Slaughter at Halbe

SEVEN No Luck for von Luck ^{25 APRIL 1945}

This was the day of the historic link-up of the Soviets and the Americans on the Elbe, when 5th Guards Army’s 58th Guards Rifle Division encountered patrols from 69th US Infantry Division of 1st US Army near Torgau. All that remained of the Third Reich was thus split horizontally in two. Another significant development that day occurred when troops of both Soviet fronts completed the encirclement of Berlin, meeting north-east of Potsdam. Now there were two encirclements for them to deal with, the ‘Berlin Group’ and the ‘Frankfurt–Guben Group’, as they called them.[1]

Meanwhile Marshal Koniev had the three armoured corps of 3rd Guards Tank Army with their infantry and artillery reinforcements advancing steadily through the southern suburbs of the city aimed directly at the Reichstag, detaching only 55th Guards Tank Brigade to cover the exposed left flank through the Grunewald Forest and move on into the Olympic Stadium area of Charlottenburg. However, there were problems, as he related:

It is interesting to note that the fronts had to apply to GHQ to sort out this problem, being incapable of doing so themselves, the hostility between the two commanders being too great. However, the change of inter-front boundary still left the Reichstag within Koniev’s reach, as a subtended line from this boundary shows, there being no designated end line across the front of the troops advancing from any direction.

In the early hours of the morning 13th Army’s reserve corps suffered a severe rebuff from the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn Infantry Division when it tried to regain Wittenberg. The Soviet infantry had been hastily trucked forward from Jüterbog without armoured support and were just leaving their forming-up areas when the German troops ran into them while expanding their own perimeter. In this surprise encounter the Germans came off best, driving the Soviets back ten kilometres by midday. The fighting continued all day. The Soviets brought up some T-34 tanks and tried to force their way in along the various streets leading into the town, but the German flak gunners formed a ‘hedgehog’ and used their 88-mm guns in the anti-tank role to hold them at bay. The German division then received orders to disengage and to move to Jeserigerhütten, where it was to prepare to attack eastwards. This was achieved by launching a series of sharp counterattacks before withdrawing.[3]

There was also some fierce fighting around Treuenbrietzen with a German penetration south of the town eastwards towards Bardenitz, but by 1500 hours this had been driven back to the southern outskirts of Treuenbrietzen by elements of 13th Army assisted by 5th Guards Mechanized Corps’ artillery, whose commander, Colonel Nikolai P. Dyakin, was killed in the action.[4]

Oblivious to the conditions under which the German forces were operating, Hitler was planning the relief of his capital and re-ordering the command structure. In future OKW was to be responsible for overall operations under his instructions. His orders would be passed through the Chief of the General Staff of the OKH, General of Infantry Krebs, who was with him. OKW would deal directly with 12th Army and Army Group Weichsel with 9th Army. The main task of OKW was: ‘By attacks with all forces and means and greatest speed to re-establish broad contact with Berlin from the north-west, south-west and south and thus bring the battle for Berlin to a decisive victory.’[5]

That day Hitler told General Weidling, now commanding the Berlin Defence Area:

In numerous urgent telephone conversations, Krebs demanded, on Hitler’s orders, counterattacks by 12th Army, SS-General Felix Steiner’s corps north of Berlin, and even by 9th Army. Krebs was fully aware of the impossibility of executing these orders, and was only passing them on to calm Hitler down. Although completely out of touch with reality, the orders signed by Krebs were still being sent to 9th and 12th Armies for action.

General Wenck’s orders for his 12th Army concentrated on the reception of the break-out elements of 9th Army. He had begun the day before with the deployment of a weak security screen against the southern flank of 1st Ukrainian Front as his XX Corps assembled and marched on the Beelitz–Niemegk area. This thrust towards Beelitz and Potsdam was to have some initial success, but brought no relief to the Berlin situation, except to provide a source of hope to the encircled population and defenders.

Major-General Ernst Biehler’s Frankfurt-an-der-Oder garrison at last succeeded in breaking through to 9th Army, a full three days after receiving Hitler’s permission to do so. General Busse could now begin to concentrate his troops for a break-out attempt to the west. Whether he was mentally prepared to act in defiance of Hitler’s orders, however, remains doubtful. Meanwhile his pocket was being harassed day and night from both land and air, and it was time to act if the people in his charge were to have a chance of escaping death or capture at the hands of the Soviets.[7]

Wolfgang Fleischer has provided the following description of the scene in the Märkish Buchholz area that day:

In the woods of the Halbe area were now concentrated the remains of XI SS Panzer Corps, V SS Mountain Corps, the Frankfurt fortress garrison, and V Corps, with in all the remnants of one tank and 13 infantry divisions, plus a number of independent units. Also with them were a large number of sick and wounded, as well as refugees, Wehrmacht employees, female flak and signals auxiliaries, forced labourers, prisoners of war, and even concentration camp inmates. The exact number of people surrounded in the Halbe pocket has never been calculated with any exactitude, but estimates vary from 150,000 to 200,000.

