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FOUR The Siege of Klessin

TONY LE TISSIER

I have pieced together this account from an after action report and extracts of a radio log provided by Lieutenant General Hans-Joachim von Hopffgarten, who was Ia (chief-of-staff) of the Panzergrenadier Division ‘Kurmark’ at the time. Further information was provided by Herr Helmut Jurisch, then a radio operator in the Tank Regiment ‘Brandenburg’. Prewar photographs and the diary of Herr Otto Karl Paul von Albedyll, the then 57-year-old squire of Klessin, were kindly provided by Dr. Reinhard Schmook of the Oderlandmuseum, Bad Freienwalde, plus additional photographs and material supplied by Dr Jürgen Freymuth OBE.

To find Klessin on the map, one has to follow the road running north out of Frankfurt on the Oder to Lebus and then look for the first turn-off on the right, where this tiny hamlet sits on the eastern edge of the Reitwein Spur, a good hundred feet above the Oder valley. The Klessin of today bears little resemblance to the Klessin of early 1945, the few remaining houses having been resited, but the geographical features are the same, with two tracks rising steeply from the Oder valley on either side of the promontory on which the Schloss, or manor house, once stood. Capping the promontory between these tracks, the house had magnificent commanding views over the valley that gave it its military significance, but today its site and former gardens are completely overgrown with trees.

The metalled road from Podelzig ran directly toward the main entrance to the house, being flanked by labourers’ cottages and outhouses either side of the approach to the courtyard entrance. This long rectangular courtyard was in turn flanked by barns, cowsheds and stables with access to the external parallel streets. A further group of cottages and outhouses lay at right-angles to the north of this formal grouping.

The owner of the Schloss, Otto von Abedyll, kept a diary from which it is clear that the Klessin Gut, or manor farm, was a prosperous concern with a variety of livestock, including dairy cattle, pigs and sheep, and considerable stocks of grain and other produce stored in its various barns. When the Red Army closed up to the line of the Oder in early February 1945, von Abedyll was able to evacuate the civilian population and most of his livestock, but the produce was lost when the area came under shellfire and the barns caught fire.

Then on the late afternoon of 15 February the Soviet 69th Army launched a surprise attack across the last of the ice into Lebus. Unheralded by the usual preparatory bombardment, two infantry divisions, supported by tanks, broke through the German lines to threaten the rear of the Reitwein Spur position, but were contained in time by elements of the Panzergrenadier-Division ‘Kurmark’ under Colonel Willy Langkeit, which had meanwhile taken over the defence of this sector. To reinforce the ‘Kurmark’ had come several two-battalion officer-cadet grenadier regiments raised from potential officers at the Reich’s various Kriegschule (KS), after which they were named. Thus the core of these units was of unusually high calibre, for the officers were instructors from these schools and the potential officers all experienced NCOs, but numbers and replacements had to be made up from all sorts, including Volkssturm.

With the ice melting, the Soviets had to resort to bridgebuilding against which the Germans turned their air and artillery resources with varying success. During the second half of February the ‘Kurmark’ received formidable artillery reinforcements and could eventually summon up to 250 guns in its support, the cooperation in providing defensive fire for the infantry working extremely well. With unusually plentiful supplies of ammunition readily available, these resources could lay up to 8,000 shells on an area of 11,000 square metres to support or quell an infantry attack. Bombardment conditions on the Reitwein Spur from the artillery of both sides were described by some First World War veterans as comparable to those experienced at Fort Douamont near Verdun in 1916. In the severe winter weather of 1945 the Wuhden and Klessin positions were of particular value as observation points.

On 2 March a night attack by elements of 8th Guards Army sweeping down the Reitwein Spur forced the German lines back to the eastern edge of Podelzig, leaving a battalion of the 1st Grenadier Regiment ‘KS Potsdam’ isolated in Wuhden, where it had to set up an all-round defence. A counterattack next day stalled under heavy Soviet fire and failed to get through. A Führer Order was then issued declaring Wuhden a ‘fortress’, which meant defending it to the last man, but it was totally unprepared for this role, its only supply resources being a potato store and a single well. Air supply was decided upon and a transport aircraft allocated for making night drops, but the Soviets promptly brought up their anti-aircraft artillery and soon rendered this means of supply impracticable. The Corps Commander, SS-General Matthias Kleinheisterkamp, then ordered an armoured thrust to relieve the garrison, but this met such a hail of anti-tank gunfire that the tanks hardly got across their start line. A subsequent dash at night by three of the ‘Brandenburg’s’ Panthers was more successful. Although one tank was knocked out and another damaged, the latter got through with the third tank, which happened to be a communications vehicle manned by radio operators and thus provided good communications for the beleaguered garrison. However, the first message out reported the majority of the battalion either dead or wounded, leaving a combatant strength of only 150–160 men. They had no medical officer with them to tend to their wounded and they were under frequent attack by Soviet infantry and being heavily shelled day and night.

Corps turned down all requests by Colonel Langkeit for permission for a break-out as being contrary to Hitler’s orders. Eventually Colonel Langkeit decided on his own responsibility to order a break-out on the 12th March, by which time the potato store and the well had been destroyed, only 80 of the original 400 men were still on their feet and the wounded had to be abandoned. Nevertheless, the ‘Kurmark’ continued to report Wuhden held for a further four days until formal permission to break out finally came through. The survivors were then rewarded with their commissions as second lieutenants and fourteen day’s leave.

^{The Deployment of the 2nd Battalion Fahnenjunker-Grenadier-Regiment 1242 on the 7th March 1945}

^{The Target areas indicated are based upon interpretation of the radio log.}

A similar fate was now to befall Klessin, which had also been declared a ‘fortress’ at the beginning of March while defended by elements of the Panzergrenadier Regiment ‘Kurmark’. Franz Schaberich, who was serving with that regiment, recalls assisting in the knocking down of walls to enable a Hetzer to get through the front door of the Schloss and manoeuvre into position to fire through the windows at the Soviet bridge below. Several hits from the vehicle’s 75 mm gun partially destroyed the bridge before returning fire obliged it to withdraw.

