Slaughter at Halbe - читать бесплатно онлайн полную версию книги автора Tony Le Tissier (EIGHT Preparing the Break-Out 26 APRIL 1945) #10

EIGHT Preparing the Break-Out ^{26 APRIL 1945}

Elements of the von Luck and Pipkorn battlegroups continued fighting around Baruth during the early hours of 26 April, and some of the dug-in Stalin tanks were blown up by specially detailed units, but there was still no follow-up by other units coming from the pocket. Some groups occupied Mückendorf and the woods around it, but concentrated artillery fire prevented any further progress against the 395th Rifle Division, which had moved up from the Golssen area. Shells bursting in the treetops caused many casualties among the German troops and accompanying civilians.

Hans Lehmann described events in Baruth that day:

The Baruth Schloss was occupied by Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht troops of units mainly made up from stragglers on 25/26 April 1945. Heavy fighting broke out, most of the damage coming from Soviet mortars, artillery and tanks. Aircraft were also active over the northern part of the town and the woods. German supply canisters were even dropped on 26 April, and a Ju 52 carrying ammunition and Panzerfausts crashed on the Mühlenberg [hill] that night, having apparently been shot down.

Two temporary cemeteries were established for the fallen Soviet soldiers, one at the crossroads outside the town cemetery and one in front of the Schloss. The remains from both were transferred to the Soviet War Cemetery on the B96 in 1947. There were about 400 Soviet soldiers in the cemetery at the Schloss.[1]

Counterattacks by two other Soviet divisions into the left flank of the German forces caused the latter to split and threw them back into the woods north-east of Baruth, while an attack by 4th Bomber Air Corps with 55 machines at midday had a catastrophic effect. Repeated strikes on the approach routes by 1st and 2nd Air Assault Corps, using between eight and ten aircraft at a time and flying some 500 missions, brought further heavy casualties and chaos to the break-out traffic. In the end these troops were cut off, surrounded and mainly destroyed, although some of the tanks are said to have reached as far as Sperenberg.[2] According to Soviet accounts, this break-out attempt resulted in 5,000 prisoners, 40 tanks and SPGs destroyed and the capture of nearly 200 guns and mortars.

Apparently surprised by the strength and aggressiveness of this attack, Marshal Koniev took further measures to cope with all eventualities. One of these was an attack towards Münchehofe, aiming to penetrate the pocket from the south. More troops were fed in to strengthen the blockade along the Luckenwalde–Märkisch Buchholz front, especially north of the Hammerfliess stream and along the autobahn. The 149th and 253rd Rifle Divisions took up positions along the autobahn from Teupitz to Terpt (due west of Lübbenau), thus also covering the road west to Luckau, and the three divisions of 28th Army’s 3rd Guards Rifle Corps occupied the Lindenbrück–Baruth–Dornswalde stretch of woods immediately west of the autobahn. Elements of 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were also deployed, the 3rd Guards Tank Army contributing 71st Mechanized Brigade, an SPG regiment and a mortar battalion to the Rehagen–Neuhof sector around the Gross Wünsdorfer See facing south, while 68th Independent Guards Tank Brigade deployed along the Kummersdorf Gut–Baruth front facing north-east.

In this way three defensive cordons were established to a depth of 15–20 kilometres. The concentration of armour on the Zossen–Baruth road also included a mobile reserve. Every break-out attempt from now on would be even more difficult and complicated for the German troops.[3]

Busse’s article on 9th Army’s last battle was written in Soviet captivity and published ten years after the event. Of 23 pages, only three are devoted to the pocket and break-out phase and contain chronological errors, dating the main break-out as 26 April instead of 28 April, and what he wrote of 24 April clearly, and totally unfairly, refers to the von Luck/Pipkorn attempt of 25 April:

The first attempt on 24 April to slip away from the constrictions of the pocket to the west failed. The armoured troops committed to the gap near Halbe did not wait for the arrival of the infantry, as they had been strictly ordered to, but drove on for their own safety. So the Russians closed the breach before the infantry could prop it open and get through. The author has unfortunately forgotten the names of the commanders and units who left their comrades in the lurch on this occasion.[4]

It seems that Busse was trying to cover up his own inadequacy here, for he himself was responsible for issuing the relevant orders, and for organising the follow-up by the infantry that failed to materialise. He was also to blame for not allowing the armoured troops to take ammunition and fuel reserves with them to sustain their action. His failure to have a proper grip on the situation may have been partly due to his headquarters being on the move from the Scharmützelsee railway station to the Hammer forestry office during the night, but still does not excuse him.[5]

SS-Second Lieutenant Porsch of Tank-Hunting Company Dora II continued his account:

I knocked out two anti-tank guns near Märkisch Buchholz that stood in our way. A few hours previously I had been awarded the Knight’s Cross. A staff officer brought it to me, as I could not leave my men.

Things were happening as never before in this war. We sat in a pocket and the Ivans hammered us with weapons of all calibres and massive air attacks. Soldiers of all branches of the service and ranks up to general were fighting with rifles or machine-pistols in their hands, men, women and children swarming around us. Afraid that we would break out of the pocket and leave them behind, they clustered around us and fell in heaps from Ivan’s explosive shells. As often as we tried, as often as we attacked, we still came up against a fresh barrier that cost death and suffering.[6]

However, 9th Army was not Koniev’s only major problem that day, for General Wenck launched his rescue operation with XX Corps from the line Brandenburg–Belzig at dawn, not heading towards Jüterbog as the OKW expected but towards Potsdam, where the Soviet forces did not appear to be quite so strong. The roads were blocked with refugees, so the troops had to move across country on either side of the railway line leading to Berlin. Wenck’s aims were given as saving: the wounded from the field hospitals within the army’s operational area, the remains of 9th Army, the Potsdam garrison, and the refugees. Consequently, General Carl-Erik Koehler, commanding XX Corps, was instructed to secure his flanks on the Elbe to ensure an open passage to the west.

The 12th Army hoped to achieve surprise with this attack, but Hitler had issued the following Führer-Order on 23 April, which was distributed in Berlin in leaflet form to boost the morale of the garrison and inhabitants:

To the Soldiers of Wenck’s Army!

An order of immense importance has removed you from your combat zone facing the enemy in the west and set you marching eastward. Your task is clear. Berlin must remain German. The objectives given to you must be achieved whatever the circumstances, for operations are in progress elsewhere to inflict a decisive defeat on the Bolsheviks fighting for the capital and from this the situation in Germany will change completely. Berlin will never capitulate to Bolshevism!

The defenders of the capital have found renewed courage with the news of your rapid progress, and are fighting with bravery and determination in the certainty of soon hearing your guns. The Führer has summoned you, and you have gone forward into the attack as in the days of conquest. Berlin awaits you! Berlin encourages you with all the warmth of her heart.[7]

Having redeployed during the previous night, XX Corps launched its attack on either side of the railway leading north-east to Berlin. As there had been no time for a formal reconnaissance, the Ulrich von Hutten Infantry Division in the lead was preceded by a reconnaissance team in eight-wheeled armoured cars with 75-mm guns, motorcyclists and an infantry company in APCs, followed by a vanguard of motorized infantry with some 50-mm anti-tank guns. On its right was the Scharnhorst Infantry Division, and on the far right the Theodor Körner, which was tasked with securing the extending right flank.

At first all went well. The angle of attack avoided the prepared line of defence held by 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and 13th Army along the Wittenberg–Potsdam road (Reichsstrasse 2), and caught 6th Guards Mechanized Corps on an exposed flank. A number of Soviet units were captured intact, including some supply columns and a tank workshop. The young trainees of XX Corps fought with all the elan of the German Army during the first years of the war under their experienced instructors.

During the night the Ferdinand Schill Division came in on the left flank with orders to head for Potsdam.[8]

Marshal Koniev badly wanted 4th Guards Tank Army’s 10th Guards Tank Corps to meet the threat posed by the advance of 12th Army on Berlin but, much to his annoyance, it remained fully committed in bottling up General Reymann’s Army Detachment Spree on the Wannsee and Potsdam ‘islands’. As Koniev himself admitted, a force of 20,000 men could not simply be ignored.[9] However, he says remarkably little about this day in his memoirs, presumably preferring to forget what must have been in fact a serious rebuff.

Meanwhile 13th Army’s 24th Rifle Corps had been detached and, since its 395th Rifle Division was already in the Golssen–Baruth sector, 117th Rifle Division (102nd Rifle Corps) assumed the all-round defence of Luckenwalde, and 280th Rifle Division (27th Rifle Corps) was stationed as corps reserve in the Jüterbog area. This deployment was so arranged that the Soviet units could engage either the 9th or the 12th German Armies.[10]

There appears to have been a major break-out attempt that night. Whether or not it was authorized by General Busse remains unclear, but it seems that elements of V, V SS Mountain and XI SS Panzer Corps were involved.[11] One group of infantry with artillery pieces and transport in train reached as far as the western outskirts of Freidorf, the village in which the headquarters of 1st Guards Breakthrough Artillery and 389th Rifle Divisions were located, before they were stopped by 5th Battery, 203rd Guards Howitzer Artillery Regiment, at a range of 150 metres. Some of the gunners had to resort to their carbines and sub-machine guns to defend themselves. The battery later claimed to have killed 90 Germans as well as destroying a 150-mm gun, a four-barrelled rapid-firing anti-aircraft gun, and six trucks. The rest of the regiment engaged more German infantry 300 metres north of Freidorf. The Germans retreated with heavy losses but then counterattacked and re-entered the village before being finally beaten off in this bitter encounter.[12]

The 1st Byelorussian Front’s 3rd Army was instructed to have its 40th Rifle Corps attack in the direction Mittenwalde–Motzen that day, occupy the the sector Brusendorf–Motzen–Pätz and establish contact with the troops of 1st Ukrainian Front. Its 35th Rifle Corps was to advance towards Pätz and its 41st towards Prieros, and they were then to occupy the Gross Köris–Prieros sector. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was to thrust towards Märkisch Buchholz and, with 69th Army operating in the centre with its right flank against Görsdorf–Streganz, was to occupy the sector Prieros–Schwerin–Behrensdorf. Finally, 33rd Army had to deliver the main blow in the Beeskow–Kehrigk direction, with a subsidiary blow on the left flank towards Gröditsch.

Meanwhile some 1,500 Soviet bombers, ground-attack aircraft and fighters were tasked with supporting their own troops, preventing 9th Army from manoeuvring, smashing German concentrations in the woods and at the Spree and Dahme crossing points, preventing resupply by air, and conducting aerial reconnaissance.[13]

Both fronts used pamphlets and loudspeakers to try to persuade the German troops to give up the fight and surrender, thus saving themselves casualties, but these efforts proved mainly ineffective, the determination of the Germans to escape Soviet captivity and break out to the west being far too strong, even among stragglers from shattered units, whether still armed or not.[14]

An SS-second lieutenant with Battlegroup Becker reported:

We reached Prieros at 1000 hours on 26 April and took up positions in front of the town, then set off again that afternoon for Hermsdorf. Supplies were already short but there was enough ammunition available. There were often unpleasant incidents. Wounded and civilians all wanted to be taken along with us even when they could hardly move themselves.

The night was cold and the sentries were often unable to distinguish friend from foe. The Prieros–Streganz road was blocked during the night. It began to rain as we lay without cover in the necessary positions, Russian mortaring being very heavy. We often had the feeling that Ivan knew exactly where we were. The men were completely exhausted, and I and an Army second lieutenant spent the night checking the sentries, coming across sentries who had fallen asleep. We had a cursory roll call: there were still 74 men of the old company, 43 from the 2nd Battalion/88[th Grenadier Regiment], and over 30 men from other units. Some were already wounded, but everyone knew that we would only get out if we stayed together.

An SS-captain from Wagner’s staff [Division Nederland] found us, bringing an urgent request for us to hold out at all costs! There were not only us soldiers but, above all, women and children in the pocket.[15]

Ernst-Christian Gädtke continues his account:

We were alerted early on 26 April. The Russians were attacking from the west and north-east. We quickly broke out and withdrew to a wood south of Neubrück, north of Märkisch Buchholz. We got a bit of a rest in the Hammer Forest, disturbed only by occasional attacks from Russian ground-attack aircraft. We lay camouflaged under the trees, so they didn’t bother us much.

With us and around us were gathering the pitiful remnants of 9th Army. The field kitchens, such as there were, formed assembly points for the shattered or simply scattered units, and food was doled out only to members of their own units, thus serving to get the troops together again.

What we didn’t know, and only discovered much later, was that Zhukov’s armies had long since thrust through to Berlin on the direct route via Seelow–Müncheberg–Rüdersdorf, and that our fighting since 17 April had amounted only to pathetic pinpricks in the southern flank of the Russian troops, who had long since gone past us. The Russian formations had certainly not taken this seriously, otherwise, in view of the comparison of strengths, there would have been nothing of us left.

While a large part of 9th Army had remained in its positions on the Oder on Hitler’s express orders, Koniev’s armies had broken through north-westwards from the Lausitz and had reached the southern outskirts of Berlin ahead of Zhukov’s troops. The 9th Army had been encircled.

There was no more talk now of a relief attack on Berlin, for it had become a question of breaking out to the west. The efforts of the units to assemble, and get themselves into order in the Hammer Forest, served only as preparations for the march and break-out from encirclement.

After all the chaotic events of the past days since we had left our positions in the woods near Fürstenberg, we were astonished how everything came together: field kitchens and supply wagons, a handful of trucks with all sorts of supplies and ammunition, finally two guns and fifty or so men, in effect stragglers – that was all that was left of the 32nd SS Tank-Hunting Battalion.

Fuel was scarce, so all the supply vehicles had to remain behind here, only the assault guns and the field kitchen were to drive on, as were the fuel truck as long as it had a few full cans of petrol. We crammed our packs from the supply vehicles and sorted out what seemed to be the most important, and what we could carry, the rest being thrown carelessly into the undergrowth. The field kitchen’s vat steamed and there was no lack of food. Only the essentials would be taken on the march, so our messtins were filled to the brim and we could have as much as we liked. The remaining supplies, especially arms and ammunition, were loaded on to the few vehicles coming with us, the last tanks and assault guns, a few self-propelled anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and some towing vehicles. I was lucky to be assigned as relief gunner to one of the remaining assault guns, and so had the prospect of riding at least part of the way.

Once it was dark, we rolled ourselves up in our blankets and tent-halves and tried to sleep on the forest floor next to the gun.[16]