Utopia in Power

UTOPIA

IN .

POWER

A HISTORY OF THE USSR

FROM 1917 TO THE PRESENT

MICHEL HELLER &

ALEKSANDR NEKRICH

Anyone remotely concerned with Russia will have to read this book'

- Edward Cranks/raw

V

UTOPIA

—IN

PfeWER

THE HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM 1917 TO THE PRESENT

MIKHAIL HELLER

Translated from the Russian by Phyllis B. Carlos

Hutchinson

London • Melbourne • Auckland • Johannesburg

AND

First published in 1982 by Calam-Levy (Paris)

Copyright 1985 by Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich

All rights reserved

This edition first published in 1986 by

Hutchinson Ltd, an imprint of Century Hutchinson Ltd.

Brookmount House, 62-65 Chandos Place, London WC2N 4NW.

Century Hutchinson Publishing Group (Australia) Pty Ltd

PO Box 496, 16-22 Church Street Hawthorn, Melbourne, Victoria 3122

Century Hutchinson Group (NZ) Ltd

PO Box 40-086 . 32-34 View Road Glenfield, Auckland 10

Century Hutchinson Group (SA) Pty Ltd

PO Box 337, Berglvei 2012 South Africa

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Heller, Mikhail

Utopia in power: a history of the USSR from 1917 to the present. 1. Soviet Union—History—1917- I. Title II. Nekrich, Aleksandr III. L'Utopie au pouvoir. English 947.084 DK266

ISBN 0 09 155620 1 cloth 0 09 155621 x pbk

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 7

INTRODUCTION 9

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 13

Chapter 1. BEFORE OCTOBER 1917 15

Chapter 2. FROM THE REALM OF NECESSITY TO THE REALM

OF FREEDOM, 1918-1920 50

Chapter 3. THE SEARCH FOR A "GENERAL LINE," 1921-1925 111

Chapter 4. IN PURSUIT OF CONFLICT, 1926-1928 201

Chapter 5. THE GREAT RUPTURE, 1929-1934 222

Chapter 6. SOCIALISM "ACHIEVED AND WON," 1935-1938 277

Chapter 7. ON THE BRINK, 1939-1941 316

Chapter 8. THE WAR, 1941-1945 370

Chapter 9. THE TWILIGHT OF THE STALIN ERA, 1945-1953 450

Chapter 10. CONFUSION AND HOPE, 1953-1964 512

Chapter 11. "REAL SOCIALISM": THE BREZHNEV ERA,

1965-1982 603

Chapter 12. AFTER BREZHNEV, 1982-1985 702

CONCLUSION 729

CHRONOLOGY 733

NOTES 758

BIBLIOGRAPHY 820

INDEX 846

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My contribution to this book was written at the Russian Re­search Center of Harvard University, where I enjoyed the stimu­lating conversation and encouragement of an unusually congenial group of colleagues. I would also like to thank the National En­dowment for the Humanities, the Ford Foundation, and the American Council of Learned Societies for their support of var­ious portions of this work. Finally, I would like to thank Steven Jones for his valuable contribution in preparing the final version of the English translation.

Aleksandr M. Nekrich

INTRODUCTION

The man of the future is the one who will have

the longest memory.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

From time immemorial history has been written by the victors. "Woe to the vanquished," said the ancient Romans, by which they implied not only that the vanquished may be exterminated or turned into slaves but that the conquerors write the history of their wars; the victors take possession of the past and establish their control over the collective memory. George Orwell, perhaps the only Western writer who profoundly understood the essence of the Soviet world, devised this precise and pitiless formula: "Whoever controls the past controls the future." Orwell was not the first to say this, though. Mikhail Pokrovsky, the first Soviet Marxist historian, anticipated Orwell when he wrote that history is politics applied to the past.

The history of the Soviet Union is not just another example confirming the general rule. In this case history was placed at the service of the state to the greatest possible extent and in the most conscious, systematic way. After the October revolution not only the means of production were na­tionalized but all spheres of existence, and above all, memory, history.

Memory makes us human. Without it people are turned into a formless mass that can be shaped into anything the controllers of the past desire. Count Alexander Benckendorff, a Baltic-German nobleman and Russia's first chief of gendarmes under Tsar Nicholas I, advised this approach to history: "Russia's past is admirable; its present more than magnificent; as for its future, it is beyond the grasp of the most daring imagination; it is from this point of view... that Russian history must be conceived and written." The chief of gendarmes was convinced of the correctness of his view. So was Maxim Gorky, the leading Soviet writer under Joseph Stalin, who said: "We must know everything that happened in the past, not in the way it has been written about heretofore; but rather, in the way it appears in the light of the doctrine of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin."

Benckendorff's worthy suggestions seem to have been adopted and grafted onto the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine, with the result that the Soviet people were successfully deprived of their social memory. In the decades after the Bolshevik revolution an unparalleled expertise was developed in manipulating the past and controlling history. Not only was the history of the Soviet Union controlled and manipulated; the history of Russia and of the nations which had been part of the Russian empire suffered as well. Soviet textbooks begin the history of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, founded in 1922, with the ancient Armenian kingdom of Urartu. Thus, it would seem that the triumphal march to the radiant heights of mature socialism began on the shores of Lake Van in the ninth century B.C.

Many Western historians who verbally reject the official viewpoint of Soviet historiography in fact accept it. They find the sources of the 1917 revolution in the internecine warfare of the Kievan princes, the Tatar yoke, the atrocities of Ivan the Terrible, the cruelties of Peter the Great, the "Conditions" limiting monarchical power that were torn up by Empress Anne in 1730, or the manifesto granting a few liberties to the nobility, signed by the short-lived Tsar Peter III in 1762. Reaching back into the distant past, Soviet historians argue that the dream of socialism was nurtured by the peasants of Yuri Dolgoruky or that Ivan Kalita, the grand duke of Moscow, brought prosperity and prominence to the future capital of the first victorious socialist country in the world. Similarly turning to the distant past, Western historians draw a direct line from Ivan Vasilievich (Ivan the Terrible) to Joseph Vissarionovich (Stalin), or from Malyuta Skuratov, head of Ivan the Terrible's bodyguard and secret police force, to Yuri Andropov, the longtime head of the KGB who recently headed the Soviet state, thus demonstrating that from the time of the Scythians Russia was inexorably heading toward the October revolution and Soviet power. It was inherent in the national character of the Russian people. Nowhere else, these schol­ars think, would such a thing be possible.

There is no question that historical events affect the lives of nations, not only in the immediate present but over the long term, even for centuries. Clearly in studying history one must take into account many factors: geo­graphical, climatic, and soil conditions, as well as national characteristics and forms of government. Moreover, there are certain similar factors in all modern societies, such as urbanization, industrialization, and demographic cycles.

In studying the history of the Soviet state it is insufficient to consider such factors. One particular characteristic—the total influence of the ruling party on all spheres of existence on a scale never before known—acts as a determining force in all Soviet institutions and on the typical Soviet citizen, Homo Sovieticus. This total influence has distorted the normal processes at work in contemporary societies and has resulted in the emer­gence of a historically unprecedented society and state.

The transition from pre-October Russia to the USSR, as Aleksandr Sol- zhenitsyn has said, "was not a continuation of the spinal column, but a disastrous fracture that very nearly caused the nation's total destruction." The history of the Soviet Union is the history of the transformation of Russia—a country no better or worse than any other, one with its own peculiarities to be sure, but a country comparable in all respects to the other countries of Europe—into a phenomenon such as humanity has never known.

On the date of October 25, 1917, under the old Russian calendar (No­vember 7 by the Western calendar), a new era began. The history of Russia ended on that day. It was replaced by the history of the Soviet Union. The new era affected the entire human race, because the whole world felt, and still feels, the consequences of the October revolution. "The history of Homo Sapiens," Arthur Koestler has written, "began with zero." One might add that the history of Homo Sovieticus began the same way.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Department of Agitation and Propaganda American Relief Administration Chinese Communist party

All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle Ag

Counterrevolution and Sabotage Central Intelligence Agency Communist Party of the Soviet Union Far Northern Construction Project Federal Republic of Germany German Democratic Republic Main Literature and Art Administration State Commission for the Electrification of Russia State Publishing House State Political Administration Main Frontier Troops Administration Main Highway Construction Administration intercontinental ballistic missile Institute of Philosophy, Literature, and History Caucasus Bureau State Security Committee Young Communist League

Agitprop ARA CCP Cheka

CIA CPSU

Dalstroi FRG GDR Glavlit GOELRO Gosizdat GPU GUPV Gushossdor ICBM IFU Kavburo KGB Komsomol Komuch KONR KPD LEF MGB

Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia German Communist party Left Front of Art Ministry of State Security

mutiple independently targeted reentry vehicle

medium-range ballistic missile

Military Revolutionary Committee

machine and tractor station

Ministry of Internal Affairs

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Plant

New Economic Policy

People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs

National-Labor Alliance of Russian Solidarists

Unified State Political Administration

Organizational Bureau

United Revolutionary Organization

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

Petrograd Military Organization

Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee

Red Trade Union International

Proletarian Cultural and Educational Organization

Polish United Workers party

Russian Association of Proletarian Writers

Russian Liberation Army

Russian National Liberation Army

Russian Union of All Military Men

Russian Social Democratic Labor party

Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

military counterintelligence

Free Interprofessional Association of Workers

Council of People's Commissars

Socialist Revolutionary

Department of Records and Assignments

Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Supreme Economic Council

All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railroad Workers' Union

All-Russia Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the

MIRV MRBM MRC MTS MVD NATO NELP NEP NKVD NTS OGPU Orgburo ORI OUN PMO Polrevkom Pro/intern Proletcult

PUWP RAPP ROA RONA ROWS RSDLP RSFSR SMERSH SMOT Sovnarkom

SR

Uchraspred UPA VSNKH VIKZHEL

VSKhSON

Zakburo

People Transcaucasian Bureau

CHAPTER

—i

BEFORE OCTOBER 1917

WORLD WAR I

The October revolution was a direct consequence of World War I. The decade preceding the war had been one of rapid economic growth. Industrial progress, in general, had begun in Russia in the 1860s after the emanci­pation of the serfs, but it intensified especially after Japan defeated Russia in 1905. Forced to rebuild its shattered navy and reequip its land forces, the tsarist government allocated large sums for military purposes, from which the industrial sector benefited the most.

Six months before the war started, the French economist Edmond ТЬёгу published a book entitled The Economic Transformation of Russia, in which he presented some rather eloquent figures. In the five-year period 1908- 1912, coal production increased by 79.3 percent over the preceding five years; iron by 24.8 percent; steel and metal products by 45.9 percent.¹ From 1900 to 1913 the output of heavy industry increased by 74.1 percent, even allowing for inflation.² The rail network, which covered 24,400 ki­lometers in 1890, had grown to 61,000 kilometers by 1915.³ Industrial progress helped to reduce Russia's dependence on foreign capital. Although The History of the USSR, a textbook for students of history at Soviet uni­versities and teachers colleges, states that in 1914 the "specific weight" of foreign capital in the Russian economy was 47 percent,⁴ another Soviet source, the historian L. M. Spirin, estimates that foreign investments amounted to only about "one-third of total investments."⁵ The English writer Norman Stone notes that on the eve of World War I foreign investment in Russia had declined by 50 percent in the period 1904^1905, and amounted to 12.5 percent in 1913.⁶

Edmond ТЬёгу emphasized that Russian agriculture had made as much progress as industry. From 1908 to 1912 wheat production rose by 37.5 percent over the preceding five years; rye by 2.4 percent; barley by 62.2 percent; oats by 20.9 percent; and corn by 44.8 percent. ТЬёгу commented: "This increase in agricultural production served not only to meet the new needs of the population. ... It also allowed Russia to expand its foreign markets significantly and, thanks to its earnings from grain exports, to end its unfavorable balance of trade." In good harvest years, such as 1909 and 1910, Russian wheat exports amounted to 40 percent of world wheat ex­ports. Even in bad years, such as 1908 and 1912, they still accounted for 11.5 percent.⁷

The population of the Russian empire, which in 1900 was 135 million, reached 171 million in 1912. ТЬёгу, basing himself on the demographic statistics of the beginning of the century, predicted a population of 343.9 million by 1948.® The figure cited by Soviet historians for the Russian empire in 1917, based on 1914 borders, is 179,041,100.⁹

The nation's economic progress was accompanied by fundamental social change. In the last fifty years of the empire, the urban population grew from 7 million to 20 million. The hierarchical structure of the state began to crumble. Social barriers fell. The importance of the nobility, the autoc­racy's traditional base of support, declined. "The class that provided lead­ership has ceased to fulfill its function; it is obsolete," wrote Vasily Shulgin, a prominent conservative politician (a monarchist) and subsequently one of the most talented chroniclers of the revolution.¹⁰

Major improvements were initiated in public education. In 1908 a law introducing compulsory primary education was adopted (although its im­plementation was interrupted by the revolution and delayed until 1930). The increased government spending for education serves as an index of the efforts being made: between 1902 and 1912 such spending rose by 216.2 percent.¹¹ By 1915, 51 percent of all children between eight and eleven years of age were in school, and 68 percent of all military conscripts knew how to read and write.¹² Certainly Russia still lagged behind the advanced Western countries, but the increased number of schools and greater funding testify to the government's commitment and the considerable success achieved in this area. The first two decades of the twentieth century also saw a remarkable flowering of Russian culture, which is often referred to as Russia's Silver Age.

The governmental system evolved at a much slower pace than the eco­nomic, social, and cultural structures. The 1905 revolution, which grew out of the disastrous war with Japan, compelled Tsar Nicholas II to accept a series of reforms and introduce a constitution. Russia became a consti­tutional monarchy with an elected assembly, the Duma. Freedom of the press, assembly, and association were guaranteed. These rights, and the powers of the Duma, were more limited than in the Western democracies, but they existed nevertheless. In the Duma, highly diverse political trends were represented—from the Bolsheviks on the left to supporters of absolute monarchy on the right. However, the Duma was based on indirect repre­sentation (a system of elections passing through several stages) and a limited franchise (allowing only those with certain qualifications to vote).

In 1906 Prime Minister Stolypin introduced a law allowing every head of a peasant family to become the owner of his share of the village's communal land. Trotsky explained clearly and concisely the potential im­portance of this reform, which was not fully implemented. "If the agrarian problem ... had been solved by the bourgeoisie, if it could have been solved by them, the Russian proletariat could not possibly have come to power in 1917."¹³

During the brief period between the 1905 revolution and World War I, Russia underwent a political evolution unprecedented in its history. Never­theless, discontent spread to all strata of the population. Despite major improvements in their condition, the peasants continued to feel intense land hunger and firmly believed that the only solution to their problems was to divide up the large landed estates. Workers' conditions were slowly improving. They had obtained, albeit with certain restrictions, the right to strike over economic issues and, after 1912, both health and accident insurance. Still they demanded a shorter workday and a better standard of living. The young bourgeoisie, seeking a place in the country's political system, demanded an extension of political rights. The intelligentsia dreamed of a revolution that would bring "freedom," and from its ranks came the nuclei of the numerous political parties. Also opposed to the central gov­ernment were all the heterogeneous peoples included in the Russian empire, the bitterest discontent being found among the Poles, the Finns, and the Jews.

Russia on the eve of World War I served as confirmation of a rule deduced by Alexis de Tocqueville from an analysis of the causes of the French revolution: for a bad government, the most dangerous time is when it begins to reform itself.

The case of Mendel Beilis, a Jew accused of the ritual murder of a Christian child, summed up the situation in a nutshell. Despite the openly expressed desire of the tsarist government and the judges for a conviction, the jury of half-literate Ukrainian peasants acquitted Beilis. The verdict in his favor was a remarkable expression of the weakness of progovernment forces.

Thus, Russia became involved in the world war at a time of rapid economic development, in an era of demolition and new construction, under conditions of universal discontent and rising expectations, with a weak government incapable of winning popular support. On several occasions the dangers posed by an entrance into the European conflict were pointed out. In February 1914, for example, Petr Durnovo, minister of the interior under the Witte government of 1905-06 and subsequently a member of the tsar's Council of State, sent Nicholas II a memorandum that included these prophetic words:

A war involving all of Europe would be a mortal danger for Russia and Germany, regardless of which was the victor. ... In the event of defeat, a possibility which cannot be excluded when faced with an enemy such as Germany, social revolution in its most extreme form would be inevitable in our country.

The memorandum was found among the tsar's papers after the revolution, unmarked by any royal notations. It is possible that the tsar did not bother to read it.¹⁴ Even Grigory Rasputin, that evil genius in the bosom of the royal family, whose influence on the destiny of the nation grew steadily after 1906, warned against the dangers of a war.

To this day historians disagree over who was responsible for and what were the actual causes of World War I. It is often forgotten that in the summer of 1914 one sentiment dominated in Europe: that war among civilized nations was impossible.

Europe entered the war after forty-five years of peace, if we count only wars between "white men," the last such being the Franco—Prussian war of 1871. War seemed inconceivable. Nevertheless it broke out. All the participants had prepared for it, yet they were all taken by surprise. For Russia the war became a test of the solidity of the various components of its colossal governmental, economic, and social organism.

The first battle lost by the Russian army, in East Prussia in August 1914, revealed the government's true condition and gave a glimpse of the factors that would bring the regime's downfall in the spring of 1917. Most historians, be they Russian or Soviet, attribute this defeat to the Russian army's unprepared, hence premature offensive, undertaken with the aim of saving France.

As early as August 1911 General Zhilinsky, then head of the Russian

General Staff, promised the French allies he would send an army of 800,000 men against Germany "on the fifteenth day of mobilization."¹⁵ When war was declared the French army launched an immediate offensive, but suf­fered very heavy casualties. Count Ignatiev, the Russian military аиасЬё in Paris, reported that losses were as high as 50 percent in some French regiments. He added: "It is now clear that the outcome of the war will depend on what we can do to divert the German forces toward outselves."¹⁶ The defeat of France would undoubtedly have meant the defeat of Russia as well. The Russian army was inadequately equipped for this crucial offensive, but that did not become apparent until too late.

The causes of the Russian defeat in East Prussia had to do above all with poor generalship, especially on the level of the General Staff and Field Headquarters (the Stavka). The hopes firmly held by all the belligerents, that the war would not last more than five or six weeks, of course proved false. The embattled nations were obliged to readjust, technically and psychologically, to the reality of prolonged positional warfare.

From the very first the Russian army suffered from a shortage of artillery shells, bullets, and rifles; like the other countries, they had believed the war would not last long. A "master plan" for the development of the Russian arms industry stated clearly that the political and economic situation ex­cluded the possibility of a prolonged war.¹⁷

In 1915, terribly shaken by its enormous losses on the battlefield, Russia was forced to withdraw from Poland—due in part to the shortage of am­munitions. Thus, a technical problem, munitions supply, became a central issue of state policy. The need to reorganize the economy to meet the demands of the war gave rise to a multitude of economic and political questions touching on the very essence of the tsarist system.

The shortage of shells was neither the sole nor the principal reason for Russia's difficulties, for in 1916, despite an abundance of munitions, amply provided by a reconverted industry, the Russian army was able to achieve success only once—in General Brusilov's offensive against the Austrians in Galicia. The shell "shortage" had been merely a symptom of a serious affliction in the tsarist state organism.

