The Soviet Century - читать бесплатно онлайн полную версию книги автора Moshe Lewin (APPENDICES) #7

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Source: B. P. Kurashvili, Istoricheskaia Logika Stalinizma (Moscow 1996, pp. 159–60).

Numbers of people sentenced for counter-revolutionary and particularly dangerous crimes, and type of penalty imposed. 1921–53.

Years	Total sentenced (persons)	Death sent.	Camps, colonies, prisons	Exiled to*, exiled from	Other measures
1921	35829	9701	21724	1817	2587
1922	6003	1962	2656	166	1219
1923	4794	414	2336	2044	–
1924	12425	2550	4151	5724	–
1925	15995	2433	6851	6274	437
1926	17804	990	7547	8571	696
1927	26036	2363	12267	11235	171
1928	33757	869	16211	15640	1037
1929	56220	2109	25853	24517	3741
1930	208069	20201	114443	58816	14609
1931	180696	10651	105683	63269	1093
1932	141919	22728	73946	36017	29228
1933	239664	2154	138903	54262	44345
1934	78999	2056	59451	5994	11498
1935	267076	1229	185846	33601	46400
1936	274670	1118	219418	23719	30415
1937	790665	353074	429311	1366	6914
1938	554258	328618	205509	16342	3289
1939	63889	2552	54666	3783	2888
1940	71806	1649	65727	2142	2288
1941	75411	8011	65000	1200	1210
1942	124406	23278	88809	7070	5249
1943	78441	3579	68887	4787	1188
1944	75109	3029	70610	649	821
1945	123248	4252	116681	1647	668
1946	123294	2896	117943	1498	957
1947	78810	1105	76581	666	458
1948	73263	–	72552	419	298
1949	75125	–	64509	10316	300
1950	60641	475	54466	5225	475
1951	54775	1609	49142	3425	599
1952	28800	1612	25824	773	591
1953 (first half)	8403	198	7894	38	273
TOTAL	4060306	799455	2634397	423512	215942

* The punishment of exile could take one of two forms. Ssylka refers to being exiled to a specific area and remaining there under police supervision, whether for a set number of years or for life. This was neither a camp nor a prison, but a ‘settlement’, where it was possible to live with one’s family in separate accommodation and perform paid work depending on local possibilities. Vysylka consisted in being banned from living in some particular location (Moscow, say, or Leningrad). Those so condemned could live and work anywhere else. Files on such persons would undoubtedly follow them to their new place of residence.

APPENDIX 2

We may add some data from a source used by Kurashvili – and V. N. Zemskov, a well-known researcher from Moscow, who made a name for himself by publishing reliable figures on the camps and purges long before others. Here I give only a few examples of the widespread practice of proposing enormously inflated figures for Stalin’s repression.

Zemskov engages with Roy Medvedev and Olga Shatunovskaya in his article ‘Gulag – istoriko-sotsiologicheskii aspekt’ (Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia, no. 6, 1991, pp. 12–13). Medvedev claimed that the Gulag expanded by several million people during the 1937–8 purges and that between 5 and 7 million persons fell victim to repression. In fact, the camp population rose from 1,196,369 inmates in January 1937 to 1,881,570 in January 1938, and dropped to 1,672,438 on 1 January 1939. There was indeed an explosion in numbers in 1937–8, but in the hundreds of thousands, not millions. The declaration by Vladimir Kriuchkov (KGB head under Gorbachev) that in 1937–8 ‘there were no more than one million arrests’ corresponds to the Gulag statistics. Zemskov stresses that, according to the official document reproduced in Appendix 1, approximately 700,000 people arrested for political reasons were executed between 1921 and 1953. Shatunovskaya (herself a victim of the repression and later active in the rehabilitation campaign under Khrushchev) asserted that, for the period 1935–41 alone, more than 19 million people were arrested, of whom 7 million were shot – a figure enthusiastically taken up in the West – while the remainder perished in the camps. According to Zemskov, Shatunovskaya has multiplied the figures tenfold – no small exaggeration! Reliable statistics exist for the period 1 January 1934–31 December 1947 indicating that, throughout the Gulag camp complex, 963,766 prisoners died. This figure comprises not just ‘enemies of the people’, but also common law criminals. This number, along with that for those who died during the deportation of the kulaks (raskulachivanie), can be added to the ‘terrible price’ that was paid.

