I had made a number of political visits abroad before I became Prime Minister, travelling on various occasions to the Soviet Union, the United States, Germany, Israel and Australia. I enjoyed these tours — as long as there was plenty to read, interesting people to meet and we were doing useful work. But it is certainly a very different experience going abroad as Prime Minister, accompanied everywhere by a highly professional team of advisers, on what is usually a hectic schedule, and meeting heads of government on equal terms.
Familiarizing myself with this new role was not made easier by the fact that within weeks of coming into office I had to face the problem of Britain’s excessive contribution to the European Community (EC) budget — something which required tough bargaining from a difficult position, and the use of diplomatic tactics which many people thought less than diplomatic. Nor was our budget contribution the only source of contention within the EC, even in those early days. It became increasingly clear to me that there were real differences of vision about Europe’s future.
Shortly after I took office the first direct elections to the European Parliament were held. (In those days the Parliament was formally known as ‘the European Assembly’, which perhaps gives a more accurate impression of its limited role.) In the course of the campaign I made a speech in which I emphasized my vision of the Community as a force for freedom:
We believe in a free Europe, not in a standardized Europe. Diminish that variety within the member states, and you impoverish the whole Community…
I went on:
We insist that the institutions of the European Community are managed so that they increase the liberty of the individual throughout the continent. These institutions must not be permitted to dwindle into bureaucracy. Whenever they fail to enlarge freedom the institutions should be criticized and the balance restored.
There has, however, always been a contrary tendency in the Community — interventionist, protectionist, and ultimately federalist. The sharpness of the contrast between these two views of Europe would only become fully apparent as the years went by. But it was never far beneath the surface of events and I was always aware of it.
I was also very much aware of another feature of the EC, which had been apparent from its earliest days, continued to shape its development and diminished Britain’s capacity to influence events — namely, the close relationship between France and Germany. Although this relationship may have seemed to depend on personal rapport — between President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt or President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl — the truth is that it was explicable more in terms of history and perceptions of long-term interest. France has long feared the power of Germany and has hoped that by superior Gallic intelligence power can be directed in ways favourable to French interests. Germany, for her part, knows that although she has contributed considerably more to the EC financially and economically than any other state, she has received an enormous return in the form of international respectability and influence. The Franco-German axis would remain a factor to be reckoned with, and I shall have more to say about it later.
My first European Council took place in Strasbourg on 21 and 22 June 1979. France hosted the talks. Strasbourg had been chosen as the venue in acknowledgement of the new importance of the European Parliament (which holds two-thirds of its sessions there) following the elections, in which Conservatives had won 60 of the 78 British seats.
I was confident that Chancellor Schmidt had taken away from our earlier discussions a clear impression of my determination to fight for large reductions in Britain’s net budget contribution. I was hoping he would pass the message on to President Giscard, who was to chair the summit; both men were former Finance ministers and should be well able to understand Britain’s point of view. (I could not help noticing too that they spoke to one another in English: but I was too tactful to remark on it.)
The background to the British budget problem is quickly described, though the precise details were extremely complicated. At the time of the negotiations for Britain’s accession we had received an assurance (as I would continue to remind other member states) that:
should an unacceptable situation arise within the present Community or an enlarged Community, the very survival of the Community would demand that the [Community] Institutions find equitable solutions, [my italics]
The reason why such an assurance had been necessary was that Britain’s unique trading pattern made her a very large net contributor to the EC budget — so large that the situation was indeed unacceptable. We traditionally imported far more from non-EC countries than did other Community members, particularly of foodstuffs. This meant that we paid more into the Community budget in the form of tariffs than they did. By contrast, the Community budget itself is heavily biased towards supporting farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): indeed when we came into office more than 70 per cent of the budget was spent in this way. The CAP was — and is — operated in a wasteful manner. The dumping of these surpluses outside the EC distorts the world market in foodstuffs and threatens the survival of free trade between the major economies. The British economy is less dependent on agriculture than that of most other Community countries and our farms are generally larger and more efficient than those of France and Germany; consequently we receive less in subsidy than they do. Britain traditionally received a fairer share of the receipts of the Community’s non-agricultural programmes (such as the regional and social funds), but the growth of these programmes had been limited by the power of the farming lobby in Europe and by the international recession.
The previous Labour government had made a great play of ‘renegotiating’ the terms of Britain’s original entry. In 1975 a Financial Mechanism to limit our contribution had been worked out in principle: but it had never been triggered, and never would be, unless the originally agreed conditions were changed. As a result, there was no solid agreement to which we could hold our Community partners.
One other development had worsened the overall position: Britain’s prosperity, relative to that of our European neighbours, had steadily declined. In spite of North Sea oil, by 1979 Britain had become one of the least prosperous members of the Community, with only the seventh highest GDP per head of population among the member states. Yet we were expected shortly to become the largest net contributor.
So from the first my policy was to seek to limit the damage and distortions caused by the CAP and to bring financial realities to bear on Community spending. But at the Council meeting in Strasbourg I also had two short-term objectives. First, I wanted to have the budget question raised now and to gain acceptance of the need for action, though without at this stage going into too much detail. Second, I wanted to secure a firm undertaking from other heads of government that at the next Council meeting in Dublin the Commission would bring forward proposals to deal with the problem.
I sought at the start to strengthen our ‘European credentials’. We Conservatives were welcomed in Strasbourg because we were seen as more pro-European than Labour: I tried to emphasize this by indicating that although we were not then in a position to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), we were ‘minded’ — an expression used so as not to offend the House of Commons to which it had not yet been announced — to swap some of our own reserves in the Bank of England for ecus (the European Currency Unit). I knew that Chancellor Schmidt was keen that we should commit sterling to the ERM; but I already had doubts about the wisdom of this course, which subsequently were reinforced. In any case, as it happened, my announcement of our intentions as regards the ecu ‘swap’ did not receive much visible welcome from the others: like other such concessions to the ésprit communautaire, it appeared simply to be pocketed and then forgotten.
If the budget issue was to concentrate minds as I wished, it had to be raised on the first day, because the communiqué is always drafted by officials overnight, ready for discussion the following morning. The draftsmen would therefore have to receive their instructions before the end of the first day. This did not prove easy. Over lunch I spoke to President Giscard about what I wanted and gained a strong impression that we would be able to deal with the budget early on. The whole group of us then set out to walk to the Hôtel de Ville through Strasbourg’s narrow and attractive streets. The bonhomie seemed tangible.
But when we resumed, it quickly became clear that President Giscard was intent on following his previous agenda, whatever he had given me to understand. At least I was well briefed and took an active part in the discussion about energy and the world economy. I pointed out that Britain had not flinched from the hard decisions required to ride out these difficulties and that we were making large cuts in public spending. By twenty minutes to seven that evening, we had decided, if we could, to hold Community imports of oil between 1980 and 1985 at a level no higher than that of 1978. We had agreed to stress the importance of nuclear energy. We had committed ourselves to keep up the struggle against inflation. Inevitably, I suppose, we had agreed to say something about ‘convergence’ between the economic performance of member states (a classic piece of Euro-jargon). In fact, we had done almost everything except what I most wanted us to do — tackle the budget issue.
Fortunately, I had been warned what might happen next. President Giscard proposed that as time was getting on and we needed to get ready for dinner, the matter of the budget should be discussed the following day. Did the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom not agree? And so at my very first European Council I had to say ‘no’. As it turned out the lateness of the hour probably worked in my favour: conclusions are often easier to reach when time presses and minds are turning to the prospect of French haute cuisine and grands crus. I spelt out the facts: and the facts were undoubtedly telling. It was agreed to include in the communiqué an instruction to the Commission to prepare proposals for the next Council to deal with the matter. So, a little late, we rose for dinner. Argument always gives one an appetite.
