Red Thrust: Attack on the Central Front, Soviet Tactics and Capabilities in the 1990s

CHAPTER 6 Red Artillery: The God of War

"All right, comrades, try to make some room."

The officers of the 155th Artillery Battalion tried to crowd, as best they could, into the back of a Ural-375 maintenance truck. It was cold and raining, and there were no houses in the dispersal area in which to conduct the staff briefing. The battalion commander, Maj. Pyotr Yefimov, and his deputy, Capt. Pavel Gonchar, sat on a workbench at the front of the van. The officers were drenched from the incessant rain; their boots were soggy and their moods were foul.

The major continued his briefing. "We're going across the Danube tomorrow." Fine, most thought. Only five days late. What a relief to get out of the forests. Finally onto flat ground! "We'll be crossing here near the town of Ainbrach. The engineers are erecting another pontoon bridge tonight. So much for the pleasant news. The new bridge is going to have to handle a lot of traffic tomorrow morning. You all saw how much equipment is in this area. That means the 2S1s and the 1V12s are going to have to make the crossing in the water." [52]

The officers were not keen on this idea. Their 2S1 armored howitzer vehicles and the 1V12 armored command vehicles were designed to be amphibious. But it would take an hour or so to get them ready for swimming, and any swimming operation with armored vehicles was risky, especially if the river was fast.

"I don't want to hear any complaints about this. There's plenty of engineer equipment around, so if anybody gets stuck in the riverbank, we will tow you out. All of the battalion's trucks will go over the pontoon bridge. We have priority. The boys on the western edge of the bridgehead need our support."

Although the 155th Artillery Battalion was normally attached to the 55th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment, their parent regiment had been pretty badly shot up during the forest fighting. The divisional artillery group assigned them wherever they might be needed. The battalion was in much better shape than the 18th Guards Motor Rifle Division's tank and motor rifle troops. Out of the twenty-four 2S1 howitzer vehicles the 155th had started the war with, they had lost only four to mechanical breakdowns or mines. Normally, the battalion had four batteries, but these had been consolidated to three due to the loss of equipment.

"We will be crossing around daybreak, at 0615 tomorrow morning. That means we start moving out of here at about 0530. You'll get all your trucks onto this road leading to Huterhof, and all the tracked vehicles will form up on the southeast edge of the village. The trucks will have a code painted on the front bumpers to help the MPs sort out the traffic.

"Now, on another matter. All tracked vehicles will have a large white triangle painted on the roof. We're going to be up close to the edge of the battle line. The fly-boys have been having problems sorting our tanks and vehicles from those of the enemy. So for your own good, paint the triangle in a prominent position and keep it clear of tarps and the usual junk.

"When we get to the other side of the river, we'll take this road down to Schambach, and then over to Amselfing. We're going to be deployed on the eastern side of Aiterhofen. Our first fire missions should come in at about 0900 if all goes well at the crossing. The batteries will be deployed in straight lines. Nothing fancy. Our fire control computers have been acting up. We'll have to move around a bit. The enemy has been doing a lot of counterbattery firing against our artillery in this area. Now, get some sleep!"

That was an easier thing to say than to do these days. Senior Lieutenant Viktor Belov and his 2d Battery were weary to the bone. The previous day had been a long and tiring series of fire missions in support of the bridgehead. They were firing at maximum range, and their howitzers were beginning to show the strain. They would take a lot of maintenance, but there was neither the time nor the equipment to permit it.

Belov walked back to his battery along with his deputy, Lt. Aleksander Durnov. "Are the men bedded down yet, Sasha?"

The young lieutenant indicated that they were, but promised to make a final check. The battery was huddled in a big clump off the road. It would make an ideal target for enemy aircraft or artillery. Nobody cared. There just wasn't enough space here for dispersal, and NATO had better things to shoot at nearer the bridgehead — like the bridges themselves.

No rail or road bridges were still standing in this section of the Danube, so all the crossings had to be made with pontoon bridges or ferries. The river here was too deep and the bottom too soft to allow the tanks to make a crossing on their own using snorkels. So they had to be laboriously ferried over using special GSP tracked ferries, an amphibious vehicle fitted with folding pontoons. Holding the bridgehead was difficult since the flow of tanks into the area was very slow. Most of the light armor, like infantry carriers and artillery vehicles, as in Belov's battery, was amphibious. They could swim over. Artillery was needed more than ever to make up for the lack of tanks.

Belov was awakened the next morning at 0500 after about four hours of sleep. It was the most he had gotten in one night since the beginning of the war. He had slept curled up inside his 1V14 armored command vehicle.[53]

It was cold inside, but at least it was protected from the rain. There were five other soldiers assigned to the vehicle, but at night usually only Belov, the driver, and the two radio operators remained inside. There just wasn't enough space for the scout or the artillery surveyor.

It was still dark outside, but at least it wasn't raining. Belov's battery had six 2S1 artillery vehicles, all parked near the two armored command vehicles. There were also six big Ural 375 five-ton trucks, which the battery used for supplying ammunition. A single GAZ-66 truck was used to provide meals for the battery, and it was in that direction that Belov now headed.

Sergeant Badarian had lit up the small stove and was preparing water for tea. There were nearly seventy men in the battery, most of them trying to get some tea and bread. There was one line for the enlisted men, and another for the senior sergeants and warrant officers. The battery officers simply walked to the front of the lines.

The artillery battery was a microcosm of Soviet Army life. Artillery units require highly trained personnel in many of the posts. Computing firing missions and other technical responsibilities are the tasks of the officers, but many other chores require technical expertise. Artillery pieces are difficult to keep in service when a lot of heavy firing is done. The technical positions were usually filled by Russians or Ukrainians, but there were also a large number of bright teenagers from the Baltic republics, mostly from the cities. The draft boards kept their eyes out for youth with a good mathematics background. Most Russians would be scooped up by more prestigious services, whereas the youth from the Baltic republics, Armenia, and other regions would be left out. The Ground Forces were only too happy to have them for tasks like these. On the other hand, artillery units have a lot of heavy, mindless work as well. Somebody has to load and unload the ammunition. This was work for the battery's second-class citizens, mostly Uzbeks or other Central Asians.