No sooner had the outburst of patriotic enthusiasm faded after the first few weeks of war than a crisis of authority began to develop in the army. By July 1915, 9 million men had been drafted. The number of officers, insufficient even for a peacetime army of 2 million, was sharply reduced by the loss of some 60,000 during the first year of war. This meant that hardly any of the 40,000 officers from before the war remained. The military academies graduated no more than 35,000 officers each year. By September 1915 it was a rare thing to find a front-line regiment (usually numbering 3,000 soldiers) with more than a dozen officers. Not until late 1915 and early 1916 did the practice of promoting the most outstanding rank-and- file soldiers begin on a large scale. The lack of noncommissioned officers was felt even more acutely.

The crisis of authority in the army was the most striking symptom of the general crisis of authority in the country. Shulgin, an important figure in the Duma, expressed his complaints to the tsar: "Goremykin [the prime minister], a senile fool, is in fact incapable of being the head of the government in the midst of a world war. ... He is organically incapable, because of his age and his hidebound rigidity, of coping with the demands imposed by the war."¹⁸ In January 1916 Nicholas replaced Goremykin with Sturmer. Shulgin had this to say about the new prime minister: 'The problem is that Sturmer is a small man, a nonentity, while Russia is involved in a world war. The problem is that all the great powers have mobilized their best forces, while in our case, we have a Santa Claus for a prime minister. ... That is why the country is in an uproar."¹⁹

The country was in an uproar because the Russian armies were being beaten. Prices were rising. Food supply to the cities was breaking down, although there was plenty of grain in the countryside. Russia was in an uproar because it was sick of the war. All segments of the population were beginning to see the source of their misfortunes in the tsar, the tsarina, and Rasputin.

The books that have been written about Grigory Rasputin and his in­explicable influence over the empress and, through her, Nicholas II would form an entire library. The correspondence of the imperial couple has provided abundant material for the most diverse interpretations, hy­potheses, and speculations: the empress's mysticism; the miraculous powers of "the monk" Rasputin, who on three occasions saved the hemophiliac prince from bleeding to death; hypnosis; even witchcraft. All that is beside the point. As Shulgin wrote: "Who does not know the sentence [attributed to the tsar]: 'Better Rasputin than ten hysterics a day.'" The historian rightly added: "I do not know whether this sentence was actually spoken, but it matters little since all of Russia repeated it."²⁰

The myth of Rasputin, the illiterate Siberian muzhik reputed to have cast a spell over the imperial family and to be shamelessly officiating in Petrograd, spread all over Russia despite the lack of modern means of communication. The myth wielded a death blow to the emperor's prestige.

The breach between society and its ruler became final in August 1915, when Nicholas assumed personal command of the army, thus shouldering direct responsibility for all of the country's defeats and disasters. His presence at Field Headquarters in Mogilev removed him from the capital.

One consequence of this became evident in February 1917, when the tsar, as if caught in a trap, was unable even to reach Petrograd. Meanwhile the influence of the tsarina and thus of Rasputin over the political life of the country grew apace.

The country lived its own life and the government lived its—in a vacuum. Despite the war—one might say because of it—rapid industrial growth continued. In 1914 the index of economic growth, taking 1913 as 100, rose to 101.2, in 1915 to 113.7, and in 1916 to 121.5.²¹ The extraction of iron ore increased in the same period by 30 percent, and petroleum production by an equal amount. There was major expansion in both the chemical industry and the machine industry. The drastic reduction of im­ports forced the industrialists to start producing machinery domestically. According to statistics from January 1, 1917, Russian factories in August 1916 were turning out more munitions than the French and twice as much as the British. In 1916 Russia made 20,000 light cannon and imported 5,625. It was 100 percent self-sufficient in the production of howitzers and 75 percent in heavy artillery.²² Subsequently, the reserves of armaments in imperial Russia proved large enough to last through more than three years of civil war.

In order to harness the turbulent and unplanned process of industrial growth and to eliminate the bottlenecks that developed along the way, some structural transformations, some reforms, were needed. But Nicholas II had only one desire: to keep the country as he had found it upon his ascension to the throne after his father's death. All of the tsar's actions, and all of his inaction, were directed to this end. Shulgin has suggested an eloquent postmortem for the Russia of that time: "An autocracy without an autocrat."²³

To the tsar's personal inaction was juxtaposed a tumultuous political area. "In 1917 there were political parties for nearly every social class," the Soviet historian Spirin notes—with some perplexity.²⁴ It should be added that these parties had originated well before 1917 and that most of them functioned legally, with their own representatives in the Duma. The Bol­shevik representatives, who openly called for Russia's military defeat, were not arrested until November 1914, and then exiled only after a trial.

By mid-1915 virtually all the parties in the Duma had gone into oppo­sition. The Progressive Bloc, the core of the parliamentary opposition, was formed in August 1915. It included the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), the Union of October 17 (Octobrists), the Progressives, and the Nationalists. The binding force in this coalition of liberals, centrists, and rightists (except for the extreme right) was the sole liberal party in Russian history: the Cadets. The Cadet program stressed that it was a party of all the people, not of one class, and that its highest loyalty was to Russia and a strong Russian state. The Cadets explained their role in opposition to the tsar by their desire to strengthen the state. To a large degree they defined progress as Russia's ability to defend its international position.

The Cadets proclaimed that "everyone without exception" should be subject to the rule of law and that "fundamental civil rights" should be guaranteed to all citizens. They called for the eight-hour day, trade union rights, and mandatory medical and old age insurance paid for by the state. They advocated distribution of crown lands and monastery lands to the peasantry and expropriation of the large landed estates with indemnifica­tion. Categorically opposed to federalism or any change in the political structure that might weaken the empire, they saw as their main task to prepare Russia for "a parliamentary system and the rule of law."²⁵

The Cadet party's principal base was among those connected with the zemstvos, the institutions of local government introduced in the reforms of the 1860s. At the beginning of the war two empire-wide organizations, the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Towns, were founded with the aim of involving the general public in the war effort, in cooperation with the government. The work of these organizations provided considerable scope for the expansion of the Cadets' influence.

The Octobrist and Progressive parties, also members of the Progressive Bloc, held liberal monarchist views. In allying themselves with the parlia­mentary opposition, they hoped on the one hand to help channel discontent and on the other to persuade Nicholas II to heed the warning voices and change the government, appointing ministers who would "enjoy the con­fidence of the nation."

The revolutionary parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) and Social Democrats (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks), sought to combine revolutionary activity with legal opposition in the Duma. During the early years of the war, revolutionary agitation found little response among the people. Par­ticularly unpopular was the Bolsheviks' slogan for a Russian defeat. The arrest of the participants in a Bolshevik conference in Finland in November 1914, including Lev Kamenev, who was presiding, and the party's other Duma representatives, deprived the Bolsheviks of their leadership inside Russia.

It was extremely difficult to direct a revolutionary party from exile. The Okhrana, the tsarist secret police, had infiltrated these parties with their agents and watched their every move. One agent, Evno Azef, dealt a particularly devastating blow to the SRs after becoming the head of its terrorist wing and a member of its Central Committee. Agents provocateurs completely penetrated the Bolshevik party as well. The Old Bolshevik Gusev-Drapkin recalled in his memoirs that in 1908-09 the Bolshevik organization in St. Petersburg was in total disarray.

At that time, provocation was extremely widespread. Sverdlov was a member of the Leningrad committee, with four others. He suspected one of them of being an agent. Well, after the February revolution, when the archives of the Police Department were opened, it turned out that all four had been agents. Sverdlov had been the only Bolshevik on the committee.²⁶

The situation was pretty much the same in the other cities. Roman Malinovsky, a favorite of Lenin's and at one time the head of the Bolshevik group in the Duma and actual leader of the party inside Russia, was one of the Okhrana's most highly prized agents.²⁷

The secret police had a special attitude toward the Bolsheviks. Lenin's policy of systematic divisiveness was in perfect accord with the desires of the police: to prevent unification of the different groupings within the Russian Social Democratic Labor party (RSDLP). A Police Department memorandum urged the heads of "all police organizations to give urgent instructions to their secret collaborators that, when participating in party meetings, they must insistently promote, and defend with conviction, the total impossibility of an organic fusion of the disparate tendencies and in particular the impossibility of a reunification between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks."²⁸ This had been Lenin's position since 1903.

The police entered so fervidly into the revolutionary spirit that they began to use party jargon. They referred to one of the tendencies in the RSDLP as "inclined toward opportunism." Violation of party discipline equally provoked the ire of the police. On June 24, 1909, police headquarters informed the Okhrana chief in Moscow:

Some members of the Bolshevik center, Bogdanov, Marat, and Nikitich (Krasin), have begun to criticize the center, have turned toward otzovizm and ultimatumizm, and after getting hold of a large part of the money stolen at Tiflis, have begun to engage in clandestine agitation against the Bolshevik center in general and some of its members in particular. Thus, they have started a school on the island of Capri, where Gorky lives.²⁹

It seems that the police were less concerned about the bank robbery in Tiflis than about otzovizm, ultimatumizm, and criticism of "the Bolshevik center," that is, of Lenin.

The gendarme general A. Spiridovich, in commenting on the usefulness of secret agents, also noted that their work "very often served the party and hurt the government."³⁰ And Lenin was certainly right when, as a witness on May 26, 1917, before an examining magistrate of the special commission on the Malinovsky affair, he affirmed that this agent had done more good for the party than harm.³¹

SPRING 1917

By the end of 1916 the general discontent that was the result of war weariness, military defeats, and high prices was intensified by reductions in food supplies to Petrograd and Moscow. On January 19, 1917, the "Section for the Maintenance of State Security and Public Order in the Capital" reported in a top secret document that "the rising cost of living and the continual failure of government measures aimed at counteracting the scarcity of food products had provoked a violent wave of discontent, even before Christmas."³²

The food difficulties that began to affect the cities in 1916 stemmed above all from the government's inability to organize the purchase and transportation of agricultural products to the rail terminals. The wartime harvests were even better than those before the war (if the territory occupied by the Germans is not counted). In 1914, 1,413 million centners were harvested. In 1915 the figure was 1,529 million, and in 1916, 1,286 million.³³ It is true that the army consumed more than in peacetime: 28 million centners of food products in 1913—14; 159 million in 1916-17. But at the same time, grain exports fell from 210 million centners in 1913— 1914 to 1 million in 1916-17. The food difficulties were tied to the peasants' refusal to sell their grain at prices constantly eroded by inflation.

The government was unable to understand the reasons behind this crisis. Its attempts to control prices often amounted to nothing better than the measures applied by the governor of Tashkent who strolled through the bazaar on Saturdays and ordered a flogging for any merchant whose prices were, in his view, higher than "normal." Every attempt to organize the provisioning of the cities with the help of specially appointed officials resulted in fiasco. Not knowing what to do, the government kept changing its policies. The politicians had no better grasp of the situation. The right explained the crisis as the result of Jewish and German conspiracies; the Union of the Russian People opened its own "Russian bread stores." The left blamed it on conspiracies by the landowners and kulaks. And everybody agreed that delays on the railroads were at fault. In reality, however, there was an adequate rail system. What was lacking was grain; the trains rushed out after the wheat, but there was no rush of wheat to the trains.³⁴ The top secret police report on the situation in the capital, cited above, concluded that society was longing "to find a way out of an abnormal political situation that is daily becoming more abnormal and strained."³⁵

The parliamentary opposition was increasingly taken with the idea that it must obtain a "responsible ministry" from the tsar, one in which rep­resentatives of the Progressive Bloc would hold the key posts. A group of Duma deputies headed by Aleksandr Guchkov, a confirmed monarchist and leader of the moderate liberals, began to plot the ouster of Nicholas II in order to save the dynasty.

The revolutionary parties, although their slogans against the war and the tsar were finding a growing response in the country, judged that the time was not yet ripe for revolution. In January 1917 Nikolai Chkheidze, a Menshevik leader, member of the Duma, and supporter of the international socialist antiwar conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal, argued: "At this time there can be no hope for a successful revolution. I know that the police are trying to organize some simulated revolutionary outbursts in order to draw the workers into the streets and attack them."³⁶ Also in January, Lenin, living in Zurich, totally cut off from Russia and receiving infrequent and confused reports, spoke in the same vein as Chkheidze: "We of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution."³⁷ Aleksandr Shlyapnikov, Lenin's representative in Pet­rograd and head of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, wrote, "All of the underground organizations and political groups [at the end of 1916] were opposed to mass actions in the coming months of 1917.'^,38

Everyone in the country felt that major changes were imminent and unavoidable—everyone except the revolutionaries. As Shulgin was to say, the revolution was ready but the revolutionaries weren't.

On February 10 Mikhail Rodzyanko, president of the Duma, arrived at the tsar's country palace with a report on the situation and a warning that if the Duma were dissolved, as Nicholas intended, revolution would break out. This revolution, Rodzyanko warned the tsar, "will sweep you away and you will rule no more." "God will provide," answered Russia's last autocrat. In reply he was told: "God will provide nothing. You and your government have made a total mess. Revolution is inevitable."³⁹

The disturbances in Petrograd began even earlier than the president of the Duma had anticipated. On February 23 groups began to gather in various parts of Petrograd demanding bread. Workers walked off the job and joined the demonstrators. On February 26 the Fourth Company of the Pavlovsky Regiment opened fire on the mounted police. The soldiers began siding with the demonstrators.

The parliamentary opposition hoped that the situation could be saved through the creation of a "responsible ministry." In a telegram, Rodzyanko told the tsar:

Anarchy rules in the capital. The government is paralyzed. The transportation of food and fuel is completely disorganized. Social unrest is mounting. The streets are the scene of disorderly shooting. Military units are firing on one another. It is necessary to appoint someone who enjoys the nation's confidence to form a new government. Any delay is out of the question; it would mean death. I pray to God that in this hour, the responsibility does not fall on the monarch.

Upon reading the telegram, Nicholas II said to his minister of the court, Count Frederiks: "Once again, this fat-bellied Rodzyanko has written me a lot of nonsense, which I won't even bother to answer."⁴⁰ The tsar contented himself by giving the Duma a two-month vacation.

Taken by surprise by the burgeoning, spontaneous movement, the rev­olutionary opposition did not know what to do and limited itself to discus­sion. At Kerensky's house, where the representatives of all the revolutionary parties gathered (all Menshevik tendencies, the SRs, the Trudovik, or Labor, group, and the Bolsheviks, represented by Shlyapnikov), the general enthusiasm was soon cooled off by Yurenev, who was close to the Bolsheviks. There is not and there will not be a revolution, he said. The reaction is growing. The soldiers and the workers have different objectives. Prepa­rations must be made for a long period of reaction. We must adopt a wait- and-see attitude.⁴¹ It was evident to all present that Yurenev was articulating the Bolshevik party's point of view. In his memoirs, the Bolshevik worker V. Kayurov, a member of the party's Petrograd Committee, explained how unexpected the events were for the party. He noted that the center had not issued any instructions. The Petrograd Committee had been detained, and Shlyapnikov, the representative of the Central Committee, found himself unable to issue any instructions for the following day. On the evening of February 26 Kayurov had no doubt that the revolution would be crushed. The demonstrators were unarmed; no one would be able to reply to the government when it took energetic measures.⁴² The Bolsheviks held fast to a wait-and-see position, for in the autumn of 1916 Lenin had rigorously forbidden Shlyapnikov to collaborate in any way with the other socialist parties.

If revolutionary agitation in the capital was on the rise without any leadership, it was not because the revolution was strong but because its enemy, the tsarist regime, was extremely weak. "The problem," said Shul- gin, "was that in this immense city it was impossible to find even a few hundred people who sympathized with the ruler."⁴³

By noon on February 27, some 25,000 soldiers—slightly more than 5 percent of all troops and police forces concentrated in Petrograd and its surroundings—had gone over to the side of the demonstrators. But this was enough for the rebellion to become a revolution. It is true that the victors were not yet aware of their victory—no more than the defeated were aware of their defeat. On the evening of February 27, roughly 30,000 soldiers arrived at the Tauride Palace, where the Duma held its sessions, looking for some form of governmental authority. The Duma, which had dreamed of much power, barely had the courage to form a Provisional Committee, which proclaimed that it had assumed the task of restoring order. On February 28 this proclamation was pasted up around the city.

A few hours before the formation of the Duma Committee, a Soviet had been organized in another part of the same Tauride Palace. Addressing itself to the workers of Petrograd, the Soviet asked them to send deputies that same afternoon, on the basis of one deputy per thousand workers. That evening the Soviet elected as its president the Menshevik Chkheidze, and as vice presidents two left-wing deputies from the Duma, Kerensky and Skobelev. The number of Bolsheviks in the Soviet was so small that they were unable to organize themselves as a faction. Shlyapnikov, who was elected to the Soviet's Executive Committee, recalls that its very first meet­ing heard a report on the food situation in Petrograd. It turned out that the situation was "by no means catastrophic."⁴⁴ Thus, the initial cause of the disturbances in the capital leading to the overthrow of the tsar proved to be nonexistent.

While two opposing powers emerged in Petrograd, the Duma Committee and the Soviet, the emperor was traveling from General Headquarters at Mogilev toward the capital. His train was stopped at the station of Dno by insurgent soldiers, and Nicholas was compelled to sign his abdication on March 2, after General Alekseev, supported by the commanders of all five fronts, told him that his abdication was the only possible way to assure the continuation of the war against Germany. Only two corps commanders, Count Keller and Khan Nakhichevansky, spoke on behalf of the tsar. The Duma Committee sent Guchkov and Shulgin, both of them monarchists, to accept the abdication.

Thus, with the agreement of revolutionaries, liberals, and monarchists alike, the monarchy departed. Russia became a democratic republic.

These events unfolded at a very rapid pace, in a way that astounded the participants. And the casualties were very small compared to what they would be later on. In February a total of 169 were killed and less than 1,000 wounded.⁴⁵

From 1916 on, especially in Petrograd, there was constant discussion of plots of one kind or another—revolutionary, liberal, and monarchist— all aimed at rectifying the situation. The only successful plot was the assassination of Rasputin in December 1916. However, this plot can be considered "successful" only in the sense that the "holy father" actually was killed, albeit with difficulty.

When the revolution transferred power to those who were called plotters and who in fact were, consciously or unconsciously, trying to destroy the tsarist regime, it was discovered that none of them had a program.

The Provisional Government created by the Duma Committee was headed by Prince Georgy Lvov, former president of the Union of Zemstvos, and consisted mainly of representatives of the former parliamentary opposition. Its proclaimed purposes were to continue the war and to convoke a Con­stituent Assembly to decide Russia's future. The socialist parties firmly believed that, in accordance with Marxist doctrine, Russia was on the eve of a bourgeois democratic revolution, so that they did not aspire to power themselves. The bourgeoisie had to fulfill its historic task, they believed; only after that would the socialists have their turn. Lenin, however, dis­trusted the February revolution. For him, in Zurich, the Petrograd events looked like the result of a "conspiracy of the Anglo-French imperialists."⁴⁶ His first orders had a familiar ring: no reconciliation with the other parties.⁴⁷

The Provisional Government's weakness, which was evident from the very first day of its existence, its lack of a clear program, its lack of confidence, allowed the Soviet to become a second power in the country. However, the Soviet did not follow a determined course either. On March 1 it issued the famous Order No. 1, which established elected committees in the Petrograd barracks, with the authority to distribute weapons and to withhold them from officers, and abolished the traditional forms of military discipline. This order was immediately extended to the entire army, despite the Soviet's explanation that it was intended for rear echelon units only. This was a major factor in the army's decomposition. However, the Soviet was relying on the army to continue the war against Germany, particularly since Germany had not responded to proposals for "a peace without an­nexations or indemnities." The Bolsheviks too were inconsistent on this question. On March 12 three Bolshevik leaders arrived in Petrograd from internal exile—Muranov, a former Duma deputy; Lev Kamenev, a former member of PravdcCs editorial board; and Stalin, a member of the Central Committee. They immediately took editorial control of Pravda, which on March 15 published an article by Kamenev containing the following sen­tences: "When one army opposes another, the most absurd policy would be to propose that only one lay down its arms and go home. ... A free people will stand firmly at their posts and will answer bullet for bullet."⁴⁸

On April 3 Lenin arrived in Russia. The leader of the Bolshevik party was amazed that he was not arrested after having returned with the help of the German authorities. Instead, representatives of the new government gave him a ceremonious welcome. Everyone, including members of his own party, was dumbfounded by Lenin's speech, which proclaimed the need to struggle for power.