At these gatherings, the custom was that heads of government and the President of the Commission dine together; foreign ministers formed a separate group. It was also customary to discuss foreign affairs. The plight of the Vietnamese ‘boat people’ was one topic which, of course, directly concerned Britain. Another was Rhodesia. It is interesting also to note that even then we were discussing the perennial problem of the Japanese trade balance.
Strasbourg had one solid result: it had put the question of Britain’s unfair budget contribution squarely on the agenda. I felt that I had made an impression as someone who meant business, and afterwards I learned that this feeling was correct. It was at Strasbourg, too, that I overheard a foreign government official make a stray remark that pleased me as much as any I can remember: ‘Britain is back,’ he said.
Many of the wider issues discussed at Strasbourg were raised again shortly afterwards in the still grander surroundings of the economic summit of the seven principal western industrial powers in Tokyo (the Group of Seven, or G7 for short). As soon as I had finished my report to the House of Commons on the Strasbourg Council, we drove out to Heathrow for the long flight to Japan. I knew that oil prices and their effect on the economy would again be top of the agenda. I was well briefed. Denis’s knowledge of the oil industry was at my disposal and I had also had a thorough briefing by oil experts over lunch at Chequers. They knew the oil business inside out; by contrast, I was to find at Tokyo that politicians who thought they could limit oil consumption by setting out plans and targets had little practical understanding of the market.
I took the opportunity to discuss some other, equally important, matters en route to Tokyo. We had sought and were given permission from the Soviet Union to shorten the route to Japan by overflying Russia. In Moscow the plane landed to refuel and I was met by the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, who broke off a meeting of communist prime ministers to come to the airport. To my surprise, an unscheduled dinner was laid out in the airport lounge. Hospitality in the Soviet Union was always generous for important visitors: there were two worlds, one for foreign dignitaries and the party élite, with luxuries of all kinds, and another for the ordinary people, with only the plainest of goods, and not many of them.
The motive for the Soviets’ special attention was soon clear. They wanted to know more about the ‘Iron Lady’ — as their official news agency, Tass, had christened me following a speech I made in 1976 while Leader of the Opposition.
In East-West relations this was the lull before a huge political storm. Under the guise of détente the Soviets and their communist surrogates had pursued for some years a policy of covert aggression, while the West had let slip its defences. At Tokyo I was to find further evidence of the Carter Administration’s overconfidence in the goodwill of the Soviet Union. The second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) had been signed only days before. There was even talk of a SALT III. But the mood was about to change, for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was less than six months away.
Although we discussed defence, the most sensitive matter I raised with Mr Kosygin was the plight of the ‘boat people’, who were leaving Vietnam in their hundreds of thousands. They were the victims of appalling persecution, terrible enough to make them sell all their belongings, leave their homes and risk their lives sailing in overcrowded and dangerous ships, with no certainty of escape. A large merchant fleet sailed under the British flag and naturally our ships were picking up these tragic refugees from communism to save them from the risk of shipwreck and piracy. The rule of the sea is that survivors from shipwreck can be landed at the next port of call. But it often happened that the next port of call — in Singapore, Malaysia or Taiwan — refused to take them unless we agreed that they should be allowed to come on to Britain. At home we were still experiencing all the social and economic pressures of past mass immigration and consequently this was something we were most reluctant to agree. At Taiwan, although they would be given medical attention and food on the ship, they were not being allowed to land. The boat people themselves refused to land in Canton: they had had enough of communism. So this meant that Hong Kong became their favoured immediate destination, from where they hoped to go on to the United States or elsewhere in the West. The communists, of course, knew perfectly well that this flood of emigration was a costly embarrassment to the West and doubtless they hoped it might destabilize other countries in the region.
I put it to Mr Kosygin that Vietnam was a communist country and a close ally of the Soviet Union, and that he had considerable influence there. What was happening was a disgrace not only to the regime in Vietnam, but to communism as a whole. Could he do nothing to stop it? His words were translated to me: ‘W-e-ll’, he said (or the Russian equivalent), ‘they are all drug-takers or criminals…’ He got no further. ‘What?’, I asked. ‘One million of them? Is communism so bad that a million have to take drugs or steal to live?’ He immediately dropped the subject. But the point had been made and fully understood, as the nervous looks on the faces of his staff — and indeed some of mine — indicated. I could not stop the stream of persecuted refugees but I could and would always challenge the lies with which the communists sought to justify their persecution. After an hour and forty minutes we returned to the plane and resumed the flight to Tokyo. Later I referred the matter to the United Nations — it was too big for any one country to tackle.
The round of international summits makes a prime minister’s life nowadays very different from what it was in the time of Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan or Alec Douglas-Home. While in Opposition I had been sceptical of the value of much of this activity. In government I still worried that summits took up too much time and energy, particularly when there was so much to do at home: within a few months of taking office I had been to Strasbourg to represent Britain in Community matters, I was at Tokyo to represent her in the wider economic forum, and I would soon be going to Lusaka for the meeting of the Commonwealth heads of government.
The G7 had its roots in international action to counter the economic crisis of the mid-1970s. The first meeting was held in 1975 at Rambouillet in France. Since then the numbers attending and the formality of proceedings have increased year by year, and the result has not been an improvement. The principal advantages and disadvantages were well summed up by Chancellor Schmidt. The G7 summits had, he believed, helped the West to avoid what he called ‘beggar my neighbour’ policies — the competitive devaluations and protectionism which had inflicted such economic and political harm during the 1930s. On the other hand, he thought that too often the summits had been tempted to enter into undertakings which could not be kept; I agreed. There was always pressure, to which some governments were all too ready to bend, to come up with forms of words and ambitious commitments which everyone could accept and no one took seriously.
However, the soaring price of oil gave the 1979 Tokyo economic summit more than usual significance. Indeed, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, the cartel of major oil producers) was meeting at the same time as the G7, its principal customers.[25] While we were in Tokyo the price of a barrel of Saudi oil rose from $14.54 to $18, with many OPEC crudes going higher still. Consequently, all the talk was of how to limit western dependency on oil and of deceptively specific targets to be met by particular dates. But I knew that the main way of reducing consumption was to allow the price mechanism to do its job. The danger, if we did not, was that countries would seek to accommodate higher oil prices by printing money, leading to inflation, in the hope of staving off recession and unemployment. We had seen in Britain that inflation was a cause of unemployment rather than an alternative to it, but not everyone had learned that lesson.
The previous summit had been held in Bonn in 1978 when the doctrine of ‘fine tuning demand’ had still been fashionable. Germany had then been expected to act, as the jargon had it, as the ‘locomotive’ for growth, pulling the world out of recession. As Chancellor Schmidt was to tell the summit leaders at Tokyo, the main result had been to put up German inflation: he would not go down that path again. At Bonn there had been no new heads of government present and the old nostrums prevailed. At Tokyo, by contrast, there were three newcomers — the Japanese Prime Minister and Conference Chairman, Mr Ohira, the new Prime Minister of Canada, Joe Clark, and myself. Apart from me, the strongest advocates of free market economics were Helmut Schmidt and, to an even greater extent, Count Otto von Lambsdorff, his Finance minister.
On leaving the plane at Tokyo airport, I stepped into a huge crowd of reporters (some two thousand reporters attended these summits then, and more now). They had turned out to see that extraordinary, almost unprecedented, phenomenon — a woman prime minister. The weather was extremely hot and humid. There was very tight security. I was glad when we arrived at the hotel where the great majority of foreign delegates, with the exception of the President of the United States, were staying. Soon after my arrival, I went to see President Carter at the United States Embassy where we talked over our approach to the issues which would arise, especially energy consumption, which posed a particular problem — and one with important political implications — for the US. Mrs Carter and Amy joined us at the end of the meeting. In spite of press criticism, the Carters obviously enjoyed having their daughter travelling with them — and why not, I thought.
It was impossible not to like Jimmy Carter. He was a deeply committed Christian and a man of obvious sincerity. He was also a man of marked intellectual ability with a grasp, rare among politicians, of science and the scientific method. But he had come into office as the beneficiary of Watergate rather than because he had persuaded Americans of the Tightness of his analysis of the world around them.
And, indeed, that analysis was badly flawed. He had an unsure handle on economics and was therefore inclined to drift into a futile ad hoc interventionism when problems arose. His windfall profits tax and controls on energy prices, for instance, only transformed the OPEC-induced price rises, which they were intended to cure, into unpopular queues at filling stations. In foreign affairs, he was over-influenced by the doctrines then gaining ground in the Democratic Party that the threat from communism had been exaggerated and that US intervention in support of right-wing dictators was almost as culpable. Hence he found himself surprised and embarrassed by such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iran’s seizure of American diplomats as hostages. And in general he had no large vision of America’s future so that, in the face of adversity, he was reduced to preaching the austere doctrine of limits to growth that was unpalatable, even alien, to the American imagination.
In addition to these political flaws, he was in some ways personally ill-suited to the presidency, agonizing over big decisions and too concerned with detail. Finally, he violated Napoleon’s rule that generals should be lucky. His presidency was dogged with bad luck from OPEC to Afghanistan. What it served to demonstrate, however, was that in leading a great nation decency and assiduousness are not enough. Having said which, I repeat that I liked Jimmy Carter; he was a good friend to me and to Britain; and if he had come to power in the different circumstances of the post-Cold War world, his talents might have been more apposite.
That evening the European members of the summit met together for dinner, hosted by President Giscard. The Community had, of course, already agreed its own approach to energy at Strasbourg. The main issue now was how this would fit in with that which the three non-EC governments at the G7 wished to pursue.
The following morning, after the inevitable photographs, the first session began in the Conference Room on the second floor of the Akasaka Palace. Delegations sat around an oblong table and were arranged in alphabetical order: it was always useful that this placed us next to the United States. The precise arrangements for the arrival of the leaders reflected formal considerations of precedence, heads of state arriving after heads of government, and the order in each category determined by length of time in office. Precedence meant most to the French and least to the Americans: in fact, neither Jimmy Carter nor Ronald Reagan took much notice of it at all. As the rest of us sat there we would speculate as to who would manage to arrive last.
The meeting began, as usual, with a short general speech by each head of government. Chancellor Schmidt spoke before me in the first session, and after me in the second. We found ourselves stressing exactly the same points — the importance of the battle against inflation and the crucial role of the price mechanism in limiting energy consumption. My interventions appeared to be well received — not least by the Germans, as Count Lambsdorff subsequently told us. It was perhaps the nearest we ever came to an Anglo-German entente. I noted that many of our present difficulties stemmed from the pursuit of Keynesian policies with their emphasis on the deficit financing of public expenditure and I stressed the need to control the money supply in order to defeat inflation. There followed, after Mr Ohira and Chancellor Schmidt had taken a similar line, an extraordinary intervention by President Giscard in which he mounted a spirited defence of Lord Keynes and clearly rejected the basic free market approach as unnecessarily deflationary. Sig. Andreotti — Italy’s Prime Minister then and again in my last days as Prime Minister — endorsed the French view. It was a revealing expression of the fundamental philosophical differences which divide the Community.
It was also revealing about the personalities of President Giscard and Prime Minister Andreotti. President Giscard d’Estaing was never someone to whom I warmed. I had the strong impression that the feeling was mutual. This was more surprising than it seems, for I have a soft spot for French charm and, after all, President Giscard was seen as a man of the Right. But he was a difficult interlocutor, speaking in paragraphs of perfectly crafted prose which seemed to brook no interruption. Moreover, his politics were very different from mine: though he had the manners of an aristocrat, he had the mind-set of a technocrat. He saw politics as an élite sport to be carried on for the benefit of the people but not really with their participation. There might be something to be said for this if technocrats really were cool intellectual guardians above the passions and interests of the rest of us. But President Giscard was as likely as anyone to be swept away by intellectual and political fashion; he simply expressed his passions coldly.
Prime Minister Andreotti was no more on my wavelength than the French President. Even more than the latter, this apparently indispensable participant in Italian governments represented an approach to politics which I could not share. He seemed to have a positive aversion to principle, even a conviction that a man of principle was doomed to be a figure of fun. He saw politics as an eighteenth-century general saw war: a vast and elaborate set of parade ground manoeuvres by armies that would never actually engage in conflict but instead declare victory, surrender or compromise as their apparent strength dictated in order to collaborate on the real business of sharing the spoils. A talent for striking political deals rather than a conviction of political truths might be required by Italy’s system and it was certainly regarded as de rigueur in the Community, but I could not help but find something distasteful about those who practised it.
For all their hospitality, it would be difficult to claim too much for the quality of Japan’s chairmanship of the proceedings. At one stage I intervened to clarify for the sake of the officials — the ‘sherpas’ as they are known — precisely which of the two alternative draft communiqués we were discussing. While we were entertained that evening at a banquet given by the Emperor of Japan, the sherpas began their work. At about two o’clock in the morning, still in my evening dress, I went to see how the communiqué drafters were getting on with their work. I found them refining their earlier draft in the light of our discussions and setting out alternative forms of words where decisions would be required from the summit the following day. I hoped we would be as businesslike as they evidently were.
The following day we met once again at the Akasaka Palace to go through the communiqué, always a tedious and lengthy process. There was some disagreement between the Americans and the Europeans about the base year from which to set our different targets for the reduction of oil imports. But for me perhaps the most revealing discussion concerned the Japanese target. Until almost the last moment it was far from clear whether Mr Ohira’s advisers would allow him to give a figure at all. Since I was quite convinced that the market itself would achieve the necessary limitation of oil consumption, regardless of what we announced, it all seemed rather academic to me. When in the end the Japanese did announce their figures no one had any idea what sort of reduction they constituted, if any; but President Carter warmly congratulated them all the same.
And so the communiqué was issued and the customary press conference held. The most important decision made had nothing to do with checking oil consumption. It was that, despite the inclinations of several G7 governments, we were not going to fall into the trap of trying to achieve a co-ordinated reflation of demand. It was a useful signal for the future.
From Tokyo I flew to Canberra, arriving the following morning. This was my third visit to Australia, though it was to be only a brief one. There was time to see my daughter, Carol, who was working as a journalist there, but my main purpose was to talk to Malcolm Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister. I briefed him on what had taken place at Tokyo. But even more important, we discussed the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka at which Rhodesia would inevitably be the main issue. Over the next eight months, Rhodesia was to take up a great deal of my time.
Rhodesia had been a long-standing source of grief to successive British governments, and an acute problem since Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. It had caused particular difficulties for the Conservative Party, a large section of which believed that the economic sanctions imposed against the illegal regime were futile and damaging and insisted on voting against them when they came up for annual renewal. Both the Conservative and Labour front benches had long been committed to seek a settlement on the basis of the so-called ‘six principles’ whose fundamental purpose was to lay down the conditions for a transition to black majority rule, while upholding the rights of the white minority and ensuring true democracy, the rule of law and an end to discrimination. But this degree of common ground between the leaders of both parties was not necessarily shared by their supporters.
