Slaughter at Halbe

SIX The Soviets Close In ^{24 APRIL 1945}

On 24 April Colonel-General Vassilii Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army, with 1st Guards Tank Army under its command, and therefore Marshal Zhukov’s strongest striking force, was busy side-stepping to the west to get into position to attack Berlin from the south. However, its plans were unexpectedly modified as the result of a surprise encounter, which must have created a tremendous upheaval at front and army command levels. At about 1030 hours, while some of Chuikov’s troops were traversing Schönefeld Airfield, they unexpectedly came across several tanks from 3rd Guards Tank Army, thus linking up with 1st Ukrainian Front. According to Chuikov, Zhukov did not apparently learn of this encounter until the evening and then acted disbelievingly, insisting that Chuikov send officers to discover what units of 1st Ukrainian Front were involved, where they were located and what their objectives were.[1]

If, as it appears, this was Zhukov’s first intimation of Marshal Koniev’s participation in the battle for the city itself, we can imagine the consternation this report must have caused. Apart from the blow to Zhukov’s pride, this incident clearly demonstrates the lack of communication between the Soviet leaders and their continuing mutual distrust. Having had his hand revealed, Stalin then laid down the inter-front boundaries, which were to run from Lübben through Teupitz, Mittenwalde and Mariendorf to the Anhalter railway station. Within the city, this meant the distinctive line of the railway leading north from Lichtenrade.

Koniev had obviously been aware of the GHQ order laying down the new inter-front boundaries on the night of the 22nd. When he issued his orders for the attack across the Teltow Canal he deployed 71st Mechanized Brigade on the right flank tasked with establishing contact with 1st Byelorussian Front. The boundary line, when extended beyond Anhalter station, passed well to the east of the Reichstag, giving him the opportunity of reaching it first from the south. Somehow this GHQ order had been withheld from Zhukov, although it had been effective from 0600 hours (Moscow time) on the 23rd, and his balance of forces and reported reactions to the news of this encounter on Schönefeld Airfield clearly demonstrate how unprepared he was for this eventuality.[2]

Significantly Chuikov states, ‘…8th Guards Army, in whose front of advance formations of 1st Guards Tank Army were also operating, was diverted by order of the front commander to the north-west against the central sector of Berlin.’[3] This diversion led to Chuikov’s 28th and 29th Guards Rifle Corps having to wheel sharply right through Rudow, Buckow and Lichtenrade into Mariendorf.[4]

Although Air Chief Marshal Novikov was responsible for coordinating air activity for the overall Oder–Neisse theatre operation with 2nd, 16th and 18th Air Armies under command, and was surely aware of the relative positions of the two fronts on the ground, he does not seem to have kept Zhukov informed on this point, possibly because Stalin forbade it.

Then, at about 1230 hours, the infantry of both fronts met near the Schönefeld autobahn junction, and later in the day Colonel-General A. V. Gorbatov’s 3rd Army of 1st Byelorussian Front linked up with 1st Ukrainian Front’s 28th Army at Teupitz, thereby completing the encirclement of 9th Army.[5] Some small groups of German troops tried to break through 28th Army’s lines between Mittenwalde and Teupitz during the day, but without success.[6]

Koniev joined Colonel-General Rybalko on the southern bank of the Teltow Canal to observe 3rd Guards Tank Army’s assault crossing. For this he had amassed no fewer than 1,420 guns, of which 400 were aimed over open sights, at the unprecedented density of 650 guns per kilometre, to fire a 55-minute opening bombardment. The importance he attached to this operation is obvious. When the attacks on either flank failed for various reasons, he pushed everything through the central successful bridgehead at Teltow.[7]

Meanwhile, in its general advance on Potsdam, 4th Guards Tank Army had split, with 6th Guards Mechanized Corps heading west for Brandenburg, whose outskirts were reached that day, 10th Guards Tank Corps in the centre taking the eastern suburbs of Potsdam, and 9th Guards Mechanized Corps attempting a crossing into Wannsee. When this operation failed, this corps was also pushed across the Teltow bridgehead at Koniev’s suggestion.[8]

The Soviet 13th Army reached Wittenberg on the Elbe that afternoon but ran into the Ulrich von Hutten, Theodor Körner and Scharnhorst Infantry Divisions, which reacted so violently that Koniev was led to believe that Wenck’s 12th Army was launching its anticipated counterattack, and therefore called in part of 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and 1st Air Assault Corps to assist. In fact General Wenck was not yet ready to launch an attack, but the news of the fighting caused some concern to 4th Guards Tank Army.[9] The Ulrich von Hutten Infantry Division retook Wittenberg by evening, established its headquarters there and deployed around the town.

