Siege of Küstrin, 1945

^{Annex C} Kreisleiter Körner’s Report

Potsdam, 5th April 1945

Reichsleiter Party Comrade Bormann

Wilhelmstrasse

Berlin

I have the following to report about the events of the last weeks in Küstrin Fortress. As all my notes, papers, etc. were destroyed without exception, I cannot give precise details and dates on individual events. I quote them only so far as my memory extends.

The Küstrin men and soldiers knew from the beginning of the battle that Küstrin had a great historical past and has a political and historical significance for the Greater German Reich. Their application to the fighting was thus particularly honourable. We were all imbued with the willpower to defend this old fortress town to the last round. This willpower alone, however, is only useful when the supply of manpower, weapons and ammunition is adequate. Unfortunately, during the ten weeks of siege we received no assistance from outside and no replacements for the tens of thousands of men either killed or wounded. To give a rough picture, I should mention that during the fighting the Wehrmacht was reduced from 11,000 to 1,200 men. The Volkssturm were reduced from 900 to about 118, the police from 65 to 14, the fire brigade from 80 to 20, and the Kreis administration from 30 to 12. Of these 12 only 4 Party members have reported surviving the breakout so far. These figures should bear witness to how heroically the battle was fought and with what meagre numbers a massively overwhelming enemy was held at bay for ten weeks. At a time when Küstrin was still relatively well equipped with heavy weapons, the artillery superiority of the Russians was calculated as 100:6, i.e. there were 100 Russian guns for every 6 German ones. During the last weeks, however, we had absolutely no heavy weapons any more. The enemy could do with us as he wanted. His aircraft romped around in the sky over the fortress unhampered by either German fighters or flak. In my opinion, Küstrin would only have fulfilled its role if it had had an establishment of about 60,000 men with the corresponding weapons. This strength was anticipated on paper, as far as I know. The most important aspects for Küstrin fortress were that the fortress outworks and the heights at Reitwein, etc., were occupied by our troops. In fact the Russians occupied those heights and thus had an advantageous view and excellent target in the fortress. Words do not suffice to begin to describe the courage and achievements. One must call to mind that the Küstrin garrison was completely cut off from the outside world for ten long weeks. Gas, electricity, sewage and water were lacking right from the beginning of the fighting. Thus there was no chance of listening to the radio, and no newspapers arrived. But there was strong artillery fire day and night. One alert followed another as the Russian attacks started. The air space over Küstrin was almost constantly overflown by Russian aircraft, dropping bombs and shooting up everything they could see on the streets. German flak and fighter protection were completely lacking. The men were under immense psychological pressure as they felt themselves completely abandoned and saw and noticed absolutely nothing of German military forces. The only fact on their minds was that they were fighting in a trap.

When the whole of Küstrin-Neustadt was lost in an afternoon in mid-March, the psychological pressure reached its climax. The Russians had taken the Neustadt from Alt Drewitz with tanks and infantry after several hours of artillery preparation. Allegedly it was not possible to receive warning of this danger in time. Elements of the fire brigade, police and other civil services, including the local Party leader, remained in the Neustadt. Apart from this, about 4,000 troops remained in the Stülpnagel Barracks and Engineer Barracks. But there were also other major installations of exceptional importance in the support of the fortress garrison. I mean the Army Supply Depot, the big Army Bakery, armoury and ammunition stores. For example, in the Norddeutschen Kartoffel-Mehlfabrik were stored foodstuffs to the value of 3.5 million Reichsmarks. The German soldiers in the Neustadt were commanded by Police Colonel Walther.

What became of those 4,000 troops nobody knows as yet. It was astonishing that the military authorities did nothing to rescue these soldiers or regain their fighting capability. No radio contact was made. At least one pitiful attempt was made to get radio sets across, but it failed. I have not heard of any repetition of this attempt. It should have been possible to arrange combat communications with these troops in advance.

The Wehrmacht had a dove unit in Küstrin, but the 270 letter-carrying doves had been taken away to Berlin several days previously. In any case I did not get the impression that everything was done to release the surrounded troops. I must also doubt that the commitment of the Luftwaffe in this urgent matter was asked for. One has an overall impression that the senior military authorities did not take the situation in Küstrin to be as serious as it really was.

If one had always reported the true situation clearly and unequivocally without embellishment, I cannot imagine that effective assistance would not have come from the outside. The bridges between the Altstadt and the Neustadt were blown at the correct moment. Individual soldiers and civilians swam across the Warthe and in this way were saved by the troops in the Altstadt. Even if a military operation had been impossible, one could at least have maintained contact with the German troops that had been cut off.