The elections of April 1979 in Rhodesia fundamentally changed the whole position. Under the new constitution, worked out under the ‘internal settlement’ with Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa was elected as head of a black majority government, in a 64 per cent turn-out of a black majority electorate. The ‘Patriotic Front’ parties — the guerillas of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo — had not, of course, taken part in the elections. Viscount Boyd of Merton — a former Conservative Colonial Secretary — had attended as an observer and reported back to me, as Leader of the Opposition, that the elections had been fairly conducted. It was generally considered that all of the six principles had now been fulfilled and there was wide expectation that we would recognize the new government when we took office.
However, I was well aware that what the people of Rhodesia needed above all was peace and stability. It was the war, relentlessly carried on by the guerillas, which had forced the white minority government to make concessions: that war had to be ended. To bring peace we had either to win international acceptance for the new regime or bring about the changes which would win such acceptance.
The first and most immediate problem was the attitude of the neighbouring ‘front line’ African states. They must, if at all possible, be won over. We sent Lord Harlech, another former Conservative minister and an ex-Ambassador to Washington, for talks with the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi and Angola. He also went to Mozambique and Nigeria. I was not at all keen at this stage that he should even talk to the leaders of the Patriotic Front, Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo: their forces had carried out atrocities which disgusted everyone and I was as keen to avoid dealings with terrorists abroad as I would be at home. However, unpleasant realities had to be faced. Peter Carrington’s view was that it was essential to secure the widest possible recognition for a Rhodesian regime, since that country held the key to the whole South African region. He turned out to be right.
Accordingly, Lord Harlech did see the Patriotic Front leaders as well as Bishop Muzorewa and others. His mission at least made clear how large were the obstacles to achieving an end to the war. In July the Organization of African Unity (OAU) endorsed the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe. Nigeria, with which Britain had important economic ties, was bitterly hostile to the Muzorewa Government. Black African states insisted on viewing Bishop Muzorewa’s Government as nothing more than a façade for continued white minority rule. The fact that this greatly underrated the change which the internal settlement had effected did nothing to reduce the consequences of their attitude for Rhodesia.
Although we did not intend to continue the joint Anglo-American approach pursued by Labour, which had got nowhere, the attitude of the United States was of vital importance. President Carter was under strong political pressure from US black and liberal opinion. The Administration would soon have to say whether Bishop Muzorewa’s Government met the conditions set by Congress, without which recognition and the lifting of sanctions by the US would not be possible. It was likely that the conclusion would be that it did not meet those conditions.
Yet the situation did offer opportunities, if we were able to grasp them. First, nearly everyone considered that it was Britain’s responsibility to solve the problem, and even though this frequently made us the object of criticism it also gave us a relatively free hand if we knew how to use it. Second, there was a great weariness among the parties involved and not just the Rhodesians themselves. The surrounding African states were finding it costly, disruptive and dangerous to play host to the two guerilla armies, themselves the target of the well-trained and effective Rhodesian army. Nkomo’s forces in Zambia were said to outnumber Zambia’s own army. There was a real desire for a settlement. But how to reach it?
Our best chance of a breakthrough was likely to be at the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. This would be the first regular Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Africa. Zambia adjoined the Rhodesian war zone. It was also land-locked, so that the Queen, who is traditionally present during the first days as Head of the Commonwealth (though she does not open or attend the meeting) could not use the Royal Yacht Britannia. There were, accordingly, some worries about Her Majesty’s safety, on which it was my responsibility to advise. My feeling was that there was no reason why her visit should not go ahead, and I gave that advice shortly before the start of the Queen’s African tour, from which she went on direct to Lusaka where she received an enormous welcome. I, by contrast, was far from being their favourite person, when, late in the evening of Monday 30 July, I arrived in Lusaka to face, without prior notice, a hostile and demanding press conference.
We had put the long flight out to good use, working through the precise approach we should take. I had a first-class team of advisers, and, of course, a first-class Foreign Secretary — with whom I had a lively exchange when he suggested that our mission was really a ‘damage limitation exercise’, at that time (as I told him) a phrase I had never even heard. I said that I wanted to do better than that; and between us in the end we managed to do so.
Our strategy was to take full responsibility ourselves for reaching a settlement. The task in Lusaka was to persuade the Commonwealth leaders to accept this, and to acknowledge that the Rhodesian problem was not the responsibility of the Commonwealth as a whole. To obtain that result we had to make it clear that Britain would be ready to resume authority in Rhodesia and to hold fresh elections. We knew also that there would have to be significant changes to the present constitution of Rhodesia if, after elections, the new government was to receive international recognition and acceptance. Those changes could only be brought about by some kind of Constitutional Conference bringing together all sides. The decision whether or not to hold such a conference would very much depend on how matters went at Lusaka.
My arrival in Zambia coincided with an announcement by the Nigerian Government that it was nationalizing BP’s Nigerian oil assets. This was not a good start, but I went on to have an extremely useful day of talks with other heads of government before the conference officially began on the Tuesday. There was, in fact, a high turn out: 27 heads of government were present and all 39 full Commonwealth members were represented. Our host was President Kenneth Kaunda. At the closed session, the opening speech — one of the best of the conference — was given by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore who reviewed international political developments. But much serious business was done ‘in the margins’, as the diplomatic jargon has it, of the larger meetings. For example, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka asked me whether a substantial sum of British overseas aid was still available for the construction of the massive Victoria Dam in his country. I confirmed it on a postcard — undoubtedly one of the most expensive I have ever written.
However, it was the situation in Rhodesia which had to be the real priority. In my opening public statement at the conference on the Wednesday I said that we would ‘listen with the greatest attention to what is said at this meeting in Lusaka’. But on Friday, at the conference’s closed session to discuss Rhodesia, I was able to be much more specific. I said that everyone should recognize just how much had changed as a result of Bishop Muzorewa’s election even though ‘there are those who seem to believe that the world should simply go on treating [him] as if he were Mr Smith.’ I drew attention to the extensive international consultations we had undertaken to identify a solution. I acknowledged that from these we had learned the strength of the view ‘that the constitution under which Bishop Muzorewa has come to power is defective in certain important respects’, in particular the provisions whereby the white minority could block all unwelcome constitutional change. We had also observed that those consulted criticized the composition and powers of the various service commissions, and I noted ‘it is clearly wrong that the Government of [Rhodesia/Zimbabwe] should not have adequate control over certain senior appointments.’ We had been told that it was essential that the the Patriotic Front should be able to return and take a full part in politics. Finally, we had been impressed by the general conviction that any solution must derive its authority from Britain as the responsible colonial power.
I summed up our intentions:
The British Government are wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia… We accept that our objective must be to establish… independence on the basis of a constitution comparable with the constitutions we have agreed with other countries… We will therefore present our proposals as quickly as possible to all the parties, and at the same time call on them to cease hostilities and move forward with us to a settlement.
It had been agreed to hold back the debate on southern Africa until the Friday so that after it the heads of government could go straight to their customary informal weekend retreat for private discussions on Rhodesia’s future. My task was to win the support of the key figures there. A small group was set up consisting of myself and Peter Carrington, Mr (now Sir) Sonny Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, President Kaunda of Zambia, President Nyerere of Tanzania, Messrs Fraser and Manley, the Prime Ministers of Australia and Jamaica and Mr Adefope, the representative of Nigeria. Sir Anthony Duff, who was part of my team, drafted the heads of agreement. It all went remarkably smoothly until the very end. Our meeting ended successfully at Sunday lunch time and the full version of the agreement was to have been discussed and endorsed by the full conference on Monday morning. However, on Sunday afternoon Malcolm Fraser chose to brief the Australian press. This required some rapid and unconventional action.
