State Secrets: An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

1

Geoffrey Hosking, Russia, People and Empire (London: HarperCollins, 1997); Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001, London: John Murray, 2000).

2

On Soviet policies to quell ethnic differences and increase their hold on power, see Robert Conquest, Stalin: Breaker of Nations (New York: Penguin, 1991); Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001); Harry W. Hazard and Robert Strausz-Hupe, The Idea of Colonialism (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1958), especially chapter 4, “Russian Colonialism: Tsarist and Soviet Empires.”

3

In December 1929 Stalin called for the “liquidation of the kulaks as a class” because he claimed they were wealthy and the class enemy of the state, which led and exploited the peasantry to deliberately thwart the government’s Five Year Plan. In reality, most kulaks only owned one or two pieces of livestock and had managed to employ a few other peasants. Kulaks were forced into state run collective farms or sent to brutal labor camps. See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); John Thompson, A Vision Unfulfilled: Russia and the Soviet Union in the Twentieth Century (Lexington, MA: Heath Publishers, 1996): 261-4.

4

For more on the civil war and famine, Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Vintage Books of Random House, 1994); Fisher, H. H., The Famine in Soviet Russia (1919-1923): The Operation of the American Relief Administration (New York: MacMillan, 1927).

5

On the fate of Soviet prisoners of war, see Nikolai Tolstoy, The Secret Betrayal: 1944-1947 (New York: Scribner, 1978); Mark Elliot, “The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, 1944-1947,” Political Science Quarterly 88, No. 2 (June 1973): 253-75; Mark Elliot, Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America’s Role in Their Repatriation (Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1982); John Whitley, “Countless Prisoners Of War Handed Back To Stalin By Churchill,” at http://www.rense.com/general47/butch.htm; Aleksey I. Briukhanov, “Vot kak eto bilo: O rabote missii po repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan” Vospominaniia Sovetskogo Ofitsera (Moscow, 1958): 38.

6

The Tatar version of Radio Liberty – Radio Azatlyk right now is broadcasting from Prague (Czech Republic) paid for by American taxpayers’ dollars, but its journalists are working under the supervision of the Russian Government and this radio has nothing to do with its very title and the distribution of real information about American democracy and American values.

7

The Communist Party sponsored an organization, the Komsomol, or Communist League of Youth, for those between age fourteen and early thirties, so that they could learn the proper things to become party members. Komsomol members provoked political activity, completed social projects (e.g., planting trees along urban roads), and supposedly served as role models for socialist behavior. John Thompson, A Vision Unfulfilled: Russia and the Soviet Union in the Twentieth Century (Lexington, MA: Heath Publishers, 1996): 261-4.

8

One plant was situated in Salavat, in Bashkortstan, and the other in Angarsk, which is located on the Angara River in the Irkutsk region, about 30 kilometers north-west of the city of Irkutsk and 50 kilometers north of the western tip of Lake Baikal.

9

Thirty years later, in 1994, I was happy to run into this same man at an international meeting, devoted to the role of mass media in the democratization of society. I was very glad to see him. He was a Doctor of Jurisprudence, a professor, and the head of the Department of Criminal Law at the Moscow Law Institute. I realized then that my old colleague was very embarrassed about his worker’s past.

10

The term “sharashka”was first introduced by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956, An Experiment in Literary Investigation I-II (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973). Also see Ann Applebaum, Gulag: A History (New York: Doubleday, 2003).

The renowned scientists Rudolf Udris, Peter Sergeev, Michael Nemtsov, and Boris Kruzhalov, who were the first to develop the hydro peroxide process for producing phenol and acetone in 1946, were working in such a chemical sharashka. Udris ultimately committed suicide. Sergeev was barely released from this sharashka when his son, Andrei P. Sergeev, who was also a chemist, was jailed there on charges of anti-Soviet agitation. See M.S. Nemtsov, “At First We Were Four People,” Chemistry and Life, no. 2 (1989); Andrei P. Sergeev, “How I Participated in Operation ‘Yprit,’” Izvestia, 11 August 1992, which chronicles the dumping of around twenty tons of bombs containing mustard gas.

11

The First Department was operating under the control of the Deputy Director of the Security Regime, a KGB officer who only formally was subordinate to Director of GOSNIIOKhT. The Second Department was also operating under the supervision of the Deputy Director of the Security Regime.

12

The Third Department was also operating under the control of Deputy Director of the Security Regime.

13

In the 1950s, the Soviet military directed the chemical weapons pipeline by controlling the research and development efforts, which took place at the Central Military Scientific Research Technical Institute in Moscow. At that time, GOSNIIOKhT was a civilian organization and its only military work was related to developing production technologies for the agents that the military’s central research institute discovered. In October 1960, Nikita Khrushchev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, decided that the research of chemical agents was too dangerous for a major metropolitan area and moved the Central Military Scientific Research Technical Institute to a town near the Volga River in southern Russia called Shikhany. Most of the military’s senior scientists, which included civilian as well as military researchers, were reluctant to relocate to Shikhany and instead “retired” to GOSNIIOKhT.

14

According to Western historians, there wasn’t any Tatar Yoke after the Tatar-Mongols were conquered at the beginning of 13th Century. The opposite is true: the Tatars are the real founders of the united Russian State. See, for instance, Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols. Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Boris Ischboldin, Essays on Tatar History. (New Delhi India: New Book Society of India, 1963); Janet Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

15

I.L. Knunyants, A.I. Shchekotikhin, A.V. Fokin, Izvestia AN SSSR, otdelenie khim.nauk, no. 2 (1953), p. 282-289.

16

Within seconds to minutes after exposure to a lethal dose of nerve agent by ingestion, skin exposure, or inhalation, a person will begin vomiting violently and go into seizures, eventually losing consciousness. Even when antidotes are available, these factors can make medical treatment much more difficult. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Medical Management of Chemical Casualties Handbook, 3rd ed. (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Chemical Casualty Care Division, 1999): 105-37.

17

In 1974 the following people received the Lenin Prize for organizing the production of Substance 33: A.V. Fokin, K.A. Guskov, M.I. Kabachnik, Ju.V. Privezentsev, V.M. Romanov, V.F. Rostunov, E.M. Zhuravski. Like Kabachnik and Fokin, Zhuravski didn’t have any relationship to this work except that he had been the chief of a department of UNKhV.

18

The Administration of Chief of the Chemical Troops.

19

It is necessary to point out that the role of the VPK has been exaggerated in some literature sources. Its role overall was limited to distribution of funds, especially currency etc. Some people named it the fifth wheel of the car.

20

I’ll write further about Kirpichev’s discovery.

21

Oleg Vishnyakov, “Interview with a Noose Around the Neck”, Novoe Vremya, No 6, 1993, p. 40. (English version, Oct. 1993, p. 22-23.)

22

Count Grigory G. Orlov (1734-1783) was a lover of Empress Catherine II of Russia. In 1762 he organized the coup d’état that placed Catherine on the Russian throne and subsequently was her close adviser. John Alexander, Catherine the Great: Life and Legend (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989): 56-7.

23

On the initial discovery, L.E. Tammelin, “Dialkoxy-phosphorylthiocholines, alkoxymethyl-phosphorthiocholines, and analogous choline esters,” Acta Chemica Scandinavica 11(1957): 1340-9. For a brief history of “V” agents, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Study of the Historical, Technical Military, Legal, and Political Aspects of CBW and Possible Disarmament Measures, The Rise of CB Weapons, vol. 1 (New York: Humanities Press, 1971): 74-5.

24

See ref.13.

25

The Bigeye bomb was developed to mix diisopropyl aminoethylmethyl phosphonate with sulfur to make VX. Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Textbook of Military Medicine, Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty: Part I (Office of the Surgeon General: US Army 1997): 65-6, 70-1.

26

Di-isopropyl-aminoethylmethyl-phosphonate.

27

David Wise. Cassidy’s Run: The Secret Spy War Over Nerve Gas. (New York: Random House, 2000).

28

BZ is short for 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate. BZ is an anticholinergic, a category of drugs that includes antihistamines, antidepressants, and antipsychotics. Depending on the dosage, the effects of BZ range from mild drowsiness to loss of coordination, dulled thought process, confusion, paranoia, delirium, and hallucination. These symptoms generally appear several hours after exposure to BZ and can last for up to 96 hours. For more information, see James Ketchum and Frederick R. Sidell, “Incapacitating Agents,” Textbook of Military Medicine, pp.296.

29

On Markov’s murder see, Richard H. Cummings, “The Murder of Georgi Markov,” Intelligencer 10, no. 1 (Feb. 1999): 9-11.

30

This facility was initially code named Tomko and worked in secrecy under a 1927 Russo-German pact to make chemical weapons. Not far from there, the so-called Tankodrom for training tank crews for German troops was located in Shikhany-1.

31

See ref. 82.

32

See Annex 5.

33

According to Kremlin spokesman Alexander Orofyonov, Kuntsevich was fired because of “a single grievous violation of his work responsibilities.” Alexander Gordeyev, “Yeltsin Fires Top Chemical Weapons Official,” The Moscow Times, 8 April 1994.

34

See ref. 56.

35

Resolution of Central Committee of the CPSU and Council of Ministers of USSR from April 24 1977 N 3509-123. See Annex 21.

36

The tests could have gone very well, but the old cholinesterase method of analysis that the scientists at Nukus used did not allow the results to be interpreted accurately.

37

Read about his “discovery” in Chap. 9.

38

Modeling was used to see how the agent would perform with other types of delivery systems.

39

The factory design was completed by NII Khimproject in Volgograd. GOSNIIOKhT deputy director Guskov told me about the planned move of A-230 production to Pavlodar, where a commercial chemical plant was already located. At that time, sarin and soman were being produced at the Volgograd plant, which is in a city. Decisions had been made to move chemical weapons production operations to this more remote location. Not only were multiple agents to be produced at Pavlodar, but also the plant’s production capability was to exceed that of Novocheboksarsk. For more on the Pavlodar plant, see Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, “The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy,” Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 136-45.

40

For more on this accident, Will Englund, “Russia still doing work on chemical arms”, The Baltimore Sun, October 18 1992; Oleg Vishnyakov, “I Was Making Binary Bombs,” Novoe Vremya 50, December 1992, 46-9, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-242, 16 November 1992, 25.

41

The work was done under the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers Resolution no. 844-186, 6 October 1989 and Ministry of Industry Decree no. 22-2, 9 December 1989. In Annex 21, see Top Secret Letter no. 1846 ss from Martynov to Shabunin, 24 November 1992; in Annex 31 see also “The Technical Order for the Compound Part of the Experimental Design Work of ‘Substance A-232’ On the Basis of the System of Components; The Code ‘Novichok-5,’” Top Secret Document 2187 ss/khf, signed on 4 May 1990 by GOSNIIOKhT Director V.A. Petrunin, on 27 April 1990 by Chief of 4984 VP MO E.A. Umbliya, on 16 May 1990 by Chief of 458 VP MO N.G. Ragulin, and on 16 May 1990 by NPO Basalt Director A. S. Obukhov. (Moscow: Russian State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, 4 April 1990).

42

See the 23 September 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the USSR, which provided for data on their respective stockpiles to be exchanged in two phases and for a joint verification experiment.

43

There is every reason to believe that the dioxin which was used for poisoning in 2004 Viktor Yushchenko, that time presidential candidate of Ukraine, was produced in this institute.

44

To qualify for this Lenin Prize, Petrunin and his cohorts had to have solid proof that they had designed, tested, certified, and begun mass production of the Substance 33 binary, complete with the signatures of the relevant factory managers. Otherwise, the application for the award would not meet the standard of being a great accomplishment worthy of the Lenin Prize. See also the comments of Vladimir Uglev in Oleg Vishnyakov’s article, “Interview with a Noose Around the Neck,” Novoe Vremya, No 6 (1993): 41-2.

45

On 10 April 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev announced during a visit to Prague that the USSR was no longer making chemical weapons and had never deployed chemical weapons outside of its own territory. Jackson Diehl, “Gorbachev Proposes New Missile Talks; Short-Range Rockets Would Be Negotiated,” Washington Post, 10 April 1987, A1.

46

In addition to V. Petrunin, the Lenin Prize was given to S.A. Arzhakov, A.V. Gaev, A.V. Kisletsov, A.D. Kuntsevich, S.V. Petrov, E.S. Severin, V.I. Sichevoi. It is not surprising that not one of these “laureates” really worked on this problem. Such was Soviet style of life.

47

For a long time it was known as Voroshilov Military Academy of Chemical Defense.

48

Later he was transferred to the KGB and even participated in the search of the apartment of Lev Fedorov, my co-author of the article “A Poisoned Policy”. See Annex 8.

49

According to these regulations, the linear velocity of the air sucked by the ventilation into the laboratory exhaust hood had to be at least 1.0 meter per second to guarantee the safety of personnel. Every exhaust hood has a chart attached to it where the date and the last measured air velocity are logged, and if these measurements are lower than the standard norms, any operations with chemical agents must be terminated.

50

Some people in the U.S. are telling me that Substance 33 or VX-gas could not cause cancer, but they are forgetting that Substance 33 never was a pure product. It was a chemical agent of about 80% purity, contaminated with a lot of other compounds. Among them there were also some products of composition with three and more sulfur atoms.

51

These solutions were so ineffective that they did not even destroy the chemical agents to the level of permissible concentration, and that is a major safety shortcoming.

52

I was not the only chemist to note the deficiencies of the decontamination solution that the Russian Army continues to employ. General Nikolai Antonov, the former commander of Military Unit 61469, has also written about this problem. See N. S. Antonov, Khimicheskoe oruzhie na rubezhe dvukh stoletii, Progress (Moscow: 1994): 64. These terribly insufficient decontamination methods caused me to publicly oppose the plans of Ministry of Chemical Industry, which was planning to use the factory at Novocheboksarsk to destroy chemical weapons. Unit 83 in this factory produced Substance 33, and the walls of this facility remain irreversibly contaminated with Substance 33. Nevertheless, V. P. Ivanov, the Minister of Chemical and Petrochemical Industry accused me of significantly increasing the costs of Russia’s chemical weapons destruction program if the Novocheboksarsk facility could not be used. See Annex 51 for the full text of secret letter no. 629 from V. P. Ivanov, Chairman of Committee for Chemical and Petrochemical Industry to S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of The Russian Federation, pertaining to case no. 62 (Moscow: 13 April 1993).

53

In collaboration with Dr. Igor Revelsky, I conducted research that demonstrated the hazards of GOSNIIOKhT’s ventilation system. The reports that our two laboratories produced on this problem were ignored because an entirely new ventilation system would have to be designed to fix the problem. The cost of this monumental task was more than the system could bear.

54

The Main Laboratory Building was constructed in 1961. In 1987, I performed chromatomass-spectrometric analysis of water samples from the artesian well beneath the pilot plant facility. This well supplied many buildings of GOSNIIOKhT with water. My analysis showed the presence of many sulfur-containing decomposition products of mustard gas in significant quantities. Workers operating the excavating machines to prepare the site for new buildings experienced symptoms of poisoning from unknown substances. At last several events with serious poisoning of workers convinced the chief engineer to order the excavations to proceed under the supervision of experienced chemists, sometimes in gasmasks.

55

For example, four air samples were taken from chimney stack number 606A. The first contained 10 times the maximum permissible concentration, the second 50, the third 57, and the fourth 80 times the maximum permissible concentration.

56

After decontamination operations, water was kept in this tank for a fixed time, in a medium of excess alkali solution, to destroy the chemical agents entirely. After that, the contents of the tank were mixed with waste effluents from the production of agricultural chemicals and were thrown outside the plant. I have to mention that for this flawed technology of sarin, V.D. Belyaev, A.V. Bruker, S.L. Varshavski, S.N. Kosolapov, L.A. Kostandov, B. P. Kuchkov, B. Ja. Libman, V.V. Pozdnev, S.N. Potapov, L.Z. Soborovski, and N.N. Yukhtin received Lenin Prize in 1961. From that time, nothing changed in relation to the production of these extremely poisonous waste waters, but it didn’t prevent others from receiving the next Lenin Prize. This time: S.V. Golubkov, I. L. Knunyants, I.V. Martynov, I.M. Milgotin, A.P. Tomilov, V.N. Topnikov, and V.M. Zimin were awarded it for production of soman.

57

More detailed information was published in: Vechernij Volgograd, June 1 and 3, 1993; Izvestia, December 2, 1993.

58

Certainly he reminded me that Golubkov was also one of Communist bosses of Volgograd – Secretary of the Volgograd Gorkom – before he was promoted to Deputy Minister.

59

See Annex 3.

60

Vladimir Shcherbak, “They hid the fact of the fire at the Factory but discovered “A method of incineration of chemical agents”, Megapolis-Express, February 17 1993; Vladimir Shcherbak, “Where to destroy the chemical weapons”, Moscow News, March 14 1993.

I have no doubt about Vladimir’s credibility. For a long time he worked as the chief of the department for the development of technologies of production of the precursors of chemical agents in the Shikhany affiliate of GOSNIIOKhT. Then he became director of GOSNIIOKhT’s Novocheboksary affiliate, working on the problems of utilization of pre-cursors at the Novocheboksarsk Factory.

Childhood illness rates in the areas surrounding the Novocheboksary plant are almost 40 percent higher than in other cities of the Chuvashiya Region. Birth defects near Novocheboksary run at roughly 90 percent. D. Frolov, “A Secret still remains A Secret”, Segodnya (30 December 1993); I. Nikonov, “What the reporter from Stern Magazine could not know”, Cheboksarskie Novosti (19 November 1992).

61

Judith Perera, “Environment: Wounds of war – Can Russia combat the deadly legacy of chemical production?” Guardian, 23 April, 1993.

62

Identification of Potential Organophosphorous Warfare Agents: An Approach for the Standardization of the Techniques and Reference Data (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1970).

63

Identification of Degradation Products of Potential Organophosphorous Warfare Agent. An Approach for the Standardization of Techniques and Reference Data (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1980).

64

Air Monitoring as a Means for Verification of Chemical Disarmament. C.2. Development and Evaluation of Basic Techniques, Part I (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1985).

65

Air Monitoring as a Means for Verification of Chemical Disarmament. C.3. Field tests, Part II (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1986).

66

Air Monitoring as a Means for Verification of Chemical Disarmament. C.4. Further Development and Testing of Method, Part III (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1987).

67

International Inter-Laboratory Comparison (Round-Robin) Test for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament. F.1. Testing of Existing Procedures (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1990).

68

In October 22 1992 he participated in a search of Lev Fedorov’s apartment by the KGB. See Annex 8.

69

Ralph Trapp, Verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention: On-Site Inspection in Chemical Industry Facilities (Oxford University Press, Stockholm International Peace Research institute (SIPRI), 1993).

70

International Inter-Laboratory Comparison (Round-Robin) Test for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament. F.4. Validating of Procedures for Water and Soil Samples (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1993).

71

See ref. 10.

72

Victor Petrunin, “To the 80th anniversary of GNTC NII Organic Chemistry and Technology – GOSNIIOKhT”, Chemical and Biological Safety (in Russian), N 5, 2004, pp. 5-10. http://www.cbsafety.ru/rus/saf17_02.pdf.

73

Ellsberg is renowned for preparing and releasing the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times in 1971. These documents contained secret and incriminating information about US conduct in the Vietnam War. Robert Reinhold, “Ellsberg Calls Decision ‘Great,’ But Says Ruling on Vietnam Papers is not Surprising,” New York Times, 1 July 1971. Daniel Ellsberg, “Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers (New York, 2002: Penguin Putnam Inc.), pp. 498.

74

In October 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, who had worked at the Dimona nuclear facility, told the London Sunday Times about Israel’s secret nuclear weapons program, which he had documented with photographs. Vanunu must have also been aware of the risks he was taking. Even before the story hit the press, Israeli secret agents kidnapped him and brought him back to Israel, where he was secretly sentenced to eighteen years of prison. He spent eleven and a half years in solitary confinement. Jonathan Randal, “Israeli Troops Kill 4 West Bank Palestinians; Vanunu Is sentenced to 18-Year Term for Revealing Nuclear Secrets,” Washington Post, 28 March 1988, A21.

75

Director of Volgograd NPO Khimprom V.V. Pozdnev along with his accomplices Sergei Golubkov, Igor Gabov and Konstantin Guskov organized a lucrative underground business which produced civilian wares that were sold in stores. Cash from this scheme was flowing directly into a huge safe installed in the office of Director Pozdnev. They spent part of this money for providing “a good time” to selected people from Moscow in a special resort built for these purposes. An investigation was started, but only the head bookkeeper was sentenced to prison, and Pozdnev died of a heart attack.

76

For instance, Howard T. Uhal, ex-Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA, “Soviet Chemical Warfare Agents Novichok and Substance 33: Were They Used During the Persian Gulf War?” http://www.nbcdefence.net/nore/novi_1.htm

77

Human Right Watch President Ken Anderson’s private letter to author, 1996.

78

Vil Mirzayanov, “Inversion”, Kuranty, October 10, 1991. See Annex 1.

79

The leaflet of the Committee of Democratic Movement of Russia in GRNIIOKhT, “Witch Hunt” at GRNIIOKhT, September 1991. See Annex 2.

80

Lev Fedorov, “The Delayed Death”, Sovershenno Sekretno, 12 August 1992.

81

Before that I had a telephone conversation with Andrei. He knew about the article “A Poisoned Policy” and he approved of it. I asked him whether he could give an interview to the American journalist Will Englund. I hoped at the same time that after his history was known by some responsible agencies in the US, perhaps they could give him the chance to be cured in an American hospital. Unfortunately at that time, I didn’t know there are not any such responsible agencies, and the ones that exist are mostly busy trying to compromise people like me. Anyway Andrei agreed to give an interview, and I immediately called Will. As a result the whole world became familiar with his history and the history of the development of Russian Novichok agents and a binary weapon based on them. See ref. 40.

82

Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, “A Poisoned Policy”, N 39, September 16, 1992. See Annex 3.

83

Letter Dated 30 January 1992, from the Representative of the Russian Federation Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Transmitting the Text of the Statement Made on 29 January 1992 by B .N. Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation, on Russia’s Policy in the Field of Arms Limitation and Reduction,” CD/1123 (Geneva: 31 January 1992).

In an interview with the US television show “20/20,” Yeltsin was asked directly whether Russia was still producing chemical and biological weapons. He responded as follows: “It’s a very difficult question. Therefore, I want to save this for my one-on-one talk with the US President. I can give only one promise. In the next few months we’re going to take steps to discontinue this kind of activity in accordance with international agreements on chemical and biological weapons.” Transcript from “20/20,” ABC News Division, 31 January 2002.

84

Will Englund, “Ex-Soviet Scientist Says Gorbachev’s Regime Created New Nerve Gas in ’91,” Baltimore Sun, September 16, 1992. My quote in the piece was: “Americans should know about it.”

85

Most of the experts that Englund spoke to declined to comment on the record. However, Dr. Lora Lumpe from the Federation of American Scientists commented that “it is unlikely that a nerve agent could be 10 times more lethal than VX gas.”

86

Resolution of the Permanent Technical Commission at GRNIIOKhT September 25, 1992. Top Secret. See Annex 5.

87

Letter of Director GOSNIIOKhT V.A. Petrunin to A.I. Tselikovsky, Head of the Department for Economic Security of the Security Ministry of the Russian Federation , October 1, 1992, N 1594ss. Top Secret. See Annex 4.

88

Letter of Major General A.I. Tselikovsky to Major General S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department at the RF Ministry of Security. Top Secret. See Annex 6.

89

O. V. Vishnyakov, “The Binary Bomb has Exploded”, Novoe Vremya, N 44, p. 4, 1992.

90

When Englund and Mironov went outside to drive to my apartment they couldn’t find Englund’s brand new car. It was stolen, despite the special police checkpoint with a guard for this compound where mostly foreigners were living.

91

Neither these items nor my doctoral dissertation contained any classified information, chemical formulas, or codes.

92

“Transcript of the Interrogation of the Suspect Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov,” Investigation Department, Case 92, (Moscow: Ministry of Security of RF, 22 October 1992. Top Secret). Later, I had the opportunity to copy this document verbatim, as well as many others assembled in the case against me. See Annex 7.

93

“Report of the search”, Committee of Governmental Security [KGB] of the USSR. Top Secret. See Annex 8. Surprisingly the Chekists wrote this document on the paper with title of former title of their Agency.

94

“Transcript of the Interrogation of the Witness”, Investigation Department, Case 92 (Moscow: Ministry of Security of RF, 22 October 1992, Top Secret). See Annex 9.

95

“Transcript of the Suspect’s Interrogation”, Investigation Department, Case 92 (Moscow: Ministry of Security of RF, 23 October 1992, Top Secret). See Annex 10.

96

This 20 March 1995 attack killed a dozen, severely and critically wounded 54, mildly injured 980, and frightened thousands of other subway commuters. B.W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996); David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1996); Sadayoshi Obu, Tetsu Yamaguchi, “Japanese Medical Team Briefing,” in Proceedings of the Seminar of Responding to the Consequences of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, Office of Emergency Preparedness (Washington, DC: US Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services, 11-4 July 1995): 2-12 to 2-29.

97

There are articles: Interfax Agency about the MB RF report of my arrest; “Statement of Editorial Office of Moscow News”; Victor Loshak, “The State Lie as a State Secret”; Natalya Gevorkyan, “To be prisoner according to Law which doesn’t exist”; Aleksei Pushkov, “Really Russia didn’t violate anything?” Moscow News N 44 (639), October 28 – Nowember 1, 1992.

98

“Transcript of the suspect’s interrogation”, Investigation Department of MB RF, Case 92, 28 October 1992. Top Secret. See Annex 11.

99

“Resolution Kalinin District Court of Moscow”, November 2, 1992. See Annex 12.

100

Annex 13: Letter of Head of the Department for Supervision of the Implementation of the Laws on Federal Security and International Relations State Justice Counselor of the Third Class Leonid M. Syukasev to Major General S.D. Balashov; October 30, 1992 N 13/2-1040-92. Top Secret; Annex 14: Letter of Major General S.D. Balashov to Leonid Sykasev, November 4, 1992. N 6/2753. Top Secret.

101

Andrey Illesh and Valeri Rudnev, “Selling the Motherland is Under Great Secrecy,” Izvestia, 6 November 1992; Valeri Rudnev, “Without my lawyer I’ll not tell you even “Hello”’, Izvestia, 13 November 1992.

102

Letter of First Deputy Attorney General of the Russian Federation State Justice Counselor of the 2nd Class I.S. Zemlyanushin to Deputy Minister of the MB RF Major General A.E. Safonov. December 10, 1992 N 13/2-1040-92,Top Secret. See Annex 15.

103

Letter of Head of the Department, Major General S.D. Balashov to Deputy Attorney General of RF I.S. Zemlyanushin. October 17, 1992 N 6/280. Secret. See Annex 16.

104

Valeri Rudnev,” The Scientist who was Selling his Motherland Finally has a Defender”, Izvestia, 17 November 1992.

105

Press Briefing in the RF Security Ministry, Federal News Service, Kremlin Package, 5 November 92.

106

See ref. 73.

107

Michael Satchell, “Death rattle of poison gas” U.S. News and World Report/September 13, 1993.

108

In 1996 in the US, one of my good American acquaintances told me that General Anatoly Kuntsevich during his visit got quite drunk in the hotel where he was staying and started to sexually harass service woman. Along came the police and started an investigation for this crime, but the case was settled. What was the price was paid by Kuntsevich?

109

Letter of General Major S.D. Balashov to Major General V.N. Markomenko to the head of the Third Main Department at the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information under the President of Russia (FAPSI). See Annex 17.

110

See Annexes 18 and 19.

111

Letter of the head of a section at the Department, A.A. Shabunin, to Director of GRNIIOKhT V. Petrunin, November 12, 1992 N 6/2835. Top Secret. See Annex 20.

112

Letter of Deputy Director of GRNIIOKhT A.V. Kuznetsov to the head of a section at the Investigation Department of MB RF Colonel A.A. Shabunin. November 24, 1992, N 1846 ss. Top Secret. See Annex 21.

113

Letter of Head of Investigation Department of MB RF Major General S.D. Balashov to Lieutenant General V.N. Zemlyanitsyn, Head of 8th Department at the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Top Secret. See Annex 22.

114

Letter of the acting Head of the 8th Department Colonel G.I. Funygin to Mayor General S.D. Balashov. December 8, 1992, N 317/5/836. Top Secret. See Annex 23.

115

Letter of Mayor General S.D. Balashov to E.M. Primakov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, December 10, 1992, N 6/03240. Secret. See Annex 24.

116

Letter of the Deputy Director of the SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service] of Russian Federation Major General V.M. Rozhkov to Major General S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of Russia, December 17 1992, N 153/5-13265. Secret. See Annex 25.

117

Letter of Major General S.D. Balashov to Major General Yu. N. Lukonin, Head of the Personnel Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, December 10, 1992, N 6/03238. Secret. See Annex 26.

118

Letter of the Deputy Head of the Personnel Department of MB of Russia Colonel E. Soloviev, December 29 1992. Secret. See Annex 27.

119

Letter of Major General S.D. Balashov to Major General A.I. Gurov, Head of NII [the Scientific Research Institute] for Problems of Security of the Russian Federation, December 10, 1992, N 6/03239. Secret. See Annex 28.

120

Letter of the Head of the Institute Major General A.I. Gurov to Head of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation Major General S.D. Balashov. December 16, 1992, N 5/NII/76. Secret. See Annex 29.

121

Peter Nikulin, “The Secret of the Old Greatcoat”, Novoe Vremya, N 46, 1992, p. 44.

122

Georgi Arbatov, “Whom does our military-industrial complex deceive?” Moscow News, N 47, 22 November 1992.

123

Igor Ermakov, “The Ministry of Security Detained the Author of “Kuranty”, Kuranty, October 24, 1992.

124

Dmitri Frolov, “Chemical Armament is Continuing!” Nezavisimaya Gazetta, October 23, 1992.

125

Dmitri Frolov, “The MB RF is Seriously Worried about Chemical Secrets”, Nezavisimaya Gazetta, October 24, 1992.

126

Natalya Gevorkyan, “It is the Privilege of the Author to be Imprisoned According to a Law that Doesn’t Exist”, MN, November 1, 1992.

127

Igor Tsarev, “The Case about the Disclosure of a State Secret”, Trud, October 28, 1992.

128

Oleg Utitsyn, “The Case of the Chemist”, Kommersant, N 39, October 26-November 1, 1992.

129

P.A. Kochkin, “Moscow has Turned into a Prison”, Ekonomika I mui, November 1992.

130

Sjifra Hershberg, Hella Rotenberg, Ruslland produceert nieuw en giftiger zenuwgas, De Volksrant, N 20749, October 24, 1992.

131

Fred Hiatt, “Russia Jails Scientist over State Secrets”, Washington Post, October 27, 1992.

132

Will Englund, “Russian Whistle-Blower Denied Visit With Lawyer He Unmasked Plan For Chemical Arms”, Baltimore Sun, October 29, 1992.

133

Amy Smithson, “Russian Nerve Gas”, Baltimore Sun, October 30, 1992.

134

Will Englund, “Russian Who Exposed Chemical Arms Is Freed From Jail Pending Trial”, Baltimore Sun, November 3, 1992.

135

“Wachen umstellen “Izwestija”, Suddeutsche Zeitung nr. 249, October 28, 1992.

136

“Eine neue Kaltperiode?”, Seuddeutsche Zeitung, 249, October 28, 1992.

137

Lawrence Uzzel, “The Scientist and the Security Forces”, Crossroads, November 15, 1992. According to Mr. Lawrence Uzzell, Director of Jamestown’s Moscow office, “On November 4, Crossroads called the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to ask if the State Department had issued any statement of protest about this case. The answer: No.”

138

Ravil Karamov, “Gafu it, Vil Mirzayanov (Frogive us, Vil Mirzayanov)”, Vakyt (Bashkortstan), N 10, 1992.

139

Favziya Khairutdinova, “Vilne kotkarik (Let’s Save Vil)”, Vatanym Tatarstan, December 6, 1992.

140

Nanette van der Laan, “Scientist: Russia Won’t Come Clean”, The Moscow Times, December 12, 1992.

141

“Scientist’s Lawyer Gets Case File”, The Moscow Times, November 19, 1992.

142

Betsy McKay, “Scientist to Be Put on Trial”, The Moscow Times, November 2, 1992.

143

Serge Schmemann, “K.G.B.’s Successor Charges Scientist,” New York Times, 1 November 1992.

144

Frank von Hippel, “Russian Whistleblower Faces Jail,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 49, no. 2 (March 1993): 7-8.

145

Valeri Menshikov, Vladimir Yakimets, “The Europarliament is against the KGB”, Moscow News, N 49, December 6, 1992.

146

“Transcript of one Meeting”, Moscow News, November 15, 1992.

147

“Transcript of the interrogation of the witness N.M. Godzhello”, November 24, 1992. Investigation Department of MB RF. Case 62, vol. 1, pp.262-266. Top Secret.

148

“Transcript of interrogation of the witness S.S. Sokolov”, January 14, 1993. Investigation Department of MB RF, Case 62, vol. 1, pp. 271-273. Top Secret.

149

See ref. 40.

150

Vil Mirzayanov, “Testing of Chemical Weapons: Thoughtlessness or Crime”, Novoe Vremya, N 50, December of 1992.

151

Valeri Rudnev, “‘State Criminal’ up to now doesn’t know what his crime is”, Izvestia, January 19, 1998.

152

Vladislav Borovitski, “Over all Saratov is poisoned sky”, Saratov, October 22, 1993; Vitaly Zemljak, “The poisoned secrets”, Interview of Vladimir Uglev and Vladimir Petrenko by Correspondent of Radio Liberty Dmitri Volchek, Saratov, August 17, 1993; Lydia Malash,, “When they are shutting up scientists in Moscow explosions are clattering in Shikhany”, Megapolis Express, February 16, 1994; Anatoli Mikhailov, “The City-Hell, Would “ The Chemical Reactor” of Volsk-17 explode?”, Trud, April 19, 1994; Olga Nikitina, “The Shikhany Syndrome. There is a smell of impending disaster”, Saratov, May 14, 1994.

153

Lev Fedorov, “Chemical Weapons or Chemical Warfare?”, Khimia i Jizn, N 7, 1993, p. 67.

154

Oleg Vishnyakov, “Interview with a Noose around his Neck”, Novoe Vremya, N 6, 1993, p. 40.

155

Gordeyev, Alexander, “Chemical Arms: Russia’s Human Guinea Pig”, The Moscow Times, March 18, 1994; Will Englund, “Chemical Weapons Shadow Moscow. Russia prosecutes whistle-blowers of secret research”, Baltimore Sun, February 14, 1993; J. Michael Waller, “Post-Soviet Sakharovs: Renewed Persecution of Dissident Scientists and the American Response”, Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, v. II, N 1, Winter 1993/94, p. 138-147.

156

Geoffrey York, “Islam in Tatarstan”, Globe and Mail (Canada), May 5, 1998.

157

Celestine Bohlen, “Regions Wary as Putin Tightens Control”, New York Times, March 9, 2000.

158

Midkhat Farukshin, The Face and Mask, Kazan, 2005.

159

Boris Ischboldin, Essays on Tatar History, New Deli: New Book Society of India, Second Ed., 1965.

160

“Transcript of the Inspection, Moscow”, February 24, 1993, Investigation Department of MB RF, Case 62. Top Secret. See Annex 30.

161

“TECHNICAL ORDER FOR THE COMPOUND PART OF THE EXPERMIENTAL DESIGN WORK OF “Substance-232” ON THE BASIS OF THE SYSTEM OF COMPONENTS”, Investigation Department of MB RF, Case 62. Top Secret. See Annex 31.

162

In a mid-January 1996, in an interview with BBC correspondent Mark Urban, Gorbachev insisted that Russia was doing everything according to its arms control agreements with America. He literally said: “I don’t know anything about these works. Maybe military people were cleaning their tails in some way.” Transcript of “Chemical Weapons News Night,” Correspondent Mark Urban (British Broadcasting Company: London, 16 January 1996).

163

EXTRACT from “The List of Major Information Constituting State Secrets”, confirmed by resolution N 1121-387 of USSR Counsel of Ministers on December 3, 1980. Top Secret. See Annex 32.

164

EXTRACT from the “The List of Information to be Qualified as Secret by the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry” confirmed by order N 234-19 of the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry on May 27 1991. Top Secret. See Annex 33.

165

FINDINGS OF THE EXPERT COMMISSION Moscow March 16, 1993. Top Secret. See Annex 34. The refusal of experts Vadim Smirnitsky and Nikolai Chugunov entirely destroyed this job of Shkarin. Moreover, their conclusions and testimonies didn’t leave any chance for the Findings of the Expert Commission to be used in the final Indictment.

166

See ref. 86.

167

“CONCLUSION OF THE EXPERT Nikolai Chugunov”, March 18, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 35.

168

“CONCLUSION OF THE EXPERT Vadim Smirnitsky”, March 17, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 38.

169

“TRANSCRIPT of the interrogation of the expert Nikolai Chugunov”, April 8, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 36.

170

“TRANSCRIPT of the interrogation of the expert Nikolai Chugunov”, April 23, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 37.

171

“TRANSCRIPT of interrogation of the expert Vadim Smirnitsky”, March 22, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 39.

172

Letter of Head of the section at the Department of Investigation, A. A. Shabunin to V. A. Petrunin, Director of the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology April 22, 1993 6/001580. Top Secret. See Annex 44.

173

Letter of Deputy Director of GRNIIOKhT N.A. Kuznetsov to A.A. Shabunin, Head of the Section of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. Top Secret. See Annex 45.

174

“TRANSCRIPT of interrogation of the expert Anatoly Kochetkov”, March 30, 1993 Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 40.

175

“TRANSCIRPT of interrogation of the expert Boris Kuznetsov”, April 8, 1993, Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 41.

176

“TRANSCRIPT of interrogation of the expert Igor Gabov”, April 29, 1993, Moscow. Top Secret. See Annex 42.

177

See ref. 154.

178

See ref. 128.

179

Letter of Head of the Investigation Department MB RF, Major General S.D. Balashov to Colonel General M.P. Kolesnikov, Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, April 22, 1993 N 6/01584. Top Secret. See Annex 46.

180

Letter of Colonel G. Funygin, Deputy Head of the 8th Department of the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to Major General S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department, of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, May 12, 1993 N 317/5/0 397 in response to N 6/01584. Top Secret. See Annex 47.

181

He was one of initiators of my persecution who awkwardly tried to justify it at a press-conference in November 5 1992. See ref. 83.

182

“RESOLUTION of the Council of Ministers”, Moscow March 30, 1993, N 256-16. Top Secret. See Annex 43.

183

Pavel Gutiontov, “Let’s Begin with the American to Teach Others”, Moskovski Komsomolets, N 65, April 7 1993; Maksim Gun, “The American Journalist was interrogated in Lefortovo”, Izvestia, April 10, 1993.

184

Kim Gamel, American Journalist Interrogated in Lefortovo, Moscow Tribune, April 9, 1993.

185

Justin Burke, “US Reporter Called For Questioning By Russia’s KGB”, Christian Science Monitor, April 9, 1993.

186

Jon Auerbach, “US reporter refuses to testify in Russia”, Boston Globe, April 8, 1993.

187

Letter of the Head of Investigation Department Mayor General S.D. Balashov to Colonel General M.P. Kolesnikov, Head of the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 6/01341/April 5, 1993. Secret. See Annex 48.

188

Letter of Head of the General Staff , Colonel General M. Kolesnikov to Major General S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, April 29, 1993 N 312/10/053. In response to N 6 01341 of April 5, 1993. See Annex 49.

189

Letter of Head of the Department Major General S.D. Balashov to V.P. Ivanov, Chairman of the RF Committee for Chemical and Petrochemical Industry , 6/01342 April 5, 1993. See Annex 50.

190

Letter of Chairman V.P. Ivanov to S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. Secret. See Annex 51.

191

Letter of Head of the Department Major General S.D. Balashov to G.V. Berdennikov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 6/01343//April 5, 1993. Secret. See Annex 52.

192

Letter of Deputy Minister of G.V. Berdennikov to S.D. Balashov, Head of Investigation Department at the RF Ministry of Security, May 11, 1993 N 61/drk. Secret. See Annex 53.

193

Transcript of interrogation of accused V.S. Mirzayanov, May 13 1993, Investigation Department of Ministry of Security of RF, Case 62, v. 1, p. 223-224. Top Secret.

194

Valeri Rudnev, “The Secrets of Chemical Weapons in the Materials of a Criminal Case and the International Conference Reports”, Izvestia, May 20, 1993.

195

Wendy Sloane, “Ellsberg Supports Russian Chemist”, The Moscow Tribune, June 2, 1993.

196

Will Englund, “Ellsberg Embraces Russian Chemist who Exposed Secret Nerve Gas”, Baltimore Sun, June 2, 1993.

197

“Press Conference by Vil Mirzayanov and US Professor Daniel Ellsberg”, Federal News Service Kremlin Package, 1 June 1993.

198

See Presidential Directive N 508, published in Rossiskaya Gazetta on 16 September 1992, and Government Decree N. 734, published in Rossiskaya Gazetta on 18 September 1992.

199

See ref. 93 and 94.

200

“INDICTMENT Concerning Criminal Case N 62, about the indictment of Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov for committing a crime according to Part 1 of Clause 75 of the Criminal Code (UK) of the RSFSR”, November 1993. Top Secret. See Annex 55.

201

Senator Bill Bradley, letter to Strobe Talbott, 14 October 1993. See Annex 56.

202

Letter of John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the Congressional Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, to Warren Christopher, the U.S. Secretary of State, October 19, 1993. See Annex 57.

203

Letter of U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, December 23, 1993. See Annex 58.

204

Letter of Dr. Wolfgang Hirschwald a professor of Berlin Free University, on behalf of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES), to Frederico Mayor, the Director General of UNESCO, December 27, 1993. See Annex 59.

205

Letter of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to President Boris Yeltsin, March 30, 1993. See Annex 60.

206

Letter of the Committee of Concerned Scientists (in the U.S) to President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, October 25, 1993. See Annex 61.

207

Letter of the New York Academy of Sciences to President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, August 25, 1993. See Annex 62.

208

Letter of the president of the New York Academy of Sciences, Nobel Prize Laureate Joshua Lederberg to the Executive Director of the newspaper “The New York Times” Max Frankel. New York Times, December 6, 1993. See Annex 63.

209

Statement of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation in the United States on September 15, 1993. See Annex. 64.

210

Mark Champion, “Scientist Says Russia “Dishonest” in Treaty”, The Moscow Times, January 12, 1993.

211

Olga Kienko, “Mirzayanov’s case: Scientist is confident that Chekists revealed themselves”, Kommersant-Daily, May 14, 1993.

212

Valeri Rudnev, “State Criminal” Still Doesn’t Know What he Violated”, Izvestia, January 19, 1993.

213

Olga Shlyapnikova, “Scientist Refused to Answer Questions of the Investigation”, Kommersant-Daily, January 13, 1993.

214

Igor Tsarev, “Poison”, Trud, 29 January, 1993.

215

Natalya Gevorkyan, “Mirzayanov’s Case is Not Cancelled Even Though we Officially Cancelled Chemical Weapons”, Moscow News, January 24, 1993.

216

Leonard Nikishin, “Toxic Fruit of Poisonous Policy”, Moscow News, January 24, 1993.

217

Vladimir Uglev, “To Teach Others”, Moscow News, January 31, 1993.

218

Svetlana Serkova, “The American Physicists are Looking for Lawyer for the Scientist”, Kommersant-Daily, February 23, 1993.

219

Olga Shlyapnikova, “The Scientist’s Wife refused to go to the Investigation”, Kommersant-Daily, 24 February, 1993.

220

Vladimir Yakimets, “Mirzayanov’s Case on the Mirror of Professor Ellsberg’s Fate”, Russia, N 9, February 24 – March 2, 1993.

221

Karl-Heinz Karish, “Russische Forscher nach Entüllung über C-Waffen in Bedrängs”, Frankfurter Rundschau, March 15, 1993.

222

SPECTRUM, “Moskau entwickelt neue Kampfgase”, Südeutsche Zeitung, 1 April, 1993.

223

See ref 219.

224

Valeri Rudnev, “Secrets of the Chemical Weapons in the Case Materials and in the Reports to the International Conference”, Izvestia, May 20, 1993.

225

Will Englund, “Two Russian Papers Investigated after New Disclosures on Chemical Arms”, Baltimore Sun, June 11, 1993.

226

See ref 219.

227

Andrei Malykh, “The Mirzayanov Case: The Most Important Documents in the Case are Absent”, Kommersant-Daily, July 8, 1993.

228

S. Fomichev, A. Alekseev, V. Petrov, V. Gergel, S. Kamensky, “The Opinion: It is Impossible to Hold an International Conference in Moscow until the Authorities Stop Persecuting People who are Against Chemical Weapons”, Moscow News, April 11, 1993.

229

Leonard Nikishin, “Vil Mirzayanov: The Goal is to Develop New Binary Weapons”, Moscow News, May 28, 1993.

230

See ref 218.

231

Thomas W. Lippman, “Russian Scientist Appeals for Colleague. Co-Worker Is Charged With Disclosing Chemical Weapons Secrets”, Washington Post, June 21, 1993.

232

Chemical and Engineering News, June 21, 1993, p. 8.

233

Georgi Arbatov, “Who needs noisy scandal?” Moscow News, July 25, 1993.

234

“The Ministries are Already Accused”, (Editorial) Moscow News, July 11, 1993.

235

Terje Langeland, “Russian Threatens to Reveal Secrets”, The Badger Herald, N 27, October, 1993.

236

Vladimir Uglev, “To Reveal the Secret of a “Binary”, Moscow News, October 31, 1993.

237

Michael R. Gordon, “Moscow is Making Little Progress in Disposal of Chemical Weapons”, New York Times, December 1, 1993.

238

Gale Colby, “Fabricating Guilt”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 1993.

239

“Human-Rights Support Sought for Russian Weapons Scientist”, The Sciences, September/October 1993, p.48f.

240

Manfred Ronzheimer, “Moskauer Chemiker droht Prozeß. Er hatte von der Entwicklung chemischer Waffen berichtet”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 23, 1993.

241

Carey Scott, “Despite Opposition, Trial Of Chemist Pushed Ahead”, The Moscow Times, December 29, 1993.

242

Vladimir Voronov, “Destroy the Constitution with Instruction”, Stolitsa, N 51, 1993, p. 10.

243

Gale Colby, Irene Goldman, “When Will Russia Abandon its Secret Chemical Weapons Program?” Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Winter 1993/1994, p.p. 148-154.

244

J. Michael Waller, “Post-Soviet Sakharovs: Renewed Persecution of Dissident Scientists and the American Response”, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Winter 1993/1994, p.p. 138-147.

245

Leonard Nikishin, “In the Eve of Trial on the “Case” of Mirzayanov”, Moscow News, N 50, December 8, 1993.

246

Pat Janowski, “Speak No Evil”, The Sciences, November/December, 1993, pp. 4-5.

247

Von Dietmar Ostermann., “The Russian Arms Centers have Developed Highly Toxic Chemical Weapons”, Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 6, 1994.

248

An open letter of the Association of German Scientists for Global Responsibility to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, Frankfurter Rundschau, January 3, 1994.

249

J. Michael Waller, “U.S. may be Funding Russian Secret Weapon”, Houston Chronicle, January 11, 1994.

250

J. Michael Waller, “Novichok: Russia’s Secret Weapon”, San Diego Union-Tribune, January 11, 1994.

251

J. Michael Waller, “Russia’s Terrible New “Secret Weapon”, Indianapolis Star, January 13, 1994.

252

Sonni Efron, “Russian Scientist Faces Trial for Chemical-Arms Report”, Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1994.

253

Michael Gusev, “State Secrets Without Protection. Sure, They Should be Protected but on the Basis of the Law”, Rossiskaya Gazetta, November 11, 1992., Interview with Michael Gusev, “CBW Aide Quizzed on Program Secrecy Rules Questioned”, Rossiskaya Gazetta, November 11, 1992.

254

Vitali Kaysin, “Let’s Wait for the Destruction of Moscow. Reporting from a Top Secret Institute, Which Recently was Busy with the Development of Chemical Weapons and Chemical Agents”, Pravda, N 4 (25958), January 1993.

255

Ida Schneerson, “Scientist is Trying to Scare People”, Kazan Telegraph, N 45 (7130), 22-29 March, 1993.

256

Fausia Khajrutdinova, “To Save Vil”, My Fatherland Tatarstan, November 11, 1992.

257

Radis Nugmanov, “Is Vil Mirzayanov a Traitor or a Patriot?” Kyzil Tan, December 23, 1992.

258

Vil Mirzayanov, “I Didn’t Divulge any Secrets and Didn’t Sell the Motherland”, Bashkortstan, November 13, 1992.

259

Vil Mirzayanov, “We are Victims of what Kind of Secrets?”, Youth of Tatarstan, December 19, 1992.

260

Vil Kazikhanov, “Interview with Mirzayanov: I Fulfilled my Patriotic Duty”, Yuldash (Sojourner), August 12, 1993.

261

Ayaz Gilyazov, “About The Chemical Secrets with a Big Secret (Interview with Vil Mirzayanov)”, Izvestia of Tatarstan, March 24 1993.

262

R. Minhazh, “Who will Fight for Tatar if not Tatar?” My Fatherland Tatarstan, March 23, 1993.

263

Fausia Khajrutdinova, “Well Done!” My Fatherland Tatarstan, September 15, 1993.

264

Fausia Khajrutdinova, “For Telling the Truth”, Bulletin of Arsk, February 2, 1994.

265

“Review of Readers Letters (Editorial): We are Admirers, Proud, and Ready to Defend him”, Youth of Tatarstan, N 21, February 15, 1993.

266

Vil Mirzayanov, “Maybe I Really Have to Reveal State Secrets?” Youth of Tatarstan, N 49, February 15, 1994.

267

Sergei Alexeev, Georgi Arbatov, Yuri Afansiev, Vitali Goldansky, Tatiana Zaslavskaya, Len Karpinsky, Viktor Loshak, Alexander Pumpyansky, and Grigory Yavlinsky, “Mirzayanov will Face a Secret Trial”,. Moscow News, January 2, 1993. See Annex 65.

268

Statement of the Chairman of the U.S. Congress Committee on Government Operations, John Conyers, January 4, 1994. See Annex 66.

269

On January 12-15, 1993 US President Clinton met President of Russia Yeltsin, in Moscow.

270

Sergei Mostovshchikov, “Chemistry and Life”, Izvestia, January 6 1994.

271

Valeria Novodvorskaya, “Up to now we have: whips, dungeons, axes”, Khozyain (Owner), N 45, December 1992.

272

Valeria Novodvorskaya, “We have Such Secrets that Would Make you Enjoy Laughing”, Ogonyok, N 2, 1994, p. 38.

273

Valeria Novodvorskaya, “The Damned Winter”, Moskovskaya Pravda, February 10, 1993.

274

Sonni Efron, “Chemist Fears Trial will Not Be Fair”, Los Angeles Times, January 6, 1994.

275

Sergei Mostovshchikov, “There will be Three Judges Instead of One at Vil Mirzayanov’s Trial”, Izvestia, January 13, 1994.

276

Semen Kontsov, “The Counterintelligence Agent Faces a Secret Trial”, Inostranets, January 12, 1994.

277

Vladimir Voronov, “The Chemists from Lubyanka against the Chemist Mirzayanov”, Sobesednik, January 27, 1994.

278

See ref. 249.

279

See ref. 250.

280

Richard Seltzer, “U.S. Scientists Protest Against the Trial of the Russian Chemist”, Chemical and Engineering News, January 24, 1994.

281

Sonni Efron, “Whistle-Blower in Russia Calls Closed Trial “a Crime”‘, Los Angeles Times, January 26, 1994.

282

“IM WORLAUT, Rußlands neue Chemiewaffen. Solitaritätsaufruf für kiritische Wissneschaftler”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 January, 1994.

283

Von Dietmar Ostermann, “Russische Rüstungszentren entwickelten hochgiftige Chemiewaffen, Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 January, 1994.

284

“Chemiewaffenprozeß in Moskau. Wil Mirzayanov wird Geheimnisverrat vorgeworfen”, Frankfurter Rundschau, January 5, 1994.

285

Dina Verchenko, “Vil Mirzayanov’s Arrest”, Express-Chronika, January 28, 1994.

286

Aleksander Protsenko, “What are they Trying Vil Mirzayanov for?”, Megapolis Express, January 12, 1994.

287

L. Nikitinsky, “The Secret of a State Secret”, Izvestia, January 22, 1994.

288

Letter of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to the Attorney General of Russia, Aleksei Kazannik. January 13, 1994. See Annex 67.

289

Letter of the Federation of American Scientists to the Attorney General of Russia, Aleksei Kazannik, January 14, 1994. See Annex 68.

290

Letter of the U.S. National Academy of Science to President Yeltsin, January 24, 1994. See Annex 69.

291

Letter of the President of New York Academy of Science Joshua Lederberg to the Attorney General of the Russian Federation Alexei Kazannik, January 20, 1994. See Annex 70.

292

Letter of the Committee of Concerned Scientists to the Attorney General Aleksei Kazannik, January 19, 1994. See Annex 71.

293

Roald Sagdeev, “This Trial can Cause Damage to our Fatherland,” Izvestia, February 1, 1994. See Annex 72.

294

Letter of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (of the U.S.) to the President of Russia. See Annex 73.

295

Letter of the, the American organization “Physicians for Social Responsibility” to Attorney General Kazannik, January 21, 1994. See Annex 74.

296

Letter of the Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists (CIFS) at the American Physical Society to President Yeltsin. See Annex 75.

297

“U.S. Scientists Protest Russian Chemist’s Trial”, Chemical and Engineering News, January 21, 1994, p. 8-9.

298

See ref. 182.

299

In 14 years following these events, the CWC has been signed and ratified by 184 countries and signed though not yet ratified by 4 more, without any mention to the Novichok agents. I believe that it is time to share information with people about their real nature. I also believe that it is my obligation to reveal this information and make it a part of the scientific data, like information about other chemical agents such as sarin, soman and VX-gas.

300

Fred Hiatt, “Russian Court Opens Unprecedented Secrets Trial”, Washington Post, January 25, 1994.

301

Sergei Mostovshchikov, “Mirzayanov is Arrested”, Izvestia, January 26, 1994.

302

Sergei Mostovshchikov, “Moscow City Court Decided to use the Force of Police Department 139 Against Vil Mirzayanov”, Izvestia, January 27, 1994.

303

After that he suffered from a nervous tic for a number of years, and no pediatrician could cure him. Even the “Holy water” that Nuria bought for a tidy sum from non-traditional healers didn’t help. At night, in bed, he threw his small thin body from side to side, bumping against the wall, and pleaded in despair, “Mama, this is not my body. It is jumping. Help me please!”

304

Even for very experienced journalists, this was unexpected. See: Sergei Mostovshchikov, “Prosecution of Russian Scientist is seen as 100 a Percent Political Trial”, Izvestia, January 28, 1994.

305

Excerpt with remarks by US Ambassador Thomas Pickering, from the transcript of the press conference held on January 28, 1994 in the Russian-American Press Center. Formally cited: Extract from the Congressional Record – Senate. (February 1, 1994. S.S.543-544). Library of Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin

306

“Russian in Chemical Arms Exposé Arrested”, New York Times International, January 28, 1994.

307

“Editorial: The Mirzayanov Case: Folly of the Authorities or the Establishment of Despotic Power”, Izvestia, January 29, 1994.

308

Sergei Mostovshchikov, “The Authorities put Scientist Vil Mirzayanov into One Cell with Criminals”, Izvestia, January 29, 1994.

309

Sergei Mostovshchikov, “Vil Mirzayanov is Sitting in a Cell with Seven Criminals and Four Mattresses”, Izvestia, February 1, 1994.

310

Carey Scott, “Activists Protest Jailing of Chemist”, The Moscow Times, February 1, 1994.

311

He was the former First Minister of Ecology of the USSR, a renowned scientist-biologist and academician.

312

“Russian Chemist Jailed after Refusing to Attend Trial”, Chemical and Engineering News, January 31, 1994.

313

Judith Perera, “Russian Whistleblower Lands in Jail”, New Scientist, February 1, 1994.

314

“Review & Outlook: Russia on Trial”, (Editorial) Wall Street Journal Europe, February 2, 1994.

315

J. Michael Waller, “Soviet Redux: Secret Weapons and Poisoned Justice”, Wall Street Journal Europe, February 2, 1994.

316

Vladimir Nazarov, “Folly is Impossible to Conceal. It will Come out and the Press will Know about it. Maneuvers on Kalanchevskaya”, Kuranty, February 4, 1994.

317

Svetlana Gannushkina, “First, you Have to be Brought up Properly, and Then you can Ask Questions. Do you Understand?”, Express-Khronika, February 4, 1994.

318

Carey Scott, “Dissident Chemist Moved to Better Cell”, The Moscow Times, February 2, 1994.

319

Natalya Khmelik, “The Costs of Upbringing”, Express-Khronika, February 4, 1994.

320

Alexander Gordeyev, “Court Adjourns Chemist’s Trial, Blames Protest”, The Moscow Times, February 4, 1994.

321

Editorial: “Mirzayanov As Prisoner: Scandalous”, The Moscow Times, February 2, 1994.

322

Olivia Ward, “Ghost of Stalin Haunts Scientist’s Trial. Meet Vil Mirzayanov – the First Dissident of the Post-Soviet Era”, The Toronto Star, February 6, 1994.

323

Ann McElvoy, “Injustice at “Toxic Trial”, South China Morning Post, February 4, 1994.

324

Soni Efron, “Trial Halted Over Calm Reporters “Circus-Like” Behavior”, Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1994.

325

Igor Ryabov, “The Chemical War” with an Invisible Enemy”, Novoe Vremya, N 5, February, 1994.

326

Fausia Khajrutdinova, “Stand Strong, Mirzayanov”, My Fatherland Tatarstan, February 4, 1994.

327

“The Collective Letter of the Participants of Mass Meeting in Ufa City (Bashkortstan) to Boris Yeltsin”, Kyzil Tan, February 3, 1994.

328

Muddaris Aglam, “We Know Right Now (verse)”, My Fatherland Tatarstan, February 4, 1994.

329

Michael Waller, “Trials of a New Russian Dissident”, Wall Street Journal, February 4, 1994.

330

Review & Outlook: “Timidity’s Price”, Wall Street Journal, February 4, 1994, A9.

331

Extract from the Congressional Record – Senate. (February 1, 1994. S.S.543-544). Library of Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin

332

Alexander Gordeyev, “Kremlin Sees Trial of Chemist As Flawed”, The Moscow Times, February 5, 1994.

333

Vladimir Nazarov, “Behind Closed Doors…” Kuranty, February 5, 1994.

334

Sergei Mostovshchikov, “The Case of Vil Mirzayanov: the Trial has Begun After All”, Izvestia, February 5, 1994.

335

Alexander Gordeyev, “Reporter Refuses a Role in Closed Chemist Trial”, The Moscow Times, February 9, 1994.

336

Amy Knight, “Yeltsin’s KGB. Back to the Bad Old Days in Moscow?” Washington Post, February 13, 1994.

337

Carey Scott, “Chemist Evidence ‘Falsified’”, The Moscow Times, February 10, 1994.

338

Valeri Rudnev, “Sentence should be Passed on the Mirzayanov Case”, Izvestia, February 9, 1994.

339

As a typical Soviet bureaucrat, he was not in any rush to fulfill a given order. This could be explained by the state of turmoil in the Attorney General’s Office in those days. Duma began discussing amnesty for all the participants of the October 1993 Coup attempt against Yeltsin. President Yeltsin and his administration were furious about this action by Duma, and they prompted Alexey Kazannik to declare that he would not disobey Duma’s resolution, which he was obliged to enforce. As an honest individual, Kazannik refused to violate Russian law, and decided to immediately resign after executing Duma’s Resolution N 65-1G about amnesty, on February 23, 1994. My trial and Kazannik’s saga coincided, creating some options for Pankratov to procrastinate with his order. Nevertheless, one of Kazannik’s last decisions was to order me to be freed from jail.

340

SIPRI was established in 1966 as a tribute to Sweden’s peaceful history. This venerable international research organization focuses on various ways to curtail warfare and keep the peace, including numerous publications on the development and use of poison gas and methods to eliminate chemical weapons. For more, see www.sipri.org.

341

The KGB intentionally omitted Will Englund’s article from my case materials, “Russia is Still Doing Secret Work on Chemical Weapons,” Baltimore Sun, October 18, 1992, in which he gave information about the development of a series of Novichok agents, and details about Andrey Zheleznyakov’s poisoning, with comments by Dr. Yevgeny Vedernikov, who prolonged his life. Moreover, Shkarin didn’t even mention Andrey’s name in any documents, despite the telephone conversations taped from my home phone (8 big cassettes were attached to my case), in which I asked him to give an interview to Will Englund, and then later to Oleg Vishnyakov, the reporter from Novoe Vremya. Another colleague of mine, Dr. Eduard Sarkisyan was brought to Lefortovo on October 22, 1992 for interrogation. He didn’t give any information about the Novichok program. According to one of well informed reporter, it was exactly Andrey’s first interview which pushed the KGB to arrest me trying to prevent further revelations about the plot of the Chemical Military Complex. See also ref. 40.

342

Valery Yakov, “The Mirzayanov Case Continues to Arouse Protest”, Izvestia, February 10, 1994.

343

Sergei Shargorodsky (The Associated Press), “Court Halts Trial of Weapons Whistle Blower”, The Moscow Tribune, February 15, 1994.

344

Vladimir Nazarov, “The Case – to the Additional Investigation, Vil Mirzayanov – to Jail”, Kuranty, February 15, 1994.

345

“Jailed Scientist Awaits a 2d Trial in Moscow”, New York Times International, February 16, 1994.

346

Deborah Stead, “Prosecutors File Motion to Halt Scientist’s Trial”, Baltimore Sun, February 11, 1994.

347

Richard Seltzer, “Charges Against Russian Chemist Undergo Review”, Chemical and Engineering News, February 21, 1994.

348

Wendy Sloan, “Trial of Russian Scientist Provides First Test for New Constitution. Chemist Tried for Divulging Military Secrets, but Under What Set of Laws?”, Christian Science Monitor, February 15, 1994.

349

Valeri Rudnev, “Mirzayanov’s Case was Sent for Additional Investigation and Scientist – to the Jail”, Izvestia, February 16, 1994.

350

Vil Mirzayanov, “There are no Hellenes or Jews in Jail”, Moscow News, February 27, 1994.

351

Konstantin Katanyan, “Jailers at “Matrosskaya Tishina Beat People Half to Death. Vil Mirzayanov Discloses Secrets of the Investigation Isolator Cell Number 1”, Golos, March 7-13, 1994.

352

Leonard Nikishin, Leonid Sharov, “Vil Mirzayanov: Jail Brings you Closer to the Truth”, Obschaya Gazetta, March 4-10, 1994.

353

Adam Tanner, “Chemist Blasts Jail as “Hitlerite”, The Moscow Times, February 24, 1994.

354

Marie Jego, “Des Prisons Russes Toujours Sovietiques”, Le Monde, April 30, 1994.

355

Valeri Rudnev, “Non-Judicial Resolution was Enforced”, Izvestia, February 23, 1994.

356

“Russia Released Scientist Imprisoned for Disclosure”, Washington Post, 24 February, 1994.

357

Michael S. Serrill, “Exposing a Devilish Gas”, Time (International Edition), February 21, 1994.

358

Richard Stone, “Russia Seen Poised to Drop Prosecution of Chemist”, Science, 25 February, 1994, vol. 263, p. 1083-1084.

359

Kathy Lally, “The KGB’s Power: In Some Ways, Little has Changed”, Baltimore Sun, March 6, 1994.

360

Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines corpus delicti as the facts constituting a crime.

361

“RESOLUTION on the termination of the criminal case”, Moscow, March 11, 1994. See Annex 78.

362

Sergei Mostovshchikov, “The Mirzayanov Case was Terminated for Absence of Corpus Delicti”, Izvestia March 12, 1994.

363

Vladimir Nazarov, “The Investigation is Over – Forget About it, Mr. Mirzayanov?!” Kuranty, March 12, 1994.

364

Richard Seltzer, “All Charges Dropped Against Russian Chemist”, Chemical and Engineering News, March 21, 1994, p. 6.

365

David Wise, “Novichok on Trial”, New York Times, March 12, 1994.

366

Editorial: “Chemistry and the Life of Mirzayanov”, Moscow News, March 13, 1994.

367

Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debates of the 103d Congress, First Session. March 15, 1994, v. 140, N 28. S. 2958. See Annex 77.