The Downing Street Years, 1979-1990

EVENTS AT ASPEN

On the morning of Wednesday 1 August 1990 the VC10 left Heathrow with me and my party aboard bound for Aspen, Colorado. The President was due to open the Aspen Institute Conference on the Thursday and I was to close it on the Sunday. I had gone out early in order to be present for his speech. At the time I left I already knew that the Iraqis were sending troops down to the border with Kuwait. The negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait which had been taking place in Jeddah had broken for the day but we understood that they were to be resumed. It therefore seemed that the Iraqi military action was a case of sabre rattling. We soon learnt that it was not. At 2 a.m. Kuwaiti time on Thursday 2 August Iraq carried out a full-scale military invasion — though claiming that it was an internal coup — and assumed total control.

An hour later — early evening on Wednesday, Colorado time — Charles Powell telephoned me from his hotel to tell me the news and I decided at once to instruct two ships in Penang and Mombasa, both about a week’s sailing time away, to make for the Gulf while the situation developed. We already had one ship of the Armilla patrol in the Gulf — HMS York, at Dubai. First thing the following morning I learnt in a note from Charles about the latest situation. Other Arab governments had evidently been caught off balance. The Arab League of Foreign Ministers meeting in Cairo had failed to agree a statement. King Hussein was trying to excuse the Iraqi action on the grounds that the Kuwaitis had been unnecessarily difficult. The ruling families in the Gulf were alarmed. With strong British support the UN Security Council had passed a resolution condemning Iraq for its action and calling for total withdrawal and immediate negotiations. Back in London, Douglas Hurd — competent professional that he was — had ordered the freezing of Kuwaiti assets in Britain, the Iraqis unfortunately having only debts. An immediate question now was whether Saddam Hussein would go over the border and seize Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. (This was indeed important: but I was convinced from the start that it must not divert us from the need to get Saddam Hussein out of the territory he had already seized by an act of illegal aggression.)

I was staying at the guesthouse to Ambassador Henry Catto’s ranch while all this was going on. I read Charles’s note, listened to the news and then went for a walk to sort things out in my own mind. By the time I got back Charles and Sir Antony Acland, our ambassador, were waiting for me. We established from the White House that President Bush was still coming to Aspen and would arrive later that morning. As is my wont, I set about arguing through the whole problem with them and by the end had defined the two main points. By the time I was due to meet him at the main ranch I was quite clear what we must do.

Fortunately, the President began by asking me what I thought. I told him my conclusions in the clearest and most straightforward terms. First, aggressors must never be appeased. We learned that to our cost in the 1930s. Second, if Saddam Hussein were to cross the border into Saudi Arabia he could go right down the Gulf in a matter of days. He would then control 65 per cent of the world’s oil reserves and could blackmail us all. Not only did we have to move to stop the aggression, therefore, we had to stop it quickly.

In making these two points I felt that experience as well as instinct enabled me to trust my judgement. There was, of course, the enormously valuable experience of having been Prime Minister through the Falklands War. My visits to the Gulf had also allowed me to establish bonds of trust with the rulers of many of these states, who often had closer links with Britain than with America. I understood their problems and could gauge their reactions.

President Bush listened to what I had to say. He then told me that he had been speaking to President Mubarak and King Hussein. The message he had received was that the United States should stay calm and give an Arab solution a chance. He had said that that was fine but that it must involve Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of the lawful Government of Kuwait. He had meanwhile authorized a boycott of Iraqi goods, termination of credits and the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. He had also instructed ships of the American fleet to move north from the Indian Ocean into the Gulf, although they were currently being hampered by heavy seas.

We then got down to discussing what must be done next. I said that if Saddam Hussein did not withdraw, the Security Council would need to impose a full trade embargo. That, however, would only be effective if everybody implemented it. It would be necessary to close down the pipelines across both Turkey and Saudi Arabia through which Iraq exported the greater part of its oil. Those would not be easy decisions. Saudi Arabia, especially, might fear that Iraq would use such action as an excuse to attack her. We could send troops to protect Saudi Arabia; but only at the specific request of the king. (In fact, a few days later the US Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney, flew to Saudi Arabia to talk to the king about precisely this.)