Following the fall of the Neustadt, in which, according to my reckoning, some 5–600 civilians still remained, the situation in the Altstadt was as follows. The Russian front in the north-east stood on the Warthe, in the south-east on the boundary of the Altstadt, in the south-west–except for a small bridgehead–on the Oder-Vorflut Canal. The fortress area was now reduced to only the Altstadt and was barely 2 kilometres long. The fortress was divided into two parts by the Oder. The Russians increased their rate of fire from all sides in the days that followed. The suburb of Kietz had already been razed to the ground by shelling and fires. All the buildings had been destroyed by the shelling and especially by fire. The defence possibilities were made even more difficult by the constrictions within the fortress. Heavy weapons had difficulty engaging any more. Many buildings had to be demolished in the Altstadt in order to provide fields of fire. The psychological pressure on the troops also increased under these circumstances. The Altstadt was known to be completely built up, the old buildings having been constructed with a lot of timber. Fire extinguishing equipment was largely lacking. Water could only be obtained from the fire-extinguishing wells, but extraction was limited. Everyone knew that should the Russians set fire to the Altstadt with their Stalin-Organs, nothing would be saved. Conditions in the cellars became increasingly unbearable. The Altstadt cellars at this time of year were always flooded from 10 to 20 centimetres. As the water continued to rise, so did the danger. Nevertheless, the troops beat back all the Russian attacks repeated daily.

Once the civilian population had been removed from Küstrin, the district administration’s main task was at an end. I then handed over the majority of the staff to the Volkssturm. The remainder were dressed and armed as well as the Wehrmacht could provide. On the orders of the fortress commandant, these 32 men then formed a unit under the title ‘Combat Team Körner’ which was then employed exactly the same as the troops. This team had a specific section to occupy and, in an alert, had to occupy that section with everyone. Nevertheless, the men of the district administration had to work until late at night loading textiles and foodstuffs to be conveyed by the nightly ammunition convoys to Seelow, where they were taken over by the Landeswirtschaftsamt (regional economic office). The textile stocks were almost entirely removed this way, but the foodstuffs were mainly retained in the fortress as, with the closing of the ring, the possibility of transporting them came to an end, and it can be taken for certain that they were destroyed in the subsequent fighting. Apart from this, I had all the cattle, horses, etc. gathered together and sent off from the fortress in treks in order to maintain the people’s food supplies. The men of the district administration thus not only served as brave and courageous soldiers, but also carried out some hard work worthy of recognition.

The fire brigade demonstrated quite exemplary conduct. I agree with the fortress commandant that their commitment to duty was quite unique. Many of the firemen were old men who, for example, on one occasion were on duty day and night for four days without enjoying an hour’s rest. They were in constant danger from enemy artillery, bombers and air attacks.

The police in Küstrin also set an outstanding example. They were always on duty and more prepared to help than the Wehrmacht. In both the last two weeks, when buildings and cellars were being destroyed almost every day, their work saved the lives of several people.

Unfortunately, I saw that the troops were not prepared to assist in this kind of work in their free time. Naturally there were individual exceptions. The whole Küstrin garrison had only a limited fighting capacity. As far as I could determine, the fortress garrison consisted of about one-third policemen gathered in from the Warthegau, one-third of Waffen-SS men, and the final third of soldiers of all branches of the Wehrmacht. They were all mixed up together and did not know each other, lacking unity. There were individual good officers and NCOs to reinforce them, men who gathered others around them and achieved extraordinary things in battle. Unfortunately there were too few of these good soldiers. I believe that the fortress was able to hold out as long as it did mainly due to the Probationary Battalion, which consisted of soldiers with a zest for attack. Apart from this there were companies of potential officers, who also had a fighting spirit that successfully fought several defensive battles. One such potential officer company sustained 90 per cent casualties in an attack on the bucket elevator. Another potential officer company started off with 150 men and ended with only 15. It should be considered whether it is right to commit soldiers selected for leadership qualities en masse, for this way we lose all this officer potential. Nevertheless, there was a need for taking action in Küstrin. There was a feeling among the troops that did not hold back in its criticism of the local military leadership. In my opinion, not everything was in order in the military camp. The SS-Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the Waffen SS held the Oak Leaves and was highly regarded and respected. I got on well with him in the best possible way. He is a National Socialist and values cooperation with the Party. Those around him were not so inspired. His chief of staff, Major Michalski, was a reservist and by career a theologian from a university. He was a very nervous man with no comradely contact with other officers, thoroughly distant, and I had the impression that he opposed the Party. I cannot assess his military capability, but believe that he was not all that good, as some of his actions revealed. The first liaison officer was Captain Lotz, who simultaneously held a pass as a special emissary of the Reichsführer-SS. In official circles he was known as boastful and pompous. I too had the same impression of him. These men were permanently around the general. I was often told that there was a shortage of officers in the fortress. On the other hand, there were many officers with absolutely nothing to do or who had only trifling jobs.