The controversy about Lenin's relations with Germany during the war and the revolution continues to this day. It started in April 1917. "This method of transportation," wrote Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, a close aide of Lenin, referring to the so-called sealed train, "drew frantic howls from the infuriated bourgeoisie, with the SRs and Mensheviks joining in the chorus. Even within our party, there were very many who found this pro­cedure unsuitable and incorrect."⁴⁹

Lenin's strength lay in the fact that for him every method was correct and suitable as long as it sped the revolution's victory. It is necessary, he would teach the Bolsheviks, to know how to use "all subterfuges, ruses, and illegal means, to know how to remain silent, to conceal the truth."⁵⁰ Lenin understood perfectly well that it was in the Germans' interest to help those Russian revolutionaries who favored the defeat of their own country. Ludendorff wrote after the war that revolution in Russia had always been his passionate desire. "How many times I dreamed that it might come about. ... A constant vision." This vision suddenly became real, a saving miracle. "In April and May 1917," wrote the German general, "despite our victories on the Aisne and in Champagne, only the Russian revolution saved us."⁵¹ Although Lenin's activities were not carried out with this aim in mind, the fact that the Russian revolution saved Germany from defeat in 1917 did not trouble the Bolshevik leader, who yearned for power re­gardless of the cost.

The April Theses, a program presented by Lenin on April 4 to RSDLP delegates attending an all-Russia conference of soviets, surprised everyone, including the Bolsheviks, by its unexpected character. Perhaps the party members would have been less surprised if they had had the chance to read Lenin's "Letters from Afar," sent from Switzerland. But Pravda had published an abridged version of the first letter and suppressed the other three altogether. The editors of Pravda, Kamenev and Stalin, had their own plan: to unite with the Mensheviks and collaborate to a certain degree with the Provisional Government. Pravda published Lenin's theses in its April 7 issue, but the next day it commented on his views in a statement by the editors: "In regard to Comrade Lenin's general scheme, we find it unacceptable in that it proceeds from the assumption that the bourgeois democratic revolution has been completed and anticipates an immediate transformation of this revolution into a socialist revolution."

One could not find a better articulation of the differences between the editors of Pravda, who had been the party's leaders in Lenin's absence, and Lenin himself. For Kamenev, Stalin, and the other Bolsheviks, Marxism was a doctrine from which deviation was not possible, whereas for Lenin there were no dogmatic truths: he was possessed by one idea—power. In the April 4 meeting at which the theses were presented, according to Bonch- Bruevich, an eyewitness, Lenin drew "sarcastic smiles" and "some chuck­ling" from his audience when he "stated candidly that he had had very little time and little material to base his observations on." With the ex­ception of some brief weeks during 1905, Lenin had not been in Russia since 1900. In April 1917, en route to Petrograd, "I met only one worker on the train," the Bolshevik leader admitted. But that was good enough. "My thoughts," said he, "might be a bit theoretical, but I suggest that on the whole they are correct and correspond to the general political situation in the country."⁵²

Lenin could have had worse luck and not run into that worker on the train. But even without him, Lenin grasped what was essential in Russia's political situation: the country had become, according to him, the freest in the world; that is, the government was weak and open to challenge.

The April Theses were both a concrete program and a Utopian one. The concrete demands were an end to the imperialist war, fraternization with the enemy, and confiscation of large landholdings and nationalization of all lands, which were then to come under the control of the local soviets. All these demands were directed toward the Provisional Government, which was, as Lenin knew, incapable of satisfying them. Consequently, it would have to be overthrown. The Utopian parts of the program—the abolition of the police, the army, and civil service; the election of officials subject to recall at any time, with salaries not to exceed those of an average worker's— these were the promises of a future government. It is true that Lenin's program was one of "unabashed radicalism" and "primitive demagogy," as Sukhanov said.⁵³ But it took into account the two principal demands of the majority of the population—peace and land.

After the February revolution, the Petrograd Soviet began to receive numerous nakazy (mandates), expressing above all the complaints and desires of the peasants and workers. An examination of the first one hundred peasant mandates shows that they called first for the confiscation of the large landed estates and the crown lands and for their distribution to the peasantry and, second, for the prompt conclusion of a "just peace." The first one hundred mandates presented by the workers show that they were less revolutionary-minded than the peasants. The workers sought mainly the improvement of their situation (the eight-hour workday, higher wages, etc.), not a fundamental transformation. For example, 23 percent of the peasant mandates demanded peace, as opposed to only 2 percent of the workers' mandates.⁵⁴

The peasants' demands for peace coincided in part with Lenin's defeatist slogans; their desires for land ran counter to the Bolshevik program. The head of the party instantly forgot the old scholastic disputes over the agrarian question which for many years had created divisions in the Social Demo­cratic party ("municipalization," "socialization," "nationalization"). He simply appropriated the program of the SRs: land to the peasants.

April 1917 may be regarded as the birthdate of Soviet ideology. This was the first manifestation, on a scale affecting the destinies of the state, of an extremely important feature of this ideology, soon to become the dominant one: flexibility, free of all fetters, a capacity to accept instanta­neously what it had previously condemned and to condemn what it had previously accepted. Related to this are two essential elements: the leader can decide to make a 180-degree turn; and the party, with some hesitation to be sure, fairly quickly will fall into line.

Lenin, unfettered by any restraints and commanding a party which had 77,000 members in April 1917,⁵⁵ confronted a Provisional Government constrained by the fact that it held only half the power, the other half being held by the soviets. The government's hands were also tied by the lack of a state apparatus. The former machinery of state had been dismantled and discarded as a vestige of tsarist rule, and the creation of a new apparatus was delayed by the emergence of dual power everywhere, the local soviets successfully challenging the young administration of the Provisional Gov­ernment. Lastly, the Provisional Government was hobbled by moral stan­dards and sentiments that would soon be regarded as "survivals of capitalism," such as keeping one's promises, being loyal to one's allies, and having faith in democracy and the people. The representatives of the moderate socialist parties (SRs and Mensheviks), who from the days of the first coalition in May 1917 played a growing role in the Provisional Gov­ernment, were hampered by their theoretical views concerning history and revolution, by the belief that social classes come to power in a certain sequence, following historic laws. Moreover, the members of the Provisional Government seemed to find power too hot to handle, as if waiting for the moment when they could be rid of it. "On April 20," Shlyapnikov writes, "Kamenev criticized the Provisional Government at a meeting of the Ex­ecutive Committee of the Soviet: 'The solution is to transfer power to another class.' Some voices came from the ministerial benches: 'Then you take the power.'"⁵⁶ In June, at the Congress of Soviets, Tsereteli protested with a certain sadness that at the time there was no political party in Russia willing to say, "Give us the power." Then came Lenin's famous reply: "There is such a party. No party can refuse power, and our party certainly does not." The Provisional Government believed that no one in Russia wanted power. Lenin's words were not taken seriously. History has shown that when such politicians as Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler did tell the truth about their intentions no one believed them.

The weakness of the government left nothing to stand in the way of the revolutionary tide sweeping over Russia. The revolution became a blind revolt, giving vent to popular hatreds that had accumulated over the cen­turies. The intelligentsia, which for decades had laid the groundwork for revolution, now looked upon it with bewilderment. In his diary Gorky voiced the intellectuals' feelings: "We worshipped the revolution like romantic lovers. But a shameless brute came along and violated our beloved."⁵⁷ The Provisional Government, the government of the Russian intelligentsia, was unavoidably drifting to the left, attempting to catch up with the rebelling masses but always lagging behind, because the people, spurred on by Lenin's extremist slogans, dreamed of an end to all government. No one could be expected to outdo Lenin in the field of revolutionary slogans; he preached the expropriation of the expropriators, a phrase which translated into simple language had an irresistibly attractive ring: "Steal back what was stolen."⁵⁸

In June, Kerensky, as minister of war, was able to persuade the army that an offensive was possible. On June 18 the Russian troops went into action, scoring major successes. Rumors concerning a tightening of military discipline sowed alarm among the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, who feared they might be sent to the front. Demands for the overthrow of the Provisional Government received a favorable hearing, especially with the First Machine Gun Regiment, which was strongly influenced by the Bol­sheviks and anarchocommunists.

During the preparations for the armed demonstration of July 4 by Petro­grad workers and soldiers joined by 10,000 sailors from Kronstadt, Lenin left the capital to rest at Bonch-Bruevich's country home in Finland. He returned on July 4 and spoke without enthusiasm to the demonstrators from the balcony of Kshesinskaya's palace. It was clear to him that he would not be able to seize power at this time.

To this day historians disagree as to whether this demonstration was the result of a Bolshevik plot or was a spontaneous movement of the workers, soldiers, and sailors. Even the official historians of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have not come to a definite conclusion. In his History of the CPSU, Short Course, Stalin wrote: "The Bolshevik party was opposed to armed action at that time, for it considered that the revolutionary crisis had not yet matured, that the army and the provinces were not yet prepared to support an uprising in the capital."⁵⁹ However, the post-Stalin version of the History says that the "workers and soldiers of Petrograd would have had enough forces to overthrow the Provisional Government and take power," but that it was still too early for such an action because the "majority of the population was still following the SRs and Mensheviks."⁶⁰

Lenin did not object to the July actions, but he did not insist on their continuation after troops loyal to the government and the Soviet entered Petrograd. For him, the July demonstrations were a rehearsal, a test of the adversary's will to resist. Zinoviev recalled the situation:

During the July days our entire Central Committee was opposed to an im­mediate takeover. Lenin thought the same. But when, on July 3, the wave of popular indignation rose high, Comrade Lenin sprang into action. There and then, in the refreshment room on the top floor of the Tauride Palace, a small meeting was held—Trotsky, Lenin, and myself. Laughing, Lenin said to us: "Shouldn't we try for it now?" But he immediately added: "No, we couldn't take power now; it wouldn't work out, because not all the soldiers at the front are with us yet."⁶¹

Zinoviev is slightly mistaken, because on July 3 Lenin was not in Petro­grad. Nevertheless, Zinoviev accurately describes Lenin's attitude toward the demonstration: if it succeeds, we will take power, "laughing"; if it fails, we will try again.

The July rehearsal ended unhappily for the Bolsheviks, mainly be­cause the Petrograd Soviet supported the Provisional Government. Bonch- Bruevich recalls a conversation with Lenin after the July disaster: "'What now?' I asked Vladimir Ilyich. 'Armed insurrection. There's no other way.' 'When?' 'When circumstances allow. But no later than the fall.'"⁶² It could be that Bonch-Bruevich, who wrote his memoir after the party's victory, exaggerated Lenin's optimism a bit. On July 5, when Trotsky met with the Bolshevik leader, Lenin was in a panic: "'Now they will shoot us down, one by one,' he said. This is the right time for them.' But he overestimated the opponent—not his venom, but his courage and ability to act."⁶³

Lenin had good reason to worry. One of the decisive arguments that convinced the troops loyal to the Provisional Government and the Soviet to move against the demonstrators were documents suggesting that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were German spies. In his History of the Russian Rev­olution, Trotsky referred to July 1917 as "the month of the most gigantic slander in world history." The accusation that the Bolsheviks had received German money was used to justify the Provisional Government's decision to arrest the Bolshevik leaders. Lenin fled to Finland. The arrested Bol­shevik leaders, Kamenev, Kollontai, Lunacharsky, and Trotsky, were soon released.

The controversy over "German money" continues even today. In this argument two different questions have to be distinguished: (1) Was Lenin a German agent? (2) Were the Bolsheviks receiving money from Germany?

First of all, the defeated have always denounced the leaders of victorious revolutions as "agents of foreign powers." This most primitive explanation for their own defeat actually explains very little. The concept of a foreign agent suggests a person carrying out the will of another. There is no question that Lenin was his own man and was pursuing his own aims, which at a certain stage coincided with those of Germany. And within a year many of those who had accused Lenin of collaborating with the Kaiser's Germany availed themselves of German aid in the struggle against Lenin's govern­ment.

As to whether or not the Bolsheviks had any German financial support, revolutionary leaders have always been accused—most often, justly—of receiving money from foreign powers. In July 1917 documents were pub­lished attesting to links between two Bolsheviks, Hanetsky and Kozlovsky, and the German Social Democrat Parvus, who made no attempt to conceal his links with the German Foreign Ministry. Lenin bitterly denied these accusations, but his denials were strange and not very convincing. For example, he wrote that Hanetsky had only "engaged in business as an employee" of Parvus's firm.⁶⁴ The party, Lenin asserted, could not have had any dealings with Parvus because since 1915 Lenin had denounced him as a "German Plekhanov" and a "renegade," "licking Hindenburg's boots."⁶⁵ In fact, Lenin stated categorically: "It is an infamous lie that I was in contact with Parvus."⁶⁶ Lenin had not had any relations with him; it was his emissaries who were responsible. Despite all the denials of Lenin, Trotsky, and other party leaders, none of them ever explained how it was possible by August 1917 for the party to be publishing, according to Lenin's own figures, "seventeen daily papers, 1,415,000,000 copies weekly alto­gether, 320,000 daily."⁶⁷

Mark Aldanov, a talented writer of historical novels and an astute his­torian, who in 1919 wrote the first biography of Lenin, discussed this question in a Russian emigre newspaper in 1935. He recalled one small party that before 1917 had engaged in very little agitational work, pub­lished a small paper, and spent about 300,000 rubles a year, a sum obtained from a few wealthy members.⁶⁸ Shlyapnikov, whose honesty there is no reason to doubt, informs us that from December 2, 1916, to February 1, 1917, the amount that came into the Bolshevik coffers was 1,117 rubles, 50 kopecks.⁶⁹ In March, in a fit of generosity, Gorky donated 3,000 rubles.⁷⁰ Trotsky, in denouncing "the most gigantic slander in world history," contends that the money needed for the Bolshevik press was donated by ordinary workers. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that in the midst of severe inflation the workers were able to give tens or hundreds of thousands of rubles weekly to a party that was far from the only workers' party and not even the main socialist party. Aldanov speculated in 1935: "The account books kept on the Wilhelmstrasse could prove to be precious documents on the history of the October Revolution, but history will not gain access to them very soon. Moreover, the records in those books are probably quite one-sided. Receipts are not given in such cases."⁷¹ Aldanov was mistaken. History got hold of the "account books" of the German Foreign Ministry only ten years after he had written those lines. It is true that no receipts bearing Lenin's signature were found—but German doc­uments referring to the transfer of funds to the Bolsheviks were.

German money, however, does not explain the success of Bolshevik propaganda. It may have allowed them to conduct their propaganda on a large scale, but the government had no less substantial amounts of money at its disposal. The important thing was knowing how to use it.

The July defeat and the general conviction that the Bolsheviks were German agents marked a delay in Lenin's ascent to power. But the situation in the country became more critical every day: defeats on the front (the German army was threatening Riga and Narva and, to the south, Moldavia and Bessarabia); inflation and unemployment were on the rise; and food supplies were short. The second coalition government, formed in July and headed by Kerensky, put off the most pressing problems until the end of the war, at which time a Constituent Assembly would be convoked. On August 26 Commander-in-Chief Kornilov decided to intervene. He ordered General Krymov's Third Cossack Army Corps to Petrograd. He wanted to put an end to the nation's disintegration, reestablish order, and punish the Bolsheviks, whom he considered responsible for the chaos. However, his action brought the opposite result. A very courageous soldier who had won fame in the world war, Kornilov was a total incompetent in political matters. What was called the Kornilov plot was nothing but a confused blunder. Although he lacked sufficient forces and allies, Kornilov directly challenged the Petrograd Soviet, which, seeing its power threatened, sought help from the Bolsheviks. The moderate socialist Voitinsky, commissar of the Northern Front, assured the Soviet's leaders, "Not one regiment, not one company of the Northern Front will obey Kornilov's orders without the approval of the Army Committee or myself."⁷²

Kornilov's troops faded away like ghosts even before reaching Petrograd. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks had been cleared of the accusations brought against them only a few weeks before by the very same Soviet and govern­ment that now gave them the seal of approval as good revolutionaries. The Committee of Struggle Against Counterrevolution, formed by the Soviet, included Vladimir Nevsky, the leader of the Bolshevik's Military Organi­zation, which at that time had 26,000 members operating in forty-three groups at the front and seventeen in the rear.⁷³

When he learned of Kornilov's military action, Lenin immediately ordered that he be fought, but that Kerensky not be supported, that as many concessions as possible be wrested from him, and that the Bolsheviks make use of the situation to arm the workers. The course of events, he wrote, could bring the Bolsheviks to power this time, "but we must speak of this as little as possible in our propaganda."⁷⁴ The party began its final sprint on the road to power.

FALL 1917

The overthrow of the autocracy changed the situation in Russia, but only for the worse. The economy was collapsing, factories shutting down, food supplies dwindling, and the value of the currency plummeting. Meanwhile, the war went on. The only real conquest of the revolution was total freedom of expression. This intoxicating freedom became a powerful weapon in the hands of the Bolsheviks; while they promised everything at once (peace, land, and bread), the other parties suggested waiting for victory, for the Constituent Assembly, for an end to the chaos. Late in the night of August 31 or early in the morning of September 1, the Bolsheviks won a majority in the Petrograd Soviet. On September 25 Trotsky was elected chairman of the Soviet. After returning to Russia from the United States in May 1917, Trotsky had immediately supported Lenin. In July he joined the Bolshevik party and was placed in its leadership. Arrested after the July events, he was released on bail from Kresty prison after the fiasco of Kornilov's at­tempted coup. As president of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky became not only the tribune of the revolution (his speeches drawing overflow crowds to the Modern Circus) but also de facto leader of the insurrection being planned. On September 5 the Bolsheviks won a majority in the Moscow Soviet. This was a signal for Lenin: it convinced him that power was within easy reach. In mid-September, from his hiding place in Finland, he sent two letters stressing the need for an immediate seizure of power. But the Central Committee needed a lot of persuasion. Some of the party's leaders— Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Stalin, in particular—held a much more moderate position than Lenin. They were convinced that the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, scheduled for October 25, would peacefully deliver power to the Bolsheviks. Finding the situation intolerable, Lenin returned to Petrograd. Until now, Soviet historians have been unable to agree on the date of the party leader's return from Finland. According to Stalin's Short Course, Lenin returned on October 7.⁷⁵ Margarita Fofanova, at whose Petrograd apartment Lenin stayed, attests that he came back on September 22.⁷⁶ What is known for certain is that on October 10 he was present at a crucial Central Committee meeting, together with Bubnov, Dzerzhinsky, Zinoviev, Kame­nev, Kollontai, Lomov, Sokolnikov, Sverdlov, Stalin, Trotsky, and Uritsky. Lenin had considerable difficulty persuading his comrades of the need to organize an insurrection; however, he had one trump card. As early as September 29 he had sent an ultimatum in the form of a letter, threatening to resign from the Central Committee, while reserving the right to "campaign among the rank and file of the party and at the party congress."⁷⁷ In 1921, while Lenin was still alive, Bukharin remembered that the "letter was written with extraordinary force and threatened us with all sorts of punish­ments. We were all astounded. ... The Central Committee unanimously decided to burn the letter."⁷⁸ Burning a letter in Lenin's absence was one thing. But on October 10, when Lenin demanded in person that a vote on the insurrection be taken, Zinoviev and Kamenev were the only two who had the courage to vote against.