By 0530, the engines of the 2S1 artillery vehicles were warmed up. Belov had had the troops prepare the vehicles the previous evening for the river crossing. The 2S1 and the command vehicles have special "gill skirts" that have to be attached to the front fenders. This helps direct the water flow from the tracks to propel the vehicle when it is swimming. He also had them check the various ports where water could seep in. He didn't want to lose any of his vehicles by sinking.

Second Battery was not the only unit on the move. Other divisional formations were moving forward in anticipation of the river crossing. Belov took the lead of his column in his 1V14 command vehicle, riding up in the turret to get a better view. In front of him was a PKT 7.62mm machine gun, the vehicle's only defense — hardly enough to ward off an infantry attack!

As they approached the crossing point at Huterhof, the road became jammed with vehicles. A sergeant in a black leather uniform approached Belov's command vehicle. He wore the usual traffic-control uniform with a white helmet and red band. "Comrade Lieutenant, could you give me your control papers?" Belov handed him down the papers, which assigned priority for the bridge crossing. Using a small flashlight, the sergeant inspected them and handed them back up to Belov. "Comrade Lieutenant, your tracked vehicles should proceed across the field over there to the right to prepare for the crossing. Your trucks can remain here, and we will get them across as soon as possible."

Belov looked around. The column ahead didn't seem to be moving. "Sergeant, have they completed the bridge yet?"

"Yes, Comrade Lieutenant. But we had an air strike here about an hour ago and we're just finishing clearing the wreckage."

Damn, the NATO people were already attacking the bridge. And at night! Belov was very anxious to get his vehicle across. When the dawn came up in an hour or so, the bridge would attract NATO artillery and air strikes like bees to honey. Belov used the intercom to instruct the driver. He was followed by the six 2S1 artillery vehicles; at the tail of the column was Lieutenant Durnov in the other battery command vehicle. As they passed around Huterhof, Belov could dimly see the shapes of a battery of 2S6 air defense vehicles.[54]

These big vehicles each had a pair of long radar-directed 30mm cannons. On top of the turrets the surveillance radar rotated at a slow rate, hunting for targets. Nestled on the sides of the turrets were tubes for antiaircraft missiles. A formidable vehicle. At least Belov hoped so. They would have to protect his unit during the crossing operation.

Belov's battalion arrived near the river's edge. The Danube glistened in the early dawn hours.

The moon occasionally peeked through the clouds, its light reflecting off the water. The opposite shore was totally black except for the signs of small fires and the occasional flicker of electric lights. Belov got out of the command vehicle and made his way over to the 1V13 command vehicle of Captain Gonchar, the deputy battalion commander. "Good morning, Comrade Captain."

"Hello, Viktor. So are you ready to get your feet wet?"

Belov did not laugh. He was very concerned that some of his vehicles might have problems crossing. "How soon do we go over, Pavel? I'd just as soon get this over with." Before Gonchar could answer, the sky lit up.

The 2S6 antiaircraft vehicles had found a target and were hammering away at some unseen enemy over the river. Belov, like all artillerymen, was used to noise. But the gun flashes were prolonged and spectacular.

It seemed like a duel of fire-breathing dragons. There were six of these vehicles around the perimeter. They were firing in twoor three-second bursts. Each burst contained a lot of tracer ammunition, and you could see the tracer hurtle over the river in the dark dawn sky. Belov could not make out any sort of target. He walked away from his vehicle to get a better view of the scene. It was fascinating. Then the unseen enemy responded. Two or three huge glares appeared in the sky, about a kilometer over the river. Tracers began coming back in the other direction! Whatever was out there had a big gun.

A tracer from the enemy aircraft impacted against one of the 2S6s near the river's edge. It looked like a fireworks display as the depleted uranium slugs from the 30mm cannon of the attacking American A-10 aircraft slammed into the steel armor of the 2S6.[55]

The contact of steel and uranium at such speeds throws off pebble-sized chunks of metal that glow like sparklers. The single burst smashed the turret, setting off the stored ammunition. The 2S6 began burning, with ammunition cooking off in little staccato bursts.

Two of the enemy aircraft screamed over Huterhof, dropping cluster bombs over the massed column. The bombs blossomed open, spraying the column with hundreds of tiny submunitions, each with the explosive force of a large grenade. The flurry of submunitions began exploding in a wave. It was a frightening sight. The whole area was engulfed in a fury of small explosions. Belov was thankful that his 2S1 vehicles were out of harm's way. And he hoped that his trucks were fer enough back in the column to have escaped the air strike.

The Americans did not escape unharmed. As one A-10 began to bank away over the river, it was hit solidly along the belly and wings by one of the 2S6 antiaircraft vehicles. With flames licking out of its belly, the plane plunged into the Danube. The two A-10s that had dropped the cluster bombs came back over the town in the opposite direction, firing their big cannons the whole time. They raked the remains of the truck column, then turned their attention to the pontoon bridge. In the early morning light,

Belov could see huge splashes of water around the pontoon bridge, but it was hard to tell whether or not it had been hit. The 2S6 antiaircraft vehicles fired three missiles at the departing planes, but the A-l0s had been dropping a steady stream of infrared flares, which seemed to distract the missiles. The two A-l0s escaped over the river, unharmed. Undoubtedly, they would be back.

A major from the bridging unit came up to Captain Gonchar's 1V16 command vehicle and advised him that the unit could begin crossing. He suggested that they wait until it was a little lighter. But after the recent display of NATO air power, Major Yefimov and Captain Gonchar decided to begin moving their equipment right away. The engineers had placed some type of matting on the riverbank. They had blown a hole in a wall along the river and bulldozed a ramp down into the water. The first vehicle to attempt the crossing was the battalion's PRP-3 scout vehicle.[56]

It had a night vision device in the turret and so could see more clearly across the river. The driver let the tank slip slowly into the water. You could see only the roof and turret when it finally settled into the river. The driver had the engine going at full speed, and its diesel was howling.