From the start the Volkssturm in Küstrin were engaged militarily. Later the men were withdrawn and used almost exclusively in the construction of defences. For the most part the Volkssturm showed their worth. It was a shame that the men of the Volkssturm were treated as second-class in everything. They often had to change quarters or positions that they had prepared with love and care to make way for the Wehrmacht. Apart from this, their provision of clothing, boots, etc., was very miserly. Most Volkssturm men had only what they stood up in and had no possibility of changing their clothing. The men were used partly to man the defences and partly to build them. This overstress was accepted but was hardly reasonable. As the Volkssturm came completely under the Wehrmacht in action, the question arises whether the district administration is necessary in such a case. The battalion commander received his orders directly from his Wehrmacht superior and also dealt with him directly. The district staff thus sat between two stools. Their work was simply in the notification of dependants and the execution of other formalities for the Volkssturm men. In this direction, it seems to me necessary to have clear relationships.

I therefore think it realistic that either the district staff should be disbanded in emergencies, or that the Wehrmacht superiors should issue their orders via the district staff. Then the battalion commander would have to deal with the Wehrmacht superiors via the district staff.

On the whole it is worth considering whether the Volkssturm should have remained in Küstrin. The defence of a fortress is a completely military task, for which the best and well-trained soldiers are already good enough. After the Volkssturm had been committed to action in the first military thrust and held the enemy until the Wehrmacht could organise proper defensive positions, in my opinion they could have worked on the most important defensive works in the fortress. Their further employment in the rear of the front would have been more appropriate. I have left unmentioned that during the first five weeks of the siege the Volkssturm men were only poorly armed. It could be anticipated that a breakout attempt by the remains of the garrison would be organised at the end of the battle for Küstrin. It was certain that this action would be allied with physical stress and much fighting and could only be achieved by well-trained soldiers. The predominantly old men of the Volkssturm were thus a hindrance and would also largely not survive the fall of Küstrin.

I remained with my district staff in Küstrin to the last hour and was militarily engaged with all my men in accordance with the commandant’s orders. At least the intention was correct, but it was of no significance. It remains to be considered whether the political leadership should be withdrawn in the future once their actual task has been accomplished. One likes to put one’s men at the disposal of the Wehrmacht, but even the Wehrmacht had already withdrawn their own administrative offices from Küstrin to Seelow or Müncheberg weeks before. This was annoying to the unwilling ones among the soldiers, but was necessary and useful. The bakery, abattoir, etc. could not continue operating under constant bombardment and lack of working space. They continued their duties in Seelow and Müncheberg and administered the supply of the Küstrin garrison from there. These supplies ceased at the point when the ring around Küstrin became completely closed. The district staff remained an inexplicable presence in Küstrin during the fighting. We were well established with the Wehrmacht and carried out some important work in saving textiles and foodstuffs for the Reich but, as a result of many requests, our role was gradually taken over entirely by the Wehrmacht. Until the men of the district staff were accepted by the Wehrmacht for rationing purposes, it was not easy for them. This was because we were not accepted as members of the Wehrmacht. After the district staff lost their bunker yet again in the last days from a direct hit, and had to find themselves new accommodation, it became impossible. In battle the Wehrmacht is always more important. Quite often we were asked: ‘What are you doing here? You have already done your job.’ I always replied that the person posing the question would very probably have been the one to shout loudest and shake his head over cowardly political leadership if we had not been there.

After most of my men had lost even the poorest items of their clothing, despite my protests to the fortress commandant it was still impossible to get them new clothing. This was partly because the uniforms were at an end, but the main reason was because, on the orders of the commandant, the officers and Wehrmacht officials regarded the district staff as unimportant in the combat area and made no effort to supply them with the necessary items.

When officials and their associates or even those of other important roles (Reichs Post, town administration, etc.) are requested or expected to remain in the combat area to the last shot, then the Wehrmacht should be given an explicit order to treat these men exactly as their own soldiers.