Lenin's argument amounted to these five points: (1) the revolutionary movement was on the rise all over Europe; (2) the imperialists (the Germans and the Allies) were ready to make peace in order to join forces and strangle the Russian revolution; (3) there was undeniable evidence that Kerensky and company were preparing to surrender Petrograd to the Germans; (4) a peasant revolt was developing, and the Bolsheviks already had the people's confidence; and (5) obvious preparations were underway for a second Kor- nilov attempt. Zinoviev objected: "We are told (1) that the majority of the Russian people are with us and (2) that the majority of the international proletariat are with us. Alas, both assertions are false and that is the heart of the problem."

In fact, that was not the problem. All of Lenin's arguments proved false: (1) his hopes for a world revolution were misplaced; (2) the Germans and the Allies continued the war for another full year; (3) Kerensky had no intention of surrendering Petrograd; (4) the peasants had begun dividing up the land, but this was far from being a "peasant revolt"; (5) and no one was dreaming of a "second Kornilov attempt." Lenin was right about only one thing: power was available for the taking, and no one was willing to defend the government. Kerensky and his ministers persisted in seeing the right as the only enemy, and naturally this eliminated any type of support from the right. The weakness and indecision of the Provisional Government irritated the "moderates" and "centrists." Bukharin proudly remembered that "on the door to my apartment was written 'Bukharin, Bolshevik.' But nobody dared to raise their little finger to me. Of course it was really stupid on the part of the bourgeoisie not to have finished us off at that time."⁷⁹ Bukharin was certainly right to call it stupidity, except that in the fall of 1917 power was not in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Power was in the streets and everyone agreed that "things had to change," even if for the worse. Pierre Pascal, a member of the French military mission, noted in his diary in September that the "corps of pages voted for the Bolsheviks," and in October that "yesterday Mr. Putilov told me he had voted for the Bolsheviks."⁸⁰

Lenin found the greatest resistance in the Central Committee of his own party; his comrades feared failure and wondered what they would do upon taking power. He answered them: 'The seizure of power is the business of the uprising; its political purpose will become clear after the seizure."⁸¹ He freely quoted Napoleon: "On s'engage et puis—on voit."

For over sixty years Soviet historiography has maintained the legend that the October revolution was a meticulously planned operation, a classic model of "the art of insurrection." This legend is not in keeping with the facts. Moreover, in the legend, the leaders of this perfect operation keep changing. First it was Lenin and Trotsky. On the first anniversary of the revolution, Stalin referred to "the Central Committee of the party, headed by Comrade Lenin," as the inspirer of the insurrection but stressed that "all the work of practical organization of the insurrection proceeded under the direct leadership of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky."⁸² Trotsky himself contributed a good deal to the legend of the splendidly organized insurrection. Later on, in the 1930s, Stalin portrayed himself as the leader of the insurrection, while acknowledging that Lenin had provided some help. Since the mid-1950s, Lenin has been the only recognized leader.

But doubts regarding the reliability of the legend could not be better founded. Suffice it to say that to this day Soviet historians disagree about the date on which the October revolution began. Some suggest it was the morning of October 24; others say the evening of that day; still others argue for October 22, the day the Petrograd Soviet assumed control over all military units in the capital.

On October 10 the Central Committee had voted for insurrection. But at its next meeting, on October 16, everyone insisted it was necessary to wait because delegates from various parts of Petrograd spoke of the lack of combativity, especially in the workers' districts of Vyborg, Narva, and Vasilevsky Island. Krylenko, the representative of the Petrograd Military Organization (PMO), reported indifference among the soldiers. Only Lenin kept urging and arguing, dragging the Central Committee on toward power.

Trotsky seemed to be everywhere, speaking at countless meetings, rous­ing the workers and soldiers with his revolutionary appeals. The other popular Bolshevik speakers, Lunacharsky, Kollontai, Volodarsky, also kept up an endless round of speeches. The Central Committee was waiting for power to fall into its hands like ripe fruit, but Lenin insisted on the need to seize it, and no later than October 20.

The existing forms of authority were collapsing. The peasant soldiers of the Petrograd garrison wanted one thing: to go home and take part in the distribution of land. The government did not know what it wanted. It did not know which forces were on its side, and above all it did not seem to recognize its enemies. Petrograd was full of rumors about a Bolshevik plot, rumors which reached their peak in October. On October 17 Gorky's news­paper, Novaya zhizn (New life), which had a circulation of 10,000 among Petrograd workers and which stood very close to the Bolsheviks,⁸³ published an editorial warning the Bolshevik party against an uprising that would bring ruin to the party, the working class, and the revolution. On October 18 it published the famous letter from Zinoviev and Kamenev in which Lenin's close comrades declared that an armed insurrection, just a few days before the Second Congress of Soviets, would be an unacceptable action threatening the proletariat and the revolution with catastrophe. Lenin's indignation upon reading this letter is well known; he called its authors traitors and "strike breakers" because they had given away the secret of the insurrection to the bourgeoisie. In reality, it had not been a secret to anyone for a long time. Lenin himself had given it away in articles, letters, and public proclamations printed in the Bolshevik press.

The question of armed insurrection was openly debated in the legal press, but the most typical sign of the decomposition of government machinery was that the authorities did not seem to consider these discussions impor­tant. Kerensky refused to call in reinforcements from the front. Out of sheer curiosity a city official called the apartment of Maria Ulyanova, Lenin's sister, and learned that Lenin was in Petrograd, but no one attempted to arrest the leader of the impending insurrection.

In an interview with the American ambassador, David Francis, Foreign Affairs Minister Tereshchenko described the government's state of mind with desperate frankness. The interview took place on October 24. "I expect a Bolshevik action tonight," said Tereshchenko. "If you can crush it," said the ambassador, "I hope it happens." "I think we could," Tereshchenko replied, "but I hope it happens anyway, whether we crush it or not. I'm tired of this uncertainty and tension."⁸⁴

The Bolsheviks were not sure of their success, but they kept moving toward power, as though drawn by the collapsing weight of the existing government. They were coming to power, albeit somewhat more slowly than Lenin would have liked. The Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), created by the Petrograd Soviet, became the main leadership body of the insurrection. The seizure of power was carried out, not in the name of the Bolshevik party, but in the name of the Soviet, although the central bureau of the MRC consisted only of Bolsheviks and Left SRs. In fact, power passed into the hands of the MRC bureau on October 21, when it issued an order to stop any weapons from being given out without its authorization and sent commissars into the military units to make sure that this edict was enforced. On the morning of October 22, the garrison was notified by telephone of this decision, which specified among other things that no order would be valid unless signed by the Military Revolutionary Committee. Meetings and demonstrations were organized in the capital. Trotsky gave a fiery speech at the House of the People, promising that the Soviet gov­ernment would give the poor and the front-line soldiers everything they would ever want, beginning with bread, land, and peace.

The revolution had already happened, although nobody was aware of it. Those who filled Petrograd's theaters did not notice. Chaliapin sang Don Carlos, a part he rarely performed in Russia. Tamara Karsavina danced for the first time in the operetta The Doll. All kinds of philosophical, literary, and sociopolitical lectures attracted large audiences. Even the members of the Provisional Government failed to notice that power had slipped from their fingers into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

Lenin's behavior during these days is still an enigma. After October 20 he seems to have disappeared. He remained in hiding, but there is no evidence of his activity in the form of letters, notes, or instructions until the evening of October 24. The much touted Central Committee meeting of October 21, where Lenin supposedly uttered the famous words, "Yes­terday was too soon, the day after tomorrow will be too late," is only a legend created by John Reed that no document or witness supports. It is true, however, that when Lenin read Reed's book, the legend struck him as so felicitous that he did not correct it.

Lenin stayed underground throughout the day of October 24, as the Military Revolutionary Committee began sending out commissars and small armed detachments to secure government buildings. Two unarmed com­missars went to the central telegraph office and brought it under Bolshevik control. A detachment from the Izmailovsky Regiment appeared at the Baltic Railway Station and stayed there to "maintain order." Detachments of Red Guards occupied some bridges but left others in the hands of government troops—in cases where the troops refused to withdraw. No one wanted to shoot. But little by little power in the capital changed hands. Meanwhile, as late as 6 PM Lenin did not suspect a thing. He sent out an urgent letter stressing that the situation was extremely critical, that it was necessary to deal a death blow to the government. In the fourth and fifth Russian editions of Lenin's works this letter is entitled "Letter to Central Committee Members." Actually Soviet historians added this title; the letter was addressed to the district committees of the party, through which Lenin meant to exert pressure on the Central Committee. On the evening of October 24, far from Smolny Institute, Lenin still feared the Provisional Government, which was no longer in power, and continued to urge the Central Committee to begin an insurrection that was already practically over.

The enigma of Lenin's absence from leadership between October 20 and 24 is doubled by the mystery of the insurrection leaders' behavior. They refrained from inviting Lenin to Smolny Institute, the seat of the Petrograd Soviet and the Bolshevik Central Committee at that time, the whole day of October 24, while he, no less curiously, awaited their invitation. Stalin wrote, in his commemorative article of November 6, 1918, "On the evening of October 24, Lenin was summoned to Smolny to lead the movement as a whole." However, by the time the Central Committee considered it ap­propriate to summon their chief, Lenin had already lost patience and was in a streetcar heading for Smolny.

In his History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky says that Lenin, upon his arrival at Smolny, approved the actions of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. "Lenin was in rapture, which he expressed by exclaiming, laughing, and rubbing his hands. Afterward he became more silent, reflected a moment and said: 'Oh, well, it can be done that way too. As long as we take power.'"⁸⁵ Nikolai Podvoisky, who together with Vladimir Antonov- Ovseenko and Grigory Chudnovsky was in direct command of operations, recalled that after Lenin arrived at Smolny he began showering them with notes: Have the telegraph office and telephone exchange been taken? And the bridges?⁸⁶

Lenin's impatience had little influence on the course of events, however. Slowly but surely the city was passing into the hands of the insurgents,

who encountered no resistance. The battle for the city (no one yet realized that it was a battle for the entire country) was waged by 6,000 or 7,000 Bolshevik supporters (2,500 soldiers from the Pavlovsky and Kexholm regiments, 2,500 sailors from Kronstadt, and about 2,000 Red Guards) and 1,500-2,000 defenders of the Provisional Government. The enormous Petrograd garrison declared itself neutral and did not intervene. At 3:30 am the cruiser Aurora dropped anchor near the Nikolaevsky Bridge, and a detachment of sailors chased off the Provisional Government's patrol and occupied the bridge. The Winter Palace, seat of the Provisional Govern­ment, was isolated from the rest of the city.

In the morning, the ministers still did not know they had lost power. They could not have learned it from the newspapers, whose articles were hopelessly out of date; Izvestia cautioned the Bolsheviks against any "foolish adventure"; Novaya zhizn counseled them "not to be the first to fire"; the Menshevik newspaper Rabochaya gazeta (Workers' gazette) hoped for a compromise.

By this time Lenin knew that he had won. At about 10 am he wrote a proclamation 'To the Citizens of Russia," announcing, "The Provisional Government has been deposed," and stating, 'The cause for which the people have fought, namely, the immediate offer of a democratic peace, the abolition of landed proprietorship, workers' control over production, and the establishment of Soviet power—this cause has been secured." Trotsky recalled that after writing this proclamation Lenin turned around "with a tired smile and said, This change—hiding underground from Pereverzev's police one moment, being in power the next... Es schwindelt' [it makes you dizzy.] He supplemented his words with an eloquent gesture of his hand: round and round his forehead," to show how it made his head spin to have gained power at last.⁸⁷ The Winter Palace, it is true, had not yet been taken. But Lenin wanted at all costs to announce victory to the first session of the Congress of Soviets. He began therefore to send notes to the members of the Military Revolutionary Committee demanding an immediate attack. This time the tone was different. He threatened to have the members of the committee shot if the order was not carried out.⁸⁸ A new era had begun. Threats of execution and later actual executions were to become essential elements of policy.

The taking of the Winter Palace was a long, drawn out affair. The Red Guards and soldiers were not particularly anxious to launch an attack, especially since the number of defenders was decreasing by the hour. The insurgents entered by ones and twos through the "servants' entrance" of the palace, which was not defended. The Aurora fired some blanks, giving

the signal to the Peter and Paul Fortress to direct its artillery fire against the Winter Palace; after firing about thirty shells, the gunners succeeded in hitting their target only two or three times. More and more Red Guards were entering the palace. Initially, the officer cadets defending tl*e Pro­visional Government took the Red Guards prisoner. Then, as the Red Guards' numbers grew, they took the cadets prisoner and disarmed them. Antonov-Ovseenko made his way into the palace and arrested the members of the Provisional Government, then sent a telegram to Lenin: 'The Winter Palace was taken at 2:04 am."

The Congress of Soviets, which by then consisted only of Bolsheviks and Left SRs, the Mensheviks and Right SRs having walked out in protest against the seizure of power, approved the formation of a "provisional workers' and peasants' government." It was called the Council of People's Commissars, or Sovnarkom, and was to rule "until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly." This government was made up entirely of Bolsheviks. Its pres­ident was Lenin; Trotsky became people's commissar of foreign affairs; Rykov, internal affairs; Milyutin, agriculture; Lomov, justice; Nogin, com­merce and industry; Shlyapnikov, labor; Teodorovich, food; Lunacharsky, education; and Stalin, nationalities. Thus the October revolution was com­pleted.

"In some respects, a revolution is a miracle," Lenin later wrote.⁸⁹ And so it must have seemed. For the second time within the year a government, stricken with impotence, was toppled by a flick of the finger. In October, as in February, the government discovered at the critical moment that it had no support. The difference between the two revolutions was that in February the tsarist government was swept aside by an explosion of universal discontent, whereas in October the Provisional Government was overthrown by a party led by a man who knew what he wanted and who was firmly persuaded that he incarnated the laws of history, that he alone had fully assimilated the teachings of Marx and Engels.

Lenin got what he wanted; the Bolshevik party came to the Congress of Soviets with power in its hands. To achieve this goal he had had to overcome the resistance of his comrades, which was far more serious than that of the Provisional Government. The "rightist" enemies of the Provisional Gov­ernment—generals and officers—were convinced that if the Bolsheviks came to power they could not hold on to it for more than a few weeks and that in the meantime at least Kerensky would have been ousted.

On October 25 the first session of the Congress of Soviets adopted two decrees presented by Lenin, on peace and on land. For the first and last time, the Bolshevik chief kept his word; he gave the country peace and land. Soon a new war would break out, a civil war this time, which would last more than three years. As for the land, it would turn out that the landlords had much less than was believed for the peasants to take, and soon the state would confiscate everything grown on the land anyway. Meanwhile, on October 25 Lenin read aloud the text of the decree on peace, which called upon the peoples and governments of all the belligerent coun­tries to agree to a just and democratic peace without annexations or in­demnities and an immediate three-month armistice to allow for peace negotiations. His decree on land stated in part: "All land... shall be confiscated without compensation [in any form] and become the property of the whole people."⁹⁰

Lenin included in the Decree on Land the exact wording of a program drawn up by an SR newspaper. This program was based on 242 "mandates" submitted by local peasant representatives to the All-Russia Congress of Peasant Deputies, held in Petrograd in August 1917. Commenting on the program at that time, Lenin wrote: "The peasants want to keep their small farms. ... No sensible socialist will differ with the peasant poor over this." He added that as long as "political power is taken over by the proletariat, the rest will come by itself."⁹¹

Lenin was able to listen calmly to the angry SRs at the Second Congress of Soviets as they denounced him for "stealing their program." "A fine Marxist this is," they said, "who has harassed us for fifteen years from the heights of his Marxist grandeur, for being petit bourgeois and unscientific, but who no sooner seizes power than he implements our program." To which he responded calmly: "A fine party it is which had to be driven from power before its program could be implemented."⁹² Lenin was calm because he alone knew that without the support of the peasantry he could not retain power, and that as long as he had power, he could easily take back what he had given and what he had promised.

In the week after the insurrection, a few half-hearted and uncoordinated attempts by the former government to oppose the new one ended in failure. Kerensky, who had left the Winter Palace on the morning of October 25, sought aid at Pskov, the site of Northern Front general headquarters. Only General Krasnov, commander of the Third Cavalry Corps, took up the defense of the Provisional Government, the same Krasnov who under Gen­eral Krymov's orders had marched on Petrograd in August to overthrow the Kerensky government. Krasnov managed to gather together only 700 cav­alrymen, "less than a normal regiment."⁹³ But these modest forces allowed him nonetheless to occupy Gatchina and then Tsarskoe Selo. On October 30 detachments of the Red Guard, reinforced by sailors, stopped the Cos­sacks' advance at the hills of Pulkovo outside Petrograd. Trotsky wrote that this victory belonged to a Colonel Valden, who had accepted the command of the Red Guards, "not because he agreed with us," but apparently because "he hated Kerensky so much that this hatred awoke a certain sympathy for us in him."⁹⁴ Krasnov ordered a retreat to Gatchina, where he was arrested. Kerensky had time to flee, thus ending his brief passage through Russian history.

While General Krasnov in his strange alliance with the socialist Kerensky led several hundred Cossacks on Petrograd, General Cheremisov, com­mander of the Northern Front, considered the country's main danger to be the "German of Berlin," against whom the front had to be maintained; as for the Bolsheviks, the "Germans of Petrograd," they would not be able to stay in power anyhow. At the same time, the representatives of the "rev­olutionary democrats," the Mensheviks and Right SRs, formed a Union for the Salvation of the Homeland and the Revolution. But their struggle against the Bolsheviks remained verbal.