That evening we all attended a Commonwealth service in Lusaka Cathedral, where we had the benefit of a long polemical sermon from the Archbishop. I had been told already that the press knew the substance of what had been decided. Sonny Ramphal and I were sitting together; he was to read the first lesson, and I the second. After he had read his I showed him a note I had received from Peter Carrington about Malcolm Fraser’s intervention, suggesting that we must now brief the British press on what had taken place, subject to the Secretary-General’s approval. On the back of my hymn sheet, while I was reading the second lesson, Mr Ramphal wrote an alternative suggestion. The heads of government had been invited to a barbecue that evening at Malcolm Fraser’s conference villa: we could hold a meeting there and settle a communiqué to be issued at once. This seemed to me an excellent idea. I agreed to telephone Kenneth Kaunda immediately after the service to warn him of what we had in mind. And so the meeting came about. It took an hour and there were some very pointed comments. I was none too pleased with Malcolm Fraser myself. But the conclusion was satisfactory. Indeed, most of us were relieved that it had all been so amicable and that our proceedings could therefore end a day early.
I returned home on Wednesday morning. I was well pleased with what had been achieved, so much of it by Peter Carrington and Tony Duff. Many had believed that we could not come out of Lusaka with an agreement on the lines we wanted. We had proved them wrong. We had incidentally proved the Zambian press wrong too: they had so convinced themselves beforehand of the truth of their own propaganda about me that it was clearly a shock to find that they were dealing with a real person rather than a colonial cardboard cut-out. I had no illusions about the scale of the task ahead: it was never going to be easy to steer Rhodesia to independence, legitimacy and stability. But after Lusaka I believed that it could be done, and that we had won the African good will to carry it through successfully.
Britain accordingly called a Constitutional Conference for the interested parties at Lancaster House in London in September. Its purpose was emphasized as being not just to talk but to reach a settlement. Peter Carrington arranged the agenda to take the most difficult questions last, so that the first item to be agreed was the new constitution; only then would come the question of the transitional arrangements; and finally the calling of a cease-fire. We calculated that the longer the conference continued, the less any of the interested parties would be willing to take responsibility for breaking it up. We reserved to ourselves the task of putting forward final proposals in each phase and we required the parties to respond, even if these proposals did not meet all their objectives. At each stage we had to exert pressure — direct and indirect — on the two sides to reach a satisfactory compromise. Peter Carrington chaired the conference with great skill and took charge of its day-to-day work. My role lay outside it. The heads of the ‘front line’ states came to London in person or sent in High Commissioners to see me for a progress report. President Machel of Mozambique was especially helpful in putting pressure on Robert Mugabe. I also gave dinner for President Nyerere, another strong backer of Mr Mugabe. His concern was how to blend the three separate armies — the two guerilla armies and the Rhodesian army — into one, a task which in fact would fall to the British army to achieve. The Lancaster House proposals could not have got through without the support of the Presidents of the ‘front line’ states and, indeed, many other Commonwealth countries.
Just after the conference concluded, all three rival leaders — Bishop Muzorewa, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo — came to see me together at No. 10. We talked upstairs in my study. They were in contemplative mood, pondering the future. I had the clear impression that each of them expected to win. Perhaps that was just as well.
Probably the most sensitive aspect of our approach related to the transitional arrangements: it was clear to me that, both for constitutional and practical reasons, Britain must resume direct authority in Rhodesia until the elections were over, though for as short a period as possible. On 15 November a bill was introduced to provide for the appointment of a Governor and for sanctions to be removed as soon as he arrived in Rhodesia. Christopher Soames accepted the post. The decision to send him, as Governor, to Salisbury on 12 December, even before the Patriotic Front had accepted the cease-fire proposals, certainly involved some risk and was much criticized at the time. But we were clear that the momentum had to be maintained. Moreover, Christopher was an ideal appointment: not only did he have the authority of a Cabinet minister and wide diplomatic experience, he and his wife, Mary, had precisely the right style to carry off this most delicate and demanding job. Heavy pressure from the US and the ‘front line’ states finally led the Patriotic Front to accept the proposals for the cease-fire on 17 December, and the agreement was finally initialled on 21 December. I telephoned the Soameses in Salisbury on Christmas Day to wish them the season’s greetings and ask how things were. The reply was that in spite of several severe breaches of the cease-fire and some clear intimidation by the supporters of Mr Mugabe, the situation looked increasingly hopeful.
The outcome of the elections is well known. Mr Mugabe’s party, to most people’s surprise, won an overwhelming victory. On 18 April Rhodesia, as the Republic of Zimbabwe, finally received its independence.
It was sad that Rhodesia/Zimbabwe finished up with a Marxist government in a continent where there were too many Marxists malad-ministering their countries’ resources. But political and military realities were all too evidently on the side of the guerilla leaders. A government like that of Bishop Muzorewa, without international recognition, could never have brought to the people of Rhodesia the peace that they wanted and needed above all else. From the British point of view the settlement also had large benefits. With the Rhodesian question finally solved, we again played an effective role in dealing with other Commonwealth — and especially African — issues, including the pressing problem of the future of Namibia and the longer-term challenge of bringing peaceful change to South Africa. Britain had demonstrated her ability, by a combination of honest dealing and forceful diplomacy, to settle one of the most intractable disputes arising from her colonial past.
With the Lancaster House Conference still in progress, I had to turn my mind once again to the vexed question of how to negotiate a substantial reduction in Britain’s net contribution to the European Community budget. Figures had at long last been put on the size of that contribution and henceforth it was difficult for anyone to deny the scale of the problem. Also the European Commission had produced a report which indicated that it was indeed possible, in line with well-established Community principles, to achieve a ‘broad balance’ between British contributions and receipts. There were, therefore, some grounds for optimism, but I had no illusion that a settlement would be easy and I was well aware of the possibility of sharp practice. British officials had indicated to those of the presidency my concern at the procedural wrangles which had characterized the previous Strasbourg Council and my desire that the presidency should take a firm line and get the budget discussed early.
By this time, the member states of the Community knew that we were serious. On 18 October I delivered in Luxemburg the 1979 Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture, which, as the occasion required, dealt principally with foreign affairs.
I warned:
I must be absolutely clear about this. Britain cannot accept the present situation on the Budget. It is demonstrably unjust. It is politically indefensible: I cannot play Sister Bountiful to the Community while my own electorate are being asked to forego improvements in the fields of health, education, welfare and the rest.
We had also taken every opportunity to seek wider understanding of the merits of our case. I had talks in Bonn with Helmut Schmidt at the end of October, and on 19 and 20 November there was a two-day Anglo-French summit in London. The Germans and the French knew that I meant business.
In the run up to the Dublin Council, we examined carefully the measures available to us to bring pressure on the Community. Christopher Soames, who had great experience of the ways and wiles of the Europeans, sent me a note to the effect that the Community had never been renowned for taking unpleasant decisions without long wrangling and that I should not worry too much about the cards in my hand because a major country like Britain could disrupt the Community very effectively if it chose. I noted his advice. In this spirit, we had examined quite early on — though we looked at it again later — the possibility of withholding British payments to the Community. For practical and legal reasons this always seemed a non-starter. Nevertheless, I believed that even the possibility caused satisfactory anxiety in the Commission, whose pressure to get a satisfactory settlement was vital. We also had the lever of refusing to agree agricultural price increases, which the French and German Governments — each facing elections — wanted to see. Our moral position was strengthened, too, by the fact that the French had broken the EC law by obstructing British lamb imports: the European Court of Justice found against them on 25 September — though morality counts for little in the Community.