In general, however, I can say that the presence of a political leader until the last minute within the Küstrin fortress worked positively with regard to the Wehrmacht, Volkssturm, etc. One noticed that the soldiers when visited suddenly in their positions expressed surprise and pleasure at seeing a brown uniform. It was especially so when firing broke out during a visit. If one took the first good rifle in one’s hands and joined in without suddenly curtailing the visit, one had the soldiers feeding out of one’s hand and could do with them as one liked. On such visits the soldiers did not know how they should respond to ‘all the best’. Mostly I came away with a rich donation for the WHW [Winter Relief Fund]. In one visit to Second-Lieutenant Hollmann’s platoon, I came away with a donation of RM 4,000, which meant that every soldier in this little unit had contributed RM 120. Almost always one had to promise to return. My relationship with many of the officers was much the same. I was, and remained until the end, a free person to whom the officers could speak freely and openly whatever had to be said. While the officers had to follow their paths of duty and not waver from setting a good example, they often came to me with their thoughts and concerns. This did not involve personal matters but only concerned the basic faults in the military leadership that they could see. SS-Gruppenführer Reinefarth was always grateful for advice on such matters, although he never or seldom expressed his thoughts to me. An uncomfortable troublemaker remained, if the reports were accurate, among those officers around the Gruppenführer.

So the battle for Küstrin continued. The enemy artillery fire, air attacks, etc., became ever stronger. Our own situation regarding ammunition, foodstuffs, etc., was frequently affected. More and more vehicles and weapons were knocked out and supplies became scarcer. Every day the fortress suffered a large loss of men. Care for the wounded, despite the superhuman efforts of the doctors, was always very scanty. Again and again new cellars had to be found for the wounded, until they too were knocked out and hardly any accommodation could be found for them. For those men remaining in combat, the whole ten weeks of the battle for Küstrin were an undesirable test of the nerves. It was not only enemy action, but the fact that no help was coming from outside, and at the end we could do absolutely nothing about the enemy aircraft, which depressed everyone. There were also many cases of death among the soldiers, policemen, firemen, etc., due to heart attacks and other natural causes.

So the day came for Küstrin when the ‘corridor’ was closed. This ‘corridor’ involved not just a drivable route, but included a narrow strip of land that German troops had held free until then and through which the convoys brought ammunition every night. Because of the state of the ground, this route could only be used by tracked vehicles. This meagre last connection with the outside world also fell, despite the anticipated help from outside, and the constant hope it gave to the Küstrin troops that one day the main road from Küstrin to Seelow would be fought free again. The men were simply shattered by this misfortune, and the feeling spread that Küstrin had long since been written off, and that all their efforts and courage had been for nothing. One should also particularly recall that no field post had been arriving in Küstrin. The Volkssturm men for the most part knew nothing about the fate of their families. The field post traffic had slowly died out, and was soon at an end with this closure. The confidence of the soldiers sank even lower when they were told that it was no longer possible to retain this small connection for supplies, and that it was no longer possible for the Wehrmacht to undertake the relief of Küstrin. But at the same time the Küstrin troops came to terms with the idea that their fate was as good as sealed. No one doubted that he would have to fight to the death in the fortress. As soon as a Wehrmacht vehicle appeared on the streets, Russian aircraft shot it up. One result from all the casualties was that more effort was demanded from those remaining. They were all overstressed and overfatigued. A new unrest set in when the Russians shelled the Oder Bridge connecting the two parts of the Altstadt fortress and rendered it unusable. The fate of the fortress appeared to be sealed from day to day. One had no doubt that, if the Russians made a determined attack with their vast superiority, they would take the Altstadt without too much difficulty. On the other hand, the core elements of the fortress troops were tough enough to fight to the last bullet and use their assault knives if necessary.

On the 22nd March the day began with an unusually strong artillery barrage. This was followed by several attacks by the Russians coming from all sides, but they were beaten back. This was repeated in the days to come. If the enemy artillery was not firing, their aircraft were over Küstrin.

On the 25th March there was a concentrated artillery bombardment on the north-eastern part of the Altstadt from all points of the compass. It was immediately clear that this part of the town had been targeted. The uninterrupted bombardment by weapons of all calibres lasted five hours. Then came the enemy aircraft in several waves dropping German bombs of the heaviest kind. Duds lying around confirmed the German origin of these ten-hundredweight bombs. The Wehrmacht observation posts reported 165 enemy aircraft. After these heavy bombs had been dropped, more aircraft arrived and dropped phosphor canisters, setting light to everything.

