George F. Kennan: An American Life

“THE BLOW HAS FALLEN NOW, WITH A BANG,” GEORGE WROTE Annelise from Riga on December 29, 1933: “It is a mean one, but we’ ll make the best of it.” He had gone there to collect their possessions while Bullitt returned temporarily to the United States; but now the State Department had ordered Kennan back to Moscow to set up the new American embassy. However thrilling the previous weeks had been, this was not a task he welcomed. He would not be, as he had hoped, chargé d’affaires. The salary and benefits would be minimal, and his status would be “full of dangers and responsibilities.” Should Annelise choose to join him, she would be the only Foreign Service wife in town, and because conditions were difficult, Grace would have to stay in Kristiansand. “You’ll hate the hotel, and there won’t be much for you to do there.” He would leave it to her: “If you don’t want to do it, you don’t have to.” But “I am damned anxious to have you with me again as soon as possible. After all, darling, we are man and wife, aren’t we?”¹

The assignment had come about because Bullitt insisted on it. He wanted Kennan in Moscow until the full embassy staff arrived, supervising building activities “and other urgent matters.” The State Department questioned Kennan’s training for such duties, but Soviet officials had asked specifically for him because of his linguistic fluency. They also associated him with the first George Kennan, who had exposed the Siberian prison conditions under which some of them, as young revolutionaries, had once been held. Bullitt took the issue to Roosevelt himself: without someone like Kennan to deal with authorities at the top, the staff could arrive in February to find their accommodations half finished, creating “extreme inefficiency and possibly… endanger[ing] life.” Faced with this onslaught, the department capitulated. Kennan was “detailed for purpose outlined.”²

He arrived in Moscow on January 3, 1934, and Annelise joined him two weeks later. “There is nothing I want to do more dear,” she had replied to him. “I don’t think it will be bad…. As long as we are together I don’t care.” She found George, still a month shy of his thirtieth birthday, the sole responsible representative of the United States of America in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.³

I.

They lived, for the moment, in the National Hotel, just off Red Square. With restaurants slow and the food bad, Annelise cooked for George in their room, using a hot plate on a whiskey case behind a screen. Under construction next door was the Mokhovaya, named for the street on which it was located, the building that was to be the temporary embassy chancery. Spaso House, the American ambassador’s future residence, stood on a side street a mile west. Constructed by a wealthy merchant in 1914, it had been seized by the Soviet government, which used it for offices and apartments and was now leasing it to the Americans, along with the Mokhovaya, until a new residence and chancery could be built on a bluff in the Sparrow Hills, overlooking the city. Bullitt had proposed the location—it could be, he argued, a “Monticello in Moscow”—and Josef Stalin agreed at the end of a vodka-fueled Kremlin dinner, sealing the pledge by kissing the astonished ambassador. But the diplomatic climate soon cooled, and the compound never got built. Spaso House and the Mokhovaya were still the principal American facilities in Moscow when Kennan himself became ambassador in 1952.⁴

Kennan’s job was to negotiate the leases, oversee construction and remodeling, arrange gas and telephone service, and clear shipments of office supplies and furniture through customs so that Bullitt and his staff would have places to live and work. Helping out were a male stenographer, the State Department architect Keith Merrill, and Charles W. Thayer, a young West Point graduate who had shown up in Moscow hoping to acquire Russian and a position in the Foreign Service. Kennan hired him; Thayer found a Harley-Davidson and was soon zooming around town on official business, “the ear tabs of his Russian fur cap flapping wildly in the wind.” This bare-bones establishment operated without codes, safes, security, couriers, or even at first an office. Contrary to Bullitt’s expectations, it had no access to the highest authorities: instead it dealt with a ponderously inefficient bureaucracy, the respective parts of which usually did not connect. “Nevertheless,” Kennan recalled, “I felt that we, with our absence of bureaucracy, accomplished more in a few weeks than did the full embassy staff, when it arrived, over the first year of its existence.”⁵

“All this had to be done,” George wrote his cousin Charlie James, “in a place which has the world’s craziest financial system,” on behalf of a government—his own—“which has the world’s craziest system of expenditure control.” The State Department provided only minimal instructions, so Kennan meticulously documented every meeting, phone call, and disbursement of funds. He was attempting to master Soviet laws on insurance—such as they were—translating tortuously worded contracts, juggling the intricacies of currency exchange, assigning space in the still-uncompleted Mokhovaya, urging the eviction of Spaso’s recalcitrant tenants, even bargaining on hotel rates for the incoming staff. The manager of the National agreed with Kennan that any Western European establishment would happily give official Americans a 25 percent discount, but that was because “the capitalist world had an economic crisis and Soviet Russia did not.”

Kennan was also becoming an expert on menu planning, interior decorating, trade promotion, tourism, emigration, marriage counseling, and mortuary science. He spent hours one day trying to explain the concept of a “quick lunch” to the kitchen staff at the Savoy Hotel, where the Americans had relocated because the National would not budge on its room rates: he could provide recipes for “light, simple dishes,” to be prepared “at very low cost.” With his assistants, Kennan was measuring the rooms in Spaso House for rugs and draperies, while trying to meet the demands of Americans already in the Soviet Union who had hitherto lacked an embassy to which to turn: there were export-hungry businessmen, tourists with lost passports, requests for help with exit visas, questions about divorce proceedings, and in one instance the dilemma of whether to disinter and photograph a corpse in Chelyabinsk in order to persuade its widow in Wisconsin that it indeed had expired.

On the night before Bullitt’s return, it fell to Kennan, Thayer, and Merrill to wrestle the ambassador’s bed up the grand staircase at Spaso. They also had to tell him that, for several more months until the Mokhovaya was ready, his residence would double as the embassy chancery. Bullitt was “steaming with fury.” There were evenings, Kennan remembered, when he and the other official Americans in Moscow, “assembled in my hotel room, gloomily sipping our highballs and watching the mice play hide-and-seek along the base-boards,” were on the verge of admitting defeat, fearing that they would soon have to “give it up and sneak shame-facedly away, the laughing-stock of Europe.”⁶

“The honeymoon atmosphere had evaporated completely,” Bullitt reported to Roosevelt a few weeks after his arrival back in Moscow on March 7. The Soviets’ hostility toward all capitalist countries, muffled during the negotiations leading to recognition, was now coming out. The only way to deal with them would be to offer carrots but to make it clear that if these were refused, “they will receive the club on the behind.” The embassy staff was the only “bright spot in the murky sky…. I am delighted with every man.”⁷

They were impressive. Loy Henderson, who went with Bullitt to Moscow as second secretary, understood that he wanted “dash, brilliance, imagination and enthusiasm,” and this he got. For in addition to Kennan and Henderson, the embassy now had three other Foreign Service officers whose careers would shape Soviet-American relations well into the Cold War. One was Elbridge Durbrow, who followed Soviet economic affairs and would serve with Kennan again in Moscow during the mid-1940s. A second was Bertel E. Kuniholm, a Kelley protégé who had studied Russian in Paris, and would later report on Soviet activities in Iran. A third, Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen, also trained with Kelley, became Kennan’s closest colleague, and would succeed him as ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1953. “In numberless verbal encounters, then and over ensuing decades,” Kennan recalled, “our agreements and differences would be sternly and ruthlessly talked out, sometimes with a heat so white that casual bystanders would conclude we had broken for life.” But “no friendship has ever meant more to me than his.”⁸

Those debates started in Moscow, and Annelise witnessed them. Because of the housing shortage, Bullitt had initially prohibited wives from accompanying his staff, but she was already there and in much demand. She found the life exhilarating : “We were young, and gay; we danced all night; but we would also talk all night.” Like the other Americans, the Kennans now had a room at the Savoy, where almost everyone was cooking on the hot plates Annelise had pioneered—when the electricity worked. Telephones functioned erratically, often with only labored breathing at the other end. Owing to ill-conceived State Department economy measures, there was no embassy automobile, so Intourist provided chauffeured Lincolns at rates that Kennan believed soon would have paid for one. With taxis scarce, the only alternative was motorcycles: Annelise recalled riding to one dinner in the sidecar dressed in a long formal gown, while George, in white tie, hung on precariously behind the driver. But the other embassies threw great parties, and as Durbrow recalled decades later: “You made better and closer friends in Moscow than any post I’ve ever heard about or been in.”⁹

There were also opportunities for George—within the limits the secret police allowed—to begin to feel himself Russian. “Just to ride on a street-car, if you can understand the conversation, is an experience,” he wrote Jeanette. One Sunday in May, with summer having suddenly arrived, the Kennans and several friends picnicked as close as they could get to Stalin’s dacha. “[W]e did not see the big boy,” but skirting the walls of his estate, they found a bluff overlooking the Moscow River filled with families making themselves at home, “with all the delightful informality which is the charm of the Russian countryside.” Security men appeared, “asked where we ‘citizens’ might be from and what we were doing there, and subsided from view just as abruptly upon learning that we were not ‘citizens’ at all, but only a bunch of bourgeois from the American Embassy.”¹⁰

From such daytime excursions and late-night discussions, Kennan gained some preliminary impressions of the Soviet experiment. He expressed these most clearly in a handwritten letter, sent by diplomatic courier, for his sister’s eyes only:

“I realize,” George admitted, “that no revolution is entirely discriminate, or ever could be, but it could, at least, make its aim an intelligent discrimination.” He would prefer one that “would raise the best elements of society—and not the worst—out of the futility and tragedy which unfortunately surrounds their existence. And this is the sort of revolution which Moscow has not got to offer!”¹¹

Meanwhile Bullitt was worrying about the physical toll Moscow life was taking on his staff. There was, he advised the State Department, a form of acute indigestion, caused by the excessive use of canned food, that mimicked the symptoms of angina pectoris. One of his subordinates had already suffered such an attack. Russian cuisine was no solution, for even when “obtained at great expense in the best hotels, [it] produces digestive upsets dignified by purple blotches.” If his young men were to stay healthy, they would need more frequent leaves than the department normally provided.¹²

The afflicted staff member was Kennan, who had been on duty in Moscow longer than anyone else. Leave was accordingly granted, allowing George a few days in Leningrad for the first time, while Annelise remained behind to set up the Mokhovaya apartment, into which they were finally now able to move. Peter the Great’s capital, George wrote Jeanette, had been erected atop the poverty and suffering that Gogol, Dostoyevsky, and Chekhov had described, “like a flower on a manure-heap.” The Bolsheviks had made no effort to clean up the mess. One of the unhealthiest in the world, the city should never have been built and would perhaps one day sink back into the swamp from which Peter had raised it.

George went on from Leningrad to Norway, where Annelise was to join him. As the mail boat from Oslo approached Kristiansand, having called at each small, freshly painted town along the way, he felt the contrast between Soviet and Scandinavian life that would always move him: “It is wonderful to see the young people all out here on vacation, clean and tanned and so strong and well-built as to put our own younger generation to shame.” Soon “we will pass the island where the Sørensen family have their summer house, and some of the family will probably stand on the rocks and wave handkerchiefs and my little daughter will stare solemnly at the white boat and wonder what it’s all about…. [W]hen she finally sees me, I’m sure she’ll draw a wry face and clutch her grandmother’s skirts for protection.”¹³

II.

Kristiansand provided protection for George as well. It reunited his family: he had not seen Grace since leaving for the United States the previous September. She was, he wrote Bullitt, “so absurdly healthy” that he hated to take her away from “this paradise of cleanliness, order, and well-fed respectability.” His own health had improved: “I feel perfectly well again now.” And he had bought a seagoing sailboat. The experienced Norwegians, he added in a letter to Charlie James, had been “waiting for me to turn turtle in one of their numerous local squalls or bust up on one of their numerous local reefs.” But he had come through the first four weeks without incident: “I regard my responsibility as a matter of national prestige.”¹⁴

George would still be sailing Norwegian waters well into his eighties. In the summer of 1934, though, he was developing a higher ambition: he wanted to become a writer. The Kennan children had grown up in a house filled with books. George and Jeanette shared poems with each other and later a passion for novels. Reading good fiction, he had written her from Riga the year before, “leaves me tingling with excitement and dissatisfaction.” Lives throb with beauty and pathos, and “I am instinctively certain that if my poor intelligence was put into the world for any purpose, it was to act as a reflector and magnifier… to drag it out of the corners where it lurks and flash it to a world which sees too little of it.”

The key to the greatness of novelists, though, had always been their limitations: “They knew one thing—one country, at the most—and were saturated with it.” George envied Chekhov his ignorance of all but Russia, Hemingway his war and its relics, Sinclair Lewis his American Midwest.

He could of course write about colleagues. If Chekhov could describe Russian villagers so clearly that American readers gasped, “how perfectly true,” why couldn’t the Moscow diplomatic community be written up in the same way? But literature was also a kind of history: it portrayed “a given class at a given time, with all its problems, its suffering and its hopes.” Diplomats’ lives, he finally concluded, were “too insignificant, too accidental, to warrant description.”¹⁵

So too, in George’s opinion, was sex. He read Lady Chatterley’s Lover that summer but found it “not a very good book.” Its frankness went nowhere and proved nothing: happiness in life was not contentment in bed. Lawrence’s characters shared only a shallow and transitory compatibility. Sex, George insisted, was “not a field for introspection.” It should be “only incidental,” for people “who spend as little time contemplating its pleasures as they do worrying about its results…. [T]here are other things vastly more important.”¹⁶

Perhaps so, but what were they? There was of course the world itself. George had seen more of it than most people and since his 1924 European trip had been filling his diaries with descriptive impressions. Now he hoped to get some of them published. One such piece, “Runo—An Island Relic of Medieval Sweden,” did come out in 1935 in the Canadian Geographical Journal after having been turned down by The National Geographic Magazine: it was George’s first appearance in print.¹⁷ But travel writing was not likely to establish a reputation, or to provide an income.

Biography, however, might be an alternative. It allowed seeing beauty, pathos, class, sex, and scenes through someone else’s eyes, an attractive possibility for George, who preferred functioning, as he himself put it, “from a certain emotional distance.” That brought him back to Chekhov. Late in 1932 he sought State Department clearance to send an essay on “Anton Chekhov and the Bolsheviks” to The Yale Review. George’s mentors Robert Kelley and Joseph Green (who had moved there from Princeton) liked the article, and the chairman of the department’s publication committee allowed that “[i]f Yale can stand it, I can.” Yale could not, however, and the piece was never published.¹⁸

There was, though, another possibility: could George F. Kennan write the life of the first George Kennan? The idea originated in Moscow, where he had found a lively interest in his ancestor: even Kalinin had asked about the connection. It had been awkward, George wrote Jeanette, “having the same name and nationality and having so much the same interests, to explain that I know little more of him than the average reader of his works and have never had any association with his branch of the family.” So at some point in the spring of 1934, he asked her to see the elder George Kennan’s widow at her home in Medina, New York, and to raise the question of a biography with her.

The visit went badly. Mrs. Kennan, now eighty, remembered George’s inadequate thank-you letter, written at the age of seven after his only meeting with his famous namesake. She also resented George’s name: convinced, erroneously, that the “Frost” had been meant to honor George A. Frost, the difficult traveling companion her husband had endured in Siberia, she had, she revealed, tried unsuccessfully after young George’s birth to get it changed. “Because George Frost Kennan can speak Russian is no reason that he can do full just[ice] to a man who had spent a large part of his life stud[y]ing different races,” Mrs. Kennan wrote Jeanette. “You see, my dear, you don’t know anything of… our life, the world we knew, or our tastes, so extremely different from your father’s or any of the [other] Kennan’s.” The current George Kennan had not fitted himself to be a writer, having neither style nor originality nor personality in expression. “[H]e may get all these things later in life after more experience,” but if the first George Kennan’s life were ever to be written, it would have to be by an “experienced biographer.”

George was stung by the brush-off. “It is no fault of mine—nor is it very important—that my middle name is Frost,” he complained to Jeanette. “I can also not feel apologetic about letters I may have written as a boy. Anyone who can remember the anguish of a child who is forced to try to write letters to grown-ups whom he scarcely knows will not take too seriously the products of these unnatural efforts.” As for not understanding that branch of the Kennan family, he had, after all, managed to understand “many other sets of tastes and ideas and acquaintances.” But with Mrs. Kennan convinced “that we are a strange crowd of backwoodsmen,” and that “we would like… to ride into fame on the coattails of an illustrious cousin,” there was little point in pursuing the matter. “I should prefer to make my progress as a Russian specialist independently.”¹⁹

Whether because of this rejection or not, George admitted to Jeanette at the beginning of August that—despite his summer in Kristiansand—he had been through “a spell of the most miserable nervous depression, which almost made me physically ill.” It had to do with his career, his marriage, and reaching the age of thirty.

George had been struck to learn that Jeanette was having similar problems: “We are so alike. It’s almost embarrassing.” And it was “ridiculous” that neither of them had been able to discover what their shared symptoms meant. Perhaps “thwarted ambitions” were “only the scapegoats on[to] which our… subconscious minds divert dissatisfaction.” They probably reflected the family inheritance “of repression and sacrifice,” or perhaps “a strange, stiff, motherless childhood.”

The night before, George added, he had written in his notebook of a man sobered by scrapes with catastrophe who was willing to sacrifice much to save a little. There was humor and enjoyment in this, but no great elation: “No fantastic vistas gleam momentarily through the shifting mists.” A price had been paid for peace of mind. It brought him “courage and a concentration of strength which he lacked before. His eyes are clear and his nerves are steady.” However, “I disrigged my sailboat today and it was very sad.”²⁰

III.

Bullitt asked Kennan not to hurry back to Moscow. There was a long, hard winter ahead, and the work to be done there was less important than his health. But by the end of July George was ready to return: “I really feel that I have gotten all I can get out of my vacation here, and that to stay longer would only mean to get rusty and lazy from inactivity.” The entire family—including Grace and a Norwegian girlfriend of Annelise’s who served as a nanny—were back in Moscow by the end of August. “Kuniholm, Kennan, and Bohlen are all working admirably,” Bullitt reported to the State Department a few weeks later. “[W]e could run this Embassy with the assistance of these three boys and no superior officers whatever.”²¹

Kennan would have blanched at this after going through the previous winter, but he and his family were at least reasonably comfortable in their apartment on the fifth floor of the Mokhovaya. They shared the building with some forty other Americans who lived and worked there, mostly free of friction, with an intimacy and informality unusual in a Foreign Service post. Grace spoke a mixture of Norwegian and English that George found “fluent for this peculiarity.” She was, he wrote Jeanette, “a sweet, happy child, and a good companion” who enjoyed family activities, including “the scrubbing of my back, whenever she is allowed to.” Dividing her attention between Americans in the Mokhovaya and children in the Kremlin park, Grace “commanded communists and capitalists alike with a queenly contempt for ideological differences.”²²

Annelise had a Russian cook and maid, although it was a mystery to her how they could work so slowly. She had bought George a guitar and was herself learning Russian. “I understand a lot when I hear people speaking, even more when I read.” One book on her list was Trotsky’s autobiography: “He is a brilliant man, but also very vain.” Family finances were better than they had been for some time, with George having received a promotion and a salary increase—the apartment came free. He was even considering co-purchasing, with Annelise’s father, the island off Kristiansand where they had spent the summer: “It might provide for little Grace—as Nagawicka did for us—the symbol of a home, something which she will otherwise lack sadly as long as we continue our wandering existence.”²³

In the privacy of his diary, however, George was as gloomy as ever. He could not help but contrast the Soviet experience with “the neurotic unreality of our own.” Russians lived life “in the raw, …good and evil, drunk and sober, loving and quarreling, laughing and weeping—all that human life is and does anywhere—but all the more simple and direct and therefore stronger.” Their revolution, like nature, was lavish and careless. “Its victims are no more to it than the thousands of seeds which are cast to the wind, in order that one tree may grow.” The survivors, though, possessed a healthy, earthy vitality that attracted him despite the fact that it would quickly crush him, “as it crushes all forms of weakness.” So much for Kennan’s confidence, two years earlier in Riga, that the Soviet system carried within itself the seeds of its own self-destruction.²⁴

One visitor to Moscow that fall was George’s half-brother Kent, then twenty-one, who spent a month in Bohlen’s temporarily vacant apartment. Kent got to practice on the Spaso House grand piano while the ambassador was away. He relished seeing opera and ballet at the Bolshoi—“lavishly mounted, frequently with a good deal of gimmicky stage business like rising moons and setting suns (in which the Russian audiences seemed to take a certain naïve delight)”—and even managed to get into a performance of Dimitri Shostakovich’s controversial Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk before Stalin shut it down. Annelise found it alarming, though, that Kent was even thinner than George, and George worried about his shyness. “I see in him,” he wrote Jeanette, the “restless ghost (and a very gaunt ghost it is) of my former self.” Kent remembered the visit as an exciting experience, with George and his colleagues constantly dropping into each other’s apartments, confusing the maids and the hidden microphones with code words, expecting GPU eavesdropping—that was the current acronym for the secret police—on every telephone call.²⁵

On November 7, the seventeenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Kennans watched the six-hour military parade in Red Square from their apartment windows. The next day George and Annelise attended their first Kremlin reception, mounting a terrifyingly high straight staircase that “made us feel like ants” to enter the great ballroom where Ivan the Terrible had once received foreign emissaries. “America,” Annelise wrote, “seems far away.” Life in Moscow was getting strenuous again, George complained later that month, as much because of social obligations as office work. In a single week the Kennans went to three dinners, three parties, and an impromptu luncheon, while giving another dinner and a tea. One event, hosted by the Russians, began at eleven in the evening and lasted until three-thirty in the morning. “I sometimes have misgivings as to how long I can stand it.”²⁶

Not long at all, as it turned out. George wrote that letter on December 2, 1934. Ten days later he fell ill with severe stomach pains, together with the inability to keep food down. “Poor boy,” Annelise wrote Jeanette on the twenty-first: “He hadn’t had anything to eat for 40 hours.” As a consequence, George missed the most famous party ever held at Spaso House: the Christmas Eve celebration at which Thayer, responding to Bullitt’s instructions to “make it good,” brought in trained seals from the Moscow Circus to slither across the ballroom balancing champagne glasses on their noses. Annelise did not miss it: “I remember that very well.” But George lay in bed at the Mokhovaya, entertained only by Grace, the two of them one “in our preoccupation with the present, our indifference to past and future.”²⁷

“He looks pretty bad to me,” the embassy counselor, John C. Wiley, reported to Bullitt, who was in Washington. Soviet doctors had recommended a sanatorium in Germany or Austria. “Private means zero,” but “Kennan is a valuable asset to the Service.” Bullitt needed no prompting. “I am so fond of that boy and have such confidence in him that I hate to see him leave Moscow,” but he knew from his own experience the agonies of ulcers. Could Kennan come to Washington for free treatment at the Naval Hospital? “[T]he President’s physician… is a good friend of mine and would see to it that you had every possible care.” But George’s Foreign Service superiors decided instead to keep him in Europe, temporarily assigning him to the nearest post so that he would not have to take sick leave. They had been “magnificent,” he wrote Jeanette. “I could embrace the old State Department for that, columns, conservatism, intrigues, and all.”²⁸

As for himself, “I am not unpleased at this turn of events.” After months of feeling miserable while being told that he was suffering from an imaginary ailment, or perhaps “the lack of another drink,” convalescence would be welcome. And so one night in mid-January 1935 his friends put him on the train to Warsaw. “Many of them, I was later told, never expected to see me again.” He was still sick enough to have to be nursed through the night by the sleeping car porter—all the more so for discovering that he had failed to pack passport, visas, and other necessary papers. That required an extra day at the border and further treatment by the village doctor: the station was the one through which he and Bullitt had passed, with much greater ceremony, a little over a year before. Kennan finally made it to Vienna, where duodenal ulcers were confirmed, probably aggravated by inadequate treatment of the amoebic dysentery that had laid George low on his European trip with Nick Messolonghitis a decade earlier. He was sent off to Sanatorium Gutenbrunn, in the town of Baden on the edge of the Wienerwald and at the foot of the Alps, with firm instructions: “rest and diet.”²⁹

IV.

George knew European “cures” too well, he assured Jeanette—and, he might have added, his Thomas Mann—to see any Magic Mountain glamour in the Gutenbrunn. His treatment was “a beneficial form of torture.” Except for his doctor’s visits and the delivery of scanty meals, George was left alone and required to stay in bed, a jarring contrast to the hyperactivity of the past year. “Just think of it. Who else could contrive in these harassed days to set aside [even] one hour… to no further purpose than the contemplation of three walls, a ceiling, two cupboards, a washbowl, a mirror, a coat rack, and the fading, shifting universe of his own memory?”³⁰

The doctor was Frieda Por, a Hungarian Jew who became a lifelong friend. “Believe me,” George later recalled, “for a Jewish woman to become a staff physician in Gutenbrunn in those days—a very conservative old Austrian sanatorium with all the other doctors real Viennese—that was quite an achievement.” Her therapy was as much psychological as physical. Whether at her behest or on his own, George read Freud for the first time. “I talked with her many times about this,” the debates extending “high and wide” into the night. She defended the power of human will and the possibilities for happiness, but only, he suspected, as someone who was neither free nor happy and “dares not admit it.” He complained that “your idea of what to do with a patient who has problems like [mine] is to wrap them in soft blankets and tell them not to be ashamed of anything they ever did. That it’s all their parents’ fault.” George preferred the grimmer Puritan tradition, which was “that you jolly well bite the bullet if you have problems…. I think will power has got something to do with it.” But his diary shows him wrestling with himself:

George did acknowledge, though, at least some relationship between his stomach and his head. “I must lack independence of character,” he wrote Bullitt, “because I react so strongly to the confidence or mistrust of others.” Loy Henderson, who supervised his work in Moscow, saw a direct connection between Kennan’s ambition and his health: when things got difficult, he would get sick. Years later Kennan saw the connection as well: “I was too tense, too anxious to please my superiors and to measure up to the responsibilities I had. I noticed that when I left government, the ulcers stopped, because I was no longer responsible to anyone but myself.”³¹

For the moment, though, George was using his Gutenbrunn time for self-analysis. Physical sickness, he thought, might provide a path to spiritual recovery. But he had no normal spiritual life, only the pressures of responsibility. So “I dare not relax…. I am like a man on a bicycle: as long as I keep going, I can balance; if I stop, I fall.” What if the body could not stand it? What if there were more physical collapses, each worse than the other? There might be refuge in sleep, sport, and spartan life, but where would that leave Annelise? “Who is going to give her companionship in youth, gaiety, and human society?”

Communion with the past might be another way to heal. George’s diary from these months contains detailed accounts of being dragged in sullen stubbornness to dancing school as a child, of being lonely at St. John’s and looking forward to the liberation of holidays, of then spending them by himself at home sulking, reading “the dirty poems” in his father’s edition of Robert Burns, snatched furtively from the living room bookshelf. Perhaps he had been trying to warn the grown-ups that they were raising “an unruly, neurotic child,” who was appealing for help. George sent Jeanette a sixteen-page unfinished account of his life as a fledgling diplomat in Geneva and Hamburg, “the unhappy little adjustments of a scared young American, who cracks up now and then with a loud thud.” And he wrote elegia-cally to Cyrus Follmer about “associations of other days” in Berlin, where there were “rare friends in whose eyes and words the world and life were once so nicely mirrored.” There had been none like that in Moscow or Riga. “Never since has life glowed so richly and so deeply. It probably never will.”

Dreams became vivid enough to record, if not to analyze. The Foreign Service, irritated by George’s messy accounts, tells him it has no further need for his services. Thinking of his family, he pleads for his job, offers if necessary to become a typist, but finds that his superiors have only been giving him “a good scare.” Jews parade along the Riga Strand holding coffee cups to their mouths—but they could also be thermometers. A Doberman follows George out of a St. Petersburg restaurant where the murdered tsar lies on a bier, surrounded by his security men sitting at tables. The animal rears as if to attack, but then turns to show a sign on his back indicating that he is “an imperial watch-dog, with full official status.” George bows in acknowledgment, introducing himself formally as “Kennan, …of the American Embassy.”³²

By mid-February, Annelise and Grace had joined George in Baden. “They take too much time,” he groused to Jeanette in a letter on March 6. “Don’t idealize our marriage. It’s been near enough the rocks on more than one occasion.” But the same letter devotes four pages to a rhapsodic description of the island off Kristiansand that he and Annelise’s father hoped to buy. And when his wife and daughter left in April for a visit to Norway, George wrote wistfully, in his diary, of their departure:

“You can’t come back to[o] soon for me,” George wrote Annelise on the twentieth. A few days later he told Jeanette that “we are just sentimental enough to abandon our brave plan of staying separated until July.” The family would be back in May.³³

George was still searching out paths—however tortuous—to recovery. He must “pretend” to be interested in life and work: “It is the only way you can beat down your own ego and at the same time save your family.” Or maybe he could arrange to “be a martyr by getting well.” If someone could convince him that recovery was such a difficult and strenuous process that he should not attempt it—“if people shook their heads with disapproval and concern at every meal I ate, every hour I rested, and every pound I put on”—then he might get well right away. He was at least trying to be “vernünftig” (sensible, judicious, reasonable) about his health, he assured Bullitt: “With these words I sound exactly like my Puritan father, but I can’t help it: I am that way.”³⁴

Bullitt, in Moscow, insisted that he not rush things. “I want to have Kennan but not kill him,” he explained to the State Department. “He is the best officer I have had here.” So after being released from the sanatorium in April, Kennan was assigned light duty at the American consulate general in Vienna and later at the legation under the sympathetic supervision of the minister, George Messersmith. The idea was to see whether he could work without losing weight. There were setbacks, but Bullitt, passing through in June, was pleased to find that George had gained twenty-two pounds. “We are both homesick for Russia,” Annelise wrote Jeanette. That seemed incredible to their friends. It had been “glorified in our memory and we will be disappointed when we go back.” For the moment, though, George’s stomach still needed a holiday.³⁵

George, for his part, was learning “that you can’t change human beings radically, all of a sudden.” In a horticultural metaphor that would stick with him, he concluded that “[t]he best you can do is to influence them, like plants, over a long period of time, by gradual changes in their environment.” The State Department had allowed him time, but it would ultimately want him back, and he would need to adapt. Diplomacy in most places required

Diplomacy in Moscow was different, however, for Soviet society lacked the cynicism and listlessness found elsewhere: it “deludes itself into believing that it is going somewhere.” George hastened to assure Jeanette, quite unnecessarily, that “I am no Bolshevik.” But “some of the visions of the more intelligent communist leaders are the most impelling and inspiring human conceptions which it has been my lot to encounter—and my experience in this respect has not been small.”

Of course diplomacy required selling one’s soul “for a mess of very meretricious ministerial dignity.” But the price of souls, like everything else, was subject to the law of supply and demand: “Probably it is better to sell one’s soul… than to let it dry up in its own bitterness and get nothing for it whatsoever.” It was like hanging on too long to virginity, which “only too soon comes to be worth nothing at all.” And so in early November the Kennans were on their way back to Moscow: “I am looking forward to my return probably more than I should,” George wrote Bullitt, “more, in any case, than I can justify through any amount of rationalization—and don’t let anyone tell you I’m not.”³⁶

V.

