of Complex Terror Attacks,” Long War Journal, Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/​archives/​2008/​09/​bombing_​at_islam​abad.php.

6. a commander named Sheikh Saeed al-Masri: Details of al-Masri’s expanded role within al-Qaeda beginning in 2007, as well the competition among rival commanders, were supplied to the author in interviews with one former and two current CIA officers involved in counterterrorism operations during the period.

7. Hayden’s initial meeting with his successor: Events described to author in interviews with two intelligence officers who witnessed the exchange.

Chapter 2: Haunted

1. chief liaison on counterterrorism to Britain: Details of Matthews’s experiences in London and her previous work at CIA headquarters and Thailand were recounted in author interviews with eight former agency colleagues as well as two relatives who were in frequent communication with her during the relevant periods.

2. sophisticated double suicide bombing: Separate accounts of the attack were obtained from International Security Assistance Force incident logs for Afghanistan’s eastern district on Jan. 19, 2009, and an interview with a Khost regional police commander who investigated the incident. The ISAF records were first posted by the anti-secrecy Web site WikiLeaks in July 2010.

3. Inspector General, had launched a wide-ranging investigation: For details of the redacted report, see CIA Office of Inspector General, “Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks,” June 2005, http://www.foia.​cia.gov/​docs/​DOC_​00014​99482/​DOC_​000149​9482.pdf.

4. list of names remain classified: For a fuller description of the CIA’s deliberations over the release of names, see “CIA OIG [Office of Inspector General] Timeline” at HistoryCommons.com, http://www.historycommons.org/​timeline.jsp?​investigations:​_a_detailed_​look=complete​_911_​timeline​_cia_oig​_9_11_​report&timeline​=complete_911​_timeline, accessed on Sept. 30, 2010.

5. attempted to distill his advice: Author interview with former senior CIA official.

Chapter 3: The Doctor

1. The raiding party gathered: Details of Humam al-Balawi’s arrest, detention, and interrogation were provided in author interviews with two family members present during the relevant events; three current Jordanian intelligence officers and one former intelligence officer who were present during the events or were given detailed briefings; and a senior CIA officer who was similarly briefed. Additional details were drawn from Balawi’s videotaped statements about his arrests, as provided to the author by SITE Intelligence Group, a private group that monitors Web sites associated with extremist groups and provides analysis to government agencies, news organizations, and other customers on a restricted-access basis.

2. “Your handcuffs will be as silver bracelets”: English excerpts from Balawi’s Internet blogs as Abu Dujana al-Khorasani were provided, along with analysis, by Jarret Brachman, a terrorism expert, author, and government consultant.

3. He was also an instant hit: For analysis of Balawi’s impact as jihadist blogger, see Brachman’s monograph “Abu Dujana al-Khorasani,” in publication.

4. Defne, began to worry: Insight into Balawi family dynamics is provided in press interviews by Defne Bayrak, including her February 5, 2010, interview with al-Jazeera Television’s Today’s Interview program. English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group. Additional corroboration provided in author interviews with two of Defne Bayrak’s journalist colleagues in Istanbul, Turkey.

5. Abu Dujana was a seventh-century Arab warrior: For more on Balawi’s namesake, see “Abu Dujana, Stories of the Sahaba,” as reprinted in http://www.articlesbase.​com/​spirituality​-articles/abu​-dujana-stories​-of-the-sahaba​-1532056.html.

6. Code-named Turbulence, it is a five-hundred-million-dollar-a-year network: For an authoritative account of the NSA’s secret data-collection network, see James Bamford, The Shadow Factory (New York: Anchor Books, 2008).

7. he was known among his peers as Sharif Ali: Biographical details about Ali bin Zeid and his interaction with the Balawi case were shared with the author in interviews with three bin Zeid family members and two of his Mukhabarat colleagues.

8. “He wasn’t flirty like some of the others”: Author interview with former patient of Balawi’s, Marka refugee camp, Amman, Jordan.

9. so closely reflected Zawahiri’s own views: Author interview with Jarret Brachman.

10. coordinated attacks on hotels in Amman: For details on the Amman hotel bombings, see Hassan Fattah and Michael Slackman, “Hotels Bombed in Jordan; at Least 57 Die,” New York Times, Nov. 10, 2005.