The PRP-3 had small position lights on the rear, pointing back to the shore. The command vehicles and 2S1s of the 1st Battery went into the water next. Bobbing up and down, they looked like an awkward flotilla of drunken ducks, only a good deal noisier. The vehicles did not have propellers, but relied on the motion of their tracks to push them through the water. The drivers had to really crank up the engines to get enough track speed to keep the vehicles moving forward against the current. The river was about 170 meters across at this point, and it would take three or four minutes to cross.

Belov led his battery into the cold Danube next. The big 1V14 command vehicle rode higher in the water than the 2S1 artillery vehicles. It was not only boxier (and therefore more buoyant), it also was lighter due to the absence of the heavy howitzer the other vehicles carried. The spacing between vehicles was about twenty meters, and the first ones were already climbing ashore on the opposite bank. By the time Belov's vehicle entered the water, the dawn sun had already appeared.

About halfway across the river, Belov noticed to his shock that the 2S1 in front of him seemed to be settling lower in the water. The crew must have realized it as well, because soon Belov noticed three crewmen on the turret roof. The 2S1 was also losing speed. Belov shouted to them to pull the vehicle out of line, but it did little good with all the noise. He called down to his own driver to try to steer around it. Although it is nearly impossible to steer vehicles like these in the water with any precision, the driver managed to move it out of the line of traffic. Belov shouted down to his driver to proceed forward. By now, the water was well over the bow of the sinking vehicle and threatened to swamp it. The driver shut off the engine, and the four crewmen jumped off and began swimming toward the approaching vehicles — a dangerous business since a swimmer could get caught in the tracks. Two of the swimmers managed to grab onto Belov's vehicle, and the other two continued to dog-paddle in the hopes of catching onto the next 2S1.

The crewmen clung for dear life to the grab handles on the side of the vehicle. One of them managed to pull himself up and climb the side of the vehicle, using the grab handles. It was the commander, Sgt. Ivan Dombrovskiy. He crawled on all fours toward the turret where Belov was standing. Dombrovskiy pulled off his dripping wet padded canvas helmet so he could talk to Belov. (Armored vehicle crewmen's helmets are designed to be soundproof due to all the noise in armored vehicles; the crew communicates via headphones connected to the vehicle's intercom.)

Belov had to remove his own padded helmet so he could talk to his waterlogged guest. Dombrovskiy related the story: The vehicle apparently had begun to fill with water almost immediately upon entering the river. At first, he didn't notice it, but soon, water began lapping up into the turret. His guess was that all the firing they had done over the past few days had cracked open a weld in the lower hull, causing a leak. He felt lucky to be alive. Dombrovskiy looked back to see what had happened to his other two men. To his relief, they had been picked up by the 2S1 following behind Belov's vehicle.

The scene near the exit ramp was chaotic. The bank was very muddy from all the rain and traffic. When one 2S1 bogged down in the mud right at the shoreline, the other vehicles began backing up behind it. Amphibious armored vehicles are not agile like boats and cannot easily remain stationary in a river current. So several 2S1s were pushed a bit downstream by the current while waiting their turn to exit. They could not easily get onshore at points below because of the stone and concrete walls. Finally, the engineers towed out the bogged-down vehicle with an armored recovery vehicle. They stayed nearby to help in case other armor bogged down. They did. The whole process of clearing the exit took forty-five minutes — far more than expected.

The battalion lost a second 2S1 from the 3d Battery during the crossing. It flooded out also, probably from hull cracks. Belov was lucky that his battery had crossed intact. He also had an added gun crew from the drowned vehicle. The battalion was on dry land by 0740. The crossing point was about a half kilometer from the main pontoon bridge. Traffic began crossing the bridge in spurts around 0700, but the air strikes were seriously disrupting the operation. Belov could see at least one other pontoon bridge farther down the river near Pfelling. There were at least four more, all providing a steady trickle of equipment over the river.

The A-l0s returned in strength at 0750. Their main target this time was the pontoon bridge itself. After having been stung by the 2S6 antiaircraft vehicles, they stood off at a distance, firing Maverick missiles against the bridge. Two missiles seemed to strike the bridge, and it began to lazily break apart. Portions of it began to move downriver with the current as the Soviet engineers set out in small boats in an attempt to repair the rapture and prevent the bridge from disintegrating.

At this point Belov received a message from the battalion to move his vehicles away from the bridgehead toward the deployment area near Aiterhofen. The column passed through the rained streets of Ainbrach. There was nothing but rabble. The road headed south through a small woods. Passing through it, they entered the remains of Schambach, a small town that had been caught up in the original fighting two days before. It was largely in rains. There had been little time to clean up, and the road in the village was littered with rabble and debris. This created a bit of a problem: The road heading westward was supposed to be in the center of town, but because the area had been so obliterated by artillery shelling, there was no evidence of the road. The PRP-3 scout vehicle had pressed ahead and found an opening in the rabble.

The battalion spilled off the road into a large pasture to the east of Aiterhofen. They had been informed that targets were likely to be in the Geiselhoring area, and the three batteries deployed accordingly. The battalion commander, Major Yefimov, and the battalion reconnaissance vehicle set off to find the "assault group" they were supposed to support. Assault group was a fancy name for a collection of tank and motor rifle troops that had been cobbled up from the remains of other units. The assault group was about the size of a motor rifle regiment, but did not have as much equipment. It was using the radio call sign Perina (feather-bed) and so was being called the Group Perina.

Group Perina was holding the western edge of the Straubing-Deggendorf bridgehead. The main direction of the Soviet attack was out of Deggendorf, south along the A92 autobahn. Group Perina was attempting to hold a large chunk of farm pasture running south of the city of Straubing. The NATO forces had no interest in fighting in the streets of Straubing itself, which were held by another improvised Soviet battle group. Attacking across open fields wasn't too appealing either. However, on the southern edge of Group Perina was a small cluster of low hills, no more than 400 meters high; this area had been the scene of most of the fighting. Group Perina had a battalion of motor rifle troops and some tanks holding the small village of Metting in the hills. They were requesting artillery support urgently.