Then on 7 March, Grenadier Regiment 1242 (formerly known as the ‘KS Wetzlar’) took over the sector Point 54.2-Klessin-Alt Podelzig, its 2nd Battalion being assigned to Klessin under the command of a Captain Wiegand. The original deployment, with Grenadier Regiment 1241 (also formerly ‘KS Weslar’) on its right, was as follows:

7th Company – between Point 54.2 and Klessin

6th Company – southern front of Klessin

Bicycle Platoon – Schloss Klessin

5th Company – eastern and northern fronts of Klessin as far as the Wuhden road, where it connected with the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion

8th Company + Mortar Platoon + 2 or 3 HMG Sections – 3–400 metres south of Klessin road junction with Reichstrasse 112

Battalion HQ – cellar on the north side of Klessin street

Three days later Captain Wiegand was sent off on a General Staff course and Lieutenant Wolfgang Schöne, commanding the 8th Company, appointed in his place, being the only officer in the battalion who had done an artillery spotting course, even though he was not the senior subaltern. One of his subsequent letters read: ‘Far right a pontoon bridge, submerged by day and refloated at night when they bring their tanks across cheekily with their headlights full on. We have to count them and report the number to Regiment. That is our main task.’

On his first afternoon in command, the Soviets advanced up the sunken road from the south with the aid of tanks to reach the Klessin-Podelzig road, but a counterattack by the regiment that evening re-opened the route and destroyed a T-34 tank. Again the following afternoon, 11 March, the Soviets in battalion strength attacked the German positions north of the hamlet and were only forced back by committing the last of the regimental reserves. That night the Soviets broke the German lines at the juncture between Grenadier Regiments 1242 and 1235 west of Wuhden and thrust south, cutting off and surrounding Klessin. Those German troops that had been fighting north of Klessin were forced back into it, adding elements of the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 1st Battalion to the garrison strength. Only a weak and by day untenable line of positions now connected the Klessin garrison with Point 54.2 and the rest of the regiment.

During the night of 12/13 March it was possible to re-supply the garrison once more using tanks and armoured personnel carriers, which were also able to remove the wounded, but came under heavy artillery fire on their return journey.

Temporarily reinforced by the remains of the Replacement Battalion ‘Feldherrnhalle’,[22] Grenadier Regiment 1242 made a bid to re-open the link to Klessin on the evening of the 13th March, but failed with heavy losses attributed mainly to heavy anti-tank gunfire coming from the direction of Wuhden. Only a few Soviet tanks were engaged in this action.

The only well providing water for Klessin was destroyed by shellfire that day and there were to be four waterless days for the garrison before some enterprising individuals managed to re-open the well and discover a second one. The garrison remained under constant artillery and mortar fire with mounting casualties. The wounded were tended by the battalion medical officer, Junior Surgeon Dr. Gehre, who worked untiringly under the most difficult circumstances, not least a lack of medical supplies. The accumulating wounded spread from the neighbouring cellar into the battalion command post itself.

The supply difficulties were partly eased by some calves, several lambs, a quantity of potatoes and a sack of peas left behind by Herr von Albedyll after the evacuation of the property.

Communications were provided by the regimental signals platoon with a radio section under Corporal Hopp, later to be promoted sergeant, whose radiomen fortunately had a faster speed of transmission than those usually encountered with the infantry. Then there was the Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’’s forward observer, Sergeant Hennecke, who was later to be recommended for promotion and the award of the Iron Cross First Class for his brilliant work in directing artillery fire under the most arduous conditions, and the forward observer of the SS-Artillery Battalion 101, Sergeant Hagen, whose radio failed to function throughout. However, there was an acute shortage of batteries for the sets, and expired batteries were supposed to be returned to Regiment for recharging whenever possible. Extracts of Sergeant Major Baier’s radio log at the regimental command post survive and provide a comprehensive background to events.

At 0941 hours on the 13th March, Klessin garrison reported the massing of Soviet anti-tank guns, mortars and infantry northeast of the hamlet and called for a fire concentration. At 1320 hours 5 Company holding the northeastern perimeter came under attack but managed to beat the enemy back. The garrison reported a fighting strength of 196 with six severely wounded awaiting collection.

At 1416 hours the Soviets repeated their attack from the northeast and then minutes later the position came under attack from the southeast as tanks and infantry emerged from the hollow below the Schloss. Because of the steepness of the approach, this latter group could only be countered with mortar fire, but the request for this was closely followed by a call for a complete fire bell around the battalion position. By 1520 hours the garrison was calling urgently and repeatedly for water, which was promised for delivery by tanks that night.

The Soviet attacks continued, causing the garrison to call for heavy machine gunfire over the position, as well as artillery, rocket and mortar fire on specific target areas. Three and a half hours later the garrison was able to report a complete defensive success by 5 and 6 Companies, but tetanus inoculations and bandages were urgently needed.

At 0210 hours next morning, 14 March, Regiment announced the armoured relief attack would commence at 0245 hours assisted by infantry. As soon as the tanks broke through, the 2nd Battalion was to push out on the flanks to re-establish contact with its neighbours on either side. The 2nd Company of the ‘Brandenburg’ provided fire cover for the 3rd Company, but then a Panther hit a mine and the tank in which Matthias Hamedinger was the radio operator was ordered to recover it. He reported: ‘The Russians were firing at our tank with Panzerfausts without hitting it. Then one hit the petrol tank alongside the engine and our tank burst into flames and the ammunition started exploding. I baled out through the radio operator’s hatch without difficulty, but the Russian infantry closed in and started firing at us with their sub-machine guns. The tracks cut by the tank into the meadow provided us with good cover, but our tank commander, Sergeant Räth, was hit and wounded.’

As Helmut Jurisch commented: ‘That first night the enemy put up such a hail of fire that, although it did not penetrate, the closer we got to Klessin, the greater was the danger that they would penetrate the side armour. Eventually the attack was broken off at dawn.’

The attempt at relief had failed and at 1000 hours the Soviets resumed their attacks from the north and south. Again this was eventually checked by artillery fire. That evening Regiment called on the garrison to hold out for one more day. The garrison was now down to 37 officer cadets, 8 senior NCOs, 116 other ranks and 27 wounded, already on their fourth day without water.

At some stage during the siege, the Political Department of the 8th Guards Army produced a special leaflet to try and get the garrison to surrender, which started as follows:

NOBODY WILL GET THROUGH!

SOLDIERS of the Klessin garrison!

You are now sitting in your pocket waiting for help.

Forget it! Help is not coming any more!

The attempts to break through to you have cost the German command several dozen tanks and armoured personnel carriers.

Tanks and armoured personnel carriers will not get through!

No one will get through!

You may hold on for another day or two, perhaps even a week – that changes nothing.

Sometime during the course of the fighting it was discovered from prisoner of war interrogations that the Soviet attacking division so outnumbered the German defence that, although all their mortar resources were kept in action, they were only fielding one regiment at a time out of three on a three-day exchange system of one in the line, one in reserve and one resting!

During the night of 14/15 March Klessin reported hearing the enemy digging in either side of the Podelzig road and called for heavy artillery fire on that area. The garrison suffered no casualties during the night.

That afternoon Regiment announced the mounting of a second relief operation and in the evening some tense signalling began in which a forward observer with the relief force, ‘M’, reported progress as recorded in the radio log. (I and II denote the 1st and 2nd Battalions respectively.)

To II 1940 Watch out! Our own relief operation. Pull back. Illuminate battlefield.

M 2002 Strong anti-tank fire. Tanks rolling forward. Strong anti-tank fire right of road to KLESSIN.

M 2012 Own tanks rolling forward.

M 2018 Tanks continuing to advance. No sign of own troops at the moment.

M 2033 Tanks 300-400m before position. Remainder on high position.

To II 2035 What is the situation?

M 2036 Fire from big mortars could be laid down in front of tanks.

M 2038 Infantry right of road advancing well.

From I What is the situation?

To I Head of advance has reached KLESSIN. Wing companies advancing.

M 2041 Own troops left of road advancing.

M 2047 Heavy artillery fire on own troops right of road.

M 2051 Lieutenant Wilken wounded. Coming back.

M 2055 Sounds of fighting quieter.

To I 2100 An officer to immediately go forward and clarify situation.

M 2100 Groups of our own troops are coming back right of road 200m from the position.

M 2105 Tanks still advancing. No sign of own troops.

From I 2107 Some tanks now behind village. No infantry companies to be seen. Where is artillery fire?

M 2110 Tanks now in hollow 400m from own positions. 3 tanks going further forward on right.

M 2120 Have some elements gone back?

To I Second Lieutenant Lehner to take over 3 Company and attack.

M 2118 Since last report at 2054 hours no returning troops seen.

From I 2125 KLESSIN reports via 8 Company: We are free.

M 2126 One tank returning.

M 2130 KLESSIN reports: We are free.

M 2137 Up to 8 men seen returning.

To I 2215 Breakthrough must be forced with tanks under all circumstances. Tanks have orders to this effect.

To I 2220 Has an officer gone forward from 1st Battalion to clarify situation?

From I 2223 Attack on the hollow stalled. Tanks partly ahead of own infantry companies without contact to the platoons. Partly covered by considerable mortar fire.

From II 2236 Contact to right re-established, to the left still unclear. Still enemy on the road.

From I 2238 Remove 7 wounded from 8 Company Command Post. 4 stretcher cases.

To II 2250 Urgently need to know whether contact to southern front has been completed.

From II If 1 Company/1242 left PODELZIG-KLESSIN road is not going to advance, fire on DROSSEL[23] from all artillery resources requested.

To II Report immediately when armoured personnel carriers arrive.

From I 7 Company has contact with KLESSIN. If a frontal advance not possible, 3 Company is to drive forward to the Russian trenches that 7 Company has blocked off and roll them up to north. Brief the tanks and let them support us from you.

From II 6 Company has contact with left platoon 7 Company, not with right of 7 Company. Armoured personnel carriers not yet arrived.

To I 0025 Prepare Engineer Platoon immediately. Platoon to roll up trenches from south to north. Lieutenant Rossmann to command platoon.

From II 0045 What is the situation?

To II 0105 Frontal thrust along the road now stalled. Engineer Platoon tasked with clearing enemy trenches from south to north. 2nd Battalion is to send an assault troop along 7 Company’s front from 6 Company to re-establish firm contact with 7 Company. Armoured personnel carriers are on their way.

From I 0125 Engineer Platoon briefed and already under way.

To I 0135 As soon as the Engineer Platoon is there, roll up the position from south to north. Also commit 3 and 1 Companies. The enemy must be chased out of these trenches.

M 0135 Wounded transport to here.

From I 0135 Wounded transport to 8 Company. Numerous wounded there.

From II 0150 2 Company on right at the moment including No. 1 Platoon of 7 Company at Grid Reference 69660/14000. Request closure of still open gap by rest of Feldherrnhalle or 7 Company. Note coordinates.

From II 0045 What is the situation?

To II 0158 Query: have the armoured personnel carriers arrived yet?

To II Request Hopp to establish:

a) How many pack radios in KLESSIN?

b) How many of these intact?

Reply immediately. Baier.

From II From Feldherrnhalle: One armoured personnel carrier and 2 heavy armoured personnel carriers driven on mines in renewed attack, also strong infantry fire.