11. Zarqawi, who had spent five years as the Mukhabarat’s prisoner: For more on Zarqawi’s radicalization and later exploits, see Lee Hudson Teslik, “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder, “Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” CFR online, June 8, 2006.

Chapter 4: Humiliation

1. He was in a small cell: In addition to the primary sources on Balawi’s interrogation as described in Chapter 2 notes, further insights into the Mukhabarat’s detention facility and procedures were provided in author interviews with two former Mukhabarat officers and an Amman jihadist who related his personal experiences in repeated incarcerations and interrogations.

2. Balawi remembered his dream: Balawi describes his dream while in Mukhabarat custody in a Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview obtained by SITE Intelligence Group. English translation courtesy of SITE.

3. On the third day of Humam al-Balawi’s incarceration: Circumstances of Balawi’s release described in author interviews with two Balawi family members in Amman, Jordan.

Chapter 5: The Informant

1. The report bore an Arabic caption: Report described to the author in interviews with a Jordanian and a U.S. intelligence officer who reviewed its contents.

2. with a known terrorist organization in Turkey: The Balawis’ interaction with the IBAD-C was described to the author by two of Defne Bayrak’s colleagues, who were aware of the couple’s contacts with the organization at the time. For more on the group, see http://www.globalsecurity.org​/military/​world/para/​eastern-raiders​.htm.

3. “I liked his personality”: Defne Bayrak interview with al-Jazeera, Feb. 5, 2010, op. cit.

4. peculiar to privileged young adults: For more on this phenomenon, see Delia Lloyd, “Smart Bombers: Do Universities Breed Terrorists?” Politics Daily, Jan. 2010, http://www.politicsdaily.com​/2010/01/19/​smart-bombers-do-​universities-​breed-​terrorists/.

5. The couple named their older girl: Author interview with a Balawi family friend, Istanbul, Turkey.

6. a promise to redraw the country’s counterterrorism priorities: For an insider’s view of the administration’s early priorities, see speech by White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, “A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans,” Aug. 6, 2009, before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as published on the White House’s Web site, WhiteHouse.gov., http://www.whitehouse.gov​/the_press_office​/Remarks-by-​John-Brennan-​at-the-​Center-for-Strategic​-and-International​-Studies.

7. Balawi was gradually checking out of his old life: Details about Balawi’s activities in his final weeks in Amman were described in author interviews with two family members and a colleague at the Marka clinic.

8. bin Zeid tucked a case of dog food under his arm: Balawi describes his meetings and discussions with bin Zeid in his Dec. 26, 2009, interview, SITE, op. cit.

9. I think we should talk to our father about this: Airport departure described in author interviews with two Balawi family members.

Chapter 6: Targets

1. Nuclear devices: This unreported event was described in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials and a separate interview with one Obama administration official, all of whom were actively involved in the response to the threat.

2. “Are you sure this was the right choice?”: Author interview with a U.S. official present during the White House exchange about Panetta’s candidacy.

3. Panetta’s stance on the so-called torture memos: Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, “Under Panetta, a More Aggressive CIA,” Washington Post, March 21, 2010.

4. change a missile’s trajectory in midflight: Capabilities of advanced munitions used by Predators described in author interviews with two current and one former senior intelligence official.

5. inadvertently killed nine people: Ibid. For alternative views on civilian casualties, see Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Revenge of the Drone,” New America Foundation, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.newamerica.net/​files/appendix1​.pdf.

6. “I don’t take it lightly”: Account of Panetta’s personal views and experiences described in interviews with three senior intelligence officials and an Obama administration official who participated in conversations in which the matters were discussed.

7. that group included Hanson: Hanson’s work duties, personality, and character described in multiple author interviews with five former agency colleagues and two family members.

8. the top items on the agenda were Mehsud: New details about National Security Adviser James L. Jones’s trip to Pakistan described in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials involved in preparatory meetings for the visit.

9. The Taliban leader was officially blamed: Although Mehsud denied involvement in the Benazir Bhutto assassination, communications intercepts pointed to his foreknowledge of the attempt on her life. See Joby Warrick, “CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination,” Washington Post, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/​wp-dyn/content/​article/2008/01/17/​AR200801​1703252​.html.