At this point President Bush was told that the President of Yemen wanted to speak to him on the telephone. Before the President left to take the call, I reminded him that Yemen, a temporary member of the Security Council, had not voted on the resolution demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It turned out that the President of Yemen too wanted time to come up with an Arab solution. President Bush told him that such a ‘solution’ must involve the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and return of the proper Government of Kuwait if it was to be accepted. The President of Yemen then apparently compared what had happened in Kuwait to US intervention in Grenada at which George Bush rightly bridled. When he returned President Bush and I agreed that all this did not seem very encouraging. We then went out to give a press conference. The President was asked if he ruled out the use of force. He replied that he did not — a statement the press took to be a strengthening of his position against Saddam Hussein. But I had never found any weakness in it from the first.

By now I was receiving a flood of telegrams reporting on reactions to the invasion. The Cabinet Office assessment of Iraq’s plans noted that an attack against Saudi Arabia did not seem imminent, because it would probably take a week to assemble the required forces. To my mind this reinforced rather than diminished the need for immediate tough action.

Understandably, I now had only half my mind on the programme of events which had been arranged for me. That said, I was fascinated by what I saw. Friday was a day of presentations and discussions about science, environment and defence — punctuated by news about what was happening in the crisis which now gripped the international community. I was talking to the young scientists working at the SDI National Test Facility at Falcon when I was called away to speak to President Bush on the telephone. He gave me the good news that President Ozal of Turkey had said he would take action to cut off the Iraqi oil which was going through the Turkish pipeline. I was not surprised. In my two visits to Turkey I had been very impressed with the President’s toughness. I had also been struck by the country’s strategic significance. As a secular but predominantly Muslim state with a large army, looking westwards to Europe but also on the fringe of the Middle East, Turkey would be a vital bulwark against aggressive Islamic fundamentalism or other brands of revolutionary Arab nationalism like that of Saddam Hussein.

After lunch I went by helicopter to the Strategic Air Defence Monitoring Centre at Cheyenne Mountain which keeps a watch on every satellite launched. Again I felt awed by the sophistication of America’s scientific and technological achievement. From within this hollowed-out mountain the United States could observe deep into space for military and scientific purposes. Two days later I was told by the general in charge of the operation that they had observed that the Soviets had now put up two satellites over the northern end of the Gulf. It was a useful indication of their concern.

On Saturday morning I spoke with President Mitterrand on the telephone. As over the Falklands, he was taking a robust position: in spite of a misconceived speech at the United Nations which tried to link a solution of the Gulf crisis with other Middle Eastern issues, President Mitterrand and France showed throughout the crisis that the French were the only European country, apart from ourselves, with the stomach for a fight.

I have already described the speech I gave on Sunday morning to the Aspen Institute.[116] Though it addressed broader international issues, I inserted a section on the Gulf. It read:

My mind was now turning to the next practical steps we could take to exert pressure on Iraq. The European Community countries had agreed to support a complete economic and trade embargo of Iraq. But it was the Iraqi oil exports and the willingness of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to block them which would be crucial. The Americans had some lingering doubts about whether Turkey and Saudi Arabia would act. I was more confident. But these doubts increased the importance of enforcing all other measures still more effectively. I instructed the Foreign Office to prepare plans to implement a naval blockade in the north-east Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the north of the Gulf to intercept shipments of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. I also asked that more thought be given to precise military guarantees for Saudi Arabia and for details of what aircraft we could send to the Gulf area immediately.

I had planned to take a few days’ holiday with my family after the Aspen speech, but after an invitation from the White House decided instead to fly to Washington and resume my talks with the President. For all the friendship and co-operation I had had from President Reagan, I was never taken into the Americans’ confidence more than I was during the two hours or so I spent that afternoon at the White House. The meeting began in a very restricted session with just the President, Brent Scowcroft, myself and Charles Powell. Half an hour later we were joined by Dan Quayle, Jim Baker and John Sununu. The last twenty minutes of discussion was attended by the Secretary-General of NATO.

The President that day was an altogether more confident George Bush than the man with whom I had had earlier dealings. He was firm, cool, showing the decisive qualities which the Commander-in-Chief of the greatest world power must possess. Any hesitation fell away. I had always liked George Bush. Now my respect for him soared.

The President began by reporting what was known about the situation and US plans to deal with it. Saddam Hussein had sworn that if American forces moved into Saudi Arabia he would liberate the kingdom from the Saudi royal family. There were now clear photographs — which the President passed around to us — showing that Iraqi tanks had moved right up to the border with Saudi Arabia. I said that it was vital to bolster the Saudis. The main danger was that Iraq would attack Saudi Arabia before the king formally asked the United States for help.

In fact, part of the way through our discussions, Dick Cheney telephoned the President from Saudi Arabia. He reported that King Fahd was fully behind the United States plan to move the 82nd Airborne Division together with forty-eight F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. The king’s only condition was that there should be no announcement until the forces were actually in place. This was excellent news. But how would we be able to conceal all this from the world media and the Iraqis who, if they knew about it, might well decide to go into Saudi Arabia at once? In fact, we were helped by the fact that all eyes were on the United Nations which was discussing Security Council Resolution 661, that imposed a ban on trade with Iraq and Kuwait, though making no explicit provision for its enforcement. American aircraft were eight hours into flight by the time the press discovered they had left.

This meeting also saw the beginning of an almost interminable argument between the Americans — particularly Jim Baker — and me about whether and in what form United Nations authority was needed for measures against Saddam Hussein. I felt that the Security Council Resolution which had already been passed, combined with our ability to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defence, was sufficient. Although I did not spell this out on the present occasion — there were too many other pressing matters to decide — my attitude, which had been reinforced as a result of our difficulties with the UN over the Falklands, was based on two considerations. First, there was no certainty that the wording of a resolution, which was always open to amendment, would finish up by being satisfactory. If not, it might tie our hands unacceptably. Of course, with the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union was likely to be more co-operative. Communist China, fearful of isolation, was also disinclined to create too many problems. But the fact remained that if one could achieve an objective without UN authority there was no point in running the risks attached to seeking it.

Second, although I am a strong believer in international law, I did not like unnecessary resort to the UN, because it suggested that sovereign states lacked the moral authority to act on their own behalf. If it became accepted that force could only be used — even in self-defence — when the United Nations approved, neither Britain’s interests nor those of international justice and order would be served. The UN was a useful — for some matters vital — forum. But it was hardly the nucleus of a new world order. And there was still no substitute for the leadership of the United States.

The discussion between President Bush and myself in Washington continued. I emphasized the importance of preparing to respond to any Iraqi use of chemical weapons. I also stressed that we should fight the propaganda war with vigour. This was a defensive action by the West to preserve Saudi Arabia’s integrity and anything which complicated or obscured that must be avoided. So, for example, we had to do everything to keep the Israelis out of the conflict. I also promised to use my contacts with Middle Eastern rulers to try to increase support for American action in defence of Saudi Arabia and to heighten the pressure on Iraq.

I returned to London on the Tuesday. The following day I had an hour’s telephone conversation with King Fahd to receive his formal request for our own ‘planes and (if necessary) armed forces to be stationed in Saudi Arabia. He expressed incredulity that King Hussein should have sided with Saddam Hussein, whose party had murdered King Hussein’s relatives. But King Fahd was as strong as ever in his determination to stand up against aggression.

Later that day I also had the sad duty of attending Ian Gow’s funeral. One of my most loyal and candid advisers, there were to be many times when I missed his shrewd counsel and his deadpan wit.

THE BUILD-UP TO WAR

I was not allowed by the Conservative Party to see through the campaign to throw Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. But in the months which now followed — and in spite of the other difficulties I faced — my attention was rarely away from the Gulf for long. I set up a small Cabinet sub-committee — Douglas Hurd (Foreign Secretary), Tom King (Defence Secretary), John Wakeham (Energy Secretary), Patrick Mayhew (Attorney-General), William Waldegrave (Minister of State at the Foreign Office), Archie Hamilton (Minister of State for the Armed Forces) and the Chief of the Defence Staff. It was this group, which met regularly, rather than the wider Cabinet Committee OD, which took the main decisions.