To II 0745 Lieutenant Schöne: Undertaking failed due to enemy anti-tank mines. Recognition of your steadfastness and that of your men. I will personally not rest until we are reunited.

From II 0732 Request yet today another drop of ammunition, Verey lights, hand grenades, water, food, lead and nickel batteries, anodes, tetanus, bandages.

From II 0920 Situation Report: Battalion is holding KLESSIN in old positions. One platoon 7 Company in battalion reserve broke back through to us after a short fight after being cut off. Right wing of battalion about 150m north of shot-up Russian tank. Gap to 7 Company about 500m. Also possible to close the gap with specific bombardment of the intervening hollow without putting tanks on stand-by.

From Div For Combat Team Klessin: Report approximate casualties immediately. Have you a doctor in KLESSIN?

To II 1153 Report immediately for Division: fighting strength, casualties and whether you have a doctor in KLESSIN.

From II 1230 In KLESSIN there are in all five pack radios and one unreliable Sender/Receiver. Four of the sets are on their last batteries. Regimental set has still duration of 24 hours in receiving mode. 2 Company cannot communicate with 1st Battalion, but I have secured their batteries. We will only transmit when we need you. Please note.

From II 1327 Fighting strength 5/182. Casualties: 15 (6 dead, 9 wounded). Doctor best possible.

To II 1740 Expected supply drop 1745-1815 hrs. Shoot white and green. Mark drop zone SCHLOSS yard.

From II 1902 To Commander: Re your message of 1730 hours. Messages that through encoding cannot be acted on in time are pointless and endanger confidence in the leadership. Drop zone not SCHLOSS but village street.

To II 1940 Supply bombs coming tomorrow morning. Timing will be passed on to you.

Thus another attempt at relieving Klessin had failed. Helmut Jurisch with the Panthers reported that, although two of their tanks managed to break through the Soviet lines, they were both soon brought to a standstill in a hail of fire. Attempts to recover them and their baled-out crews were equally unsuccessful because of the volume of fire. Even though there were some dead and wounded among the crews, the majority were captured alive.

However, two Panthers commanded by Second Lieutenant Eimer and Sergeant Stephen had got through to the garrison, although they were not included in the strength return until the 19th. Most importantly, they brought with them a useful addition to the radio link for directing artillery fire.

Early next day, 17 March, Klessin reported visible signs of deterioration in the state of the men as a result of the failure to resupply. The supply drop by Luftwaffe aircraft at 1600 hours coming in from the direction of Podelzig in the face of considerable anti-aircraft fire from the ample Soviet resources resulted in all the supply containers falling east of the Schloss into the Soviet positions. That evening Klessin reported: ‘Visible drop in physical capacity of men after six days without resupply. Already two men have collapsed from physical exhaustion in 6 Company. Today three wounded. Totals 19 severely and 30 lightly wounded. Fighting strength 184.’

On 18 March the radio log continued:

To II I promote with effect from 1 Mar 45 all officer cadet sergeants to officer cadet staff sergeants, Sergeant Lippmann to staff sergeant, Corporals Hopp and Herbert to sergeant. Those unqualified are not to be informed.

To II The Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group and the General Officer Commanding have announced their special recognition of Officer Cadet Grenadier Regiment 1242 for exemplary fortitude at WUHDEN and KLESSIN. From Div

1630 Combat Team Klessin! How much longer can your radios function?

From II 1833 Another 2 days on ‘Receive’.

To Div Another 2 days on ‘Receive’. However, when traffic continues like today and yesterday, only one more day on constant ‘Receive’.

To II 1910 Division wants to know whether there were 2 pigs in KLESSIN when it was surrounded and whether the potato store there has been entered. Reply immediately.

From II 2045 2 pigs destroyed by enemy action before encirclement. Potatoes available have diminished. Amount consumed as rations will be accounted for upon relief.

From II 2130 Situation unchanged. Day-long harassing fire from mortars and anti-tank guns. Last night a storm troop was repulsed by 5 Company and papers captured. Enemy constantly reinforcing encirclement positions.

Fighting strength 178.

Casualties: 3 dead, 3 wounded,

8 severely wounded have died so far.

Resupply urgent: ammunition, Verey cartridges, hand grenades, food, flares, bandages, medicines, tetanus.

Emergency water supply re-established.

Later Wolfgang Schöne was to comment: ‘The tactical radio, partly through my fault, was loaded with unnecessary traffic (i.e. recommendations for medals and promotions, detailed strength returns for routine traffic, the especially grotesque questions from Division about Herr von Albedyll’s two pigs and my ironically intended reply).’

On 19 March the Luftwaffe succeeded in dropping thirteen containers on the village street at a cost of two aircraft shot down, but the containers could only be recovered at night due to the heavy enemy machine gun and anti-tank gun fire. These containers brought welcome relief to the garrison and proved a considerable boost to morale, as the radio log shows:

From II 0512 Attack on 5 Company. Barrage requested.

To II 0540 Supply bombs again today.

From II 0652 Strong movement and noise during the night, apparently in preparation for attack on 5 Company. Quiet in front of 6 Company. Watch out for green flares. Where is the resupply?

From II 0823 Enemy has dug his way in during the night to hand grenade throwing distance on the boundary between 5 and 2 Companies and close east of the WUHDEN-KLESSIN road. Expecting attack today from several directions.

From II 0845 To 13 Company: Request from 0900 hours onwards harassing fire on TONI during the morning.

From II 0925 To 13 Company: Harassing fire on TONI falling too short. Up 50m.

From II 0942 To 13 Company: Request irregular harassing fire on TONI until noon with up 50m.

To II 0950 Can barrages on MÜHLE-MARS be thickened up? If so by how much?

To II 1016 Please report daily fighting strength and casualties from 18 Mar onwards.