At the next Council — in Dublin at the end of November, the Irish having now assumed the European Community Presidency — the issue of our budget contribution dominated the business. The obvious security risk from the IRA required that I be lodged overnight in splendid isolation in Dublin Castle, the former seat of British rule. The Irish press enjoyed the idea that I slept in the bed used by Queen Victoria in 1897, though I had the advantage over her of a portable shower in my room. Indeed, I was very well looked after. The hospitality was perhaps the best feature of the visit, and contrasted strongly with the atmosphere at the meetings which was extremely and increasingly hostile. I had expected something of the sort. I went to Dublin with a newly tailored suit. Ordinarily I would have enjoyed wearing something new on an occasion as important as this, but I thought twice: I didn’t want to risk tainting it with unhappy memories. This was not, though, the only wise decision I made at Dublin: the principal one was to say very clearly, and with at least as much force as at Strasbourg, the word ‘no’.
The Council opened amicably enough in Phoenix Park at the Irish President’s official residence where he hosted lunch. Back in the Council at Dublin Castle we got down to business. My opening speech set out the facts of our case in somewhat greater detail than at Strasbourg and I elaborated on them in the vigorous debate which followed. There was a good deal of argument about the figures, at the root of which was an obscure and complex issue — how to calculate the losses and gains resulting to individual states from the operation of the CAP. But which ever way one did the sums, there was no doubt that the UK was making a huge net contribution, and unless it was mitigated it was about to become the biggest. We were not arguing that we should be net beneficiaries (though some in Britain would have wished me to); in fact, we were only asking for a ‘broad balance’. It was unacceptable that at a time when we were making cuts in public spending at home we should be expected to make a net contribution of more than £1 billion a year. I emphasized Britain’s commitment to the Community and our wish to avoid a crisis, but I left no one in any doubt that this is precisely what the Community would face if the problem were not resolved.
We had put forward our own proposals on the budget. But the Commission had come up with some of its own and I was prepared to accept their basic approach as a starting point. First, they proposed that action be taken to shift the weight of Community expenditure generally away from agriculture towards structural and investment programmes. The trouble was that this would take too long — if it happened at all. Second, they proposed, in addition, specific spending on UK projects to boost our receipts. But there simply were not enough suitable projects. Finally, on the contribution side, the 1975 Correction Mechanism had so far failed to cut our payments. If it were reformed on the lines the Commission was proposing, it could help reduce our net contributions — but still not by enough: we would still be contributing about the same as Germany and much more than France. Something far more radical would be required.
I made one other point which was to prove of some significance. I said that, ‘the arrangement [must] last as long as the problem.’ It seemed to me then, and even more so by the end of the Council, that we simply could not have these battles every year, all to establish what common sense and equity ought to have made self-evident from the beginning.
It quickly became clear that I was not going to make the other heads of government see matters like this. Some, for example the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr Andries Van Agt, were reasonable, but most were not. I had the strong feeling that they had decided to test whether I was able and willing to stand up to them. It was quite shameless: they were determined to keep as much of our money as they could. By the time the Council broke up Britain had been offered a refund of only £350 million, implying a net contribution of some £650 million. That refund was just not big enough and I was not going to accept it. I had agreed that there should be another Council to discuss the matter further, but I was not overoptimistic after what I had seen and heard in Dublin. For me it went much further than hard bargaining about money, which was inevitable. What I would not accept was the attitude that fairness as such did not seem to enter into the equation at all. I was completely sincere when I had said that Britain was asking no more than its due; and my anger when such a proposition was regarded with cynical indifference was equally genuine.
It was while reflecting on the quintessentially un-English outlook displayed by the Community at this time and later that I came across the following lines from Kipling’s ‘Norman and Saxon’ in my old, battered collection of my favourite poet’s verse. The Norman baron with large estates is warning his son about our English forefathers, the Anglo-Saxons, and says:
The Saxon is not like us Normans. His manners are not so polite.
But he never means anything serious till he talks about justice and right.
When he stands like an ox in the furrow with his sullen set eyes on your own,
And grumbles, ‘This isn’t fair dealing’, My son, leave the Saxon alone.
At the press conference after the Council, I gave a vigorous defence of our position. I said that the other states should not have ‘expected me to settle for a third of a loaf. I also refused to accept the communautaire language about ‘own resources’. I continued to state without apology that we were talking about Britain’s money, not Europe’s. I said:
I am only talking about our money, no one else’s; there should be a cash refund of our money to bring our receipts up to the average level of receipts in the Community.
Most of the other heads of government were furious. The Irish press was vitriolic. One British newspaper, The Times, described my performance at the press conference as ‘bravura’, though there was more criticism from the leader columns. The best comment, I felt, was from Le Figaro, which said:
To accuse Mrs Thatcher of wishing to torpedo Europe because she defends the interests of her country with great determination is to question her underlying intentions in the same way that people used to question those of de Gaulle in regard to French interests.
I liked the comparison.
We used the period between the end of the Dublin meeting and the next European Council to press our case, both in public and through diplomatic means. On 29 and 30 January I had talks with the Italian Prime Minister (later President) Francesco Cossiga. I had already had dealings with Sig. Cossiga in 1979 when the Schild family, my constituents, were kidnapped in Sardinia. I had found him highly competent and deeply concerned. He was also a man of principle, as his earlier resignation as Minister of the Interior after the murder of the former Christian Democrat Leader Aldo Moro showed, and as I already knew him to be from my own experience. Italian politics and Italian politicians do not evoke much understanding or sympathy from the British, or indeed from the Italians, and I confess to sharing some of that disenchantment. But Francesco Cossiga was himself a sceptic about the usual Italian practices. He was the nearest thing to an independent in Italian politics; in negotiations he always played a straight hand; he could be relied upon to keep his word, as he did over the stationing of Cruise missiles in Italy; and he was an undoubted Anglophile and a strong admirer of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as the birth of true liberal politics. I was glad that it was Sig. Cossiga who was due to host the next European Council.
On 25 February Helmut Schmidt came to London again. Our talks centred on the question of our budget contribution and on the German Chancellor’s repeated wish to see sterling within the ERM, and — contrary to the usual misleading press reports — they were useful and quite jolly. On 27 and 28 March there was a full scale Anglo-German summit in London. I sought once more to stress how seriously we felt about the British contribution. Subsequently, I learned that Helmut Schmidt had been telling other Community governments that if there were no solution there was a danger that we would withhold British contributions to the Community. So I had created the desired impression. The European Council due for 31 March and 1 April had to be postponed because of a political crisis in Italy (not an unusual event), but we pressed for a new Council before the end of April and it was finally called for Sunday and Monday 27 and 28, to meet in Luxemburg.
At this time, there was a marked hardening of public opinion in Britain as the result of our treatment by the Community. In particular, there was much speculation about possible withholding of Britain’s contributions, which did not displease me, though I was cautious in public on the subject. I said on Panorama on 25 February that we would consider withholding but would be loath to do it because it meant going against Community law. I also went on French television on 10 March and said:
I wouldn’t expect France to be the biggest contributor if she had an income below average in the Community. And I do indeed assure you that your very distinguished French politicians would be the first to complain if that were so.
I gave an interview to Die Welt in which I said:
We shall do our utmost to prevent matters coming to a crisis. But it must be realized that things cannot continue like this.
The atmosphere in Luxemburg turned out to be a good deal better than in Dublin. I was optimistic. From a discussion I had had with Sig. Cossiga, who had spoken to President Giscard, it seemed at first that the French were prepared to set a ceiling on the size of our net contributions for a period of years irrespective of the growth in the overall Community budget, subject to review at the end of the period. This would have been a step forward. On closer examination, however, it became clear that what the French really wanted was to get decisions on their most politically sensitive topics — farm prices in the CAP, lamb and fishing rights — before settling the budget. Finally, it was agreed that parallel meetings should be held over the weekend: Agriculture ministers would meet and so would a group of officials working on the budget issue.