During his first week in power the most serious resistance Lenin ran into came from his closest comrades in the Central Committee and the government. It broke out on two fronts, when the All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railroad Workers' Union, the Vikzhel, demanded on October 29 that a "homogeneous socialist government" including all the socialist parties be formed. Their demand included the threat of a general railroad strike. The poet Alexander Blok was wrong when he wrote, 'The Vikzhel has shown the breadth of its black hands." The Vikzhel's "hands" were not "black" (that is to say, reactionary) but pink. During the October days, the neutral position of the union, which refused to allow military trains into Petrograd, had contributed to the Bolshevik victory. And when the union issued its ultimatum, the Central Committee agreed to the "ne­cessity of broadening the base of the government and the possibility of changing its composition." It did this in Lenin's and Trotsky's absence. The former was leading the suppression of a desperate attempt by the officer cadets to start an insurrection in the city; the latter was mobilizing forces against Krasnov. A Central Committee delegation headed by Kamenev went to a meeting called by the Vikzhel and agreed to the proposal of a coalition government made up of eighteen members, five of them Bolsheviks, but excluding Lenin and Trotsky. A delegation of workers from the Putilov Factory declared at this meeting: "We will not allow bloodshed between the revolutionary parties; we will not allow a civil war." One of the workers summarized the opinion of the capital's proletariat in these words: 'To hell with Lenin and Chernov [leader of the Right SRs]. Hang them both!"⁹⁵

With Trotsky's support, Lenin rejected the very idea of a coalition. "If you have a majority," he said to the supporters of a coalition government, "take power in the Central Executive Committee and carry on. But we will go to the sailors." In response Kamenev, Rykov, Milyutin, Zinoviev, and Nogin left the Central Committee, and Rykov, Teodorovich, Milyutin, and Nogin left the Council of People's Commissars, the Sovnarkom. In their declaration, they stressed that the only way to maintain a purely Bolshevik government was through "political terror."⁹⁶

As always, Lenin managed to put down the revolt of his troops through blackmail; he threatened to resign and appeal to the "rank and file." Later, Kamenev and his supporters made a full apology and returned to the bosom of the Central Committee and government. Kamenev, the unrecognized father of future "Eurocommunism," proposed more than once while Lenin was still alive that measures be taken to soften Bolshevik rule. But each time he quickly abandoned his proposals. Historians justly reproach him for his weakness and indecision. But this lack of tenacity in defending his ideas is primarily explained by the fact that Kamenev, in every dispute with Lenin, soon realized that a weakening of Bolshevik rule would threaten the very foundations of the party. The Old Bolshevik Kamenev did not want to change the party's character.

In rejecting all attempts at compromise and all claims by the other socialist parties to even the sightest share of power, Lenin only confirmed what had been stated in Pravda the day after the seizure of the Winter Palace:

We are taking power alone, relying on the country's voice and counting on the friendly support of the European proletariat. But having taken power, we will punish with an iron hand the enemies of the revolution and the saboteurs.... They dreamed of a Kornilov dictatorship.... We will give them the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁹⁷

For Lenin, the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party.

Soviet power spread over the country with no serious resistance. Only in Moscow, where Lenin had said victory would be sure and there would be nobody to fight,⁹⁸ did the resistance last for eight days.⁹⁹ In general, local garrisons and armed workers' detachments easily dealt with any at­tempts to stop the Bolsheviks from taking power. The assassination of General Dukhonin, the commander-in-chief at Mogilev, by the Red Guards of the new commander-in-chief, Ensign Krylenko, completed the annihi­lation of the old army.

The consolidation of Soviet power could not be considered complete until the problem of the Constituent Assembly was resolved. The decision to convene the assembly, freely elected by the citizens to determine the future political regime in Russia, had been made by the Provisional Government. "All the best people of Russia," wrote Gorky, "for nearly a hundred years had lived by the idea of a Constituent Assembly."¹⁰⁰ Among the slogans the Bolsheviks had used to campaign against the Provisional Government was the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly. They accused the government of preventing the people, "the true master of the Russian soul, from pronouncing its sovereign word." On April 4 Lenin, who had barely arrived in Russia, said with indignation, "I am accused of harboring views in opposition to the quickest possible convening of the Constituent Assembly! I would call these charges delirious raving if decades of political struggle had not taught me to view honesty in an opponent as a rare exception."¹⁰¹

The elections to the Constituent Assembly, the freest elections in the history of Russia, took place after the October revolution. The composition of the assembly (SRs, 40.4 percent; Bolsheviks, 24 percent; Cadets, 4.7 percent; Mensheviks, 2.7 percent)¹⁰² determined the ruling party's attitude toward it, an attitude which was violently negative. Nevertheless, on Jan­uary 5, 1918, the Constituent Assembly met. Bonch-Bruevich, head of the Sovnarkom's administrative service, a friend of Lenin, and head of "Room 75," the embryo of the Soviet repressive agencies, recalls a "humorous conversation" in the halls of the Tauride Palace the day before the first session of the Constituent Assembly. Lenin's laughing reply to a comrade who impatiently insisted on knowing when the Constituent Assembly was finally going to begin its deliberations was this: "Since we made the mistake of promising the world that this talk shop would meet, we have to open it up today, but history has not yet said a word about when we will shut it down."¹⁰³ In order to teach the deputies to the Russian parliament where power lay, Bonch-Bruevich brought a "detachment of the most reliable sailors" to the Tauride Palace—200 sailors, or about one armed sailor for every two deputies, which was ample compensation for the absence of a Bolshevik majority. "I noticed," wrote Bonch-Bruevich, who was in the room with his sailors, "that two of them, surrounded by their comrades, were aiming their guns at Chernov." Bonch-Bruevich persuaded them not to kill the president of the assembly, adding that Lenin would not allow it. "Okay, since the Little Father doesn't want it, but it's too bad," said one sailor, speaking for everyone. At that time the "Little Father," as the sailors affectionately called Lenin, felt that it would be enough to disperse the Constituent Assembly. He gathered the members of the government and

after a quick exchange of opinions, the unanimous conclusion was reached that the talk shop was useless.... It was decided not to interrupt the pro­ceedings, to give them a chance to jabber to their heart's content for a day, but not to allow the next day's session to take place, to announce that the assembly was dissolved, and to urge the deputies to return to their homes.¹⁰⁴

Lenin lost all interest in the Constituent Assembly after it refused to acknowledge the primacy of the Bolshevik government and the decisions of the Soviet Congress. The historic announcement by the sailor Zhelez- nyakov, 'The guard is tired," ended the brief history of the Russian par­liament. The guard's wishes became the fundamental law.

The left SRs, a splinter from the Socialist Revolutionary party, played an important role in the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the consolidation of Bolshevik power. For a short time after the October rev­olution the Left SRs, led by Maria Spiridonova, Boris Kamkov, and Vladimir Karelin, maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality toward the new seat of authority. In November they entered the government and were given three ministerial posts, which allowed Lenin's government to present itself as a pluralistic one. At the Constituent Assembly the Left SRs blocked with the Bolsheviks.

On the eve of the gathering of the Constituent Assembly, Lenin played the role of judge, jury, and executioner for the first time. Bonch-Bruevich brought him "the first reports of sabotage," compiled by Room 75. Lenin read it all, verified it, checked the sources of the documents, compared handwriting, and arrived at the conclusion "that the sabotage movement really exists, that it is mainly directed from one center, and that this center is the Cadet party." He therefore decided to outlaw the party and brand its members "enemies of the people."¹⁰⁵ A few days later, as president of the Sovnarkom, Lenin signed a decree to that effect. After chasing the Cadets out of the Constituent Assembly with the help of the Left SRs, Lenin was able to dissolve the parliament with little effort. A by-product of the decree outlawing the Cadet party was the murder in a hospital of two of the party's leaders, Shingarev and Kokoshkin, deputies to the Con­stituent Assembly.

After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, a demonstration took place in Petrograd which encountered the bullets of the Red Guards.

The workers of the Obukhov Factory, the cartridge factory, and other factories took part in the demonstration. Under the red flag of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party, the workers of Vasilevsky Island, Vyborg, and other districts marched to the Tauride Palace. It was exactly these workers who were shot, and for all of Pravdcis lies, it cannot conceal this shameful fact.¹⁰⁶

Gorky wrote this in an article entitled "January 9—January 5," which drew a parallel between the shooting of workers by the tsar's troops on January 9, 1905, and the shooting of workers by the Red Guard on January 5, 1918.

CHAPTER

FROM THE REALM OF

NECESSITY TO THE REALM OF FREEDOM,

1918-1920

THE SHAMEFUL PEACE

Nikolai Berdyaev was wrong in believing that of all tendencies, bolshevism was "the least Utopian and the most realistic," that it best corresponded to the situation existing in Russia in 1917.¹ The Bolsheviks had an easy victory because they promised Utopia: everything for everyone, right away. 'The face of truth is terrible," wrote the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno. 'The people need myths and illusions; they need to be lied to. Truth is frightening, insupportable, deadly." The Bolsheviks offered the illusion of peace, land, and bread. The reality, however, was a new war, forced grain requisitioning, famine, and unprecedented terror.

Shortly before the October revolution, at his retreat in Finland, Lenin put down in writing his plan for transforming Russia. He called his Utopia State and Revolution. He considered this work so important that in a note to Kamenev he requested that if the author were killed the pamphlet be published at all costs. Basing himself on the doctrine of Marx and Engels and taking as a living model the Paris Commune, Lenin outlined the communist state which would emerge after the proletarian revolution. In this state there would no longer be an army or police, all officials would be elected, and the functions of administering the state would be so simple that anyone, even a cook or housekeeper, could learn them. Government officials would earn no more than skilled workers; Lenin gave great importance to this concept. The author of State and Revolution recognized that the victory of the proletariat would not im­mediately give birth to a communist society; a period of transition would be necessary, during which the dictatorship of the proletariat would replace the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. "The proletariat needs the state," Lenin quoted Engels, "not in the interests of freedom, but in order to hold down its adversaries." The dictatorship of the proletariat had two basic functions: to suppress the exploiters' resistance, and to provide leadership for the masses of the population. The first function seemed simple to him, since the repression of an insignificant minority would be the work of the overwhelming majority of the population, the working class. The second function presented no major problems either; people should submit to the "armed vanguard" until everyone could "become accustomed to observing the elementary rules of social intercourse... without coercion, without subordination."²

Immediately upon taking power Lenin ran into harsh reality, which put his Utopia to the test. First of all, the new government had to resolve the war problem, which had been fatal to the Provisional Government. Nego­tiations with Germany began at Brest-Litovsk in December. Prince Max von Baden described in his memoirs some of the peculiarities of these talks. His cousin, Prince Ernst von Hohenlohe, a member of the German delegation, was placed next to a Madame Bitsenko at the dinner table: "She earned this distinction by having murdered a minister." Anastasia Bitsenko had committed this act in 1905. The veteran terrorist represented the Left SRs in the delegation. The encounter at the dinner table between Hohenlohe and Bitsenko, and at the negotiating table between Leon Trotsky and General Hoffmann, was a confrontation between Utopia and reality. The majority of the Bolshevik Central Committee thought that if they simply announced the war was over they could calmly proceed to the building of communism. The Germans demanded reality, that is to say, territory: Po­land, Lithuania, parts of Latvia and Byelorussia.

Bukharin, the spokesman for the Left Communists, an important group­ing within the Central Committee, rejected in principle any compromise with the imperialists and preached a "revolutionary war" against Germany, explaining that it would ignite a "worldwide conflagration." Trotsky pro­posed the celebrated formula, "neither war nor peace," which was supported by the majority of the Central Committee. The Soviet government an­nounced, through Trotsky, that it would withdraw from the war but not sign a peace treaty. Lenin, in the minority, argued the realities of the situation: we have no army, we are helpless, we must sign a treaty. His comrades and disciples had been blinded by Utopia. They failed to understand what was obvious to Lenin: Utopia could not be realized unless power was main­tained. This last argument was Lenin's most important, convincing, and decisive one. When the Germans, taking advantage of Trotsky's announce­ment, began a new offensive and issued an ultimatum, Lenin demanded that it be accepted immediately. He explained, "If the Germans said that they wanted to overthrow Bolshevik power, we would naturally have to fight."³ In other words, power was worth fighting for, but not territory or other such "outmoded" concepts. In discussing Trotsky's refusal to sign the peace treaty, Bonch-Bruevich asks, "How can such a nonsensical at­titude be explained?" He answers:

Generally it has been said that pseudo-patriotic and nationalistic prejudices played bad tricks on the negotiating commission; none of its members, including Trotsky, wanted to take upon himself the woeful responsibility of placing his signature on this humiliating peace treaty, which ignorant loud­mouths might interpret as "betrayal of the homeland," a direct blow to Russia as a state.⁴

Lenin's fanatical self-assurance and belief in his Utopia allowed him to disregard such "pseudo-patriotic and nationalistic prejudices."

On March 3, 1918, the Soviet delegation signed a peace treaty at Brest- Litovsk, "a shameful peace," as Lenin put it, agreeing to German occu­pation of the Baltic states, parts of Byelorussia, and all of the Ukraine. The Soviet Republic agreed to pay an enormous indemnity to the Germans in the form of provisions, raw materials, and gold. But Lenin still held power. "The Brest-Litovsk peace," the Small Soviet Encyclopedia observes, "fulfilled the essential task of preserving the dictatorship of the proletar­iat."⁵

The Left SRs resigned from the government to protest the treaty, but they continued to support the Bolsheviks. Some officers and generals re­fused to recognize the unilateral peace, but the soldiers and peasants were opposed to war. Their support allowed Lenin to stay in power. The shameful peace did not, however, solve any internal problems. All existing conflicts were exacerbated.

On April 8, in a conversation with Lunacharsky, the people's commissar of education, Lenin presented an idea he "had been toying with for some time." In Campanella's City of the Sun the fronts of the houses were covered with frescoes that served to educate and instruct the citizens of that Utopian city. Lenin proposed that Lunacharsky select some slogans for a similar "monumental form of propaganda." Later Lenin picked his favorites from among the suggested slogans. He was especially fond of one: "The golden age is coming; people will live without laws or punishment, doing of their own free will what is good and just." Perhaps these words of Ovid had haunted Lenin as he wrote his State and Revolution. But the golden age did not come after the October revolution. Certainly, men began to live without laws, but nothing they did of their own free will was good or just.

THE SPIRIT OF DESTRUCTION

The first task Lenin assigned to the proletarian revolution was the destruc­tion of the state—the smashing of the old state machinery, in Marxist terminology. This had begun before the revolution, for the army had already fallen apart. After October the judicial system was abolished and replaced by revolutionary tribunals, which railroaded people to prison on the basis of "proletarian conscience and revolutionary duty." Pillaging, looting of wine cellars, and murders were daily occurrences in the revolutionary capital; they found an indignant chronicler in the person of Maxim Gorky. Until the newspaper Novaya zhizn was shut down in July 1918, in a column called "Untimely Thoughts," Gorky constantly and indignantly presented the facts and castigated the people's commissars who, in their efforts to prove their "devotion to the people," did not hesitate to "shoot, assassinate, and arrest those who did not think like them, did not hesitate to lie and slander their enemies."⁶ As an example, Gorky mentioned the case of the sailor Zheleznyakov, who, "translating the ferocious speeches of his leaders into the simple language of a man of the people, said that for the good of the Russian people, it would be all right to kill a million" opponents.⁷ Bonch-Bruevich, who after October 1917 was in charge of security in Petrograd, remembered that "to maintain public order in the city, from the end of October until February 1918, at a time when drunkenness and brawling were at their peak, the only reliable forces we had were the Latvian riflemen at Smolny, some soldiers of the Chasseurs, Preobrazhenzky, and Semenovsky regiments, who were guarding the State Bank, and some units from the Second Fleet."⁸ A few pages later, Bonch-Bruevich tells of his visit to the "loyal sailors" of the Second Fleet. They were commanded by two "politically conscious anarchists," the same Anatoly Zheleznyakov who closed down the Constituent Assembly and who, according to Gorky, was willing to kill a million people, and his brother, an alcoholic and a murderer. Bonch-Bruevich narrates the monstrous exploits of these sailors, "the pride and joy of the Russian revolution," with a bit of fear perhaps, but also with obvious satisfaction at knowing they were on "our side." One of the sailors described how he had put forty-three officers in front of a firing squad.⁹ When the Zheleznyakov brothers began to pillage and kill on a level unheard of even in revolutionary Petrograd, they were disarmed and sent to the front to defend Soviet power. Disarming them required "a strong detachment of Bolshevik Latvians." Also, "just in case, we alerted the Volynsky and Chasseurs regiments, who at that time had distinguished themselves by their sobriety, or rather, their tolerable degree of drunkenness."¹⁰

Clearing the city of anarchists, whether "conscious," "spontaneous," or "pure," did not mean an end to arbitrary justice. The suppression of the enemy took on an organized character. Room 75 was too weak to defend the government, though it had done its best. At a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, Bonch-Bruevich explained that he had obtained confessions from detainees by threatening to shoot them.¹¹ (The death penalty had been abolished just a few days before.) Room 75 was only the forerunner of the true political police. On December 7, five weeks after the revolution, it was replaced by a new body that became a key instrument of Soviet power, the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle Against Coun­terrevolution and Sabotage—the Cheka. The idea for such an agency had come to Lenin in the aftermath of October. He searched for the right man to head it up: "Is it impossible to find among us a Fouquier-Tinville to tame our wild counterrevolutionaries?"¹² At the beginning of December a man was found who actually did resemble the bloody public prosecutor of the French revolution, whose standard sentence had been the guillotine. At a meeting of the Sovnarkom, this man, Felix Dzerzhinsky, recited his creed: "Do not believe that I seek revolutionary forms of justice. We don't need justice at this point. We are engaged today in hand-to-hand combat, to the death, to the end! I propose, I demand, the organization of revolu­tionary annihilation against all active counterrevolutionaries."¹³

The new organ of "revolutionary annihilation," directly under the au­thority of the Sovnarkom and its president, Lenin, gave priority to the struggle against "sabotage."

From its inception, the new government showed a complete mastery of vocabulary. A new art was born, the art of propaganda, of changing the meaning of things by changing their name. After the proletarian revolution, strikes, the weapon of the proletariat, lost their justification; so they were renamed. When, as we shall see, a general strike of civil servants began, it was denounced as "sabotage," a sinister term implying the need for severe punishment. Power was in the hands of the Bolsheviks, as the nation, and above all the intelligentsia, would learn all too quickly.

Among the ideas of Engels that are still relevant today are these prophetic words: "Nations that have boasted of making a revolution have always discovered on the day after that they had no idea what was happening, that the completed revolution had nothing to do with the one they wanted." In Russia the first to discover this truth "the day after" were the intellectuals. For over a century they had lived for the revolution, longed for it, worked for it. The more the monarchy weakened, the more active they became. As early as the turn of the century they had felt the underground tremors of impending disaster, had hailed the coming onslaught of the "new Huns," had called down fire from heaven, and had agreed to be trampled into the dust for the sake of Russia's regeneration. The February revolution, which brought freedom and lent a voice to the "great silent mass" of the people, at first seemed to be their dream come true. But the people bore little resemblance to the icon worshiped by the intellectuals, who although they controlled the Provisional Government, had no clear idea what to do with their power. Gorky noted in his diary the lament of an anonymous intel­lectual reflecting the sentiments of most of his kind: "I feel terrible, like a Christopher Columbus who has finally reached the shores of America but is disgusted by it."

The intellectuals did, however, find the strength to fight against the "shameless brute" who had violated their beloved. A strike of civil servants and municipal employees broke out first in Petrograd, then in Moscow, and spread to other cities as well. Urban transit systems and power plants shut down. Moscow's teachers went on -strike (for three months), as did those of Petrograd, Ekaterinburg, Astrakhan, and Ufa. Doctors, health workers, nurses, and pharmacists followed suit. University professors refused to recognize the new government. Many technicians also resisted, expressing their ideas mainly through the All-Russia Union of Engineers. One week after the October insurrection, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets invited the "creative intelligentsia" of Petrograd to a meeting at Smolny. Aside from two Bolsheviks, Rurik Ivnev and Larissa Reissner, only three intellectuals showed up, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Vsevolod Mey- erhold, and Alexander Blok. Mayakovsky, who in March 1917 had pro­claimed, "Long live art free of politics," and Meyerhold, director of a spectacular show, The Masked Ball, at the Imperial Alexandrinsky Theater, represented the new revolutionary art.

The hopes of these artistic innovators were described years later by the modernist theatrical director Aleksandr Tairov: "What was our reasoning?

The revolution was destroying the old forms of social life. We would destroy the old forms of art. Consequently, we too were revolutionaries and could march in step with the revolution."¹⁴ These revolutionary artists were sadly mistaken to expect any lasting sympathy from the political revolutionaries. Nevertheless, for a while the new government made use of these "destructive elements." Evgeny Zamyatin described them as "the slippery school of con man art," who "knew when to wear the red cap and when to take it off, when to sing the glories of the tsar and when to sing the hammer and sickle." With the exception of one real poet, Mayakovsky, Zamyatin noted, "the Futurists were the slipperiest of all; without losing one second, they announced that the official artists of the new regime would, of course, be they."¹⁵

At Smolny, Alexander Blok was an alien presence—he who had seen the revolution as Russia's purifying fire, who when he closed his eyes could hear "the music of revolutions." It was also with his eyes closed that he wrote 'The Twelve" and 'The Scythians." He came to his senses rather quickly and with quite a shock: "When the Red Army and socialist con­struction began, I couldn't take it any more," he wrote in his diary.

The disenchantment of the overwhelming majority of the intellectuals did not surprise Lenin; he preached that only the intelligentsia could bring "revolutionary consciousness" to the working class but had always been suspicious and ill disposed toward them. What he did not expect, however, was the disenchantment of the working class, in whose name and for whose sake the revolution had been carried out.

Of the three slogans that had allowed the Bolsheviks to take power, peace and land reflected above all the interests of the peasantry. The third slogan, bread, expressed the interests of the working class but its exact meaning was a good deal less clear. Also unclear was the meaning of "workers' control of production." Moreover, it was symptomatic that the decree on workers' control was not adopted on October 25 along with the other two, but twenty days later, on November 14, 1917.

This decree provided for "workers' control of production, of the purchase, sale, and storage of raw materials and finished products, and of the financial aspects of the enterprise."¹⁶ What could be simpler than this at first glance? The workers would control everything, and all economic problems would be solved by the producers themselves. In January 1918 Lenin encouraged the proletariat: "You are the government, do as you wish, take what you need, we will support you. ... You will make mistakes, but you will learn."¹⁷ This monumental experiment, involving the entire Russian economy, soon has its effect. The workers often interpreted the vague concept of "workers' control" in a very simple way. "I came to the factory and began to put workers' control into effect," a Communist worker related. "I broke open the safe to count the money, but there wasn't any."¹⁸ The organ of the Central Council of Trade Unions, Vestnik truda (Labor herald), complained that the workers regarded "the factories that have been placed in their hands as an inexhaustible ocean from which unlimited quantities of goods can be taken without doing any harm."¹⁹

Governmental measures completely disorganized the functioning of in­dustry. In May 1918 Tomsky, president of the Central Council of Trade Unions, said, "Current labor productivity has dropped to a point that threat­ens us with total disorganization and collapse."²⁰ The decline in labor productivity was one expression of growing discontent among the workers. A. Volsky (Jan Waclaw Machaiski) made this comment in the magazine Rabochaya revolyutsiya (Workers' revolution), whose only issue appeared in June—July 1918: "After the bourgeois revolution of February, workers' wages were substantially increased, and the eight-hour day was won; after the proletarian revolution of October, the workers didn't get anything."²¹ There was another difference between the two revolutions: after the pro­letarian revolution, the working class lost the possibility of fighting for its rights. "Control of production" proved to be a fantasy; the destruction of the management system existing in industry brutally aggravated the workers' plight.

In March 1918 an emergency convention of delegates from local plants and factories was held in Petrograd. It stated:

The unions have lost their independence and no longer serve to organize the defense of workers' rights. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies seem to fear the workers. They do not allow new elections, but have en­trenched themselves; they have become government bodies and no longer express the opinions of the working masses.²²

A declaration adopted by delegates from the largest factories in Petrograd and from the railroad workshops, power plants, and printing houses ap­pealed to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets. It summed up the results of the first months of the revolution as follows:

On October 25, 1917, the Bolshevik party, allied with the Left SRs and supported by armed soldiers and sailors, overthrew the Provisional Govern­ment and seized power. We, the workers of Petrograd, have in our majority accepted this change of government, made in our name but without our knowlege or participation. .. . Moreover, the workers have supported the new government, which declared itself a workers' and peasants' government and promised to carry out our wishes and respect our interests. All our organi­zations were placed at its service. Our sons and brothers have shed their blood for it. We have patiently endured famine and adversity. In our name all those whom the new government has designated its enemies have been cruelly repressed. Hoping that the promises it gave would be kept, we resigned ourselves to the eradication of our liberty and our rights. But four months have gone by already, and we see that our trust has been cruelly abused, that our hopes have been brutally stamped out.²³

The delegates' movement, expressing the disenchantment of the working class, began to spread to other cities. In Moscow an organizing committee was established for an All-Russia Conference of Factory Delegates. The movement was labeled Menshevik, Right SR, counterrevolutionary, and broken up.

The workers voted against "proletarian power" with their hands—pro­duction fell off tremendously—and with their feet—they abandoned the disorganized and ruined factories. In May 1918, at the first congress of local economic councils, Aleksei Gastev discussed the workers' refusal to work: "In fact, we are faced with an enormous sabotage in which millions participate. I laugh when I am told of bourgeois sabotage, when the terrified bourgeois is singled out as if he were the saboteur. We are dealing with national, popular, proletarian sabotage."²⁴

The collapse of industry soon had repercussions on agriculture. The Bolshevik party had won the support of the peasants by "borrowing" the agrarian program of the SRs. Lenin did not try to hide this fact: "At least until the summer of 1918, we maintained power because we had the support of the peasantry as a whole."²⁵ In October 1917 the peasants had supported the Bolsheviks, but disenchantment quickly set in. A popular song in the first years of the revolution had this line: "Our engine runs full steam ahead. Last stop is the commune." The Russian peasants didn't want to go that far; they wanted to get off at the first stop, the distribution of the landed estates.

Radical agrarian reform, of which the peasants had dreamed for centuries and the intellectuals for a hundred years, swept the country like wildfire, but with unexpected results. In the overwhelming majority of regions, those who had tilled the soil from time immemorial received on the average half a desyatina, or 1.35 acres, of additional land.²⁶ Workers, artisans, and household servants who had fled the cities also demanded—and received — a plot of land. However, this was not the main reason for the peasants' disillusionment. Each had obtained a bit of land, and the large estates had at last been abolished. Dissatisfaction over the new government began the moment it started demanding agricultural produce from the peasants without providing anything in return. Inflation had stripped money of its value, and industry no longer produced for the countryside's needs. Peasant "sab­otage" was now added to that of the intelligentsia and the proletariat. In November 1917, 641,000 tons of grain were stored; in December 1917 136,000; in January 1918, 46,000; in April 1918, 38,000; in May 1918, 3,000; in June 1918, 2,000.²⁷ The cities were starving. The famished workers further reduced their already low output or simply fled to the countryside.

The Bolshevik government created discontent among those who had supported it. But Lenin's disappointment with the proletariat was just as strong. (He had always been unhappy with the peasantry.) Within a few months after the revolution, the Russian working class, whose "political maturity" Lenin had praised, proved itself in his eyes to be immature, not proletarian enough, and lacking in the training necessary to run the country.

The Utopian dreams of State and Revolution, written on the eve of October, evaporated upon contact with reality. In March 1918 Lenin wrote a new Utopian program, an article called "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," in which he spelled out the most important features of "com­munism" (which later came to be called war communism, after its failure became apparent). The "task of suppressing the resistance of the exploit­ers," Lenin wrote, had been fulfilled for the most part. "Now we must administer Russia." This second task was as easy as the first, in the author's view. It could be accomplished simply by establishing "nationwide ac­counting and control of the production and distribution of goods."²⁸ In October 1921 Lenin described his 1918 program more fully:

At the beginning of 1918 we made the mistake of deciding to go over directly to communist production and distribution. We thought that under the surplus food appropriation system the peasants would provide us with the required quantity of grain, which we could distribute among the factories and thus achieve communist production and distribution. I cannot say that we pictured this plan as definitely and clearly as that; but we acted approximately on those lines.²⁹

It was precisely at the beginning of 1918 that Lenin, according to Trotsky, then his closest comrade-in-arms, constantly repeated at Sovnarkom meet­ings: "In six months we will have built socialism." Ten years later, Andrei Platonov would write The Strange Herbs of Chevengur, a novel about some revolutionary dreamers who decide to build socialism "at one blow," using "the fighting methods of revolutionary conscience and compulsory labor service."

Unlike Platonov's characters, Lenin had vast resources at his disposal for realizing his communist Utopia. In industry, "control of production" gave way to nationalizations. Private trade, the foundation of the capitalist system, was banned. And compulsory labor service was introduced. "We ought to begin," Lenin wrote, "by introducing compulsory labor service for the rich."³⁰ Later these principles would gradually be extended to the majority, the workers and peasants. The example of wartime Germany served as confirmation to Lenin that such a scheme could succeed. "German imperialism... displayed its economically advanced position by the fact that it went over, earlier than any of the other warring powers, to a system of compulsory labor service."³¹ Lenin's plan had the simplicity of genius: the Kaiser's Germany plus Soviet power equals communism.

Compulsory service was applied to the peasants in the form of government decrees in May and June 1918 instituting grain requisitioning. Under the so-called surplus food appropriation system (prodrazverstka) peasants were obliged to sell the state all their surplus, at fixed prices. This requisitioning of grain, Lenin said, "must become our fundamental activity" and "must be pursued to the end. Only when this problem is resolved will we have the socialist foundations on which to build the glorious structure of so­cialism."³²

The ban on private trade and the absence of any state trading system brought famine to the cities, an outcome that must have seemed incom­prehensible to a population which had revolted because of food shortages. Lenin formulated his scheme for building the "glorious structure" in the following manner: "There are two ways to fight hunger, a capitalist one and a socialist one. The first consists of free trade. ... Our path is that of the grain monopoly."³³ And so the battle for grain began. In order to confiscate grain, the government organized "food detachments," a measure Lenin described as the "first and most momentous step toward the socialist rev­olution in the countryside."³⁴ Poor peasants' committees were established by decree on June 11, 1918, to help bring the "revolution to the coun­tryside." Part of the grain discovered and confiscated by these committees was to be distributed to the poor peasants themselves, as a "material incentive."

Bonch-Bruevich offers these recollections of the period of "war com­munism":

The onrush of revolutionary events.. . changed our social relations to such an extent that we considered it best to nationalize absolutely everything, from the biggest factories down to the last hairdressing shop run by one hairdresser owning a clipper and two razors, or down to the last carrot in a grocery store. Roadblocks and checkpoints were put up everywhere so that no one could get through with food [smuggled from the countryside]. Everyone was put on government rations.³⁵

Bonch-Bruevich does not explain that the rations varied considerably and that certain categories of the population did not get any at all or that only "speculation by bag traders," who smuggled foodstuffs past the road­blocks, saved the urban population of the Soviet Republic from death. In 1918 and 1919 city dwellers obtained 60 percent of their food from the black market. The grain monopoly and the government's food policy con­tributed greatly to the demoralization of citizens by forcing them to resort to illegal measures, fostering crime on a huge scale and giving birth to an extremely powerful black market. The grain monopoly and the ban on private trade trained people to think that commerce, in and of itself, was a counterrevolutionary activity or at best an unworthy occupation. The grain monopoly, like all the acts of the Soviet government, had not only a concrete goal but also an "educational" function, undermining both the administra­tive structures of the old society and its moral foundations as well.

On January 13, 1918, a decree on the separation of church and state deprived the church of all its property and legal rights, in effect outlawing it. In September a decree on the family and marriage and one on the schools were adopted almost simultaneously. Marriage (only civil marriage was recognized; religious marriage was abolished) and divorce were made freely available. Alexandra Kollontai declared the family's obsolescence, both to the state, because it prevents women from doing work useful to society, and to family members themselves, because the state would gradually take over childbearing.

However, the state could not afford to assume this task immediately after the revolution, although articles were inserted in the legal code making it possible in the future. The government's intentions were made clear at a national educational conference in remarks by Zlata Lilina, Zinoviev's wife and the director of public education in Petrograd, who called for the "na­tionalization" of all children, to remove them from the oppressive influences of their families, because children, "like wax, are highly impressionable" and because "good, true Communists" could be made out of them.

Schools became coeducational, tuition was abolished, and tests were done away with, along with homework. While supporting school reform, the All-Russia Union of Schoolteachers spoke out against the subordination of schools to the state.

The destruction of the prerevolutionary social fabric (the army, the legal system, administration, the family, the church, schools, political parties, the economy) did not frighten Lenin. He was convinced he had the key to building a new world, a pure Utopia, on a bare, newly cleared surface. The key was the dictatorship of the proletariat.

BIRTH OF A DICTATORSHIP

The dictatorship of the proletariat was part of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party's program from its inception. To Lenin, the model for such a dictatorship, as discussed by Marx, was the Paris Commune. In State and Revolution Lenin said that only a complete ignoramus or bourgeois swindler could argue that the workers as a class are incapable of directly admin­istering the state. After taking power, however, he changed his tune. Clemenceau liked to say that war was too serious a matter to be left to the generals. Lenin soon reached the conclusion that dictatorship of the pro­letariat was too serious a matter to be left to the proletariat.

Lenin defined the dictatorship of the proletariat first of all as a system that rejected parliamentarism, with its separation of legislative and exec­utive powers. The dictatorship of the proletariat would fuse the executive and legislative functions.³⁶ This meant that the holders of power could pass laws strengthening their own authority without any checks or balances. Lest there be any misunderstanding, Lenin gave this clear explanation: 'The scientific definition of dictatorship is a power that is not limited by any laws, not bound by any rules, and based directly on force."³⁷

Since the proletariat showed itself incapable of exercising such a dic­tatorship, the vanguard of the working class, the party, had to assume the task. Lenin did not conceal his views: "When we are reproached for ex­ercising the dictatorship of a party... we say, 'Yes, the dictatorship of a party! We stand by it and cannot do without it.'"³⁸ Even before taking power, he had scorned the bourgeois concept of "the will of the majority." "What is needed," he wrote, is "a strength which at the decisive moment and place will crush the enemy's strength."³⁹

Lenin's first contact with the practical reality of power persuaded him of the need for a dictatorship of the party and beyond that—this was a new contribution to Marxism—the dictatorship of a single leader. In March 1918 he justified such a dictatorship by the needs of the modern economy.

Large-scale machine industry—which is precisely the material source, the productive source, the foundation of socialism—calls for absolute and strict unity of will. . . . But how can strict unity of will be ensured? By thousands subordinating their will to the will of one. Given ideal class consciousness and discipline on the part of those participating in the common work, the subordination would be something like the mild leadership of a conductor of an orchestra. It may [also] assume the sharp forms of a dictatorship. ... Be that as it may, unquestioning subordination to a single will is absolutely necessary.⁴⁰

Four months after the revolution, in March 1918, Lenin spoke of the need for a one-person dictatorship for economic reasons. In March 1919, in a eulogy for Yakov Sverdlov, he stressed the need for personal dictatorship for political reasons. "In this time of violent struggle, as we exercise the workers' dictatorship, we must advance the principle of personal authority, the moral authority of one man [like Sverdlov] whose decisions are accepted by everybody without lengthy discussions."⁴¹ Firm authority was a concept Lenin had been attached to for a long time. Trotsky in his pamphlet The Second Congress of the RSDLP: Report of the Siberian Delegation (published in Geneva in 1903) described Lenin's plans.

The state of siege [in the party], on which Lenin insists so energetically, requires the party to have a strong central authority. The practical experience of organized distrust [toward the leadership] requires an iron hand; Lenin makes a mental rollcall of the party's personnel and comes to the conclusion that he and only he has that iron hand.

Lenin did not hide his intentions; Trotsky did not have to guess at them. According to the stenographic record of the Second Congress, when a delegate named Popov referred in his remarks to the omnipresent and all- penetrating spirit of the Central Committee, Lenin raised his fist in the air and called out: 'The fist." The power of the fist, which Lenin had estab­lished within his party, was extended to the country as a whole. Thus was born the twentieth-century "philosophy of power."

Upon discovering that reality did not bear the slightest resemblance to his previous conception, Lenin decided to change it by force, first of all by changing other people's conception of it. It is significant that the first decree of the Council of People's Commissars was a decree on the press putting censorship into effect and outlawing magazines and newspapers guilty of a critical attitude toward the new government. Bonch-Bruevich admits that for some, "even some of the Old Bolsheviks," it was hard to accept the fact that "our old program" from before the revolution had called for "freedom of the press," but after the seizure of power this freedom was immediately abolished. Bonch-Bruevich formulates the "new demands of October" this way: "During a revolution there should be only a revolutionary press and no other."⁴²

A good pupil of Lenin and Stalin, Hitler pointed out that the bourgeoisie's weakness in relation to revolutionary Marxism stemmed primarily from a separation between spirit and force, between ideology and terror. In Marx­ism, said the Fiihrer, "spirit and brute force are harmoniously blended." He added, "National socialism is what Marxism could have become, if it had broken its absurd ties with the democratic order."⁴³ Lenin was the first to discover the secret of blending "spirit and brute force," the practical use of force to carry out a Utopian program, and the use of a Utopian program as camouflage for brute force.

Essential to Lenin's policy, which sought to maintain a minority in power, was splitting the majority, atomizing society.

One of the government's first actions was to wipe out all the ranks, titles, and "social estates" that had existed in old Russia. Unlike the bourgeois revolutions, which had introduced the formal equality of all citizens under the law, the proletarian revolution established inequality as a principle. This was done by the Soviet constitution, adopted in July 1918. One section of the population was completely stripped of its rights. The Russian lan­guage was enriched by the word lishenets, "disfranchised person." The lishentsy were people whose income came from a source other than their own labor: individual tradesmen, religious officials, former police collab­orators, members of the imperial household, but also "persons who hire labor with the aim of extracting a profit." This referred primarily to peasants who hired others, even if this meant one worker in the spring or fall to help work the land. No less than 5 million people fell into this category. Deprivation of rights affected all family members. For the children this meant above all being prohibited from studying at the university level and having only limited access to secondary school, depending on the number of openings. All peasants had their electoral rights curtailed: in elections to the soviets the vote of one worker had the value of five peasant votes.

The peasantry was divided into many categories: rural proletarians, poor peasants, middle peasants, and kulaks. Since there were no specific criteria for determining the category to which any one peasant belonged, arbitrar­iness became the rule. In the system created, the possession of one or two cattle or one or two horses determined one's position in society and the future of one's children. "Social status" became a permanent scar. The revolution forbade social mobility to those individuals whose social origins were undesirable. These could not be changed any more than could racial origins.

A concrete example of "disenfranchisement" was the decision by the Petrograd Commissariat of Food Supply in June 1918 to put into effect a "class-based rationing for the various groups of the working or nonworking population." Initially, four categories were created: (1) industrial workers performing heavy physical labor; (2) all other workers and salaried em­ployees; (3) those in the liberal professions; and (4) nonworking elements.⁴⁴ This decision stemmed from Lenin's orders of December 1917 on "the need to distribute food rations according to a class principle."⁴⁵ On September 27, 1918, Pravda reported: "The Commissariat of Social Security has confirmed the necessity of stripping all kulaks and bourgeois elements, both rural and urban, of their rations. The surplus thus obtained will be used to increase the rations of the rural and urban poor." Having divided society into categories, the government assumed the right to sentence part of the population, the lower castes, to starvation, for the preservation of the upper castes.