One of our first tasks was to provide the promised support for Saudi Arabia. On Thursday 9 August Tom King announced the despatch of two squadrons of aircraft — one made up of Tornado F3 air defence fighters and the other of Jaguar ground attack ‘planes, 24 aircraft in all. They were in place and operational two days later. Nimrod maritime reconnaisance and VC10 tanker aircraft were also sent. We reinforced them at the end of August with a further squadron of Tornados — but this time the GR1 ground-attack version — which were sent to Bahrain to provide a day-and-night anti-armour capability. Rapier air defence detachments were deployed in support.

Of course, I kept in frequent touch with President Bush over the telephone. I ensured that he was abreast of the military dispositions we were making and that we responded to American requests. We also regularly discussed the latest information about Saddam Hussein’s intentions. The general view seemed to be that whatever he had originally planned, he would not attack Saudi Arabia, once American forces were there. But it seemed to me that the important lesson for us was that Saddam Hussein was simply not predictable. As I put it in a minute to the Ministry of Defence on Sunday 12 August:

These were weeks of vigorous telephone diplomacy. I encouraged Turkey in its steadfast opposition to Iraq. The Turkish economy was badly hit because — unlike Jordan — Turkey was applying UN sanctions effectively. I spoke to President Ozal about this over the telephone on Friday 24 August. He commiserated with me about what he described as Saddam Hussein’s disgraceful exploitation of British hostages on television. He thought that this exhibition had in fact worked against him and shown what sort of person he really was. I never failed to remind the Saudis and the governments of the Gulf States how much they owed to Turkey and urged them to offer generous financial compensation.

A less savoury ally against Saddam Hussein was Syria, with which we still had no formal diplomatic relations. I disliked the regime and had no illusion about its continued willingness to employ terrorism and violence if they suited its purposes. But the fact remained that the rivalry between Syria and Iraq gave us an opportunity which must not be missed. Moreover, it made no sense to have our forces fighting alongside the Syrians if we still had no diplomatic channels for discussion. Reluctantly, therefore, I agreed to the reopening of diplomatic relations, though the formal announcement came a few days after I left office in November.

In the evening of 26 August President Bush telephoned me from Kennebunkport. I told him how pleased I was with Security Council Resolution 665 which had been passed the day before, enabling us to enforce the embargo. We must use our powers to stop Iraqi shipping. This was no time to go wobbly. Information we had gleaned from secret sources must be published to show up sanctions busting. The President agreed. I told him that the only area in which I thought we were not doing well was in the propaganda battle. We were now probably going into a longish period to see whether sanctions would work and we must not let the faint hearts grow in strength. The President was worried also about the use of the port of Aqaba in Jordan to evade sanctions and I told him that I would raise the question when I saw King Hussein in a few days’ time.

In the case of Syria, my enemy’s enemy had to become my friend. But I was saddened that one of Britain’s most long-standing friends appeared to be siding with the enemy. I had been on the friendliest of terms with King Hussein of Jordan but there could be no question of just allowing him to continue to flout sanctions and justify the Iraqi invasion. So when he came to see me for lunch on Friday 31 August I could not conceal my feelings.

He was clearly very uneasy about the line he was taking. He began by making a forty-minute statement which yet again justified what the Iraqis had done. I said that I was amazed at his account of what was in fact a blatant act of aggression. Iraq was a country which had used chemical weapons — not just in war but against its own people. Saddam Hussein was not only an international brigand, he was also a loser who had done immense damage both to the Palestinian cause and to the Arabs and who over eight years had vainly thrown wave after wave of young Iraqis into the war against Iran. I said that the king should not be attempting to negotiate on Iraq’s behalf but rather to implement sanctions against it. I could not have been more direct. But no amount of pressure was likely to alter the calculation which the king had made: that he could not come out openly against Saddam Hussein and survive.