According to 9th Army’s rear area commander, Lieutenant-General Friedrich-Gustav Bernhard, there were some 50,000 fighting troops and 10,000 Volkssturm personnel in the pocket and ‘including rear service units, there were up to 150,000 men in the pocket. Also in the pocket were the whole headquarters of 9th Army under General Busse and his staff, the commanders and staff of XI SS Panzer Corps, V SS Mountain Corps and V Corps, as well as senior officers of the rear area services.’

Soviet accounts reckoned that the German force amounted to 11 regiments, 4 brigades, 71 battalions, one artillery regiment, 5 artillery battalions, 1 tank regiment, 1 tank battalion and the Frankfurt fortress garrison. Some, certainly exaggerated, Soviet accounts also include figures of over 2,000 guns and mortars and about 300 armoured vehicles in the pocket.

There would be little sense in attempting a comparison of strengths between the opponents, as no reliable figures are available for the German side. Witness accounts give subjective impressions and are seldom based on documentary evidence available today. Apart from this, only definitive comparisons at an exact time and place would have any value, as the strengths of the surrounded group varied daily, if not by the hour, for the worst. Accordingly all figures given serve only as a rough indication.

What is certain is that, after a week of heavy fighting, defence and retreat, the German formations were down to seldom more than half their original strengths and equipment holdings, bearing in mind also Soviet claims that German units on the Oder and Neisse fronts had suffered up to 80 per cent losses. Taking into consideration that the heavy artillery pieces and static flak batteries would have had to be blown up and abandoned in the retreat, there were probably fewer than 1,000 guns and mortars available in the pocket, all with extremely limited supplies of ammunition. A similar situation applied to the armoured vehicles. In contrast to the Soviet figures, 9th Army reported to army group headquarters on 24 April that V Corps had 79 tanks of all kinds and XI SS Panzer Corps had 36. No figures were given for the other formations or units. In fact it now seems that there was possibly a maximum of 250 armoured vehicles in all, but only between 150 and 200 of these would have been available for combat. The acute and ever-worsening fuel and ammunition situations made things even worse for the encircled troops.

The following were in the pocket just before the final encirclement:

There were no prepared defensive positions available for the encircled troops, so they used natural obstacles, or quickly improvised defensive positions in villages, barns and other suitable features. Often the encroaching enemy forced them into small pockets within the greater encirclement. The fighting along the pocket’s perimeter also continued remorselessly. The 1st Byelorussian Front was able to gain some 10–15 kilometres in various sectors that day, and 9th Army was unable to prevent the further constriction of the encirclement, especially in the north and north-eastern sectors.[9]

Ernst-Christian Gädtke, who was now on foot with his unit’s supply section, having had to abandon his assault gun due to engine failure, continued his story:

The situation for the surrounded soldiers and civilians was becoming more desperate by the hour. The troops’ freedom to manoeuvre was becoming less and less. They were now completely cut off from their supply lines and attempts at air supply produced less than at any time in the war. Soviet fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft fire were too strong and the German air transport facilities too weak. Fuel and ammunition were in even shorter supply than they had been on the Oder.

Available sources on the attempts to resupply the encircled forces by air give a stark picture. As early as 0710 hours on 25 April, 9th Army radioed the Air Liaison Officer at Army Group Weichsel: ‘To Flivo: Friedersdorf available but no machine has landed yet. Get them going immediately!’ A little later, at 0750 hours, another message followed that included: ‘The army has been left in the lurch by air supply despite available airfield and lighting facilities. Urgently request for night of 26th in Kehrigk area. Location by coordinates with codewords follows.’ At 1850 hours that same day the Air Liaison Officer sent the following reply: ‘The fifth transport aircraft crossed the airfield for 30 minutes at 0300 hours, but saw no lights.’ A few minutes later he reported: ‘The next air drop by six aircraft on the southern edge of the airfield will start from the north. Later landings by further aircraft too risky.’ Finally the quartermaster department of Army Group Weichsel reported that 75 tons of air supplies had been loaded for 9th Army that day. Apart from these details, this signal read:

Even if one or another air drop had succeeded in the following days, it would hardly have been of much account for the surrounded troops.