10. Before sunrise on June 23: Details of the June 23, 2009, operations described in author interviews with two intelligence officers briefed on the events. For more on the attacks, see Bill Roggio, “Scores of Taliban Killed in Second US Strike in South Waziristan,” Long War Journal, June 23, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/​archives/2009​/06/seventeen​_taliban_ki.php.

11. “It created a havoc”: Unsigned report by Dawn news staff, “Missile Attacks Kill 50 in South Waziristan,” Dawn, June 24, 2009, http://news.​dawn.com​/wps/wcm​/connect/​dawn-content​-library/​dawn/news/​pakistan/04-​suspected-us-​drone-strikes​-swaziristan-qs-03.

Chapter 7: The Jihadist

1. Humam al-Balawi arrived alone: Accounts of Balawi’s early weeks in Pakistan were provided in author interviews with three U.S. and two Jordanian intelligence officials briefed on the events.

2. “You have made us proud”: bin Zeid’s words, as recalled by Balawi in Dec. 26, 2009, video interview, op. cit.

3. I want to study medicine: Defne Bayrak’s account of her husband’s explanation for his travels to Pakistan, as told to al-Jazeera in Feb. 5, 2010, interview, op. cit.

4. from his Taliban interviewer: Interview excerpts, as published in “An Interview with the Shaheed,” posted by al-Sahab Web site on Feb. 28, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.

5. The two had a mutual acquaintance: Descriptions of Balawi’s relations with Mehsud and his early interactions with the Pakistan Taliban provided interviews with a Tehrik-i-Taliban member and two Pakistani intelligence officers who later investigated the Balawi affair after the Khost bombing. Additional insights are drawn from Balawi’s accounts of his meetings with the Taliban chief.

6. Qari had beheaded a kidnapped Polish geologist: For a description of the incident, see Bill Roggio, “Taliban Feud over Murder of Polish Hostage,” Long War Journal, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.longwar​journal.org/​archives/​2009/02/​taliban​_feud_over​_mu.php.

7. I could go to FATA: Description of Balawi’s offer of his spying services in Pakistan provided in author interviews with two Jordanian and four U.S. intelligence officials. A detailed account of Balawi’s meetings and conversations with bin Zeid about the assignment is related in Balawi’s Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview, op. cit.

8. the “father of smoke”: For more on the terrorist Imad Mughniyeh and the circumstances of his death, see Matthew Levitt and David Schenker, “Who Was Imad Mughniyeh?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy online, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.washington​institute.​org/template​C05.php​?CID=2716.

9. who had killed Abdullah Azzam: For more on the influential cleric and the circumstances of his death, see Aryn Baker, “Who Killed Abdullah Azzam?” Time (June 18, 2009), http://www.time.com/​time/specials/​packages/​article/0,​28804,​1902809_​1902810​_1905173,​00.html.

10. the logistics of Balawi’s journey came together: Details about the arrangements for Balawi’s insertion into Pakistan were described by two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials personally knowledgeable or privy to classified briefings on the events.

11. he could make out a familiar form: Balawi describes his encounter with the guard Ahmad, a disabled Taliban fighter, while sleeping outdoors in a videotape essay titled, “O Hesitant One: It Is an Obligation!” posted by al-Qaeda’s media arm, as-Sahab, April 30, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.

12. “We pray to God”: For a fuller description of the interview with Baitullah Mehsud, see Nick Schifrin, “More Dangerous than Osama: Militant Leader Claims He Is Fighting a ‘Defensive’ Jihad to Destroy the White House,” Brian Ross Reports, Jan. 28, 2008, ABC News online, http://​abcnews.​go.com/​Blotter/​story?id=​4199754&page=1.

13. capturing an entire garrison: For a discussion of Baitullah Mehsud’s defiance of Pakistan’s government, see “Baitullah Mehsud,” a Times People Topic, New York Times, Aug. 25, 2009, http://topics​.nytimes.​com/top/​reference​/times​topics/people/m​/baitullah​_mehsud/​index.html.

14. the real target would be a decoy: This controversial story was described in detail by an official of the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the main Pakistani Taliban alliance, and related separately by two other Taliban associates, suggesting that it is a widely shared story that was used to establish Balawi’s credibility. There is no independent corroboration of the event by the CIA or other U.S. sources.

15. “Every drone strike”: Quote related in interview with Taliban official close to Mehsud.

16. his every move was being recorded: Detailed description of the attack on Baitullah Mehsud provided in author interviews with three U.S. intelligence officials involved in the planning or oversight of the operation.

Chapter 8: Pressure

1. Taliban leader was “alive, safe and sound”: “Taliban Ask Gov’t to Prove Mehsud Death Rumors,” AFP/Reuters, in Nation online, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/11-Aug-2009/Taliban-ask-govt-to-prove-Mehsud-death.

2. his staff was caught up in the drafting of a proposal: Details of the CIA’s proposal for strengthening its campaign against al-Qaeda, and of the White House’s reaction to the plan, were provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials and one administration official involved either in the planning meetings or in the presentation.

3. helicopter gunships swept the Taliban’s valley: For a discussion of the Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan from its faltering start in June 2009 to its final phase in October, see Bill Roggio, “What Lies Ahead in Waziristan,” Long War Journal, Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/analysis_what_lies_a.php.

4. touched off several bloody rounds of: Wall Street Journal online, Aug. 10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/​article/​SB124976257​139816985.html.

5. Shadow Army, a paramilitary force: Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda’s Paramilitary ‘Shadow Army,’ ” Long War Journal, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.longwar​journal.org/​archives​/2009/02/​al_qaedas_​paramilita.php.

6. technology had helped turn the tide against Iraq’s insurgents: Bob Woodward, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,” Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost​.com/​wp-dyn/​content/article/2008​/09/07/​AR20080​90701847.html.

7. “We don’t know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is”: Defense Secretary Robert Gates interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC News’ This Week, Dec. 5, 2009, http://blogs​.abcnews​.com/george/​2009/12/​where-is-​bin-laden-​secretary-gates​-says-no-​intel-in​-years.html.

8. One of the most promising involved: Details of CIA discussions and activities during the six-year search for bin Laden’s courier were described in interviews with two current and two former intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the events.

9. The Taliban’s defeat had been engineered by a small group of CIA officers: For perhaps the most authoritative description of the CIA-led offensive, see Gary Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005).

10. “will have flies walking across their eyeballs”: Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War (New York: Anchor Books, 2009).

11. shut down for good: Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Closes Unit Focused on Capture of bin Laden,” New York Times, July 4, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/04/washington/04intel.html?_r=1.

12. She arrived in Kabul in August: Details of Hanson’s time in Afghanistan provided in author interviews with two agency colleagues and two family members.

Chapter 9: Chief

1. attempted to bury an IED: An account of the premature mine explosion is contained in International Security Assistance Force incident logs for Afghanistan’s eastern district for Sept. 19, 2009, and released publicly by the anti-secrecy Web site WikiLeaks in July 2010.

2. She would be safe at Khost: A detailed description of Matthews’s experiences and conversations during her early weeks at Khost was provided in author interviews with eight former agency colleagues as well as two relatives who were in frequent communication with her during the relevant periods.

3. “the only women in a sea of men”: A narrative of Matthews’s early years in the CIA was drawn from accounts provided in interviews with six agency colleagues who knew her professionally and socially during that period, with additional insights provided in interviews with family members.

4. The officers … drew up contingency plans for killing bin Laden: For an authoritative account of pre–September 11 failures in the pursuit of al-Qaeda, see the final report of the so-called 9/11 Commission, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, http://govinfo.​library.​unt.edu/​911/report/​index.htm. Report released in July 2004.

5. “We’re at war now, a different kind of war”: Former CIA counterterrorism director Cofer Black’s words as remembered by a former CIA officer, in John Kiriakou and Michael Ruby, The Reluctant Spy (New York: Random House, 2010).

6. the case became the center of a roiling controversy: See Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War, loc. cit.

7. Zubaida was never truly an al-Qaeda leader: For an assessment of Zubaida’s role in al-Qaeda, see Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, “Detainee’s Harsh Treatment Foiled No Plots; Waterboarding, Rough Interrogation of Abu Zubaida Produced False Leads, Officials Say,” Washington Post, March 29, 2009.

8. Teams of SAD officers and Special Forces commandos spearheaded the assault: See Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda, loc. cit.