As a result we did not get around to talking about the budget at all at our first session. Indeed, only after dinner, and the usual foreign affairs tour de table, did I obtain agreement that the official group should resume effective negotiation that evening. The French were the main stumbling block: the proposals their officials presented were much less helpful to us than President Giscard’s had seemed to be. In the meantime, the Agriculture ministers of the other governments of the Community had agreed on a package of proposals which would have raised farm prices, increasing again the proportion of the Community budget devoted to agriculture (quite contrary to the proposals put forward in Dublin) and giving the French a sheep meat regime which was more or less all that they wanted. Against this — for us — distinctly unfavourable background, we received eventually the offer of a limit on our net contribution of about £325 million, applying only to the year 1980. Under a subsequent proposal our net contribution would have been limited to about £550 million for 1981 as well.
My reaction was that this was too little. But above all I was not prepared to have a settlement that only lasted for two years. Helmut Schmidt, Roy Jenkins (President of the Commission) and almost everyone else urged me to settle. But I was not willing to return the following year to face precisely the same problem and the attitude that went with it. So I rejected the offer. The draft communiqué, moreover, was unacceptable to us since it continued to insist on the old dogma that ‘own resources are intended to provide the finance for Community policies; they are not contributions from member states.’ Nor did it make reference to the assurances we had been given on our accession to the Community that action would be taken ‘should an unacceptable situation arise’.
Many reacted to my decision in luxemburg with disbelief: in some circles the very last thing expected of a British prime minister was that he or she should quite so unashamedly defend British interests. But there was, I noted, a contrast between the reaction in some of the press which was extremely hostile and the reaction in the House of Commons and the country, which was thoroughly supportive.
In fact, we were a good deal closer to a settlement than was widely recognized. Great progress had already been made in winning agreement to substantial reductions in our contribution. What remained was to secure these reductions for the first two years with a reliable undertaking for the third. We had a number of powerful levers by which we could apply pressure to this end. The French were increasingly desperate to achieve their aims in the Agriculture Council. There was even talk of overriding the British veto by abrogating the so-called Luxemburg compromise of 1966, established to accommodate de Gaulle. (This was an understanding rather than a formal agreement with the force of law, which enabled any one country to block a majority decision when its vital national interests were at stake.) In fact, precisely this did happen at the Agriculture Council in May 1982 — and this during the Falklands War. However, at this particular time it would have been a dangerous move, particularly since the French had already been found in breach of Community law over lamb imports. The Germans, too, were keen to see higher agricultural prices. Most important of all, the Community would, we thought, probably reach the limit of its financial resources in 1982. Its persistent overspending was catching up with it, and greater resources could only be made available with British agreement. Ultimately our negotiating position was a strong one.
It soon became clear that Luxemburg, following the clashes in Dublin, had had the desired effect. In spite of talk of the Luxemburg offer having now been ‘withdrawn’, there was evidence of a general desire to solve the budget issue before the next full European Council at Venice in June. The easiest way to achieve this appeared to be a meeting of the Community Foreign ministers.
Peter Carrington, having received his mandate from me, flew to Brussels on Thursday 29 May with Ian Gilmour. After a marathon eighteen-hour session they came back with what they considered an acceptable agreement, arriving at lunch time on Friday to brief me at Chequers.
My immediate reaction was far from favourable. The deal involved a net budget contribution in 1980 higher than envisaged at Luxemburg. It appeared from Peter’s figures that we would pay rather less under the new package in 1981, though to some extent this was sleight of hand, reflecting different assumptions about the size of that year’s total budget. But the Brussels proposal had one great advantage: it now offered us a three-year solution. We were promised a major review of the budget problem by mid-1981 and if this had not been achieved (as proved to be the case) the Commission would make proposals along the lines of the formula for 1980–81 and the Council would act accordingly. The other elements of the Brussels package relating to agriculture, lamb and fisheries, were more or less acceptable. We had to agree a 5 per cent rise in farm prices. Overall, the deal marked a refund of two-thirds of our net contribution and it marked huge progress from the position the Government had inherited. I therefore decided to accept the offer.
Wider international affairs had not stood still while we were engaged in bringing Rhodesia to legal independence and negotiating a reduction in our Community Budget contribution. In November 1979, forty-nine American diplomatic personnel had been taken hostage in Iran, a source of deep and growing humiliation to the greatest western power. In December at the invitation of President Carter I made a short visit to the United States — the first of many as Prime Minister. In a short speech at my reception on the White House Lawn I went out of my way to reaffirm my support for American leadership of the West. Then in a speech the next day in New York I warned of the dangers of Soviet ambitions and urged the need for strong western defence:
The immediate threat from the Soviet Union is military rather than ideological. The threat is not only to our security in Europe and North America but also, both directly and by proxy, in the Third World… we can argue about Soviet motives but the fact is that the Russians have the weapons and are getting more of them. It is simple prudence for the West to respond.
I also undertook to support the United States in the UN Security Council in seeking international economic sanctions against Iran under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The President and I discussed defence and the situation in Ulster. I took the opportunity to thank him for all he had been doing behind the scenes in the final stages of the negotiations on Rhodesia.
Then, at the end of 1979, the world reached one of those genuine watersheds which are so often predicted, which so rarely occur — and which take almost everyone by surprise when they do: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In April 1978, the Government of Afghanistan had been overthrown in a communist-inspired coup; a pro-Soviet government was established, which, however, was met by widespread opposition and eventual rebellion. In September 1979 the new President, Taraki, was himself overthrown and killed by his deputy, Hafizullah Amin. On 27 December, Amin in turn was overthrown and killed, to be replaced by Babrak Karmal, whose regime was supported by thousands of Soviet troops.
The Soviets had long considered Afghanistan to have a special strategic significance and sought to exercise influence there through so-called ‘Treaties of Friendship’. It was said that they were probably concerned, in the light of events in Iran, at the possibility of anarchy in Afghanistan leading to a second fundamentalist Muslim state on their borders, which might destabilize their own subject Muslim population. The West had for some time been anxious that the Soviets would make a drive for the oil in the Gulf. And the energy crisis gave them a still stronger reason to do so.
Perhaps I was less shocked than some by the invasion of Afghanistan. I had long understood that détente had been ruthlessly used by the Soviets to exploit western weakness and disarray. I knew the beast.
What had happened in Afghanistan was only part of a wider pattern. The Soviets had instigated Cubans and East Germans to advance their aims and ambitions in Africa. They had been working to further communist subversion throughout the Third World, and for all the talk of international peace and friendship, they had built up armed forces far beyond their defensive needs. Whatever their precise motives now in Afghanistan, they must have known that they had threatened the stability of Pakistan and Iran — the latter unstable enough already under the Ayatollah — and were within 300 miles of the Straits of Hormuz. Moreover, bad as the situation was in itself, it could be worse as a precedent. There were other areas of the world in which the Soviets might prefer aggression to diplomacy, if they now prevailed: for example, Marshal Tito was evidently approaching the end of his life in Yugoslavia and there could be opportunities for Soviet intervention there. They clearly had to be punished for their aggression and taught, albeit belatedly, that the West would not only talk about freedom but was prepared to make sacrifices to defend it.