1.5 MILLION SOVIET TRAITORS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In his Novyi Sotsializm (Moscow 1997, pp. 22–7), B. P. Kurashvili offers something of an apologia for the regime, reminding readers that it did have enemies and suggesting that the war saw approximately 1.5 people actively collaborate with the Nazis. No source is given for this estimate, which – and he is right about this – involved around 1 per cent of the active population. But the existence of such collaborators indicates that the purges launched against ‘enemies of the people’ struck blindly at innocent people and spared some real or potential traitors. Many of those who fought with the Germans were captured but not executed. After the war, they were not treated with excessive severity. According to Kurashvili (and certain documents in my possession), many of those who served with the Nazis (Vlassov’s army, Cossack units, units composed of non-Russian nationals), when arrested, were not accused of any concrete crimes but sent for five years to ‘labour battalions’. The same was true of many of the Ukrainian and Baltic state partisans who fought against the regime after the war. This involved some hard-fought battles, with many casualties. However, the majority of partisans who were captured were sent into exile and later amnestied and allowed, from 1960 onwards, to return home. It is possible that such comparative indulgence was designed to placate nationalist circles in the Ukraine and the Baltic countries.

APPENDIX 3

Source: R. G. Pikhoia, Sovetskii Soiuz – Istoriia Vlasti, 1945–1991 (Moscow 1998, pp. 365–6).

Criminal prosecutions versus ‘prophylactic’ measures by the KGB, 1959–74.

A. Criminal prosecutions

–	1959–62	1963–6	1967–70	1971–4
total brought to court	5413	3251	2456	2423
treason	1010	457	423	350
spying	28	8	0	9
antisov. agitprop	1601	502	381	348
smuggling	47	110	183	474
illegal currency operations	587	474	382	401
illegal frontiers crossing	926	613	704	553
divulging state secrets	22	31	-	18
other crimes	1003	1011	321	258

B. ‘Prophylactic’ measures

(These actions were not registered in earlier years)

–	1959–62	1963–66	1967–70	1971–74
‘profiled’ total	–	–	58298	63108
suspicious contacts with foreigners nurturing treasonable intentions	–	–	5039	6310
politically damaging manifestations	–	–	35316	34700
‘profiled’ with community participation	–	–	23611	27079
official warning issued	–	–	–	981
brought to court from those previously ‘profiled’	–	–	100	50

APPENDIX 4

The Interior Ministry as an industrial agency and the Gulag as a supplier of manpower (1946).

Source: RGAE, f. 4372, op. 84, d. 271.

In December 1946 the Gulag’s statistical department produced a report on the number of inmates and ‘special contingents’ that worked for various ministries, the MVD supplying the manpower. A list of forty-seven ministries and government agencies was provided, with the number of inmates employed: heavy industry, military and naval concerns, construction sites for petroleum enterprises, aircraft construction, construction of agricultural machinery, Ministry of Electrical Energy. In a document dated 13 September 1946 addressed to Beria, Kruglov, the Interior Minister, complained that forty-five of the government agencies using labour supplied by the Gulag had not paid for it. They had accumulated a debt of 50 million roubles, putting the Gulag in a difficult financial position. There was no longer enough money to buy food for the inmates (not only were they not paid; they were not even fed!).

Source: RGAE, f 7733, op. 36, d. 2097, LL. 253, 256.

On 1 November 1946, the same Kruglov sent a report to Voznesensky, head of Gosplan, to inform him that the MVD had exceeded the Plan’s targets for industrial (and other) construction sites, and asked for 222 million roubles, on the grounds that he had exceeded the plan as regards investment. A table drew up a list of some seventeen MVD agencies and their investments. It discloses a flourishing network of administrative agencies, managing an ever-growing number of branches (the organizational structure is increasingly difficult to follow). Their administrative creativity is remarkable, and the greater their investment, the higher the salaries of the agencies and the enormous bonuses of the bosses. Especial attention is paid to work linked to defence requirements – the name of these departments and agencies is generally preceded by the prefix spec (abbreviation of the adjective ‘special’ in Russian).

Source: RGAE, f. 7733, op. 36, d. 2291, L. 315.

April 1947: the MVD now possessed twelve branch directorates, managing the production of metals, mining, forestry, sawmills, machine factories, textile enterprises, shoe factories, refineries, gas facilities, concerns processing cobalt and nickel, glass works, rubber factories – the list is long and gives the names of camps (Norilsk, Vorkuta, Uhta, Dal’stroi) celebrated for their output and their very harsh conditions. The very ‘businesslike’ tone ignores or conceals the misery underlying these ‘businesses’ and the moral degeneracy of the managers of this regime.