On the 26th March and during the preceding night, the concentrated bombardment was repeated on the north-eastern part of the Altstadt as far as the Marktplatz, including the town hall. During the night of the 26th/27th March the artillery continued to fire on the burning part of the Altstadt. Whenever it stopped, the enemy aircraft prevented the fire brigade from putting out the flames with their machine guns. This part of the town was reduced to the ground and most of the cellars were destroyed.

The attack was resumed on the 27th March with artillery fire and bombers on the south-west part of the Altstadt, reducing the whole of this part of the town to dust and ashes. Even the Schloss, until then apparently exempt, was set on fire. The last ammunition dump went up in the air. In my estimation there were several hundred wounded lying in the Schloss and the Oelkeller that surely must have all died. With the destruction of this part of the Altstadt, the fortress commandant also lost his command post, and there was no other suitable bunker available that he could transfer to. At noon the Russians launched a major attack on the Altstadt from Sonnenburg. Despite fierce resistance, they were able to reach as far as the Marktplatz. I spoke to the fortress commandant twice on this day and recommended that as the ammunition was running out and as resistance could only be sustained for a little while longer, he should consider how at least some of the combatant troops could be saved. Through my liaison officer, SS-Captain Siedke, the news was brought to me that evening that the Gruppenführer was moving his command post to the Artillery Barracks on the other side of the Oder. I was asked to join the Gruppenführer with my men. The Gruppenführer with his staff of ten men and I with about fourteen men set off, led by one of the district staff who was familiar with the area. We crossed the railway bridge to the Artillery Barracks. In the subsequent discussion, the Gruppenführer asked me and my men to move into the front line, as there was no room for us. That same night I set off with my staff for Kuhbrücken-Vorstadt. The sector commander likewise informed me that there were no cellars or bunkers available even for his soldiers, so we moved into the front line.

The general feeling among the officers and men was that they fully understood that the fortress had to be held until the last minute, but they did not see why the order should not be given to break through to the German lines when the ammunition ran out and so save at least some of the troops. It was known that the ammunition would run out within a few hours and, if there were no further orders, about 1,500 men would have to wait until the Bolsheviks came and slaughtered them. I believe there were also officers who were determined to risk a breakout with their men should no order come from the local command for a combined one. All, however, were determined only to leave the fortress at the very last moment. It seemed senseless to fire their last round in Küstrin and then await the arrival of the Bolsheviks unarmed. Once it was established that no help could be expected from outside, one often heard that soldiers and even officers were proposing to the local command that they should now act independently. As no such orders came, even more rumours circulated among the troops that the fortress commander was no longer with them and they were leaderless. Encountering such rumours did not help much. When a leader is present he has to deal with this situation himself. The fortress commandant could only deal with it in one way, which was to order a combined breakout by the rest of the men. There was no alternative, for the prerequisite for the defence of the fortress was ammunition, and that was lacking.

At about 0800 hours on the 27th March the Russians started a three-hour bombardment that also covered Kuhbrücken-Vorstadt. Behind it they began an attack from Neu Bleyen and the west. As the Soviet infantry attacked, the German infantry turned and ran. Brandishing a drawn pistol, several officers tried to get their men back into their positions, but it did not work. Some of the foxholes were abandoned by the troops at the main Soviet point of attack. I saw a second lieutenant firing an automatic rifle, and a sergeant with a sub-machine gun, who used it extensively. Then there were about six Volkssturm men, who remained staunch and fired away. A Volkssturm battalion commander set an excellent example by remaining in front with these few men and telling them not to weaken. This Volkssturm officer was from the Warthegau and not known to me. I joined these men with my Party comrades from the district staff at the critical point of attack. We lay down with them and fired away continuously. This small fighting band forced the Bolsheviks to take cover and then, as we began to attack, to withdraw. Meanwhile an SS officer had got some of the men back on their feet and some 10 to 15 of them joined us in our position. More and more soldiers gradually joined us. The Russians attacked several times this day but were always beaten back. The German soldiers avoided fighting with the Russians as they were aware of their superiority in weapons. Soon every second Russian had an automatic rifle or grenade-launcher, the others having quick-firing rifles with 15 to 20 rounds. Behind the Russians were other heavy weapons. In contrast the German soldier had his old-fashioned rifle that had to be reloaded for every shot. As the ammunition in the last weeks had no more than five rounds in a clip, each bullet had to be loaded into the breach individually. During this attack German artillery was called on. They fired from the area of Tucheband, but fired too short into our own lines. After this attack also failed, the Russians used loudspeaker propaganda. They played German marches and the proclamations of German generals in Soviet captivity, always asking the German soldiers to give up the fight. The Russians used this loudspeaker propaganda on the Küstrin fronts every day. The speakers mentioned local events, which had a big effect on the troops. They mentioned the fortress commandant, other officers and also Küstrin officials by name, saying, for example, that I had gone away again or that I felt very comfortable in my home in the Neustadt.