From II Reply to 0955 hours. 13 Company: MARS and MÜHLE cannot be drawn in closer. Command MÜHLE unchanged. Command MARS up 50m. Combine fire.

To II 1042 How is the fire on MÜHLE-MARS?

To II 1150 Expected supply drop 1400-1430 hours. Fire Verey lights as per last time. Hopefully it will work.

From II 1342 Checked fighting strength of 18 Mar 45: 5 officers, 55 officer cadets, 17 senior NCOs, 121 other ranks, plus 2 tank crews. Casualties: 2 officer cadets, 1 other rank wounded. 1 officer cadet, 2 other ranks dead.

To II 1448 There has been a delay. Exact time is coming through.

To II 1520 Delicacies arriving 1630 hours. 24 aircraft. Light signals. Mark drop zone.

From II 1605 Enemy attacking. 1 salvo on MARS.

From II 1620 Query: Has barrage on MARS been fired?

From II 1625 Request barrages on MARS and TONI up 25m.

From II 1655 Own bombs here. Detailed report follows.

From II We thank you for the help. Detailed report follows.

From II 1719 Beaten off in front of 5 Company.

To II 1722 Well done, Schöne.

From II Forward Observer 13 Company to 13 Company: Guns on bearing 190 more WUHDEN one shot.

To II Report immediately how many supply bombs on target.

From II 10 bombs on target.

To II Query: Was shooting down of two of our aircraft observed?

From II Yes, in the direction PODELZIG.

From II 1745 Without prejudice to further commendations, request award of Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class to Second Lieutenant Heinrich of 5 Company. From the first days of the encirclement he has beaten back numerous attacks, some severe, with his company, held his position steadfastly and on 10 Mar personally led a counterattack to restore the old front line.

To II Lieutenant Schöne: On the instructions of the Divisional Commander Second Lieutenant Heinrich is awarded the Iron Cross First Class. Heartiest congratulations.

From II 2047 Fighting strength: 5 officers, 54 officer cadets, 18 senior NCOs, 115 other ranks, plus 2 tank crews.

Casualties: Wounded 5 officer cadets, 5 other ranks.

Dead 3 other ranks.

7 light wounded back on duty.

To II 2245 Lieutenant Schöne: How did the food taste?

From II Lovely, we thank you!

The resources of the Panzergrenadier Division ‘Kurmark’ being recognised as inadequate to break the deadlock at Klessin, Grenadier Regiment 300, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Helmut Weber, was detached from the 303rd Infantry Division ‘Döberitz’ and given two or three days to prepare. Its task was both to relieve the Klessin garrison and re-establish firm defensive lines back to Grenadier Regiment 1242, at the same time apparently taking over control of this sector from the depleted 1242nd. Then, at the last minute, the promised armoured support was withdrawn.

The regiment advanced behind a heavy artillery barrage at 0515 hours on 20 March, only to find themselves heavily shelled in turn. However, moving fast, the commander of the 2nd Battalion, Captain Böge, managed to break through along the track to the hamlet with some of his men and some sappers of the Armoured Engineer Battalion ‘Kurmark’ within fifteen minutes. Losses among the attacking force were considerable and only 45 men eventually got through to Klessin, where Lieutenant Schöne handed over command of the garrison to Captain Böge, but was instructed by Regiment to continue reporting as before. The Soviets followed up their counter-bombardment with attacks from both north and south and soon regained their blocking positions as they systematically destroyed the 300th’s troops in their path.

At about 0900 hours a Volkssturm man of 7 Company who had been captured in the previous day’s fighting appeared with a Soviet demand for the garrison to surrender by 1400 hours. This demand. signed ‘The High Command of the Red Army’, was set out in proper German and promised, should they surrender, immediate attention to the wounded and immediate release to their homes once the war was over. It was ignored and the Volkssturm man rearmed and put back into the line, only to be killed later on. The radio log continues:

From II 1545 Request immediate recce along road to here whether trenches are free of enemy. Green flares if trenches free of enemy, otherwise red.

From II 1615 From 6 and Assault Companies. Trenches reoccupied by enemy. One to one and a half companies. An energetic attack with supporting fire could still regain these trenches today. Reserves close by. After break-in, strong protection to right and left.

To II 1656 Immediate radio silence except for urgent matters.

To II Request strengths of Böge elements there.

From II 1800 To Commanding Officer 300: Strength of 2nd Battalion 300:

HQ 2/3/10, 5 Company 1/2/7, 6 Company 0/1/7, Engineers 0/0/4, Storm Company 0/0/4, 2 Company 1/4/4.

From II 1948 Request running harassing fire on SPERBER during the night.

To II 2025 Where is your strength and casualty report?

To II 2055 We are trying again. Time 2300 hours.

From II To Regiment: Fighting strength 5 officers, 56 officer cadets, 17 senior NCOs, 110 other ranks, plus 2 tank crews.

Casualties: 3 other ranks wounded, 1 officer cadet dead.

Total wounded 64.

Air supply tomorrow necessary with batteries, food, flares, Verey cartridges, machine gun ammunition and hand grenades.

The 300th launched a second attack at 2330 hours with its greatly diminished resources, but this again was stalled by Soviet artillery fire with heavy loss. Attempts at relief involving some heavy fighting resumed on the 21st, as these extracts from the radio log show:

From II 0832 To Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: from Forward Observer, 2nd Battery. Possibility exists that codes have been blown. Use new codes.

From II What is the situation?

To II New countermeasures being prepared.

From II 0935 To Commanding Officer 300:

1) Enemy is digging in from direction of WUHDEN in a second trench running from the shot-up Panther to here from the direction of the main road. Thus there is a danger that this trench will eventually lead to the track and form a second continuous trench between you and us.

2) Fire direction is being tried via tank, as own set is u/s.

2) Request permission to fire upon identified heavy weapons.

The ODER is clearly visible.