9. They arrived in Khost at 2:00 A.M.: An account of the CIA’s first days at Khost was provided in author interviews with one current and one former agency officers who were present at Khost during the events.

10. Green Beret sergeant named Nathan Chapman: For more on Chapman, see the Special Forces tribute site to him: http://www.quietpros.com/Afgan/chapman_nathan_ross_5sfg.htm.

11. Haqqani had spent years on the CIA’s payroll: For a comprehensive history of the network and its founder, see Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” Afghan Report No. 6, Institute for the Study of War, October 2010, http://www.understandin​gwar.org/​report/​haqqani-network.

12. “It’s just rudimentary, baseline, box-checking training”: Author interview with retired CIA instructor who led training courses and exercises for CIA officers at Camp Peary, near Williamsburg, Virginia.

13. There were three thousand of these soldiers in the eastern half of Afghanistan: For an account of the CIA-trained Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, see Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

Chapter 10: The Double Agent

1. first big score as a spy: Details of Balawi’s video attachment and the reaction within the CIA were described in interviews with three current intelligence officials who participated in meetings to discuss the finding, and one former U.S. intelligence official who reviewed internal memos and notes about the events.

2. a top aide to bin Laden: For more on Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, see Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, “Al-Qaeda’s New Leadership,” Washington Post online special, accessed Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.washington​post.com/​wpsrv/world/​specials/​terror/​rahman.html.

3. “You have lifted our heads”: bin Zeid’s reaction to Balawi’s apparent success as a spy, as described in Balawi’s Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview, op. cit.

4. serve up graphically detailed descriptions of the damage: Descriptions of Balawi’s assistance to CIA targeters in the fall of 2009 were provided in author interviews with three U.S. and two Jordanian intelligence officials.

5. code-named Agent Hero: For an official account of the double agent Colonel Penkovsky’s espionage achievements during the Cold War and his eventual execution in Russia at the hands of the KGB, see his official CIA profile at https://www.cia.​gov/news​-information/​featured​-story-archive/​2010-​featured​-story-​archive/colonel​-penkovsky.​html.

6. Indonesian terrorist ring known as Jemaah Islamiyah: For a detailed description of the terrorist group, see the profile “Jemaah Islamiyah” at HistoryCommons.com, at http://www.history​commons.org/​entity​.jsp?​entity=​jemmah_​islamiyah.

7. “I have to be there for Ali”: Darren LaBonte’s comments, biographical information, and friendship with bin Zeid described in author interviews with two CIA colleagues as well as with members of the bin Zeid and LaBonte families.

Chapter 11: Dangle

1. The Jordanian had made direct contact with the deputy commander of al-Qaeda: Details of Balawi’s e-mails about his reported interaction with Zawahiri, as well as the internal reaction to his messages, were described in author interviews with U.S. intelligence officials who participated in meetings convened to discuss the e-mails, and one former U.S. intelligence official who reviewed internal memos and notes about the events.

2. “we have a chance to go after Zawahiri”: CIA director Leon Panetta’s words, as recalled in author interviews with two intelligence officials and one administration official who attended the meeting.

3. the al-Qaeda version of a mad scientist: See Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).

4. “To kill Americans and their allies”: Ibid.

5. an alleged 2003 plot to attack New York City’s subway system: See Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

6. Zawahiri was known to have visited the same province: For a description of the failed assassination attempt on Zawahiri, see analysis by Bill Roggio, “Zawahiri, and al-Qaeda’s Future Plans,” Long War Journal, Jan. 15, 2006, as posted by http://threats​watch.org/​analysis/​2006/01/​zawahiri-​and-alqaedas-​future-p/.

7. “Bush, do you know where I am?”: Andrew Buncombe, “Zawahiri Taunts Bush in New Videotape,” Independent, Jan. 31, 2006.

8. a series of options for a meeting with Balawi were weighed: The CIA’s internal debate over the meeting with Balawi was described in author interviews with three CIA officers who participated.

9. “government was crying out for information”: Interview with the author.

10. Balawi became increasingly insistent: Negotiations with Balawi over the details of his meeting with the CIA and bin Zeid recounted in author interviews with two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials.

11. “We need to go slow on this case”: LaBonte’s words and his bosses’ response, as described in interviews with two CIA officials briefed on the exchange.