On Thursday 6 September the House of Commons was recalled to debate the position in the Gulf. Unlike the US Congress, Parliament firmly supported the stance taken by the Government: the voting when the debate ended the following day was 437:35. I was also turning my mind to the military campaign which I believed would have to be fought. Later that same afternoon I discussed the situation with Douglas Hurd. I said that I was ever more certain that Saddam Hussein would not leave Kuwait unless he was thrown out. Douglas was more inclined to be optimistic, believing that sanctions might succeed if we could convince Saddam Hussein that he would be militarily beaten if he stayed. I agreed that sanctions must be given some more time to work. But we must not lose sight of the danger of leaving our forces too long in the desert and of the Arab and wider international front against Saddam Hussein crumbling. I did not want to see a firm deadline but we must start to look at the dates which would narrow the options for military action. I also said that we must not be under any illusion: if the sanctions against Iraq did not work, and the Americans and the Multi-National Force failed to take action, Israel would strike.

It was very difficult to know how effective the Iraqi army would be. I had some doubts about their soldiers’ spirit, based on the assessment of their preference for high-level bombing and chemical weapons over infantry fighting in the war against Iran. But the Republican Guard was thought to be more formidable. The Americans were extremely cautious, wanting very large amounts of armour in the Gulf before they would be prepared to move. By contrast, some of Iraq’s neighbours thought that the Iraqis would crumble quickly; and as it turned out they were proved right.

In any case, as with the Falklands, I was determined to ensure that our forces had the best possible equipment and plenty of it. The Americans wanted us to reinforce our troops in the Gulf and had suggested that we should send an armoured brigade equipped with Challenger I tanks to join the Allied Forces there. I knew that the Challenger had a good reputation for manoeuvrability, but a bad one for reliability. So on Thursday 13 September I called a meeting with Tom King, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chief of the General Staff and representatives of Vickers. I cross-questioned them about all the possible weaknesses. I could not forget the way in which the earlier American attempt under President Jimmy Carter to rescue the Iranian hostages had failed because the helicopters used had been unable to cope with the desert conditions. After much discussion they convinced me. But I said that they must take all the spare parts they could possibly need with them, not wait for more to be sent out, and I also insisted upon receiving a written guarantee of 80 per cent availability — several times better than Challenger had achieved in Germany.

I also wanted the commander of our forces to be someone in whom I — and they — would have complete confidence. The MoD came up with several names but only one man seemed to be right for the job — Sir Peter de la Billière. Tom King was reluctant to see him appointed: Peter de la Billière was within a week of retiring and the other candidates clearly had much to be said for them. But I wanted a fighting general. I knew the qualities of Sir Peter from his command of the SAS operation at the time of the 1980 Iranian Embassy siege[117] and from the Falklands. I also knew that he spoke Arabic — of some importance when part of a large multi-national force with a crucial Arab element. So I told Tom King that Sir Peter was not retiring now if I had anything to do with it: and if he did not go to command our forces in the Gulf, he would be coming as personal adviser on the conduct of the war to Downing Street. He went to the Gulf.

I telephoned George Bush the next morning to tell him that I was about to announce the decision to send the 7th Armoured Brigade to the Gulf, comprising two armoured regiments with 120 tanks, a regiment of Field Artillery, a battalion of armoured infantry, anti-tank helicopters and all the necessary support. It would be a completely self-supporting force, numbering up to 7,500. They were the successors to the ‘Desert Rats’ of Alamein. The President was pleased. ‘My heavens, a marvellous commitment; this is really something,’ he said.

I met the President again in New York on the evening of Sunday 30 September. We were officially there to attend the ‘UN Children’s Summit’, an occasion at which the only high point was an inspiring speech from President Havel of Czechoslovakia. President Bush was very tired, having flown back to Washington from New York to complete negotiations with Congress on the fateful 1990 budget compromise, which was to undermine him politically, before returning for this meeting. But he was in good spirits. We discussed Jim Baker’s wish for another UN Security Council Resolution specifically to endorse the use of force to bring about Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. As always, I was dubious, preferring to rely on Article 51. But what was clear to all of us was that the time for using force was now rapidly approaching. There was no evidence that sanctions were having any real effect on Iraq’s decisions — and that was what counted. I was clearer than ever in my mind that there could be no weakening in our resolve to defeat — and be seen to defeat — Saddam Hussein’s aggression.

As so often over these months I found myself reliving in an only slightly different form my experiences of the build-up to the battle for the Falklands. There is never any lack of people anxious to avoid the use of force. No matter how little chance there is of negotiation succeeding — and no matter how many difficulties are created for the troops who are trying to prepare themselves for war — the case is always made for yet another piece of last-ditch diplomacy.

On this occasion it fell to Mr Yevgeny Primakov, Mr Gorbachev’s special emissary on the Gulf, to make all the standard arguments. He came to see me at Chequers on the afternoon of Saturday 20 October, having just returned from Baghdad. He argued for some ‘flexible linkage’ between the crisis in the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli problem to save Saddam Hussein’s face and to give ‘some room for manoeuvre’. I said that Saddam Hussein was a dictator, that we should look at his actions rather than listen to his words, and that there could be no deals with such a man. Of course, we all had a duty to return with greater determination to resolve the Arab-Israeli problem; but that duty obtained quite independent of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. He must not be appeased. We learned later that Mr Primakov had reported back to Moscow that Mrs Thatcher was quite the most difficult and determined of them all.

On the evening of Tuesday 23 October I had a meeting with Tom King and Douglas Hurd. The main purpose was to give guidance to the Chief of the Defence Staff at his meetings with General Colin Powell, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the United States over the next two days. I began by listing our strategic objectives. These were to provide the guidelines according to which British policy in the forthcoming war should be determined. Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait and the latter’s legitimate Government must be restored. All hostages must be released. Iraq must pay compensation. Those responsible for atrocities must be brought to account before an international court. Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical capability must be eliminated in the event of hostilities and dismantled in the event of a peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi troops. To do this the widest possible alliance of Arab governments against Iraq must be maintained and Israeli involvement must be avoided. A regional security system must be established to constrain Iraq in the future.

As for Saddam Hussein himself, it would not be a specific objective to bring about his downfall, though that might be a desirable side-effect of our actions. We must aim for a situation in which Saddam Hussein had to face his own people as a beaten leader of a beaten army. I said that further work on targets in Iraq was needed. Purely civilian targets must be avoided. But it was for consideration whether power stations and dams should be regarded as legitimate targets. There was no intention that our forces should occupy any part of Iraqi territory, but they might need to enter Iraq in hot pursuit of Iraqi forces. I said that it was necessary to get the Americans to accept that military action would in all likelihood have to be initiated before the end of the year. I also said that we must try to continue to wean them away from seeking prior authorization for the use of force from the UN and to rely instead on Article 51.

I argued this last point through with Jim Baker when he came to see me on the evening of Friday 9 November. But I was not able to sway him. He said that UN authority was crucial to sustain the support of American public opinion for military action. I also raised my worries about delaying the military option until the extra American forces now being sent had arrived in the Gulf. I said that it was vital not to miss the window of opportunity which would close in early March. He was able to reassure me on this point. But by now time was running out for me as well as for Saddam Hussein.

In response to Jim Baker’s request and at my last Cabinet on Thursday 22 November — to which I announced my resignation as Prime Minister — the decision was made to double Britain’s military commitment and to deploy an extra brigade to the Gulf. We would send the 4th Brigade from Germany, comprising a regiment of Challenger tanks, two armoured infantry battalions and a regiment of Royal Artillery, with reconnaissance and supporting services. Together the two brigades would form the 1st Armoured Division. The total number of UK forces committed would amount to more than 30,000.

Since the morning of Thursday 2 August hardly a day had passed without my involvement in diplomatic and military moves to isolate and defeat Iraq. One of my very few abiding regrets is that I was not there to see the issue through. The failure to disarm Saddam Hussein and to follow through the victory so that he was publicly humiliated in the eyes of his subjects and Islamic neighbours was a mistake which stemmed from the excessive emphasis placed right from the start on international consensus. The opinion of the UN counted for too much and the military objective of defeat for too little. And so Saddam Hussein was left with the standing and the means to terrorize his people and foment more trouble. In war there is much to be said for magnanimity in victory. But not before victory.