The battalion was ready to begin firing about thirty-five minutes after having reached the fields. Captain Gonchar placed the battalion in a triangular formation, with each battery deployed in a simple line. This was bad if the enemy should decide on counterbattery fire, but the urgency of the moment demanded a simple fire plan. Normally the battalion would deploy its reconnaissance team forward to locate the objective precisely and to observe the impact of the battalion's fire. Since it would take the PRP-3 and its scout team more than forty-five minutes to reach the vicinity of Metting, the deputy battalion commander, Captain Gonchar, decided to rely on a team from the divisional artillery group that was already nearby. The target was Hill 394 to the west of Metting. The NATO forces had seized the hill from Group Perina the night before. The hill overlooked Metting. The NATO forces had a small number of armored vehicles and appeared to be preparing for an attack on the town itself.

The main problem facing the artillery battalion was the matter of ammunition. The 2S1 carries forty rounds of ammunition, but this would be expended rapidly if the fighting became serious. Everyone in the battalion had seen what had happened at the bridgehead; no one expected to see their twenty Ural 375 trucks anytime soon. The big Urals contained all the reserve ammunition for the battalion. They would also be a bit shorthanded. The 2S1 carries a four-man crew, but the trucks carry additional troops who perform loading and other chores. The weapon could be fired with four men, but it would slow their rate of fire.

Gonchar had already radioed back to the divisional artillery group, explaining their predicament. An officer there had promised to send up some ammunition from Deggendorf, but the roads were crowded, and the main attack elements were clamoring for more ammunition as well. Gonchar told the battery commanders to have their drivers assist in firing the howitzers. It was a risk, since enemy counterbattery fire might catch them just sitting there. But the vehicles were armored, and Gonchar decided against moving the batteries around unless there was evidence of enemy artillery.

Major Yefimov was in transit to the headquarters of Group Perina, and had left it to Gonchar's judgment how the initial artillery strike should be configured. In view of the situation, Gonchar decided to register the target with a round from each battery. There was no sense wasting precious ammunition. A single howitzer from each battery fired a registration round. Gonchar waited in his command vehicle for word from the forward observers. There was nothing but the squawking of radio jamming on the line, which continued for several minutes.

Finally, the radiomen managed to reestablish communication. "Lev, this is Belka… you are short 100 meters… repeat, you are short 100 meters… confirm, over."

"Belka, this is Lev, adjusting plus 100, repeat, plus 100, over."[57]

Gonchar had the computer operator calculate the necessary changes, which were passed on to the three firing batteries. One of the radio operators was assigned to stand on the roof of the command vehicle and use flag signals to tell the batteries to open fire. The target was an area of two hectares, and the firing norms called for 300 rounds of 122mm ammunition for adequate suppression. This meant 100 rounds from each battery, about 15 percent of the ammunition on hand. At his signal, the batteries began firing. The fire strike would take about five minutes.

The forward observers reported that the artillery strike appeared to be successful. The enemy attack had been halted, although there was still sporadic tank fire. Gonchar was pondering whether to move the battalion; enemy counterbattery radar could have located them.

He was interrupted by one of the radiomen in his vehicle. "Comrade Captain, it's Major Yefimov, he wishes to speak to you urgently!"

"Pavel, the attack at Metting is just a feint. The enemy is launching

a major attack against the center of our positions at Feldkirchen. Tanks, infantry vehicles… the works. We will need everything you have to break up the attack. Stand by for coordinates."

Viktor Belov was listening in on the radio net and signaled to his six artillery vehicles to prepare for a rapid fire engagement. They could expect frequent adjustments to keep pace with the momentum of the enemy attack. In moments, the fire control computer in Captain Gonchar's vehicle had prepared the firing solutions and the data was passed to the batteries.

The first salvo was fired in less than two minutes from the original receipt of target data. The battalion had been firing for about a minute when the first adjustment came in. The NATO attackers were obviously moving very fast. Belov was observing the firing from the outside of the command vehicle when he saw what looked like small airbursts explode over the battalion. He lunged for the rear door to try to get inside the protective armor of the command vehicle. Enemy counterbattery fire!

The American forces launching the attack against the Straubing bridgehead were well prepared to deal with the Soviet artillery. They had moved a Firefinder radar into position the night before. It was directing a battalion of M109A2 155mm howitzer vehicles to the west of Geiselhoring. The Americans expected the Soviets to use armored artillery vehicles. Normal artillery would not be very effective against these, so they used M836 SADARM ammunition instead. The SADARM projectiles contain two submunitions about the size of a soup can. Each submunition separates from the projectile and is slowed by a special parachute configured to allow the submunition to rotate in a spiral pattern. At the front of the submunition is a millimeter wave and infrared sensor, which looks for a large, metallic, and actively infrared target (like an artillery vehicle). When it finds the target, it fires an explosively formed slug capable of punching through the thin roof armor of most armored vehicles.

The enemy counterbattery attack was sudden and lethal. Within a half minute, most of 1st Battery and nearly all of 3d Battery had been hit. Belov's 2d Battery, at the southern edge of the deployment, had about half its vehicles hit. Sitting so close together, the battalion vehicles had made a very vulnerable target to the enemy. In all, of eighteen howitzer vehicles, eleven had been hit and put out of action, as had four of the six command vehicles.

Belov had leapt into his vehicle at precisely the wrong moment. A SADARM submunition had homed in on the hot engine exhaust of the vehicle and had fired a penetrator at it. The slug ripped into the rear compartment, immediately above the radio operators. It smashed through one of the operators, leaving a gruesome trail, and careened into two of the torsion bar suspension arms, effectively jamming the center road wheels. Belov was hit in the shoulder by a small fragment of metal, which penetrated the muscle. It was painful but not serious. The back door of the vehicle remained open, swaying with the impact of the SADARM. Belov emerged from the rear of the vehicle in a daze and splashed with the blood of his hapless radio operator, who had also been hit. Captain Gonchar's vehicle had also been hit and was burning. Smoke curled out of the back door, and several survivors stumbled out. One of the nearby artillery vehicles was on fire.

The enemy artillery, not content with the havoc already wrought, fired in several salvos of DPICMs.[58]

These sowed hundreds of little grenades over the area. Although not particularly lethal to crews in armored vehicles, they could break tracks and cause other damage. It would be some time before this artillery battery was ready for action again.

The fictional scenario presented here highlights two branches of the Soviet Ground Forces that are in many respects superior to their NATO counterparts — the artillery and the combat engineers. The artillery has always been the favored branch in Russian armies, whether Tsarist or Soviet. The Russians have traditionally regarded the artillery as the "god of war." Artillery in this century has been the primary cause of casualties, ranging from 60 to 80 percent in the Soviet experience. The combat engineers are the branch that "lubricates" the mobility of the army. They

are responsible for ensuring quick passage through natural and man-made terrain obstacles such as minefields, fortifications, and rivers. The Soviet combat engineers received special attention as a result of the experiences of World War n, particularly the costly river-crossing operations of 1944-45.

The Soviet artillery branch is formally called the Rocket and Artillery Force. It is responsible for conventional tubed artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tactical ballistic missiles. In spite of its favored position in the Ground Forces, Soviet artillery lagged behind NATO artillery for the two decades after World War II. The Soviets fielded enormous quantities of conventional towed artillery, but largely ignored the trend toward artillery mechanization. The NATO armies were converting their artillery forces away from towed guns to armored artillery vehicles, which provided the guns with more mobility and a measure of armored protection.

The lag in Soviet developments in this field was due to several factors. The artillery is one of the more conservative branches of the Ground Forces, and there was probably resistance to the adoption of mechanized artillery when towed artillery is so much cheaper. But even the most die-hard conservative had to admit that traditional towed artillery was far less suitable on a battlefield where chemical or nuclear munitions might be used. Furthermore, with advances in artillery detection radars, towed artillery is more vulnerable to counterbattery fire.

Ironically, one of the main impediments to Soviet artillery modernization was the prestige of this branch and its research and development organization, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). When the Kremlin decided to develop atomic weapons, it was the artillery branch that managed the program. And in the late 1940s when Stalin decided to push the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, it was the artillery branch, not the Air Force, which headed the effort. These two high-priority projects drained away much of the artillery's finest talent. In 1960, the strategic missile force was finally broken off from the artillery and formed as an independent branch of the armed forces. This led to a renaissance in the Soviet artillery, which first became evident in the early 1970s.

After decades of neglect, the Soviet artillery branch began to modernize with a vengeance. The first armored artillery vehicles, the 2S1 Gvozdika (Carnation) 122mm self-propelled howitzer and the 2S3 Akatsiya (Acacia) 152mm self-propelled howitzer, began appearing in large numbers.[59]

These vehicles look like tanks, but they are much more thinly armored — only enough to protect against small arms fire and light shrapnel. And their guns are designed for indirect artillery fire, not direct fire like tanks. Neither of the new Soviet vehicles was particularly innovative, but they were comparable in quality to NATO designs of the period. What was so surprising was the numbers of vehicles being produced. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that the Soviets produced in excess of 10,000 self-propelled guns from 1972 through the mid-1980s, which was far in excess of the total number of self-propelled guns in every army on earth. The U.S. Army has only about 2,400 self-propelled guns.

The modernization program was also surprising in terms of its depth. It included highly specialized long-range artillery vehicles, such as the 2S5 Giatsint (Hyacinth) 152mm gun, the 2S7 203mm artillery vehicle, and the 2S4 Tyulpan (Tulip tree) 240mm heavy mortar vehicle.

The airborne forces received their own airmobile artillery vehicle, the 2S9 Anona (Anemone). New multiple-rocket launchers were also developed, such as the BM-22 Uragan (Hurricane), an equivalent of the U.S. Army's M270 MLRS (multiple launch rocket system). Besides the weapons themselves, the Soviets fielded a wide range of sophisticated support vehicles. They developed a specialized command vehicle, the 1V12 armored command and reconnaissance vehicle (ACRV), based on the same chassis as the 2S1 artillery vehicle. There are different versions of this vehicle for battery and battalion commanders, as mentioned in the scenario. Other armies use armored artillery vehicles, but no army has developed a vehicle specifically for this purpose the way the Soviets have done. In addition, the Soviets developed a specialized artillery radar scouting vehicle, the PRP-3 (Small Fred), and a mobile artillery location radar system, the SNAR-10 (Big Fred).

The Soviet Ground Forces differ in their artillery deployment from NATO practices. At a divisional level, Soviet artillery firepower tends to be lighter than that of U.S. Army divisions. The Soviets make up for it by heavier concentrations of artillery at army and front level, and by the sheer number of divisional artillery units. A typical forward deployed

Soviet division these days, like the units portrayed in the fictional scenario, has about 192 artillery vehicles. Each tank and motor rifle regiment has a battalion of 2S1 122mm self-propelled howitzers, like the unit depicted in the scenario. In addition, there is a divisional artillery regiment with 72 2S3 152mm self-propelled howitzers and 24 BM-21 Grad (Hail) 122mm forty-barrel multiple rocket launchers. The U.S. divisional artillery has fewer vehicles, but of larger caliber and greater firepower. The U.S. Army relies on the M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer, rather than a 122mm howitzer, as its standard divisional artillery piece.