The Soviet formations here were up against improvised but relatively strong German forces. The troops were mainly young recruits drawn from various training establishments in the area but they were led by experienced instructor officers and NCOs, and some of their equipment had come straight off the manufacturing lines. The Ulrich von Hutten’s 3rd Tank-Hunting Battalion ran out of fuel that day, but was given a tip-off about the local Nazi Party chief ’s private store of 40,000 litres, which was promptly confiscated for the benefit of the division.[10]

Further south the intervention of the 5th Guards Army group under Koniev’s chief of operations, who, in addition to the chief of staff, had been sent to resolve the situation, succeeded in checking Field Marshal Schörner’s disruptive drive towards Spremberg. However, several more days of hard fighting were to ensue before the Germans were driven back.[11]

That day 2nd Air Army moved all but its bomber bases forward across the Neisse, the bombers still having ample range for continuing operations in support of 1st Ukrainian Front.[12]

There was also a surprise development in 33rd Army’s sector, where the bridgehead had been firmly contained by V SS Mountain Corps against all attempts to break out since the beginning of the operation. That morning the 2nd Brigade of the Dnieper Flotilla laid a smokescreen across the Oder opposite Fürstenberg and supported an attack by marine infantry and some troops of 33rd Army on the town. The withdrawal of V SS Mountain Corps had already begun, so there could not have been much resistance, if any, to this assault.[13]

The 9th Army withdrawal that had started on 23 April continued smoothly enough on the southern and south-eastern sectors of the perimeter, where the Soviet attackers were unable to follow up fast enough. When the last of 21st Panzer Division had passed through Münchehofe, an engineer company set up a roadblock at the entrance to the village, using Goliath mini-tanks filled with explosives to be detonated beneath enemy tanks.[14] The situation was more complicated on the northern sector, where the pressure from the Soviets was more direct, and on the eastern sector the combat team based on 32nd SS Field Training and Replacement Battalion and commanded by SS-Captain Frenken of 32nd SS Engineer Battalion was having to fight a desperate battle on the line Ahrensdorf–Behrensdorf.[15]

During the night of 24/25 April, 21st Panzer Division withdrew to the line of the chain of lakes between Teupitz and Prieros, while 32nd SS Division’s battlegroup pulled back to the Prieros area on the right flank. At the same time, 21st Panzer Division’s 155th Armoured Artillery Regiment Tannenberger unilaterally decided to break out, requisitioning fuel from 21st Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion and heading off in a north-westerly direction without informing anyone. Nothing is known of this formation’s fate, but its departure left a gap in the lines and a lot of anger among those remaining.[16] A crisis in morale was brewing, as Major Brand, commanding 21st Armoured Reconnaissance battalion, reported:

The battles on the pocket perimeter that followed saw the deaths of thousands and were a nightmare for the survivors. Small groups of armoured vehicles with escorting infantry, such as the remains of 502nd SS Heavy Panzer and 10th SS Armoured Reconnaissance Battalions, were to play a prominent part in the Storkow–Bad Saarow area. There was no continuous front and fighting was taking place everywhere, though the intention was to conduct an orderly withdrawal from one line to another. Counterattacks brought temporary success, checking but not stopping the Soviet advance. Soviet penetrations in the flanks and rear could not be prevented.

Heinz Deerberg, then a twelve-year-old boy, reported on his experiences:

The complete air superiority of the Soviets and other factors made conditions for the German troops even worse. Organized convoys and units became entangled with leaderless groups of soldiers on foot; refugee groups with their horse-drawn carts and handcarts, and wounded in all kinds of vehicles were all making their way westwards on the country roads and woodland tracks of the Spreewald. The 16th Air Army alone flew 2,000 sorties on 24 April. Tanks and SPGs were knocked out, ammunition trucks blown up, and whole groups of people killed or wounded by direct hits, as well as many military and privately owned horses.[19] Because of the constant Soviet pressure and the little or complete lack of reconnaissance by the Germans, most sectors and assembly areas remained ignorant of what was going on around them. Even 9th Army HQ lacked a proper overview.

At the end of 24 April the OKW summarized: