The Cold War: A Military History

WITH THE EXCEPTION of strategic aircraft and some other elements which remained national preserves, the vast majority of NATO’s operational air assets were organized into Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAFs). Within these air forces there was a high degree of standardization and interoperability, although there was never a truly standard aircraft used by all the air forces, even though some aircraft almost achieved that status. The F-86 Sabre was widely used in the 1950s, for example, as was the F-4 Phantom in the 1970s and the F-16 in the 1980s, but never by all, and true standardization at this level remained a dream. Standardization was, however, achieved in such important areas as fuel, refuelling (both on the ground and air-to-air) and weapons attachments, but many problems remained: there was no standard machine-gun, for example.[1] Of equal, if not greater, importance was standardization in procedures, and here progress was much more marked, so that a German squadron could fly into and operate from a British base or a US squadron into an Italian base with equal ease on the operating side (although there could be some logistic difficulties).

This air-force standardization was strengthened by a process known as ‘Tactical Evaluations’ (Tacevals), in which a NATO team would arrive at an airbase and put the headquarters, squadrons, aircrews and support elements through a series of unannounced tests to ensure that they were up to the commonly agreed NATO tactical standards. This was a sternly applied and much respected system which, unfortunately, had no equivalent in the ground forces.

One of the most dramatic examples of NATO air forces’ ability to operate together was the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) at Geilenkirchen. This force operated a fleet of Boeing E-3 AWACS aircraft and was totally multinational, operating entirely to NATO standards and procedures. The original charter laid down that, while the crews operating the AEW equipment and sensors in an aircraft were to be multinational, for ‘safety reasons’ the flight-deck crew (i.e. pilot, second pilot and flight engineer) all had to be from the same nation. In a telling indication of its multi-nationality, however, the NAEWF personnel themselves demanded that this rule be dropped, as being both unnecessary and divisive.

At a somewhat higher level, there was a constant struggle between land and air commanders. The land commanders wished to exert direct control over the deployment and tasking of their allocated air assets, whereas air commanders believed in what they regarded as the ‘essential unity of air power’ and required an exclusively air-force chain of command, with the land forces submitting tasking requests which would then be met, at their discretion, by the air forces, who would decide on the relative priorities.

In some ways the air-command structure was very flexible. A NATO air commander covered every area in the Central Region, and any air assets deployed to that area came under his command. Additional squadrons could therefore be flown in as required, without the need to deploy additional large headquarters, as was the case for ground forces.

CENTRAL REGION ORGANIZATION

When NATO was first established there were two headquarters within the Central Region: AFCENT and an air headquarters, designated AIRCENT. The latter was, however, disbanded when NATO headquarters was compelled to leave France in 1967, and when HQ AFCENT reopened at Brunssum in the Netherlands it subsumed both land and air functions, although it incorporated an air cell to provide co-ordination between the two Central Region tactical air forces. For the air forces this was a retrograde step, since, in their view, it removed the focal point for air matters and, despite the existence of the air cell, allowed disparities in doctrine and procedures to arise between the two ATAFs.

These air-force reservations, coupled with the introduction of the strategy of flexible response, led to one of NATO’s many reviews, which resulted in the establishment of a new body – Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe (HQ AAFCE). When the Military Committee agreed to this in mid-1973, it stipulated that AAFCE was to be an international headquarters commanded by a USAF officer, who would be responsible to CINCENT, and that it would be collocated with HQAFCENT in both peace and war. It was also agreed that the two ATAF commanders would be collocated with their respective army groups in both peace and war, but would be operationally responsible to Commander AAFCE.

HQ AAFCE was formally established in June 1974, but in an ‘interim’ headquarters at Ramstein in southern Germany, and not, as ordained by the Military Committee, with HQ AFCENT at Brunssum. One of the early improvements was the establishment of the Central Region Air Operations Centre (CRAOC) alongside AAFCE, with Allied Air Tactical Operations Centres (ATOCs) interposed in the air command chain between ATAFs and the airbases. Thus AAFCE and the ATAFs were responsible for overall planning and co-ordination, while the CRAOC and ATOCs were responsible for tactical planning and the execution of the resulting plans by bases, wings and squadrons.

The air situation over the Central Region involved six elements:

• Second Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF) comprised elements from the Belgian, British, Dutch, German and US air forces. Its peacetime headquarters was in Mönchengladbach in northern Germany, where it was collocated with NORTHAG headquarters. 2ATAF was commanded by a British four-star officer.

• Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4ATAF) was composed of elements of the Canadian, German and US air forces, with its headquarters in Ramstein in southern Germany. It was commanded by a US four-star officer.

• 2ATAF and 4ATAF were part of AFCENT and were in support of NORTHAG and CENTAG, respectively. As noted above, however, in order to achieve the air-force requirement for the ‘unity of air power’, a separate Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe (HQ AAFCE) was established at Ramstein in southern Germany. Its commander was a US four-star officer.

• As with the ground forces, the Central Region air forces had a strong interest in events over the Baltic and the Jutland peninsula, but this was the province of Commander Air Baltic Approaches (COMAIRBALTAP), who was responsible to Commander-in-Chief Northern Europe (CINCNORTH). COMAIRBALTAP air assets included the Danish air force, German air-force units stationed in Schleswig-Holstein, German naval air units committed to action in the Baltic, and British air-force units when deployed with the United Kingdom Mobile Force.

• Immediately in the rear of the Central Region was France, whose air forces were under national command. Despite the existence of a separate national command chain, however, there was considerable co-operation between France and the NATO air commands in peacetime, which would have been even closer in war.

• Also in the rear was the United Kingdom, which was the base for many US and UK aircraft committed to supporting the Central Region. The air defence of the British Isles (less Irish airspace, which was outside NATO) was originally an exclusively British national responsibility, but in April 1975 this area became NATO’s UK Air Defence Region. Its commander was Commander-in-Chief UK Air Forces (CINCUKAIR), a British officer, with his headquarters at High Wycombe, to the west of London. The forces at his disposal were, however, exclusively provided by the British air force.

THE AIR FORCES

The Belgian air force was totally committed to 2ATAF, to which it contributed fighters and ground-attack aircraft. Belgium was one of the NATO partners involved in the purchase of the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, and was then one of the few NATO air forces to purchase French aircraft, acquiring 106 Dassault Mirage 5s in the late 1960s. Subsequently, it was one of the major partners in the F-16 programme. In the 1980s it fielded some 144 combat aircraft, a mixture of F-16 Fighting Falcons and Mirages.

In addition to its land contribution to the Central Region, Canada also provided an air group, which consisted of three fighter squadrons. In the 1960s the aircraft were CF-104 Starfighters (the Canadian version of the USAF’s F-104 Starfighters); these were later replaced by the CF-116 (the Canadian-produced version of the F-5 Freedom Fighter) and finally by the CF-18 (the Canadian-produced F-18 Hornet).

In war, virtually all Danish air assets would have been assigned to COMAIRBALTAP. In the 1980s the Danish air force comprised four squadrons of F-16 Fighting Falcons (sixty aircraft) for air defence and ground attack. There were also two squadrons of the Swedish F35 Draken (thirty-four aircraft – the survivors of forty-six purchased in 1968–9), which were used for reconnaissance and ground attack. There were also small transport and air–sea rescue elements.

Front-line equipment of the Luftwaffe went through four major stages. The first three generations were US aircraft – F-86 Sabres in the 1950s and 1960s, F-104 Starfighters in the 1960s and 1970s, and F-4 Phantoms in the 1970s – but these were followed by the Anglo-German-Italian Tornado in the 1980s. Front-line strength amounted to some 630 fixed-wing aircraft, which were split between 4ATAF in southern Germany, 2ATAF in northern Germany and COMAIRBALTAP in Schleswig-Holstein. One of the Luftwaffe’s main concerns was that its bases could be vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes by the Warsaw Pact, and its airfields were therefore sited as far to the west as was practicable.

The transport force was centred on some ninety C-160 Transall aircraft, which were built in a collaborative programme with France. Because the weather over West Germany was frequently poor and the skies were crowded with military and civil flights, all except the most basic flying training was conducted in the United States.

The small Grand Duchy had no air force of its own, but was selected as the official country of registration for NAEWF. The aircraft were eighteen Boeing E-3A Sentries and three second-hand Boeing 707s used for crew training and transports, which were purchased between 1983 and 1985. Even though the aircraft were registered in Luxembourg, they were actually based in West Germany, at Geilenkirchen, and they also used forward operating bases in Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey.

Like those of Belgium, all Dutch operational aircraft, which in the late 1980s amounted to some 225 aircraft, were committed to 2ATAF. In the 1960s the Dutch acquired a large number of F-104 Starfighters, which were replaced in the 1980s by 213 F-16s. There was also a small transport force. All Dutch airbases were on national territory.

The majority of British air assets assigned to the defence of the Central Region was Royal Air Force (Germany) (RAF(G)), which, in war, became part of 2ATAF. Throughout the Cold War, RAF(G)’s tasks were long-range interdiction, air superiority, ground attack and reconnaissance. In the 1950s and 1960s its principal strength lay in its large number of Canberra squadrons, which carried nuclear weapons as part of SACEUR’s deterrent force, and Hunter fighters, both of them British-built. In the 1970s and the early 1980s these were replaced by Buccaneer long-range strike aircraft and Phantom fighters, and from the mid-1980s by Tornados. RAF(G) was also the only land-based air force to deploy the Harrier V/STOL aircraft. Unlike in most other forces, the British army’s transport helicopter support was provided by the air force, for which RAF(G) operated CH-47 Chinook and Puma helicopters.

By the 1980s RAF(G) comprised fourteen operational squadrons. There were six interdictor/strike squadrons (Tornado); one squadron (Tornado) which specialized in the suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD); two (Phantom) for air defence; one (Tornado) for reconnaissance; two (Harrier) for close-air support and two (one Chinook, one Puma) for helicopter support.

In war, additional UK-based RAF aircraft would have been available to the Central Region, including strike, airborne-early-warning and fighter aircraft, and two Harrier V/STOL squadrons were earmarked for Denmark.

Among the aircraft operated from the UK was the airborne-early-warning force, which for many years was provided by Shackleton aircraft. Powered by four piston engines, and essentially slightly updated versions of a Second World War bomber, these were totally inadequate for modern conditions. It was originally planned to replace them by a force of Nimrod AEW aircraft, but after lengthy development the Nimrod was abandoned, and Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft were entering service as the Cold War ended.

United States air assets in Germany were commanded by the Seventeenth Air Force, with its headquarters at Sembach in southern Germany, its missions including air superiority, conventional and nuclear strike, suppression of enemy air defences, reconnaissance and electronic warfare. In the 1980s it comprised some 350 combat aircraft in four squadrons of F-15 air-superiority fighters;[2] three squadrons for SEAD (an equal mix of F-4s and F-16s); five squadrons in the tactical-fighter role (F-16s); two squadrons in the EW role (one with EF-111s,[3] one with EC-130s) and two reconnaissance squadrons (RF-4s).

In war, the Seventeenth Air Force would have received massive reinforcement from the continental USA and would also have received support from US aircraft based in the UK – mainly F-111s and A-10s, but again including many reinforcements from the USA. All of these came under the command of the Third Air Force at Mildenhall, England.

In accordance with national policy, the French air force made a very determined effort to use only French aircraft, unless there was no domestic alternative. This was successfully achieved, although some Boeing C-135FR tanker aircraft and E-3 Sentry AEW aircraft were purchased from the USA,[4] while others were developed in collaboration with European partners.[5]

The major part of French air strength was concentrated in the Force Aérienne Tactique (FATac), whose missions included destruction of enemy aircraft at their bases, offensive action in support of ground forces, and gathering intelligence. To achieve these tasks it consisted in 1984 of 322 front-line aircraft in five strike squadrons (Jaguar and Mirage III), ten ground-attack squadrons (Mirage III/Mirage 5 and Jaguar) and three reconnaissance squadrons (Mirage III/Mirage F1).

The air-defence command (Commandement ‘Air’ des Forces de Défense Aérienne) had twelve interceptor squadrons equipped with approximately 220 Mirage III and Mirage F1 fighters. These were tasked using data obtained from the French radar chain (STRIDA), which was linked into the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE).

AS WAS TO be expected in an alliance based on democracy and commercial opportunities, there was open competition in the very lucrative aircraft market, especially for fighters. Challenging the overwhelming industrial might of the United States was always a daunting experience, however, and was frequently both frustrating and very expensive too.

Quite by chance, the start of the Cold War coincided with the advent of the jet age, and competition between the Warsaw Pact and NATO spurred a frantic pace of advance in aircraft technology, as each side sought to achieve an advantage over the other. In the late 1940s all Western air forces were equipped with predominantly propeller-driven combat aircraft, but everyone understood very clearly that these had been outdated at a stroke by the invention of the turbojet engine. Among the Western powers, only two – the United States and the United Kingdom – had viable aircraft design and production facilities, but even for them the first priority was to dispose of their massive stocks of obsolescent and obsolete aircraft, to help pay for the state-of-the-art jet aircraft they needed for their own air forces. For both the US and the UK (as well as for the Soviets on the other side of the Iron Curtain) their existing wartime aircraft industries were a valuable starting point, although the wealth of research data they had captured from the Germans in 1945 was to prove of inestimable value.

FIGHTER AND ATTACK-AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT

The United States’ first operational turbojet fighter was the straight-wing F-80 Shooting Star, deliveries of which started in 1945, just too late to see service in the Second World War. It had a maximum speed of about 950 km/h – little better than the last of the propeller-driven fighters – and survived long enough to become heavily involved in the early days of the Korean War. It was, however, quickly succeeded by the F-84 Thunderjet, also with a straight wing, but with a much higher performance. Some 3,600 of these were built, many of which were exported to NATO countries in the early 1950s.

Design of the first swept-wing interceptor, the F-86 Sabre, began in 1945, with the first prototype flying in 1946 and service deliveries starting in 1948 – a rate of progress that would have been inconceivable thirty years later. The F-86 was the most successful fighter of its day and, with a maximum speed of just over 1,000 km/h and armed with a mixture of guns and rockets, it proved superior to the Soviet MiG-15, which it met in combat in the skies over Korea. The F-86 also became widely used in NATO, being produced in Canada and Italy as well as the United States. Even the UK, which was suffering a delay in production of British-designed fighter aircraft, was forced to operate a number in the early 1950s. Also widely used at this time was the F-84F, which had been created by fitting swept wings to the F-84 Thunderjet, in place of the earlier straight wings; some 2,713 were built, again, many of them for NATO countries.

Meanwhile, intense efforts were being made to exceed the speed of sound, which was eventually achieved in October 1947. Thereafter numerous fighters were able to exceed Mach 1 in a dive, but in 1949 a programme was started to develop the first operational fighter capable of exceeding the speed of sound in level flight.

During the late 1940s the pace of these and many other development programmes both in the USA and the UK was as rapid as peacetime conditions allowed, but when the Korean War broke out, and in particular when the MiG-15 was encountered, all military programmes, especially those involving new technology, were greatly accelerated. The F-100 Supersabre programme was one of those affected; the first flight took place in May 1953, and production aircraft, which had a maximum speed of 1,390 km/h, began to reach squadrons in October of that year. Unfortunately, as happened in many of the programmes rushed through in the early 1950s, the aircraft hit snags and had to be grounded in November 1954 to enable major modifications to be carried out. By the time production ended, however, 2,294 had been produced and the type had been sold to several NATO air forces. It started to leave service in the mid-1960s, but remained with the US air force long enough to take part in the Vietnam War.

In the early 1950s there was rising concern in the USA that the Soviets were developing long-range bombers which would be capable of reaching the continental United States. This led to a requirement for a high-performance interceptor, and the resulting F-102 Delta Dagger became the only delta-winged fighter to operate with the USAF and the first to be designed as a ‘weapon system’, where the aircraft became relatively less important than the avionics that controlled it. Work started in 1952 and the first prototype flew in October 1953, when it exhibited very disappointing flying characteristics, leading to a total redesign. The revised design proved satisfactory and was placed in production, with 875 single-seat fighters and 63 two-seat trainers being delivered within twenty-one months.

The F-102 design was modernized to produce its replacement, the F-106 Delta Dart, which entered service in 1959, but only after further and lengthy development problems. Once these were solved the F-106 served as the continental USA’s only manned interceptor, the last squadron standing down in 1991, exactly thirty years after production had ceased.

The McDonnell F-4 Phantom fighter was designed for the US navy and Marine Corps as a carrier-borne aircraft, but went on to become one of the most successful of all Cold War Western land-based fighters. The naval version first flew in 1958 and entered service in 1961; then, following its adoption by the USAF, the first land-based version flew in 1963. The F-4 was an outstanding design, with a maximum speed at altitude of 2,400 km/h (Mach 2.27) and a ceiling of approximately 20,000 m, outperforming not only other US fighters in the 1960s, but also the Soviet fighters it met over North Vietnam. At one stage production was running at a remarkable seventy-five aircraft per month, and the F-4 was used by numerous NATO air forces: 2,612 were delivered to the USAF, 263 to West Germany, 170 to the UK, 12 to Spain, and 8 each to Greece and Turkey (who both subsequently received a large number of surplus F-4s from West Germany).

During the course of the Cold War there were periodic revulsions against the seemingly inexorable increase in the complexity and cost of fighter aircraft. One outcome of such a feeling was the Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighter, which was designed as a simpler and cheaper, but nevertheless high-performance, alternative. It was funded by the company and first flew in 1959, but it attracted only a relatively few orders from the US air force. Despite this, the type sold well overseas, including to several NATO air forces.

The General Dynamics F-111 started life as the TFX (Tactical Fighter, Experimental) programme in an effort to produce a long-range, high-performance attack aircraft which would meet the needs of the US navy, Marine Corps and air force, and which would also, it was hoped, obtain large overseas orders. The key design feature of the F-111 was its swing wing, and the programme started in 1960, with the first flight in 1964 and initial service delivery in 1967. From the start, however, the programme was beset by problems, which ranged from excessive aerodynamic drag, through ever-escalating weight and cost, to inter-service rivalry. The problems were eventually overcome, and the F-111 fighter and the FB-111 strategic-bomber version became very successful and capable aircraft, although they were only ever purchased by the air force. The FB-111 was also due to have been ordered by the British air force in place of the abandoned TSR-2 (see below), but this order was cancelled and the only overseas order was for twenty-four from Australia.

Another 1960s aircraft, the A-7 Corsair II light attack aircraft, was designed for carrier operations with the US navy and Marine Corps, but then, like the F-4 Phantom, it was adopted by the air force as well. The first flight was in 1965, and the Corsair II showed a realization that supersonic performance was not necessary for a tactical fighter. The type also served with other NATO air forces, Greece purchasing sixty-five and Portugal twenty.

The Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt was designed to meet a USAF requirement (known as ‘AX’) for a highly capable but low-cost ground-attack aircraft, which would provide a very heavy ‘punch’ enabling it to destroy large numbers of Warsaw Pact tanks. This necessitated an extremely strong air-frame and armoured protection for the pilot, to enable both to survive at low altitude above the European battlefield. The aircraft was also required to operate from and be maintained at forward bases with limited facilities. Having won the AX competitive fly-off, the A-10 was placed in production and entered service in 1977, with a total of 707 being produced, all for the USAF; there were no export orders. Main armament was a seven-barrelled 30 mm gun, plus 7,247 kg of ordnance on eleven pylons.

The F-15 Eagle air-superiority fighter was the successor to the F-4 Phantom, with the first flight in 1972 and service delivery in 1974, following which the type served as the main USAF fighter for the remainder of the Cold War and beyond. With a maximum speed of 2,655 km/h (Mach 2.5), it climbed to 15,240 m in 2.5 minutes and, while it was an outstanding interceptor fighter, it was also adapted to the attack mission. The aircraft and its back-up systems were, however, so expensive that no NATO orders were forthcoming.

Yet another attempt was made to reduce the costs of fighter aircraft in the late 1960s, this time with considerable success, as the outcome was the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. This started life as the YF-16 lightweight fighter for the US air force, but it was then developed by the company and proved so sound a design that it quickly evolved, first into a ‘no-frills’ interceptor, and subsequently into a very effective multi-role fighter. It was ordered for the US air force in 1975, with 2,795 being delivered; others, as described below, were ordered by other NATO countries. The F-16 was armed with a 20 mm Vulcan cannon and carried 5,420 kg of ordnance if the aircraft was to be manoeuvred at its maximum of 9g, but an even greater load was possible if restrictions on manoeuvrability were imposed.

In 1944 Canada became one of the earliest countries to start work on turbojets, and in March 1947 detailed design began on a large, long-range, twin-turbojet interceptor. Designated CF-100, the first prototype flew in 1950 and some 670 aircraft were then built for the Canadian air force, with deliveries starting in 1952. The CF-100 had a maximum speed of 1,060 km/h and a range of some 4,000 km, making it an exceptional aircraft for its time.

Experience with the CF-100 encouraged the Canadian air force and industry to develop an even more ambitious design, the CF-105 Arrow, which, like the CF-100, was a very large, twin-engined, twin-seat interceptor, but this time with delta wings. The first of five prototypes flew in 1958 and immediately demonstrated a very high performance; the production model would have had a maximum speed of 2,100 km/h and a ceiling of 18,300 m, which, with its advanced avionics, placed it ahead of any contemporary Western aircraft in its field.

By early 1959 the programme was going well, with $C300 million already spent and an estimated $C200 million required for completion; anticipated unit cost was $C3.7 million per aircraft. Then, in late February 1959, the Canadian government announced the immediate cancellation of the programme; all aircraft, jigs and tools were immediately destroyed, and some 14,000 workers were laid off. The reason for this sudden change of course, which was a devastating blow to the Canadian aircraft industry, was given as the disappearance of the need for manned interceptors in the missile era.

Such an explanation seemed somewhat hollow (to say the least) when, just two years later, the Canadian air force placed an order for sixty-six US-designed McDonnell F-101 Voodoo twin-seat interceptors, which were built in Canada as the CF-101. Since that time, apart from some Canadian-designed light transports, virtually all aircraft built in Canada have been licence-built US designs.

At the start of the Cold War the UK was second only to the USA as an aviation power, and considerable resources were lavished on the aircraft industry’s survival. The British actually developed a turbojet engine before the USA, and the Gloster Meteor twin-jet fighter entered service in 1944, followed by the de Havilland Vampire single-jet fighter in 1946, both of which were exported to several NATO air arms in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The Meteor and Vampire then provided the backbone of the British air force’s fighter force for a decade, while a series of swept-wing designs was developed, culminating in the Hawker Hunter, which entered service, after lengthy delays, in 1957. Once its problems had been resolved it proved to be an effective and popular interceptor and ground-attack aircraft, and a total of 1,525 were manufactured in the UK and a further 381 in Belgium (192) and the Netherlands (189). Thirty Hunters were exported direct to Denmark, and many more to non-NATO countries.

In the 1950s the British judged the major air threat to the UK to be from high-flying Soviet bombers armed with atomic weapons, for which the answer was an extremely fast-climbing, short-range interceptor. Several different prototypes were built and tested, but the English Electric Lightning was selected; this could reach 12,000 m in under 2.5 minutes, and had a ceiling of 18,000 m. It was originally armed with both air-to-air missiles and cannon, but the latter were deleted in later marks. The Lightning entered service with the British air force in 1961 and was deployed in both the UK and Germany, but, although popular with its pilots, it was not bought by any other NATO nation.

In March 1957 the British Air Staff produced an operational requirement for a new aircraft to replace the Canberra, which was in service in large numbers as the air force’s standard light bomber. The aircraft, designated TSR-2 (TSR = tactical strike/reconnaissance), was to be an all-weather, autonomous aircraft, capable of operating at high subsonic speed at very low level, the number required being 138. Numerous initial bids were received, including one, which was rejected out of hand, from Blackburn Ltd for a land-based version of the Buccaneer carrier-based bomber, then under development for the British navy. In 1960 a development contract was awarded to the newly formed British Aircraft Corporation. In 1962 the total programme cost was estimated at £220 million, but this had risen to £272 million in October 1964 and to an extraordinary £750 million in April 1965, when the recently elected Labour government cancelled the entire project. A further echo of the Canadian CF-105 debacle was that all jigs and tools were destroyed, although, as a result of subterfuge, one aircraft survived.

A provisional order was then placed for the American F-111, but this too was cancelled, in January 1968. The yawning gap in air-force capabilities was then filled in two ways. To meet the tactical-fighter requirement, orders were placed for the F-4 Phantom. For the long-range-interdiction, Canberra-replacement role, the Buccaneer (which had been so summarily rejected twelve years previously) was selected as the ‘interim’ solution, while the long-term requirement would be met by a totally new Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), which eventually became the Tornado. The TSR-2 was, however, to be the last major British national project, and the MRCA was planned from the outset as a multinational collaborative programme.

The French aviation industry made a quite remarkable recovery following the Second World War, and after a decade during which the air force had to depend on US and British aircraft the French air force has been equipped with French or French-led collaborative designs. French designs included the very successful Mystère and Mirage fighters, while collaborative programmes included the Jaguar with the British and the Transall transport and the Alphajet trainer with West Germany.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Some NATO countries had no history of aircraft design and production, and did not wish to establish such a capability during the Cold War; they were therefore content to place orders with the USA or other European countries for existing designs. Such countries included Denmark, Norway and Portugal, and also West Germany until it had re-established its own aircraft industry. For those that wished either to maintain an existing domestic capability or to set up a new one, however, the design, development and production of advanced fighter aircraft became prohibitively expensive on a domestic basis, leaving two possible choices: one was to produce a foreign design under licence; the other was to collaborate with one or more other countries to design and develop a new aircraft.

One of the earliest co-production deals concerned the British Hawker Hunter fighter, 445 of which were manufactured in Belgium and the Netherlands for their respective air forces in the late 1950s.

The next major licence-production project concerned the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, which first flew in 1954 and which, despite having been bought in small numbers by the USAF and regarded by it as too dangerous, went on to become very important to NATO. The F-104 was designed to maximize performance, and, with a top speed of 2,330 km/h and a ceiling of 17,680 m (27,400 m in a ‘zoom’), it certainly achieved that. Unfortunately, it did so by having a long body and two tiny, very thin wings, resulting in an aircraft which, by the standards of the day, was hard to fly and ‘hot’ (i.e. fast) on landing. Despite this, a NATO production programme was set up, which involved factories in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Between them these factories produced no less than 1,445 aircraft for service with NATO air forces: Belgium 101, Canada 200, Denmark 40, Germany 749, Greece 45, Italy 125, the Netherlands 120, Norway 19 and Turkey 46. In its early years the difficult handling and a number of accidents gave the F-104 a bad reputation, and what appeared to be excessive losses became a matter of major public concern, especially in the Luftwaffe. In its later years, however, the F-104 had an accident rate no worse than any other type.

The Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighter was built under licence in Canada as the CF-5 for the Canadian forces (240 built) and as the NF-5 for the Dutch air force (102 built). The types entered service with Canada in 1968 and in the Netherlands in 1969.

Apart from being purchased in large numbers by the USAF, the General Dynamics F-16 was also selected by a consortium of European air arms in what was termed the ‘sale of the century’, which led to additional production lines being established in Belgium and the Netherlands. Deliveries were Belgium 128, Denmark 70, the Netherlands 100 and Norway 42. The USAF and these four European air forces subsequently co-operated in the F-16 Operational Capabilities Upgrade (OCU) programme in the 1980s, which resulted in much improved avionics, electronics and weapons fits.

The second path was multinational collaboration in design and development, as well as in production, sometimes under the auspices of NATO, but sometimes as a government-to-government deal in which NATO had little or no involvement. One of the early attempts at a common solution to a NATO problem was the competition announced in December 1953 for a light attack aircraft, in which all continental European air forces had expressed an interest. There were three entries from France and one from Italy, but when the latter was judged the winner the French withdrew from the entire project. In the event, all but two air forces withdrew, and the Italian entry, the Fiat G91, was ordered only by the Italian (174) and German (438) air forces, with manufacture taking place in both countries.

The Jaguar was an Anglo-French project to produce a dual-role tactical-support aircraft and advanced trainer, although, in the event, only a few two-seat aircraft were produced and the majority were strike aircraft. The first flight was in 1968, and each country purchased 200 aircraft.

One of the most successful military collaborative programmes was the Panavia Tornado (originally known as the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA)), which was produced by a consortium comprising British Aircraft Corporation (42.5 per cent), Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (42.5 per cent) and Aeritalia (15 percent).[1] The engine was also a collaborative effort between Rolls-Royce (UK; 40 per cent), MTU (Germany; 40 per cent) and Fiat (20 per cent). The project began in 1968, the first prototype flew in 1974, and the aircraft entered service in 1982. The basic swing-wing multi-role aircraft (the Tornado IDS – i.e. interdictor/strike) was designed to conduct attack, interdiction and reconnaissance missions, but there were also two specialized versions: one for electronic combat and reconnaissance (ECR), the other an air-defence (i.e. fighter) version (ADV). Production totalled 929 – 697 IDS, 35 ECR and 195 ADV – all of which went to the air forces, except for 112 of the IDS version which went to the German navy. Collaboration in design and production was mirrored in other fields, with the aircrew being trained at a trinational unit in the UK, while logistics support was controlled by the NATO MRCA Maintenance Agency (NAMMA). Although the programme was not without its complications, overall it was a major success, proving that European nations could co-operate on a very advanced technical project. The aircraft demonstrated its combat capabilities in the Gulf War, showing an unrivalled ability to carry a huge range of underwing stores and to fly at high speed at very low levels.

Although the US imported or manufactured under licence a wide range of aircraft components and engines, there were only two major examples of European aircraft being adopted by the US armed forces – both of them British. The English Electric Canberra, which first flew in 1949, was a very successful twin-engined light bomber which was produced in large numbers for the British air force. It was also adopted by the USAF as the B-57, becoming the first foreign aircraft to be procured in large numbers since 1918: 403 were manufactured under licence by the Martin company.

The other example was the British Aerospace Harrier V/STOL fighter, which used a turbojet with rotating nozzles to achieve vertical/short take-off and landing. The original prototype (designated P. 1127) first flew in 1960, and a trinational (German, UK, US) air-force squadron was established to ascertain the potential of this revolutionary concept. In the event neither the German nor the US air forces placed an order, but a completely redesigned aircraft was then adopted by the British air force, with a prototype flying in 1967 and service entry as the Harrier GR.Mk 1 in 1969. The US Marine Corps became interested in the type in 1968, and this was followed by an initial order for twelve. The type was then manufactured under licence as the AV-8A by McDonnell Douglas in the United States. Later McDonnell Douglas became the leading partner in development of the AV-8B, which was procured in large numbers by the US Marine Corps and in smaller numbers by the British air force and the Italian and Spanish navies.

The US armed forces have placed other, but much smaller, orders for non-US aircraft. The largest of these orders concerned the series of light, rugged, short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft produced by de Havilland of Canada, including 959 single-engined L-20 Beavers, 202 of the larger, single-engined U-1 Otter and 10 of the twin-engined Twin Otter. The US army also bought 159 of the twin-engined, thirty-two-passenger CV-2 Caribou, but these had to handed over to the USAF in 1967 when the latter took responsibility for large fixed-wing aircraft. The US army also helped to pay for development of the larger UC-8 Buffalo, but, because of the deal with the USAF, no orders were forthcoming. Later de Havilland STOL types were bought by the US armed forces, but only in very small numbers: three DHC-7 ‘Dash Seven’ by the US army, and two DHC-8 ‘Dash Eight’ by the USAF. Other US purchases from NATO partners included twenty-eight British Short C-23s for the US army and National Guard, and ten Italian Alenia G.222 twin-engined C-27A transports for the USAF.

CONCLUSION

Aircraft development proceeded at a frantic pace throughout the Cold War, as Western air forces sought to retain what was thought to be a technological lead over the Warsaw Pact. As a result, many new fighter and light-bomber designs appeared, although by no means all of them entered service.

There were two significant changes during the period. The first of these was that, whereas in the 1940s and 1950s the aircraft and its engines had been the most glamorous and expensive part of the package, from the 1960s onwards the airframe simply became a carrier for a complex package of avionics and electronics. The cost of the latter represented by far the largest proportion of the overall package.

A further factor was that in the 1940s and 1950s the time from concept to service entry was very short, even though the designs were pushing contemporary technology to its limits. The F-86 Sabre, for example, took just three years from conception to realization. That compares well with the seven years it took to get the F-111 into service, and over ten years for the F-15. On the other hand, the F-86 was in front-line service with the US air force for less than ten years, while the F-111 and F-15 had served for twenty-three and fourteen years respectively by the time the Cold War ended, and had many years to go after that.

THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT industry produced some remarkable aircraft during the Cold War, and its products were watched with special intensity by Western intelligence agencies and media. The early development of such aircraft was always shrouded in mystery, and first vague reports were usually followed by very blurred and heavily retouched photographs. The first firm indications of the shape and performance then came either when the type entered service with 16th Air Army in East Germany or when it appeared at one of the rare Soviet air displays. In the 1980s, however, the US government took to publishing blurred photographs taken from satellites, showing new prototypes on the flight line at testing centres such as Ramenskoye.

The early revelations were always accompanied by speculative articles in the Western technical and defence press, usually overestimating the type’s performance and its significance to the West. The first reliable assessment of a new type’s performance came only when it was exported or used in a war somewhere in Asia, Africa or the Middle East, where it could be compared against Western aircraft. Not infrequently this resulted in a reversal of the earlier assessment, with the aircraft’s performance and capability then being undervalued, although this was often because the aircraft was being flown by less highly skilled pilots and with a less effective ground-control system than would have been available in a war on the Central Front.[1] A further factor was that export aircraft were frequently equipped to a lower standard, especially in radar and electronic countermeasures, than were Soviet air-force versions.

In contrast to the numerous manufacturers on the NATO side, tactical aircraft flown by the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact air forces were the products of just two design bureaux, both in the Soviet Union.[2] The better known – at least in the early days of the Cold War – was the Mikoyan and Gurevich (MiG) bureau, whose name first achieved international prominence when the MiG-15 fighter burst on the scene in the Korean War. The first major jet-powered attack aircraft of significance to NATO, however, was the MiG-17 (NATO = ‘Fresco’) which entered service in the mid-1950s and carried a 500 kg bombload over a combat radius of some 700 km. Next came the MiG-21 (NATO = ‘Fishbed’), although the original versions were air-superiority fighters. The later MiG-21bis had a ground-attack capability, enabling it to deliver a 2,000 kg payload over a radius of some 700 km. Whereas the MiG-17 and the MiG-21 were air-superiority fighters with a secondary ground-attack capability, however, the swing-wing MiG-27 (NATO = ‘Flogger’) was designed specifically for the ground-attack mission, being capable of carrying a 4,000 kg load over a 540 km radius on a ‘lo-lo-lo’ (low level out, low level over the target, low level back) mission profile.

The second design bureau, named Sukhoi, produced some excellent aircraft. The Sukhoi Su-7 (NATO = ‘Fitter’) entered service in the late 1960s and was capable of delivering a 2,500 kg load, but over a radius of only 350 km, although when the aircraft was fitted with swing wings and redesignated Su-17M (NATO = ‘Fitter C’) this was increased to some 685 km with a 2,000 kg payload. The next to appear was a totally new design, the Sukhoi Su-24 (NATO = ‘Fencer’), which entered service in 1974 and was one of the finest attack aircraft of its era, being capable of delivering an 8,000 kg ordnance load to any target in the Central Region, including most of Spain and all but a very small part of the United Kingdom.

A totally different design was the Sukhoi Su-25 (NATO = ‘Frogfoot’), with high speed and agility providing protection, although the pilot also sat in a titanium-protected cockpit. The Su-25 carried a 4,000 kg load of bombs and rockets, and entered service in time to be committed to the war in Afghanistan in 1981. It would undoubtedly have given a good account of itself in an attack on the Central Front.

The Soviet air force’s Frontal Aviation command and most other Warsaw Pact air forces also used the Mil Mi-24 (NATO = ‘Hind’) series of attack helicopters, which again showed the difference between Soviet and Western approaches to equipment development. In the West the tendency was to develop totally new equipment, but the Soviets took the engines, drive system and main rotor of the well-tried Mil Mi-8 transport helicopter and married them to a new fuselage. A new tail rotor and stub wings of the type used on the Mil Mi-6 completed what was to become an extremely effective combat helicopter, which established a fearsome reputation in Afghanistan.

Apart from the aircraft themselves, the Soviets also developed a wide range of aircraft weapons. Further, the all-weather capability improved dramatically too, as did the offensive and defensive ECM capabilities.

Dramatic improvements were also made to the Warsaw Pact air defences – the ability to resist NATO offensive air operations. The SAM systems in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and the western military districts of the Soviet Union grew rapidly in both numbers and sophistication over the years, as did the air-defence fighters.

THE SOVIET AIR FORCE

Like most organizations on both sides in the Cold War, the Soviet air force changed its internal organization over time. For the greater part of the Cold War, however, it consisted of five operational commands: Frontal Aviation, Long-Range Aviation, Air Transport, Fighter Aviation and Naval Aviation. The most significant of these to the Central European battlefield was Frontal Aviation (Frontovaya Aviatsiya), which, in the latter half of the Cold War, was equipped with some 5,000 aircraft, of which approximately 4,000 were in eastern Europe facing NATO. Frontal Aviation’s specific roles were:

• attacking targets to about 400 km into hostile territory;

• low-altitude interdiction;

• counter-air operations in order to achieve air superiority;

• air cover over ground troops and for airborne operations;

• air reconnaissance by visual, photographic and electronic means;

• tactical airlifting of troops and cargo.

Soviet doctrine ensured that there was the closest possible co-operation between ground and air forces, with air-force representation at frontal and divisional level. Air strikes were considered to be an extension of the artillery fire plan, with priority being placed on command posts, tactical nuclear-delivery systems, communications systems, and neutralization of enemy artillery systems. A particular priority was to undertake pre-emptive strikes against enemy nuclear-delivery systems when it appeared probable that they were about to launch a nuclear strike of their own. In the counter-air battle, enemy airfields would have been the highest-priority targets. At all levels commanders of Frontal Aviation and air-defence forces were collocated to ensure that the two systems were always in co-operation and not in conflict.

Frontal Aviation was organized into tactical air armies of varying sizes, depending upon their strategic importance. The majority were deployed in eastern Europe, with each of the western military districts having its own air army, as did each of the four groups of Soviet forces in the Warsaw Pact countries. By far the most powerful, however, was the 16th Tactical Air Army, which was stationed in East Germany as part of GSFG.

A tactical air army was normally composed of a fighter division and a fighter-bomber division (each subdivided into regiments and squadrons, each of four flights of four aircraft), an independent reconnaissance regiment and a helicopter regiment. The 16th Tactical Air Army was, however, much larger, and in the mid-1980s it comprised one fighter division, two fighter-bomber divisions and two mixed fighter/fighter-bomber divisions, all of three regiments each, plus five helicopter assault regiments, three reconnaissance regiments and two aviation transport regiments. In the late 1980s these totalled some 900 fixed-wing aircraft and 400 helicopters.

Large Soviet air assets were also stationed in other Warsaw Pact countries in peacetime. Soviet elements in Czechoslovakia before 1968 were small, but following the invasion they grew rapidly and in the 1980s comprised a fighter regiment, an interdiction regiment and a ground-attack regiment, plus five helicopter regiments.

Soviet air units in Hungary were part of the Southern Group of Forces and consisted of three fighter regiments, a ground-attack regiment and two helicopter regiments.

Soviet air-force elements stationed in Poland were allocated to the Northern Group of Forces and had a particularly important task in protecting the Soviet lines of communication and providing air cover for Soviet troops moving forward into East Germany. The forces included one fighter division (three regiments), an independent attack regiment, a reconnaissance regiment and two helicopter regiments. In addition, there were two regiments of Su-24 interdictors, part of the 24th Tactical Air Army, whose missions were long-range attacks on targets in western Europe.

OTHER WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES

The Czechoslovak air force was usually the first of the non-Soviet air forces to receive the most modern Soviet equipment. The 10th Tactical Air Army consisted of two air divisions equipped with fighters and fighter-bombers, one reconnaissance regiment (three squadrons), five helicopter regiments (three squadrons) and a transport regiment. The 7th Air Army was responsible for air defence and consisted of three missile divisions, each of two regiments, plus two fighter divisions, each of three fighter regiments (eighteen squadrons).

Hungary maintained an air force that was somewhat different to others in the Warsaw Pact, as it was not independent but was an integral part of the army. The air-defence element consisted of three fighter and three SAM regiments, while the limited tactical element consisted of two ground-attack regiments (reduced to one in 1980) and one reconnaissance regiment. The air force also operated one regiment of helicopters.

The East German air force was wholly committed to operations as tasked by the Soviet 16th Tactical Air Army in support of the combined Soviet and East German ground forces. It comprised two air divisions, one with two fighter/ground-attack regiments, the other with three, each regiment having three ten-aircraft squadrons. There were also two reconnaissance squadrons, a transport regiment and three helicopter regiments. Air-defence elements comprised seven SAM regiments. All equipment came from the Soviet Union, except that all trainer aircraft were of Czech origin.

Poland maintained the largest Warsaw Pact air force outside the Soviet Union, comprising three fighter-bomber divisions (eighteen squadrons), two reconnaissance regiments (six squadrons), two transport regiments and three helicopter regiments. For many years the National Air Defence Force was a separate service and co-operated extremely closely with the Soviet air force in the air defence of the Soviet lines of communication between the USSR and the forward elements in East Germany. In the late 1980s, however, the Air Defence Force was integrated into the air force, while remaining organized into three air-defence corps (one to each Polish military district), each of one air-defence division (three fighter regiments) and one SAM division. All front-line aircraft were of Soviet design, but Polish and Czech trainers and some Polish helicopters were also used.