In addition to the Soviet forces already deployed, some special artillery units were brought in, and a total of six air corps from 2nd and 16th Air Armies. In all some 280,000 men, 7,400 guns and mortars, 280 tanks and SPGs, and 1,500 aircraft were now pitted against 9th Army. Of particular significance was the deployment of the 1st Guards Breakthrough Artillery Division on 25 April. This was one of the Stavka reserve formations normally allocated only to support specific break-through battles at the beginning of a major operation. However, after the successful breach of the Oder–Neisse defences in Operation Berlin, it was realised that there would be no further requirement in this particular role and these divisions were reallocated to the fronts with which they had fought the opening battle.

Koniev had already detached 19th Guards Mortar Brigade to support 3rd Guards Tank Army in Berlin, but the remainder of Guards Major-General V.B. Husid’s 1st Guards Breakthrough Artillery Division was now sent to support 3rd Guards Army against the 9th Army pocket opposite Halbe and Märkisch Buchholz. Divisional headquarters was established at Briesen and the subordinate formations and units allocated in direct support of the infantry formations in Army Artillery Groups (AAGs) and Divisional Artillery Groups (DAGs) as follows:

This system greatly increased the firepower of the existing divisional artillery groups in dealing with local incidents, while enabling coordination to provide a massive artillery concentration when necessary. All artillery units were allocated standing barrage, concentrated fire and moving defensive fire target areas. The batteries were protected by anti-tank barriers and given sectors for firing over open sights should German tanks break through to them, and special provision was made for fighting at night. The heaviest guns of the 98th Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade were located immediately behind the 21st Rifle Corps facing Halbe.[12]

The troops of 1st Ukrainian Front built defences along the anticipated breakthrough route from Märkisch Buchholz to Luckenwalde, three engineer brigades laying some 40,000 mines between them and erecting numerous barricades reinforced with explosives along a 12-kilometre strip.

The 3rd Guards Army was ordered:

This concentration of several divisions in the rear of 3rd Guards and 28th Armies provided sufficient resources to establish a second cordon backed by reserves, with 28th Army’s 38th Guards Rifle Corps deployed with its 96th Guards Rifle Division near Golssen, its 50th near Baruth and its 54th by Lindenbrück. Meanwhile 3rd Guards Army’s 76th Rifle Corps was detailed to attack in the general direction of Straupitz–Schlepzig and to cooperate closely with 1st Byelorussian Front’s 33rd Army on its right.[14]

A major factor that might have helped the break-out to succeed was the element of surprise, but this was denied by the Red Army’s complete air superiority. The Red Air Force had identified the German movement towards Märkisch Buchholz, Löpten and Halbe, as well as the concentration of troops and materiel on the western edge of the pocket on the day before. This resulted in attacks from 4th Air Bomber Corps, mainly from 70 twin-engined Pe-2s, on the identified target.[15] Artillery fire met the marching columns mixed with the refugee treks and hit their assembly and camping areas. Chaos reigned as shot-up tanks, burning SPGs, abandoned vehicles and wrecked horse-drawn equipages strewed or blocked the routes. This combination of air attacks and artillery strikes repeatedly forced the troops to take cover, and traffic jams became more frequent on the congested roads and tracks. The important bridges across the Dahme at Märkisch Buchholz were hit, making access to Halbe more difficult. It was only by making detours and taking their time that the troops were able to make progress through the press of refugees. The important elements of surprise with a coordinated attack were thus lost, severely reducing any chance of success.

Busse’s instructions for the break-out that day appear to have been hasty, impromptu and ill-considered. Lack of reconnaissance and operational intelligence meant that he had no idea of the strength of the Soviet forces that now faced him, and his own forces were still too widely dispersed to be able to take advantage of a successful breach of the enemy lines in any numbers. In ignoring the fact that the refugees’ desperation to get away from the Russians was just as strong as that of his soldiers, he was making a serious mistake.

Seizing on Battlegroup von Luck of the 21st Panzer Division, which had only reached him that day, he promptly took it under his immediate command. This battlegroup consisted mainly of Colonel Hans von Luck’s 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment, accompanied by the remaining Panther tanks of 22nd Panzer Regiment. Busse’s plan was for two armoured battlegroups to break out simultaneously, secure the nodal point of Baruth and obtain use of the roads leading west from there to Jüterbog and Luckenwalde. These attacks would be led by Battlegroup von Luck from Halbe and Battlegroup Pipkorn from further south.