An essential instrument of Lenin's policy was the Cheka, which func­tioned in fact as a special organ of the Bolshevik party, directly under Lenin's control. According to Krupskaya, what Lenin feared most of all from the very first days in power was the softness of his own comrades. He was infuriated by a resolution of the Second Congress of Soviets abol­ishing the death penalty, passed on October 25, 1917, on a motion by Kamenev. The February revolution had abolished the death penalty, and when Kerensky attempted to restore it to punish deserters, the Bolsheviks had strenuously objected. Now Lenin angrily repeated: "Nonsense. How can one make a revolution without firing squads?" According to Trotsky, Lenin insisted this was a big mistake, "a pacifist illusion." After the death penalty was abolished, the Bolshevik government, under pressure from Lenin, decided in spite of the decree to "have recourse to a firing squad when it becomes obvious that there is no other way."⁴⁶

A network of "extraordinary commissions" (local Cheka units) covered the entire Soviet Republic. They were set up in major cities, county seats, and provincial capitals, on the railroads, in the ports, and in the army. Very soon the Cheka was granted unlimited power. It was, according to one of its leaders, "an organ that employs in its struggle the methods of investigating commissions, the courts, and the armed forces."⁴⁷ The ex­traordinary commissions themselves made arrests, conducted investiga­tions, held trials, handed down sentences, and carried them out.

On August 30, 1918, in Petrograd, the student Leonid Kanegisser as­sassinated Uritsky, the chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, and in Moscow, the Socialist Revolutionary Fanny Kaplan wounded Lenin. This day marked a turning point in the history of the Cheka. It was ordered to carry out a "merciless mass terror." The Sovnarkom published a decree on September 5 authorizing the Red Terror. That same day Fanny Kaplan was shot without trial by the Cheka.⁴⁸ A wave of executions ensued. 'The number of exe­cuted," said Yakov Peters, deputy chairman of the Cheka, "has been greatly exaggerated. In no way does the total exceed 600. In Peters' view, this was not excessive, since it was in retaliation for the assassination attempt on the party's leader. Grigory Petrovsky, people's commissar of internal affairs, issued a special order expressing indignation "at the insignificant number of serious acts of repression and mass executions of White Guards and bourgeoisie" and requiring that "substantial numbers of hostages be taken."⁵⁰ Dzerzhinsky, chairman of the Cheka, explained in a memorandum what a hostage was: "Hostages must be taken from among... people of high social position, large landowners, factory owners, prominent officials and academics, close relatives of people formerly in power, etc." This was because "nobody will intercede or give anything" for some "rural teacher, forester, miller, or small shopkeeper."⁵¹

The hostage system, unknown in pre revolutionary Russia, was supple­mented by another instrument of repression new to the country—the con­centration camp. The notoriety stemming from its use by Hitler should not obscure the fact that the Soviet state was the initiator of this institution. Trotsky had the honor of being first to use the term. In his order of June 4, 1918, he demanded that all Czechoslovaks who refused to lay down their arms be detained in concentration camps.⁵² On June 26 Trotsky sent a memorandum to the Sovnarkom proposing that all former officers who refused to join the Red Army be considered part of the bourgeoisie and placed in "concentration camps."⁵³ On August 8 Trotsky substantially en­larged the category of those subject to detention and ordered camps estab­lished in Murom, Arzamas, and Sviyazhsk for holding "reactionary agitators, counterrevolutionary officers, saboteurs, parasites, and speculators."⁵⁴ On August 9 Lenin, troubled by the extent of the peasant insurrection in Penza province, sent a telegraph to the Penza Executive Committee urging it to carry out "ruthless mass terror against the kulaks, priests, and White Guards; confine all suspicious elements in a concentration camp outside the city."⁵⁵

The concentration camp became a universal instrument of terror against "suspicious elements." On September 5, 1918, after this method of repres­sion had already been widely employed, it was legalized by a decree of the Sovnarkom: "It is necessary to protect the Soviet Republic from class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps." The next point in this decree states: "All persons implicated in the activities of White Guard organizations, conspiracies, or uprisings are subject to being shot."⁵⁶

As a punitive measure the concentration camp was second in severity to the death penalty, which was restored officially on February 21, 1918, by a decree of the Sovnarkom granting the Cheka the "right to take im­mediate reprisals against active counterrevolutionaries."⁵⁷ This category included "enemy agents, profiteers, marauders, hooligans, counterrevo­lutionary agitators, and German spies." All were to be "shot on the spot," in other words, without investigation or trial.⁵⁸ The Cheka expanded this list, in its "proclamation" of February 22, to include "saboteurs and other parasites." On June 16 the People's Commissariat of Justice informed the revolutionary tribunals that they were not under any "constraints" in se­lecting "the methods of struggle against counterrevolution, sabotage, etc."⁵⁹

The exact number of people shot during the first year of the revolution is unknown. According to Latsis, only twenty-two people were shot by the Cheka during the first half of 1918, but during the second half of that year "more than 6,000 were shot."⁶⁰ Aside from the fact that Latsis's figures are open to question, the number of people shot by agencies other than the Cheka, such as the revolutionary tribunals and local soviets, is not known. It should suffice to note that the official announcement of the execution of "former Tsar Nicholas Romanov" states that on July 16, 1918, the sentence handed down by the Presidium of the Urals Regional Soviet was carried out. It added: 'The wife and son of Nicholas Romanov have been sent to a safe place."⁶¹ In fact, the tsar, his wife, son, and four daughters, a doctor, a cook, a footman, and a maidservant were all shot. If Latsis, the first historian of the Cheka, always counted one when eleven people were shot, his statistics can hardly be considered reliable.

From the very first days of the regime, dictatorship was for Lenin a panacea for all problems, be they political, economic, or social. In 1902, in his notes on Plekhanov's draft program for the RSDRP, Lenin wrote that if the peasants did not adopt the proletarian standpoint, "We will say, under the 'dictatorship': there is no point in wasting words when the use of power is required." After reading this remark, Vera Zasulich wrote in the margin, "Against millions! That's easily said." For Zasulich, a terrorist who had been willing to shoot an official of the autocracy, a dictatorship imposed on millions seemed unthinkable. For Lenin, who was against individual acts of terrorism, mass terror was an indispensable method for building a socialist society. This meant mass terror against the peasants. (A resolution of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense of February 15, 1919, said, "hostages must be taken among the peasantry, so that if the snow is not cleared away, they will be shot."⁶²) It meant mass terror against the workers. (All workers discontented with the new government were declared "nonworkers," not "pure proletarians"; they had been contaminated by the petit bourgeois mentality; meanwhile, the concentration camps were bap­tized "schools of labor. And it meant mass terror against all other classes as well.

In September 1918 all the regional Chekas received the following order from Dzerzhinsky: "In its activities, the Cheka is completely independent; it carries out searches, arrests, and executions, and reports afterward to the Sovnarkom and the Central Executive Committee."⁶⁴ Besides these unlimited powers, the Cheka was granted "infallibility." Criticism was forbidden of "this organ, whose work proceeds under extremely difficult circumstances.

During the first months following the revolution a new state was born, a totalitarian state. It was not so much the severity of its laws as their complete arbitrariness that became their distinguishing feature. The con­stitution had deprived a substantial section of the population of its rights and placed it outside the law. But this was not unique to the Soviet system. In Old Russia certain categories had had limited rights. Even after the reform of 1861 this was true of the peasantry. Jews were also denied many civil rights. But these limitations were defined by law, which also allowed for the possibility of passage from a more restricted "social estate" to another that enjoyed all rights. After the revolution, even the categories that, ac­cording to the constitution, had all rights were in fact deprived of them.

In 1922 Lenin demanded that an article be included in the penal code giving heavy sentences to those who "objectively aid or might aid" the world bourgeoisie. This concept of "objective" (or "unintentional") aid meant that the state, in the person of its leaders, could define or choose whomever it wished as an opponent. And the Cheka would take appropriate measures, against which there was no appeal.

Former tsarist officers became one category of active or potential ene­mies, but when military specialists were needed to help organize the Red Army, they were transferred to the category of "useful citizens." During the summer of 1918, when the civil war was brought to the countryside through the formation of poor peasants⁹ committees, the only useful peasant was the poor one or the agricultural laborer. When evidence showed that this policy tended to unite all the peasantry against Soviet power, the "middle peasant" was added to the category of "useful," and by the end of 1918 the poor peasants⁹ committee were phased out.

In the preface to the Red Book of the Cheka, the situation in postrevo- lutionary Russia was defined in a precise and vivid manner: "The new dictator who had replaced the landowners and the bourgeoisie found himself in splendid isolation as he undertook to build anew."⁶⁶ But this "splendid isolation" had been chosen by the dictator himself.

The isolation of Lenin's party became complete with the resignation of the Left SRs in March 1918. Later, in July, the Left SRs carried out a number of armed actions and were charged with attempting to overthrow the Bolshevik government. "In leaving the government," said the closing argument of the Bolshevik prosecutor, "the Left SR party freed the gov­ernment from a useless burden that was restraining its activities, but it did not pass immediately into the enemy camp."⁶⁷ The Left SRs had walked out of the government to protest the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, but they had remained in the Central Executive Committee and other Soviet institutions, including the Cheka. On July 6, 1918, two Left SRs, Blymkin and Andreev, assassinated German Ambassador Mirbach. Soviet historians interpret that act as a signal for a general Left SR uprising. However, a resolution of the Left SR Central Committee stated that the action was "directed against the current policy of the Sovnarkom and not at all against the Bolsheviks."⁶⁸

The armed "demonstration of discontent" against Bolshevik policy that the Left SRs organized showed that Lenin's power rested on very fragile foundations. A handful of Black Sea sailors who were part of a Cheka detachment commanded by Popov nearly toppled the government. Joachim Vatsetis, a former tsarist army colonel who had crossed over to the Soviet side and who commanded a division of Latvian fusiliers, became the man on whom Lenin's power depended. The situation in Moscow on July 6 closely resembled that in Petrograd on October 25, 1917. Most of the garrison remained neutral, and the outcome was decided by a few armed units. The Latvian rifles (2,750 soldiers) and some students at a military academy (eighty of them) were the only forces that defended Lenin's gov­ernment against the Left SRs, who were not seeking to take power in the first place. The rebellious Popov detachment did not have more than 600 people and had only two batteries.⁶⁹ Vatsetis was instructed to crush the "uprising," whose leaders had gone to the Fifth Congress of Soviets, then in session, to explain their aims. Four commissars were sent to "supervise" Vatsetis, who commanded the only unit capable of fighting. At the Kremlin, where he was to receive instructions, the commander of the Latvian division found a disturbed and frightened Lenin: "He came over to me with short, rapid strides and asked me very quietly: 'Comrade, can we hold out until tomorrow?'"⁷⁰ Lenin understood very well that the "rebel" action was di­rected against him personally.

A few rounds of artillery directed against the Cheka building, where Popov's men had positioned themselves, were enough to discourage the Left SRs, who were only protesting against the treaty with Germany (and against Lenin, who insisted on the treaty). In all other matters they agreed with the Bolsheviks. Blymkin, who later gave himself up to the Cheka in the Ukraine, stressed in his testimony that there had not been an insur­rection and that shots had been fired only as "acts of self-defense by revolutionaries."⁷¹ The verdict of the revolutionary tribunal was a confir­mation of Blymkin's words: twelve men from the Popov detachment were shot by a firing squad, along with Aleksandrovich, a Left SR who had been Dzerzhinsky's deputy and had attempted to use the Cheka to serve his

party's interests. Left SR leaders Maria Spiridonova, Boris Kamkov, Vlad­imir Karelin, and Yuri Sablin were given symbolic prison sentences and later set free. Blumkin was pardoned and given a job with the Cheka.

The events of July 1918 allowed the Bolsheviks to rid themselves of a "burden" (the Left SRs in the government) and showed once more that the Cheka and loyal military units were the key to retaining power. The Left SRs, erstwhile friends and comrades-in-arms of the Bolsheviks, suddenly found themselves tagged with a label that was to become standard practice: "agents of the Russian bourgeoisie and of Anglo-French imperialism."⁷²

UP TO AND INCLUDING INDEPENDENCE

"What is our Russian empire?" asked Andrei Bely in his novel Petersburg. "Our Russian empire," he answered, "is a geographical entity; that is to say, a piece of a well-known planet. And the Russian empire includes, first and foremost, Great Russia, Little Russia, White Russia, and Ru- thenian Russia; secondly, the kingdoms of Georgia, Poland, Kazan, and Astrakhan; thirdly, it includes oh, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera."⁷³ In the 1897 census, the first systematic census in the empire, the population was 122,666,500, of which 44.32 percent were Russian. In short, the Russian state was multinational.

From the time of Peter the Great until the coronation of Alexander III, the nationalities policy of the Russian empire was distinguished by its relative tolerance toward the national traits of the various peoples contained within it. Only the Poles, whose state had been crushed and whose territory had been partitioned by Prussia, Austria, and Russia, continued their fight for national independence. Alexander III introduced a new chauvinistic policy of Russification, which aroused great discontent among the non- Russian peoples, and which Nicholas II continued.

The 1905 constitution allowed the nationalities of the empire to present their demands and express their aspirations, and it soon became evident, at least before 1917, that there were no major separatist tendencies. The inhabitants of the Russian empire wanted reforms, democratization, equal­ity of rights for all citizens, but not the fragmentation of the state. Among the first acts of the Provisional Government was the nullification of tsarist laws restricting the rights of national minorities and the proclamation of full equality for all citizens of the Russian Republic, regardless of religion, race, or national origin.⁷⁴ The foundations were also laid for local self-rule. The governors of Transcaucasia and Turkestan were replaced by special committees, consisting mainly of Duma deputies who were natives of those

regions. Administration of the southwestern provinces was placed in the hands of Ukrainians, and in the summer of 1917 the Ukraine was recognized as a separate administrative unit.

In 1917 nationalist movements developed with unexpected vigor, fed by the same sources as other revolutionary movements. There was a difference, though. In the "borderlands" the peasant discontent caused by the post­ponement of agrarian reform was not directed against the landowners but against the Russian settlers; it took on a nationalist, anti-Russian character.

The October revolution hastened the decomposition of the empire; even the peoples that a short time before had not even dreamed of autonomy began to demand independence. The Soviet government recognized full independence for Poland. This did not require very much effort, since Poland had been occupied by the Germans and the Provisional Government had already promised it independence. Independence was likewise granted to Finland. However, People's Commissar of Nationalities Stalin, speaking at the congress of the Social Democratic party of Finland on November 14, 1917, called on the Finnish Bolsheviks to take power, adding: "And if you require our help, we will give it to you, fraternally extending our hand to you. You can be sure of that."⁷⁵ In January 1918, when the local Bolsheviks in Finland attempted to take power, Soviet troops stationed there at the time did indeed aid the insurgents.

Before coming to power, Lenin often referred to Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine as nations whose right to independence was being frustrated by the Provisional Government. In June 1917 he expressed indignation at the Provisional Government's refusal to carry out its "elementary democratic duty" to declare itself in favor of autonomy for the Ukraine and its right to secede freely. After October his attitude on this issue changed. The Ukrainian nationalist movement had assumed vast dimensions after the February revolution. One of its leaders, professor Mikhail Hrushevsky, whose History of the Ukraine provided a historical and literary basis for the movement, declared in March 1917: 'There is no longer a Ukrainian problem. There is the great and free Ukrainian people, who are creating their own future under new conditions of liberty."⁷⁶ Hrushevsky was elected president of the Central Rada, which represented the revolutionary parties and national minorities.

Gradually the Rada became the highest expression of the will of the Ukrainian people. On June 13 it published its first universal declaration. "Henceforth," it stated, "the Ukraine will be the Ukrainian People's Re­public. Without seceding from the Russian republic, without endangering its unity, we shall take a firm stand upon our land, so that we can help all of Russia with all our strength, so that the entire Russian republic can become a federation of free and equal peoples." This document also de­lineated the boundaries of the new republic: 'The territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic includes all territories inhabited by a majority of Ukrain­ians."⁷⁷

The Bolsheviks, who had criticized the Provisional Government for being slow to grant Ukrainian demands for independence, were themselves op­posed to independence for the Ukraine. Yuri Pyatakov, head of the Ukrain­ian Bolsheviks, said after the universal declaration was published, "We should not support the Ukrainians, because their movement bodes no good for the proletariat. Russia cannot exist without the Ukrainian sugar industry; the same can be said about coal (the Donets basin), wheat, and so forth."⁷⁸ But the Bolsheviks' weakness in the Ukraine (in August 1917 they had 22,303 members there, with 15,818 in the Donbass, Kharkov, and Eka- terinoslav)⁷⁹ forced them to ally with the Rada as the Provisional Govern­ment. On the eve of the October revolution, the Rada supported the Bolsheviks, believing that they were even weaker than the Provisional Government. In Kiev their combined efforts put an end to the power of the Provisional Government on October 29. Soon after the victory, these mo­mentary allies came into conflict. The Rada refused to recognize the all- Bolshevik Sovnarkom as the legitimate government of Russia and demanded that it be replaced by a more representative socialist body. On December 4 the Soviet government issued an ultimatum to the Rada: while recognizing the right of the Ukraine to independence, it demanded that the soviets and Soviet power in the Ukraine be recognized, or else there would be war.

Two days before the ultimatum, the Soviet government had issued the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which solemnly proclaimed: (1) the equality and sovereignty of all peoples; (2) the right of nations to self-determination, up to and including separation and the formation of nation-states; (3) the liquidation of all national and national-religious priv­ileges and restrictions; (4) the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.⁸⁰

A congress of soviets, convened in Kiev, gave a majority to the supporters of the Rada. The Bolsheviks walked out and organized their own congress in Kharkov. The central executive committee elected in Kharkov declared itself the sole legal government of the Ukraine and sent a telegram to Moscow announcing its total subordination to the Soviet government. On December 12 the Bolsheviks in Kharkov expelled all other socialist parties from the central executive committee and became the sole ruling party. War with the Rada began. In January 1918 units of the Red Guard occupied Kiev.

The nationalist movement in Byelorussia was in an embryonic stage in 1917. The Byelorussian peasants did not display any awareness of their ethnic differences from the Russians. Political life in Byelorussia centered around the Russian and Jewish socialist organizations. In March a Bye­lorussian National Committee consisting of representatives of all ethnic groups and social classes was founded. It called for autonomy and federation with Russia. Gradually a Byelorussian socialist party, the Gromada, became the main force in the committee. In July a Byelorussian rada was created on the Ukrainian model. At the same time Bolshevik influence grew, es­pecially among the soldiers, who were impatiently waiting for peace to come. The Gromada refused to accept the October revolution and in De­cember convened a Byelorussian national congress, which on the night of December 17 declared Byelorussia independent.

As for the 16 million Muslims inhabiting the Russian empire, their First All-Russia Congress began in Moscow on May 1, 1917, attended by about a thousand delegates. The congress passed a resolution granting equal rights to women, in a break from longstanding Islamic tradition. It also assumed the right of religious self-determination, the right to select the religious leader of Russia's Muslims, the mufti, who was previously ap­pointed by the tsar. The national question provoked a heated debate. A group of delegates, headed by Volga Tatars, advocated the preservation of a unitary Russian state with national-cultural autonomy. The Azerbaijani delegation, supported by the Bashkirs and Crimean Tatars, demanded a federation and territorial self-rule for all peoples. By a majority vote, the congress passed a federalist resolution. On July 21 a second congress met in Kazan and decided, in view of the weakening of the central government, to begin organizing autonomous Muslin cultural institutions without delay. On November 20 a national assembly met in Ufa and elected three min­isters—for religion, education, and finance. Their task was to take concrete steps to assert the cultural and national autonomy of all Muslims in Russia.

By October 1917, then, the Muslims of Russia had laid the foundations for their own religious and cultural administration. Events during the next few months, however, broke all links between the various Muslim regions, and each group went its own way in trying to cope with the problem of incipient civil war.

A political party of the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, the so-called Alash-Orda, was founded in the summer of 1917 at a congress in Orenburg. Its goal was the unification of all the nomadic tribes of the steppes into an auton­omous "Kirghiz state." The Bashkir delegates in the First All-Russia Mus­lim Congress had also demanded autonomy. But after the congress rejected their demand for a Greater Bashkiria, which would have united all the Tatars and Bashkirs of the Ural and Volga regions, as well as their demand for a Lesser Bashkiria, which would have included only the territories inhabited by Bashkirs, they walked out of the congress. They then attended the Orenburg meeting, opting for territorial autonomy together with the Turkic tribes of the steppe lands and Turkestan. During the spring and fall of 1917 there were frequent clashes between Muslins and Russian settlers. In September the Provisional Government declared martial law in the entire Semirechie region in Central Asia, to stop interracial strife.

In December, the Bashkirs, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz declared their auton­omy in Orenburg and established relations with the Cossacks of that region. Thus an anti-Bolshevik movement was created, led by Dutov, the ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks, and supported by Muslim political leaders.

The Bolshevik forces in the steppes of Kirghizia and Kazakhstan were insignificant. "In October 1917 there were fewer than thirty Bolsheviks in Ashkhabad, and in Kazakhstan there were about a hundred. In Verny, there was no Bolshevik organization at all before the October revolution. Until mid-1918 only a few isolated groups of pro-Bolshevik soldiers and workers functioned in certain towns of Kirghizia."⁸¹ Bolshevik slogans found support among the soldiers, the railworkers, and the settlers. These elements saw the dictatorship of the proletariat as a Russian dictatorship. Since the Bolsheviks proclaimed a power of the soviets of workers, soldiers, and peasants, and since there were no workers, soldiers, or peasants among the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, the Muslim tribesmen also perceived Bolshevik power as Russian power.

The political movement in Turkestan was composed of a conservative religious current and a liberal, pro-Western one. Initially enemies, they drew closer toward the end of 1917 because they both called for autonomy, which the Russian government refused to grant. The Muslim socialist move­ment, close to the Left SRs, was much less influential, but it played a decisive role in the October events. In Turkestan, as in the rest of Central Asia, the Bolsheviks could be counted on one hand. On October 25 rail- workers opened fire on a Cossack club in Tashkent. Within two days the soviet, controlled by the Bolsheviks and supported by the Left SRs, had taken over the city. On November 15 the Third Regional Congress of Soviets met and proclaimed the victory of Soviet power throughout Turkestan. The congress rejected Muslim demands for autonomy, since it might weaken Russia's authority, and declared itself against Muslim participation in the Soviet government in Central Asia. According to the resolution, this was because of the "uncertain" attitude of the local population toward the soviet and because the native population had no proletarian organizations, which the Bolsheviks would have welcomed into the government.⁸²

The Crimean Tatar National party, founded in July 1917, came into conflict almost immediately with the Provisional Government because the government refused to place Muslim schools under Tatar control or to allow the formation of an exclusively Tatar military unit. The main strength of the Bolshevik organization in the Crimea, established in June 1917, was in Sevastopol. The Left SRs and Mensheviks held a majority in the Sevastopol Soviet, which condemned the October seizure of power. The first conference of Crimean Bolsheviks did likewise. A delegation of Baltic sailors sent to Sevastopol by the Bolshevik Central Committee soon straightened out the situation. The Bolsheviks loyal to Lenin walked out of the soviet and created a revolutionary committee (revkom), which organized a massacre of Black Sea naval officers, dispersed the soviet, and had its Menshevik and Left SR leaders shot. Tatar nationalists convened a constituent assembly, the Kurultai, in Bakhchisarai, which proclaimed itself the sole legal authority in matters concerning Crimean Tatars. The Kurultai adopted a constitution based on Western democratic models and installed a national directory, which functioned as a de facto Tatar government of the Crimea and refused to recognize the legitimacy of Bolshevik power.

In 1916 the population of the Caucasus region was approximately 12 million, including 4 million Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians, nearly 2.5 million Azerbaijanis, less than 2 million Armenians and about the same number of Georgians, and 1.5 million "mountain peoples," as the ethnically variegated native inhabitants of the Caucasus Mountains were called.⁸³

The three main political parties in Transcaucasia—the Azerbaijani Muslim Democratic party (Mussavat), the Armenian Federation (Dashnaktsutiun), and the Georgian Social Democratic party (the Georgian Mensheviks)— had all been founded before World War I. All three supported the Provisional Government after the February revolution, favored autonomy within the framework of a Russian federation, and enjoyed mass support from their respective national constituencies.

The October revolution, the first signs of decomposition in the Russian Army of the Caucasus, and Turkish advances into Transcaucasia began to change the situation. On November 11 the Mussavat, Dashnaktsutsiun, and Georgian Mensheviks established their own local provisional govern­ment, the Transcaucasian Commissariat, whose purpose was to maintain order in the region until the All-Russia Constituent Assembly elected a government for the Russian state as a whole. After the Constituent Assembly dissolved by the Bolsheviks, the Transcaucasian delegates returned to their home region and organized a legislative body, the Transcaucasian Seim (or Diet). Lacking influence among the masses, the Bolsheviks directed their propaganda at the soldiers. In the elections for the Constituent Assembly in the Transcaucasian region the Bolsheviks received only 4.6 percent of the vote.⁸⁴ Even in Baku, their stronghold in the region, roughly 80 percent of the Bolshevik vote came from the soldiers. The Bolsheviks tried to use their support among the soldiers to take power in Tiflis in November 1917, but Georgian workers thwarted the attempt.

In April 1918 the Turks, who had taken Batum and Kars, issued an ultimatum to Transcaucasia: it would be occupied unless it declared its independence. On April 22 the Transcaucasian Federation, which included the ruling Mensheviks of Georgia, the Dashnak government of Armenia, and the Azerbaijani Mussavat, proclaimed the independence of the Trans­caucasian Federal Republic.⁸⁵

On the western borders of the old Russian empire, independent states were formed with no difficulty, since these territories were under German occupation. In December 1917 Finland, Lithuania, and Latvia proclaimed their independence. In February 1918 Estonia did the same.

By the beginning of 1918 the Russian state had disintegrated. The developing civil war was a contest not only between the supporters of different political and social systems but also between advocates of differing national conceptions about the future state. Both the Reds and the Whites fought for unification of the Russian state, but each side presented its version of this same program differently.

The Bolshevik program on the national question was authentically Marxist in the sense that it embraced two mutually contradictory principles: the self-determination of nations, and the centralized state. Lenin favored a centralized party and extended the centralist principle to the state. For him, the nationalities problem was above all a problem of political power. He considered the national minorities of the Russian empire his allies in the struggle for power. In 1915 he glorified treason: "Whoever argues against treason and against the disintegration of the Russian state... has adopted the bourgeois, and not the proletarian standpoint."⁸⁶ From October 25, 1917, he championed and defended a strong, centralized state, seeing it as "a tremendous historical step forward... toward the future socialist unity of the whole world."⁸⁷

Lenin's wish for a strong, centralized state was inspired not by patriotism but by his desire for a powerful weapon in the fight for world revolution, which was for him the principal purpose of the October revolution. This is why Lenin's policies had a "dialectical" character. In his telegram to the Congress of Soviets of Tashkent, he wrote, 'The Council of People's Com­missars will support autonomy for your region based on Soviet principles."⁸⁸ Lenin was for independence, on the condition that it was subordinated to "Moscow's point of view," that is, the views of the Central Committee.

Lenin was forced to fight against those Bolsheviks who did not understand the subtleties of the party's nationalities policy. Pyatakov, Dzerzhinsky, and Bukharin argued that the proletarian revolution was going to eliminate social classes and would likewise put an end to the very concept of nations. They demanded that all references to independence and autonomy be abandoned, on the grounds that these were bourgeois categories. The people's commissar of nationalities, Stalin, was, like Lenin, a strong defender of centralized power. In May 1918 Stalin formulated his commissariat's policy, explaining that Soviet power would recognize autonomy as long as it was under Mos­cow's leadership and control. Autonomy was not granted to the nation but to the working class and the toiling peasantry, and only if they supported Soviet power.⁸⁹

Lenin opposed the "national nihilism" of some of his comrades because of tactical considerations, understanding better than anyone the strong appeal of "self-determination" as a slogan.

When Confucius was asked how he would rule, the wise man answered: I would start by giving words their true meaning. As Lenin began his rule the first thing he did was to strip words of their meaning. He would give them meanings depending on the need of the moment and modify them depending on the audience. The Bolshevik party entered the civil war with a program defending the right of nations to self-determination "up to and including independence," while at the same time insisting that "the prin­ciple of self-determination must be an instrument in the struggle for so­cialism and must be subordinated to the principles of socialism."⁹⁰

REDS AND WHITES

The October revolution, which was supposed to bring peace to Russia, plunged it instead into a civil war of the most terrible kind. The first volleys were fired in the south of Russia, in the Cossack regions. In February 1917 the Cossacks had refused to support the tsarist regime; until then they had been regarded as its strongest bulwark. They had likewise refused to support the Provisional Government, declaring their neutrality toward the Bolshevik seizure of power.

Of the two main Bolshevik slogans, peace and land, the Cossacks un­questionably supported the first; they wanted to go home. On the question of land, they differed radically from the rest of the Russian peasants. They wanted, not more land, but the preservation of what they had. It was the traditional privilege of a Cossack male to be granted thirty desyatinas, about eighty acres, of land in exchange for military service until age thirty- six. At the turn of the century the Don Cossack region, the largest of the eleven Cossack territories (all located in the outlying parts of the empire), had a population of 1,022,086 Cossacks and 1,200,669 non-Cossacks.⁹¹ Sverdlov announced that the most important task of Soviet policy was to divide the Russian villages into two enemy camps, to turn the poorest peasants against the "kulak elements." Only if we can split the countryside, he said, will we obtain the same results in the villages that we have in the cities.⁹² These attempts to foster divisions were not successful, and the government was forced to abandon them by dissolving the poor peasants⁹ committees at the end of 1918, six months after they had been formed. In the Cossack regions the campaign to turn non-Cossacks against Cossacks resulted in fierce hostilities between them.

The enemies of the revolution converged on the Don region, hoping for support from the Cossacks. But the Cossaks did not want the restoration of the monarchy. They wanted simply to take advantage of the revolution to obtain greater autonomy, while preserving their privileges. General Alek- seev, the last chief of staff of the tsarist army, did not find the help or the support he was hoping for on the Don.

Alekseev's plan was to organize a "volunteer army" to fight the Soviet government. His work went slowly. His army grew from about 300 in November 1917 to approximately 3,000 in January 1918, staffed mainly by former officers, officer cadets, and private school students. Alekseev and General Kornilov, the de facto commander of the Volunteer Army, had high hopes for a great influx of volunteers, especially from among former officers (of which there had been 133,000 in May 1917). Their hopes were in vain. The officers did not wish, any more than the soldiers, to keep on fighting; they considered the war over. General Kaledin, ataman of the Don Cossacks, declared on January 29, 1918: "Our situation is hopeless. Not only does the population not support us; it is hostile to us." He committed suicide the same day.

Red forces, 10,000 strong, led by Rudolf Sivers, had entered Don Cos­sack territory in mid-January. By January 23 Rostov—the region's main city—was taken. The Volunteer Army, burdened with wagon trains full of politicians, journalists, professors, and wives of officers and soldiers, fled into the steppes. There began what was known as the Icy March. Each soldier of the Volunteer Army had only a few hundred cartridges, and for each of its eight artillery pieces there were 600—700 shells. Through severe difficulties, surrounded on all sides by the enemy, the Volunteer Army reached the Kuban region, hoping to find what it had not found on the Don. On April 17, at Ekaterinodar, General Kornilov was killed in battle. His death was an irreparable loss for the future White Army. General Denikin assumed command. He abandoned the siege of Ekaterinodar and led the army back to the Stavropol region, between the Don and the Kuban, from whence the Icy March had begun. During those eighty days of constant combat, from January to April, the situation had changed radically in southern Russia. The Germans had occupied the Ukraine, and the Don Cossacks had abandoned their neutrality. The establishment of Soviet power had been accompanied by mass executions. Under Sivers' orders, all cap­tured "volunteers" had been executed, and there were many executions for other reasons. For example, General Renenkampf was shot for refusing to serve in the Red Army. The church was persecuted, and a draconian system of grain requisitioning was put into effect. On April 10, 1918, the Cossacks rebelled. General Krasnov was elected ataman, and he organized the Army of the Don.

Another center of struggle against Soviet power arose in the east. Thou­sands of Czechoslovak prisoners of war were being transported by train to Vladivostok to be shipped to France to join the war against Germany and Austria. On May 17, 1918, they revolted and took Chelyabinsk. Moscow ordered all soviets from Penza to Omsk to disarm the members of the so- called Czech Legion, but the legionnaires rejected the demand. On May 25, the Czechs took Mariinsk and by June 8 they held Novonikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk), Penza, Syzran, Petropavlovsk, Kurgan, Omsk, and Sa­mara.⁹³

During World War I the Czechs and Slovaks had refused to defend the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and had surrendered to the Russians en masse. By the end of the war there were close to 200,000 Czechoslovak prisoners in Russia. The Czech Legion had reached the strength of 50,000 soldiers and officers. Under the terms of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, the Soviet gov­ernment was required to disarm the legion. The Czechs gave up some of their arms but hid the rest.

The Czech revolt gave a powerful impetus to the anti-Bolshevik movement east of the Volga. On August 6 Kazan fell. The Czechoslovaks needed only to cross the Volga and the road to Moscow would have been open to them. For the first time since the October revolution, the Soviet government was threatened by a truly dangerous foe. The creation of a regular army became a necessity. Until then, scattered uprisings by disparate opponents of the Bolshevik party in the borderlands of the old Russian empire had been crushed by semiguerrilla Red Guard detachments and units of the Red Army still affected by a revolutionary zeal which did not readily accept authority. The forces of the Cheka had sufficed to crush a number of peasant revolts. The Soviet newspapers of spring 1918 are full of information about this.⁹⁴ The extent of repression can be judged from documents published by the Soviet authorities concerning the executions that followed the crushing of the July 1918 uprising in Yaroslavl. After the city was retaken "fifty- seven people were shot on the spot." Then a "special investigating com­mission" subjected hundreds of people to "an exhaustive interrogation" after which it was "discovered" that 350 people "were the ringleaders of the conspiracy and had had relations with the Czechoslovaks." The entire "gang of 350" was shot "by order of the commission." Ten more were executed after a further investigation conducted by the Cheka of Yaroslavl. The Red Book of the Cheka gives a very candid account of the suppression of the Yaroslavl insurrection, which lasted from April 6 to April 21. Latsis relates that 106 of the conspirators, and an armored division that went over to their side with two armored cars, held off the assaults of the First Soviet Regiment of the International Detachment and a Left SR unit for a long time. The suppression of the Left SRs in Moscow, it should be noted, did not stop them from supporting the Soviet side in Yaroslavl. After an artillery barrage, with an armored train from Moscow taking part, "a large part of the city was consumed in flames." Then the city was subjected to air bombardment with "bombs of the highest destructive power." The following ultimatum was presented to the besieged city: all its inhabitants must leave or "it would be subjected to a merciless hurricane of fire by heavy artillery, and also chemical shells."⁹⁵ Such methods of warfare were not successful when the well-trained and disciplined Czechoslovak troops appeared, how­ever.

The Central Executive Committee proclaimed the republic in danger. Trotsky, appointed people's commissar of war, took on the task of creating a regular army. Earlier than the other party leaders, including Lenin, Trotsky understood that dreams of "the people in arms" or of the army being replaced by the militia were nothing but Utopia. He based the new army on two principles: the employment of military specialists, and terror. It was obvious that an army could not function without professionals and equally obvious that the officers of the tsarist army had no desire to serve the Bolsheviks. Trotsky ordered the mobilization of former officers and NCOs. Refusal to join the army meant internment in a concentration camp; in addition, the families of officers were taken hostage. Fear had an im­portant role in Trotsky's theoretical system. "Intimidation," he wrote, "is a powerful [instrument] of policy, both internationally and internally. War, like revolution, is founded upon intimidation. A victorious war, generally speaking, destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intim­idating the remainder and breaking their will. The revolution works in the same way: it kills individuals, and intimidates thousands."⁹⁶ Trotsky's terms individuals and thousands were merely figures of speech: in reality it was a matter of millions and tens of millions. Nevertheless this passage can be accepted as a clear statement of the concept of terror on which the Soviet Republic was founded. It was necessary to kill some in order to shatter the will of the rest.

After the fall of Kazan, Trotsky left for the front and signed an order with the following warning: no mercy for the enemies of the people, the agents of imperialism, or the lackeys of the bourgeoisie. He warned that in the train of the people's commissar of war, where the order was drafted, there was a standing revolutionary tribunal with full powers and that in Murom, Arzamas, and Sviyazhsk, concentration camps had been set up. Having reached Sviyazhsk, on the west bank of the Volga across from Kazan, Trotsky reorganized the Fifth Army. Showing his fist of steel, he ordered the commander and the commissar of a regiment shot because they had retreated without orders. The execution of the commander did not produce any commentary; that of the commissar (a man named Panteleev) was a real sacrilege in the eyes of the Communists because one of their own had been shot. The incident was discussed throughout the civil war; later it was used to demonstrate Trotsky's "Bonapartist aims."

Trotsky's pitiless feat yielded the desired results. On September 10 Kazan was retaken. By the beginning of October all of the Volga region was in the hands of the Red Army, which at this point numbered more than half a million men. By the end of the year, the figure had passed one million. The army's character also changed. Commanders were no longer elected, they were appointed. Soldiers and commanders took an oath written by Trotsky. It began, "I, a son of the working people," and ended, "If I violate this oath, may the merciless hand of revolutionary law punish me." The creation of this mass professional army took place under the slogan of world peace. 'The objectives of socialism," wrote Trotsky in the preface to his plan for the creation of the army, "is total disarmament, perpetual peace, and fraternal collaboration among all of the earth's people's."⁹⁷

A mass professional army could not function, much less fight, without military specialists. Trotsky created a revolutionary army with the same officers who the day before had been denounced as enemies of the revo­lution. Only a small number of officers and generals willingly served the Soviet government. One of the first to join the Red Army was General Mikhail Bonch-Bruevich, who had commanded the Northern Front and was the brother of Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, the administrator of the Council of People's Commissars. Trotsky gave him the task of organizing a general staff. General N. M. Potapov, who had crossed over to the Bolshevik side even before the October revolution, was appointed second in command of the army and put in charge of Field Headquarters, the Stavka.⁹⁸