12. “But it’s my case”: The Jordanian intelligence agency’s effort to replace bin Zeid as the case officer for Balawi was confirmed by CIA director Leon Panetta in a press briefing on Oct. 19, 2010. Additional details about the internal discussions and events preceding bin Zeid’s departure for Afghanistan were described in author interviews with two Jordanian and two U.S. intelligence officials, as well as with bin Zeid’s and LaBonte’s families.

Chapter 12: Rehearsal

1. She would join them via Skype: Details of Matthews’s experiences during Christmas week were provided in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and two family members.

2. the most important ops plan of her life: Matthews’s plan and the various reactions to it were described in author interviews with two senior U.S. intelligence officials, three CIA colleagues, and two former Special Forces officers with personal knowledge of the events.

3. no formal counterintelligence review for Balawi: The CIA’s internal review, as described by Panetta on Oct. 19, 2010, confirmed deficiencies in the agency’s counterintelligence review of the case. Additional insights provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials.

4. they had found Balawi’s behavior suspicious: Author interview with Pickering, op. cit. at Langley, Virginia.

5. everything seemed wrong: LaBonte’s and bin Zeid’s concerns about the Balawi case were described in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and family members with whom they discussed their feelings in the final days of December.

6. “Sometimes it’s your job to say something”: Dec. 21, 2009, e-mail from Jeremy Wise to former navy colleague, provided to author.

7. Stay far away from this: Roberson’s words, as recalled by Khost colleague and recounted in author interview with the Khost colleague.

8. “Pray for me”: Hanson’s words as recalled in author interview with family member.

Chapter 13: The Triple Agent

1. very different from the vests he usually made: For the initial account of the making of Balawi’s suicide vest, see Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Inside Al Qaeda: Nine Years After 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s Network Remains a Shadowy, Little-Understood Enemy,” Newsweek, Sept. 13, 2010. Additional details provided in interview with Pakistani Taliban official.

2. police discovered that they could often distinguish the dead bomber: For a fuller understanding of the forensics of suicide bombing investigations, see Almogy et al., “Suicide Bombing Attacks: Update and Modifications to the Protocol,” Annals of Surgery, vol. 239, no. 3 (March 2004).

3. outlandish theories about how the CIA’s missiles found their targets: Specifics provided in interviews with two Taliban associates and a Pakistani law enforcement official.

4. Balawi’s days started at 5:30 A.M.: Details about Balawi’s training camp experiences, including his leg injury, as well as al-Qaeda’s internal debate over his trustworthiness, were provided in interviews with two Pakistani Taliban officials.

5. If you do not march forth, Allah will punish you with a painful torment: For an example of al-Masri’s rhetoric, see his “Message to the People of Pakistan,” on March 26, 2009. English translation provided by www.nefafoundation.org.

6. Some in the group had been interrogated in U.S. detention camps: Conclusion reached by CIA investigators of the Khost attack, as described in author interviews with two participants in the review.

7. “All praise is due to God, the bait fell in the right spot”: Balawi’s words in his Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview. English translation provided by SITE Intelligence Group.

8. Among the dead was Abdullah Said al-Libi: For more on this attack, see Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda Shadow Army Commander Thought Killed in Dec. 17 Strike,” Long War Journal, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.longwar​journal.org/​archives/​2010/01/​al_qaeda​_shadow​_army_2​.php#ixzz​1AMkm70vc.

9. “what is going on in the head of a martyr”: Balawi’s words in essay titled “The Last Writing of Abu Dujana al-Khorasani,” released Feb. 26, 2010, by al-Qaeda’s online magazine Vanguards of Khorasan. English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.

10. “We will get you, CIA team”: Balawi’s words in English in a videotaped suicide message posted on Feb. 28, 2010, by al-Qaeda media arm, as-Sahab. Video provided courtesy of Ben Venzke and IntelCenter, http://www.intelcenter.com/.

Chapter 14: No God but God

1. There was a weightier matter: Dane Paresi’s views about the Balawi case and life at Khost were described in author interviews with two of his Khost colleagues, a family member, and a third person, a former military comrade with whom he spoke in December 2009.

2. he finally arrived at Ghulam Khan: Details of Balawi’s transit through Pakistan to Khost were provided in interviews with three current and one former U.S. intelligence official.

3. “wants to go on a martyrdom-seeking mission”: Hakimullah Mehsud’s and Balawi’s statements in a joint video appearance first broadcast on Jan. 9, 2010, on al-Jazeera television. English transcript provided courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.

4. “These are the hired dogs”: Balawi’s words in his Dec. 26, 2009, video, op. cit.

5. “Are you going to perform jihad and get yourself killed”: Balawi offers insight into his anxieties over his mission in his essay “The Last Writing of Abu Dujana al-Khorasani,” op. cit.

Chapter 15: The Martyr

1. witnesses to the explosion: The immediate aftermath of the explosion and the initial efforts to save the wounded were described in author interviews with three U.S. intelligence officials privy to after-action reports.

2. Alley was nearing the end of his shift: Author interview with Dr. Josh Alley. For more on Alley’s recollections of the day, see his blog at http://www.joshalley.com/node/158.

Chapter 16: Fallen

1. Hayden happened to be in Langley: Accounts of the reaction to the Khost bombing at Langley were described in author interviews with three +intelligence officials and one administration official present at the time.

2. grim task of locating wives and parents: The circumstances surrounding notification of the CIA and Jordanian families were described in author interviews with family members.

Chapter 17: Resolve

1. “A successful epic”: Al-Masri’s reaction to the bombing in a statement posted on jihadist Web sites on Jan. 6, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.

2. “We claim the responsibility for the attack”: Tom Cohen, “Taliban Factions Compete for Credit in CIA Bombing Deaths,” CNN online, Jan. 3, 2010.

3. “Our fidaeen have penetrated the terrorist America”: Hakimullah Mehsud’s words in a videotaped statement recorded April 4, 2010; English translation courtesy of Long War Journal, http://www.longwar​journal.org/threat​-matrix/​archives/​2010/05/full_​text_of_​hakeemullah​_video.php.

4. CIA’s senior managers gathered in the director’s office: Account of CIA meeting related in author interviews with two agency officials present at the meeting.

5. CIA Predator carried out the first retaliatory strike: Details of the missile strikes in late December and January were provided in author interviews with two senior agency officials who participated in meetings in which the strikes were discussed.

6. “Hakimullah feared dead”: “Hakimullah Feared Dead in SWA Drone Attack,” OnePakistan online, Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.onepakist.an.com/news/top-stories/29848-hakimullah-feared-dead-in-swa-drone-attack.html.

7. the human dimensions of the disaster became fully clear: The events at Dover were described in author interviews with two CIA officials and four family members present at the time.

8. a series of private services: Private memorials described in author interviews with family members who participated.

9. “they went to another country to defend our country”: Remarks by President Obama and Leon Panetta at Feb. 5, 2010, memorial service, as recorded by CIA and posted on the agency’s Web site at https://www.cia.gov/​news-information​/press-releases-statements​/press-release-2010/​president-and​-cia-director​-speak-at-​memorial-​service.html.

Chapter 18: Memorial Day

1. proper burial for Elizabeth Hanson: Details of the service provided in author interviews with two CIA officials and a family member present for the burial on May 21, 2010.

2. they had located an al-Qaeda operative: CIA effort to target al-Masri described in author interviews with two senior agency officials privy to the details.

3. pair of longtime Washington hands: Author interviews with Thomas Pickering and Charles E. Allen.

4. the major preoccupation was the good health and safety of the man: Author interview with Thomas Pickering.

5. “The most important failure was one of imagination”: 9/11 Commission report, op. cit.

Epilogue

1. Bin Laden set up housekeeping: Details of Osama bin Laden’s hiding place, as well as the May 1, 2011, Navy SEAL raid that led to his death, were compiled from official White House and Defense Department statements and from interviews with two Obama administration officials briefed on the events.

2. “We think we’ve found a path forward”: Details of CIA discussions and activities during the six-year search for bin Laden’s courier were described in interviews with two current and two former intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the events.

3. “When you put it all together”: Leon Panetta interview with Jim Lehrer on PBS NewsHour, broadcast May 3, 2011.

4. “Once those teams went into the compound”: Author interview with Panetta, May 3, 2011, and ibid.

5. “we have rid the world of the most infamous terrorist of our time”: May 2, 2011, e-mail from Leon Panetta to CIA staff, provided to author.