We remained on alert day and night, for a new attack could begin any moment. On the 28th March there was a repeat performance of the day before. The concentration was on that part of the town between the Oder and the Oder-Vorflut Canal. Again we endured hour-long artillery bombardments, aerial bombing and phosphor canisters. As I had to stay in the trenches with my men, I sent my liaison officer to the Gruppenführer with my opinion once more. My question as to how much longer the ammunition would last received a chilling reply: the ammunition for the heavy weapons was all but exhausted and there was only 20 minutes’ worth of small-arms ammunition left. The Gruppenführer had assembled his officers for a conference. All the officers were unanimous in their opinion that to fire off the remaining ammunition in 20 minutes and then leave 1,500 men quite helpless was clearly senseless. All agreed that it would be better to try to use these men in the new front near Golzow. The Gruppenführer would send a telegram to the Reichsführer informing him that he had defended the fortress to the last round. My liaison officer, SS-Captain Siedke, returned at about 2200 hours with the information that the Gruppenführer had decided with a heavy heart to break through to Golzow with the remaining men. He had fulfilled his task. Now the last rounds were being kept for the breakthrough fighting. Forty artillery shells were then fired, and other rounds for which there were no longer any weapons were blown up. Everything that might be useful to the Russians was destroyed. Those of the wounded who could walk should join their units, the other wounded having unfortunately died in the flames or the demolitions. The word was passed that only the lightest clothing should be worn for the breakthrough and all pack items, overcoats, etc., should be left behind. The men only had light infantry weapons,i.e. rifles, sub-machine guns, pistols and hand grenades. The Gruppenführer arrived at Kuhbrücken with his men at 2300 hours. I had put a man with local knowledge at the head of the whole platoon of district staff; he knew every tree and bush in the Oderbruch. We set off in a southerly direction from Kuhbrücken under the cover of the Oder dyke towards Kietz. We had to cross the dyke between Kuhbrücken and Kietz individually. Of course, all talking and noise was strictly forbidden.

The local man did not look for a track but for particularly swampy ground and meadows where one could expect the fewest Soviet positions. Thus it was possible for about 1,200 men from Küstrin to move across without firing a shot or the Russians noticing. Once the first Russian lines were behind us, we went in a northerly direction with many diversions to the Schäferei sheep farm. Of course there were many Russian positions and other Soviet bunkers on the way. The rifle-armed Russian sentries thought that only Russian troops could be moving about and let us through unchallenged. The Soviet troops seemed to be sleeping in many of the bunkers but were killed in cold blood without a shot being fired if they drew attention to themselves. Certainly it would have been possible to take a large number of prisoners along with us, but as it remained uncertain what kind of fighting awaited us, this was not done. The troops were in a good fighting mood on this march. On one occasion I saw a solder angrily berating for five minutes a Russian who had surrendered. When the Russians realised that they were confronted by German soldiers, they usually surrendered. We were not fired on once from Russian bunkers or by sentries.

One outstanding advantage for us on this enterprise was the weather: it was a dark night and raining. The stress of the march was nevertheless immense. We stumbled mainly though swampy meadows or ploughed fields. The heavy Oder mud clung thickly to one’s boots, making walking difficult and demanding the last of one’s strength from everyone. Nearly all the men were completely exhausted, but again and again they gathered up their strength and straightened their backs. Of course we had become all mixed up and there was no longer any cohesion between companies and platoons. The constant firing of flares forced us to keep taking cover, which was physically very demanding. We came to the second Russian lines near Gorgast, where we were accosted by a Russian sentry with a password, and when we failed to reply the Russians opened up on us with two machine guns and five or six rifles. We fired back with the remainder of our ammunition, shouted ‘Hurra!’ and ran into the fire in an attack. The Russians fled when they saw that we were in earnest. The Russians then started using heavy weapons, firing shells and mortars into our ranks. This developed into a fight lasting one to one and a half hours. However, it did give us time to draw breath. Incidentally, a German soldier fired a Panzerfaust into a bunker at the beginning of the fight that silenced all the weapons in it, after which Russian soldiers immediately surrendered from two other bunkers. As our ammunition was about to run out, we suddenly stopped firing and kept quiet. We marched on. Only then and now did we have to attack with cries of ‘Hurra!’ and chase the Russians away. The Very lights coming from the German lines were useless. To my knowledge, before we set off the Gruppenführer had radioed that we were trying to break through towards Golzow with 1,200 men and requesting that, should we succeed, to make tactical use of the gap. Opposing light signals were agreed. It was later established that the radio message had not got through, which was why the corresponding light signals were lacking. We had also finally lost our direction during the previous fighting. I believe that we had moved several kilometres between the Soviet and German lines. When the completely exhausted Küstrin team finally found the right direction for Golzow, we came under extraordinarily heavy fire from the German front. We replied to the fire at first, but when we realised that it was coming from the German front line, we stopped firing. With loud shouts and singing the national anthem we eventually made ourselves noticed. I reckon, however, that we had suffered our worst casualties from the German fire. In Golzow we immediately asked that the German casualties lying in no-man’s-land should be recovered that same night. I know from SS-Gruppenführer Reinefarth that he too was lying there completely exhausted and that he was finally brought out in an armoured reconnaissance vehicle. As to the extent of our casualties, I have not been able to get any approximate figures so far. We had reckoned from the start that a good half would be left on the wayside in the breakthrough. The wounded could not be brought along, as everyone had been told in advance, for the last of one’s strength was needed.

The town of Küstrin is a single heap of rubble. The buildings have been shot through, burnt out and those burnt walls still standing shot through yet again. There is not a single Küstrin family that will find the smallest item of their personal goods again. Certainly Küstrin fortress has shown itself worthy of its great historical past in this war. Only when the town was completely shot up, when the ammunition and food stocks were destroyed and there was no chance of holding on any longer did the troops assemble for a breakthrough battle. When one thinks that during the days and weeks beforehand all the men had become tired and burnt out, the breakthrough battle was a unique performance that deserves recognition. SS-Gruppenführer Reinefarth gave the order to break through at the last minute, making a decision that was fully justified. He did what a responsible and self-confident leader must do in such a situation. Metaphorically speaking, there were only two possibilities. Either the fortress held on for another 20 minutes and then surrendered defenceless to the Bolshevik soldiers, or, taking the last of the ammunition, the men broke out and thus, despite the expected losses, several hundred men were saved for the German front. In the troops’ opinion, the garrison should have been taken out through the ‘pipeline’ as soon as Kietz and the Neustadt were lost, to establish a new Oder front west of Küstrin, which would have saved about 3–4,000 men at no great cost.

It will be understood that one simply cannot accept or believe that any earnest attempt was made to relieve Küstrin. If one had been made, then it is at least astonishing that several divisions with fresh, rested soldiers with tanks and heavy weapons were not able to do what the fought-out and tired fortress garrison of Küstrin achieved in the opposite direction with just a few small arms. There are few fortresses that could hold out for ten weeks against such superior forces.

To finish my report, I would like to make an observation that perhaps would not be unimportant in the continuation of the war. First, the question of why it is that the soldier breaks down so often and runs away. I have only one explanation for it, and that is the lack of good officers who not only lead in a military sense but also establish a close comradely relationship with their men. The men [in Küstrin] were all completely exhausted and weary from week-, month- or year-long fighting. They daily experienced the enemy’s superiority in weapons and manpower and were losing confidence in their own resources. They had reached an emotional state in which nothing mattered any more. Although it is not allowed in such a tense situation, one might survive if one were at least allowed to have some leave in limited circumstances. When that is impossible, a solution for the fighting troops should constantly be looked for. A unit after a week’s fighting in the forward area should earn a week’s rest in a rear area. One still sees full garrisons in the country, so such an exchange of soldiers should be possible. A unit that has been able to sleep comfortably for a week and has had its clothing and weapons repaired and even some training, returns refreshed into battle. Old First World War soldiers often told me that they had never experienced units fighting and fighting until they finally died. For instance, during those ten weeks in Küstrin perhaps a third of the troops could have been stood down. Certainly it was necessary to have a large proportion of the troops familiar with the local terrain remaining in place. It was the same with the Volkssturm in Küstrin. Much of their accommodation was full of lice because they had no change of clothing, which made them dirty and consequently unhappy and discouraged. They could have been brought back once every so often to have a good sleep, sort out their clothing and above all have a good wash and even get half a day’s training. These troops would certainly be valuable in the further fighting. Here is an example:

I crawled up to a soldier who was on sentry duty in a foxhole on the Warthe, and so on the front line. I tried to have a chat with him, as in other such cases, but he would hardly say anything. When I asked him what his task was, he still remained silent. I must accept that perhaps my brown uniform put him off. He stared at me stupidly. When I finally offered him a cigarette and then got closer to him and asked how long he had been on sentry duty, he answered since early yesterday. He had been on duty for a day and a half without being relieved. He was completely exhausted, overtired and half asleep. Such a soldier cannot do much if the Russians should really come. This case was reported by me and investigated further.

One always had the impression that those who are really able, if they are unassuming and do not like putting themselves in the limelight, make little progress in the Wehrmacht. Those holding positions on the staff often have high decorations, but act very pompously and boastfully in their manners and appearance.

Most of the senior officers in Küstrin stemmed from the police. In my opinion, they lacked the tactical knowledge needed for commanding troops that the majority of the Wehrmacht officers had learnt on their way up through the ranks. When they belong with the competent officers, then they should wear Wehrmacht uniform. For the Wehrmacht, especially the officers, it must have been sickening to be commanded by police officers. The battle commander in the Neustadt was Police Colonel Walther, and in the Altstadt, Police Major Kulla. While they knew each other well, they had naturally filled other officer posts in their sectors with police officers. In the current situation it is important, without regard to the body one belongs to, to put the most able men in the right place; in this case, they should have donned Wehrmacht uniform and set aside their police ones.

Often very young SS officers were allotted posts that other officers of the Wehrmacht had to step aside for. An 18-year-old SS second lieutenant had, for example, to lead a combat group that included Wehrmacht and Flak captains and lieutenants. These officers were not only old enough to have been the fathers of this SS second lieutenant, but even gave the impression that they possessed ability well above that of the SS officer set over them. Most of these young SS officers were daring types, not weaklings, and certainly engaged bravely in every situation. However, such men should be given special assignments for which they are better suited. Appointments for which knowledge, and not least experience, are required belong, however, to other people. Here is an example:

A fire threatened to spread across from a neighbouring building. This was reported to the SS second lieutenant. He immediately ordered the building to be blown up. When the NCO reported that there was clothing in the cupboards and washing hanging around that someone must have brought there, he ordered the building to be demolished a second time. The NCO came back again and reported that about 70 soldiers who used the cellars were at the moment in action, but all their property, packs, clothing, etc. was lying around in the cellars. The NCO was reprimanded and was told once more to blow up the building. Only a few minutes perhaps would have been necessary for a few men to remove these soldiers’ items. Apart from this the fire was in no way so far advanced that the demolition was so urgent. The order had been given without any consideration whatsoever by a young man who had surely never had to buy underclothes with his own money. Thank God the soldiers in this situation were much more sensible and saved their comrades’ things before blowing up the building.

The soldiers’ lack of fighting spirit was also illustrated in the way that they always quickly let themselves be disarmed. We often went into the cellars when there was a smell of burning with a pistol in the hand to winkle out skivers. It was sufficient with two or three men to round up groups of eight to nine men, who timidly obeyed and willingly dropped their rifles, belts and steel helmets. I collected up many weapons for the Volkssturm in this way with my Party comrades and caught cowardly soldiers. When Gauamtsleiter Party Comrade Dame came to Küstrin and I told him, he did not want to believe it. I suggested that he tried it himself. Party Comrade Dame, who was in civilian clothes, rounded up six soldiers who had fled to the Altstadt from the Neustadt. There was a short interrogation and then Dame forcefully demanded that the soldiers immediately lay down their rifles, belts and steel helmets. All six soldiers obeyed and were apparently pleased to be without their weapons. If a single German civilian can so overwhelm six soldiers, what would happen when these soldiers were confronted by Russians? Whether this failing morale can be restored, I do not know. However, what is possible in my opinion, is that by continually relieving those soldiers who are weary, tired and grown apathetic with the fighting, one can give them back an inner equilibrium before they are sent back into battle, and advise them of the urgency and significance of their fight.

I could say a lot about the looting carried out by German soldiers. One was often ashamed at how senseless and how mean German soldiers were to loot the homes of their countrymen. Often I heard it said: ‘The Russians could not be worse!’ I presume, however, that the higher commands have been informed of these deeds also from other places.

Heil Hitler!