On Friday 28 December President Carter rang me at Chequers and we discussed at length what the Soviets were doing in Afghanistan and what our reaction should be. What had happened was a bitter blow to him. Britain had not felt able to comply with all that the Americans had wanted of us in response to the hostage crisis: in particular, we were not willing (or indeed legally able) to freeze Iranian financial assets, which would have had a devastating effect on international confidence in the City of London as a world financial centre. However, I was determined that we should follow America’s lead now in taking action against the USSR and its puppet regime in Kabul. We therefore decided on a range of measures, including the curtailment of visits and contacts, non-renewal of the Anglo-Soviet credit agreement and a tightening of the rules on technology transfer. I also sought to mobilize the governments of the European Community to support the Americans. But, like President Carter, I was sure that the most effective thing we could do would be to prevent their using the forthcoming Moscow Olympics for propaganda purposes. Unfortunately, most of the British Olympic team decided to attend the Games, though we tried to persuade them otherwise: of course, unlike their equivalents in the Soviet Union, our athletes were left free to make up their own minds. At the UN our ambassador, Tony Parsons, helped to rally the ‘non-aligned’ countries to condemn the Soviet Union’s aggression. In London, on 3 January, I saw the Soviet Ambassador to enlarge in vigorous terms on the contents of my exchanges by telegram with President Brezhnev.
From now on, the whole tone of international affairs began to change, and for the better. Hard-headed realism and strong defence became the order of the day. The Soviets had made a fatal miscalculation: they had prepared the way for the renaissance of America under Ronald Reagan.
But this was the future. America had still to go through the humiliating agony of the failed attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages. As I watched President Carter’s television broadcast explaining what had happened, I felt America’s wound as if it were Britain’s own; and in a sense it was, for anyone who exposed American weakness increased ours. I was soon, though, in a position to demonstrate that there would be no flinching when it came to dealing with our own brand of Middle East terrorism.
I first learned of the terrorist attack on the Iranian Embassy at Prince’s Gate in Knightsbridge on Wednesday 30 April during a visit I was making to the BBC. The early reports were, in fact, misleadingly anodyne. It soon became known, however, that several gunmen had forced their way into the Iranian Embassy and were holding twenty hostages — most of them Iranian staff, but also including a policeman who had been on duty outside and two BBC journalists who had been applying for visas. The gunmen were threatening to blow up both the embassy and the hostages if their demands were not met. The terrorists belonged to an organization calling itself ‘the Group of the Martyr’; they were Iranian Arabs from Arabistan, Iraqi-trained and bitterly opposed to the prevailing regime in Iran. They demanded that a list of 91 prisoners be set free by the Iranian Government, that the rights of Iranian dissidents should be recognized and a special aeroplane provided to take them and the hostages out of Britain. The Iranian Government had no intention of conceding these demands; and we, for our part, had no intention of allowing terrorists to succeed in their hostage taking. I was conscious that, though the group involved was a different one, this was no less an attempt to exploit perceived western weakness than was the hostage taking of the American embassy personnel in Tehran. My policy would be to do everything possible to resolve the crisis peacefully, without unnecessarily risking the lives of the hostages, but above all to ensure that terrorism should be — and be seen to be — defeated.
Willie Whitelaw, as Home Secretary, took immediate charge of operations from the special emergency unit in the Cabinet Office. The unit is immediately activated when a security crisis occurs. On it representatives of the Cabinet Office, Home Office, Foreign Office, military, police and intelligence services advise a minister in the chair — usually, as on this occasion, the Home Secretary; I only once and briefly took this role at the time of the hijack of an aircraft from Tanzania to Stansted. Hour by hour information is gathered, sifted and analysed so that every circumstance and option can be properly evaluated. Throughout the crisis, Willie kept in regular contact with me. In turn the Metropolitan Police kept in touch with the terrorists by a specially laid telephone line. We also made contact with those who might be able to exert some influence over the gunmen. The latter wished to have an Arab country’s ambassador act as intermediary. But we were extremely doubtful about this: there was a risk that the objectives of such an intermediary would be different from our own. Moreover, the Jordanians, whom we were prepared to trust, refused to become involved. A Muslim imam did talk to the terrorists, but without result. It was a stalemate.
Willie and I were completely agreed as to the strategy. We would try patient negotiation; but if any hostages were wounded we would consider an attack on the embassy; and if a hostage were killed we would definitely send in the Special Air Service (SAS). There had to be some flexibility. But what was ruled out from the start was to let the terrorists leave, with or without the hostages.
The position began to deteriorate on Sunday afternoon. I was called back early from Chequers and we were driving back to London when a further message came over the car-phone. There was too much interference on the line to be able to talk easily so I had my driver pull into a lay-by. Apparently, the information was that the hostages’ lives were now at risk. Willie wanted my permission to send in the SAS. ‘Yes, go in’: I said. The car pulled back out onto the road, while I tried to visualize what was happening and waited for the outcome. Executed with the superb courage and professionalism the world now expects of the SAS, the assault took place in the full glare of the television cameras. Of the 19 hostages known to be alive at the time of the assault all were rescued. Four gunmen were killed; one was captured; none escaped. I breathed a sigh of relief when I learned that there were no police or SAS casualties. Later I went to the Regent’s Park Barracks to congratulate our men. I was met by Peter de la Billière, the SAS commander, and then watched what had happened on television news, with a running commentary, punctuated by relieved laughter, from those involved in the assault. One of them turned to me and said, ‘we never thought you’d let us do it.’ Wherever I went over the next few days, I sensed a great wave of pride at the outcome; telegrams of congratulation poured in from abroad: we had sent a signal to terrorists everywhere that they could expect no deals and would extort no favours from Britain.
The Middle East continued to occupy my attention throughout the rest of 1980. At the European Council in Venice on 12 and 13 June the heads of government discussed Israel and the Palestinian question. The key issue was whether the Community governments were to call for the PLO to be ‘associated with’ the Middle East peace talks, or to ‘participate in’ them: I was very much against the latter course, for as long as the PLO did not reject terrorism. In fact, the final communiqué reflected what seemed to me the right balance: it reaffirmed the right of all the states in the region — including Israel — to existence and security, but also demanded justice for all peoples, which implied recognition of of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. So, of course, it pleased no one.
Then the Middle East focus shifted again. In September 1980 Iraq attacked Iran and we were once again in the throes of a new crisis, with potentially dangerous political and economic implications for western interests. Saddam Hussein had decided that the chaos in Iran provided him with a good opportunity to renounce the 1975 Algiers Settlement of the two countries’ disputed claims to the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and seize it by force.
Shortly after the outbreak of the war Peter Carrington came over to Chequers to discuss the situation with me. I was chiefly concerned to prevent the conflict spreading down the Gulf and involving the vulnerable oil-rich Gulf States, which had traditionally close links with Britain. I told Peter that I did not share the common view that the Iranians would quickly be beaten. They were fanatical fighters and had an effective airforce with which they could attack oil installations. I was right: by the end of the year and after initial successes, the Iraqis became bogged down and the war threatened both the stability of the Gulf and western shipping. But by this time we had put in the Armilla Patrol to protect our ships.
As I looked back on the international scene that Christmas of 1980 at Chequers, I reflected that the successes of British foreign policy had helped us through a particularly dark and difficult time in domestic, and particularly economic, affairs. But as in economic matters so in foreign affairs I knew that we were only starting the course. Tackling Britain’s Community budget problem was only the first step to reforming the Community’s finances. Bringing Rhodesia to legal independence was but a prelude to addressing the problem of South Africa. The West’s response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would have to be a fundamental rethinking of our relations with the communist bloc and this had barely begun. The renewed instability in the Gulf as a result of Iraq’s attack on Iran would ultimately require a new commitment by the western powers to the security of the region. All these issues were to dominate British foreign policy in the years ahead.