From II 0946 For establishment of new fire direction it will be necessary for the command tank to drive to the firing position of the 2nd Battalion, Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’.

From II 1026 To 13 Company: Prepare for orders to fire.

To II 1037 Give short basis for commendation of Sergeant Hennecke.

To II 1055 Fire direction will be conducted via tank. From 1130 hours reciprocal callsign is ROTHKELCHEN.

From II 1132 To Regiment: Sergeant Hennecke has as Forward Observer in heavy fighting under the heaviest artillery fire so outstandingly conducted himself, that a considerable part of successful defence is attributable to him.

From II 1218 To Regiment: Request urgent running harassing fire on SPERBER, EMIL, DROSSEL by all available artillery resources.

To II Still no orders from Corps.

There followed recommendations for the award of the Iron Cross First Class for six officer cadets, and Second Class for a further 38 officer cadets, 26 other ranks and eight Volkssturm men, the promotion of Second Lieutenant Heinrich to lieutenant and Gunner Brandenburg to bombardier for his outstanding conduct as a radio operator under the heaviest enemy fire.

All the while Colonel Willy Langkeit, the ‘Kurmark’ divisional commander, was doing his utmost to get permission from the XIth SS Panzer Corps commander, the fanatical Nazi SS-General Matthias Kleinheisterkamp, to give permission for the garrison to break out, but so far without success.

The log continues:

From II Where is resupply?

To Commanding Officer 300: Request further harassing fire during the whole night on DROSSEL, SPERBER, GUSTAV.

Query: Where is 6 Company? Conditions for wounded bad.

From II 1910 Strength of Grenadier Regiment 300 and Engineer Regiment 309: 4/11/30, plus 1/9 wounded.

From II To Commanding Officer 300:

Some enemy barrages from heavy mortars, otherwise quiet.

From II Artillery working well. Request once more urgent artillery action during night on GUSTAV, DROSSEL and EMIL. Greetings please from 6, 7 and 8 Companies. The fire has not gone out yet.

From II 2118 To Regiment:

Fighting strength: 5 officers, 55 officer cadets, 17 senior NCOs, 107 other ranks, plus 2 tank crews.

Wounded: 1 officer cadet, 3 other ranks.

Wounded of 2nd Battalion/1242 in KLESSIN 54.

Request supply of following: flares, batteries, machine gun ammunition, Verey cartridges, replacement machine gun, food.

There was a second successful supply drop by the Luftwaffe that night with thirteen containers recovered.

The whole of 22 March Klessin lay under heavy bombardment from artillery, mortars, anti-tank guns and heavy machine gun fire. The situation had become almost untenable, as the radio log records:

From II 0500 Barrages on GUSTAV and TONI.

From II 0510 Barrages up 100m and 100m more to left.

From II To 13 Company: Once TONI fired, one barrage on MARS, where enemy forming up.

From II Order to 13 Company cancelled.

To II 0555 Has enemy broken in?

From II 0618 What is the situation on the left?

From II 0621 Russians broke in 2 Company at 0500 hours. 7 Russians in trench left behind a machine gun when thrown out again. 1 dead and 2 wounded in this. 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’ fired well-laid bombardments during the night. Situation restored.

Waiting urgently for food, Verey cartridges, hand grenades and machine gun ammunition.

From II 0920 Request one salvo harassing fire on RITTERSPORN, from where sound of tanks.

From II 1003 Enemy bombardment with heavy mortars. Situation for wounded bad.

From II To 13 Company: Request harassing fire on MARS and ILONA from 11 to 1300 hours. Timing from Regiment.

From II Expecting enemy attack. Under running artillery bombardment. Conditions for wounded unbearable.

From II 1000 KLESSIN fortress boundaries: From crossroads at western exit SE 300m, NE 250m, N 300m, W 150m, S 150m. Please pass on to Luftwaffe.

From II 1111 To Regiment: Prepare barrage all round.

From II Is barrage ready?

To II Barrage is ready.

From II 1148 MARS, GUSTAV, ILONA, one salvo.

From II 1200 Bombardment of own positions by Russians.

From II 1203 Query: Has salvo been fired on MARS, ILONA, GUSTAV?

From II 1209 One salvo on DROSSEL.

From II 1217 Prepare barrage all round once more.

From II Enemy attack. Fire barrages on GUSTAV, TONI, RABE, MARS and keep firing.

From II Barrage on GUSTAV urgent.

From II Barrage on GUSTAV urgent. Keep on firing, and DROSSEL.

From II Enemy attack. Barrages on DROSSEL, GUSTAV and SPERBER.

From II Fire again on GUSTAV urgent. Enemy attacking!

From 7 Coy Enemy attack on KLESSIN clearly visible. Barrage on hollow!

To 7 Coy Where exactly is enemy attack? Give exact areas.

From II Fire rockets 600m further to north.

From II Fire on GUSTAV again.

From II 1247 Enemy is attacking from directions of 49.7, 56.2 and 16.8, from north and northwest.

From II Request concentrated fire on GUSTAV. One running barrage on RITTERSPORN 2.

To 7 Coy The enemy attacking KLESSIN is most urgently to be forced to ground with machine guns.

From 7 Coy Enemy attack from WUHDEN toward west swung round on KLESSIN and from the dip in front of our own Sector on KLESSIN.

To II Do you have lamps for a night supply air drop?

From II 1344 To 13 Company: 2 salvoes on MARS.

From II 1347 Situation re-established, cleared up. Casualties from enemy artillery fire expected.

To II 1350 Query: Have all attacks been beaten back?

From II 1355 Prepare for further all round fire.

To II 1419 How was the last rocket barrage?

From II 1435 To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’:

One salvo on GUSTAV immediately.

From II Query: Is the barrage ready? Command TONI 100m up, otherwise in own trenches.

To II 1448 Barrage ready.