Busse’s orders to von Luck were as follows:

Similarly, Battlegroup Pipkorn, led by SS-Colonel Rüdiger Pipkorn, and consisting of the remains of his 35th SS Police Grenadier Division and the remaining tanks of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, was to strike out westward from Schlepzig, north of Lübben. Pipkorn happened to be an old friend of von Luck’s from their recruit days, but had more recently been compulsorily transferred as a General Staff officer to the Waffen-SS.

By 1900 hours several tanks had arrived to join von Luck’s battlegroup, including some small, fast Hetzer tank-hunters. Ammunition was loaded and fuel shared out, but as no supply trucks were to accompany them, their capacity for fighting and movement was limited to what they were now carrying. These preparations could not go unnoticed and by nightfall some hundreds of women and children with their primitive carts and baggage had gathered round, and von Luck did not have the heart to turn them away.

They set off at 2000 hours, their first objective being Baruth, the important traffic junction astride the swampy bottom of the Nuthe glacial valley. When they reached the Berlin–Dresden autobahn, they found individual Soviet supply trucks on it, heading for the capital, so road blocks were established north and south of the crossing point.

There were then (no longer) two bridges across the autobahn south of the Teupitz–Halbe exit, the southernmost of which had been blown. From there one of the original tracks connecting the villages before the forestry grids were imposed led in a shallow S to Baruth. von Luck’s force made good progress, despite having to traverse these woodland tracks and fire breaks in the dark. Whenever the tanks stopped the civilians would close up behind and wait for the next move.

In order to reach the Juterbog road, von Luck would have to seize, pass through and hold Baruth, as the valley bottom that the town straddles is otherwise virtually impassable to tanks because of the network of irrigation ditches running through the water meadows.

They reached the outskirts of Baruth at about midnight but, as they emerged cautiously from the woods, they suddenly came under heavy anti-tank and machine-gun fire. Clearly the Soviets had anticipated a break-out attempt at this point. The defences here included some Josef Stalin heavy tanks which had been dug in so that only their turrets were exposed. The Stalin tank was superior in armour to anything the Germans had, its only known weakness being the time it took to reload its formidable 122mm gun. These tanks effectively blocked the line of advance, so Colonel von Luck decided to wheel his battlegroup round to the right and then send in his Panzergrenadiers to take the town from the north, this appearing to be the easiest break-out route, providing he did not get involved in lengthy fighting that would give the Soviets time to reinforce their positions.

Just then some Panthers of Battlegroup Pipkorn appeared from the east. The southern group’s attack from its positions near Schlepzig in the Upper Spreewald had also begun at about 2000 hours, but proved unsuccessful. When the leading elements reached the defensive positions of 329th Rifle Division, they had encountered heavy fire and come under repeated flank attacks, which gave them a severe mauling and caused the leading elements to scatter. Only a few individual groups actually got as far as the autobahn near Staakow, where the bridge crossed the autobahn south of Halbe, and then pushed on via Dornswalde for Baruth.

Despite these welcome reinforcements for the Germans, the Soviets were able to do better and towards dawn it became clear that, with ammunition and fuel rapidly running out, the German troops would be unable to break through. von Luck therefore radioed General Busse informing him of the hopelessness of the situation, together with his decision to continue the attack while the cover of darkness lasted, but that he feared more counterattacks and air attacks with the coming of daylight. Busse ordered the battlegroup to stay where it was, avoid direct attacks and wait for the remainder of 9th Army to catch up.

Instead von Luck summoned his subordinate unit commanders and told them that he had decided to disband his force and give them the opportunity of breaking out in small groups. He himself would return to the pocket with his adjutant, Captain Liebeskind, a liaison officer and a runner to explain his actions. However, as it turned out, Pipkorn was killed during this action and von Luck captured early on 27 April on his way back. Some of his men actually reached the Elbe, but most were either killed or captured.[17]

From Radeland, the nearest village east of Baruth, schoolboy Erwin Hilldebrands reported:

One of the last messages from 9th Army reported at 2230 hours:

Army Group Weichsel commented on these battles:

Nevertheless, Busse’s words, like other similar bombastic messages in the Nazi vein by senior German officers during the course of the war, could not disguise the failure of his first attempt at a break-out.

During the night of 25/26 April, Hitler repeated his efforts to get both armies to come to the relief of Berlin. In an order to the 12th Army he demanded: ‘Disregarding your flanks and rear, your attack groups are to act with firmness and determination to form keenly coordinated thrusts.’ To achieve this, it was ordered: