The fall of the Neustadt now led to the fate of the Altstadt and the Küstrin Fortress being decided on the flat, soggy plain of the Oderbruch.
On 13 March Marshal Zhukov issued fresh orders for the reduction of the Küstrin Fortress and the unification of his bridgeheads, just as the 32nd Rifle Corps of General Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army was attacking the Küstrin-Altstadt garrison in conjunction with another attack by the 4th Guards Rifle Corps of General Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army from Kietz. Neither of these attacks succeeded, and the plans for this operation had to be reviewed once more. The urgency of Zhukov’s orders showed that he was not too involved with the East Pomeranian operation or with the operational control of his main forces to look ahead to the earliest resumption of the main operation on Berlin.
The 5th Shock Army was now ordered to use two reinforced rifle divisions in a main attack on Golzow, with a subsidiary attack from the Alt Bleyen area on Gorgast. The stated aim was to break through the German defences in the Genschmar/Alt Bleyen sector, take the area Genschmar/Golzow and Kuhbrücken-Vorstadt, seize the 16.3 and 10.3 elevations, but not Golzow itself, and then go over to the defensive.
The 8th Guards Army, also using two reinforced rifle divisions, was ordered to break through the defences in a north-westerly direction, complete the taking of Kietz, and then go over to the defensive in the area Golzow/Alt Tucheband/Hathenow. The main attack was to be conducted towards Golzow with a subsidiary attack on Kietz as far as the Vorflut Canal.
The operation thus planned involved these two armies using only part of their resources, while their main forces had the task of defending the existing bridgeheads and of tying down the German troops with diversionary attacks by small groups. Close coordination between these two armies, and the supporting elements of the 16th Air Army, was essential if the plan was to succeed, for it was appreciated that the fortress was well favoured with natural obstacles, which would make it extremely difficult to overcome.
The 5th Shock Army picked the 32nd Rifle Corps, which in turn picked the 60th Guards and 295th Rifle Divisions, for the main thrust. The 1373rd Rifle Regiment of the 416th Rifle Division was tasked with the subsidiary thrust, while the other two regiments of that division were to secure the banks of the Warthe opposite the fortress.
The 8th Guards Army detailed the 4th Guards Rifle Corps, whose 47th and 57th Guards Rifle Divisions would be used for the main assault. Two regiments of the 35th Guards Rifle Division would be used for the subsidiary thrust, while its third regiment would secure the Oder embankment.[1]
The Küstrin garrison had lost more than half its complement, most of its artillery pieces and an incalculable amount of ammunition and supplies. No replacement of personnel or heavy weapons in worthwhile numbers could be expected. Supplies had already been minimal during the preceding weeks and never balanced the expenditure, for the forming of a stable front in the Oderbruch opposite the threatening bridgeheads had received priority.
In Küstrin itself a decimated garrison could still hold a relatively useful position on the Oder, even with its modest equipment, by blocking the nearest river crossing places and the only east–west railway on the whole front. The nightly supply convoys guaranteed an adequate delivery of life-sustaining items and kept the numbers in the main dressing station down to an acceptable level. As long as the ‘corridor’ remained open and convoys could continue to operate there was no need to fear a crisis in food and ammunition supplies.
However, the fortress area was now reduced to the Altstadt in its encompassing peninsula with the remains of the old bastion-enclosed town centre–a piece of land about 2 kilometres long but only 800 metres wide at its widest point between the Oder and Warthe rivers–as well as the Island of similar size to the west formed between the Oder and the Vorflut Canal. The Island contained the Altstadt railway station, the Artillery Barracks, an abattoir and a brewery, but relatively few houses. Deeply flooded scrubland and meadows covered wide expanses of the Altstadt peninsula known as the Gorin in the north and the Island in the south. This was a difficult area for the garrison, for only two or three spades down one struck groundwater and so no effective trenches or foxholes could be dug, but the attacker was equally disadvantaged from lack of cover. Consequently no serious attempts had been made to cross here until now.
The front around the fortress had now consolidated on this new line. A German attack on Kietz from the north in regimental strength achieved little. Enemy reconnaissance and assault troops kept the squeezed-in garrison busy every day. One night some Soviet scouts in rubber dinghies came down the Oder and were first spotted opposite the Altstadt walls, coming under fire from both banks.
Tied down, the garrison was being subjected to wearing artillery bombardments. The intensity and frequency of air attacks depended upon the weather and varying target priorities along the whole middle Oder front, but even individual aircraft almost always found a target within the narrow fortress territory. Everywhere shells of German origin were being fired, the large number found in the fortress leading to the depressing realisation that they could not have come from a German long-range battery on the Seelow Heights, but had been fired from Soviet guns. In fact the 8th Guards Army had collected up all the guns and ammunition captured on the way from Posen to the Oder and some 65,000 captured German shells of 105mm and 150mm calibre were used in the fighting for the bridgehead south of Küstrin.
When the bombardment lifted in the evenings or occasionally died away, men climbed up into the open by the dim glimmer of shaded pocket torches to stand in line at the water pumps or to gather sandbags from burnt-out or collapsed buildings to reinforce the entrances and windows of their own bunkers. In some places, such as at the town hall, the cellar doors were barricaded with squashed clarified butter cartons taken from destroyed stores, as they had proved good at stopping bullets and shrapnel.
Stores not required by the garrison were taken to Seelow by the nightly convoys. Even some goods that had been stored by Neustadt firms in the supposedly bombproof Altstadt and subsequently damaged were taken away by the halftracks. Off-duty Volkssturm men stuffed boxes full of shoes, clothing, suits, coats, etc. into sacks for this purpose.
However, the most important task for the convoy’s journeys was the removal of the wounded. Losses and damage had made the lack of beds, medical equipment and medicines even worse. Some of the forward dressing stations had already fallen. A former Luftwaffe medical depot in the Neustadt that the fortress had taken over went up in flames. Consequently, with a daily increasing proportion of casualties, the seriously wounded had a lesser chance of being evacuated, and with this in mind, in the middle of the month the combat units of the Volkssturm and the Hitler Youth were moved out of the railway offices on the Marktplatz to make room for them.