There are 96 M109s in four battalions in each U.S. heavy division. For heavy firepower, the U.S. Army has battalions of 24 M110A3 203mm howitzers in the corps. The Soviets have 203mm artillery vehicles like the 2S7, and they are found at army and front levels, and not in the division. Finally, the U.S. Army deploys 36 M270 MLRS 227mm multiple rocket launchers in the division, compared to 24 of the smaller Soviet BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. To give some comparison, a single salvo by the howitzers of a U.S. heavy division delivers 6.2 tons of projectiles, while the Soviet howitzers in a division, though more numerous, deliver 4.9 tons.

The multiple rocket launchers add considerably to divisional firepower — a 68-ton salvo in the case of the U.S. division and 12 tons in the case of the Soviet division.

Although the Soviet division's firepower is less than that of a U.S. Army division, in any confrontation in Europe, NATO divisions are likely to be faced by two or three Soviet divisions, often with additional artillery support from army or front level. Modest advantages at divisional level are meaningless if the NATO divisions are confronted by the artillery of several Soviet divisions. The NATO divisions attempt to counteract their quantitative inferiority with technical superiority and proficiency. The effect of artillery is not purely a matter of mass. The first salvo to strike a target is far more effective than any successive salvo. The reasons are simple. If the first salvo can catch the opponent unaware, the projectiles explode before the opponent can seek cover, whether in a trench or in an armored vehicle. Successive waves may continue to be destructive, but the opponent usually has taken defensive measures after the first impact, reducing the effect.

Therefore, the ability to strike a target accurately on the first fire mission is an important advantage in maximizing the impact and lethality of the artillery. The U.S. Army has some notable advantages in this area due to improvements in fire control data handling. The U.S.

Army uses the Tacfire system, which not only provides rapid computer-based firing solutions, but allows the transmission of critical firing data to the batteries more quickly and accurately than traditional methods.

Although artillery remains the branch responsible for causing the greatest number of casualties on the battlefield, it remains largely ineffective against tanks when used in the normal, indirect fire mode. Tanks were largely developed as an antidote to artillery after World War I. Artillery has not been as decisive a weapon since the advent of the armored vehicle. Numerous attempts are being made, however, to increase the lethality of artillery against tanks. As a result, it is likely that in the future artillery will play a greater role in the antiarmor battle. The new artillery antitank projectiles include high-tech approaches, like precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and novel low-tech solutions, like artillery-scattered mines.

Precision-guided munitions have been the buzzword of advanced artillery since the late 1970s. There were glowing reports of technical advances that would permit artillery to fire guided projectiles capable of destroying a tank with a single round. The first generation of these weapons appeared in the U.S. Army in the early 1980s in the form of the Copperhead laser-guided projectile. A forward observer, equipped with a laser designator, aims the laser at an enemy tank. He radios to the artillery vehicle, which fires a Copperhead roughly into the area where the tank is located. The Copperhead picks up the coded laser light reflecting off the tank and guides itself against the tank.

First-generation PGMs like the Copperhead are an advance in the ability of artillery to oppose tanks, but such systems have many shortcomings. The Copperhead requires secure communication links between the forward observer and the artillery. If the radio link is jammed, the weapon is useless. The Copperhead can also be defeated by bad weather. Laser light can be absorbed or deflected by heavy rain, fog, and certain kinds of smoke. But the real problem is that the Copperhead does not provide any really unique capability on the battlefield. At the moment, it is useful only in attacking tanks along the forward edge of the battlefield, since it can be used only against targets that can be seen by the forward observer. Other weapons like antitank guided missiles can perform the same function. And an antitank missile like the U.S. Army TOW is about half the price of a Copperhead. For a PGM to have a revolutionary impact on the battlefield, it must be capable of striking targets beyond the front line, in the depths of the enemy positions. The Copperhead can be used in this fashion if there is a laser-equipped, remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) drone to designate the targets. At the moment, the U.S. Army does not have such a drone. So to be effective, a new generation of PGMs should be autonomous, that is, able to guide itself against the target without the need for a designator. This has proven to be very tricky.

The first weapon of this sort is likely to be the U.S. Army SADARM, an artillery projectile that contains two or more guided submunitions. The 155mm howitzer or MLRS rocket launcher fires the SADARM roughly into the area behind the lines where the enemy tanks have been spotted by reconnaissance aircraft or drones. The projectile opens up, dispersing the SADARM over the target. The submunitions, which are about the size of a soup can, have special plastic parachutes to slow them down. As the submunition falls to earth, the parachute device gives it a slight spiral motion. The first spiral is about 150 yards across, and then gradually grows smaller so that an area 150 yards in all directions is covered. The submunition has what is called a "hybrid" sensor, which uses a tiny millimeter wave radar and infrared sensor to pick up the target. When it finds a target, the submunition is detonated, firing an explosively formed metal slug at the top of the enemy vehicle.

It was originally hoped that the SADARM would be the long-range tank killer that artillery has long sought. It has not lived up to expectations, however. The "footprint" that its sensor sees is small, so it has little chance of engaging a moving tank formation. The SADARM is likely to be effective against stationary tanks and other targets. One of its main roles, as described in the scenario, will be counterbattery fire, for which the SADARM is ideally suited, since self-propelled guns are stationary when firing, and their gun barrels give off a very evident infrared signature that the submunition can easily see.

A third generation of PGMs is under development even before the second generation, like SADARM, has entered service. The third-generation systems are larger, more complex, and more expensive. They are large enough to incorporate guidance surfaces, so they can steer themselves into moving tank targets. They also are large enough to include highly sophisticated computer-processing systems to discriminate between low-priority targets (like trucks) and high-priority targets (like tanks). The first of these is likely to be the TGW (terminally guided warhead), being developed as a joint NATO program. It will be carried on the MLRS multiple rocket launcher. Similar systems are also being developed for conventional artillery howitzers, but they appear to be much farther down the road.

Systems like SADARM may enter service by the early 1990s, and systems like the TGW by the mid-1990s. Do the Soviets have such systems? Probably not yet. The Soviets do not appear to be as advanced as the United States in the critical microprocessor technologies that are needed for PGMs. From Soviet writing, it is evident that they are interested in such systems. Until their industrial base proves capable of developing them, however, Soviet artillery will have limited capability against armored targets.

High tech is not the only way to skin a cat. Low tech can work, though perhaps not as elegantly. There are two approaches to defeating armor using low-tech artillery: attacking the thin tops of armored vehicles and attacking the thin bottoms. Since it is nearly impossible to hit small targets like tanks with ordinary artillery projectiles, artillery designers have developed ICMs (improved conventional munitions). These are also called cargo rounds. Unlike normal artillery shells, these rounds contain dozens of small, unguided submunition grenades. They work like a shotgun. Before they hit the ground, a special fuse breaks open the round a few hundred feet in the air. Instead of one big explosion in one spot, they cover a much larger area with a lot of little

explosions. There can be forty to one hundred of these in a projectile, each capable of punching through the thin roof armor of a tank. The warheads are not large enough to do a lot of damage unless they get a lucky hit; for example, they might detonate near ammunition stowage or fuel. The ICMs have not been used extensively in any recent war due to their novelty. But computer simulations have suggested that they could be very deadly against light armored vehicles like infantry transports or self-propelled artillery. But they must be used in heavy concentrations to ensure a good probability of hitting their targets.

Artillery-scattered mines attack the other Achilles' heel of tanks — their soft underbelly and tracks. Conventional antitank mines had to be laboriously emplaced by hand before a battle began. The new artillery-scattered mines can be delivered as the battle develops, covering only those areas where an enemy is attacking. A lot of mines are required to lay down a minefield thick enough to have a good probability of stopping most of the tanks. But tanks are very poorly protected underneath, and their tracks can be broken easily. Artillery mines can assist in stopping a tank attack, as was suggested in Chapter 3.

Little is known about Soviet low-tech antiarmor munitions like these. It seems likely that the Soviets do have such systems. They do not require sophisticated sensors, although they do require very careful quality control at the factory and precise light machining. Such munitions mesh with Soviet tendencies toward the employment of massed artillery. To be really effective, these munitions have to be expended in large numbers. The greater the density of the minefield, the more likely enemy tanks will run over it. The more submunitions scattered over a target, the greater the likelihood of lethal damage to enemy vehicles.

The Soviets see reconnaissance-strike complexes (RSC) as the wave of the future in artillery. An RSC is not a single weapon, but rather a group of weapons and sensors. The main emphasis is on new ways for the artillery to identify and target enemy vehicles and defenses. An RSC would consist of a conventional artillery unit, an airborne reconnaissance system (either aircraft or unmanned scout drone), and a communications and data handling post, which would coordinate the information collected by the reconnaissance system with the artillery unit. The NATO armies are already developing these systems, although progress has been slow. The U.S. Army's Aquila unmanned scout drone program proved to be overly complex, but the army has managed to put together an impressive artillery fire control system with Tacfire, and future systems like AFATDS (artillery fire and target designation system).

One area where the Soviets have shown more activity than the U.S. Army is rocket and missile artillery. The Soviets were among the pioneers in the use of rocket artillery in World War II. The legendary Katyusha multiple rocket launchers have remained a staple of the Soviet artillery since their initial use in 1941. Rocket artillery is an area saturation weapon and has less precision than conventional tubed artillery. A multiple rocket launcher like the BM-21 Grad can hurl nearly two tons of high explosive and metal against a target in a single salvo. Such an enormous amount of firepower hitting a target in a few brief seconds has tremendous shock value.

The disadvantage of multiple rocket launchers, aside from their lack of precision, is the time it takes to load them; it takes about ten minutes to reload a BM-21. Rockets are also inherently more expensive than artillery projectiles with the same payload. Rockets require more propellant than conventional artillery, so they weigh more and take up more precious cargo space than tubed artillery. Rocket artillery will never replace tubed artillery, but it acts as an important firepower supplement.

The U.S. Army used multiple rocket launchers in World War II, but on a smaller scale than the Soviets. They largely ignored this form of artillery until the late 1970s, when the M270 MLRS was developed. The MLRS is much larger than most Soviet systems, firing a more potent rocket. The Soviets are currently fielding a vehicle of somewhat similar size, the BM-22 Uragan, and have an even larger 280mm rocket launcher in development.

The Soviets also have had a more active interest in ballistic missiles for tactical artillery use.

They have deployed the R-65 Luna-M (FROG-7) in divisions since the 1960s, and at army and front level have the R-300 (SS-lb Scud) and OTR-22 (SS-12 Scaleboard). The U.S. Army has the Lance, a FROG-7 equivalent. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty of 1987 has altered the use of missiles in the artillery role. The SS-12 Scaleboard is being destroyed under the terms of the treaty, as is the new OTR-23 (SS-23 Spider). As a result, the missile weapons have been pushed up a notch in the organization hierarchy. The FROGs and their new replacement, the SS-21 Scarab, are now found at army level rather than in the divisions.

Missile weapons of this type are primarily intended for the delivery of tactical nuclear warheads. Older missiles, such as the Scud, are not accurate enough to be used with conventional high-explosive warheads. The Scud received some prominence in the late 1980s owing to its use by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranian and Iraqi Scuds were fitted with conventional high-explosive warheads, but because of their lack of accuracy, they were used to bombard cities rather than smaller military targets. As missile accuracies improve, their use with nonnuclear warheads becomes more feasible. Because of their cost, they are usually reserved for high-priority targets. Typical targets in a conventional war would be communication and command posts, airfields, and major transport centers like rail yards.

The capabilities of Soviet artillery are often neglected in public discussion of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance. Artillery has not played a decisive role in modern wars since World War I and has been overshadowed by the tank and other armored vehicles. Nevertheless, artillery is likely to remain the primary cause of casualties in future wars, and new munitions and fire control technologies are likely to increase its importance on the modern battlefield.

Soviet interest in combat engineers stems largely from their experience in World War II.

Mobile warfare inevitably means that rivers will be frequently encountered. Rivers are the most formidable natural obstacle to mobile operations.

The Soviets have tried to diminish the impact of rivers on mechanized operations by making the lead combat elements, such as tanks and light armored vehicles, capable of crossing on their own. It is nearly impossible to make tanks amphibious due to their weight. The Soviets solved this problem by equipping tanks with "deep wading" equipment. Soviet tanks are designed so that all their major openings — engine grills, hatches, ventilation covers, and air intakes — can be hermetically sealed. Snorkels are fitted to the vehicle to provide air for the crew and the engine. The tanks can then be driven across the bottom of riverbeds.

This ingenious system is not without its faults. The Soviets have demonstrated tank river crossing operations during their annual war games, but have fudged the matter by laying concrete roadways on the river bottoms to prevent problems. In reality, riverbeds may be too soft or irregular to permit easy transit by tanks, and the water may be too deep for the snorkels. Even when the riverbed is suitable, the operation is hazardous. In spite of their weight on dry land, tanks retain a certain measure of buoyancy underwater. This makes them very difficult to handle and especially difficult to steer. As a result, a river crossing operation by tanks is unlikely to be a spontaneous affair, with the tanks leaping into the water at first opportunity. Combat engineer troops are provided with special amphibious vehicles, like the IRM, which have sensors capable of testing the river bottom. Armored recovery vehicles are also likely to be present to help tow tanks that become bogged down.

In the event that the river is unsuitable for deep fording with tanks, as in the fictional scenario, the Soviet engineers have special tank ferries. These are tracked vehicles with folding pontoons stowed on their roofs. It takes two of these vehicles, called GSPs, to make a ferry buoyant enough to support a tank. The vehicles drive into the water and are clipped together. They have their own ramps, and the tanks can drive aboard and be transported to the opposite shore. A tank division has only six of these pairs, so it would take some time to move a regiment of tanks across a river.

Light armored vehicles are less of a problem. They are light enough that they will float with the right hull design. Virtually all Soviet light armored vehicles are amphibious. Wheeled light armored vehicles like the BTR-80 infantry transporter have a water jet propulsion system. Water is drawn into a tunnel and pushed out the back end by a propeller. Tracked vehicles like the BMP infantry transporter or 2S1 artillery vehicle can use their track to propel themselves through the water, as mentioned in the fictional scenario.

The U.S. Army has paid less attention to these amphibious features, since it presumes it will be operating defensively with bridges intact behind its positions. American tanks are not designed for deep wading. Many light armored vehicles, like the M113 infantry transporter or the M2 Bradley, are amphibious like their Soviet counterparts. However, many other vehicles are not. The M109 armored artillery vehicle is not amphibious, unlike the Soviet 2S1 as seen in this scenario.

Tanks and light armored vehicles constitute about a fifth of the vehicles in a Soviet tank or motor rifle division. The rest are trucks, trailers, and other support vehicles. Very few of these are amphibious. To get these vehicles across a river, conventional combat engineer techniques are used. Pontoon bridge systems like the PMP are the usual method. The PMP is carried on a truck; the truck backs up to the edge of the river, and the pontoon sections are slid off into the water for the engineers to assemble. A typical Soviet division has enough PMP sections to make 120 meters of sixty-ton bridge, or 280 meters of twenty-ton bridge. The bridge takes from fifteen to forty minutes to assemble, depending on the type. In the event of a major river crossing operation, additional pontoon bridge units would be provided to allow several bridges to be assembled.

Rivers are the main natural obstacle to mobile tank warfare. Mines are the most common manmade obstacle. The Soviets have paid more attention to rapid minefield breaching than any other army. Every tank regiment has its own minefield breaching equipment, and the division has specialized equipment. The standard method for minefield breaching is the mine roller, which consists of heavy cast metal wheels on special arms attached to the front of the tank. The tank is driven into the minefield and the rollers detonate the mines in front of the tank. The rollers can withstand more than a dozen mine explosions before they are worn out and have to be replaced. Soviet tanks can also be fitted with mine rakes — small plows that push aside tilt mines or other types of mines that the rollers do not detonate. As the mine-roller tank drives through the minefield, it leaves a trail of incandescent markers for the remaining tanks to follow.

Minefield breaching of this type is slow and tedious. The mine-roller assembly is too heavy to permit tanks to always carry it. It takes time to bring it forward from rear supply areas and fit it to the tank. And the tank moves through the minefield slowly. If the minefield is properly protected with tanks or antitank missiles, the mine-rolling tank makes an easy target. The way around this problem is to use a rapid minefield breaching method. The Soviets use a specialized vehicle called the MTK, which has a special rocket launcher. Attached to the rocket is a length of explosive tubing. When fired, the rocket drags the explosive over the minefield and drops it. When it hits, the explosive line charge is detonated, destroying mines near it and blowing a path through the minefield. Such a system is very quick to operate, but it is complex and costly. A division will have only a handful of these vehicles.

Although the Western press is full of stories about "technology transfer" and the Soviet acquisition or theft of Western military technology, the reverse situation is not often discussed. One of the few areas where the U.S. Army has copied Soviet technology has been combat engineer equipment. The U.S. Army's ribbon bridge system is based on the Soviet PMP system. The U.S. Army and Israeli Army mine rollers and mine rakes are based on Soviet mine-clearing systems. None of these are high-tech systems, but they do demonstrate the Soviet attention to detail in this often neglected area.

Indeed, the amount of Soviet attention to combat engineering belies Soviet claims of the defensive orientation of the Warsaw Pact. An army does not need a lot of fast bridging equipment or minefield breaching systems if it is primarily interested in defense. An army that has an offensive posture, however, requires rapidly deployable bridging equipment, since it has to presume that its opponent will destroy his own bridges as he retreats, to hinder the passage of the enemy. This has even been recognized by Mikhail Gorbachev, who stated in his UN speech in December 1988 that he would reduce the amount of engineer equipment held by forward-deployed Soviet formations in Central Europe as part of the Soviet gesture to reduce cold war tensions in the area.