But while Kennan was balancing the competing claims of body, mind, family, and profession in Vienna, the Soviet Union had changed. Although hardly free from difficulties, the political atmosphere throughout most of 1934, he recalled, had been “far more friendly, pleasant, and relaxed than anything Russia was to know for another two decades.” The mood disappeared overnight, with the assassination, on December 1, of the Leningrad party boss, Sergei Kirov. It remains unclear, to this day, whether Stalin ordered the murder. But he used the provocation to consolidate absolute power through a wave of arrests, imprisonments, and executions that would terrorize the country for the next five years and would haunt it long after that. It was, as Kennan saw it, “one of the major catastrophes of Russian history… the revenge of the Revolution upon itself.”³⁷

By the time the Kennans returned to Moscow in mid-November, George had to admit to Jeanette that the life to which he had looked forward was not likely to be possible. Foreign friends were leaving, and Russian friends were vanishing, “even the doctors and dentists who are bold enough to treat us.” Embassy life went on, but under the scrutiny of a staff riddled with spies. “Our position is precisely that of enemy negotiators in a hostile camp in time of war.” The Soviet government was behaving, indeed, “as if the war were already here.”³⁸

There were still opportunities to travel, but only under strict police supervision. In mid-December Kennan attempted to visit Leo Tolstoy’s country home, Yasnaya Polyana, as an ordinary tourist, without seeking special privileges. The trip was exhausting, though, and he became ill on the way: Russia was still “a bad place for weak stomachs.” The GPU, which had been tailing him, intervened sympathetically to provide an overnight hotel room in Tula, a taxi to the estate the next day, and a guided tour, leaving Kennan with a rare feeling of gratitude to his minders—but also with the inescapable sense of being minded. The place reminded him of the Frosts’ country house, near Delafield, where he used to hike from St. John’s in the winter. “There was the same smell of apples and wood fires, the same chill in the corners away from the stove, the same sense of snow-covered fields outside.”³⁹

Kennan devised a more ambitious challenge to his own stamina—and to GPU ingenuity—when he risked a journey to the Caucasus in March 1936. Official timetables promised regular air service from Moscow: “I insisted on putting it to the test and asked for a ticket.” Rather than admit that the flights did not exist, the authorities “placed a couple of ancient crates at my disposal.” One of them, assigned to fly Kennan from Kharkov to Rostov-on-the-Don, was an open monoplane. He arrived too frozen to speak, “to the consternation of a girl guide sent out to meet me, who saw her linguistic talents confronted with ignominious failure.” After thawing out, Kennan went more sensibly by train to the Black Sea, where he found tsarist hotels that were now proletarian “pig-sties,” and then to Georgia, where the air at least felt freer than in Russia. He returned by slow train from Tiflis, after which Moscow seemed “a haven of civilization, culture, and comfort.” Bullitt, who had suggested the trip, watched it carefully. His young aide arrived healthier than he had been for some time, he reported to the State Department. Perhaps there had been “no organic defect” at all, but “merely a general nervousness.”⁴⁰

Bullitt was in his final months of service in Moscow: he would spend the summer and fall working for Roosevelt’s reelection, with the understanding that the president would then appoint him to some less demanding overseas post. With help from Kennan and his colleagues, the ambassador prepared a series of valedictory reports on what two and a half years of diplomatic relations had accomplished. The record was sparse: trade remained unimpressive, negotiations on debts and claims had broken down, there had been no further progress on the new embassy chancery, and the previous summer the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had hosted a meeting of the Third International, the organization dedicated to spreading revolution throughout the world. American communists attended, a blatant violation, Bullitt believed, of Litvinov’s promise to Roosevelt, in 1933, that the Soviet Union would refrain from interfering, in any way, in the nation’s domestic affairs. “[I]t must be recognized,” the ambassador warned dramatically in what the staff referred to as his “swan song” dispatch, that “communists are agents of a foreign power whose aim is not only to destroy the institutions and liberties of our country, but also to kill millions of Americans.”⁴¹

“People have sneered at Bullitt for the enthusiasm and optimism with which he approached his task in Russia, and for the meagerness of the results obtained,” Kennan wrote in 1938. That was, he thought, not fair: “It was a gallant try, …in a profession where risks are unavoidable.” He himself, however, had never shared Bullitt’s optimism: Kelley’s training had left him without illusions as to what diplomacy could accomplish in Moscow. Kennan also knew, from Russian history, that hostility toward the outside world was not new. To make this point, he prepared a report taken wholly from the dispatches of Neill S. Brown, the U.S. minister in St. Petersburg from 1850 to 1853. They had been found, Kennan claimed, in a pile of rubbish in what was left of the American legation there. “Secrecy and mystery characterize everything,” Brown had written, of the reign of Nicholas I. “Nothing is made public that is worth knowing.” The Russian government possessed, “in an exquisite degree, the art of worrying a foreign representative without giving him even the consolation of an insult.”

Delighted, Bullitt forwarded Brown’s observations to the State Department as an accurate picture of life in the Soviet Union in 1936: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” Kennan saw in them the need to regard Bolshevism, “with all its hullabaloo about revolution,” not as a turning point in history, but as only another milepost in Russia’s “wasteful, painful progress from an obscure origin to an obscure destiny.” Nothing in Brown’s dispatches or in Kennan’s training, however, anticipated the horrors of Stalinism. If the purges continued, he concluded in another study written for Bullitt, “there would be nothing left of the Soviet system of government but rule by a small irresponsible group” whose authority rested only on “bread and circuses” and repressive police power: “in short, fascism.”⁴²

This did not mean, though, that relations with the U.S.S.R. were useless. Bullitt’s “swan song,” in which he warned of the Soviet desire to “kill millions of Americans,” concluded on a wholly different note: “We should neither expect too much, nor despair of getting anything at all.” There is no way to know who drafted which portions, but the recommendations that followed—a patient balancing of competing pressures over a long period of time with a view to producing growth in desired directions—sounded more like Kennan’s methods for achieving physical health and psychological stability than like Bullitt’s emotional volatility:

The future of Soviet-American relations would therefore depend chiefly on the United States. “[W]e should guard the reputation of Americans for businesslike efficiency, sincerity, and straightforwardness. We should never send a spy to the Soviet Union. There is no weapon so disarming and effective in relations with the communists as sheer honesty. They know very little about it.”⁴³

Whoever drafted it, the conclusions of Bullitt’s “swan song” anticipated with eerie precision the most famous essay Kennan ever published: his briefly anonymous 1947 “X” article, in Foreign Affairs, on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”⁴⁴ Bullitt, more than anyone else, launched Kennan on the trajectory that led to that achievement. He gave Kennan his first big break by asking him, on the spur of the moment, to help open the Moscow embassy. He nursed Kennan through a year-long health crisis that, without steady behind-the-scenes support, could easily have ended his career. He consistently praised Kennan’s work in reports to the State Department: Bullitt’s critical personnel assessments spared no other member of the Moscow embassy staff. “Nothing but Mr. Kennan’s health,” he concluded in the last of these, “can prevent him from becoming one of the most valuable officers in the [Foreign] Service.”⁴⁵

Kennan knew what Bullitt had done for him. His generation of Foreign Service officers, he wrote his former boss after his ambassadorship to France was announced in September 1936, had been trying to save themselves “from the comfortable philistinism or the decadent estheticism which are the refuges of most of our older colleagues.” Bullitt had understood and sympathized with these efforts. It would seem “very strange not to have your guidance in the Moscow work—especially for me, who can recall our associations in this work from the very beginning.” The Americans there would “plug along,” but “the last vestiges of the novelty of opening up a new territory are gone. Our work is routine—and no longer adventure.”⁴⁶

SHORTLY AFTER HIS DECEMBER 1935 TRIP TO TOLSTOY’S HOME AT Yasnaya Polyana—with its unexpected assistance from the GPU and its unanticipated evocations of boyhood winters in Wisconsin—Kennan asked the State Department for permission to return to the United States. He had not been there for over two years, he pointed out, and on that visit he had taken only seventeen days of leave before departing with Bullitt for Moscow. Annelise and Grace would be traveling to America in February: it would be Grace’s first trip there. Moreover, “my wife expects another child to be born in April. I should naturally like to join her soon after the child has been born.”¹

There were legal as well as sentimental reasons for the request. A new law had raised the possibility that children born abroad might be denied American citizenship if one parent lacked that status. Annelise was not yet a citizen, so there was little choice, George recalled, but for her to make the long winter voyage back before the baby arrived, after which “I had to come over and fetch them all back to Russia.” The trip would strain finances, he told Jeanette, but with luck there would be enough “to see Annelise and Grace to the United States and the next youngster into the world. Then we’ll see where we stand.”²

Joan Elisabeth Kennan was born in April at Jeanette’s home in Highland Park, Illinois, and George got there in mid-May. The expanded family vacationed for a few weeks at the Hotchkiss cottage on Pine Lake, just north of Nagawicka—the family compound there had long since been sold. George read Charles Beard’s The Open Door at Home, listened to radio coverage of the Republican national convention, and wrote a letter to Bullitt “wishing that there were another opportunity—just at this time—for one of those high and wide discussions which we have had on only too rare occasions.” What he wanted to talk about, though, was not Russia, but America.

The journey home, Kennan reported, had been a reintroduction to capitalism, of which he had seen little recently except Norway and Austria, which had been too idyllic and too depressing, respectively, to be representative. Germany, as he passed through it, had been a “great garden, well-kept and blooming, …populated by clean and healthy people.” London had been full of business activity but striking for its social stability: he had forgotten that such a thing existed. So “I got back to this country almost a complete convert to the horrors of capitalism, ready to forgive even radio advertising, …and the Saturday Evening Post.”

Once home, however, his optimism began to fade. He acknowledged the high living standard, the political liberties, the freedom of expression. But there was also chaotic municipal growth, an increasingly spoiled countryside, and an absence of public regulation, all of which left “little for the future but retrogression.”

Geography insulated the United States from the international consequences of ineffectiveness, but “no oceans can spare us the internal consequences.” Only “strong central power (far stronger than the present constitution would allow)” could rescue individuals from economic hardship and social injustice. “And I’m afraid that’s what’s coming.”³

Kennan’s letter set forth concerns about his country that would remain with him for the rest of his life: anxiety over the way unrestricted capitalism eroded community; a sense of environmental dangers that was well ahead of its time; frustration over the extent to which domestic political pressures, responding to private interests, shaped public policy; fear that this would weaken the United States in a world dominated by more purposeful states; and finally a striking lack of faith in the health and durability of democratic institutions. “I hate the rough and tumble of our political life,” George had written Jeanette the previous year. “I hate democracy; I hate the press… ; I hate the ‘peepul;’ I have become clearly un-American.”⁴

The problem, he conceded many years later, was “not just that I had left the world of my boyhood, …it was also that this world had left me.” It had of course left everyone else too, but the process had been so gradual that most Americans hadn’t noticed. Only expatriates, returning after years spent abroad, could really see what was happening. “Increasingly, now, I would not be a part of my country, although what it had once been would remain a part of me.” Allegiance would be “a loyalty despite, not a loyalty because, a loyalty of principle, not of identification.”⁵

The Kennans sailed for Europe in mid-July 1936, sharing the SS Manhattan with the “gum-chewing supermen” and “hefty amazons” who would represent the United States at the Berlin Olympics. Upon arrival in Hamburg,

George, Annelise, Grace, and Joan went by way of Kristiansand, Oslo, Copenhagen, and Helsinki to Leningrad, where the fortress of Kronstadt at the harbor entrance provided a grim welcome. Getting to the Moscow train was an ordeal, followed by terror when family, luggage, and George got separated in the midst of huge crowds. Reunited, they arrived the next morning in a rainstorm with no one to meet them, and so made their own way to the Mokhovaya, “drenched, disorganized, and entirely happy to be again among the people whose friendship and understanding still made Moscow the nearest thing in the world to home.”⁶

I.

Home, to be sure, had its problems. The Mokhovaya, constructed only of brick, wood, and plaster, was already falling apart, leaving cracks from which there emerged, according to an American inspection report, “countless moths, which feed upon the insulating material within the walls,” along with “roaches and other insects against which a constant battle must be fought.” Varying gas pressure made cooking uncertain, while electricity remained erratic. The building was poorly heated in winter, but when the weather was hot and the windows were open, layers of oil, soot, and dust blew in from the traffic on the street outside. Bathrooms doubled as laundry facilities, and servants slept in kitchens and halls. “Our friend Durby [Durbrow] had fought with our cook and fired her,” George wrote Jeanette. “We hunted for another one but couldn’t find any, and finally had to take the old bitch (she is generally referred to in this manner) back. We still have no nurse.”⁷ Nonetheless the living quarters were better than those of most other foreigners in Moscow, and the work that went on in the offices below was remarkable.

“It is not an exaggeration to say,” Kennan noted with pride the following year, “that by the beginning of 1937 the American Embassy at Moscow, which had started from scratch three years before, had become one of the two or three best-conducted and best-informed missions in the city.” He and four other Foreign Service officers sent the State Department 329 dispatches of an “original informative or reportorial” character in 1936, comprising 3,857 pages. Topics ranged from Soviet relations with the United States and other countries through the operations of the Communist International, Stalin’s first purge trials, the successes and shortcomings of the Soviet economy, the new draft constitution, and the activities of Americans living in the U.S.S.R. There were also reports on slum clearance, fish exports, fur auctions, sausage casings, and the All-Union Conference of Engineers’ Wives. At the department’s request, Kennan himself produced a 115-page analysis of Russian documents relating to the purchase of Alaska in 1867.

The embassy library received over a hundred Soviet and foreign newspapers daily, subscribed to between 350 and 400 periodicals, and maintained a collection of over a thousand books while forwarding additional copies to the legation in Riga and to the Division of Eastern European Affairs library in Washington. However moth-ridden and roach-infested it may have been, the Mokhovaya was now a major research center on Soviet affairs—so much so that department officials were beginning to grumble about the number of dispatches they were receiving, some of which seemed “unnecessarily voluminous.”⁸

The work was “very hard, very delicate, and quite thankless,” George wrote. “We don’t try to see anything of the Russians any more, except for a few official parties. It’s too risky for them.” The isolation of foreigners had never been greater, and the group that remained got smaller, more ingrown, and increasingly bored with each other. Social life within the embassy was, if anything, more intense. “Have been out every single night [except] last night,” Annelise added on January 2—George was back in Vienna for a medical checkup.

It helped that there was now, for recreation, an American dacha outside Moscow, which several of the embassy bachelors had purchased. Not far from Stalin’s own country retreat, it had a log house, a tennis court, a garden, horses to ride, and a high wooden fence. There was something very comforting, Charlie Thayer remembered, “about driving through those big wooden gates after a long hard day trying to understand the Russians…. [T]he GPU seemed to disappear from existence.”⁹

The Kennans used the place regularly. “We had the feeling we could go out at any time,” Annelise remembered. Surrounding the dacha, George explained, was “the most wonderful riding country you can imagine. We make a point of saying good-day to all the peasants. They look as though they were seeing a ghost, and grope uncertainly for their hats. They think maybe the Revolution was all a bad dream, and that the masters are back in the saddle.” On one memorable occasion, George, Grace, and Stalin drove back from their respective dachas on the same road at the same time. As his limousine passed, the dictator “stared gloomily out of his window at Grace and myself and we stared back.”¹⁰

Still, Moscow was a difficult place to raise children. When Grace fell ill with bronchial pneumonia, no nurse dared enter a foreign embassy. A Russian doctor did come, but only after receiving permission from the Foreign Office, which also had to approve the use of a portable X-ray machine. “For one whole day,” George admitted, “I literally didn’t dare to hope that she would live.” He worried that “we wouldn’t even be able to find a priest to bury the little girl.” Grace recovered dramatically, however, and was soon sitting up and pestering everyone, being as naughty as one can be with “feet firmly on this earth.”

“I feel that I am ripe for a transfer,” Kennan confessed wearily at the end of this December 1936 letter to Jeanette. For in addition to the hardships of life in Moscow, he and his colleagues were developing “a doctrinaire skepticism which cannot be a good thing. We know so thoroughly the limitations of our job that it seems hard to see its possibilities…. [W]e have the psychology of old men.” The time had come to turn things over to people “whose experience is less and whose enthusiasm is greater. It will do us all good.”¹¹

II.

That opportunity came quickly enough. Bullitt’s successor, Joseph E. Davies, arrived on January 19, 1937, with ample enthusiasm but no experience whatever. He was, like Bullitt, a friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but there the similarities ended. A lawyer, campaign contributor, and the new (but third) husband of Marjorie Merriweather Post, one of the richest women in the world, Davies was in every sense a political appointee. He was sleek, self-confident, hungry for publicity, and proud of not being a diplomat. He knew nothing of the Soviet Union but was sure that powerful men were the same everywhere and that he could, through the force of his own personality, get through to its leaders. All of this placed Davies at odds with the disillusioned Bullitt and the staff he had left behind. Davies “drew from the first instant our distrust and dislike,” Kennan recalled. “We doubted his seriousness…. We saw every evidence that his motives in accepting the post were personal and political and ulterior to any sense of the solemnity of the task itself.” At the end of the new ambassador’s first day in Moscow, Kennan and several other young career officers gathered in Henderson’s rooms to consider “whether we should resign in a body from the service.”¹²

They did not, but the State Department was sufficiently concerned that it sent one of its most trusted investigators, J. Klahr Huddle, to assess the situation. “It is difficult to express just what happened to the staff of the Moscow Embassy when Mr. Davies arrived,” Huddle reported back. One problem had been the difficulties of importing into the country all that the Davieses had wanted to bring. This included an entourage of sixteen aides, servants, and relatives, as well as a phalanx of freezers filled with the food they would consume while in residence at Spaso House. They demanded transportation on private trains—a concept unfamiliar to the Soviet railway authorities—together with Leningrad docking facilities for Mrs. Davies’s yacht, the Sea Cloud. The ambassador showed up at his Mokhovaya office only twice before returning to the United States in March, but he left behind three thousand envelopes to be stamped, sealed, and mailed: these contained fund-raising appeals for the Mount Vernon Girls School in Washington, of which Mrs. Davies was a trustee.

A man of broad knowledge in many fields, Davies was reluctant to acknowledge, Huddle noted, “his lack in the present one.” Soon after arriving he asked Henderson to produce, on two days’ notice, briefings on all the other European states, specifying their leadership, population, culture, religion, economy, alliances, and the status of their relations with the U.S.S.R. He quickly developed a dislike for Kennan, Huddle reported, which was unfortunate, “because Kennan prides himself on his knowledge of Russia, is very sensitive, and does his best work with a little encouragement and praise.” Overall, Huddle concluded, the ambassador in his first two months at Moscow had “very seriously” imperiled the morale of the embassy staff, and “when I arrived, [it] was almost at the breaking point.”¹³

George confirmed this to Jeanette: it would be some time before the effect wore off, and “I can take my profession seriously again. If I had had a little money, you would probably already have seen me trooping back to Wisconsin to start life over again.” Annelise added that the Davieses “are just awful…. I am trying to calm [George] down as best I can and just laugh it all off,” but “[i]t is worse than I ever could dream it to be.” The problem, Kennan later explained, was that men like Davies required underlings “to cover up their mistakes, to toss them meaningless baubles to keep them occupied, [and] to go on doing the important things under the surface.” By March, the staff could at least look forward to the temporary departure of the “Davies ménage,” at which point, Kennan predicted, “the sun will begin to shine, the flowers to peep through the ground, and the little birdies will arrive from the South and tell us what a nice world it is after all.”¹⁴

The second of Stalin’s purges was going on that winter, which made the atmosphere all the more oppressive. “[E]verybody was so scared,” Annelise remembered. Davies gave a dinner for thirty-six people, of whom six were soon executed, “including the man who sat next to me.” The ambassador insisted on attending the trials, but before doing so asked Kennan to

He then brought a furious Kennan along to whisper translations of the proceedings: “During the intermissions I was sent, regularly, to fetch the ambassador his sandwiches, while he exchanged sententious judgments with the gentlemen of the press concerning the guilt of the victims.”

Davies assured the State Department that the trial had established “a definite political conspiracy to overthrow the present Government.” He was careful to point out, though, that the trials had not been fair by American standards, because the accused had been denied counsel, were forced to testify against themselves, and their guilt had been assumed from the start. He also saw to it that the department got another perspective. Noting that “Mr. Kennan has been here a great many years and is an exceptionally able man, thoroughly familiar with Russia,” Davies took the unusual step of forwarding his interpreter’s assessment of the trials, along with his own.

They were not that far apart. Kennan’s report emphasized the ease with which confessions could be coerced but acknowledged that the defendants had “probably done plenty, from the point of view of the regime, to warrant their humiliation and punishment.” What really happened might never be known: “[t]he Russian mind, as Dostoevski has shown, …sometimes carries both truth and falsehood to such infinite extremes that they eventually meet in space, like parallel lines, and it is no longer possible to distinguish between them.” In a significant acknowledgment of Kennan’s expertise, Robert Kelley, now the director of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, sent both reports to the secretary of state, Cordell Hull: they represented, he observed neutrally, “two points of view based on different methods of approach,” differing “only in degree” in their conclusions.¹⁵

Embassy security was another of Kennan’s concerns. While the Davieses were back in the United States, Thayer discovered a crude listening device—lowered on a fishpole in the Spaso House attic—in the wall behind the ambassador’s desk. Intrigued, the staff tried to catch the culprit, a project that required the rigging of trip wires, alarm bells, and in one instance Kennan’s spending an uncomfortable night in the billiard room with a nonfunctioning flashlight and an empty revolver. The results, in the end, were inconclusive. Davies was “displeased that we had ever inaugurated them,” fearing that they would compromise his public image of popularity with the Soviet leadership. It hardly mattered, for the ambassador “was not in the habit of saying things of any consequence, either in the bugged study or anywhere else.”¹⁶

“[Q]uite frankly I think that [Kennan] has been here quite long enough—perhaps too long for his own good,” Davies had by then written the State Department. “He is of a rather high-gear, nervous type” and had been ill “ever since I have been here.” Given his health along with the difficulties of raising a young family in Moscow, it would be good for all concerned if Kennan could be transferred to a post where living conditions were easier. The loss to the embassy would be serious, but it was “not fair to Kennan not to give him a chance to get well.”¹⁷

Kennan, for his part, was ready to go: as his comments about the “psychology of old men” suggest, he had been ready even before the Davies “ménage” appeared on the scene. “This has been, for me, the most unhappy winter on record,” he wrote Jeanette at the end of March from Yalta, where he had taken a few days off to visit Chekhov’s last home. But winter was coming to an end, “and with it, I hope, will end my sojourn in Russia. Life has its ups as well as its down[s], and we’ll see what a new post, a new chief and new surroundings will bring.”¹⁸

He was not displeased, therefore, when the State Department informed him in June that he would be reassigned to the American consulate in Jerusalem: “I sent to London for a bunch of books on the Palestine Mandate and prepared to forget, for a time, that Russia had ever existed.” But Kennan was horrified to learn, almost simultaneously, that the department had eliminated the Division of Eastern European Affairs, his administrative and intellectual home in Washington. Kelley, its chief, was as surprised as everyone else, and the library he had assembled was broken up—although not before Bohlen had rescued several hundred of its most valuable books and hidden them in an attic. “I was shocked,” Bullitt wrote R. Walton Moore, the State Department counselor. “[T]he division which Kelley built up was the most efficient in the world in its handling of these highly complicated questions.”¹⁹

The official explanation was efficiency. Eastern European Affairs was to be merged, along with its Western European counterpart, into a single Division of European Affairs. Moore confirmed rumors, however, that the White House had ordered the change: someone had persuaded the president, perhaps unwisely. Just who was unclear. Kennan suggested long afterward that if there ever had been “the smell of Soviet influence” within the government, this moment was more plausible than any that Senator Joseph McCarthy’s followers had identified. There is no conclusive evidence for this allegation, but it is reasonable to assume, from the fact of Davies’s appointment, that Roosevelt wanted a new approach to Moscow. It’s certainly possible, then, that the new ambassador had at least some role in shaping this new arrangement.²⁰

However it happened, Kennan saw that Soviet-American relations were henceforth to have “the outward appearance of being cordial, no matter what gnashing of teeth might go on under the surface…. [N]ot only were we career officers in Moscow an impediment, but so was the Division of Eastern European Affairs.” The president, it appeared, knew nothing about, or cared nothing for, what they had accomplished. “We could never forgive F.D.R. that he had done this to us.” And so “I could only conclude that my approach to Russia had outlived its usefulness.”²¹

III.

“At first I thought it was awful,” Annelise wrote Jeanette of the Jerusalem assignment, but she soon changed her mind. At least the climate would be warmer, the roads would be better, and there would be the chance to study biblical history. George had even begun learning “the Yiddish language.” Kennan’s transformation into a Middle East expert was not to be, however, for on August 13, 1937, while on leave in Paris, he received an unexpected cable signed by the secretary of state himself: “Your work in Moscow has been so useful in character that Department is considering advisability of assigning you to the European Division to deal with Soviet affairs. While your personal preference may not be controlling, it would be gratifying to know before the assignment is actually made that it would be agreeable to you.”²²

Kennan’s superiors, former and current, had quietly arranged this. Bullitt had insisted, after learning that Eastern European Affairs was to be abolished, on the need to strengthen Soviet analysis in Washington: Davies “cannot be counted on to handle the Russian situation in a serious manner.” Henderson, from Moscow, strongly seconded the idea and suggested Kennan. It would be a waste to send him to Jerusalem: “George has developed a lot during the last two years.” Meanwhile Messersmith, Kennan’s chief during his Vienna recuperation, had conveniently become assistant secretary of state for administration and could oversee the change in plans. Finances would still be tight, and his rank would still be unimpressive, George wrote Jeanette, but “some of my best friends” had come out on top in the “palace revolution.” So he replied to Hull that an assignment in Washington would indeed be agreeable.²³

After a quick trip to the Riviera to see Kent, who was studying there, the Kennans picked up their children in Kristiansand, and by early October George was back in the city he had left, with bitter disillusionment, a decade earlier. His diary recorded a mixture of moods:

Washington reeked of cigar smoke and automobile exhaust, rang with shrill voices and the slapping of backs, and it seemed that “[n]obody stayed there very long.”²⁴ Still, there were compensations.

Despite their limited budget, the Kennans managed to rent a comfortable eighteenth-century house in Alexandria: largely unfurnished except for its own roaches, it was a step up, nonetheless, from the Mokhovaya. Thayer’s wealthy relatives gave George and Annelise a “horsey” fall weekend outside Philadelphia, and they even attended a Christmas reception at the White House: “Very dull, of course,” Annelise reported, “but it was fun to see the place, its occupants and the other guests.” It had been, George acknowledged, a happy time.

Two months later George got a promotion that raised his salary to $5,000. This was not much, he explained, but “[o]nly one man who entered the service when I did has gotten as high, so there’s a certain amount of satisfaction involved.”²⁵

George had arrived in time to help Bohlen, who would replace him in Moscow, retrieve the hidden books from Kelley’s library and place them in the State Department office he would now occupy. It was, in effect, the “Russia desk” in the newly constituted Division of European Affairs, and Kennan was the resident specialist on that country. Relishing the old building’s “solid cool corridors, its unruffled placidity, …its distinct distaste for anything which smacks of exaggeration, haste, or excitement,” Kennan used his position to try to balance Davies’s reports—still misleadingly optimistic, he thought—on what the life in the Soviet Union was really like.

The authorities, he emphasized, had restricted the activities of foreign diplomats, with the expectation that, “like well-trained children,” they should be “seen and not heard.” Officials once friendly to the embassy had disappeared in circumstances suggesting “exile, imprisonment, or disgrace, if not execution.” Soviet citizens entering the United States should be watched with a view to determining “where they were and what they were doing.” Kennan tried to explain to a puzzled Secretary of State Hull—it was the only meeting they ever had—why Russian communists were arresting American communists who happened to be in the Soviet Union. He prepared a brief report on Comintern activities, spent a fair amount of time on Soviet-American trade, and devoted very little to explaining why the moment was not right to seek Moscow’s cooperation in demarcating the Alaskan boundary in the Bering Sea.²⁶

The spring of 1938 brought Kennan two professional recognitions, only one of which he knew about. The latter was an invitation to lecture at the Foreign Service School, where he had been a student twelve years before. He spoke on “Russia,” quoting Neill Brown’s dispatches from the 1850s to show how little had changed since tsarist times. He found it “almost impossible to conceive of our being Russia’s enemy,” but “I cannot see that the possibility of our being Russia’s ally is much greater.” The United States must simply show patience: in a close paraphrase of Bullitt’s 1936 “swan song,” Kennan insisted that “[w]e must neither expect too much nor despair of getting anything at all.”²⁷

The recognition of which Kennan was unaware came by way of espionage. On April 22 he drafted an internal memorandum, not meant for circulation beyond the State Department, questioning Davies’s optimism about the future of Soviet-American relations. “According to the theories on which the Soviet state is founded,” Kennan pointed out, “the entire outside world is hostile and no foreigner should ever be trusted.” Davies’s dispatch found its way into the official compilation of documents on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union for this period, published in 1952. Kennan’s commentary did not. But thanks to the enterprise of Aleksandr Troyanovsky, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, both documents wound up, in the summer of 1938, on the desk of Josef Stalin.

Troyanovsky had got them “by conspiratorial means,” he explained, and “absolutely no one” in the Washington embassy or at the Soviet Foreign Ministry knew that he had done so. Davies, “a typical bourgeois,” had both positive and negative things to say about the Soviet Union, but he had to contend with hostility in the State Department, led chiefly by Kennan. He “speaks Russian well and is a nephew [sic] of the celebrated George Kennan, who in the 1880s [sic] wrote the well-known book, ‘Siberia and Hard Labor,’ which we all read at one time or another.” Kennan’s attacks on Davies showed that he was “trying to turn Roosevelt personally against us,” but despite these efforts the president and Secretary of State Hull “have not lost their equilibrium and in general take a comparatively acceptable position toward us.”²⁸

The security breach would have appalled Kennan, had he known of it, but the notoriety might have pleased him: Stalin personally underlined the most significant sections of Troyanovsky’s report. Kennan could not have disputed the Soviet ambassador’s assessment of his intentions, or his lack of success, for the moment, in seeing them realized. Stalin, no doubt, filed the information in his capacious memory, for future use.

IV.

There were also, that spring, two quietly personal gratifications. After Hitler annexed Austria in March, George helped his Jewish “Frau Doktor,” Frieda Por, emigrate to the United States. “That saves my life,” she wrote in an unpublished memoir she prepared four decades later. “It is almost unbelievable that you are now in America,” Annelise wrote Frieda after George met her in New York. “I only hope that you will like it and that you will be able to work as you wish.” And then on June 13, 1938, in Milwaukee, Annelise herself became an American citizen.²⁹

She and the children were spending the summer at Pine Lake, leaving a self-pitying George in Washington, bereft of family, car, or money, busing home each night along an avenue of filling stations, advertising signboards, hot-dog stands, junked automobiles, and trailer camps, to dine on a bowl of cereal and then to sit for an hour or so on the front steps. So it was a relief for him to get to Wisconsin in June. While there, he rented a bicycle for a few days with a view to discovering whether there was still a house at the end of some country road where “human warmth and simplicity and graciousness defied the encroachments of a diseased world.”³⁰

He found the highways deserted, except for the people traveling them encased in metal machines: in a hundred miles he met no other cyclist, pedestrian, or horse-drawn vehicle. The drivers and their passengers had no more of a link with the landscape than if they had been on an airplane flying over it. They were “lost spirits,” for whom “space existed only in time.” The roads were a far cry from “the vigorous life of the English highway of Chaucer’s day.” But there were inns and taverns along his route, with helpful people willing to provide directions.

As a consequence, George was able to find the farm, near Packwaukee, that his grandfather had once owned and where his father had grown up. The old house was gone, but there was a new farmer with a house of his own who insisted, despite George’s unexpected arrival, that he stay the night. This he did, washing up in the kitchen, eating with the family and the farmhands, occupying the guest bedroom, and rising early the next morning for a breakfast as hearty as the supper had been. The farm, unlike the highway, was a community, with the only intimation that it might not survive coming in the arrival of a college-educated daughter, “smart, well-dressed, confident, blooming with health and energy, …a breath of air from another world.” It seemed unlikely that she would wind up on the farm: the city, “at once so menacing and so promising,” had claimed her for its own.

George saw the future himself when he spent the next night in a college town where the streets were empty except for automobiles, each containing a couple or two “bent on pleasure—usually vicarious pleasure—in the form of a movie or a dance or a petting party.” Anyone unlucky enough not to be among these “private, mathematically correct companies” would be alone. “There was no place where strangers would come together freely—as in a Bavarian beer hall or a Russian amusement park—for the mere purpose of being together and enjoying new acquaintances. Even the saloons were nearly empty.”

All of this convinced George that the technology industrialization had made possible—automobiles, movies, radio, mass-circulation magazines, the advertising that paid for them—was creating an exaggerated desire for privacy. It was making an English upper-class evil a vice of American society. This was

Americans had in the past, to be sure, subordinated personal interests to collective needs in the face of floods, hurricanes, or great wars. Perhaps some new cataclysm would force them to do so again. Kennan looked forward to it much as Chekhov, in the 1890s, had anticipated the “cruel and mighty storm which is advancing upon us, which… will soon blow all the laziness, the indifference, the prejudice against work and the rotten boredom out of our society.” Whatever might be sacrificed in years to come, Kennan concluded, “the spirit of fellowship, having reached its lowest conceivable ebb, could not fail to be the gainer.”³¹

The bicycle trip and the essay it inspired amplified the anxieties about America that he had raised with Bullitt two summers before, but they added the idea that challenges—cataclysms of some kind—could be a good thing. This idea too would stick in Kennan’s mind, reappearing, nine years later, in the carefully read pages of Foreign Affairs:

As with Kennan’s 1932 vision of the Soviet Union’s decline and fall, concerns about himself and his country had produced a grand strategic insight—with help, this time, from Chekhov. But what if the United States, in the face of great challenges, could not pull itself together? What if its internal institutions were not up to the task?

V.

Kennan suggested, in his 1936 letter to Bullitt, that a new form of government might be necessary, capable of wielding “strong central power (far stronger than the present constitution would allow).” At some point in 1938—it is not clear when—he began developing his ideas on this subject, apparently with the intention of producing a short book. He never finished the project, but the surviving drafts, entitled “The Prerequisites” and “Government,” suggest the direction of his thinking.

The problems confronting the United States, Kennan believed, resulted from the fact that its constitution was a century and a half old. It worked well enough for its time but had now come up against uncontrolled industrialization, a malfunctioning economy, a declining agricultural population, and ugly problems of urbanization. The American people, hence, no longer had “its old fiber or its old ideals.” Instead it was afflicted by crime and corruption, along with the antagonisms of class and race. Some saw government as having created these problems; others believed that only government could solve them. But both groups accepted democracy, abhorring “fascism” or “dictatorship.” Both were wrong, Kennan insisted: the only solution lay along a path that few Americans were willing to contemplate, extending “through constitutional change to the authoritarian state.”

There were, after all, no absolute democracies or dictatorships. Democracies taxed their citizens, allowed the police to use force, and tolerated unemployment: surely a government in the hands of political machines and lobbyists was not really majority rule. Dictatorships could not operate without the cooperation of those who administered them and without the acquiescence of those subject to them: why did dictators go to such lengths to shape public opinion through propaganda? If truly “absolute,” they would have no need of it. And then there were regimes, like those in China, Japan, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, which were neither democracies nor dictatorships but fell somewhere in between. Both terms, then, were vague clichés: it was time to drop “the angel of democracy” as well as “the bogey-man of dictatorship.”

The task of government was to provide its people with adequate living standards, to ensure their humane behavior toward one another, and to give them a sense of contributing toward the general improvement of their society. Beyond that, objectives need not be specified: “We leave to the communists the detailed description of distant millenniums.” But what kind of government—if neither democracy nor dictatorship as generally understood—could best achieve these objectives?

Only one entrusted, Kennan was sure, to the right kind of people. They would have to be, of course, a minority, but not the conglomerate of professional politicians and powerful special interests that currently controlled the country. Leaders instead should be selected “from all sections and classes of the population… on the basis of individual fitness for the exercise of authority.” Fitness would reflect “character, education and inclination,” but because not everyone could be trusted to recognize it, there would have to be “a very extensive restriction of the suffrage in national affairs.”

Three groups in particular would lose the right to vote. The first were “aliens” and “naturalized citizens,” whose political influence, exercised through ethnic groups and the bosses that dominated them, had become disproportionate. They would be happier as the wards of a government they could respect than as “fodder for the rent-sharks, ward-heelers and confidence men of the big cities.” The second was nonprofessional women, who were turning the country into a matriarchy through their domination of families, the economy, and national culture. They had failed to live up to the responsibilities their power entailed, placing it, rather, in the hands of “lobbyists, charlatans and racketeers,” while themselves becoming “delicate, high-strung, unsatisfied, flat-chested and flat-voiced.” Finally, there were “negroes,” for whom seventy years of the “nominal” right to vote had provided no benefits: their condition was “the outstanding disgrace of American public life.” Removing the franchise from them would induce a greater responsibility for them on the part of the white population, because “we are kinder to those who, like our children, are openly dependent on our kindness than to those who are nominally able to look after themselves.”

With these restrictions, political power would gravitate to people with the qualifications to exercise it “intelligently and usefully.” Their leaders would organize themselves independently of all political parties or vested interests. They would be “profoundly indifferent to the size of [their] popular backing and unhampered by the necessity of seeking votes.” They would thereby command the confidence of their followers. And they would train their successors, by recruiting young people willing “to abandon the attractions of private life, the prospect of making money and of keeping up with the Joneses,” in order to subject themselves to the discipline that would be required of them “if they entered a religious order.”

Kennan’s elite would have no need to seize power, for “[i]f the present degeneration of American political life continues, it is more probable that power will eventually drop like a ripe apple into the hands of any organized minority which knows what it wants and which has the courage to accept responsibility.” He was not trying to create such a leadership vacuum, for it was already on the way. He was only trying to anticipate it, with a view to ensuring that “there should be at least one competitor with a sense of decency and responsibility.”³³

VI.

Left incomplete, filed, and apparently forgotten, Kennan’s essay resurfaced and became famous, after he opened his papers for research in the 1970s, as an egregious example of political incorrectness. Embarrassed, he withdrew it from further scrutiny, explaining to the historian who most carefully analyzed the draft that it stood in relation to his later thinking as “an esquisse does to an artist’s final painting. It was to be modified, polished, pushed in other directions.” More privately, he complained that he had never meant what he had written for publication. “They were scraps of diary material. I could just as well—if you asked me to write in the diary the next day—have written contrary to that.” It was inappropriate to excavate this “stuff ” as evidence “of my mature thinking and compare it with things that I wrote in later years.”³⁴

In one way, this makes sense. The essay abounds in gaffes that, one hopes, would never have made their way into print. Aliens could not have been denied the vote, because they had never been granted it. Fears of “flat-chested” women colluding with “racketeers” were, to say the least, bizarre. Insisting that African Americans would be better off deprived of even “nominal” voting rights brought Kennan perilously close to paternalist arguments advanced, before the Civil War, to defend slavery. It was not clear how narrowing representation would produce a government selected “from all sections and classes of the population.” Nor were young people likely to prepare for leadership by becoming—even if temporarily—monks. “Buried in the papers of even the most enlightened men are, no doubt, some rather wild notions,” two other historians who saw this 1938 essay commented, with philosophical resignation.³⁵

But these were not, as Kennan claimed, just diary scraps. They were the beginnings of a book, and although he took it no further at this point, some of his arguments would show up again, softened, in later writings.³⁶ They also reflect, at this relatively early stage in Kennan’s career, one of his most persistent paradoxes: that he understood the Soviet Union far better than he did the United States.

Kennan’s analyses of the U.S.S.R. were as sophisticated as anything available at the time. By the end of his first decade in the Foreign Service, he was explaining Russian society far better than Russians were doing for themselves. He had proven himself a worthy successor to the first George Kennan, a point not lost on Soviet officialdom at the highest level. And yet the second Kennan’s writing about the United States showed no sophistication at all. He portrayed an America devoid of leadership, riddled with corruption, engulfed in pollution, beset with boredom, and pervaded by such loneliness that the entire country seemed populated by refugees from Edward Hopper paintings. It was as if the New Deal had never happened.

In an unpublished memoir also composed in 1938, Kennan made a point of describing how a committee of experts under Austria’s chancellor Kurt Schusch-nigg had revised that country’s social insurance system three years earlier: the government had been authoritarian, yet it had shown that an “intelligent, determined ruling minority” could act more responsibly than most democracies. Had Nazi Germany not taken over Austria, the scheme would have been “a model of foresight and thoroughness.” But in 1935, the same year that Schuschnigg’s experts submitted their recommendations, the Roosevelt administration established from scratch, through constitutional processes, a social security system far more robust than its Austrian counterpart. Kennan seems not to have noticed this, or the more general fact that an American democratic revolution was taking place in the 1930s that would, for all its shortcomings, shape world history at least as decisively as what was happening in the authoritarian states of Europe.³⁷

To be sure, the Department of State did not expect Kennan to write professionally about the United States. His “reporting” on America was to himself and—occasionally in a sanitized form—to Jeanette and Bill Bullitt. He was free to indulge in impressions, omissions, even inconsistencies. But the same was true of his letters and diary entries about the Soviet Union, which also were not meant for publication. It’s clear from reading these that Kennan knew what he was writing about. It’s clear from reading his writings on the United States that he did not.

One explanation is that he had not lived there for more than a few months since being sent to Geneva in 1927. He had never traveled as extensively in the United States as he had in Europe. He had read more American literature than American history, and he appears to have had no interest at all in American politics. He viewed the country through a series of snapshots that were, to him, extraordinarily vivid; but they focused on small scenes at particular moments. They offered little sense of the country as a whole, or of its evolution through time. They provided a poor basis for grandiloquent generalizations about where the United States had been and where it was going.

Another difficulty was that Kennan romanticized what he did know. He could remember an America in which travel was by train and boat, automobiles were a novelty, not a curse, and country roads were elongated communities, like Chaucer’s highways. Something of value had indeed been lost. But that same America had lacked antibiotics: hence his mother’s death from a ruptured appendix, and his own near-death from scarlet fever. It was as if Kennan filtered his past through a gauzy screen, blurring or even eliminating the bad parts, while exaggerating those he saw in the present.

That led him, in turn, to turn personal grievances into national problems. He blamed capitalism for having left him on the verge of poverty in 1932, but he was hardly alone in this and as a result the domestic political system had brought about reforms. But it had also brought Joe Davies to Moscow in 1937, so there was little to be said for it: “Was the Foreign Service really supposed… to place itself at the disposal of each successive administration as a nurse-maid to its patronage creditors? If so, we were really nothing but high-paid flunkeys.”³⁸ Kennan’s view of the United States lacked a sense of proportion: displacement failed to produce the detachment that characterized the perspectives of foreign interpreters like Alexis de Tocqueville, James Bryce, and Alistair Cooke.

The problem, fundamentally, was patriotism. “I wonder whether anyone who has not lived abroad can understand the hypersensitiveness which expatriate Americans can develop toward their own country,” Kennan wrote in another unpublished memoir composed in the early 1940s. Their information was necessarily based more on past memories than on present knowledge, yet faith in the United States was a spiritual necessity. “Were it to be otherwise—were it not to be possible to rely on the basic worthiness, the decency, the justice and the soundness of one’s own country—then the Foreign Service officer would indeed be a lost soul.” So Kennan came back to America “glowing inwardly at everything which… is sound and right and refreshing, and wincing at everything which offends a taste rendered more discriminate than the average by its ability to draw comparisons.” His sensitivity was that of a musical instrument, vibrating to the “most minute phenomena,” for “[t]hat which he represented having been judged for years by him, he can now do no other than to judge himself by that which he represents.”³⁹

“I think it’s so extraordinary,” Chip Bohlen later recalled. “He really sees things in a somber light, particularly as far as the United States is concerned.” And yet “I don’t mean for one minute the slightest suggestion that he wasn’t a patriotic government servant. Indeed he was.” Kennan viewed himself as so American that he had trouble distinguishing his own character from that of his country: he had always found it difficult, Bohlen remembered, to “divorce his visceral feelings from his knowledge of facts.”⁴⁰ Because he was by nature a pessimist, he took a pessimistic view of the United States. Whatever inward glow he may have felt appeared rarely in what he wrote, but the winces—and worse—were always there. Faith in America left him doubting democracy: an American-bred authoritarianism, hence, was the only alternative.

Wisconsin was an exception. Despite the loneliness of its highways and the bleakness of its small-town life, it was, Kennan believed, a “compact commonwealth” with an admirable balance between industry and agriculture, a sturdy population, and a tradition of humaneness and good nature. Could it not become, like some of the small neutral countries of Europe, a refuge for decency and common sense? But this too was personalizing the country: Wisconsin was home and therefore his own refuge. It was a place where he could “conceivably be content,” confident that he was doing something worthwhile. Salvation lay in smallness, whether of government, avocation, or aspiration.

The time for that, however, had not yet come. Kennan was “much too broke and in debt” to contemplate retirement from the Foreign Service. Moreover, Europe was heating up, what with Hitler’s annexation of Austria in March and his demands for Czechoslovakia’s German-speaking Sudetenland: “I did not want to miss the climax.” So Kennan made his plea to his friends in the State Department, and they responded, in August, with instructions to depart as soon as possible for Prague.⁴¹ It would be, also, a “compact commonwealth,” but one surrounded, unlike Wisconsin, by Nazi German authoritarianism.

“ALL IN ALL, I THINK IT IS AN EXCELLENT SOLUTION,” KENNAN wrote Bullitt in August 1938. The assignment to Prague was “eminently satisfactory.” He would be the only secretary in the American legation. He knew German, “and I find that I can read Bohemian with little difficulty, after the effort I’ve put in on Russian.” His time in Vienna had given him an interest in Central Europe. The only disappointment was that “I cannot have another chance to work with you.”¹

The timing could hardly have been better—or worse. On September 12 Hitler threatened military action against Czechoslovakia if it did not give up the Sudetenland. The resulting war scare led British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, on the fourteenth, to request a meeting: it took place the following day at Berch-tesgaden, the dictator’s mountain retreat. That same day The Washington Post ran a photograph of George and Annelise with Grace and Joan, aged six and two, under the headline “Alexandrian and Family Headed for Danger Zone.” The editorial cartoon that day showed a skeletal finger turning the clock back from 1938 to 1914. The Kennans sailed from New York aboard the SS Washington on September 21, only to run into the great hurricane that would, when it hit Long Island and New England later that evening, kill some seven hundred people. “It was a fitting and ominous beginning,” George recalled, “to the coming tour of duty in Europe.”²

The ship’s radio allowed its passengers to follow the developing crisis, but only sketchily. They did get the news that Chamberlain had met Hitler again at Bad Godesberg on the twenty-second, that Hitler had rejected the compromise Chamberlain proposed there, and that war was rumored to be only days away. Alarmed, the State Department advised George by radiogram that “[y]our family should not proceed to Prague at this time.” They landed at Le Havre on the twenty-eighth, where they learned that Hitler and Chamberlain would hold a third meeting at Munich the next day with the Italian prime minister, Benito Mussolini, and the French premier, Édouard Daladier. With no way to know whether to expect war or peace, the disembarkation took place in “almost complete pandemonium.” “For me,” George remembered, “the war really began on that day.”³

Despite the confusion, he managed to telephone the American embassy in Paris, which told him to bring himself and his family there. They arrived by train that evening, driving to the hotel through blacked-out streets, to find an airplane ticket to Prague for George only—the family would go to Norway.

Kennan’s plane, the last one for weeks from Paris to Prague, departed shortly before the one that would fly Daladier to Munich. Bombers were visible on German airfields, ready to take off. Czechoslovakia looked more peaceful, “[b]ut there were hundreds of thousands of men, down there, poised to shoot at each other, or not to shoot, depending on the outcome of the events of the day.”⁴

The silence in Prague, when Kennan arrived, was unsettling for someone so recently in New York. It seemed implausible “that this quiet spot, where the swallows wheeled in the sunshine over roofs of Spanish tile and the sound of church-bells drifted down the hillsides, [could be] the center of world attention, and might within twenty-four hours be laid waste by German bombers.” But the city was packed with people snapping up newspapers, while correspondents clustered around radios in the hotels, waiting for word from Munich. As rumors of the settlement began to come in, “horror and bitterness” swept the city. Kennan had to be careful, walking through the darkened streets, not to speak English loud enough to be overheard. The next day the Czechs listened to the official announcement “with all the excruciating sadness of a small people” who had tried to preserve their independence, “only to be cheated at last of the fruits of their efforts.” They faced a future over which they had no control, seeking solace where they could while “the hand of misfortune—ponderous and relentless—smashed one after another of their most cherished creations.”⁵

I.

“Prague is wonderfully beautiful,” George wrote Frieda Por in mid-October, “but it is a sad time that I have experienced here.” With the Germans occupying Czech territory to the north, west, and south, the city was almost completely cut off. It had, hence, a museumlike atmosphere.

But the world had bid farewell, it seemed, to the civility these monuments represented: this was a new and more brutal age. In the church near the City Hall, a priest instructed his congregation on how they should respond to the Munich betrayal. “Let them turn their faces from it. Let them abandon all hope of the virtue of the human race and seek their solace in a just, unbending, and stern God.” Meanwhile, on the square outside, “[f]at Jews sat gloomily over their coffee cups and German papers.”⁶

George’s legation duties were light. “The work—after all the headaches of Moscow and the Department’s Russian desk—seems like child’s play,” he wrote Cousin Grace. The minister, Wilbur J. Carr, was “as nice and kind as he can be.” But there were, as always, irritating Americans to deal with. One was “an attractive young lady,” indignantly tossing “a most magnificent head of golden hair,” who demanded to know what the legation staff of eight proposed to do about the thousands of refugees from the Sudetenland who would be descending on Prague in the next few days. “We relegated her… to the category of ignorant, impractical do-gooders, and were relieved to get her out of the office.” She turned out to be the journalist Martha Gellhorn, later a close friend, and George realized in retrospect that both had lessons they could have taught each other.

Even more exasperating was “young Kennedy” whose father, the American ambassador in London and another of Roosevelt’s political appointees, had sent him on a “fact-finding” mission. The kid was “obviously an upstart and an ignoramus,” so with the “polite but weary punctiliousness that characterizes diplomatic officials required to busy themselves with pesky compatriots,” Kennan got him to Prague through German lines and back out again. It was a shock when the memory suddenly returned while Kennan was ambassador to Yugoslavia in the early 1960s, the kid having appointed him to that position. “By just such blows, usually much too late…, is the ego gradually cut down to size.”⁷

Kennan was living, for the moment, in a flat presided over by an unpleasant German woman “whose stupidity is counter-balanced by a most amazing meticulousness and efficiency.” She had fixed his few clothes “as they have never been fixed in their lives. Yesterday she even discovered that I had a book with uncut pages and spent half an hour indignantly setting that matter to right.” With no car, he was hiking regularly in the countryside, sometimes fifteen or twenty miles a day, although he had to stop doing so in an improbable Abercrombie and Fitch outfit—a red mackinaw coat with matching breeches—because it made him look German: peasants muttered angrily whenever they saw him. Like the resentment of city-dwellers on hearing English, these were small, if misdirected, signs of defiance.⁸

Meanwhile the German army—“those gray-clad figures which were to become so familiar to all of Europe during the coming three years”—was ominously near. Traveling north through the Sudetenland at the end of October, Kennan found the officers he met receiving long lines of Czech, German, and Jewish refugees with equal courtesy. It was the first of many occasions on which he would wonder about “the strange qualities of that vast organization…, which has so stern a conscience for the correctness of its own behavior toward those who have submitted to its authority, and then—once its military work has been done—turns over its helpless charges without a quiver to the mercies of the National Socialist Party and the Gestapo.” Already “Jews not wanted” signs were showing up in shabby Sudetenland hotels, but a young German soldier with whom Kennan shared a train compartment was “filled with childish confidence that a better life had come for all concerned in that unhappy district.”⁹

George was making that trip to meet Annelise, who was driving their American car south—it had, with the family, crossed the ocean on the SS Washington and then taken refuge in Norway. The plan had been to rendezvous at the Hotel Flensburger Hof on the German-Danish border, but the police had taken it over, so George went on into Denmark, stationing himself on the outskirts of a town through which Annelise would have to pass. As tended to happen at tense moments, he was coming down with a bad cold that not even the warmth of aquavit could alleviate.

They got back to Flensburg that evening, and “I subsided into bed with a fever of 101° and teeth rattling like a machine gun.”

After a long wet drive the next day the Kennans checked into the Bristol Hotel in Berlin, where they ran into old Moscow friends, the journalists Demaree Bess and Walter Duranty. It was a new experience to find themselves there “at the peak of Germany’s amazing development of strength, [recognizing] that here was at last a power—in a sense Moscow’s own monstrous progeny—prepared to meet the Kremlin on its own terms.” The Kennans lunched with Cyrus Follmer the next day, had tea with the Kozhenikovs, “who hadn’t changed a bit,” and then dinner with Charlie Thayer, now stationed in Berlin. After dinner, in his apartment, they sat up most of the night listening to Russian music while “talking, talking, talking as I suppose only people can who have lived in Russia and felt that strange, direct need for human communication which seizes everybody in that vast, drab country.”

The car broke down on the way back to Prague, requiring its temporary abandonment in a village next to a new industrial plant—a project of the Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goering—where “[g]reat chimneys faded up into the night sky and enormous spurts of red flame lit the dark countryside.” But on the third-class train into Dresden, tired German workmen sat silently, heads in hands, saying nothing about National Socialism. Dresden mechanics, “whose urban prestige demanded that they outdo their provincial colleagues,” got the car going again, and it got the Kennans to Prague without further incident.¹⁰

They found there an apartment in a seventeenth-century palace. With walls a foot thick and nothing symmetrical, “you had a feeling of security as great as though you had been in an air raid shelter.” It didn’t matter that the Czech army was auctioning off its horses in the courtyard. The animals, at least, were indifferent to their fate. Grace and Joan arrived in time for Christmas, along with the handmade red cribs that had accompanied them to Moscow and Alexandria. “[F]or a few brief months, while the clouds of war and desolation moved steadily closer and an uneasy lightning played on the horizons of Europe, we again had the luxury of a home.”¹¹

There was still a diplomatic community, and although social life was not very cheerful, “it is quite enough as far as we are concerned,” Annelise wrote Jeanette, “George particularly!” There were opportunities for tennis, horseback riding, ice skating, even dancing: “The other night I found myself having scrambled eggs and sausages at 5 o’clock in the morning. I hadn’t been up so late since we were in Russia.” Nonetheless, she noticed, the world outside was making itself known. “One Sunday we visited at an estate which is now in Germany. While we had tea the Gestapo was announced. Queer feeling.” George urged his sister to visit while there was still time. Prague had been preserved “only by a damn thin margin.”¹²

II.

Despite his sympathy for the Czechs, Kennan’s first reaction to Munich had been one of relief. Their country’s fortunes, he was sure, lay in the long run “with—and not against—the dominant forces of this area.” The Allies had erred in breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, and certainly in leaving three million Germans within Czechoslovakia’s boundaries. No state could have survived as a democracy under those circumstances. At least Munich had preserved “a magnificent younger generation—disciplined, industrious, and physically fit—which would undoubtedly have been sacrificed if the solution had been the romantic one of hopeless resistance rather than the humiliating but truly heroic one of realism.”¹³

That view assumed, though, that the Munich settlement would stick. Kennan’s travels around the country quickly convinced him that it would not. The Germans were demanding what amounted to extraterritoriality, with jurisdiction over everyone of their nationality in Czechoslovakia. They were building no customs houses or passport control facilities along the new borders. Their businessmen were avoiding long-term deals with Czech counterparts. The army was under pressure to yield to German control. And the authorities in Slovakia and Ruthenia, which made up the eastern half of the country, had been completely won over by the Germans. “They are making awful fools of themselves; dressing up in magnificent fascist uniforms, flying to and fro in airplanes, …and dreaming dreams of the future grandeur of the Slovak or Ukrainian nations.”¹⁴

Germany’s racial policies also threatened the status quo. If left alone, Kennan reported in February 1939, Czechoslovakia would treat its Jews relatively humanely: there was not, in itself, “the basis for a really serious and widespread anti-Semitic movement.” Yet German demands were already forcing Jews out of government, university, and other professional positions, and there were calls for more radical measures to eliminate Jewish influence. Because the Czechs on their own would be reluctant to go that far, meeting those requirements “might very well necessitate readjustment in the Prague government.”¹⁵

The final blow to the truncated Czechoslovak state came early in March when the Slovaks, with German approval, demanded complete independence. Hitler then executed long-standing plans to occupy all remaining Czech territory. Kennan got the word at four-thirty on the morning of the fifteenth. “Determined that the German army should not have the satisfaction of giving the American Legation a harried appearance, I shaved meticulously before going to the office.” He and the staff spent the morning burning their records on the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which was helping Jews escape from Central Europe, lest the Nazis seize them. Meanwhile, ashen-faced applicants for asylum were lining up outside, but there was no authority to grant it, and there would have been few facilities for providing it. “Their faces were twitching and their lips trembling when I sent them away.”

“People were caught like mice in a trap,” Annelise wrote to Jeanette a few days later. “The Jews are panic-stricken. Our Consulate is swarmed with them. We have heard about many suicides already. I feel sor[r]y for them, but not half as sorry as for the Czechs.” One Jewish acquaintance, who George knew had worked with the Americans for many years, showed up at the apartment. “We couldn’t possibly keep him.” The legation was about to be withdrawn, in which case American diplomatic privileges would probably be revoked, and “[h]e’d only have been in worse shape for having been found in our place.” Besides, there were ten thousand others: “I told him that I could not give him asylum, but that as long as he was not demanded by the authorities he was welcome to stay there and to make himself at home.”

“I was very worried,” Annelise acknowledged, “that he was going to commit suicide with my two children there.” But George advised him and other Jewish friends to go straight to the German army and apply to emigrate: “It’s going to be easier than when they have the SS in.” This worked, and they made their way safely out of the country.

By noon the Germans had taken the city: there were hundreds of vehicles plastered with snow, the occupants’ faces red with what some thought was shame but what George feared was mostly the cold. Annelise noted that many of the Czechs “hissed, showed their fists, and shouted pfui.” On the next day Hitler arrived, and the Kennans watched him pass by. “One thing which rather pleased me,” Annelise commented, “was the quiet in the streets. They marched the Germans up to cheer for Hitler, but it was might[y] few and seemed like a drop in the bucket to what he was accustomed to.” George too found the silence striking. “Hitler rode quietly past our front door, without even a crowd on the side-walk to impede the view.”

With the extinction of Czechoslovak independence, most foreign embassies and legations left Prague. But the State Department kept the American consulate general open, making Kennan responsible for political reporting from what was now the German “protectorate” of Bohemia and Moravia. “The job,” he explained to Jeanette, “is, all in all, an enviable one. I have my own office and staff, …and am more or less independent.” He and Annelise would keep their apartment but would be ready to send the children to Norway at any moment if that seemed necessary. And George had to recommend, reluctantly, that Jeanette defer her trip, because “the whole situation is now too shaky for anyone to make any plans for more than a few days.”¹⁶

III.

With Czechoslovakia the first non-German state the Nazis had taken over, their policies might well set a precedent for what to expect elsewhere in Europe, now that Hitler’s intentions were clear. Kennan’s job would be to convey this preview to Washington. Berlin, he thought, should want “peace, quiet, and a minimum of bad feeling,” because Czechoslovakia was incidental to more distant objectives. Even Hitler had to worry about public opinion. Here Kennan was echoing one of the few shrewd insights in his 1938 “Prerequisites” essay: that dictators, “having deprived themselves of all legal means of retreat, have the bear by the tail.” He now could watch how this dictator handled that problem.¹⁷

The Czechs, at first, did not seem bearlike. “Toward their rulers they show—like the ‘brave soldier Švejk’ of Czech literary fame—a baffling willingness to comply with any and all demands.” They coupled this, though, with “an equally baffling ability to execute them in such a way that the effect is quite different from that contemplated by those who did the commanding.” Beneath the surface, they were bitter indeed—so much so that they were the only Europeans who wanted a great war, because only that could liberate them. Clandestine political groups were already forming, ready to become resistance movements as soon as hostilities commenced. Nor would the Czechs, if victory came, treat their tormentors gently: “Retaliation will be fearful to contemplate.”¹⁸

If the Germans were to have a trouble-free occupation, therefore, they would have to show tact and restraint, for which they were not noted. Their failure to do so appeared quickly. The military authorities allowed the Czechoslovak president, Emil Hácha, to retain his position and his residence in Hradčany Palace but rendered him honors in ways that suggested ridicule rather than respect. It was small recompense to have Hitler as an unannounced houseguest whenever it suited his convenience. Berlin appointed Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German separatists, to administer all of Bohemia, but then removed him. Since nothing could have done more to harden Czech hostility, it was difficult to see why he had been selected in the first place. By the end of May, arrests were increasing, prisons were filling up, and old ones were reopening. Reports of brutality were all too well authenticated. Terror had now begun, and the Czechs “are quite powerless to oppose it.”¹⁹

Meanwhile, the Slovaks’ “independence” was turning out to be that “of a dog on a leash.” Their leaders were mismanaging their economy, the Hungarians were openly coveting their territory, and the Slovaks themselves, who were hardly pro-Czech, were beginning to realize that they were not apt to fare as well as they had before dismantling their former shared state. If war broke out, the Bratislava regime would prove too undependable to be of use to the Germans, and they would take it over as well.²⁰

Jews had even less to hope for. There had been no Jew-baiting in the streets of Prague, as had followed the Anschluss in Vienna, Kennan reported at the end of March; still, Jews could hardly expect a fate much different from those in Nazi Germany. In Ostrava, near the Polish border, he found Jews being excluded from all public places. “One doctor, I am told, has attended thirty-three Jewish suicides since the occupation.” And in Slovakia, legislation had relegated Jews to the status of “thieves, criminals, swindlers, insane people, and alcoholics.” None of this made any sense in countries still dependent on Jewish capital.²¹

The Czechs, being realists, might have reconciled themselves to German rule had it been “firm in its purposes, conscious of its responsibilities, integrated in its activities, and incorruptible in the performance of its duties.” But it had been none of these things; instead the Germans had given the impression “of a regime in an advanced state of moral disintegration.” All of this had implications for the future of Europe, because until the Nazis developed greater maturity, they would stand little chance of successfully managing responsibilities borne for centuries—“and at times not uncreditably”—by the Roman Catholic Church and the Hapsburg Empire.²²

Although Messersmith praised Kennan’s reports, there is no evidence that they went beyond the State Department, or that they had any impact on American foreign policy in the final months of peace in Europe. They did reflect, though, a conviction that would grow stronger in Kennan’s mind, the more he saw of the Germans over the next few years: “that even in the event of a complete military victory the Nazis would still face an essentially insoluble problem in the political organization and control of the other peoples of the continent.” The reason was that Nazi ideology had nothing to offer apart from “glorification of the supposed virtues of the German people,” an argument that had “no conceivable appeal” to anyone else.²³

That conclusion, in time, would also shape Kennan’s view of the country that eventually defeated Nazi Germany and sought its own domination of Europe. For the moment, though, the Soviet Union was moving toward an uneasy alliance with Hitler, the surprise announcement of which, on August 24, 1939, made possible Germany’s attack on Poland a week later, and the beginning of the Second World War.

IV.

For all of his skill in analyzing Russia and Germany, Kennan failed to anticipate the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He had noted, in 1935, the Soviet Union’s propensity to seek “non-aggression” treaties with capitalist states while building up its military strength for an eventual confrontation with them. He had wondered, after Hitler extinguished Czechoslovakia’s independence in 1939, why the Germans were discouraging the Ruthenians’ ambitions to make themselves the nucleus of a Nazi Ukraine. But Kennan did not put these two things together, assuming instead that if the Soviet Union aligned itself with anyone, it would be Britain and France. He did not know that an old Moscow acquaintance, Hans-Heinrich (Johnnie) Herwarth von Bittenfeld, a part-Jewish German diplomat, was using tennis matches and horseback rides at the American dacha to pass along top-secret information to Bohlen on the negotiations leading up to the Hitler-Stalin accord. But Bohlen hedged his reports to Washington, and when the State Department did at last alert the British and French ambassadors, their governments did nothing.²⁴

Kennan, still in German-occupied Prague, had no espionage service to draw upon. The only people “who could tell us things,” he explained to Messersmith in April, were no longer people worth trusting—presumably Germans. The best alternative was to attempt to guess, from an understanding of the past and an analysis of the present, what they might be planning. But his reports could go only by courier, and by May he was not even sure that he could continue sending those out. “[A]t the moment,” he acknowledged, “it is a rather lonely job.”²⁵

Grace and Joan stayed in Prague through the first months of German occupation; in June, though, George and Annelise sent them to Kristiansand while treating themselves to a brief vacation in England. The sailing from Hamburg, he wrote, was “the saddest I have ever seen,” with only a few forlorn passengers present as the ship’s band tried to cheer things up with “Deutschland über Alles” and the “Horst Wessel Lied.” London was disconcertingly normal, as equestrians rode badly in Hyde Park, while a fascist heckled a communist at Speaker’s Corner. George got to meet Anna Freud, “a very fine psychologist in her own right,” and then went off on his own for a few morose days on the Isle of Wight, where the food was “unimaginative beyond belief.”²⁶

There was time, after returning to Prague, for an automobile trip through Slovakia to Budapest, and then in early August for a family visit in Norway. George got back in midmonth and on the nineteenth sent his last long prewar dispatch, describing the summer as a strange and unhappy one: “Everything is in suspense. No one takes the initiative; no one plans for the future.” Annelise arrived on the day the Nazi-Soviet Pact was announced, only to be sent back, “in high indignation,” on what turned out to be the last train from Berlin into Sweden. “I didn’t want to leave as I didn’t think there would be immediate danger in Prague, but G. thought I ought to.” After a few days in Oslo, she arrived in Kristiansand on September 3, the day of Great Britain’s declaration of war against Germany. “I hope all the time that this war is just a nightmare and that I’ll wake up soon and find that it isn’t true.”

George was still in Prague when the war began. The State Department decided to transfer him to Berlin, and he drove himself there on empty highways in mid-September, carrying extra supplies of gasoline since there was none to be bought along the way. Embassy wives and children had departed, strict rationing was in place, and “I am settling down,” he wrote Jeanette, “to what is bound to be a nasty assignment.” Berlin had become provincial and dreary. “If there are any nice Germans left, it is practically impossible to have any normal association with them…. But it’s all experience and it’s what we’re paid for.”

During the past few weeks, he added, “I have felt myself overcome by wave after wave of sheer patriotism and gratitude to our poor old country for the relative quantity of good humor and decency which, thank God, it still contains.” This was unlikely in itself to be enough, however: “If we are unwilling to make any serious move toward the prevention of the disintegration of Europe, I wish that we would at least start now on a rearmament program which would make everything we have done before look like child’s play. Because if Europe disintegrates much further we may need it.”²⁷

V.

The State Department expected Kennan to continue the kind of political reporting he had been doing from Prague, but it soon became clear that the embassy in Berlin was overwhelmed. Having taken over British and French interests in Germany, it was keeping track of prisoners of war, assisting civilian nationals left behind, managing diplomatic properties, and arranging exchanges of official personnel. Out of sympathy for Alexander Kirk, the chargé d’affaires, Kennan volunteered his services as administrative officer and continued in that capacity throughout most of the time he was there.²⁸

Annelise joined George after a few weeks, leaving the children in the comparative safety—and certainly the easier life—of neutral Norway. The fear of bombs in Berlin, she wrote Jeanette, was not great, since it was far away, well defended, and “the British seem to content themselves by throwing pamphlets.” The blackout, however, was extreme. Going home each evening, George recalled, involved groping in pitch blackness from column to column of the Brandenburg gate, feeling my way by hand after this fashion to the bus stop; the waiting for the dim blue lights of the bus to come sweeping out of the obscurity; then the long journey out five and a half miles of the “east-west axis”; the dim, hushed interior of the bus, lightened only by the sweeps of the conductor’s flashlight; the wonder as to how the driver ever found his way over the vast expanse of unmarked, often snow-covered asphalt… ; the eerie walk home at the other end, again with much groping and feeling for curbstones; [and finally] the façade of what appeared, from outside its blackout curtains, to be a dark and deserted home; and the ultimate pleasant discovery, always with a tinge of surprise, on opening the door that behind the curtains was light, at least a minimal measure of warmth, …a wife, and a coziness all the more pronounced for the vast darkness and uncertainty of the war that lay outside.

The Kennans had rented a house they could ill afford, George explained to Jeanette, in order to have a place where they could do something for friends: “At least give them a meal or a bed when they need one most.”²⁹

One guest was a German Baltic woman George had known in Riga, who now had three children. Terrified that the Soviet Union was about to absorb the Baltic states—it did in 1940—she and her family had fled to Germany with one suitcase each on three hours’ notice. All they could expect, George believed, was resettlement in the apartment of “some miserable Pole who had himself been kicked out on three hours’ notice.” They would take over that family’s belongings in compensation for their own, and then be expected to begin life over again “surrounded by the fanatical hatred and resentment of the neighbors.” If George went broke putting up such friends for a few days at a time, he wrote his sister, then “I’ll come back to Wisconsin and you can all support me… until I learn how to make baskets or breed cows or something.” The family stayed with the Kennans for three months.³⁰

Meanwhile the office routine was demanding—“people have stupidly neglected to provide any holidays in the prosecution of wars”—but rewarding: “My tasks and responsibilities are such that if I cope with them successfully I need have no qualms about running even the largest of our Foreign Service establishments, in the future.” The years ahead would be full of difficulty, with an element of danger thrown in. There was at least the comfort, though, that if he had any belief left in the value of living when he came home, “it will not be for want of contact with the seamier aspects of human nature.”³¹

There was, of course, still Norway. George and Annelise rejoined the children in Kristiansand for the Christmas of 1939, walking around the tree holding hands, opening presents, and attending amateur theatricals, while relishing “peace, lights, shops, food, smart clothes, smiling faces, mountains, snow, and normalcy.” More Norwegian seamen than French soldiers had died as a result of military action, George reported to Jeanette on the last day of the decade, but the war was still, “as for you at home, a matter of voices on the radio and headlines in the papers. Let’s hope that it will long continue to remain so.”³²

VI.

Apart from proclaiming neutrality and establishing a western hemispheric security zone, President Roosevelt’s first significant diplomatic initiative after the war broke out came in February 1940, when he sent Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on a mission to Rome, Berlin, London, and Paris. The purpose of the trip was left vague, but Roosevelt probably meant it to show that he had neglected no possibility, however remote, of helping to settle the conflict. Welles was not to visit Moscow—FDR was still angry about the Soviet attack on Finland two months earlier. But on the assumption that Welles might want information on the U.S.S.R., Kennan was assigned to meet him in Italy and accompany him through Switzerland and Germany. Welles asked for none, leaving Kennan with little to do but follow him around and help with the travel arrangements. Nothing came of the mission, but George did get himself, or at least part of himself, photographed in Life: everyone else was in the picture, he wrote Jeanette, “but all you could see of me was a hump in the table cloth, which denoted my knee.”³³

The visit to Rome did provide a chance to compare Mussolini’s regime with Hitler’s. Kennan thought the Italian dictator wise to have preserved the monarchy. The future of Europe, he wrote in a paper he finished while on the trip, might well lie in the survival of an aristocracy “pliable enough, irrational enough, and at the same time stable enough, to bridge all the delicate contradictions of the continent.” Hitler was well on the way to unifying it, but he was doing so without any sense of responsibility for European culture as a whole. Monarchies, for all their foibles, at least had that. One ought not to shrink, therefore, “at the restoration of the Mozart court and the chocolate soldier. It is the real soldiers that are dangerous.”³⁴

Kennan saw plenty of them on both sides of the Rhine while escorting the Welles mission from Berlin to Basel. They were not shooting at each other, but that was unlikely to last, at which point the war was bound to take its toll, even in Scandinavia. For the moment, though, George wrote Jeanette in February, “the little rascals will have to stay in Norway and take their chances along with several hundreds of thousands of Norwegian kids.” Annelise joined them there in March.³⁵

On April 4 George, back in Berlin, got information that changed his mind: “I had reason to call her long distance and ask her to bring the children back at once.” He met them in Copenhagen on the sixth: Gracie and Joan were dressed in twin blue coats, with Happy Hooligan bonnets. The family returned by train to Berlin and on the eighth learned that a German ship had been torpedoed off Kristiansand. Mounting rescue efforts with characteristic thoroughness, the Norwegians wondered why the survivors all seemed to be young men of the same age with military haircuts. The next morning the Germans announced the occupation of Denmark and Norway. “At noon, Annelise and I heard together, with a feeling of sickness and horror, of the bombing of Kristiansand and the shelling of the town from the sea.” She had taken it all with “composure and dignity,” George wrote Jeanette on the fifteenth, “[b]ut it is naturally a cruel strain on her, and it is something which I am afraid neither of us will ever quite get over, however it turns out.”

Kristiansand, he added, had always seemed a little unreal: “So much decency and comfort and health [existing] side by side, within a few hundred miles distance, with such overpowering forces of nastiness and perversion and brutality.” But now at least things were clear. “The worst has happened, and there are no more questions to be asked… no more wondering about who is right and who is wrong.” It would be, henceforth, a simple matter “of who gets whom, as Lenin put it. And we know only too definitely which side we are on.”

What was not clear was where the family would go next. The embassy did not want wives with children staying in Berlin. The Kennans owned no home in the United States. George suggested France, but Annelise wisely objected: “I would be just two steps ahead of the German army with two children. I don’t think this is a very realistic idea from somebody who is very smart.” So they decided, in the end, on Highland Park. “We knew that we could stay with [Jeanette] for the summer. And that was as far as we thought.”³⁶

George was able to get everyone to Genoa—the port where, sixteen years earlier, he and Nick Messolonghitis had thrown themselves on the mercy of a harried American vice-consul—and on May 4, 1940, Annelise, Grace, and Joan boarded the SS Manhattan, the ship they had shared, four years earlier, with the American athletes on their way to the Berlin Olympics. It was supposed to sail at eight o’clock that evening, but after dinner George went back to the dock, suspecting the ship might still be there. It was, although the gangplank had been taken up.

At last the ship began to move, and soon “there was only a very tiny arm, waving with frantic despairing cheer, to indicate the particular cubby-hole of floating steel to which I had entrusted my only treasure of reality and permanence.”³⁷

VII.

On May 6, while on his way back from Genoa, Kennan heard radio reports of increasing tension in the Mediterranean: “I reflected with smug satisfaction that my family must by that time be somewhere west of Gibraltar.” On the eighth, in the train to Berlin, he got into a conversation with a German American, now a Nazi, full of boasts about Germany’s strengths and the weaknesses of the United States. Kennan consoled himself with the thought that if his country did harbor strengths, they would be of the kind that his traveling companion would be “unable to comprehend anyway.” On the tenth he got word that the long-expected German invasion of Holland and Belgium was about to begin: “I rode to the office breakfastless, clutching my shaving articles.”

On the fourteenth he dined with a German friend who would be off the next day to join the army. “As a reasonable and patriotic and loyal man, it was the only honorable thing to do, and I understood him. A sense of it being the end of all things hung over us, but our training stood us in good stead; we had a few drinks, and we were a gay little company.” On the seventeenth—the Norwegian national holiday—Kennan took his dogs for a walk, let them chase rabbits in vacant lots, and came home “in complete depression, reading of the advance of the German armies in Belgium and France, and wondering how I could adapt myself to a world where Europe lived under the domination of Germany.”³⁸

Early in June, with France on the verge of defeat, rumors began circulating that the Italians were about to declare war. Kennan walked to the Italian embassy on the afternoon of the tenth, joining a cheerful, indifferent, obedient crowd the German authorities had ordered up, “like the Moscow proletarians bound for a parade.” On the veranda were some of the staff, with their wives. The women were dressed as though for a garden party. “I knew most of them and slunk around in the crowd to avoid their seeing me.” The sound trucks boomed out Mussolini’s speech from Rome, and the Germans, understanding nothing, applauded politely. Later that evening Kennan sat with American friends on his own veranda, drinking highballs and listening to antiaircraft fire in the distance, while another more distant radio voice—Roosevelt’s—proclaimed that “the hand which held the dagger had thrust it into the back of its neighbor.”³⁹

Four days later, equipped with a German permit, Kennan traveled into the Netherlands to reestablish communications with American diplomats there. The train passed boxcars taking prisoners of war east. Their pale faces and bewildered eyes made him wonder whether the day had not passed when free peoples made the better soldiers. Now, in an age of the machine, slave peoples had the advantage, for it was the machine that counted, and “the machine—in contrast to the sword—was best served by slaves.”

As the train entered Holland, a Nazi businessman and a Dutch fifth columnist were congratulating each other. “I had to grip the cushion of the first-class compartment to keep from butting in and attempting to blast some of the complacency and hypocrisy of the conversation.” In the end, Kennan could not resist, warning the Dutchman that

At the moment, though, the contradiction meant little. In The Hague, he found a German military band playing to a sizable audience of “placid, applauding Dutchmen,” not far from a place where German bombs had wiped out most of a city block. In Rotterdam, shops were open, trains were running, and the streets were crowded with busy people. But suddenly, “with as little transition as though someone had performed the operation with a gigantic knife, the houses stopped, and there began a wide, open field of confused bricks and rubbish.” Meanwhile, “the imperturbable Dutch rode along on their bicycles as though nothing had happened.”⁴⁰

Two weeks later Kennan was off to occupied France. War damage in Belgium was greater than in Holland, but there was no evidence anywhere of much resistance. With no other way to get to Paris, he offered to hitchhike, complete with diplomatic pouch, perhaps remembering his 1924 trip. But since the only vehicles on the road were those of the German army, embassy officers frowned on this idea and instead lent him a car with enough gasoline to get there, in the company of an American ambulance driver who had been caught behind the lines by the Blitzkrieg.

The devastation south of the Belgian frontier was horrendous. All the towns were damaged, and several of the larger ones were “gutted, deserted, and uninhabitable.” The odor persisted, in places, of decomposing bodies. German sentries guarded the debris, as though it mattered now who stood before shattered houses and stinking corpses. French refugees were “seared with fatigue and fear and suffering.” One girl, riding atop a cart in torn dirty clothes, made a particular impression on Kennan: “Just try to tell her of liberalism and democracy, of progress, of ideals, of tradition, of romantic love.” She had seen the complete breakdown of her own people. But she could also see German soldiers, handing out food and water at crossroads, setting up first-aid stations, transporting the old and the sick. “What soil here for German propaganda, what thorough ploughing for the social revolution which national-socialism carries in its train.”

In Paris, though, the Germans seemed strangely at a loss: the city was intact but dead. Policemen stood on the corners, without traffic to direct or pedestrians to guard. At the Café de la Paix, six German officers sat at an outside table with “no one but themselves to witness their triumph.” It was as if Paris had been “too delicate and shy a thing to stand their domination and had melted away before them just as they thought to have it in their grasp.” When the Germans came, its soul disappeared, leaving only stone. “As long as they stay—and it will probably be a long time—it will remain stone.”⁴¹

VIII.

After returning to Berlin early in July 1940, Kennan settled into a lonely bachelor’s existence. British air raids were hitting the city regularly now: shrapnel was ripping through the leaves of the trees in his garden, then clanking onto the street. It was more of a nuisance than anything else. Soon he was sleeping through the raids, and there was little evidence that they were having much effect. Hitler’s military successes were expanding Kennan’s embassy responsibilities as the Americans took over the “interests” of each new country the Germans had invaded, but he was growing more confident that they could not win the war.

September 11 was the Kennans’ ninth wedding anniversary, but Annelise was not in Berlin to celebrate. George spent it, instead, arranging a clandestine midnight meeting in a limousine driving around the Grunewald forest. With him was a friend, Hubert Masarik, one of the two Czech diplomats who had been present but ignored at the 1938 Munich conference. Speaking only for himself, Kennan ventured a bold set of predictions: that within a year the United States and the Soviet Union would be at war with Germany, and eventually also with Italy and Japan; that it would take them through 1944 to defeat Hitler, but that victory was certain; that the Czechs should therefore conserve their strength, so that they would never again have to rely on British protection. At Kennan’s request, Masarik passed this message on to General Alois Eliás, the Czech prime minister of the German “protectorate.” It was, Eliás commented, the best news he had yet received—he expected the Germans to execute him, however, before it could be confirmed. This they did, a year later.⁴²

Kennan’s optimism was in part psychological warfare: he admired the Czechs, understood their fatalism, and hoped that they would not lose hope. But he had stronger reasons for saying what he did, one of which had to do with what was happening in Czechoslovakia itself. If the Germans’ occupation of that country was indeed a hint of how they would run the rest of Europe, then they were already in trouble. Back in Prague in October to close down what was left of the American diplomatic establishment, Kennan found that the Germans had stripped the region of its economic assets, setting off serious inflation: the cost of living had soared by some 50 to 60 percent. Czech universities were closed completely or open only to Germans, and all major industries were now under German control. Their authority might be physically unchallengeable, but morally it did not exist. “Whatever power the Germans may have over the persons and property of the Czechs, they have little influence over their souls.”⁴³

A second source of optimism came from souls of a different sort: those of Germans opposed to Hitler. Kirk, the retiring chargé d’affaires, had been meeting quietly with Count Helmuth von Moltke, one of several Prussian aristocrats who had always viewed the Nazis with disapproval and now were convinced that Hitler was leading Germany into disaster. After Kirk’s departure, Kennan took over this contact, although because he feared leaks, he never reported his conversations to Washington. Another acquaintance with similar views was Gottfried von Bismarck, grandson of the Iron Chancellor, whom Kennan remembered refusing to rise at the opera when Nazi officials came in. Still another was Johnnie von Herwarth, who had leaked the information to Bohlen about the Nazi-Soviet Pact. These connections, however, involved only listening: Roosevelt was not about to authorize negotiations with the conservative German opposition. The conversations did, though, provide evidence of yet more friction within the Nazi machine: the fact that Hitler drew his support from the lower middle class and the nouveau riche, while the old Prussian nobility opposed him.⁴⁴

Finally, it was now clear to Kennan that the Germans were losing military and diplomatic momentum. There were official acknowledgments that the war would not end that winter. The promised invasion of Britain had not materialized. Reports of German bombers raining ruin on English cities became so repetitive that newspaper readers began joking about them. And Kennan was picking up evidence of increasing tension in Soviet-German relations: “All the glowing references to this subject seem to come from Berlin; whereas the Russian expressions of opinion, as far as I see them, are marked by a very obvious dryness, and are interspersed with occasional sharp cracks of the Russian ruler over the German knuckles.” By November, there were rumors that Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov was about to pay an official visit: “That, if true, would really enliven things.” Molotov did come and the meetings were difficult, not least because the last one had to take place in an air raid shelter. The Germans assumed that they had won the war, the acerbic Russian told his German counterpart Joachim von Ribbentrop, but it was the British who seemed to be fighting to the death.⁴⁵

Life in Berlin, George wrote Jeanette, had not been easy: “You will probably find me distinctly older when and if I get back.” But there had been no health crises: “Happily I still feel that I am gathering rather than losing strength as these months—some of which are like years—go by. Only I don’t know what to use my strength on, when this is all over.” He was rising high enough in the Foreign Service to expect significant future appointments but still doubted the American capacity to craft a real foreign policy. The alternative was “to stay home and do something useful.” Who, though, would want him? “For good or for bad, I am Europeanized.” “Thanks for the news about my children,” George added. “I just lapped it up.”⁴⁶

The first months of 1941 were spent getting back to the United States to see the family, who were now renting a house in Milwaukee. This was not easy in wartime. George left Berlin on January 10, sailed from Lisbon on the seventeenth, and arrived in New York on the twenty-ninth: he then spent three weeks in Wisconsin, where early in February the Milwaukee Journal interviewed him as “[o]ne of the leading diplomatic representatives of the United States dealing with the German government.” Had he heard Hitler’s speeches? “No, I’ve been too busy at the embassy…. As a matter of fact, I don’t think I’ve ever seen Hitler.” “Yes you have, daddy,” Grace piped up. “Remember we saw him together riding down the street in Prague.” “Grace,” George admitted, “it seems you remember things better than I do.”⁴⁷

The trip back, with Annelise, took five weeks: they did not reach Berlin until April 12. “I don’t know how I can thank you enough for taking my little girls,” she wrote Jeanette from the ship. “I miss them like hell—it was terribly hard to leave.” But “George is not the kind of person who is happy alone and I think he needs me more than the children do (as long as they can stay with you).” Jeanette later admitted to having felt imposed on. “I at the time had [my] three boys and the two girls and I was running a nursery school, and there were times when I felt: ‘Oh! It’s much easier to go back to Germany with George!’ But it wasn’t that much easier for her.”⁴⁸

Annelise had gone back for several reasons. Her family in Norway had survived the German invasion and was for the moment safe. George had even been allowed to visit the Sørensens briefly before traveling to America. She hoped to do the same, but the Germans refused to allow this: “It is a great disappointment.” She also worried about the “Kennan depression” she saw in the letters George had written from Berlin. “I know now that he really did have a bad time and that there were many things which I could have helped him with,” she explained to Jeanette. “What a life! It may be exciting in spots, but it almost tears one to pieces. (If I don’t stop soon I’ll sound as gloomy as George!)”⁴⁹

Something else concerned her as well. Annelise had discovered, by this time, that George’s bachelor existence in Berlin had not been celibate: “Our personal life was also very difficult at that time.” He had always, he admitted when he was seventy-eight, had a roving eye: “‘Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife.’ My God, I’ve coveted ten thousand of them in the course of my life, and will continue to do so on into the eighties.” Who this one was, how long the relationship lasted, and how Annelise found out about it remain unclear. Her resolve, however, was firm. When asked decades later why she had left her children to return to a war zone, she cut off further discussion with a single sentence: “To save the marriage.”⁵⁰

As the summer wore on, this arrangement too began to unravel. Despite Jeanette’s willingness to provide a home for Grace and Joan when they had no other, the burdens on her were growing, but there was no way for both George and Annelise to make another long trip home. He was now the second-ranking officer in the embassy, with no one under him qualified to take over his responsibilities. So Annelise would return alone in September. “We have been so touched by what you have told about the children,” George wrote Jeanette. “Poor little things, I wonder if they are destined always to bat around from one place to another with at best half of the normal parent complement.”⁵¹

The need for roots was much on his mind that fall. Plans to purchase part of the island in Kristiansand had fallen through, probably fortunately in the light of the war. Now, though, George had another idea, even if Jeanette thought it “mad”: he wanted to buy a farm somewhere in the United States: “I have thought this over very carefully and know what I am doing.” After a series of rapid promotions, he was at last relatively well off. American farms were less expensive than Berlin houses, and after all how many other people made $8,000 a year? He had lived for too long with no home at all. He had seen too many places “where every form of existence except that of the small land-holder has been pretty thoroughly shattered.” Wisconsin looked like the best bet: it was where the Kennans had lived longer than anywhere else. So might Jeanette and Gene sound out the owner of their grandfather’s old farm near Packwaukee?⁵²

IX.

“Dined at the Hoyos’ to meet an American couple, the George Kennans,” Marie Vassiltchikov, a young White Russian living in Berlin who kept a remarkable diary, noted on May 26, 1941. “He has highly intelligent eyes but does not speak freely, but then the situation is of course ambiguous, as the Germans are still allies of Soviet Russia.” Kennan faulted himself and his Berlin colleagues, years later, for not having foreseen the abrupt end of that alliance less than a month later. Enough indications of trouble had accumulated, however, for the embassy to warn the State Department, which in turn tried to alert the Kremlin. None of this had any effect, and on June 22 the invasion began. Two days later Kennan sent Loy Henderson, now back in Washington, his views on this major turning point in the war.

He could see the advantage of extending material aid to the Soviet Union “whenever called for by our own self-interest.” But there should be no attempts to identify politically or ideologically with the Russian war effort, because to do so would also associate the United States with

The Soviet Union was in the war because it had collaborated with Hitler, thereby playing “a lone hand in a dangerous game.” It must now take the consequences alone. Sharing no principles with the Western democracies, it had “no claim on Western sympathies.”⁵³

It was a typical Kennan memorandum, relentlessly clear-sighted in its assessment of European realities, yet wholly impractical in its neglect of domestic political necessities in Washington and London. For how were Roosevelt and the new British prime minister, Winston Churchill, to persuade their democracies to aid the Soviet war effort without identifying politically and ideologically with it? On this point Kennan’s nemesis Joseph E. Davies provided more useful advice, insisting in the face of State and War Department skepticism that the Russians would survive the Nazi onslaught, while offering to lead a publicity campaign to convince an equally doubtful American public that the U.S.S.R. would be a worthy ally. FDR listened to Davies, encouraged his efforts, and—given the circumstances—was right to do so.⁵⁴

Kennan’s attention remained focused on German-dominated Europe, where by the fall of 1941 the disaster confronting Jews was becoming obvious. “We didn’t know about the gas chambers,” he recalled. But “we had no optimistic feelings about the fate of the Jewish community. We thought they were in for it.” One striking indication of this, George wrote Annelise in October, was the new requirement that the Jews wear yellow stars:

Most Germans, he sensed, were “shocked and troubled by the measure.” Perhaps as a result, “the remaining Jews are being deported in large batches, and very few more stars are to be seen.”⁵⁵

“We went to great lengths in the embassy in Berlin,” Kennan remembered, “to try to rescue the Jewish children and get them out.” The staff had difficulty, however, getting accurate information about the number of children from their parents and from the Jewish community. “[T]hey would falsify their statistics, they wouldn’t come clean about things.” Perhaps, Kennan later acknowledged, that was how the Jews had survived for centuries in Europe: “Wherever they met authority they had to try to get around it. But all I can say is that we were jolly well fed up with them.”⁵⁶

Kennan sensed, during the final months of 1941, “that things were now out of control—not only out of our control (we, after all, in our poor overworked embassy, had never at any time had any influence on the course of events), but out of everyone’s control.” As the Germans advanced into Russia—following the direction and the timing of Napoleon’s invasion in 1812—relations with the United States, “never better than frigid at any time since the beginning of the war,” continued to deteriorate. “No one knew how the end would come. But many of us sensed it to be near.”⁵⁷

With this in mind, Kennan sent a ten-page letter to the State Department on November 20, summing up what his three years in Czechoslovakia and Germany had taught him. It was, in a way, his own “swan song” dispatch. He began with calendar and climate: winter operations in Russia were now inevitable, and that in itself was a defeat for Hitler. “It means that none of the original aims of the Russian campaign has yet been achieved.” Despite all their “gushing” about a “New Order,” the best the Germans could hope for was a stalemate in the east while attempting to keep an increasingly restive Europe under control. Anything worse could be much worse,

Compounding the problem was the fact that Southern and Eastern Europe were “full of desperate little adventurists” who were holding their own people in check with repeated admonitions that the Germans were bound to win the war. If the impression ever took hold in those countries that the tide was running in the other direction, “there is going to be a scurrying for cover such as the world has rarely witnessed.”

Even if none of this happened and the Germans achieved their objectives, what would they do next? Could they really restore order and peace in Europe? Their exploitation of conquered countries was “consuming the goose that lays the golden egg.” They could not “go on indefinitely borrowing and re-borrowing the capital of their countries.” Only abnormal war conditions allowed such a system, and these would not continue indefinitely. Any attempt to get back to normal “would split it wide open.”

In the meantime, rationing was ineffective, black markets were thriving, and people in the occupied territories were working only as hard as they had to. Within Germany, civilian administration was chaotic, while the Nazi leadership was riddled with intrigues as the jockeying began to succeed Hitler: “The life of a single man, after all, is a weak reed on which to pin the difference between great personal power and violent death.” Only the army seemed stable, which was why the elements opposed to Hitler were gathering there.

Hitler himself did not seem alarmed by any of this: to the contrary, he appeared ready to authorize a new wave of terror, designed to sweep away the slightest manifestations of independence. Either the gods were “making mad a man whom they would destroy,” or Germany’s future, and that of Europe, “is destined to be more gruesome than any of us have ever conceived…. Everything or nothing. Either we win or we pull the whole house down.”⁵⁸

X.

Kennan acknowledged, in retrospect, that “perhaps those of us who served in Moscow were not quick enough to understand the whole Nazi phenomenon, because we couldn’t imagine that there could be any regime as nasty as the one with which we were confronted.” There is something to this when it comes to the period before Kennan was sent to Czechoslovakia and Germany. He had, after all, found the latter state to be a “great garden” when he traveled through it in the spring of 1936, after two and a half years in the Soviet Union. What he saw in Prague in 1938–39, however, dispelled whatever illusions he may have had about the Nazi regime. His analyses of it from then on were at least as critical as his earlier assessments of its counterpart in Moscow. He certainly believed that Germany posed a greater threat than the U.S.S.R. to the balance of power in Europe, and hence to the security interests of the United States. And through Annelise’s family, he had a personal stake in resisting the Nazis: “I was married to a woman whose father was tortured and nearly killed in Norway by these people.”⁵⁹

He was by no means anti-German. He relished the language, respected the culture, and recognized repeatedly that not all Germans shared the brutality of their leaders. He dealt with Germans professionally and met them socially: that was part of his job. He wrote, and years later published, sympathetic sketches of German women forced to survive by granting or selling sex.⁶⁰ He acknowledged acts of mercy on the part of the German troops that had just invaded France. He was fully aware that the German army—Hitler’s principal weapon of destruction—also harbored such resistance as there was to him. He also saw, however, the selective morality of that organization, not least in the fact that it could treat Jews and Czechs no differently from Sudeten Germans, but then with equal ease hand the former over to the Gestapo. He caught the compulsive efficiency of Germans in small things like mending clothes or cutting book pages, but also their gross inefficiency in managing their own country as well as an occupied continent. And he understood that there would have been a “German problem” even if Hitler had never appeared on the scene: the Germans “were never a problem for the rest of Europe until the country was united.”⁶¹ Kennan’s views on Germany, in short, were as complex as the Germans themselves.

The same was not true of his attitude toward Jews. He had a few Jewish or partly Jewish acquaintances, among them Frieda Por, Anna Freud, and Johnnie von Herwarth. He did more than he acknowledged in his memoirs to rescue Jews: he got Por out of Austria in 1938; he and Annelise did the same for the Jewish friend who took refuge in their apartment in Prague on the day the Germans took over; he worked hard while in Berlin to arrange the exodus of Jewish children. He knew little, however, of Jewish culture. He found Jews as a class exasperating: hence his anger at the parents of Jewish children in Berlin. And like most members of their own generation and the many that preceded it, the Kennans often made references—“fat Jews,” for example—that would today seem anti-Semitic. Even worse was Annelise’s comment—no doubt George shared this view—that while she felt sorry for the Jews on March 15, 1939, she felt “not half as sorry as for the Czechs.”⁶²

Biographers have an obligation, however, to place their subjects within the period in which they lived: it is unfair to condemn them for not knowing what no one at the time could have known. What could the Kennans have anticipated, for example, about the respective fates of Czechs and Jews on March 15, 1939? That the Czechs had lost their independence was clear. That the Jews would have a hard time at the hands of the Germans was also obvious: the violence of Kristallnacht four months earlier left no doubt about that. But that over the next six years Hitler would seek to kill all the European Jews—and would succeed in murdering six million of them—was not at all apparent on the day he invaded Czechoslovakia, even to himself. As his most thorough biographer has pointed out, the Holocaust did not get under way until late 1941, and even then “there was as yet no coordinated, comprehensive program of total genocide.”⁶³

The problem with the future is that it isn’t as clear as the past. That’s why the writing of history generally—and the writing of biography particularly—requires empathy, which is not the same as sympathy. It asks a very simple question: What exactly would I, knowing what they knew then, have done differently?

“THUS FAR BERLIN HAS BEEN AS SAFE AS HIGHLAND PARK,” GEORGE wrote Jeanette on October 29, 1941. He was not sure how long that situation would last, but he wasn’t worried. “The only real chance of my suffering any difficulties (and those would be more of a comic than a tragic nature) would be in the event that we were to enter the war, in which case I should probably be interned by the Germans for a number of weeks, if not months.”¹

He was the first American embassy official to hear the news, by shortwave radio on Sunday evening, December 7, that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. Four days of “excruciating uncertainty” followed, with the German government cutting off cable and telephone links. By Wednesday none remained. Embassy staffers began burning codes and classified files, so thoroughly that ashes drifted over the neighborhood, raising fears for the safety of adjoining buildings. On Thursday the eleventh, sound trucks and a crowd began to gather outside as Hitler prepared to speak in the Reichstag. An inoperative telephone abruptly rang, with word that a car would take the chargé d’affaires, Leland Morris, to a meeting with Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Kennan entertained the Foreign Office escort while Morris got ready: “A stiffer conversation has never transpired.” At the Wilhelmstrasse, Ribbentrop kept Morris standing, subjected him to a tirade, and then handed him Germany’s declaration of war on the United States.

The Foreign Office was as unsure as the Americans of what would happen next. Two more days of limbo followed, with the staff free to work and move about the city. Then, on Saturday the thirteenth, orders came to have everyone ready to leave Berlin the next morning. Embassy personnel would share a special train with remaining American journalists in the city. It fell to Kennan to organize the departure, working with an SS Hauptsturmführer, Valentin Patzak, who would be the Americans’ keeper for the next five months. On Sunday all assembled at the embassy, “only to find the building, inside and out, already guarded by members of the Gestapo, and ourselves their prisoners.”

The group knew nothing of their destination until menus appeared, in the otherwise threadbare dining car, labeled “Berlin—Bad Nauheim.” The latter was a spa north of Frankfurt, where the young Franklin D. Roosevelt had stayed several times with his family. The Americans would be lodged in Jeschke’s Grand Hotel, a once-elite establishment closed since the European war had broken out, but now hurriedly reopened. Furniture was in storage, pipes had burst, staff had scattered, and the manager had gotten twenty-four hours’ notice that he would be housing more than a hundred Americans indefinitely. Morris, nominally Kennan’s superior, left him in charge: “I personally bore the immediate responsibility for disciplinary control of this motley group of hungry, cold, and worried prisoners, as well as for every aspect of their liaison with their German captors. Their cares, their quarrels, their jealousies, their complaints, filled every moment of my waking day.”²

I.

Years later Kennan would complain that historians—and some of his early biographers—had failed to acknowledge his organizational skills: they gave the impression “that I was a totally impractical dreamer, and could never do anything that was worthwhile in an administrative or practical sense.” He had a point. He had, after all, almost single-handedly set up the American embassy in Moscow in 1934. He ran the Berlin embassy between 1939 and 1941, which by the end of that period was providing diplomatic representation for most of German-occupied Europe. And in 1947–49 Kennan would create the first Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State: that organization would never again be as effective as it was under his direction.³

None of these tasks, however, were as difficult as Bad Nauheim. The internees included Foreign Service officers, Army and Navy attachés, journalists and radio correspondents, several wives, a few children, five dogs, one cat, and three canaries. Logistics were a constant worry, the group having encumbered itself with forty tons of baggage, in some 1,250 pieces. They had no way of knowing how long they would be there, and no means of communicating with families and friends in the United States. They were totally dependent on the Germans, who were in turn constrained only by the knowledge that their own diplomats were interned—under much better conditions—at the White Sulphur Springs resort in West Virginia. The Grand Hotel offered greater comfort than that allowed prisoners of war or concentration camp inmates, to be sure. But the food was rationed and mostly unpalatable, the rooms were cold, and recreational facilities were limited. “The boredom, the lack of space, the distance from home and family, and the inevitable friction between people” were bound to cause strains, the principal historian of the internment has written. With Morris having declined the responsibility, “Kennan provided the direction, coordination, structure, and rule enforcement for the entire community.”⁴

Collaboration with the Germans sounded objectionable in principle, but there was nothing to be gained in practice, Kennan believed, by refusing cooperation with Hauptsturmführer Patzak to make the internment run as smoothly as possible. Withholding it would invite punishment, forcing the Americans to treat their interned Germans similarly and delaying everyone’s repatriation. Honesty required openness about what the Swiss—the intermediaries between the Americans and the Germans—were doing to get the group home. Information was unreliable, however, and even scraps could set off rumors, giving rise to false hopes and subsequent disappointment. So Kennan at times imposed censorship, in one instance even confiscating an issue of the internees’ newspaper, the Bad Nauheim Pudding—named for a grimly ubiquitous dessert.⁵

Leadership also involved being an instantly available ombudsman. On January 25—an unusual day only in that he happened to keep a list—Kennan recorded thirty-two tasks performed. They included accounting for lost luggage, obtaining stationery, determining whether photographs could be taken from hotel balconies, drafting memoranda to go to or through the Swiss, discussing the issue of tips with the hotel management, clearing up several misunderstandings with Patzak, reporting a lady’s missing powder case, and placating a husband who came in “to say that he did not want representations made about his wife.” Later, as the weather warmed up, it fell to Kennan to negotiate the use of a nearby field for baseball. The bat was an improvised tree branch. The ball was a champagne cork wrapped in a sock. Kennan played catcher for the “Embassy Reds” against the “Journalists,” under the puzzled supervision of the Gestapo. “I would never reveal George Kennan’s batting average,” Associated Press reporter Angus Thurmer replied when asked half a century later, “nor would I expect him to reveal mine. Gentlemen in this club don’t do that.”⁶

Through all of this, Kennan found the time to become a professor. The setting was “Badheim University,” the school the internees organized to keep themselves busy. Kennan offered a “course” on Russian history, for which he prepared over a hundred pages of lecture notes, some of them scrawled outlines, others typed and finished presentations. They began with the establishment of Christianity and extended—although more thinly toward the end—well into the Stalin era. Apart from his lecture at the Foreign Service School in 1938, these were the first he had ever delivered. They attracted sixty “enrollees,” almost twice the number as the next most popular lecturer. Kennan, the “university” organizers concluded in a written appreciation of his efforts, had “a natural gift for presenting material vividly and interestingly while meeting the highest standards of scholarship.”⁷

The lectures stressed historical continuities—geography, climate, soil, ethnicity, culture—as the best way to understand the Soviet Union now that it had become a wartime ally. One in particular stood out for its application of Freudian psychology: in contrast to his skepticism while in Vienna six years earlier, Kennan was now convinced “that the theory is not without foundation.” The “childhood” of peoples was just as important in determining their character as it was for individuals.

The first five centuries of Russian history had produced an “adolescent” nation with a primitive system of government, a crudely organized society, and an uneducated religious leadership. Beginning with Peter the Great, the tsars embraced modernization but their subjects did not. Industrialization and war in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries widened this gap, so that when revolution came, “the mighty tree of Tsardom, which had lost its roots in the people, could not stand the force of the gale.” It fell with “a suddenness and impact that shook the world.”

Russians at that point “shed their westernized upper crust as a snake sheds its skin,” appearing before the world as a seventeenth-century semi-Asiatic people, with “all the weaknesses of backwardness and all the strength and freshness of youth.” They moved their capital back to Moscow, and an “Oriental” despot—Stalin—installed himself in the Kremlin, bringing with him “the same intolerance, the same dark cruelty, the same religious dogmatism in word and form, the same servility, …the same fear and distrust of the outside world,” that had characterized the premodern tsars. The only difference now was that the Russians made weapons and could use them “with the best of us.” That raised the question, then, when the time came to make peace with Germany, “of whether Russia is to be the confusion or the salvation of the Western European continent.”⁸

Kennan’s image of a tree with thin roots came close to describing his own condition after weeks of confined hyperactivity. In one sense, he recalled, the responsibility of looking after other people from morning to night kept him from brooding too much about himself. But by February he was contemplating the possibility that he might never see his family again. That was when he drafted his long letter to Grace and Joan—never finished—in which he tried to explain what it would be like to grow up with a missing parent. The Kennan and James families, George warned his daughters, were susceptible to depression, even tragedy, but there was “something placid and gay and healthy in your mother’s nature which is a good corrective for all that, and which I hope you have inherited.”⁹

As the days dragged on with no end in sight, Kennan later admitted, “I had moments of real neurosis.” One came on a Sunday when he lunched alone, in “gloomy dignity,” then found in the lobby the luggage from the latest group of Americans to arrive from the latest country swallowed up by the Axis. The hotel had no one to move the bags upstairs, and none of the internees volunteered. So he himself performed the task, shaming a few other Americans into helping him load the elevator. At that point he remembered that his cocker spaniel Kimmy—“an unfortunate beast which [I] had been unable to get rid of in the last harried moments before internment”—had been left alone longer than was wise. Abandoning helpers, luggage, and elevator, George dashed to his room to find the dog surrounded by the shredded remains of the only photographs he had of Annelise, Grace, and Joan. Using the third person, he described what happened next:

That, however, was not the worst experience. Something else happened in April, and it was serious enough for Kennan to resume—briefly—keeping his diary:

So what was this all about? Another sexual indiscretion? An exposure of irresponsibility in some other form? Perhaps even an overblown reaction to having lost his composure and locked himself in his room over the depredations of a dog?

What occurred was less important than what it showed, which was how precariously Kennan balanced leadership against fragility. Both were in evidence on May 5, 1942, the day he got confirmation that the internment was to end: the group would depart by train for Lisbon in a week, and thence by ship home. Kennan drafted the notice, got Morris to sign it, posted it in the empty front hallway, and then walked away. It had required months of work to bring this about, and he was sure that his fellow internees, for the most part, would be ungrateful.

There were complaints about being limited to a single carry-on bag on the train, this on a day “when thousands of people are dying… for what they conceive to be important issues.” Kennan was so disgusted “that I couldn’t bring myself to go down to dinner and have locked myself in my room for the evening.”¹²

He was also, by this time, fed up with his own government. There had been no communication from the State Department, even through the Swiss, until shortly before the departure. At that point two messages arrived, neither of which boosted morale. One announced that the Foreign Service officers would not be paid for the period of their internment, since they had not been working. A second raised the possibility of sending only half of the internees back on the Drottningholm, the designated Swedish repatriation ship, in order to make room for refugees, presumably Jewish. “Mr. Morris and I succeeded in warding off both of these blows.” It was not, Kennan explained years later, that “you didn’t want the Jews to come.” But “my God, this was an exchange ship.” If half the Americans hadn’t come, half of the Germans wouldn’t have been repatriated either. “We didn’t know anything about [the Holocaust], and obviously being prisoners we didn’t learn anything about it.”¹³

The Americans arrived in Lisbon on May 16, a day on which Kennan indulged himself in two long-postponed pleasures. One was a hearty breakfast at the Spanish-Portuguese border station, which he, as the internees’ official representative, was able to enjoy while they remained, enviously hungry, on the train. The second was a poem composed—it showed—on a full stomach:

The Drottningholm sailed, well supplied, on the twenty-second, with the ship’s name and the word “DIPLOMAT” painted in huge black letters against its white sides to ward off submarine attacks. It arrived safely arrived in New York on the thirtieth.¹⁴

II.

Annelise had rented a house in Bronxville, New York, shortly before Pearl Harbor, and was there with the children when she learned of George’s internment. The State Department told her not to expect him back before March: “I just keep praying that nothing will happen to make it more complicated than it is.” Beyond that, she had no information: “I never had heard a word about him. No communication whatever.” Shortly before his release, George was able to send a message through the department asking about his family. It reached Annelise as a telegram from the secretary of state. “I was sure he was dead,” she recalled. “I was so furious. I sat down and wrote a telegram [that] said: ‘I’m glad for the first opportunity to tell where we are and the welfare of the children.’ He never got it.”¹⁵

Frieda Por, who examined George soon after his return, found that he had lost fifteen pounds, his stomach problems had returned, and it had been only “through the exercise of great willpower that he was able to continue carrying out his heavy responsibilities.” On the basis of her report, the State Department authorized a forty-five-day leave.¹⁶ The Kennans used it, not to relax, but to buy a farm.

“I am a great believer in the power of the soil over the human beings who live above it,” George had told his Badheim University “students” in one of his lectures on Russian history. His private reasons for wanting a farm were more complicated. A happy personal life, he had concluded while interned, would never be possible. Professional satisfaction was out of reach because Americans, “biologically undermined and demoralized,” had a broken political system. The solution, then, was “the sort of glorified gardening called gentleman farming, …the only form of playing with toys which is not ridiculous in elderly men.” (George was thirty-eight at the time.) But he could not ask his wife and children to give up “the advantages of education and all personal amenities.” The ideal thing, therefore, would be to combine agriculture and diplomacy, “[f]or the same sort of catastrophe is not likely to hit both of them simultaneously.”¹⁷

The Kennans had no farming experience: only a book, called Five Acres and Independence. They would not be able to manage a farm alone, but they could, Annelise pointed out, rent it to a resident farmer: “I’m always a little more realistic than George.” Wisconsin was out as long as he remained in the Foreign Service, so the farm would have to be near Washington. They began looking, then, in the Gettysburg region of southern Pennsylvania. “It is lovely rolling country, with beautiful rich soil,” George wrote Jeanette.

By the last week in June, the Kennans had given up the Bronxville house, stored their furniture, and set off “after the fashion of modern pioneers: the whole damned family, including the dog [the disgraced Kimmy, now forgiven], the phonograph and the typewriter, in an old Ford car—and with no home on the face of the globe.” Their address, for the near future, would be simply “General Delivery, Gettysburg, Pa.”¹⁸

“[W]e haven’t bought a farm yet,” Annelise added a few days later, but despite the temptation “to say to hell with it all, let’s go somewhere nice where we can swim and sail and loaf,” they were still at it “with all the perseverance that a Scott [sic] and a Norwegian can muster.” They had seen one promising possibility: a 238-acre farm with an enormous three-story house, a smaller one for a tenant farmer, a tobacco barn, and a three-car garage, owned by the children of a Jewish emigrant, Joseph Miller, who had used it as a temporary refuge for Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. The house was ugly, awkward, filled with junk, and had not been cleaned since the old man’s death: “It was just like the Cherry Orchard without the orchard.” The price was $14,000, which would require, Annelise worried, “such a big mortgage.” A few days later, she wrote again: “Jeanette, hold on tight—yesterday we bought it!”¹⁹

On July 21, 1942, George reported to his sister that the family had spent its first night in their own house. There had been cobwebs everywhere, “and I had no idea what sort of beasts or ghosts would emerge.” Only a few doors had banged, though, and “we are starting on our first full day of country life.” The motor for the pump had rusted and the well had silted up, but “never mind, we’ll make it.” By the next morning, he was relishing

It was not clear “whether we’ll be able to swing it financially, or whether [the farm] will gradually eat us up and ruin us, too.” But he had no regrets. “I have the sense of having my hands on something really solid…. I can see the results of my own handiwork, and they are results that last.” On the door frame leading into the house the Kennans discovered—and thought it right to keep—a mezuzah, the Jewish acknowledgment of the blessings of life.

That evening George took Grace, one of the tenant farmer’s children, and Kimmy on a walk through towering stalks of corn. While the dog flushed pheasants and chased rabbits, George climbed a cherry tree to survey his estate. It was astonishing, he explained to his sister,

Located just outside the village of East Berlin, Pennsylvania, the farm allowed at least one economy. Beginning with this letter, and continuing until the supply ran out, the Kennans used stationery George had brought back from the other Berlin, scratching out the German street address and adding a carefully placed “East” and “Pa.”²⁰

The East Berlin News-Comet reported on July 24 that the Miller farm had been sold to “a Mr. Kennedy of New York and Washington, D.C.,” who with his wife and two children would use the property for leisure activities and as their summer home. The editor, Harriet Tierney, had gotten the news from the town barber, Lavere Burgard, who later corrected the story to say that the name was more like “Cannon” and that the buyer “had something to do with the government.” The George Shetters, who owned the local restaurant, confirmed this information, noting that the gentleman in question had made a long-distance phone call from there. East Berlin had little experience with important outsiders, and so the rumors began to fly. Mrs. Tierney then took it upon herself to settle the matter by driving out to the Miller place to find out who the newcomers were. Satisfied, she wrote another story introducing the Kennan family to East Berlin.²¹

III.

The psychological distance between the two Berlins was even greater than the physical distance, so for the moment—uncharacteristically—George Kennan was happy. But he was still in the Foreign Service and there was still a war on; hence on September 8, 1942, George loaded his family into the back of a borrowed milk truck, leaving Kimmy—who was to stay behind on the farm—racing desperately after them. Grace went to Washington, where she would spend the year in boarding school, while Annelise and Joan accompanied George back to Lisbon: his new assignment was to be counselor at the American legation in Portugal. The trip this time was by air. “It is just surreal to go so far so fast,” Annelise wrote of the three-day flight via Bermuda and the Azores. “Somehow it doesn’t seem right.” She regretted leaving so soon. “Little by little my roots have fastened in the States,” she assured Jeanette. “I like the country and love the people—in spite of what George thinks of them.”²²

George, for his part, accepted the wartime obligation of overseas service but envied those who could perform it in uniform. Military life carried risks, but survivors would return with the laurels “simply by virtue of their participation.” Diplomacy too had its dangers, but there would be no rewards.

Internment had at least taught him that “there is nothing worse than a vacillation between hope and despair.” Strength came from having one or the other—“possi-bly they are the same thing.” Kennan recorded these gloomy thoughts because “I feel that if I hold them constantly before me I shall be able to do my job with greater detachment, greater humor, less nervous wear-and-tear, and, paradoxically, greater enjoyment.”²³

“I am neither happy nor unhappy,” he wrote Jeanette from Lisbon. He could never feel at home in a place, however beautiful, “where it never snows, where the hot summer is the dead dormant season, and where the grass gets green and the crops are put out in the fall. But I’m doing my job as best I can and—hell—it’s war.” Finances were again a problem: “We are broke, as usual.” Portuguese living costs were high, Grace’s school fees were a drain, and income from the corn crop had been slow to show up: “I hope the people in East Berlin won’t get too excited about our arrears.” Annelise was helping out by working in the legation press office. She found it “fun to get into a field which the Germans have had very much to themselves and see the results.” Nevertheless, she added, “[w]e almost turn handsprings to save 15 dollars a month.”

With the Anglo-American landings in North Africa on November 8, the war news was better. But Annelise’s family in Norway was having a hard winter, and early in 1943 she learned that her father had been arrested. “He will take it,” George told Jeanette, “just about the way our father would have, in similar circumstances.” It was, though, Annelise emphasized, a grave, even life-threatening situation, made all the more frustrating by the fact that there was nothing they could do to help. Meanwhile George’s job offered “no triumphs, no glory, no recognition—not even the satisfaction of physical hardship and combat. When the war is over, I won’t even want to talk about it.”²⁴

There was one unexpected drama, though. On February 22, 1943, the Pan American Airways Yankee Clipper, a long-distance seaplane that set the standard for luxury transatlantic air travel at the time, crashed in the Tagus River as it was landing in Lisbon. Rushing to the scene, Kennan found, among the survivors, his Princeton classmate and fellow Foreign Service officer W. Walton Butterworth, who despite being in shock had managed to swim to shore with a briefcase of classified documents. George got him to a hotel and into a hot tub, filled him full of brandy, and pinned the papers on a clothesline to dry. The clothes, presumably, were left to dry on their own.²⁵

Portugal, with Spain, had maintained an uneasy neutrality in the war. But whereas Generalissimo Francisco Franco had tilted his country toward the Axis, the Portuguese, honoring the spirit if not the letter of their ancient alliance with Great Britain, had inclined in the opposite direction. Politics and geography attracted intelligence services from all sides: Kennan estimated that eleven operated in Lisbon simultaneously, several of them employing double agents. “There were so many spies,” the British diplomat Frank Roberts recalled, “that they completely obliterated each other.” One of Kennan’s unannounced tasks was to try to straighten out at least some of the confusions.²⁶

There were many. The Office of War Information was portraying the Portuguese prime minister, Dr. António Salazar, as a Franco-like fascist. The Board of Economic Warfare was withholding food and arms in an effort to discourage the Portuguese from providing wolfram and other strategic commodities to the Germans. The Office of Strategic Services was organizing a rebellion against Portuguese rule in the Azores. The British were stockpiling fuel there with a view to securing air and naval bases for the forthcoming invasion of Western Europe. Meanwhile Bert Fish, the amiable but placid American minister in Lisbon—Roosevelt appointed him as a favor to a Florida senator—had made no effort to reach any agreement with Salazar on overall Portuguese-American interests. “Ah ain’t goin’ down there and get mah backsides kicked around,” Kennan recalled him explaining. “He’s too smaht for me.”²⁷

Sorting this out required that Kennan focus for the first time on grand strategy. What, exactly, did the United States want from Portugal? To what extent were its practices consistent with its priorities? Were those priorities consistent with one another? Did any single agency or official know everything that was going on, or care? How did all of this relate to winning the war, or to what would happen when peace returned? The problem was not just that of a right and left hand failing to communicate. The more appropriate analogy would have been a confused Hindu deity with multiple arms, each appendage busily at work on projects of which the others were unaware.

Kennan’s first approach was a traditional one: he studied the situation and, in February 1943, drafted a long analysis, sent under Fish’s name to the State Department, which specified, as the critical American interest, obtaining the Azores bases. It suggested letting the British negotiate the arrangements, justifying them under the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1373. Any other course, it warned, risked destabilizing the Salazar regime, perhaps even provoking German intervention. When the department did not respond, Kennan followed up with another dispatch pointing out that Salazar seemed inclined toward an alliance with the Western powers. This elicited no reply either, just “that peculiar and profound sort of silence which is made only by the noise of a diplomatic dispatch hitting the Department’s files.”²⁸

By early April, Kennan was complaining privately about having to clean up the messes inexperienced people had made, while coping with lack of interest and confidence on the part of bosses. The frustrations were such that his ulcer—“that modern mark of distinction”—had returned, requiring a trip home for treatment. He was not as ill as he had been in Moscow, he told Jeanette, but “an ulcer is an inexorable sort of thing. You just have to let down.” George got to Washington in June, retrieved Grace from her school, and spent a few weeks with her on the farm: “I simply love the place.” Both then sailed for Lisbon on July 21, giving George the time, while at sea, to reflect on his country, and its capacity to lead the world.²⁹

IV.

He did so in a ten-page single-spaced typed letter, intended only for Jeanette, which began with all the forebodings about America that his encounters with it—however brief—tended to set off. There had been a “retrogression” in civilian life “no less inexorable than our military advance…. I sometimes wonder whether, as in the case of declining Rome, its pace is not the price we are paying for the victory in arms.” Familiar worries followed about industrialization and urbanization, compounded now by the question of where ten million veterans would find jobs after the war. Hundreds of intellectuals were planning the future of postwar Europe. “Is there no one with sufficient leisure to contemplate a postwar America?”

Here, though, there was a shift in Kennan’s thinking. In 1938 he had seen authoritarianism as a solution for the nation’s problems. Since that time he had witnessed European authoritarianism and worse: the greatest danger to the United States, he now believed, could come from a homegrown dictatorship. The cause would be the “petty-bourgeois jealousy which resents and ridicules any style of life more dignified than its own—a phenomenon of which we saw much in Nazi Germany.”

It followed, therefore, that some “enlightened and responsible” minority—not necessarily one of wealth—must gain power “if anything is to impede in our country the organic progress of political form from demagoguery to dictatorship.”

Only in this way could two more vulnerable minorities be protected. One was blacks, “a gentle and lovable people” who had never adjusted to urban life, followed “every sort of quack or extremist,” and thus were fanning “a racial antagonism from which no one except the outright enemies of our people could possibly profit, and which may have the gravest of consequences to the negroes themselves.” Jews were the other endangered group. Twenty centuries of experience had shown that they would never assimilate, but Hitler had made it impossible even to mention this problem: instead “our leftist press [howls] down as a fascist and anti-semite anyone who suggests that it might be officially recognized and given governmental consideration.” Both issues needed to be resolved if “[b]eat the negroes” and “beat the Jews” were not to become the slogans “for the solution of difficulties utterly unconnected with those unfortunate groups.”

With respect to foreign policy, the aftermaths of wars were decisive moments when lines were drawn that could last for generations. The United States had had the opportunity to do that after World War I but “muffed” it. “If we muff this, too, can we be sure that we will be given a third?”

Without an American effort to set postwar standards of international conduct, they would find their own level—probably that of the “rising masses” of Asia—at which “no humane, well-meaning people like our own could exist. Our position—and with it all that we prize in internal liberty—is one that can be maintained only by the firm, consistent and unceasing application of sheer power, in accordance with a long-term policy.”

That would require professionalism: a state, like a business, must, if it wished to survive, find the courage to select “a few people in whose intelligence and integrity it has confidence” and to delegate to them over long periods of time not only responsibility for the execution of policy but also its formulation. In fact, though, the United States was approaching the postwar era with no such vision. Diplomacy was not “improvisation” or “exhibitionism” or “missions-to-Moscow”—here Kennan was slamming Joe Davies’s recently released movie by the same name, which dramatized his Moscow experiences in a way that even sympathizers with the Soviet Union thought whitewashed the Stalin regime.

“Against the pageant of history we cut a small and distinctly episodic figure,” George concluded. “Ignorant and conceited, we now enter blindly on a future with which we are quite unqualified to cope.” He assured Jeanette, at the end of these “lugubrious” observations, that he had not lost hope. There were in the American character great reserves of decency and humor and good nature. But if these assets were to yield a return, “then new forms must be found, new ideas must gain currency, new associations of collective effort must come into being.”³⁰

“Don’t take it too seriously,” he added in a postscript from Lisbon, written before sending off this long screed.³¹ Jeanette knew him well enough not to. She understood her value to George as a confidante, as a therapist, and even—as in this letter—as a soapbox. He had long relied on, and benefited from, her patience: she provided a mirror in which he could, from time to time, examine himself.

This particular reassessment showed Kennan beginning to connect his obtuseness regarding America and his astuteness with respect to the world. His experiences in Czechoslovakia and Germany had purged him of the simpleminded view, expressed in the “Prerequisites” essay of 1938, that a dictatorship might be good for the United States. He was not so sanguine as to assume, however, that one could never arise there: he understood how it had happened in Germany and refused to rule out the possibility that American reserves of decency and good nature might be exhaustible. However exceptional his own views of it were, he never believed that his country could exist as an exception to what was happening elsewhere.

Kennan’s most significant argument, however, was that the United States, for better or for worse, had gone beyond discovering the world: whatever it did now would shape the world. That was a task, he believed, for which the nation was unprepared, and his Portuguese experiences had done nothing to reassure him. He began to develop, as a result, a new sense of responsibility within the duties assigned to him: at several points over the next few years Kennan took risks that jeopardized his own Foreign Service career because he thought that the national interest demanded that he do so. Obliged to operate for the first time at the level of grand strategy, he found the rules of his profession falling short. He chose, successfully but dangerously, to violate them.

V.

“It was a good thing that I returned when I did,” George wrote in his postscript to Jeanette, “for the Minister here died… when I was on the boat, and it was high time I was getting back to my little parish.” Fish’s death left Kennan in charge of the legation at a critical moment. The British, he learned, had concluded a secret agreement with the Portuguese on August 17, 1943, allowing them to use the Azores bases. They had informed the State Department, but it had given the Lisbon legation no guidance as to what the American response should be. “We have no idea of the views of our Government,” Kennan complained on September 9, despite the fact that this development “is of the greatest importance for the future correlation of military and political power in the whole Atlantic area.” James C. Dunn, the department’s adviser on political relations, replied lamely that the Anglo-Portuguese negotiations had been handled “in the highest quarters” and that “we have no clearer picture than you of the general plan.”³²

Finally on October 8, the day the British landed on the islands, the department instructed Kennan to assure Salazar that the United States respected Portuguese sovereignty “in all Portuguese colonies.” No further explanation was provided. Minutes before he was to meet Salazar on the tenth, however—the prime minister having returned to Lisbon to receive Kennan’s message—the department rescinded the instruction. At this point, exasperated but thinking quickly, Kennan decided to exceed his instructions. He reminded the puzzled Salazar that there had been no general discussion of the Portuguese-American wartime relationship and proceeded to conduct one. He then told the State Department what he had done, only to receive an equally puzzled reminder that it had always been American policy to “promote our trade and have pleasant relations with the Portuguese people.”³³

Then, on the sixteenth, another department cable arrived instructing Kennan, “by direction of the President,” to “request” the American use of Azores facilities on a scale far larger than anything the British had asked for or obtained. Convinced that such an unexpected communication would provoke Salazar’s wrath—if not his resignation—Kennan took a second unusual step: he refused to carry out a White House order and asked permission to return to Washington to explain why, if necessary to the president himself: “I am willing to take full personal responsibility for this position.”³⁴

That message made its way back to FDR, who asked for Kennan’s reasons in writing and, when given them, replied that he would “leave to your judgment and discretion the manner of approach to these negotiations.” Vastly relieved, Kennan went to the Foreign Office in Lisbon and told “a whopping lie”: that the State Department had now authorized him to extend a previously contemplated but delayed acknowledgment of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese possessions, including the Azores. This elicited an appreciative message of gratitude from the Portuguese minister in Washington “for the guaranty thus given.” But it in turn puzzled the State Department, causing the under secretary of state, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., to tell a colleague that the Portuguese diplomat had thanked him “for some damn guarantee, and said that he always knew we would want facilities in the Azores. Now what in the name of hell did he mean by that?”³⁵

Kennan himself—revealing nothing—witnessed that exchange, having been abruptly and without explanation ordered back to Washington. The trip took five days, flying by way of South America and Bermuda, so there was plenty of time to worry: he arrived “unnerved, overtired, jittery, not myself.” Stettinius hustled him off to the Pentagon, where he found himself facing General George C. Marshall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who was in a particularly bad humor that day. All were angry about the delay in securing Azores base rights. A confused discussion ensued, which Stimson ended by telling Stettinius that the State Department needed “a full-fledged ambassador” in Lisbon who could “give proper attention to our affairs at this important post. Will you see to that, Mr. Secretary?” Kennan was then told to leave.³⁶

Angry with himself for having failed to explain the situation adequately, convinced that he knew more about Portugal than anyone else in Washington, Kennan took yet another unorthodox step: he got in touch with the president’s chief of staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, who had been a fellow passenger the year before on the Drottningholm. Leahy arranged a meeting with Roosevelt’s top aide Harry Hopkins, who then took the surprised Kennan to see the president himself. FDR listened cheerfully to the whole story, told Kennan not to worry “about all those people in the Pentagon,” and drafted a personal letter to Salazar recalling that as under secretary of the Navy after World War I, he had been responsible for dismantling Azores bases used by the Americans and returning them to Portuguese control. “I do not need to tell you the United States has no designs on the territory of Portugal and its possessions…. I do not think our peoples have been in close enough touch in the past.”³⁷

That, Kennan recalled, produced the desired results: “I went back with that letter and opened negotiations with Salazar…. [W]e spent many hours in conversation, [and he] agreed to our use of the British facilities.” Afterward Kennan was able to reconstruct what had happened. The Pentagon had seen only his refusal to execute Roosevelt’s order, but not his explanation or FDR’s approval of it. The State Department, “accustomed to sneezing whenever the Pentagon caught cold,” had simply transmitted its demand for Kennan’s recall, without attempting to clarify the matter. The episode illustrated how poor communication had been within the American government, so much so that four years later Kennan turned it into a case study, at the newly established National War College, on the need for closer political-military coordination. It was, one of his students commented, “a hell of a way to run a railroad.”³⁸ But the episode also showed—for all his nervousness—a growing self-confidence on Kennan’s part.

During the Azores base negotiations, Kennan violated at least four rules, any one of which could have got him sacked from the Foreign Service. He exceeded his instructions in a conversation with a foreign head of government. He refused to carry out a presidential order. He lied, to another government, about the position of his own. And he went over the heads of his superiors in the State Department—as well as the secretary of war and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to make a direct appeal to the White House. He turned out to be right in the end and so enhanced rather than ruined his reputation: he even received, from the secretary of state, personal congratulations for “the rapid and substantial progress made.” In this sense, Kennan passed his own test of hoping “to do better than other, less experienced men.” There were, however, many more experienced men in the department who viewed Kennan’s Azores “adventures,” despite their favorable outcome, “with a disapproval bordering on sheer horror.” They considered him, Kennan’s British friend Frank Roberts guessed, “very foolish, and rather lucky to get away with it.”³⁹

VI.

Kennan’s next assignment—there having been no enthusiasm on his part or the department’s for his staying in Lisbon—did little to reassure him about Washington’s coordination of military operations with political objectives. The new job was that of political adviser to the American ambassador in Great Britain, John G. Winant, who would be representing the United States on the recently established European Advisory Commission. Created by the British, Americans, and Soviets late in 1943, this organization’s chief responsibility was to settle the terms of Germany’s surrender and to agree on plans for the postwar occupation of that country. But Washington had reached no consensus on how to handle these matters: as a consequence, the EAC could accomplish little. “So far as I could learn from my superiors in the department,” Kennan remembered, “their attitude toward the commission was dominated by a lively concern lest the new body should at some point and by some mischance actually do something.”⁴⁰

The inactivity might have been harmless had the British and Russians remained similarly inactive, but they did not. By February 1944 both had submitted draft surrender documents, and they had even agreed on occupation zone boundaries. Under their plan, the British would control the northwestern third of Germany, the Americans the southwestern third, and the Russians the eastern third. Berlin, deep within the Soviet zone, would be jointly occupied. Winant pressed Washington for a reaction, but for several weeks received no response. The State Department then forwarded, on March 8, a completely different plan, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that awarded the United States 46 percent of Germany’s territory and 51 percent of its population, while pushing the Soviet zone far to the east. The proposed boundaries broke up existing German administrative districts but did not extend all the way to the Czech border, leaving control of that region undetermined. No explanation accompanied this plan: Winant was told simply to put it before the EAC as the American position.⁴¹

Kennan’s Azores bases experience left him in little doubt about what had happened. Once again the Joint Chiefs had elevated military convenience above all else, and the State Department had unquestioningly passed along their plan. This time Kennan did not have to offer to return to Washington to explain the plan’s deficiencies: his chief, Winant, sent him. The flight, by way of Iceland and Newfoundland, was the worst yet. The plane’s heating system failed halfway across the Atlantic, and while landing at Gander its brakes froze, causing it almost to slide off the runway into the sea. Kennan arrived in Washington again “dazed and unnerved by the vicissitudes of wartime intercontinental travel.” His reception, however, was considerably warmer than it had been the previous fall.⁴²

“The President was kindly, charming, and talked to me at some length,” Kennan reported to Bullitt, with whom he stayed. When shown the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal, FDR “laughed gaily and said, just as I had expected him to say: ‘Why that’s just something I once drew on the back of an envelope.’” The president agreed that the proposal made no sense and authorized Winant to accept the British-Russian alternative. He spent most of the interview fretting about the British occupation of northwestern Germany—FDR wanted the Americans there—but he showed no concern about Berlin lying within the region the Russians would control. Kennan was relieved to have the confusion cleared up but irate that it had again fallen to him to do it. “Why it should have been left to a junior officer such as myself to jeopardize his own career by going directly to the president on these two separate occasions—why the Department of State could not have taken upon itself this minimal responsibility—was a mystery to me at that time.” It remained so when Kennan wrote that passage in his memoirs more than two decades later.⁴³

Apart from their speed, one of the few benefits of long, uncomfortable transatlantic flights—Kennan took seven between September 1942 and March 1944—was that they allowed time to read: the noise level made conversation impossible. So his traveling companion was Edward Gibbon. It’s not clear how much of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire he got through, but it was enough to influence his thinking on the problems of occupying the territories of defeated adversaries. One passage particularly stuck in his mind. “It is incumbent on the authors of persecution,” Gibbon had written, “to reflect whether they are determined to support it in the last extreme.” If they did so, they risked “excit[ing] the flame which they strive to extinguish; and it soon becomes necessary to chastise the contumacy, as well as the crime, of the offender.”⁴⁴

That, Kennan believed, was what the policy of unconditional surrender, agreed upon by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Casablanca conference in January 1943, was likely to do. It suggested no concern over “the amount of responsibility we are assuming in Germany.” It reflected “no desire, and no real plan, for acquiring allies and helpers among the German people.” It implied taking the harshest measures possible “short of actual physical extermination.” It would demand “a ruthlessness now foreign to our troops,” giving them “the worst possible lessons in the practices of government.” And, he added, “[i]t will certainly require, to be successful, a far greater degree of unity of purpose and method than can conceivably be achieved at this time between the Russians and ourselves.”⁴⁵

So what to do? “We must keep quite separate in our minds our program for the treatment of Germany, and the type of surrender document we want. The latter should serve the former.” That meant focusing on the military defeat of Germany, the removal and punishment of “the most conspicuous and notorious Nazi leaders,” and the elimination “of all possibility for further oppression and aggression.” It did not mean thorough denazification:

Such an approach would leave no Germans running the country, for “[w]hether we like it or not, nine-tenths of what is strong, able, and respected in Germany has been poured into those very categories which we have in mind.”

Leaving some Nazis in power would not be popular. But the German resistance to Hitler had shown itself to be weak and disorganized, and even if it were stronger, “the worst service we could render to the liberal and democratic elements in Germany would be to saddle them with public responsibility at the moment of catastrophe and humiliation.” Far better, then, to let lesser Nazis bear that burden under restrictions the Allies imposed and leave the German people eventually to kick them out. That would be “a profoundly democratic approach.”

The fundamental American interest in Germany, Kennan concluded in a memorandum he sent Admiral Leahy at the White House, was “to see that no European power acquires the possibility of using Europe’s resources to conduct aggression outside the continent of Europe.” In a broader sense, it was also an American objective “to see that western Europe survives and prospers as a major cultural force in the world.” This would require “patient, persistent and intelligent” efforts over a considerable period of time, with the goal of achieving “the maximum degree of federation in Europe.” That, in turn, would depend upon enlisting German resources in the rehabilitation of European life. And what if the Soviet Union—also an occupier of Germany—should disagree? In that case, “we will be right and they will be wrong, and we will have to find ways of persuading them to accept our view.”⁴⁶

Kennan unburdened himself, while in Washington, to his fellow Soviet expert Bohlen, an increasingly influential adviser to Roosevelt and Hopkins, now back from his own internment in Japan: “Chip was very distressed if I didn’t agree with him, and viewed it almost as a betrayal.” He always seemed to be defending “what the Department did, what the government did.” Bohlen pointed out that “we didn’t have the tradition of fighting a war with an eye on the future.” Kennan, not reassured, was sure that demanding unconditional surrender was dangerous, putting “too much weight on our future relationship with the Soviet Union. We ought to keep our hands free.” For what? Bohlen wondered: “We’ve always wanted to win like a boxing match and get the hell out.” The two friends tried to convince each other through most of the night. Kennan went home weeping with anguish. “I suppose, in a way, I loved him like a brother, …and this is why we argued so.”⁴⁷

Service on the European Advisory Commission confirmed Kennan’s conviction that the U.S. government was woefully deficient at grand strategy, if by that term one meant the ability to coordinate all available means with fundamental policy ends. Military planners were not qualified to take political considerations into account; but the Department of State—which was qualified—refused to take that responsibility. Strategy was emerging, then, from a confusing mix of competing initiatives, false starts, wasted energy, and as he himself had experienced, emergency appeals to the president himself. It was indeed a hell of a way to run the state that was likely to be running the postwar world. In thinking about these problems, Kennan found himself deriving lessons from the running of other worlds; hence his airborne interest in ancient Rome. He had no position yet in which he could apply this approach, which echoed his argument in the Bad Nauheim lectures that the study of history was the most reliable guide to the making of policy. But one would soon come.

VII.

“Mostly, I was unaware of the war that raged around us,” Joan recalled of the two years she spent in Portugal. “We took in some refugee Jewish children for a while, but I didn’t know anything about Hitler’s campaign against the Jews.” Only seven at the time, though, “I must have understood something.” One day, while the family was picnicking, some airplanes flew over. George and Annelise exchanged uneasy glances, enough for Joan to ask: “Are those German bombers?”

Her parents carefully kept whatever marital problems they were having from her, “[b]ut there are always little clues that children pick up.” One day “[m]y mother threw something at my father, either a vase or a lamp. Naturally, this made an impression.” Whether for this reason or not, Annelise and the children spent the Christmas of 1943 in Lisbon without George, who had flown back to Washington for the initial consultations on his EAC assignment: “Terribly disappointing,” she cabled him, but “[w]ill carry on in the best tradition.” He then went directly to London, where Annelise joined him: Joan realized only later how “blissfully ignorant” she had been of the danger they faced from the continuing German bombing of the city.⁴⁸

Soon the stress he was under caused George’s ulcer to flare up again, forcing a brief hospitalization in January. While he was back in Washington at the end of March, Navy doctors advised him “to discontinue all work for a period of time.” Having received this news with “what I suspect to have been some relief,” the State Department “urged me to make the vacation a good long one, and assured me that I had no need to worry further about the affairs of the EAC—another officer would be sent at once to take my place.”⁴⁹

Kennan’s Foreign Service colleagues suspected him, one of them recalled, of using his illnesses to get out of boring jobs and back into the center of things. Certainly he did not stop working—he simply shifted the nature of it. He went to the farm, exhausted himself with physical labor, and as he explained to Bullitt, recovered remarkably quickly:

“Excuse the sloppiness,” George added in a letter to Gene Hotchkiss. “Getting callouses on your hands seems to raise hell with the more delicate capacities, such as letter-writing.” Early in April, still unsure of his next assignment but relieved that it would not be London, George cabled Annelise in Lisbon to suggest that she pack things up and await further word: “Love to yourself and children. Hope we can soon be together.” Three weeks later he was able to add: “Everything fine feeling much improved.”⁵⁰

Life at the farm allowed a brief reversion to bachelor life: George invited his old friend Cyrus Follmer—himself a Bad Nauheim internee, now working at the State Department—to East Berlin for a visit. They reminisced about the other Berlin and the Kozhenikovs, while Cyrus got enlisted in planting more trees. Some of the walnuts, George wrote several weeks later, were “thrusting themselves up with the most uninhibited abandon” while others were “hiding away in the deep grass.” But “to them that last shall be given gifts that no extrovert can boast of: inner strength, and the fortitude born of suffering, and great persistence.” “That my dear Cyrus,” George concluded, “ends my little Sunday morning sermon…. I am apparently going abroad again soon: very far, and for a long time; and I am sad to think how little I am leaving behind in this country, beside these neglected acres, which could draw me back again.”⁵¹

“I AM STILL ENTIRELY IN THE DARK ABOUT WHAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT will assign me to next,” George wrote Gene Hotchkiss from the farm in mid-April 1944. But he added: “I suspect that it will be Moscow; and if it is I am inclined to accept it and go. I spent so many years on Russia that I don’t want them to be wasted. And I feel that… I must live there once more, before I retire from this form of life.” Kennan’s appointment as counselor, the second-ranking position in the U.S. Embassy to the Soviet Union, came through on May 22. It had been in the works long before that.¹

W. Averell Harriman, the American ambassador since October 1943, was as remarkable as his predecessor, Bill Bullitt. The son of the railroad magnate E. H. Harriman—whose biographer, curiously, had been the first George Kennan—young Averell was a Union Pacific shareholder while still a Yale undergraduate and rowing coach. He became a company vice president at the age of twenty-four, five years later founded the bank that became Brown Brothers Harriman, and by the mid-1920s was running one of the first foreign mining concessions in the U.S.S.R. An avid skier, polo player, and racehorse breeder, Harriman was also a high-level fixer, which is why Roosevelt made him Lend-Lease administrator to Great Britain in 1941. There he formed a close friendship with Winston Churchill and an even closer one with the prime minister’s daughter-in-law Pamela, who became his lover and, when he was seventy-nine, his third wife. With aid to Britain flowing smoothly after two years, FDR persuaded the reluctant Harriman to take the even more demanding job in Moscow. Like Bullitt a decade earlier, the new ambassador was determined to have good help.²

“Before I went to Moscow,” he remembered, “I investigated who were the two best Russian experts. They were George Kennan and Chip Bohlen.” But Kennan was handling the Azores bases negotiations, and Bohlen—then head of the State Department’s Soviet desk—was becoming indispensable to Roosevelt as a policy coordinator and Russian-language interpreter. The president therefore promised Harriman, at the Tehran conference in November, that Moscow would be Kennan’s next post. Characteristically, though, he failed to tell the State Department, which instead sent Kennan to London to work on the European Advisory Commission. It took until mid-January 1944 to sort out the confusion, by which time Kennan’s ulcers had made it too risky to send him back to the city that had first provoked them.³

Kennan’s “rest” at the farm brought a rapid recovery, however, and in May Bohlen arranged for him to meet Harriman—a fellow ulcer sufferer—in Washington. The two hit it off immediately, agreeing that Kennan would run the civilian side of the Moscow embassy. Harriman knew of Kennan’s objections to Roosevelt’s policies, but these did not bother him. Secure in his access to the president, self-confident enough to respect expertise he did not have, Harriman appreciated Kennan’s candor: “I never considered a difference of opinion as something objectionable. It was something that I expected, and hoped for, to bring out the facts and establish a sound judgment.”

“Averell Harriman was an operator,” Kennan recalled. “He had a direct line to Stalin, which he thought was the only important thing. I don’t think he attached great importance to our analyses of Russian society.” But by encouraging his counselor to provide real counsel, Harriman gave Kennan the freedom to speak his mind without risking his career, as he had had to do in Portugal and on the EAC. Kennan used the opportunity to mount a sustained assault on Roosevelt’s approach to the Soviet Union.

Most of Kennan’s criticisms remained within the precincts of Spaso House and the Mokhovaya, although Harriman occasionally passed sanitized versions to Washington: “I would change the telegrams he’d drafted, and that sometimes upset him.” Kennan had little sense at the time of whether his “anxious Need-lings” were getting through to his boss. Harriman’s own views on the U.S.S.R. were changing, though, and Kennan helped him find his way. He became, in turn, Kennan’s channel to the highest levels of the American government. Through his official actions Harriman showed, Kennan later acknowledged, that he had not been oblivious to what “caused me such concern.” This was, he was sure, a better way for Harriman to indicate agreement “than by verbally holding, so to speak, my intellectual hand.”

Kennan regarded Harriman as “a towering figure on our Moscow scene, outwardly unassuming but nevertheless commanding in appearance, without petty vanity, intensely serious but never histrionic…, imperious only when things or people impeded the performance of his duties. The United States has never had a more faithful public servant.” Of Kennan, Harriman said simply: “I’ve never been able to work with anyone as closely as I did with him.”⁴

I.

The journey from East Berlin (Pennsylvania) to Moscow required the entire month of June 1944, partly because wartime travel was complicated, but also because the State Department allowed George to stop off in Lisbon to see his family. While he was there, the D-Day landings took place, a long-awaited military breakthrough that made it possible to begin implementing the postwar planning he had witnessed—and worried about—in London and Washington. In response to a request from Henry Norweb, the new minister to Portugal, Kennan laid out the implications for the Lisbon legation staff, making no effort to conceal his qualms.

There was no doubting the heroism or the fighting ability of the men sacrificing their lives for faith “in the ultimate righteousness of our society and in the wisdom of those who lead it.” Americans at home had organized “an amazingly successful war effort, which puts to shame all the predictions about the softness and lack of fibre of our people.” But the Roosevelt administration’s strategy for postwar Europe was ill-conceived, and there was cause for concern that war veterans, when they returned, would find their country a changed and perhaps unsettling place.

Without specifying the details, Kennan portrayed the American approach to the European Advisory Commission as “shallow and often unrealistic.” Washington was proceeding “not from what Europe is, but from what we would wish it to be.” It assumed extreme territorial changes without anticipating the tensions these would create. It was proposing a new international organization, along the lines of the old League of Nations, which would freeze that settlement in place. The resulting repression would “force the vanquished peoples to new feats of inventiveness and organization,” until finally they reached the point at which they could sell their collaboration “to the highest bidder among the erstwhile victors.” It would be, in short, the post–World War I settlement all over again.

Meanwhile the men fighting the war would have to compete for jobs after it, with workers “spoiled by high wages” secured through collective bargaining. Veterans who had faced death on meager pay would have little sympathy for labor unions. When combined with growing racial tensions and increasing juvenile delinquency, it would be “a miracle if we could survive this crisis without violence and disorder.” Americans should not think “that we can avoid at home the appearance of those same forces of ugliness and cruelty and timidity and intolerance which we are now fighting abroad.” This was the clearest expression yet of an idea Kennan had been wrestling with—at times with erratic results—since the late 1930s: that there were no distinct boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs. Americans could not insulate themselves from forces that had disrupted other societies. How they handled these would largely determine what the United States could do in the postwar world.⁵

On June 15 George deposited his baggage at the airlines office in Lisbon, sat with Annelise for an hour at an outdoor café watching Portuguese passersby, and then drove with her to the airport, where “we said another of those tearing watime goodbyes” that had become so familiar. “Don’t worry about me,” she wrote of this latest separation while he was still en route, “because I am feeling quite different about it.” (George had arranged, this time, for Annelise and the children to follow him to his new post.) “But even so, I don’t like it and never will.” Getting to Moscow was more difficult than it had been in peacetime: George’s trip required a circuitous routing across the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the southern U.S.S.R. by whatever air transport was available. It took two weeks, giving him time to read more Gibbon, to keep a detailed diary, and to reflect on the Americans—and Russians—he met along the way.⁶

The journey provided Kennan’s first close look at the U.S. military, and he liked what he saw. On the flight from Gibraltar to Algiers, “I sat proudly side by side with the pilot.” He had never before been on an operational mission, “and I could not have been more pleased.” The next day he found Naples full of “slouching, impassive young American kids” who were running it “pretty damned well.” An Army Air Force general four years younger than he seemed “as efficient as any officer I ever saw.” Kennan spent the night in an Army tent, then used the next morning to reread Gibbon’s account of the Byzantine general Belisarius’s conquest of Naples in A.D. 536. It was a rare opportunity for historical comparison “which only the fortunes of war and the settings of antiquity can provide.”

Most of the Americans with whom he lunched that day, Kennan discovered, agreed with the great historian’s warning that there was nothing “more averse to nature and reason than to hold in obedience remote countries and foreign nations in opposition to their inclination and interest.”⁷ For the moment, this was reassuring. If there was anything “more hopeful than the skill with which our military men pursue the responsibilities of conquest, it is the alacrity with which they again drop them, once their possession is no longer in dispute.” Empires were not their avocation.

The Germans were still much on Kennan’s mind. Prisoners of war, he learned, had been claiming that the Americans were destroying Europe’s cultural values and turning it over to Bolshevism, “that we understand nothing of the continent, and have no plan for its future.” The charge sat strangely, Kennan thought, against discoveries “of SS torture instruments, of bodies without fingernails or toenails, of tons of high explosives hidden in the German Embassy.” But even if accurate, “the fault is still with the Germans for having provoked our intervention.”

This thought too would stick with Kennan: that the national security of the United States was inseparable from the balance of power in Europe. Beyond that, though, the Americans were novices. “The French know exactly what they want, and are quite unreasonable about it. We are the soul of reasonableness and have only the dimmest idea of what we are after.”

No one could say the same of the Soviet Union. “Whoever would understand Russia today should study… the great mass of women of the educated officer class,” Kennan concluded after meeting one of them in Naples. For such women, “work is not a decoration to private life but a stern duty to the state. And independent thought is, as in Nazi Germany, a form of self-corruption, unnecessary, dangerous, immoral.” Nor was the tendency confined to women: it was what Bolshevism had done to Russia. Kennan thought it “the most terrifying and discouraging difference from our own mentality.”⁸

The next few days, which involved stops in Cairo, Baghdad, and Tehran, exposed Kennan for the first time to the Middle East. Overwhelmed by its heat, dust, and languor, repelled by the “religious bigotry” that—in contrast to the Russians—kept the feminine half of society under “indefinite house arrest,” he found little in the region to recommend it. The trip left Kennan with an aversion to what would later be called the “third world” that he did little, in his own later life, to overcome.⁹

In Baghdad, Kennan stayed with Loy Henderson, exiled there by Roosevelt, Henderson believed, for his anti-Soviet views. Stuck in the legation because it was too hot to go out during the day and too dangerous at night, Kennan persuaded himself that the very bleakness of the place might someday tempt Americans into trying to fix it: “If trees once grew here, could they not grow again? If rains once fell, could they not again be attracted from the inexhaustible resources of nature? Could not climate be altered, disease eradicated?” His countrymen would do better to return, “like disappointed but dutiful children, to the sad deficiencies and problems of their native land.”¹⁰

Kennan flew from Tehran to Moscow by way of Baku and Stalingrad on July 1, 1944. In the latter city, everything except the airport seemed to have been destroyed. Lunch was served in a dining hall with few chairs and only one glass, but everyone was good-natured about it: “How deeply one sympathizes with the Russians when one encounters the realities of the lives of the people and not the propagandistic preten[s]ions of their government.” On the final leg into Moscow, “I sat glued to the window, moved and fascinated to see before me again this great, fertile, mysterious country which I had spent so many years trying to understand.” Harriman had a car waiting at the airport, insisted on putting Kennan up at Spaso House, “and with that a new life began.”¹¹

II.

Kennan found the Soviet Union less wracked by fear than it had been when he left it in 1937. Stalin’s purges had long since ended. Hitler’s attack and the brutality that followed had “pulled regime and people together, in a process for which the former, at any rate, can be highly thankful.” Soviet diplomats, to be sure, were still uneasy at social events with their Western counterparts, trying to imagine how what they said might sound “if repeated by an accusing comrade.” But national self-confidence as a whole had been greatly strengthened, for the Russian people had “repelled the invader and regained their territories in a series of military operations second in drama and grandeur to nothing else that the history of warfare can show.”¹²

Life in Moscow, if anything, was harsher than during Kennan’s earlier tour of duty. American embassy personnel had been evacuated to Kuibyshev after the Nazi invasion, leaving Spaso House and the Mokhovaya empty. By 1943, when they returned, both buildings had deteriorated, and not much had been done since to fix them. “All is as well as it could be in our little world,” Kennan wrote Bohlen in September 1944. By that he meant that “the building is falling to pieces, the majority of our cars don’t run, …[and] the mouse population is increasing fast after its war-time vicissitudes.” A State Department report, completed that summer, cataloged with grim precision what anyone assigned to Moscow should bring, keeping in mind weight limitations on airplanes: full dress evening attire with white tie, winter and summer clothing, overshoes and galoshes, socks and stockings, electrical appliances with adapters, radios and phonographs, extra eyeglasses, dental plates and prostheses. It warned not to expect drinkable tap water, fresh fruit, safe milk, palatable eggs, or recreational facilities: “There are no golf courses in the Soviet Union.” And it strongly advised against sending anyone with “chronic, relapsing or recurrent diseases,” such as “gastric or duodenal ulcer[s].”¹³

Despite the vicissitudes, Kennan was happy to be back. “Russia seems something poignantly familiar and significant to me,” he explained to Jeanette, “as though I had lived here in childhood.” Wandering the streets of Moscow and rambling through the nearby countryside left him with “an indescribable sort of satisfaction to feel myself back again in the midst of these people—with their tremendous, pulsating warmth and vitality.” He sometimes felt that he would rather be sent to Siberia with them, “which is certainly what would happen to me without delay if I were a Soviet citizen,” than to live among the “stuffy folk” on Park Avenue.

Having forced himself to acknowledge that he could never become a Russian—“for at the age of forty one cannot afford to be unrealistic”—George had the sense of having passed the point “before which one still hopes for some unfolding of the mystery and after which one settles down to derive such modest comforts as one can from the remaining years of life.”

By the time he wrote this, in early October, Annelise and the children had arrived, by much the same route that George had taken. “I have really enjoyed having the family here,” he wrote Jeanette. “They couldn’t be sweeter, and we have a lovely home life in the little apartment which we inhabited seven years ago.” Grace and Joan were adapting to the life of diplomatic children in Moscow, playing regularly in the Spaso House garden, the closest equivalent to an American backyard. Both girls were learning Russian, and Grace was attending a Soviet school, where she was treated well by her teachers despite the ideological requirements they had to follow. The Kennans visited one day when gifts from America were being handed out. The teachers gave party-line speeches, but George noticed that while these were going on, “little hands were reaching out” attempting to open the packages. These were locked up after the ceremony, and the children never saw them again.

Grace pleased George, one day that fall, by praising him as a father: “I replied that I wasn’t gay enough to make a really good Daddy.” Joan at that point chimed in: “Oh Daddy, that’s all right. With a little forcing, it would do. And if you wouldn’t work in that office all the time.” There were evenings, Joan recalled, when “my father told me wonderful stories that he made up himself, each installment being invented on the spot—they were so good that I wish he had written them down.” He also read from Grimm’s Fairy Tales: “It was one of my father’s lesser known gifts, reading aloud.” Diplomacy made its demands, though: her parents went out a lot, and “my mother would come in and say good night to me before they left.”¹⁴

“George has put on weight since we came,” Annelise reported to Jeanette, “so it looks as if it agrees with him!” But he was working hard, there were plenty of things to “upset a nervous tummy,” and they all missed the farm, as well as the warmth and fresh food of Portugal. Annelise had no formal job in Moscow but spent much of her time introducing Foreign Service wives at other embassies: a whiz at languages, she also acted as their interpreter. That role could be tedious, but there were compensations. “Churchill is here,” she wrote Jeanette in October, “and the big shots are busy and the smaller ones wish they were in on it.” The Kennans fell somewhere in between. British ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr did not invite them to the dinner he gave for the prime minister, which Stalin attended, but they were allowed in afterward to gawk at the great men. “We waited for hours…. [A]t least I can tell my grandchildren that I have seen some of the people who [have] made history.”¹⁵

The American diplomatic community was still small and closely knit. Dorothy Hessman, who became Kennan’s secretary in Moscow and remained with him for almost two decades, recalled little consciousness of rank: “Everybody came to all the parties, and we had a good time together.” There was even an embassy orchestra in which George played the guitar and the double bass: it called itself “The Kremlin Krows” until Soviet officials grumbled about the name, after which it became “The Purged Pigeons.” The American dacha was still in use, there was swimming in the river that ran nearby, and in the winter even a tame form of skiing in the low hills outside of Moscow. “[W]e all saw each other too much,” Patricia Davies remembered. “We didn’t have any choice.” There were feuds and rivalries, “but by and large, people seemed to get along pretty well.” “It was something like a cruise ship,” her husband, John Paton Davies, added, “a rather macabre cruise ship.”¹⁶

Parties, under such circumstances, could become legendary. With Harriman out of town in November 1944, it fell to George and Annelise to organize a Thanksgiving dinner and dance at Spaso House for, as she put it, “the lonely souls in town.” One was Lillian Hellman, the stridently left-wing playwright who with Roosevelt’s support—but to the alarm of the FBI—had recently shown up in Moscow, ill after a harrowing two-week air trip across Siberia. Worried about her health, George arranged accommodations at Spaso, and she had recovered sufficiently by Thanksgiving to join the festivities. That evening Hellman fell dramatically and decisively in love with the embassy third secretary, John Melby. “Whatever might have happened that first night was postponed,” their biographer has written, because Annelise insisted that Melby come back downstairs and dance with her. “But the next morning, at breakfast, they found the magic still held.” The affair, a famous Cold War romance, would continue off and on for the next three decades.¹⁷

A few days before Christmas that year, two American journalists in Moscow, William Lawrence of The New York Times and John Hersey of Time, decided that they would like to have the holiday dinner with, as Hersey wrote his wife, the “Kennons.” But “we couldn’t think of any reason in the world why they should want us.” So why not invite them to dine at the Metropole? “But then we decided that they’d want to have Christmas with their girls and we’d better not do that. We dropped the whole Kennon idea—until about five that afternoon. Then, without any prompting except what she must have gotten by mental telepathy, Mrs. Kennon called me first, and then Bill, and invited us to Christmas dinner! Both of us practically sang into the phone when we accepted.”¹⁸

“There is no telling how long I’ll remain here,” George had written Jeanette that fall. “Presumably at least until both wars are over. But one never knows…. A single wrong word—a single mistake—can only too easily ruin a person’s usefulness in any atmosphere as delicate as this, and among people so hyper-sensitive.” Harriman, however, was “a truly exceptional man, of great courage and competence. I genuinely admire him and have learned a good deal, working for him.” George’s own job was important, “[t]o the extent that Russia’s relations with the United States are important…. That might mean anything, depending on how you look at it.”¹⁹

III.

“Our new minister has arrived so Ave’s thrilled,” Harriman’s daughter Kathleen, who served as his official hostess in Moscow, wrote on July 3, 1944. “The new counselor speaks in Russian perfectly freely,” an aide reported to Molotov a few days later, “quite willingly entering conversation, although in his manner he seems at first reserved and dry.” By then Kennan had already spent hours talking with his new boss: as Harriman’s aide Robert Meiklejohn noted, “[t]he Ambassador put him to work at once.” The topic was probably Poland, for Kennan followed up with the first of many memoranda on that subject.²⁰

History had shown, he wrote, that Germany and Russia tolerated a strong and independent Poland only when they themselves were weak. “Otherwise, Poland inevitably becomes a pawn in their century-old rivalry.” With the Red Army nearing Warsaw, independence looked extremely unlikely. The alternative would not necessarily be communism, but it would involve “extensive control of foreign affairs, military matters, public opinion, and economic relations with the outside world.” As a consequence, the United States should be very careful not to promise the Poles “a prosperous and happy future under Russian influence. Prosperity and happiness have always been, like warm summer days, fleeting exceptions in the cruel climate of Eastern Europe.”²¹

“All interesting,” Harriman commented, “especially last para[graph].” It was indeed, because Great Britain had gone to war in 1939 on Poland’s behalf, and Roosevelt and Churchill had publicly pledged, two years later in the Atlantic Charter, to restore “sovereign rights and self-government… to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” Stalin, however, had paved the way for the German invasion of Poland with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the Red Army had occupied the eastern third of the country shortly thereafter. Hitler’s attack in 1941 placed the Soviet Union nominally on the side of the Polish government-in-exile in London, but the relationship remained wary because Stalin was determined to keep the territorial gains the U.S.S.R. had made, as Germany’s ally, at Poland’s expense.²²

Then in 1943 the Germans revealed that they had found the graves of some fifteen thousand Polish prisoners of war, allegedly shot by the Russians three years earlier, at Katyn Forest, near Smolensk. When the London Poles called for an investigation, Stalin broke diplomatic relations with them and began preparations to set up a Polish government of his own design. At Harriman’s request, Kathleen and John Melby inspected the site early in 1944, after the Russians had recaptured it. They reported that the Germans had killed the Poles, and Harriman accepted their findings. Kennan, still in London, had his doubts—correctly as it turned out—but with no evidence of his own, he fell in “with the tacit rule of silence which was being applied at that time to the unpleasant subject in question.”²³

Meanwhile Roosevelt was running for reelection. With a large, politically active Polish American community in the United States, the last thing he wanted was controversy over Katyn or anything else that had to do with Poland. On his instructions, Harriman told Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, a month before Kennan’s arrival in Moscow, that “the Polish-Soviet question must not become an issue in the forthcoming presidential campaign.” The president was doing what he could to restrain the London Poles and hoped that “whatever the Soviet Government publicly stated would be on a constructive side…. It was time to keep the barking dogs quiet.”²⁴

With that objective in mind, Roosevelt arranged for Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the prime minister of the London Polish government, to visit Moscow at the end of July. He was coming, Kennan warned Harriman, at a moment when pride and elation over Soviet victories had “almost reached the point of hysteria.” The Russians were less worried than ever before about controlling Eastern Europe and would not go out of their way to meet the wishes of émigré Poles. But Harriman refused to pass this depressing conclusion on to Washington. “The Russians have a long-term consistent policy,” Kennan complained in his diary. “We have—and they know we have—a fluctuating policy reflecting only the momentary fancies of public opinion in the United States.” Given this disparity, Americans should stop “mumbling words of official optimism” and instead “bow our heads in silence before the tragedy of a people who have been our allies, whom we have saved from our enemies, and whom we cannot save from our friends.”²⁵

On August 1, 1944, the day Kennan wrote those words, resistance fighters linked to the London Poles seized large portions of Warsaw, in the expectation that the Red Army, which had reached the eastern suburbs of the city, would come to their assistance. But, as he noted on the sixth, “there is some suspicion that the Russians are deliberately withholding support, finding it by no means inconvenient that the Germans and the members of Mikołajczyk’s underground should destroy each other.” These fears seemed confirmed on the fifteenth when Harriman and Clark Kerr asked that British and American planes dropping supplies to the Warsaw insurgents be allowed to refuel at Soviet bases. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Vyshinsky turned them down flat, denouncing the uprising as “ill-advised, …not worthy of assistance.” Harriman returned from this conversation, Kennan recalled, “shattered by the experience.” The ambassador informed Roosevelt later that evening that “[f]or the first time since coming to Moscow, I am gravely concerned by the attitude of the Soviet government.”²⁶

Years afterward Kennan claimed to have concluded that this was the moment for an Anglo-American showdown with the Soviet leadership. They should have been given the choice “between changing their policy completely and agreeing to collaborate in the establishment of truly independent countries in Eastern Europe or forfeiting Western-Allied support and sponsorship for the remaining phases of the war.” The second front had been established. Soviet territory had been liberated. The West had the perfect right to divest itself of responsibility for what their “ally” would now do. The time had come to “hold fast and be ready to drive a real bargain with them when the hostilities [were] over.”²⁷

Kennan’s recommendations at the time, however, were less drastic. Stalin and his subordinates, he reminded Harriman, had “never ceased to think in terms of spheres of influence.” They expected support in such regions, “regardless of whether that action seems to us or to the rest of the world to be right or wrong.” This was not, he admitted, an unreasonable position, because they would surely have respected Washington’s predominance in the Caribbean. The problem was that the American people, “for reasons which we do not need to go into,” had not been prepared for such a postwar settlement, but instead had been led to believe that the Soviet Union was eager to join an international security organization with the power to prevent aggression: “We are now faced with the prospect of having our people disabused of this illusion.” The United States should therefore warn the Kremlin leaders that their actions were making it difficult “for this or any other American administration to do for the Russian people the things which all of us would like to be able to do.” The choice would then lie with Moscow: “If this position is adhered to and if repercussions in American public opinion are unfavorable, Russia has only herself to blame.”²⁸

Roosevelt quickly made it clear, though, that he did not wish to alter his Soviet policy in the light of the Warsaw Uprising, and Harriman followed his lead: “We had to fight the war. Hitler was our main enemy. We shouldn’t let divergence interfere with that.” Kennan, angrier now, suggested that an international force administer postwar Poland. If that were not possible, then the United States should abandon its interests there altogether rather than “to try to defend them in circumstances over which we will have no real influence.” Harriman wrote back bluntly: “George—These are two extremes, and much ‘too extreme.’”

“I didn’t blame Averell for it,” Kennan recalled. “Averell was the President’s personal representative, and he couldn’t join me in these criticisms.” Isaiah Berlin, who knew both men well, explained that Harriman believed in negotiation, “whereas George believed in principle. Those two things could never quite be reconciled. There was no open hostility or tension between them that I know of. But they were very different.” Harriman remembered respecting Kennan’s judgments: “They were accurate but sometimes too impractical to be acted upon.” When he disagreed with Kennan, though, “I simply didn’t bother to waste the time to argue. It didn’t amuse me to do so.”²⁹

IV.

While the Polish crisis was developing that summer, Kennan composed a long essay—the final version came to about twelve thousand words—in which he sought to compress what he knew about Russia generally, and Stalin’s Russia in particular. He submitted it, with some diffidence, to Harriman’s aide: “The Ambassador may want to glance over it. I doubt that he would care to read the whole thing. It is just what he would call ‘batting out flies.’” But Kennan’s hopes for the paper were higher than that: “Conscience forced me… to make this statement at least available to whose who had responsibility for the formulation of American policy. It would be up to them, then, to draw the logical conclusions, if by chance they should be interested.”³⁰

Entitled “Russia—Seven Years Later,” the essay began by pointing out that the residents of a country, like sailors at sea, had little perception of the currents upon which they were floating. “This is why it is sometimes easier for someone who leaves and returns to estimate the speed and direction of movement, to seize and fix the subtleties of trend.” Kennan had used this argument to justify writing about the United States after visiting it—even if briefly—from abroad. It was also why “no foreign observer should ever be asked to spend more than a year in Russia without going out into the outside world for the recovery of perspective.”

The war, Kennan acknowledged, had left the Soviet Union weakened, with some twenty million of its people killed and the destruction of perhaps 25 percent of its fixed capital.³¹ Those losses would be offset, however, by the absorption of new populations to the west—the territorial gains Stalin had demanded and his allies had tacitly granted—together with the relocation and massive expansion of heavy industry required to repel Hitler’s invasion. When set against the coming collapse of Nazi Germany, these would make the U.S.S.R., whether for good or ill, “a single force greater than any other that will be left on the European continent when this war is over.”

That gave its internal configuration international significance. In seeking to map this, Kennan considered first “the spiritual life of the Russian people,” at once “the most important and the most mysterious of all the things that are happening in the Soviet state.” No shepherd ever guarded a flock more carefully than the Kremlin watched “the souls of its human charges,” and they responded with amiable acquiescence: “Bade to admire, they applaud generously and cheerfully. Bade to abhor, they strike a respectful attitude of hatred and indignation.” There was nothing new in such dissembling: Russians had long considered it “a national virtue.” It meant, though, that Soviet leaders could never really know what their people were thinking. “The strength of the Kremlin lies largely in the fact that it knows how to wait. But the strength of the Russian people lies in the fact that they know how to wait longer.”

Culture, in the meantime, was stagnating. The Bolsheviks’ triumph had stimulated creative minds, especially those of Jewish intellectuals: “It was their restless genius which contributed most to the keen and analytical quality of Soviet thought and Soviet feeling in the years immediately following the revolution.” But the Jews suffered disproportionately from Stalin’s purges, and now their influence was almost gone. In its place was a chauvinistic “cult of the past” that smothered innovations connected with the freedom of the spirit, the dignity of the individual, and the critical approach to human society. Only when Soviet power waned would Russian culture again give off those “effervescences of artistic genius” with which it had once “astounded the world.”

Politics, in such a society, could hardly exist: as in most authoritarian states, there was only a struggle to reach the ruler and to control his sources of information. Yet Stalin’s advisers knew little more than he about the outside world. Their judgments might occasionally correspond with reality, but these people were as often as not “the victims of their own slogans, the slaves of their own propaganda…. God knows what conclusions they draw from all this, and what recommendations they make on the basis of those conclusions.”

For this reason, Western concepts of collective security could only seem “naïve and unreal” in Moscow. Soviet leaders paid lip service to these principles when they wanted military assistance from the United States and Great Britain, but with the second front in place, they no longer needed to observe “excessive delicacy.” Their own priorities now took precedence, and these amounted simply to power. The form it took and the methods by which it was achieved were secondary issues: Moscow didn’t care whether a given area was “communistic” or not. The main thing was that it should be subject to Moscow’s control. The U.S.S.R. was thus committed to becoming “the dominant power of Eastern and Central Europe” and only then to cooperation with its Anglo-American allies. “The first of these programs implies taking. The second implies giving. No one can stop Russia from doing the taking, if she is determined to go through with it. No one can force Russia to do the giving, if she is determined not to go through with it.”

Understanding the Soviet Union, Kennan insisted, would require living with contradictions. Russians were used to “extreme cold and extreme heat, prolonged sloth and sudden feats of energy, exaggerated cruelty and exaggerated kindness, ostentatious wealth and dismal squalor, violent xenophobia and uncontrollable yearning for contact with the foreign world, vast power and the most abject slavery, simultaneous love and hate for the same objects.” Their life, hence, was not one of harmonious, integrated elements but an ever-shifting equilibrium between conflicting forces. No proposition about the U.S.S.R. could make sense “without seeking, and placing in apposition, its opposite.” It would also be necessary to realize that for the Soviet regime there were no objective criteria of right and wrong, or even of reality and unreality. Bolshevism had shown the possibility of making people “feel and believe practically anything.” Even an outsider, thrust into such a system, could easily become “the tool, rather than the master, of the material he is seeking to understand.”

Few Americans, Kennan was sure, would ever grasp this. Most would continue to wander about in a maze of confusion, with respect to Russia, not dissimilar to that confronting Alice in Wonderland. For anyone who did penetrate the mysteries, there would be few rewards. The best he could hope for would be “the lonely pleasure of one who stands at long last on a chilly and inhospitable mountaintop where few have been before, where few can follow, and where few will consent to believe that he has been.”

What Harriman thought of Kennan’s essay is not clear, although he carried a copy with him when he returned to Washington in October 1944. Probably as a result, other copies wound up in the State Department files and in the papers of Harry Hopkins. Kennan was “puzzled and moderately disappointed” by Harriman’s silence. He could understand why the ambassador might not wish to comment on content, since it was “politically unacceptable if not almost disloyal, in the light of the public attitude of our own Government.” But “I did think he might have observed, if he thought so, that it was well written. I personally felt, as I finished it, that I was making progress, technically and stylistically, in the curious art of writing for one’s self alone.”³²

That was a shrewd assessment. “Russia—Seven Years Later” was impressive for the way it used the past in order to see the future. Contrary to what almost everyone else assumed at the time, Kennan portrayed the Soviet Union as a transitory phenomenon: it was floating along on the surface of Russian history, and currents deeper than anything Marx, Lenin, or Stalin had imagined would ultimately determine its fate. Decades before the documents opened, Kennan anticipated what they would reveal about the leadership’s ignorance of the outside world. His list of the intellectual adjustments Americans would have to make to understand the U.S.S.R. foreshadowed George Orwell’s dramatization of them, five years later, in his great novel 1984. And the essay was indeed well written.

But as policy prescription, the paper failed. It was far too long and hence too discursive: if Harriman did try to slog through its twenty single-spaced legal-sized typed pages, his eyes probably glazed over when Kennan meandered off into Byzantine influences on Russian architecture, or nineteenth-century Russian music, or the complaint that “the last good novel was written—let me see—at least a decade ago.” Nor was Kennan’s argument always clear. For all the space he gave to it, he failed to explain how Russian culture affected Soviet behavior. He contradicted himself by claiming at one point that Kremlin leaders could never know what their people were thinking, while warning elsewhere of their ability totally to control that thinking. There were no clear recommendations for what the United States should do: this surely would have disappointed anyone who read the essay through to the end. They would have found there, instead, a self-indulgent self-portrait—the lonely expert atop the chilly and inhospitable mountain—which seemed to suggest that only Kennan was qualified to stand on that pinnacle, and that no one would take his conclusions seriously if he reached it. When conveyed in this form, he was correct.

V.

“This is my sixth winter in Moscow,” George wrote Jeanette on January 25, 1945, “and I’m getting pretty well used to them. We are taking things pretty easy and just praying that they will really relieve me here in time to let me get home before the whole spring season is over.” The main subject of this letter—Jeanette having sent Betty MacDonald’s best seller The Egg and I—was chickens: “If we have any of our own on the farm, I’m afraid they’ll have to live by the survival of the fittest.” Jeanette knew her brother well enough to doubt, though, that he would ever take things easily, or that his principal preoccupation was poultry.³³

She would have been right, for on the next day Kennan completed his sharpest attack yet on American policy toward the Soviet Union. It took the form of an eight-page personal letter to Chip Bohlen. Kennan wrote it knowing that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin would be meeting at Yalta on February 4, and that Bohlen—the president’s interpreter—would literally have his ear. He sent it four days after Harriman had left to supervise preparations: Hessman, who typed it, remembered that the ambassador’s absences seemed to liberate Kennan. This document too failed to achieve its purpose: given its startling contents, he could hardly have expected otherwise. But it did, with uncanny foresight, prescribe policy. By the middle of 1947 the U.S. government had agreed to almost everything Kennan had recommended. He was still lonely and unappreciated at the beginning of 1945, but that was only because he was two and a half years ahead of everyone else.³⁴

Kennan began by reminding his old friend of a claim Bohlen had made the previous summer: that if Kennan had not been limited by “the narrow field of vision provided by Lisbon and the EAC, …I would have had more confidence in the pattern of things to come.” Six months in Moscow had expanded Kennan’s horizons, but without changing his conviction that Soviet political objectives in Europe were not consistent “with the happiness, prosperity or stability of international life on the rest of the continent.” Stalin and his subordinates viewed with suspicion “any source of unity or moral integrity” that they could not control. Rather than allow these to exist, there was no evil they would not be prepared to inflict, “if they could.”

No one was to blame for this: the situation was deeply rooted in Russian history and in European geography. Nor did Kennan question the need for Moscow’s assistance in defeating Nazi Germany: “We were too weak to win [the war] without Russia’s cooperation.” Nor could anyone doubt that the Soviet war effort had been “masterful and effective and must, to a certain extent, find its reward at the expense of other peoples in eastern and central Europe.”

He did wonder, though, “why we must associate ourselves with this political program, so hostile to the interests of the Atlantic community as a whole, so dangerous to everything which we need to see preserved in Europe.” Why not instead divide Europe “into spheres of influence—keep ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?” That would allow honesty in dealing with Moscow, while “within whatever sphere of action was left to us we could at least [try] to restore life, in the wake of the war, on a dignified and stable foundation.”

Instead, the Roosevelt administration was refusing to specify American interests in Europe, while going ahead with plans for a new League of Nations with “no basis in reality,” a course that could only accentuate differences with the Soviet Union while giving the American public “a distorted picture of the nature of the problems the postwar era is bound to bring.” As that was happening, political and territorial settlements were being made that would leave the food-producing regions of Germany in Soviet hands, the American and British zones flooded with refugees, and no realistic prospect for cooperative tripartite administration of that country. American influence would be confined “to the purely negative act of destroying Nazi power.”

So what to do? “We should gather together at once into our hands all the cards we hold and begin to play them for their full value.” Plans for the United Nations should be set aside “as quickly and quietly as possible.” The United States should abandon Eastern Europe altogether. And Washington should accept Germany’s division into a Soviet and a consolidated Anglo-American zone, with the latter integrated as much as possible into the economic life of Western Europe. Each of the victors would take reparations from its zone only, on a “catch as catch can” basis. Kennan admitted that this “bitterly modest” program would amount to a partition of Europe. “But beggars can’t be choosers.”

Bohlen received Kennan’s letter at Yalta. He wrote back hurriedly that although its recommendations might make sense in the abstract, “as practical suggestions they are utterly impossible. Foreign policy of that kind cannot be made in a democracy. Only totalitarian states can make and carry out such policies.” What Bohlen meant, he explained in his memoirs, was that democracies

More privately, Bohlen remembered worrying about Kennan’s “damn-it-all-the-hell-with-it-let’s-throw-up-our-hands” attitude. “Obviously you couldn’t do that.” Roosevelt understood that Americans, who had fought a long, hard war, deserved at least an attempt to make peace. If it failed, the United States could not be blamed for not trying. Or as Bohlen put it in his reply to Kennan at the time: “Quarreling with them would be so easy, but we can always come to that.”

Kennan’s letter went nowhere because he destroyed all copies of it—or thought he had—at Bohlen’s request: “That it was written to him while he was at Yalta challenged what the President was trying to do.” But Hessman quietly kept a copy, and as it happened Bohlen did also, even publishing portions of it years later in his memoirs, to Kennan’s surprise. Despite all of Roosevelt’s efforts to get along with Moscow, Bohlen acknowledged, Stalin did “exactly as Kennan had predicted and I had feared.” Even so, Bohlen could not agree “that we should write off Eastern Europe and give up efforts to cooperate with the Soviet Union”—at least not yet.³⁵

VI.

John Paton and Patricia Davies arrived in Moscow, after years of Foreign Service duties in China, at the end of March 1945. They found Harriman functioning at the level of Roosevelt, Stalin, and their respective advisers, mostly from his Spaso House bedroom, where the ambassador would review dispatches late into the night in a dressing gown, in front of the fireplace. “We’d sit around there and chat,” Patricia remembered, while Harriman would feed the fire. “There was something about the way he did it that drove George absolutely up a tree! You could just see him holding himself back, and his eyes, those large eyes, practically popping out of his head.” Kennan would whisper, when Harriman could not hear: “That man doesn’t know how to build a fire!”³⁶

The risk that Harriman might incinerate Spaso House was not Kennan’s only source of anxiety. New York Times correspondent C. L. Sulzberger found him resentful that Harriman had concealed everything from him connected with Yalta. Martha Mautner, who had just joined the embassy staff, saw that Harriman had “both ears to the ground—he was very sensitive to political considerations.” Frank Roberts, now serving in the British embassy in Moscow, recalled Kennan as insisting to Harriman: “You must get home to the president what a terrible villain Stalin is, what awful things he has done.” Harriman’s reaction was: “We’re allies, and we’re fighting the war together. There is a moral consideration which obviously you’re quite right to put to me, but I don’t think I need to put it now to the president.” John Paton Davies remembered Harriman as “a great team player.” He felt “that Kennan was too skeptical, not really at all with the Roosevelt point of view.” Kennan, in turn, “suffered agonies of frustration” over his inability to influence Washington.³⁷

No doubt Kennan was frustrated: that was his normal state. His differences with Harriman, however, were not as great as they appeared to Roberts or Davies—or probably even to Kennan—at the time. The ambassador had been advocating a tougher line toward the Soviet Union since the Warsaw Uprising. “Unless we take issue with the present policy,” he had written Harry Hopkins in September 1944, “there is every indication the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved.” Harriman did not always confide in Kennan, so he may not have realized the extent of his boss’s support for a firmer stance. And they did differ over how quickly such a shift could happen. Kennan, who resented domestic political influences on foreign policy, wanted it to take place at once. Harriman, like Bohlen, knew that this was impossible: “We couldn’t shock people in Washington because we would lose our influence.” It was, therefore, Harriman’s patience that worried Kennan, not any significant disagreement over the postwar intentions of the Soviet Union, or how the United States should handle them.³⁸

The key to changing American policy, Harriman knew, was changing the mind of the president himself. Roosevelt’s declining health—obvious to all who saw him at Yalta—made this difficult: exhausted leaders tend not to embrace new initiatives. Even so, the gap between Stalin’s promises of “democratic” regimes in Eastern Europe and the practices of Soviet officials there was becoming too large even for Roosevelt to ignore. When, at the beginning of April, Stalin interpreted a German surrender offer in Italy as evidence of an Anglo-American plot to divert the remaining fighting to the Eastern front, the president was furious. Had he lived, Kennan later speculated, subsequent history “might have been quite different.” But he was dying, and so he never saw Harriman’s request for permission to tell the Soviet leader that if his government continued its policies, “the friendly hand that we have offered them will be withdrawn and to point out in detail what this will mean.”³⁹

On the morning of April 13, Joan Kennan, then nine, was lying quietly in bed in the Mokhovaya apartment, playing with a kitten. “My father came into the room and said, ‘Joanie, the President is dead,’ and then sat on my bed looking so serious and so sad that I knew this was something very significant.” She could not recall her father ever speaking to her about world affairs, so “I was rather pleased that he thought me old enough to comprehend, at least partly, the significance of such a major event.”⁴⁰

Harriman had been planning a trip to Washington when the news reached him earlier that morning. Knowing the importance of being in the right spot at the right time, he accelerated his departure and so was on hand to advise an inexperienced Harry S. Truman on what he should do. With Bohlen present taking notes, Harriman warned that Stalin had interpreted American restraint as weakness: the view had developed in Moscow that “the Soviet Government could do anything that it wished without having any trouble with the United States.” That left the West facing a “barbarian invasion of Europe.”⁴¹

It’s not clear what Kennan would have said if given the opportunity, but what Harriman said was close enough. He had not been oblivious to the concerns of his anxious subordinate, and now he had the ear of a president with no firm views of his own. The effect on policy, however, was for the moment minimal. Truman gave Molotov a tongue-lashing when he passed through Washington on April 23—even Harriman, who was there, thought it excessive—but the president did not immediately give up on his predecessor’s efforts to enlist Stalin’s cooperation in shaping the postwar settlement.⁴²

There were several reasons for this. One had to do with Molotov’s destination: he was en route to San Francisco, where the conference establishing the United Nations—Roosevelt’s most cherished project—was to open on April 25. With hopes for the new organization as high as they had ever been, the United States could hardly undercut it before it had begun to function. A second reason was military: Pentagon planners, unsure whether the top-secret program to build the atomic bomb would produce a usable weapon, still counted on Soviet assistance in defeating Japan. Finally, Truman had other close advisers to whom he listened. One was Joe Davies, whose persistent desire to give the Soviet Union the benefit of every doubt countered Harriman’s determination to do the opposite.⁴³

From Moscow, Kennan saw little that encouraged him. Taking advantage of Harriman’s absence, he peppered the State Department with an almost daily litany of complaints about Soviet behavior:

Expecting the official announcement, Kennan and Roberts accepted invitations to a gala performance at the Bolshoi Theater that evening, only to find that it celebrated Aleksandr Popov, the alleged Russian inventor of radio.⁴⁴

When the authorities did finally announce the end of the war, on May 9, they and everyone else were unprepared for what happened. The first spontaneous demonstration anyone could remember in Moscow broke out in front of the Mokhovaya, where Soviet and American flags were flying, and it would not disperse. “We were naturally moved and pleased by this manifestation of public feeling,” Kennan recalled, “but were at a loss to know how to respond to it.” Anyone venturing into the street “was immediately seized, tossed enthusiastically into the air, and passed on friendly hands over the heads of the crowd, to be lost, eventually, in a confused orgy of good feelings somewhere on its outer fringes. Few of us were willing to court this experience, so we lined the balconies and waved back as bravely as we could.”

Sensing that more was expected, Kennan climbed precariously onto a pedestal at the base of a column in front of the building to make his first and last public speech in Russian before the walls of the Kremlin: “Congratulations on the day of victory. All honor to the Soviet allies.” This was about all, it seemed, that “I could suitably say.”⁴⁵

VII.

Kennan could, however, write—and the essay he composed that month was neither contradictory nor self-indulgent nor impractical. Entitled “Russia’s International Position at the Close of the War with Germany,” it expressed the hope that peace would not resemble the Russian summer, “faint and fleeting, tinged with reminders of rigors that recently were and rigors that are soon to come.” Reality, though, was likely to be just that. The war was ending with the defeat of two totalitarian states, but a third was poised to dominate much of the postwar world.

This was hardly an original insight. Bullitt had made the same point in a long letter to Roosevelt as early as January 1943. Harriman had been worrying about the war’s outcome since the summer of 1944 and now had influential supporters in Washington: by May 1945, for example, the new secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, had concluded that Soviet ideology was “as incompatible with democracy as was Nazism or Fascism.” That same month Winston Churchill used the phrase “iron curtain” for the first time in seeking to alert Truman to the risks inherent in the way the war was ending.⁴⁶

What set Kennan’s essay apart was not the alarm it expressed but the optimism it reflected: the Soviet Union’s position, he argued, was more likely in the long run to weaken it than to strengthen it. The reasons went back yet again to Gibbon, ancient Rome, and “the unnatural task of holding in submission distant peoples.” The U.S.S.R. had taken over, or incorporated within its sphere of influence, territories that even the tsars had never controlled. The peoples affected would resent Russian rule. Successful revolts “might shake the entire structure of Soviet power.”

Much would depend, therefore, upon the skill with which Stalin’s agents managed their new empire. They had the advantages of geographical proximity, experience in running a police state, and the disorientation the war had left behind. No one could expect popularity, though, “who holds that national salvation can come only through bondage to a greater nation.” The “naked bluntness” with which the Red Army had occupied these territories would make the task of running them even more difficult: in this sense, the Kremlin had been better served by the revolutionaries of the interwar era than by the generals and commissars “whose girth is no less and subtlety no greater than those of the Tsarist satraps of a hundred years ago.”

Nor could Moscow provide economic assets to offset political liabilities. Land reform would not put more food on people’s tables. Trade with the capitalists would undermine self-sufficiency. Heavy industry would drain resources from consumers, forcing them to accept a Soviet standard of living. There would of course be claims of economic success: “Russians are a nation of stage managers; and the deepest of their convictions is that things are not what they are, but only what they seem.” Non-Russians to the west were not likely to buy such arguments.

The Kremlin’s greatest difficulty, however, would come in administering its new empire. None of its peoples spoke Russian, and only 60 percent used other Slavic languages; few Russians knew any tongue other than their own. If Moscow sought local assistance, it would risk “disaffection, intrigue, and loss of control.” If it tried to train Russians in the appropriate languages and customs, they were likely to be “corrupted by the amenities and temptations of a more comfortable existence and a more tolerant atmosphere.” If it kept its agents isolated, or sent them only for brief periods of time, then they could hardly be effective either.

Curiously, Soviet leaders expected help from the West through recognition of the “independence” of states within their sphere, as well as help in repairing the economic damage their own policies were inflicting. They knew how often the Americans and British had been told that the only alternative to cooperation was another world war, in which civilization would face “complete catastrophe.” As long as the West believed this, it would not challenge Soviet policy, and Soviet policy would not change.

Should the West, contrary to expectations, muster up “political manliness,” the U.S.S.R. would probably not be able to maintain its hold on “all the territory over which it has today staked out a claim.” Communist parties throughout Western Europe would bare their fangs, and Molotov would no doubt threaten withdrawal from the United Nations. But the Soviet Union “would have played its last real card.” Further military advances would only increase responsibilities already beyond its capacity to meet. And it had no naval or air forces capable of challenging any position outside of Europe. No one in the Kremlin, however, believed that the West, “confronted with the life-size wolf of Soviet displeasure standing at the door and threatening to blow the house in,” would stand firm. “And it is on this disbelief that Soviet global policy is based.”⁴⁷

This essay, Kennan recalled, “set forth for the first time—indeed, the writing of it evoked for the first time—thoughts that were to be basic to my view of Russia and its problems in future years.” It laid out the key assumption of what later became the strategy of “containment”: that the Soviet Union’s self-generated problems would frustrate its ambitions if the West was patient enough to wait for this to happen and firm enough to resist making concessions. “I didn’t say war was inevitable. I said we had to stand up to them. Time will have its effect, and… this is going to affect the regime.”

Kennan gave the paper to Harriman, who returned it without comment. Harry Hopkins may have read it when he visited Moscow in late May and early June. Otherwise, as with Kennan’s earlier efforts to “pluck people’s sleeves, trying to make them understand the nature of the phenomenon with which we in the Moscow embassy were daily confronted,” there was no response: “So far as official Washington was concerned, it had been to all intents and purposes like talking to a stone.”⁴⁸

VIII.

With the war over, George Kennan sent himself to Siberia. He had requested permission to go soon after arriving in Moscow the year before, and following months of delay the approval, to his surprise, came through. The ostensible reason for the trip was to visit the new industrial complex at Stalinsk-Kuznetsk (now Novokuznetsk), a massive steel production facility southeast of Novosibirsk where few if any foreigners had ever been. But there was also a personal motive, which was “the example of my distinguished nineteenth century namesake. I wanted, before leaving Russia again, to see at least a small portion of the vast Siberian territory where so many of his travels had taken place and with which his name was so widely associated.”⁴⁹

The first George Kennan had crossed Siberia by horse-drawn carriages and sleighs because the railroad to Vladivostok would not become fully operational until 1905. Four decades later, on June 9, 1945, the second George Kennan boarded the Trans-Siberian Express in Moscow, relishing the opportunity to relax and to watch the country and its inhabitants go by. He had a compartment to himself but shared a washroom with two taciturn secret police agents, stationed next door. Two good-natured car attendants, Zinya and Marusya, kept a samovar going with scraps of wood collected at frequent station stops along the way, while shooing away anyone trying to hitch an unauthorized ride.

At one stop a soldier accused an old woman of cheating him. “‘You’d better be careful, little mother,’ he said gaily, ‘not to run across me in the other world. The archangels are all my friends.’ To the crowd’s delight, the old girl crossed herself anxiously; and the incident ended in general laughter.”

The trip took four days. Fellow passengers were pleasant but wary: “We didn’t talk much.” One evening, however, Kennan passed around copies of the American embassy’s Russian-language magazine, provoking a lively corridor discussion on the transition from Roosevelt to Truman. “Then everybody began to look guiltily over his shoulder and the meeting quickly dispersed.” With traffic on the line heavy,

The waits were long enough for the passengers to get off and pick flowers: at one point, “when the train stopped among the swamps, we climbed down the embankment, took off our shirts, splashed off the yellow scum from the surface…, and washed our heads in the cool dark liquid from underneath.” Toward Novosibirsk, the prairie became “completely flat, treeless, shrouded in streaks of ground-mist; and the dome of the sky stretched out to tremendous distances, as though vainly trying to encompass the limits of the great plain.”

Kennan arrived weary, wilted, and without an appetite after ninety-eight hours on the train, to be greeted with the usual Russian dinner accorded visiting dignitaries. It included of course vodka, as well as “river fish, salmon, cold meat, radishes, cucumbers, cheese, hard boiled eggs, bread and butter, soup, beer, steak, fried potatoes, fried eggs, cake, and tea.” Each refusal was “an indication that the respective dish was not good enough,” which served only “to stimulate my host and the waitress to new feats of hospitality.” Upon recovering, Kennan felt well enough to inspect an airplane factory and an experimental farm, to attend a football match, the circus, and the Jewish theater—evacuated from Minsk early in the war, and “still playing on odd nights in Yiddish to a full house”—and to take in an opera in an enormous new theater, the largest in the Soviet Union, for which the funds had been raised locally, in wartime, with the streets surrounding it “still those of a Siberian village.” There could be “no more flamboyant a repudiation of the past, no more arrogant expression of confidence in the future, than the erection of this almost mystical structure on the remote banks of the Ob.”

After several days Kennan continued by train to Stalinsk-Kuznetsk, a city that fifteen years earlier had been a swamp. It now contained thousands of workers and their families, as well as one of the largest steel mills in the Soviet Union. Obviously it had required “a great feat of willpower and organization to build and put into operation at all an establishment of this size in a place so remote from the other industrial centers.” Perhaps the sacrifices had been worth it if the plant had helped to win the war, but it had clearly cost far more to build and to operate than a comparable facility in the United States. State-sanctioned “labor unions” placed production ahead of the safety, health, and welfare of the workers. A nearby collective farm provided the state with a reliable supply of agricultural commodities, but its peasants seemed “as effectively bound to their place of work as were the Russian serfs of the period before emancipation.”

Banquets continued to be a challenge. “I am having an extremely interesting and enjoyable trip,” George wrote Jeanette on a postcard he mailed from Stalinsk-Kuznetsk. “I am constantly reminded here of G. K. the elder and his travels. Fortunately for me, I have none of his physical hardships to cope with; but I face a culinary hospitality before which I think even he, in the end, would have wavered.” The police, if curious about the identity of “G. K.,” failed to pursue the matter, and the card made it safely to Highland Park.

Back in Novosibirsk on a hot day, Kennan suggested to one of his handlers that they take a swim. They chose the river, surely a site known to the first George Kennan, but now with the great railroad bridge and the gigantic opera house looming in the distance. Still, “[l]ittle naked boys poked along the shore in a leaky old row boat as boys will do everywhere.” The scene led Kennan to wonder whether Russian dreams of grandeur would not at some point “cut loose from all connection with reality and begin some fantastic colossus of a project, build part of it hastily and with bad materials, never to finish it, and then leave the beginnings to rot away or be used for utterly incongruous purposes.” If so, the Ob would remain, flowing quietly toward the Arctic Ocean. “And probably, regardless of what marvels had or had not been constructed on shore, for countless summers naked little boys would continue to find leaky old boats and to pole their way up and down the stream…, shouting and splashing, cutting their feet on the rocks, and making astounding discoveries about the nature of rivers and the contents of river bottoms.”

Kennan returned to Moscow by air, a trip that itself required three days, several stops, and considerable improvisation. On the flight to Omsk, an illiterate old woman regaled him with observations on life reflecting “all the pungency and charm of the mental world of those who had never known the printed word.” Kennan shared his lunch with her under the tail of the plane after they landed, began reading Tolstoy aloud, and soon had half of their fellow passengers as an audience. Stuck overnight in Sverdlovsk with no continuing flight scheduled, Kennan watched gratefully as the local party secretary, shouting loudly over the phone, commandeered one. In Kazan, the police for once lost track of him, allowing Kennan the “pleasant and homelike, if slightly vulgar” experience of “sauntering on the streets of a Volga River town of a summer evening,” philosophically eating sunflower seeds and spitting out their husks. It provided “the same sense of bovine calm and superiority as chewing gum. For a moment I could almost forget that I was a foreigner in a country governed by people suspicious and resentful of all foreigners. But not for long.”

Flying to Moscow the next day, Kennan sat on a crate, looked out the window, and tried “to gather together into some sort of pattern the mass of impressions which the past fortnight had left upon me.” The Russians, he concluded, were “a talented, responsive people, capable of absorbing and enriching all forms of human experience.” They were “strangely tolerant of cruelty and carelessness yet highly conscious of ethical values.” They had emerged from the war “profoundly confident that they are destined to play a progressive and beneficial role in the affairs of the world, and eager to begin to do so.” How could Americans not sympathize with them?

Their government, however, was “a regime of unparalleled ruthlessness and jealousy, …determined that no outside influence shall touch them.” As long as it was in place, outsiders could do little. Generosity would only strengthen it. Blows aimed at it would excuse further repression. The wise American, therefore, would try neither to help nor to harm but instead to “make plain to Soviet acquaintances the minimum conditions on which he can envisage polite neighborly relations with them, the character of his own aspirations and the limits of his own patience.” He would then “leave the Russian people—unencumbered by foreign sentimentality as by foreign antagonism—to work out their own destiny in their own peculiar way.”⁵⁰

SHORTLY BEFORE KENNAN LEFT ON HIS SIBERIAN TRIP, HE MOVED his family into a new Moscow apartment in the former Finnish legation, now empty because Finland and the Soviet Union had been on opposite sides during the war. The Finns had arranged, through the Swedes, to rent the building to the American embassy, which badly needed the space. The “Finnsky Dom,” George wrote Jeanette, was “vastly preferable” to the Mokhovaya, with its cacophonous street outside and an equally noisy elevator inside. “Here we have a garden, and a balcony, and peace and quiet at night, and a room for each of the children; and the servants are tucked away where you don’t stumble over them every day.” George’s career continued to prosper: on June 1, 1945, the Foreign Service promoted him to its Class I rank, at a salary of $9,000. He still worried, though, about the precariousness of his position: “You can easily imagine how delicate a job [this] is in these particular days, when the public eye is focused on Russian-American relations to an extent where one false step or unwise word could attract attention everywhere.”¹

Some of the delicacy was Kennan’s own doing, given his repeated objections to his government’s policies. “I couldn’t be the sort of smooth, self-contained type of Foreign Service officer who advanced because he’d made no waves. It’s a wonder to me that I got along as well as I did.” It is indeed, but there were safeguards. One was the State Department’s respect for professional expertise. Having gone to the trouble to train Soviet specialists, it did what it could to protect them; Kennan, for all his prickliness, had long been regarded as the best of the group. Harriman too provided cover. He wanted a heretic working for him—although he rarely reassured the heretic—and Harriman usually got his way: “I was quite an arbitrary fellow in those days.” Finally, Kennan had a good track record. He had been right on the Azores bases and while serving on the European Advisory Commission. As the months passed in Moscow, Soviet behavior further enhanced his reputation by vindicating his pessimism about its future course.²

Shifting Washington’s policy, however, was more difficult than simply objecting to it. There were limits to what even a respected professional could do from a distance when hardly anyone outside his profession had ever heard of him.³ Kennan’s personal views were clear: he wanted to end any pretense of shared interests between the U.S.S.R. and the Western democracies. There should be an outright division of Europe into spheres of influence, with each side doing as it pleased in the territory it controlled. The term “Cold War” had not yet been invented, but its features had formed in Kennan’s mind. He thought it folly not to reshape strategy to fit them: to do anything less was to risk what remained of Europe. “We were… in danger of losing, like the dog standing over the reflecting pool, the bone in our mouth without obtaining the one we saw in the water.”⁴

Despite Truman’s tough talk in his first meeting with Molotov, neither he nor his advisers were prepared to go that far. Hopes persisted that differences with the Soviet Union reflected diplomatic failures, not fundamentally divergent visions of the postwar world. Not even Harriman, now gravely concerned about Stalin’s intentions, was ready to abandon negotiations, if only to show the American public that they had been given every chance. “I plagued whosoever might be prepared to listen, primarily the ambassador, with protests, urgings, and appeals of all sorts,” Kennan remembered, but to little avail. Even Harry Hopkins was getting impatient with him. “Then you think it’s just sin, and we should be agin it,” he admonished Kennan, after hearing his objections to the attempts Hopkins was making, on Truman’s behalf, to settle the Polish question through talks with Stalin in Moscow. “That’s just about right,” Kennan responded. “I respect your opinion,” Hopkins replied. “But I am not at liberty to accept it.”⁵

Faced with conflicting advice about what to do, Truman convinced himself that Stalin’s subordinates were to blame for the deterioration in Soviet-American relations that followed the Yalta conference. Like his predecessor, the new president sought a solution in another face-to-face meeting with the Kremlin boss—who seemed to him much like an American big city boss. It took place at Potsdam, just outside Berlin, during the last two weeks of July 1945. Midway through, the British electorate removed Churchill from office, leaving Stalin the only one of the original Big Three still in power. He had focused, since the war began, on how its conduct would determine the postwar settlement. Truman and Churchill’s successor, Clement Attlee, had hardly had time even to think about this.⁶

For Kennan, such thinking was fundamental. He had never understood how the fighting of the war could fail to affect the nature of the peace. He had always doubted that talks around big tables, whether at Tehran, Yalta, or Potsdam, would change much. With no one having listened, with the war at an end, with the agreements reached at Potsdam—as Kennan saw it—having once more papered over cracks, he saw no reason to remain in the Foreign Service. On August 20, 1945, he again submitted his resignation. He had long been contemplating this step, Kennan explained to H. Freeman (Doc) Matthews, the State Department’s director of European affairs. The reasons were personal—Moscow was no place to raise children—but also political: “a deep sense of frustration over our squandering of the political assets won at such cost by our recent war effort, over our failure to follow up our victories politically and over the obvious helplessness of our career diplomacy to exert any appreciable constructive influence on American policy at this juncture.”⁷

I.

Despite the distinction he attained within it, Kennan had rarely found the Foreign Service rewarding. “He was never satisfied,” his friend and British embassy counterpart Frank Roberts recalled, “either with what he was doing or with what policy was [or with] what his effect on that policy could or should be.” His first resignation had come in 1927, only a year after he entered the service: Kennan’s superiors had persuaded him to stay on by offering the training that made him a Soviet specialist. No sooner had he become one than George was floating alternative possibilities—writing, teaching, farming—with his sister Jeanette. Losing his inheritance in 1932 ruled these out, and by the time the Kennans were again reasonably solvent, the war had started. George felt the obligation to see it through to the end, but he continued to write frequently—often wistfully—about doing something else. The farm made the prospect all the more alluring. George’s back-to-back letters to his sister and to Chip Bohlen in January 1945 showed that one part of his brain was thinking about chickens, while another was dividing Europe.⁸

Annelise was certainly ready to return to the United States. George cabled the news of his resignation while she was returning from Norway where, with Grace and Joan, she had been visiting Kristiansand for the first time since the Germans occupied it in 1940. “My heart gave a jump,” she replied. “It is a little scary, but only a little. We’ll make out all right, but it will be quite a change.” Her family had been well, but Norway no longer felt like home. “Maybe I took too readily to my adopted country.” Annelise suspected, though, that it was better that way: having “a longing in you for another country makes it impossible to be happy anywhere else.”⁹

George himself was longing for countries, or at least cities, other than Moscow. He welcomed the opportunity, therefore, to escort a group of American congressmen to Leningrad and Helsinki in September 1945. In contrast to his first visit, in 1934, the old capital evoked nostalgia, even a sense of coming home. Vivid images crowded his mind, and hence his diary:

Somehow in that city, “where I have never lived, there has nevertheless by some strange quirk of fate—a previous life, perhaps?—been deposited a portion of my own capacity to feel and to love, a portion—in other words—of my own life.”

From Leningrad, the trip was by train across former Finnish territory where the war had left few buildings standing. The gulls wheeling overhead mocked ruins below; healthy vegetation concealed land mines. At the new border, everything changed. There was a new station, simple, clean, and in good repair. Newspapers were on sale at a freshly painted kiosk. A fat, sleek horse pulled a peasant cart “with a happy briskness which no Russian horse possesses.” Sidings were full of freight cars hauling neatly packed war reparations east, leading Kennan to wonder whether these might induce “pangs of shame among the inhabitants of the great shoddy Russian world into which they were moving. But on second thought I was inclined to doubt this very strongly.”

The Finnish locomotive at last arrived, coupled onto the cars, and started off at a speed that seemed “positively giddy after the leisurely lumbering of Russian trains.” A diner offered good if scanty food. The other passengers were friendly and unafraid. The scene suggested “the efficiency, the trimness, the quietness and the boredom of bourgeois civilization; and these qualities smote with triple effect on the senses of a traveler long since removed from the impressions of [a] bourgeois environment.”¹⁰

The youthful Kennan had, from time to time, shown a certain disdain for that environment. Part of the fascination of Weimar Berlin—even more so of the Soviet Union when he first arrived there—had been that some other society seemed under construction, however harshly, inefficiently, and idealistically. Siberia still offered hints of that, but Stalinism had long since smothered such experimentation in the rest of Russia, leaving only a depressing seediness. The Finnsky Dom, hence, had been a relief after the Mokhovaya: seediness wears one out. And now Finland itself—a bourgeois horizon lying just across the Karelian isthmus—took on an almost mystical appeal, as it would for so many other foreigners in the U.S.S.R. over so many years.¹¹ It was time to leave—but that did not happen quite yet.

II.

“Dear Averell,” Kennan had written while Harriman was still at Potsdam in July: “Gibbon stated in the ‘Decline and Fall’ that the happiest times in the lives of peoples were those about which no history was written.” Moscow was quiet, with only the usual annoyances over staffing, housing, and courier services. “Compared to the questions you [are] discussing, …these problems seem small.”¹² Perhaps so, but Kennan by then was beyond seeing anything as insignificant. His dispatches to Washington—on matters large and small—continued to be filled with portents of trouble to come.

An agreement between Soviet and Polish tourist agencies would restrict the free travel and residence of foreigners. A visiting journalist’s sympathetic newspaper story revealed how the cultivation of novices could undercut the reporting of professionals. The Kremlin would regard any withdrawal of American troops from western Czechoslovakia—which they had occupied at the end of the war—as a sign of weakness, despite wartime agreements that had assigned that territory to the Red Army. Soviet requests for postwar economic assistance were meant to sustain wartime levels of arms production. An Anglo-French plan to consult Moscow on the future of Tangier would provoke “a colorful revolutionary pronunciamento denouncing all interference in Morocco by great powers and calling on Moroccan proletariat to arise and eject them.”¹³

This last warning reflected a larger concern: that the international communist movement—which Stalin had appeared to disavow when he abolished the Comintern in 1943—remained in place and subject to his authority. Paris was the operational center for the European democracies, as were Cuba and Mexico for Latin America. The West had yet to grasp that some of its own citizens could be trained, like pets, “to heel without being on the leash.” To be sure, managing this network required finding the “almost imperceptible line which divides fancied independence of political action from the real thing.” But Soviet leaders had a great deal of experience in doing that.¹⁴

On August 8, 1945, with Harriman back in Moscow, Kennan accompanied him to the Kremlin for a meeting with Stalin. Despite his short stature, scrawny mustache, discolored teeth, pocked face, and yellow eyes, the “Generalissimus,” as he now styled himself, struck Kennan as having “a certain rough handsomeness,” like “an old battle-scarred tiger.”

The subject that day was the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan, with Harriman expressing pleasure at being once again allies. There was no avoiding the implications of the American atomic bomb, however, used two days earlier at Hiroshima. It must have been “a very difficult problem to work out,” Stalin acknowledged, and “very expensive.” It would bring victory quickly, and it would mean “the end of war and of aggressors. But the secret would have to be well kept.”¹⁵

Kennan could not have agreed more, except that it was the Soviets from whom he wanted to keep the secret. “My first reaction was: ‘Oh God, if we’ve got something like this, let’s be sure that the Stalin regime doesn’t get it.’” He warned Harriman that “it would be a tragic folly for us to hand over the secrets of atomic energy production to the Russians.” More formally, he cautioned the new secretary of state, James F. Byrnes:

It was, thus, “my profound conviction that to reveal to the Soviet Government any knowledge which might be vital to the defense of the United States, without adequate guaranties for the control of its use in the Soviet Union, would constitute a frivolous neglect of the vital interests of our people.” Unusually, Kennan asked that the State Department make his view “a matter of record,” and to see that it was considered in “any discussions of this subject which may take place in responsible circles of our Government.”¹⁶

The Generalissimus, in the meantime, had paid Kennan a compliment. The occasion was the congressional visit in mid-September. To Kennan’s surprise, Stalin agreed to see the American legislators, probably with the hope of speeding action on a $6 billion postwar reconstruction loan Molotov had requested the previous January. With Harriman away again, it fell to Kennan to escort the delegation to the Kremlin, and to serve as interpreter. Several members arrived tipsy from having enjoyed “tea” somewhere in the Moscow subway, and just before entering Stalin’s office one asked: “What if I biff the old codger one in the nose?”

Oblivious to this near-disaster, Stalin greeted his visitors politely and at the end of the meeting went out of his way to praise Kennan—with whose views espionage had already familiarized him—for the excellence of his Russian. Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky added dutifully: “Yes, damn good.”¹⁷

Byrnes and Harriman were at that time attending the first postwar conference of Soviet, American, British, French, and Chinese foreign ministers, held in London in mid-September. It was not a success. Molotov was difficult, no agreements were reached on the principal agenda item, peace treaties with former German satellites, and the meeting broke up without even a public communiqué. Harriman was pleased that Byrnes had held firm: there had been, he assured the Moscow embassy staff, no more “telling the Russians how much we love them.” Kennan, for once, was also content. The Kremlin would have to face the fact, he cabled Byrnes, “that if it has not been thrown for a loss, it has at least been stopped without a gain.” This was in effect a reversal: the first serious one, for Soviet diplomacy, since the war began. Whether there would be recriminations within the leadership remained to be seen. Byrnes took the trouble to reply personally, saying that he had found Kennan’s dispatch “highly illuminating,” with “much food for thought.”¹⁸

The football metaphor failed to impress Dana Wilgress, the Canadian ambassador in Moscow, with whom Kennan shared it. He had great respect for Kennan, Wilgress reported to Ottawa, “but he suffers from having been here in the pre-war days when foreign representatives became indoctrinated with anti-Soviet ideas as a result of the purges and subtle German propaganda.” With “only one down to go,” it was the Anglo-Saxons who were “in a huddle about what formation to try next.” That might be, Lester Pearson, Wilgress’s counterpart in Washington, commented, but Byrnes had made it a point, at a meeting with Truman, Attlee, and Canadian prime minister William L. Mackenzie King, “to express great respect for Kennan’s judgment and wisdom…. There is no doubt that whatever Kennan says carries great weight in the State Department.”¹⁹

The Truman-Attlee-King meeting, held in mid-November, focused on the international control of atomic energy and what the Soviet Union’s relationship to that process might be. Whether Kennan knew of Byrnes’s praise is not clear, although he was in Washington at the time: having received his resignation, Kennan’s superiors had called him back for consultations, just as they had done almost two decades earlier. “I took up with Mr. Kennan the question of his resignation,” a State Department official noted in a memorandum he left unsigned. “I made it clear to him that I did not think that this was the time for any of our capable senior officers to quit; their services were too badly needed.” Perhaps encouraged by the sense that the Washington mood was shifting and that his voice was beginning to be heard, Kennan agreed that “no action would be taken on his resignation…, that it would simply be held in abeyance.”²⁰

III.

One of the curiosities of Moscow life during this period, Roberts remembered, was that he and Kennan had found themselves in charge of their respective embassies longer than the actual ambassadors were. With Harriman and Clark Kerr often away, Kennan and Roberts collaborated closely: “We were constantly having to compare notes, not merely on how the Soviets were going to carry out Potsdam, but [on] what the Soviets were up to in the Middle East, or wherever.” Both warned their governments that cooperation with Moscow “wasn’t going to be very easy.”²¹

Ernest Bevin, the former dockworker who had become British foreign secretary, understood this clearly, Roberts assured Kennan. He regarded the failure of the foreign ministers’ conference as a healthy development: it would be a mistake for either government to show haste in trying to resolve the difficulties that had arisen. Harriman had already detected in Bevin a considerable difference from his predecessor, Anthony Eden. Where that “suave diplomat” would dodge Molotov’s blows, the stolid Bevin, like Byrnes, had “simply faced up to them.”²²

It soon became clear, though, that Byrnes—more slippery than stolid—was no longer prepared to do so. He relished the plaudits his hard line had won him but hoped to earn more now by breaking the diplomatic stalemate. Making the most of the free hand Truman had given him, fancying himself a wily negotiator, convinced that Molotov lacked the authority to make decisions on his own, the secretary of state decided to deal with Stalin himself. In early December, shortly after Kennan’s return to Moscow, Byrnes announced an agreement with Molotov to hold another foreign ministers’ conference in that city just one week hence. Bevin, not consulted, was furious: he had no choice, though, but to attend.²³

He could hardly have been more upset than Kennan, for whom Byrnes’s self-appointed mission to Moscow—reminiscent of Joe Davies—exemplified all that was wrong with American foreign policy. “Those of us who have spent years in diplomacy appreciate better than anyone else the necessity for compromise and for flexibility,” Kennan commented in his diary after commiserating with Roberts. “But when anyone is not able to exude more cheer and confidence than I can put forward at this time about the diplomatic undertakings of our Government…, I am sure that it is best that he should not be concerned with them.”²⁴

For the moment, though, concern was unavoidable. Accompanied by Bohlen—who had also not been consulted—Byrnes and his entourage landed in the middle of a Moscow blizzard on the afternoon of December 14. Confusion prevailed from the start, with Harriman having been told to meet the plane at the wrong airport. Kennan rushed to the right one just in time to greet the secretary of state, who spoke standing in snow with no overshoes, while the wind howled through the little group that had welcomed him. Byrnes was then driven to Spaso House to thaw out, but Kennan was given no significant role in the proceedings that followed: whatever respect Byrnes had accorded Kennan’s views in Washington, he chose not to draw upon them in Moscow.²⁵

Kennan was allowed to observe a single short session on the nineteenth. He found Bevin looking disgusted while Molotov presided with “a Russian cigarette dangling from his mouth, his eyes flashing with satisfaction and confidence as he glanced from one to the other Foreign Minister, obviously keenly aware of their differences.” Byrnes was negotiating “with no clear or fixed plan, with no definite set of objectives or limitations.” Relying entirely on his own agility, “his main purpose is to achieve an agreement.”

Afterward Kennan and Roberts dined with Doc Matthews, who had also flown in with Byrnes. “By the end of the evening, [Matthews] looked so crestfallen at the things that he had heard from Roberts and myself [that] I felt sorry for him and had to try to cheer him up.”²⁶

One compensation was the lively presence, in Moscow, of Isaiah Berlin, whom Kennan quickly found to be the best informed and most intelligent foreigner in the city. A dinner conversation, joined by Bohlen, stretched on until two in the morning, with Berlin convinced that the Soviet leadership saw conflict with the West as unavoidable. Did they not realize, Kennan wondered, that if a conflict came about, it would be because of their own belief in its inevitability? Berlin thought not: “They would view it as inevitable through the logic of the development of social forces.” Friends would discover in time that they were enemies, “even though [they] did not know it at the moment.”²⁷

Byrnes, to whom this would soon happen, left Moscow proud of what he had accomplished. Stalin had agreed to token concessions that in no way weakened his control over Eastern Europe, while winning symbolic involvement in an occupation of Japan that left American predominance in place. Both sides would continue to recognize Chiang Kai-shek’s government in China; both would participate in a U.N. effort to control the atomic bomb. Stalin made no promises to remove Soviet troops from northern Iran; nor did he withdraw demands on Turkey for territorial concessions and a naval base in the Dardanelles. From Kennan’s perspective, nothing had changed: all Byrnes had done had been to revive the pretense of common interests, to paper over still more cracks.

Profoundly discouraged, Kennan undertook yet another essay—never completed—to explain why this would not work. Unlike Americans, Russians throughout their history had faced hostile neighbors. As a result, they had no conception of friendly relations between states. There was no use “referring to common purposes to which we may both have done lip service at one time or another, such as strengthening world peace, or democracy, or what you will.” Such “fatuous gestures” would only lead Kremlin officials to think “that they should have been demanding more from us all along.”

It should be American policy “to accompany every expression of our wishes by some action on our part proving that Russian interests suffer if our wishes are not observed.” That would require imagination, firmness, and policy coordination, precisely the qualities lacking in Byrnes’s hastily arranged Moscow trip. There should be no top-level appeals over the heads of knowledgeable subordinates. Sledgehammers should be used, when necessary, to swat flies: “[W]e must be prepared to undertake a ‘taming of the shrew’ which is bound to involve a good deal of unpleasantness.” The Soviet system was designed “to produce the maximum concentration of national energies. We cannot face them effectively unless we do all in our power to concentrate our own effort.”²⁸

Reflecting on the outcome of the Moscow conference, Wilgress assured his Ottawa colleagues that he had not intended “to question in any way the integrity or ability of Mr. George F. Kennan.” The fact that he was so highly regarded explained “the temporary ascendancy of the tough school shortly after the taking over of office by Mr. Byrnes.” But recent events had shown its repudiation. It was true that “American college teams usually have two or more quarterbacks,” but “the rules of the game do not permit them to use more than one at a time.”²⁹

Kennan might well have agreed, had he been able to read Wilgress’s dispatch. On January 21, 1946, he wrote to remind his old friend Elbridge Durbrow, now in the State Department, that he wanted to come home. “I have been abroad 18 of the last 19 years. I owe it to myself and particularly to my family not to delay longer in establishing roots in the United States.” He did not wish to leave the Soviet field, since “our country is decidedly short of people who can speak of Russian affairs with any authority, objectivity and courage.” But the Foreign Service was not the place to do this: “There is little that a person like myself can accomplish within the walls of a diplomatic chancery or in subordinate positions in the Department of State.”³⁰

IV.

George F. Kennan would be forty-two on February 16, 1946. Tall, thin, half bald now, with strikingly expressive blue eyes, he had spent all of his professional life in the Foreign Service. He had become, within the Moscow embassy, almost as compelling a figure as Harriman himself. “I was, in a way, astonished,” Berlin recalled of his first meeting with Kennan. “He was not at all like the people in the State Department I knew in Washington during my service there. He was more thoughtful, more austere, and more melancholy than they were. He was terribly absorbed—personally involved, somehow—in the terrible nature of the [Stalin] regime, and in the convolutions of its policy.” John Paton Davies was struck by Kennan’s intuitive but creative mind, “richly stored with knowledge, eloquent in expression, and disciplined by a scholarly respect for precision.”

Patricia Davies regarded Kennan quite simply as “a giant among the dwarves.” But he remained a puzzle, even to his closest friends.³¹

Durbrow, for example, thought him cool, calculating, and ambitious: “George, in his not too pushy a way, was going to get ahead, by golly, if it was the last thing he did.” He was “very sure of himself. I never saw him fly off the handle. I fly off the handle all the time, myself, so I would have noticed that.” Loy Henderson agreed about the ambition but not the self-control. Kennan was emotionally fragile: “It was difficult for him to take unpleasant things.” Perhaps as a result, ulcers still plagued him, although drinking milk helped. So did physical activity, for which the dacha outside Moscow substituted at least in part for the farm outside East Berlin. Henderson also remembered Kennan tending “to look down in a patronizing way on people whom he didn’t consider as intellectuals. He would make little remarks now and then indicating that the person was not in his class.”

Martha Mautner, however, had a different impression. Kennan “liked to have disciples—people who would sit at his feet, [but he] tended to treat everyone on an equal basis, even the most junior people. He used to talk with us a good deal, I guess as a way of blowing off steam. I thought at the time that it was unusual for someone in his position to be unloading this kind of thing on people like me.” William A. Crawford, a young Foreign Service officer who arrived just as the war was ending, found Kennan very accessible. He ran “informal little confabs” on whatever he thought worth discussing. His personal interest extended beyond professional work: “You felt a very close relationship to him.”³²

Dorothy Hessman, who knew Kennan as well as anyone outside his family, saw that his apparent aloofness concealed shyness. He was “very approachable, if you made the first move. He didn’t want to give the impression that you had to respond to any gesture of friendliness that he would make.” There were no Valentine’s Day cards in Moscow, so on one such occasion she and another secretary sent him a little verse. Fond of rhyming, he sent one back. The Kennans regularly hosted sing-alongs in the Finnsky Dom, with George playing the guitar: that was the rehearsal site, also, for Christmas carols. Patricia Davies thought him “very gentle, really, even with rather tiresome people.” Mautner remembered him serving as a crown-bearer, with Frank Roberts, at an Orthodox wedding for two friends: “I can still see them to this day, holding these crowns during this long service, Kennan very tall and Roberts quite short, their arms getting tireder and tireder.”³³

Roberts thought Kennan an idealist and a realist at the same time. He was always “trying to find the morally best solution, while at the same time not ignoring the realities of the situation.” Berlin sensed piety: he could not help feeling himself “in the presence of a dedicated preacher, in front of whom one can’t tell off-color jokes. You can’t enjoy yourself too openly. No boisterous laughter permitted. To some extent, he casts a lampshade over the room. Bright lights have to be dimmed a little.”³⁴

Kennan’s Russian, Crawford remembered, evoked respect even among native speakers for its fluency and elegance. Bohlen’s was that of the street, “colloquial, expressive, pungent,” while Kennan’s was “the Russian of Pushkin.” He “loved the Russians,” Berlin insisted. “He responded to Russian books, and the Russian character. I had long conversations with him about Moscow versus Petersburg, the Slavophiles, the Westerners, the development of Russian art.” But Kennan had no illusions about the Soviet Union. “I think that maybe Harriman did, or chose not to look.” Berlin saw Kennan as much more appalled by evil than Bohlen, who liked to regale listeners with accounts of the Big Three meetings, all of which he had attended. “The cynicism of Roosevelt, the bellicosity, the insensitivity, of Churchill, and the cunning of Stalin” shocked Kennan, “whereas for Chip, it was a play with various characters.” It was not his habit to think “about the spiritual awfulness of it.”³⁵

With Bohlen in Moscow for the foreign ministers’ conference, the Davieses got to watch him argue with Kennan. American policy was still off limits—at least before witnesses—but as Patricia recalled: “Oh, boy, on the Soviet Union!” No one struck physical blows, but “the verbal blows were very very heavy.” Given their ferocity, John found it remarkable that the conversations remained friendly: “There were no nasty personal attacks.” But as Patricia pointed out, “They had a very different outlook, my goodness.” Berlin specified, in his characteristic rapid-fire diction, what set Kennan apart from Bohlen:

For Kennan, communism was “an enemy to everything one believed in. He was a grave observer of spiritual phenomena, some white, some black. Nothing much in between. One was either with us or against us. At that time, it certainly felt like that.”³⁶

Annelise monitored George’s intensity closely. “She [held] him down to earth,” Patricia Davies recalled. He could be “rather impractical in many ways, maybe even slightly grandiose,” but Annelise had ways “of pricking bubbles.” It was difficult for him to get a big head, or even “the slightest little swelling. The prick would be there.” She was “an extraordinary person, very strong,” and with a good sense of humor. And George relied on her in all kinds of ways. Embassy colleagues could tell when Annelise was away, because he would come down to the office “in the darndest getups.” Patricia wouldn’t say anything to George about the weird combinations of socks, shirts, and ties, but she did mention it to Annelise one day, after she got back: “I just thought you ought to know.” “Oh, of course,” she explained, “I always lay everything out because you know he’s color blind.”³⁷

That was George Kennan on the eve of becoming famous: he saw what others saw, but in different colors. He had always done so, whether because of loneliness, sensitivity, ambition, intelligence, imagination, impatience, or patriotism. He had a historian’s consciousness of the past, which gave him a visionary’s perspective on the future. Within the mundane present, however, he could come across—like his selections of socks, shirts, and ties in Annelise’s absence—as a bit weird. How did it feel, Patricia Davies asked him one day toward the end of 1945, to be so much more of a hard-liner than anyone else? “I foresee that the day will come,” he replied somberly, “when I will be accused of being pro-Soviet, with exactly as much vehemence as I am now accused of being anti-Soviet.” She thought it then “one of the silliest things I’d ever heard,” but years later after this had indeed happened, “I brought it up with him. He had forgotten, although it was no surprise to him that he had said it.”³⁸

V.

“I am insisting on leaving here this spring,” Kennan wrote Bill Bullitt on January 22, 1946, the day after he asked Durbrow to expedite his return to the United States. “I hope to publish after I get home a book on the structure of Soviet power…. I have had exceptional opportunities to learn about things here, and I would like to feel that I had justified them.” Moreover if, “like everyone else who has been bitten by this bug, I am destined to spend the rest of my life reading, talking, and arguing about Russia,” he might as well establish his credibility.³⁹ Precisely one month later, in a final exasperated attempt to awaken Washington, Kennan sent the State Department a very long telegram. After that, nothing in his life, or in United States policy toward the Soviet Union, would be the same.

Like most legends, the Kennan “long telegram” of February 22, 1946, has become encrusted with certain inaccuracies, two of which originated with the author himself. The telegram was not, as he described it in his memoirs, “some eight thousand words” in length: the actual total was just over five thousand. Nor was it a response to “an anguished cry of bewilderment” from the Treasury Department over the U.S.S.R.’s refusal to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, despite having participated in the wartime Bretton Woods conference that designed them. Kennan’s explanation of that development had gone out early in January, with the pointed reminder that the Kremlin leadership considered “ultimate conflict between Soviet and Capitalist systems [to be] inevitable.”⁴⁰

Rather, it was Stalin himself who provoked the “long telegram” by making a speech meant, superfluously, to win him an election. He delivered it, with great fanfare, in the Bolshoi Theater on February 9, the eve of the first postwar balloting for the entirely symbolic Supreme Soviet. Districts throughout the country had all nominated their candidates by a unanimous vote. “Since prevailing local philosophy rules out hand of Divine Providence as origin of such singular uniformity of inspiration,” Kennan cabled the State Department, “it must be attributed and is to a more earthly and familiar agency.” Stalin used his address to congratulate the army, party, government, nation, and—by implication—himself for winning the war. He mentioned American and British allies, but only perfunctorily. He said nothing about foreign policy, but he did call for a peacetime level of industrial production three times what it had been before the war. He justified the sacrifices this would require with a turgid analysis—straight out of Marx and Lenin—of capitalism’s tendency to produce conflict: it had happened in 1914 and 1939, and it was sure to happen again. The Soviet Union sought only peace, but it would have to be prepared.⁴¹

No one familiar with Stalin’s thinking would have found much new in the speech: it reflected what he had long believed and often said. Kennan thought the address so routine that he simply summarized it for the State Department. Having analyzed hundreds of Moscow events over the past year and a half, he saw little need to exert himself over this one. He would, after all, be leaving soon, and at just this moment he was getting sick: “I was taken with cold, fever, sinus, tooth trouble, and finally the aftereffects of the sulpha drugs administered for the relief of these other miseries.” Bedridden and in a bad humor, he was coping with the daily flood of dispatches and other embassy business as best he could.⁴²

But the situation in Washington was far from routine. Truman had reprimanded Byrnes, on the secretary of state’s return from Moscow, for failing to report to him regularly: as a self-taught student of ancient history, the president was especially worried about Stalin’s ambitions in the Near East. He had also begun to share suspicions—long held by several of his other advisers and by congressional critics—that Byrnes’s pride in his negotiating skills was really an addiction to appeasement. Always a weathervane, Byrnes quickly swung back to his tougher line from the previous fall. Stalin’s repudiation of Bretton Woods had ended whatever chance there might have been for American economic assistance to the U.S.S.R., and there was now evidence—soon to become public—that Soviet intelligence had been running espionage operations in the United States and Canada aimed at stealing information on the atomic bomb. Within this context, Stalin’s February 9 speech had something of the effect of a shot on Fort Sumter. “All the things we did to work out Lend Lease and gosh knows what else during the war, the efforts made by F.D.R. at the various meetings, the San Francisco conference and all that sort of business—it was just unbelievable the way he threw it all out the window,” Durbrow remembered. Stalin’s speech had said “to hell with the rest of the world.”⁴³

Kennan’s silence puzzled Durbrow, and he was not alone. Matthews, his immediate superior, asked: “Durby, have you had anything from George Kennan on this Stalin speech?” “No, God, I expect it any day. He must be working on a real deep one, one of his better efforts.” Still nothing. “Doc, I’ve looked at all the telegram take, and there’s not a damn line. Maybe it’s coming by pouch.” “Why don’t you send him a little friendly reminder?” As it happened, Matthews himself drafted the message, which went out over Byrnes’s signature on February 13. Stalin’s speech, it pointed out, had evoked a response with the press and the public “to a degree not hitherto felt.” With the pronouncements of Stalin’s subordinates, it had seemed “to confirm your various thoughtful telegrams. We should welcome receiving from you an interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these announced policies.”⁴⁴

Harriman, by then, had left Moscow for the last time as ambassador. “Now George,” he claimed to have said, “you’re on your own. I want you to express your opinions and send them in.” He could say anything he wanted “without my dampening hand.” So with the State Department also having encouraged him, Kennan could hardly remain silent. Sick or not, “[h]ere was a case where nothing but the whole truth would do.”

It was Kennan’s habit to write out rough drafts, then call in Hessman to type as he dictated from a horizontal position: “He always said he could think better [that way].” Still nursing his ailments, this was his posture when he summoned her on February 22, which “was officially a holiday, so I wasn’t all that thrilled.” After she finished the final version, Kennan dragged himself out of bed to take it personally to the Mokhovaya code room, where Mautner was on duty: “This has to go out tonight.” “Why tonight? I’ve got a date.” “They asked for it—now they’re going to get it!” So she found a Navy communications officer to help, and they sent it off.⁴⁵

The mode of transmission was critical. A pouched dispatch would not have been read “until it got to the desk officer or some of the guys up the line,” Durbrow pointed out. But a telegram—the longest ever sent in the State Department’s long history—was sure to attract attention. Moreover, “we were wondering why George didn’t send us something. Everybody was waiting for it. They’d say: ‘Gee, has anything come in?’ ‘No, it hasn’t come in yet.’ So by the time it got there it was something.” And “it was such a beautiful job to begin with.” The department, Kennan was relieved to learn, had not been at all disturbed by his “reckless use” of its telegraphic channel. Kennan’s number 511, Matthews cabled him on the twenty-fifth, was “magnificent. I cannot overestimate its importance to those of us here struggling with the problem. Heartiest congratulations and best wishes.” Two days later Byrnes himself added that he had read 511 “with the greatest interest. It is a splendid analysis.”⁴⁶

Now back in Washington, Harriman found the telegram “fairly long, and a little bit slow reading in spots.” But it did contain what Kennan “hadn’t been allowed to say before.” Harriman shared it with Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, who had long been looking for an analysis of this kind. Forrestal, in turn, had the telegram reproduced and circulated all over Washington, including to Truman himself. As Kennan recalled:

It all showed, Kennan concluded, that the real world was less important than the government’s “subjective state of readiness… to recognize this or that feature of it.” Harriman did not find this surprising. “That was one of the things,” he later recalled, “that I couldn’t get George to understand—that our timing had to be right.” It was “why I didn’t want a lot of [his] stuff to go in, because I knew it would have gone in the files and died. But this was just the critical time. It hit Washington at just the right moment. It was very fortunate.”⁴⁷

VI.

Like Stalin’s speech, Kennan’s “long telegram” reiterated much that he had said at other times and in other ways. But by breaking the rules once again—this time the State Department’s restrictions on the length of telegrams—he got the attention of his superiors, just as he had twice during the war by going to Roosevelt himself. “I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel,” he had written at the beginning of 511, dropping an occasional article in at least a gesture toward communications economy, “but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it all at once.”

There were from the Soviet perspective, he explained, two antagonistic “centers of world significance,” one socialist, the other capitalist, with the latter beset by insoluble conflicts. The greatest of these divided the United States from Great Britain, and it would in time lead to war. This might take the form of an Anglo-American clash, but it could also involve an attack on the Soviet Union by “smart capitalists” seeking to ward off their own war by fabricating a common foe. If that happened, the U.S.S.R. would prevail, but only at great cost: hence the importance of building its strength while seeking simultaneously to deepen and exploit conflicts among capitalists, even to the point if necessary of promoting “revolutionary upheavals” among them.

That position did not, Kennan emphasized, reflect the views of the Russian people, who were for the most part friendly to the outside world, eager to experience it, and hopeful now “to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor.” Nor did it make sense: capitalists had not always fought one another; capitalism was not now in crisis; the idea that capitalists would provoke a war with the Soviet Union was the “sheerest nonsense.” Soviet leaders, however, respected neither public sentiment nor logic. Instead, history and ideology shaped their actions in a particularly insidious way.

The history was that of Russian rulers, whose authority had always been “archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries.” The ideology was Marxism, made “truculent and intolerant” by Lenin, which provided the Stalinists with the perfect justification

Uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries-old movement that had always blurred distinctions between defensive and offensive actions, was now operating under the cover of international Marxism, “with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world.”

This dual character caused the Soviet regime to function on two levels: a visible one consisting of its official actions, and an invisible one for which it disclaimed responsibility. Both were coordinated in “purpose, timing and effect.” On the visible plane, the U.S.S.R. would observe diplomatic formalities and participate in international organizations to the extent that those facilitated its interests. On the invisible plane, it would make full use of communist parties throughout the world, as well as such other groups as it could penetrate and control, to undermine the influence of the major Western powers. This would involve efforts to “disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity.”

The problem, therefore, was a daunting one: “We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.” Controlling great resources and a great nation, it could draw upon “an elaborate and far flung apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history.” Nor was its leadership subject to reason: “The vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tenaciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived.”

Coping with this adversary was “undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face.” It would require “the same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort.” But it was within the power of the United States to solve it, and it could be done peacefully. The Soviet Union, unlike Hitler’s Germany, had no fixed timetable, was not inclined to take unnecessary risks, and would, when resisted, retreat. It was still much weaker than the West. It had no orderly mechanisms for replacing its leaders. It had swallowed territories that had severely weakened its tsarist predecessor. Its ruling party dominated but did not inspire the Soviet people. Its propaganda was negative and destructive: it should be “easy to combat it by any intelligent and constructive program.” For these reasons, “I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia.”

That would mean, however, educating the American public to the seriousness of the problem, for “[t]here is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown.” It would involve maintaining the “health and vigor of our own society,” because international communism was “like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue.” It would demand putting forward “a much more positive and constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past.” Europeans, exhausted and frightened in the wake of the war, were “less interested in abstract freedom than in security…. We should be better able than Russians to give them this.” Finally, “we must have courage and self confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet Communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”⁴⁸

Kennan regarded the “long telegram,” years later, as resembling “one of those primers put out by alarmed congressional committees or by the Daughters of the American Revolution, designed to arouse the citizenry to the dangers of the Communist conspiracy.” But if the task at hand was to shift Washington’s policy from afar—and Kennan had been trying to do that since the summer of 1944—then his “outrageous encumberment of the telegraphic process” was just the right instrument. The “long telegram” expressed what Kennan knew, in a form suited for policy makers who needed to know, better than anything else he ever wrote. No other document, whether written by him or anyone else, had the instantaneous influence that this one did. “My reputation was made. My voice now carried.”⁴⁹