The seriously wounded could not always be brought back to the middle of the town from some of the exposed front line before dark. Too often help came too late, but even a proper burial site was lacking, the town cemeteries lying outside the defended area. A provisional cemetery in the yard of a housing block near the main dressing station was soon overfilled, and consequently many of the dead were being buried indiscriminately wherever there was a patch of workable earth. Not all the dead were treated in this manner, for some were smothered under collapsing buildings or blown apart by direct hits. At least among the combat teams, even if the men had only been together for a short while, their names could be recorded, and there were some so-called grave registry officers keeping the lists of the dead of some units somewhere among the ruins. There were also many reported missing in the fighting. A list published by the German Red Cross in 1958 gave a total of 1,400 names of soldiers, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and policemen aged between 17 and 61 years missing in Küstrin at the war’s end.
Some of the severely wounded were buried in the collapsed beer cellar of a restaurant on the Marktplatz opposite the town hall. Shells and low-flying aircraft made transportation to the main dressing station impossible, so some were taken into the crypt of the nearby church, which was soon destroyed. That evening several shells hit the roof and flames immediately engulfed the straw-dry timberwork. The heat caused the bells to ring before the nave and bell cage collapsed, burying everything under them. The wounded could not be saved, and even their names remained unknown.
While the church was alight, soldiers on the equally shot-up roof of the nearby Schloss prevented the clouds of sparks from setting fire to Reinefarth’s quarters. There was no longer any organised fire-fighting. The firemen and air raid wardens had suffered casualties proportionate to the front-line troops, while their vehicles had become victims of the bombardment and could hardly be used in the rubble-strewn streets. A few portable, petrol-driven pumps provided an inadequate replacement. Sappers used the demolition of individual buildings and ruins to prevent the spread of fire, turning them into natural anti-tank barriers. Furniture, doors and floorboards–as far as they were available–were ripped up by the Hungarian troops no longer in the front line. Wood for reinforcement work had meanwhile become as rare as fuel for the stoves in the cold, wet earth bunkers, cellars and fortress casemates. Nevertheless, day after day the flames continued to consume.
Eventually there was only one motor pump left intact, which was used in the Marktplatz to draw water from a deep well. In a surprise air attack most of the men fighting the ensuing fire fled into the hallway of a partially ruined building, but a bomb ripped its walls apart and the few firemen that were left waited in vain for their comrades to reappear.[2]
Officer Cadet Corporal Hans Dahlmanns recalled:
When the Soviet troops reached the east bank of the Warthe, the situation on the peninsula became very dangerous. The way in, following the railway line, led in full enemy sight over an about 50-metre-long railway bridge spanning across the flooded land to our peninsula. Anyone moving on it could expect heavy machine-gun and mortar fire.
One of the two officer cadets that had come with me to the peninsula lay in a small dugout just a few paces from the bridge. He was wounded by a mortar bomb splinter in the upper thigh and had to wait until darkness before he could be extracted. He was in great pain, which he bore bravely. Presumably he got away from Küstrin as the fortress was not completely surrounded at this stage. The other officer cadet died from a mortar splinter to the head while delivering a message.
The route to the peninsula was little liked, but had to be managed every day, not least because of the water level report, which had to be read at the risk of one’s life at the foot of the swing bridge and reported to the company command post. Since the Russians had arrived on the Warthe, this had been located in a cellar of the first house on the edge of the Altstadt. If we did not receive the water level report, I had to do the job, something I particularly disliked.
My main task at this point was maintaining contact between the company commander and the individual platoons deployed near the bridge. Apart from this I had to deliver the Warthe water level report daily to the fortress commandant in the Schloss. This message carrying became increasingly dangerous as the fortress area diminished, as firing could come from all sides and there were big stretches offering little cover. More and more often I saw the bodies of soldiers lying on the streets and squares that had been hit by sudden barrages far behind the front line. The Red Army had plenty of ammunition and used it industriously.
On my messenger rounds I regularly came past the Oder Potato Meal Factory, where I could call on my father. From mid-February until the end of March I saw him practically every day.[3]
Teenager Hans Dalbkermeyer concluded his account:
It must have been between 15 and 18 March that a Führer-Order demanded all the youths be evacuated from Küstrin. Some 40 to 50 youths assembled in a casemate room one evening. We were told that we would leave the town with the nightly supply convoy. We were briefed about the route and the way the convoy operated between the almost completely surrounded town and through the Russian lines. We could put our packs on the tracked vehicles, but would have to walk behind. Meanwhile I had acquired a pack again with some laundry and utensils. All weapons were to be left behind, but I took a small 6.35 pistol and ammunition with me despite the prohibition. As well as our packs, the tracked vehicles took the wounded to the hinterland.
Long thick ropes were attached to the rear of one of the vehicles to enable us to walk behind without losing contact. The convoy set off, left the town over the Oder and Vorflut Canal bridges, and set off into the night as quietly as possible, without any noise and without lights. We three remaining Birnbaumers kept together with others behind an armoured personnel carrier, and during the dangerous section were protected by being in the middle of the tracked vehicles. Hardly ever on proper roads, mainly on tracks and fields, we went stumbling on, but never letting go of the life-saving rope, towards safety and freedom. We reached Seelow in the early morning, recovered our packs and felt saved and at peace.
After a break in a Wehrmacht shelter on the Marktplatz, 30 to 40 of us were ordered to go on by rail to a retraining camp. The train left Seelow at midday. The orders to go to the retraining camp did not apply to us, so when the train stopped at Eberswalde we secretly got off. There was a local train on the track alongside going to Berlin-Bernau, so we stepped straight across from one carriage to the other without using the platform. As both trains set off in opposite directions, we separated from that closed and supervised group.
We knew that the main administration of our Heim Schools was based in Berlin-Spandau, so we reported back there. After three days in Berlin with nightly bombing attacks and the exchange of our fantasy uniforms for civilian clothing, my war service came to an end. With some difficulty we went by train from Berlin to Thuringia at the end of March. In Haubinda, near Hildburghausen, we found our Birnbaum school encamped, and with them my younger brother.[4]
Officer Cadet Corporal Fritz Kohlase arrived at Alt Bleyen with the 303rd Fusilier Battalion on the night of 19/20 March to relieve elements of the 25th Panzergrenadier Division, which was being pulled out of the line for a short rest:
We relieved units of the 25th Panzergrenadier Division and took up positions in the area around Alt Bleyen manor farm, the battalion headquarters and dressing station being set up in the farm. The 2nd Company’s command post was set up in the cellar of one of the few farm labourers’ cottages. The company itself occupied the prepared trenches directly in front of the farm, with a field of fire covering the Schäferei [sheep farm] and Alt Bleyen. The dugouts, however, only provided protection from splinters and light shells. Immediately south-west of the farm were two infantry guns, and two machine guns were positioned about 100 metres south-west from them. From there they could cover the whole western and southern sides with their fire. Another 100 metres further on towards Gorgast was an 88mm flak gun dug in for ground fighting. A communications trench connected these firing points and ended in the trenches we were occupying. The flat terrain started in front of our positions, extending to the Schäferei and Gorgast to the south-west. Far off to the south, towards the railway, a line of trees obstructed our view. The land was completely flat and easy to observe. Behind the labourers’ cottages were three self-propelled guns. The supply route between the hinterland and fortress ran past near the farm. Every night German tracked vehicles went along to the Altstadt and back again.
We obtained our ammunition and food supplies at night, as our supply column was located well behind the main front line. The noise of fighting came from Küstrin and the Gorgast direction all day long. At night fires reddened the sky over the fortress. For us at the Alt Bleyen manor farm Tuesday and Wednesday passed peacefully. We just had to be careful, for the Russian snipers reacted to every movement.[5]
The whole area was now facing four days of aerial bombardment preparatory to the ground attack by the 8th Guards and 5th Shock Armies, as witnessed by Officer Cadet Corporal Fritz Kohlase:
On Wednesday afternoon [21 March] two to three hundred twin-engined Soviet bombers in close formation dropped two bomb carpets on the boundary line near Gorgast. Although the bombing area was 3 kilometres from us, the earth around us shook. This and an otherwise suspicious silence indicated that the next enemy offensive was imminent.[6]
Officer Cadet Corporal Hans Dahlmanns continued his account:
On 20 March my company command post moved into the cellars of the Court House. It was no longer possible to check the Warthe water level and report it to fortress headquarters, but nobody asked for it. I made my rounds as a messenger under fire, visiting my father every day, on the last occasion just a few hours before his death. I believe this was on 24 March.
I remember that I returned to the Court House at dusk and was given the job of mending a shot-though cable providing power from a generator in the town to the courthouse cellar to enable us to hear the news on the radio. It had become dark, but nevertheless I still had to take cover from the ‘Sewing Machines’ flying overhead and dropping flares and incendiary and explosive bombs on anything that moved. Once the aircraft had flown off, I resumed looking for the break in the cable and was suddenly shocked by a tremendous explosion that must have occurred close by. But I had heard no bomb falling, which shocked me, as it was completely unusual. Soon afterwards I found the fault in the cable, repaired it and turned back for the Court House cellar. Then I heard on the radio the news that Allied troops had crossed the Rhine and were fighting around Dinslaken, my home town.
A little later, an NCO of my company came in and told me that my father’s command post at the Oder Potato Meal Factory had been hit by an incendiary bomb that had ignited a stack of shells. After a while the fire had reached the hand grenades stored there, setting off a violent explosion that had destroyed the north-west side of the factory. Second-Lieutenant Schröter had been left hanging head down in the beams, still conscious, but he died soon afterwards. Nothing had happened to my father, however. So I had another quiet night.
The next morning I went to my company commander asking to go to the Oder Potato Meal Factory to see what had happened. The whole way I thought what the worst could be. The previous evening the NCO had said that my father had not been seen. I found the factory mainly destroyed, above all glowing as hot as an oven so that it was impossible to go in. I then went to the nearby Artillery Barracks to ask Captain Fischer about it. On my way I passed a soldier named Müller in a trench who was in my father’s company and asked about him: ‘I cannot say’, he replied and turned away, and at that moment I knew that my father was dead.
I remember the feeling that suddenly overcame me and blanketed out everything else. I felt no sadness or despair, rather a frightful emptiness before a background that was filled with anxiety, an increasing depression and returning anxiety. A strange rigidity gripped me. If I had recognised it, it was as if I had slipped out of myself.
It was in this state that I met Captain Fischer, who officially informed me that my father was dead and expressed his sympathy. My father had personally led the team trying to extinguish the burning ammunition with water from the Oder and wet sacks. The explosion caused the building to partially collapse, burying the firefighters under the debris. They experienced a mercifully swift death, while those who had survived the collapse in the hollow space beyond were behind a wall of fire that no one could penetrate. Their cries for help could be heard but no one could get through and they were burned alive. Between ten and twenty men of my father’s company died with him.
I went back to the command post in the Court House, but cannot remember what I did or felt.[7]
The 25th Panzergrenadier Division, whose fighting strength had been reduced to 5,196 men by 17 March, had been withdrawn to rest and refit near the village of Friedersdorf on the Seelow Heights. Hitler had come up with the unrealistic idea of using this and three other experienced divisions to attack northwards from Frankfurt, where the Germans still had a bridgehead on the east bank, in order to cut off the Soviet Reitwein-Lebus bridgehead and eventually relieve Küstrin. This operation, which depended upon getting four divisions across the only bridge, was to be achieved within three days commencing on 24 March. On the first day of the operation there was to be a big surprise attack that would methodically destroy the enemy bridges between Frankfurt and Küstrin. However, the Soviets forestalled this plan by attacking on 22 March before it could be implemented, and the 25th Panzergrenadiers had to be thrust back into line in considerable haste.[8]
That same day Colonel General Gotthardt Heinrici, until then commander of the 1st Panzer Army, reported in Zossen to the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Heinz Guderian, who had surprised him in Upper Silesia with a telephone call announcing that he was Heinrich Himmler’s successor as commander-in-chief of Army Group ‘Weichsel’. Guderian briefed him on his area of responsibility, which extended from the Baltic to the mouth of the Neisse river, and his forces, which consisted of the 3rd Panzer Army in the north and the 9th Army in the south. Guderian especially stressed the critical situation at Küstrin.
That evening Heinrici arrived at the Army Group Headquarters near Prenzlau, where Himmler received him in front of a portrait of Frederick the Great, saying that his relief was due to some important tasks that Hitler had given him. He then gave a widely rambling account of his leadership since January. Then came an important telephone call. The commander-in-chief of the 9th Army reported that a Soviet attack to combine the two bridgeheads, cutting off Küstrin, had occurred. Himmler handed the telephone to Heinrici saying: ‘You now command the army group.’
In detail, the Soviet attack by about four rifle divisions from the south and two from the north was launched at 0715 hours, and the leading elements of both Soviet armies met at the Förster Bridge over the Alte Oder north-west of Gorgast that afternoon. Successful as the operation had been, it had only been achieved at considerable cost. Captain Horst Zobel’s 1st Battalion of the ‘Müncheberg’ Panzer Regiment claimed the destruction of 59 Soviet tanks that day, not counting damaged or immobilised ones, and the 9th Army’s overall claim was 116 Soviet tanks.