From II 1448 …and thrown out again in a counterattack. The enemy was being driven on by commissars. Current statements from prisoners. We are expecting further enemy attacks.

Casualties not yet reviewed.

Conditions for wounded very, very bad.

Cover hardly possible. Reserves fully committed.

Urgently request fighter aircraft support.

To II What is situation?

From II 1540 Relief today urgently necessary. The enemy is occupying the eastern part of the SCHLOSS and is constantly reinforcing. Forces for a counterattack not available. Please relieve urgently.

From II Barrage all round.

From II Continual barrage all round urgent.

To 7 Coy Force the enemy now attacking southern KLESSIN to the ground with all your weapons.

From II Barrage all round urgent.

From II Where is the barrage?

To II Where is the main enemy point of attack?

From II East and south of SCHLOSS.

From II 1630 Heavy losses. We are fighting to the last man.

To II 1643 Hold on. Decision applied for.

From II One battery on GUSTAV. Own artillery firing too short.

From II To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: one salvo on SPERBER.

From II One salvo on GUSTAV.

From II 1711 Situation difficult. We must fear the worst this evening.

From II To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: one salvo on GUSTAV.

From II To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: Harassing fire on SPERBER, GUSTAV and RITTERSPORN 2.

From II Where is the harassing fire on areas GUSTAV, SPERBER and RITTERSPORN 2?

To II Harassing fire being fired constantly. Report where and how strong enemy penetration.

From II Enemy has penetrated SCHLOSS and southern part of village with one company.

From II Where is the harassing fire?

To II 1754 Artillery report that they are firing constantly. What is the situation?

From II 1800 Prepare all round barrage.

To II 1805 Barrage ready.

From II Request constant harassing fire all round.

To II 1821 Own artillery doing everything possible.

From II 1825 Wounded can no longer be provided shelter in the position. Considerable collapse of trenches. We are using the last of our strength. Enemy preparing to attack.

To II Tell Lieutenant Schöne of concern that all the divisional Radio codes, including the most important, be destroyed in radio station HOPP. Report immediately if code blown. Corporal Hopp is already aware.

From II 2000 Fire barrage!

From II 2001 Request last orders.

To II 2036 Is there an enemy attack?

From II No!

From II Mortar fire landing on own positions.

From II 2055 Heavy artillery harassing fire on position.

To II 2104 Decision whether KLESSIN garrison is to continue fighting has been passed by Division to Army Group.

From II 2101 To Regiment: Old command post blown up.

To II 2126 Through a direct hit or demolition?

From II Several direct hits. Burnt, then exploded.

From II One salvo on all blocking areas.

To II 2206 KLESSIN can be assured that the Regiment is doing everything possible.

The garrison’s fighting strength fell dramatically through losses in dead and wounded, and both tanks were knocked out by direct hits during the course of the day. That evening Second Lieutenant Greib of the Bicycle Platoon knocked out a Stalin tank with a Panzerfaust at point-blank range. However, the situation demanded constant artillery support, which did not stop the Soviets getting a foothold in the eastern corner of the Schloss that evening that proved of considerable tactical value to them.

Although the situation in Klessin was now desperate, both the Corps and Army commanders regarded Hitler’s orders as sacrosanct, so Colonel Langkeit apparently decided to bypass them and appeal direct to Colonel General Gotthardt Heinrici at Army Group. Meanwhile decorations and promotions were used as morale-boosters. Years later Schöne was to comment that they had never lost confidence in their regimental and divisional commanders in this situation.

On the morning of the 23rd March the Soviets broke through into the main part of the Schloss after a long and heavy artillery preparation and after several failed attempts. The defence were by now too weak to mount a counterattack and were obliged to form a cordon west of the building. The Soviets then brought in two tanks, an anti-tank gun and several heavy machine guns with which they began to dominate the hamlet from the Schloss, causing trenches to collapse and inflicting heavy casualties to the extent that nearly everyone of the defence were wounded.

Two breaches in the northern defences had to be cleared during the morning, and by noon the last fifteen to twenty unwounded soldiers formed a hedgehog around the battalion command post, into which a number of the wounded had to be carried. Then, during the late afternoon, the Soviets forced their way into the centre and the northern part of the hamlet, splitting the garrison into several groups. The radio log shows how the situation developed during the day:

To II 0036 All officer cadet staff sergeants in KLESSIN are promoted second lieutenant with immediate effect. Heartiest congratulations.

From II To Commanding Officer 300:

Enemy is pressing in ever closer on inner defences from all sides.

One tank destroyed in close fighting. The wounded are lying in the trenches. Everything can be expected to be overrun in the next attack. No reserves left. Is it possible to break out or be relieved by 0300 hours?

From II Tanks are ready with infantry.

To II Send further recommendations for Iron Cross.

From II Where are the barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN 2?

To II Barrages coming.

From II Decision presses until 2300 hrs. This combat team cannot take another attack without reinforcement and will be overrun.

To II Highest recognition of your brave conduct. Hold on!

Langkeit, Colonel.

From II Request harassing fire on DROSSEL.

To II Men of KLESSIN! One looks on you full of pride and admiration. You are the decisive wave-breakers against the Bolshevist storm on the Reichs capital. Heil our Führer! SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS Kleinheisterkamp.

From II To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: one salvo on RITTERSPORN 2.

Enemy forming up point.

To II Lieutenant Schöne: The Führer has awarded you the Knights’ Cross. Heartiest congratulations from the Regiment.

From II 0410 Strength 90 men.

From II 0445 Request permission to break out. Russians ready to attack.

To II 0515 To Captain Böge: High Command insists position is to be held under all circumstances.

From II Enemy attacking. Barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN 2.

From II Enemy attacking. Barrages on ILONA down 50m and RITTERSPORN 2, for 13 Company.

From II All artillery resources on RITTERSPORN 2.

To 13 Company: on SCHLOSS and 8 Company.

From II ILONA up 200m. Barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN.

From II Enemy attacking from east via SCHLOSS (one company). Request running barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN.

To II Query: whether one can fire on the SCHLOSS?

From II The SCHLOSS can be fired on. Not too short!

From II What is the situation?

To II 0750 Hold on! How is it, Lieutenant Schöne?

From II Where is barrage on ILONA? Schöne OK.

To II ILONA fired on several times.

From II Prepare barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN 2.

To II 0826 Ready.

To II 0910 Is it known that Schöne has been awarded the Knights’ Cross?

To II 0952 Award all those recommended for Iron Cross First and Second Class, also Iron Cross First Class for Christ, Second Class for Hohenstein, Ackermann and Scherzinger.

From II 0957 Why no fire on ILONA?

From II Artillery firing too short. Up 100m.

From II 1000 Enemy in company strength in SCHLOSS. No reserves left to throw them out with. Situation of wounded hopeless. One cellar of wounded in enemy hands in SCHLOSS. Fire support from own arms especially lacking. Artillery radio unserviceable through battery, also Panthers. Transmitting with last battery. Desperately need ammunition, food, batteries, flares.

From II 1100 To Regiment: Recommend Iron Cross First Class for Second Lieutenant Zeller (twice wounded) and Second Lieutenant Plonka.

To II 1103 What are hedgehog coordinates now?

From II 1130 Prepare barrages for ILONA and RITTERSPORN 2.

To II 1130 Artillery fire on ILONA. Give corrections immediately.

From II 1137 Fire barrages.

From II 1142 Fire barrages immediately.

From II 3 salvoes on RITTERSPORN 2, 100m left.

To II Where enemy attack? Give bearing.

From II Enemy attack from east.

From II 1200 Two shots were too short.

To II 1302 Please report whether codes for all radio stations in KLESSIN (apart from the valid sheets for the 23rd and 24th) have been destroyed or have fallen into enemy hands.

From II 1345 When is relief coming? Own artillery especially tired.

To II 1349 Highest Command have yet to give orders.

From II Urgent barrages on RITTERSPORN 2 and ILONA.

From II 1440 To Regiment: Enemy counterattack in northern part.

No reserves available. Cutting off hardly possible. Repeat request of this morning as last possibility. Dead and wounded mounting by the hour.

From II 1510 Direct hit on command post. Fighting to the last man.

From II 1535 Urgent barrages on MARS and RABE.

From II 1549 Barrage on MARS.

From II 1559 Mortars firing too short, up 100m.

To II 1738 The decorations and promotions are evidence to you of Highest Command’s recognition of your exemplary fight. The Division is proud of you. Langkeit, Divisional Commander.

To II How many enemy have penetrated northern and western parts?

From II I cannot encipher as I have no codes.

To II Are the codes destroyed?

From II 1759 Yes.

From II 1810 Request barrage on Schloss.

To II Are there no more codes available?

From II 1822 Correct, none.

At last at 2120 hours the message from Division was passed to Klessin by Regiment: ‘Mission accomplished; fight your way through!’

Captain Böge ordered those men immediately to hand to assemble at the potato store at the western edge of the hamlet with the intention of breaking through during the night as a compact group. As many as possible of the severely wounded were taken along to the assembly point. Meanwhile Lieutenant Schöne took a group to the east to create a diversion and, due to the heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire, contact with him and his group was soon lost.

Using the cover of the thick smoke and dust of an artillery barrage, Captain Böge’s group reached the hollow southwest of Klessin just ahead of a group of twenty to thirty Soviets and were able to use captured Panzerfausts found in the hollow to blast their way through and reach the unoccupied first and second lines of Soviet trenches. By this time the Soviet troops were fully alerted and using flares and Verey lights to illuminate the breakthrough point, which was brought under heavy machine gun fire from both north and south. But Böge’s men, using the last hand grenades and Panzerfausts stormed the third, heavily-manned Soviet trench and broke through, just 26 of them reaching the German lines.

Meanwhile Lieutenant Schöne’s group reached the potato shed and then followed the track west across the fields for about thirty minutes before they too had to storm the last of the Soviet trenches. Using the last of their strength, some 30-35 men, including some severely wounded, got through to the German lines. Several others were to slip through the Soviet lines during the course of the night and reach the neighbouring Grenadier Regiment 1241.

The Political Department of the Russian 8th Guards Army utilised the victory over Klessin to issue a special pamphlet aimed at the 1242nd with the text:

THE LESSON OF KLESSIN

SOLDIERS of the Officer Cadet Grenadier Regiment 1242! More than 300 German soldiers were surrounded in Klessin. On the 23rd March 1945 the entire garrison was destroyed. No man broke through to their own lines. 75 men raised the white flag and stayed alive. All the others died senselessly.

Who is to blame?

HITLER IS TO BLAME!

He began this senseless war. He demanded in his orders: “Hold out at any price!”

YOUR COMMANDERS ARE TO BLAME!

They did not withdraw the troops from Klessin when they should have done and then condemned them to death with lying promises. With their futile attempts at relief they sent hundreds of other soldiers to their deaths, as well as squandering many tanks and self-propelled guns.

When the war ended, just part of the front portal of the Schloss remained, together with the rusting hulks of the destroyed German and Soviet tanks. Tens of thousands of mines littered the landscape. The mines and hulks were removed and the remaining ruins collapsed. Later the hamlet was revived with the construction of a row of houses along the Wuhden road and two cottages on the old site.

In 1995 a stone was unveiled in Wuhden commemorating those who had fought and died on the Reitwein Spur, with the inscription:

He who lives in the memories of his comrades is not dead

Only those forgotten are dead

We remember our fallen comrades and all that died in the war

1945

Reitwein Spur with the villages

Podelzig, Wuhden and Klessin

1995