The 25th Panzergrenadier Division moved off eastwards from Werbig at about 1800 hours to launch a counterattack along both sides of Reichsstrasse 1 and the Berlin–Küstrin railway line with the ‘Müncheberg’ Panzer Division on its left flank. By dusk the Alt Tuchenow–Golzow railway line had been reached and Golzow railway station retaken. The German formations, now supported by Army Flak Battalion 292, went over to the defence.
Meanwhile the inner sweep of the Soviet attack had successfully bottled up the ‘corridor’ defenders with those of the fortress garrison west of the Vorflut Canal. The ‘corridor’ elements included the 303rd Fusilier Battalion, a mixed armoured company of self-propelled guns and Mark IV tanks of Captain Zobel’s battalion that had become cut off in the fighting for Gorgast, and the 2nd Battalion of the 1st ‘Müncheberg’ Panzergrenadier Regiment.[9]
Officer Cadet Corporal Fritz Kohlase recalled how it began:
The second Russian offensive on Küstrin began with an artillery preparation on the morning of Thursday, 22 March 1945. The whole front line as far as our horizon, the southern and northwestern parts of the corridor position lay under heavy artillery fire, but no shells fell on us. We had orders to hold our fire. The central part of the corridor was to remain as quiet as possible, but barely 2 kilometres from us was a frightful wall of fire, steel and earth.
As passive spectators, we had to look on as the barrage began to move. Then came the Soviet infantry and, behind the storm troops, enormous columns, including panje wagons.
The self-propelled gun commander sought me out to complain strongly about our battalion commander. Despite orders to the contrary, he had begged Major Quetz for permission to open fire, and having been refused, he said: ‘We will never have the Russians so concentrated in front of us. What losses we could inflict upon them now! All those that we don’t put out of action today we will have to defend ourselves against tomorrow under worse conditions of increased superiority. Apart from that, we would be supporting our comrades on the main front line!’
The sounds of heavy infantry and cannon fire came from Gorgast and the Schäferei that seemed to move a little and then increase into a strong cannonade. Towards noon it changed to short, raging infantry fire, then became weaker and finally ended with a dull explosion.
Since the assault that had gone past us that morning we had seen no one, either Russian or German. At dusk a wounded SS man came towards us unimpeded across the open fields. He belonged to the Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler’ and reported the destruction of his battalion. He now wanted to join the other Leibstandarte battalion that should be somewhere near Berlin. When he realised that he was in an encirclement and had also been heading east, he asked for some bread and water and went back the way he had come.
Later that evening the battalion was redeployed to cover the farm from the south-west. One section took up position every 100 to 150 metres. I had to dig in with my men about 75 metres from the 88mm gun with no communications trench to the rear. The company commander personally gave me my orders: ‘This position is to be held to the last man. Evacuation only on orders!’
Towards midnight Sergeant Hoffmann and I made a reconnaissance towards the railway line. We went forward about a kilometre without seeing or hearing anyone on this dark night. Only from Küstrin was there occasional artillery fire and burning fires.[10]
Officer Cadet Corporal Hans Dahlmanns takes up the story in Küstrin:
It must have been one or two days later [after 20 March] that ground-assault aircraft attacked the Court House with heavy bombs. I was about to leave on my messenger rounds, but stayed in the cellar with my back to some steel air-raid shelter doors as both neighbouring cellars had been partly destroyed by direct hits. The company command post was in one of them. When the clouds of dust subsided, the steel doors were completely buckled and two men pulled the company commander out into the open.
The company command post was then established in an earth-covered bunker that was about in line with the Court House, but further north-west near the railway line in quite thick undergrowth. That afternoon or the next day, I was given the task of reconnoitring the area and trenches to the south-east. These stretched from behind the Court House, parallel to the Warthe, to the road leading to the Neustadt, where Soviet troops were expected soon. In an earth bunker I found a Russian soldier who had been wounded in the foot. I ordered him to come with me, but finally I had to put his arm around my neck and support him.
I took him to the wooden bunker and we tried to carry him between four of us to the field hospital, but this did not work, as the Friedrichstrasse that we had to cross was under heavy shellfire and we had to turn back. When we returned to the bunker, the order to retreat arrived together with the news that the railway and road bridges would be blown up behind us.
An NCO saw the wounded man and said: ‘In a fortnight he will be fighting against us again.’ He handed me his pistol and went on: ‘Take him outside and shoot him!’ I refused, as did the others, until the company cook took the pistol, led the wounded man outside and shot him. The whole scene took place in the presence of the company commander, Lieutenant Schröder, who said nothing, as if he was not in charge. I have long thought that I should have left the young Russian soldier in his hole. He would have been in safety next day, and I am convinced that his foot would have taken the rest of the war to heal.[11]
Sapper Ernst Müller remembered:
On 22 March we moved our battalion command post from the Law Courts to the Oder Malt Factory, which was not far from the Artillery Barracks on the west bank of the Oder. As I knew the town well, I had to go back over the Oder bridges into the Altstadt. The road bridge had already suffered considerable damage in the meantime. It was often difficult taking messages to the Altstadt.
Once I had to find out at night in complete darkness whether the Warthe bridges had been completely destroyed. This was not the case with the road bridge. For this task I had an escort of several men, one of whom was lost. Upon our return to the command post I had to take some bitter words from his friend.
It must have been on 22 March that Soviet bombs hit the casemate in the Friedrichstrasse. The event was devastating for us. Among those platoon commanders gathered there for a conference were Lieutenant Hagen, Second-Lieutenant Behr, Battalion Sergeant Major Gleiche, and Staff Sergeants Tewes and Kukei.
On or about 20 March the fortress commandant, SS-Gruppenführer and Lieutenant-General of the Waffen-SS Reinefarth, moved his command post out of the Altstadt to the Artillery Barracks. About five days later he gave over command of the fortress to Captain Fischer, who mockingly said: ‘So a little captain will now take over the fortress.’ This fact has not been noted in any book to appear so far. However, I had this from the mouth of Captain Fischer himself![12]
The Wehrmacht Report of 23 March pulled a veil over the fatal development at Küstrin with the fable that a Soviet attack on the flanks of the bridgehead had been checked by ‘the effective defensive fire of our Oder defences after a minimal initial success’.
The Soviets resumed their attack to the west with new forces. The XXXIXth Panzer Corps commanded by General Karl Decker, with the ‘Döberitz’ Infantry Division on the right, the 25th Panzergrenadiers in the centre and ‘Müncheberg’ Panzer Division on the left, had to withstand the heaviest pressure all day long, the focal point being in the centre astride Reichsstrasse 1, but they were able to hold all their important positions or regain them by counterattack.
In the now fully encircled fortress, the worsening of the now critical situation became noticeable. A new line of defence had to be drawn straight across the ‘corridor’ near Bleyen, and the forces thrown back in this encirclement were now having to fight facing west.
Ground-attack aircraft attacked the Kommandantenstrasse leading from the Marktplatz to the fire brigade depot, where a group of armoured personnel carriers was standing. Within minutes these vehicles, condemned to immobility by the rubble-strewn streets, were in flames under a hail of bombs and explosive shells. A platoon of Volkssturm just released from the front line was surprised by this attack, only a few of the men being able to reach cover in time.
For the first time there were no night convoys, but food reserves gave no reason for concern and there was enough ammunition left for several days, as hardly any of the heavy weapons were still serviceable. But the closure would have a disastrous effect on the main dressing station as now no serious cases could be evacuated to the hinterland and the number of casualties was mounting by the hour.[13]
Officer-Cadet Corporal Fritz Kohlase described the Soviet advance:
The Russians attacked us on Friday afternoon without any preliminary reconnaissance, artillery or armoured support. They came from the direction of the Gorgast–Kietz railway line in line abreast, widely spaced out and several metres apart, holding rifles or sub-machine guns in their hands. The first row was followed by a second, this by a third, then the fourth, fifth and sixth. Despite orders to the contrary, the two machine guns behind us opened fire at 800 metres and all the other weapons joined in. The Soviet infantry then advanced in bounds as our artillery in the Seelow area joined in the battle. They merely dug themselves in before us as they came under direct fire from the 88mm gun. This position was the turning point of the Russian attack. West of us the attackers stormed further northwards, thus thrusting eastwards and digging in 100 to 200 metres from the heavy machine guns and the rifle trenches west of the farm. This attack was a difficult but precisely executed manoeuvre, assisted by the inaccuracy of the German defensive fire.[14]
Shortly after midnight on 23 March the 25th Panzergrenadier Division attacked along the Golzow–Gorgast road to reach the Alte Oder. By daybreak it had penetrated Gorgast, where bitter fighting broke out, but later overwhelming Soviet forces forced a withdrawal to the starting point.
Both sides were preparing for big operations to decide the Küstrin situation. The 9th Army was planning a relief attack for Küstrin that would include the ‘Führer’ Grenadier Division under Major General Otto-Ernst Remer. The 8th Guards Army was preparing to attack the Altstadt fortress. Meanwhile the commander-in-chief of the 1st Byelorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov, had been summoned to Moscow for consultations about the forthcoming Berlin Operation. Before leaving, recalling the false report of 12 March on the taking of the fortress, he asked the commander of the 8th Guards Army when he thought he could take it. Chuikov riposted that it lay in the attack path of Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army, which had already claimed to have taken it. Zhukov said that when mistakes occurred they had to be corrected. Chuikov promised to take Küstrin before Zhukov met Stalin. The attack was fixed for 29 March and would be led by divisions on both banks of the Oder. Heavy batteries were dug into the dykes to provide direct fire on the bastions. Soviet units had already worked their way forward into the corner between the Oder and Warthe rivers at the Kietzerbusch railway halt and skirmishing no longer died down at night.[15]
Officer-Cadet Corporal Fritz Kohlase again:
During the night leading to Saturday [24 March] more fires flamed in Küstrin. In the south-west German troops sought to break out of the encirclement. They forced the Soviet front back with strong artillery fire and started fighting for Gorgast in the depths of the night. However, they were brought to a halt and shortly afterwards were driven back to the west by the Red Army.
For my comrades and me this failure was a great disappointment. With my section I had marked the south-westerly point of the Küstrin encirclement and seen the fire of our relieving troops about 3 kilometres away.
The noise of combat came from Küstrin all day long. At night, when it was quiet, fires lit up the town. The Russians also shot a building within the farm area into flames practically every night, making the delivery of ammunition and food difficult. Sometimes it took more than two hours for the few hundred metres to be covered, and once it succeeded only at the second attempt. Every night the ‘Orderly Sergeant’, an armoured Soviet biplane, appeared and would switch off its engine near its target then glide over it dropping small shrapnel bombs. During the day several German aircraft flew over Küstrin and dropped supply containers by parachute.
The Russians penetrated a gap in the positions between us and the 3rd Company, and occupied an isolated farm. From there a gun brought us under such uncomfortably direct fire that the battalion’s assault platoon received orders to regain the farm. The badly led attack in the dark, without the support of heavy weapons, failed.
One evening I had a stupid altercation with the 88mm battery commander. He inspected the flak position and then came to my section under cover of darkness. A steel helmet protected the head of this officer. After I had made my report, he told me off for wearing a field cap in the front line. When I told him that we only wore steel helmets under certain conditions, and that my company commander also wore a field cap, the altercation became louder until in the end I had to give way, if only for a few minutes, until he had disappeared in the direction of the manor farm.
The battalion lay under heavy fire on the Saturday and Sunday from infantry weapons, Stalin-Organs and guns. The worst were the often hour-long attacks by ground-attack aircraft, which concentrated on the infantry guns but failed to put them out of action. The battalion’s losses increased, but my section was lucky so far.[16]
The Küstrin garrison’s fighting capacity rapidly diminished. All movement by day outside the foxholes, bunkers and casemates was unthinkable. The Soviet artillery observers had virtually every bit of the remaining fortress within view of their binoculars, even in the Altstadt, whether over heaps of rubble or through the skeletons of burnt-out buildings, and even their infantry weapons could reach almost everywhere. Ground-attack aircraft tackled systematically every street that showed signs of life. The police station on the Marktplatz collapsed under their bombs. Those units not deployed in the front line kept within the hollow spaces of the old fortifications. Numerous stable cellars had been destroyed in the previous days, shattered or burnt out.
Officer-Cadet Corporal Fritz Kohlase recalled:
On Saturday [24 March] the 3rd Company on our left was thrown out of its positions. Their counterattack on Sunday failed because of the company commander having a nervous breakdown. The immediate enemy response thrust into the company’s departure line, occupied it and closed up to the south-eastern corner of the manor farm complex.[17]
Officer Cadet Corporal Hans Kirchhof was wounded at about this time:
In March I received orders to build and occupy a new position, also on the Oder dyke, but about 100 metres from the infantry bunker. This put us about 500 metres from the Bienenhof, lying on a mound where once a pub had stood. From here I could fire towards the Sonnenburger Chaussee. Far off to the south-west, south and south-east we could sometimes see enemy vehicles, but did not fire at them. Sometimes when we had permission to open fire, we fired at targets on the west bank of the Oder.
In the course of the offensive on the Altstadt we too came under strong artillery fire. The dugout in which I was received two direct hits, causing the entrance to collapse and making a hole in one of the walls. At least the latter served me well, for I was able to crawl out through the hole. The cause of this was a Soviet anti-tank gun on the west bank of the Oder.
My right eye had been hit and was falling out. In addition one nostril had been pierced through and a large wooden splinter was stuck in my upper lip. One of my men suffered a bruised groin from the same shell-burst. There were no other casualties as at the beginning of the barrage the men had spread out so that a direct hit would only get one man. I said good-bye to my men and went back to the Altstadt alone. There were no communication trenches from our position to the rear, only individual foxholes. My route was along the foot of the dyke across the Oder levels, followed for a long time by bursts of enemy machine-gun fire, fortunately too high or too far away.
Because of my sudden reduction to one eye, my progress was uncertain and not very fast. To avoid the enemy fire, I crossed the dyke and went on along the Chaussee. Here, however, the Russian rifle positions were closer, so I crossed back to the Oder levels, where I soon reached the dead angle.
Our company command post was in a casemate near the Kietz Gate, right on the road and a bit north of the big road junction. There was also an infantry command post here, a room for the Panther turret crew and the replacement crew for my gun. I sought out the latter first and was bandaged for the first time. The infantry company commander had me brief him on the events at the Bienenhof. I was able to stop Wolfgang Paul from going forward with his men for the moment, as it made no sense to do so, and also avoided unnecessary injuries.
As the Altstadt was under strong artillery fire, I remained in the casemate. Only at nightfall did the firing reduce to harassing fire. When comrades took me to the Schloss the streets were still burning right and left. The field hospital was in a cellar with the rooms for patients laid out with mattresses. I did not receive the attention of a doctor until the following day, because, in my opinion, the only doctor was expecting many acute cases of badly wounded soldiers. When I asked the doctor about the condition of my eye, he replied that I would have to get used to it for a long time.
How long I was in the field hospital in the Schloss cellars, I do not know. The weak lighting was the same day and night. There was plenty of coming and going, but I lost all sense of time. I lay on my mattress and dozed.[18]
Luftwaffe Gunner Josef Stefanski also came under heavy fire:
Later I was sent to a flak battery located on the west bank of the Oder near the Reichsgarten pub. There were two guns in the position, and from there we were able to shoot up two Soviet tanks coming up the Sonnenburger Chaussee. Several German dead were buried behind the Artillery Barracks at the Reichsgarten pub.
When we had run out of ammunition for our guns, or the guns had been hit by enemy fire, I was assigned as an infantryman in the Altstadt. We were accommodated in the Girls’ Middle School on Schulstrasse, which received a direct hit one day that buried twenty-eight of our comrades. We could only dig out seven men alive, and the remaining twenty-one could well still be buried under the rubble.[19]
Meanwhile there were conflicting opinions over the conduct of operations between Headquarters 9th Army and Army Group ‘Weichsel’ on one side, and the Army General Staff (OKH) and the Armed Forces General Staff (OKW) on the other. The former wanted, with a new but limited attack, to facilitate a breakout by the garrison, to hold the line established on 23 March, and to put all the divisions available to the task of eliminating the 5th Shock Army’s bridgeheads in the Kienitz–Gross Neuendorf sector. However, the OKH and OKW, at Hitler’s insistence, wanted the fortress to be relieved and ordered an attack to be launched from the Frankfurt Fortress’s bridgehead on the east bank north-west of Küstrin, which, it was hoped, would shatter the communications and forces of the 69th Army and 8th Guards Army holding this sector. This latter plan was known as Operation Boomerang. It depended on getting the five divisions concerned across the single bridge at Frankfurt, a move that could not possibly have gone unobserved, thus eliminating the essential element of surprise. The controversy over this matter eventually was to contribute to the causes for Colonel General Heinz Guderian’s dismissal as Chief of the General Staff on the 28th of the month.[20]
When Colonel General Gotthardt Heinrici took over Army Group ‘Weichsel’ on 22 March, the 25th Panzergrenadier Division was supposed to be about to move to the Frankfurt bridgehead in preparation for the attack on the east bank, although the Küstrin Fortress had just been encircled. Heinrici visited Führer Headquarters on 25 March and managed to persuade Hitler to change the plan to a reopening of the Küstrin corridor. The orders to SS-Lieutenant General Reinefarth commanding the Küstrin Fortress were to hold out at all costs, so the reopening of the corridor (with the added but unrealistic goal of reducing the Kienitz bridgehead) was an acceptable alternative to the original plan of attack for Hitler, although Heinrici regarded both proposed attacks as an unnecessary waste of manpower. The date for the revised attack was set for the 27th.[21]
To conduct this attack General Karl Decker’s Headquarters XXXIXth Panzer Corps was given the 25th and 20th Panzergrenadier Divisions, the ‘Führer’ Grenadier Division, the ‘Müncheberg’ Panzer Division, the ‘1001 Nights’ Combat Team and the 502nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion.[22] These formations had the task of breaking through the Soviet defences in the sector formed by the Küstrin–Berlin railway line as far as the Oder dyke on the Kalenzig meadows. The 20th Panzergrenadier Division and the ‘Führer’ Grenadier Division in the middle were to thrust through to Küstrin and, together with the forces on the flanks, enlarge the strip up to the line of the Küstrin–Berlin railway/ as far as the Oder near Neu Bleyen/ the Oder dyke at the Kalenziger Bunst/the Kalenziger Wiesen (meadows).[23]
Officer-Cadet Corporal Fritz Kohlase recalled:
On the night leading to Monday [26 March] we lost our left flank protection about 150 metres away. The leader of the three-man section there was wounded. A warrant officer, who was a bit simple but also very brave, sorted out the men. As the enemy situation was not clear to him as a result of the changed circumstances, he simply crept over alone and orientated himself. All went well while he traced the enemy position, but he was spotted on the way back and shot through the thigh by one of his own men. While his comrades were taking him back to the dressing station, the Russians established themselves in the abandoned trench and took us under uncomfortable fire from the flank.
The infantry guns, the heavy machine guns, the Hoffmann section, the 88mm flak gun and my section still formed a long, narrow finger into the enemy, from which we were connected to the manor farm only by a trench from the flak position. Our battalion position in the manor farm area was itself only a part of a wedge reaching from Kuhbrücken to the north-west.
Night after night the Soviet units moved in closer, spending the day in quickly dug out scoops ready to take another jump forward the following night. With our 42 machine guns and the necessary supply of ammunition we were able to slow down their rate of advance. Nevertheless we were not able to sleep any more. Only during the day, crouched in our foxholes, could we take a short nap or sink into a light half-sleep in which any change in the position would immediately awaken us.
My section received no more cold rations on the last night, only a few canteens of drinking water. The Russians had worked their way forward to less than 100 metres from us and dug foxholes all around us. The night was as disturbed as if daylight had driven off the darkness.[24]
The first serious plans for a breakout were developed in the fortress on 26 March, when even some of the SS officers close to the commandant began to feel uncomfortable with their situation. It was thought that a breakout had some chance of success while the encirclement at the junction of the two Soviet armies had still not been fully consolidated and the units there remained unfamiliar with the terrain. The increasing pressure on the small German-occupied strip along the west bank of the Oder, which was the only possible starting point for a breakout, called for haste.
At the time of the first brief closing off of the town at the beginning of February, any mention of breakout plans would have led to a court martial. Now, with the indication that the relief attack had been repelled, or at least had been unsuccessful, the situation had changed dramatically.
Reinefarth had reasons enough for delaying making a decision. The penalty for disobeying Hitler’s orders was quite clear, and while there was still a chance of the fortress being relieved, he could not claim to have been under pressure. Apart from this, should the ‘corridor’ reopen, even briefly, he could not guarantee reaching the German lines safely, even if he used a tank. The landing strip prepared weeks before for just such an emergency was still in reasonably good order, but could only have been used in daylight by a very skilful pilot and almost every metre of it was now under Soviet observation and even within range of light infantry weapons.[25]
Officer Cadet Corporal Fritz Kohlase continued his account:
This Monday morning the Red Army units made a concentrated attack on the Alt Bleyen manor farm. Katyuschas opened fire, and were joined by guns and mortars. The opening blow was so strong that we could not see the flak position 75 metres away.
Because of the proximity of the enemy and his overwhelming superiority in numbers, we had no choice but to keep firing during the fire preparation so that he could not get up to attack. Within a short time four of our six machine guns were out of action with ripped barrels from lacquered ammunition. Our lives depended upon these machine guns. Replacements were needed. To get through the barrage only Fischer, Krell and I were available. The machine-gunners could not leave, so I had to go. I jumped out of the trench and dived into the wall of fire. Suddenly I received a blow, was lifted up and lost consciousness. When I came to, I carefully moved my arms and legs and felt my head and body. Nothing. My steel helmet lay several metres away. Now I crawled on until I reached the flak position, where a sentry pulled me into the trench. I sought out my platoon commander and the gun commander. Together we controlled the gun. It was ready to fire. The crew had so far had only a few wounded. The flak machine gun also began to fire. I took two of its four replacement barrels. Then the gun commander pushed me up out of the trench. This time I was scared and crawled back.
Then the storm began on the manor farm. First a Soviet storm troop broke into the trenches of our 1st Platoon, rolled it up and approached the company command post, threatening to split the battalion in two. The company headquarters troop was able to clear this breach in an immediate counterattack using sub-machine guns, hand grenades and Panzerfausts. The troops attacking the flak position were gunned down by the 88mm gun at point-blank range.
The battalion commander also sent the three self-propelled guns to our support. They drove right up to the Soviet rifle pits and turned, squashing all who lay there. Immediately the Soviet fire concentrated on our self-propelled guns. When one of them received a direct hit, the others turned back.
The firing slowly died down. The noise of combat could only be heard from the dyke road to Kuhbrücken. Here, between the parallel dyke roads to the southern hamlet of Alt Bleyen, a panzergrenadier battalion of the ‘Müncheberg’ Panzer Division was defending itself, together with an officer-cadet company and another dug-in 88mm flak gun, against the tank-supported enemy attack from the north. That afternoon the attackers were able to break through to the southern edge of Neu Bleyen. By evening nine destroyed enemy tanks stood in the area, the officer cadets were down to only a few men and the 88mm gun had been rendered unserviceable. The Russians had reached the dyke road between the manor farm and Kuhbrücken.
On this beautiful sunny Monday morning the Soviet artillery resumed firing at us, slowly increasing in intensity. This lasted several hours. Then the ground-assault aircraft appeared flying sometimes in threes, sometimes in sevens. They crossed over our battalion’s positions always in the same order: orientation, dropping bombs, firing with machine guns or rockets. Once one group was finished, another would follow. When the aircraft tipped over to attack, one could only pull one’s head in and trust to luck. The infantry guns were attacked the most. In the afternoon even phosphorus was dropped on them.
I was afraid that the Russians would overrun us when the ground-attack aircraft forced us to take cover. But, despite their superiority, the Soviet infantry did not dare to do so. Apparently they had not recovered from their bloody repulse that morning.
One had to be unbelievably cautious. My field cap was shot through several times when raised to see what would happen.
That afternoon, as the relentless fire from Soviet artillery and ground-attack aircraft continued and it became simply a matter of luck whether my foxhole would suffer a direct hit, I lost my last belief in a higher Being connected with human history. My belief no longer existed, driven out by the fearful development of air attacks on the civilian population and the knowledge that the Christian priests on our side prayed to the same God as the Allies for the success of their weapons.
The enemy attack had cost us a lot of ammunition. I had only two Very light cartridges for the coming night. For supplies we had half an iron ration and half a canteen of water per man. That afternoon supply containers were dropped on Küstrin again.
With darkness a runner from the company appeared. Because of the losses the division into platoons was cancelled and the number of sections reduced. Half an hour later I was shot in the chest during a short exchange of fire. I reported to my platoon commander, whom I found in the flak position, and went on through the trenches of the Hoffmann section over the dead bodies left from that morning. The Russians were dug in here close to our positions.
It was half dark in the dressing station in the cellars of the manor house. In the flickering of the Hindenburg Lights, the doctor told me: ‘That is not a shot in the lungs. You have been lucky. If you can walk, then get away. Alt Bleyen is about to be evacuated. Take the lead with the sergeant over there of all the walking wounded.’
It was pitch dark. We went slowly past the pond to the dyke road and then along the foot of the dyke, even more cautiously, our weapons ready for action in our hands. For a distance of several hundred metres the Russians were on one side of the dyke and on the other side were our men at long intervals. About 100 to 150 metres from the dyke there was a shallow, weakly occupied trench on the other side of the ‘corridor’ connecting the manor farm with Küstrin. This is where I saw out the rest of the evening. We expected hand grenades to come over the dyke at any moment, but everything remained quiet.
The survivors of Fusilier Battalion 303 were able to withdraw to Kuhbrücken during the night, but only by leaving behind the heavy weapons, including the three self-propelled guns. Together with the remains of other units, they took up new positions here as Combat Team ‘Quetz’.
When we reached the spider’s web of tracks in Kuhbrücken that night, we met Volkssturm men in the cottages there who believed the Alt Bleyen manor farm to be surrounded. Together with others they had been ordered to fight open the way back to the farm complex and get us out. They were mightily relieved not to have to clear the complex.
We went over the Kietz railway bridge to the main dressing station that had been set up in the cellars of the Artillery Barracks on the Island. The doctors could hardly keep their eyes open from sheer exhaustion. One instructed me to take the next wounded transport back to hospital, but when I told him where I came from he fell silent.
Then we were sent on into the Altstadt. We passed a large burning building, apparently stacked full of tins of preserves judging from the constant dull explosions emerging, crossed the Oder Bridge and finally reached the auxiliary hospital in the cellars of the Boys’ Middle School. I was allocated the lower bunk of a two-storey air-raid bed and immediately fell asleep.[26]
Sapper Ernst Müller told a similar tale:
In the evening darkness of 26 March I noticed in leaving the cellar of the Potato Meal Factory that cartridges were on fire in front of the building between heaps of stick grenades. The culprit was apparently a ‘Sewing Machine’, an enemy aircraft dropping bombs. When I reported this, Captain Fischer ordered the fire to be extinguished using sacks soaked in the Oder. Later I was ordered to fetch some firemen. On my return I had just reached the Artillery Barracks when the stack of munitions blew up. The cellar of the Potato Meal Factory was on fire. A wall of fire prevented every attempt to reach those trapped in and behind the rubble. Several of them were burnt alive. Between twenty and thirty men lay buried in the rubble, among them Captain Dahlmanns, Second-Lieutenant Schröter and Corporal Grosch. Second-Lieutenant Schröter should not actually have been in Küstrin. He had been given the job of taking us to the front, and then should have returned to Armoured Engineer Replacement Battalion 19 in Holzminden, as his wound was not yet fully cured. The already mentioned Corporal Hans Dahlmanns thus lost his father, whom I knew as a good man, who had treated me in a fatherly manner. I was also present when Captain Fischer expressed his condolences to Corporal Dahlmanns upon the death of his father.[27]
The German counterattack began at 0400 hours on 27 March and after a few hours got halfway to Gorgast and as far as the Wilhelminenhof farm and Genschmar before the German divisions were driven back to their start points with heavy losses. According to the 9th Army’s situation report of 27 March, 5 commanding officers, 68 officers and 1,219 men had been lost. The reasons given included minefields, heavy mortar and anti-tank fire with accompanying artillery fire, well-constructed strongpoints in the individual barns and lack of ground cover. In fact the Germans had given the Soviets far too much time in which to consolidate their positions in a greatly enlarged bridgehead.[28]
On the northern flank, with flanking protection from the 1st Battalion of the ‘Müncheberg’ Panzer Regiment, the ‘1001 Nights’ Combat Team started the attack with three infantry companies and a total strength of 390 men and 49 Hetzers; by the end of the attack it was reduced to only 40 men per infantry company, having lost 51 killed, 336 wounded and 32 missing, and having had 25 Hetzers destroyed. According to Captain Zobel, the Hetzers were late getting into their start position, having first to negotiate a railway underpass, by which time the Soviet artillery had been fully alerted. One infantry company of this elite battle group reached as far as the western edge of Genschmar, but at daybreak came under such heavy artillery, tank and anti-tank fire from the Henriettenhof farm, Genschmar village, the southern edge of the Genschmarer See and the Wilhelminenhof farm (the latter having fallen to the Soviets in the meantime) that it was forced to withdraw.[29]
Despite the XXXIXth Panzer Corps’ initial lack of success, on the same day at 1730 hours the ‘Führer’ Grenadier Division and part of the ‘Müncheberg’ Panzer Division made a fresh attack on the Wilhelminenhof strongpoint and the wood 700 metres north-west of it, making some progress before having to go over to the defensive.[30]
In the fortress they waited hour by hour for a sign of salvation. The disappointment increased, as did the fire from the Soviet artillery, reaching at times as much as 1,000 shells per hour. Air attacks concentrated more and more on those structures still holding out, the old bastions. The Bastion Christian Ludwig containing the youth hostel was destroyed by three heavy bombs, the casemate used as a front-line cinema being partly destroyed, leaving buried under the rubble numerous soldiers who had sought shelter there. The already badly damaged town hall took another direct hit, the cellar collapsing and burying Volkssturm men lying there in an underground room with some of the lightly wounded. Only a few shattered men were saved by chance hours later.[31] The fate of Johannes and Otto Dawidowski was described by a survivor:
On the morning of 27 March we were told to go from our accommodation in Wallstrasse to the company command post for new orders for the next day. One group of four Volkssturm men set off. We had hardly gone 100 metres when a sudden bombardment took us by surprise. The Russians were firing with heavy calibre weapons on the area we were in. At the same time aircraft were dropping bombs. We sought shelter under a high and thick wall where the Zorn firm stored its coal.
The Dawidowski brothers and another comrade from Drewitz sought cover under the third arch of the wall, while the fourth one of our group and other comrades went under another arch and in a somewhat deeper situated building. The coal-yard wall was under particularly heavy fire, and was swaying to and fro from the hits. Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion and a flash of fire. It was a direct hit on the third arch in the wall, exactly where the Dawidowski brothers and the other comrade were standing. This part of the wall collapsed. The men standing under it were buried under the falling masonry and were certainly killed instantly.
The shooting increased. It was no longer possible to get through to the company command post. Although the way back to the platoon accommodation was only about 100 metres, I did not get back until evening. There was no chance of looking for the dead and burying them, as next day the Altstadt was to be evacuated following the Russians coming in through the Kietz Gate. So the dead still lie today under this wall.[32]