The most potent panzers in Normandy were the fifty-seven ton Tiger I and sixty-eight ton Tiger II; fortunately for the Allies they were few in number. The popular perception in many Allied tankers’ minds though was that all panzers were dreaded Tigers, leading to an inferiority complex.
In mid-June 1944, Schwere Panzer Abteilung 503, equipped with Tiger Is and IIs under Hauptmann Rolf Fromme, was assigned to Panzergruppe West. This was good news as the battalion was considered the most experienced Tiger tank unit in the whole German Army. The 503 were formed to assist Rommel in North Africa, but, with the end in sight in Tunisia, were sent to Russia. It had fought on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1942–43, seeing action at the Battle of Kursk. The battalion, operating Tiger IIs, was then transferred to Panzergruppe West, fighting round Caen and helping to stem the tide of Operation Goodwood. Although depleted, the battalion escaped the Falaise pocket.
Two other SS heavy tank battalions equipped with Tiger Is also served in Normandy. Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101 thwarted the British 7th Armoured Division at Villers-Bocage, though notably most of its tanks were lost in the Falaise pocket. Its sister unit, SS-Panzer Abteilung 102, went into action on 9 July at Point 112, supporting the 10th SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. By 20 August the battalion had claimed 227 Allied tanks, but again was lost in the chaos of Falaise.
Schwere (Heavy) Panzer Abetilung 503 came into being in May 1942, drawing on men from Panzer Regiments 5 and 6. There were insufficient Tiger tanks so it had to be brought up to strength with Panzer III Ausf Ns. Although destined to serve Erwin Rommel in North Africa, the cancellation of the Porsche-designed Tiger in favour of the Henschel model delayed the battalion’s deployment. Instead, in December it found itself destined for the Eastern Front and Field Marshal von Manstein’s Army Group South.
The Tigers of this battalion soon gained a truly fearsome reputation. Its full complement of tanks did not arrive until April 1943, but during the third battle of Kharkov the battalion helped destroy the main Soviet attacking force, Mobile Group Popov. Abteilung 503 then took part in Operation Citadel in July, designed to crush the Kursk salient, during which it lost only eight tanks. In return it single-handedly claimed an incredible total of 501 Russian tanks, 388 anti-tank guns, seventy-nine artillery pieces and eight aircraft.
Abteilung 503 then became part of a heavy kampfgruppe including armour from the 6th Panzer Division under Oberst Dr Franz Bake. While covering the withdrawal of 6th Panzer on 20 July 1943, Bake, with six Tigers, caught the Soviets by surprise and knocked out twenty-three T-34s. Three days later his battle group claimed another thirty-three Soviet tanks.
The 503 were reassigned to assist the 19th Panzer Division, but in January 1944 thirty-four Tigers of the battalion found themselves part of Heavy Panzer Regiment Bake. Bake’s panzers endured seven Soviet counterattacks, claiming 286 Russian tanks and assault guns.
During 4–8 February 1944, eleven Tigers and fourteen Panthers attempted to breakthrough to the German troops trapped in the Cherkassy Pocket, northeast of Uman. A second attack from the Rubany-Most area was more successful, knocking out eighty Russian tanks and assault guns. The rate of attrition against the Soviets was such that by 13 February Bake only had four Panthers left. At this point command of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 503 was assumed by Hauptmann Fromme, who was then to lead the battalion in Normandy. By mid-February, Bake’s Tigers had helped 35,000 German troops escape the Cherkassy Pocket. Having lost all the Tiger tanks of Abteilung 503, on 6 March 1944 Panzergruppe Bake was created with the newly-arrived Schwere Panzer Abteilung 509.
The exhausted panzertruppen of the 503 were withdrawn to Lemberg on the Polish border and then on to Ohrdruf, Thuringia, in the spring of 1944 for refitting, along with almost a hundred Red Army ‘volunteers’. By the summer it still had no tanks, but between 11 and 17 June the battalion received a shipment of thirty-three new Tiger Is and twelve Tiger IIs; the latter monsters had only recently come into service and were used to equip I Kompanie.
SS-Sturmbannführer von Westerhagen assumed command of the Schwere SS–Panzer Abteilung 101 when it was formed in July 1943 around a cadre from the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. It was placed under the direction of I SS Panzer Corps and the battalion was then attached to its founding unit and sent to Italy in August 1943. Two companies were sent to Russia, where they remained until April 1944.
The 101 was then assigned to the I SS Panzer Corps, consisting of the 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 102, formed in October 1943, was attached to II SS Panzer Corps. It was also sent to Normandy, where it fought the Allies under the leadership of SS-Sturmbannführer Weiss.
At the time of the invasion, Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101 was stationed in the Beauvais area with Corps HQ at Septeuil west of Paris; the latter moved to Baron-sur-Odon between Villers-Bocage and Caen on 9 June. The battalion reached Normandy on the 12th and II Kompanie, minus four tanks left with the workshop company under Obersturmführer Stamm, found welcome cover from Allied air attack in a small wood northeast of Villers–Bocage. I Kompanie under SS-Hauptsturmführer.Mobius was deployed to their right; it is unclear just how involved Mobius’ tanks were in the coming battle. The battalion had a theoretical strength of forty-five Tigers, but in fact numbered thirty-seven; less than half these were available at Villers-Bocage and by 1 July only eleven were fully serviceable.
The failure of Operation Perch on 13 June 1944, of all the setbacks the Allies suffered during the Normandy campaign, has to rank as one of the worst. In the space of just five minutes a mere handful of the dreaded Tigers destroyed the brigade spearhead of the 7th Armoured Division, saved the Panzer Lehr Division from encirclement, prevented the German line from being rolled up and stopped the Allies from breaking out to the southwest of Caen. In short, this engagement could have speeded the conclusion of the Normandy campaign; instead bad planning and bad luck resulted in a major setback for the British Army.
Sited at the head of the Seulles valley, Villers-Bocage dominated the approaches to Mont Pinçon, ten miles (16km) to the south, the Odon valley and Caen in the east. The road network for the whole region stemmed from the village, making it of strategic importance to both sides; anyone controlling Villers-Bocage controlled the roads.
What the British did not know was that the 2nd Panzer Division had been alerted to move from Amiens to Normandy to establish blocking positions in this sector, and that elements of Abteilung 101, I SS Panzer Corps reserve, under SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann, had occupied Point 213. The British were outclassed from the start. The Cromwell, which had replaced 7th Armoured Division’s Sherman tanks when they left Italy, was too lightly armoured and armed. In stark contrast, the Tiger tank could expect to remain unharmed by the majority of Allied tanks except at point blank range. In addition, the late arrival of 7th Armoured Division’s second armoured brigade, due to bad weather, meant the division lacked 150 tanks and supporting infantry when it went into action.
To make matters worse, Wittmann was an established tank ace. In July1941, in the Balkans as an SS-Unterscharführer, he had been awarded the Iron Cross II Class while commanding an assault gun in the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division, and in September had gained the Iron Cross I Class on the Eastern Front. By December 1942 he had became an SS-Unterscharführer and the following year was given command of a Tiger I in 13 Kompanie of the Leibstandarte‘s SS-Panzer Regiment. When he reached SS-Obersturmführer, on 20 January 1944, his kills stood at 117 vehicles. In April he took command of 2 Kompanie in the Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101.
On the 13th the Germans had planned to carryout maintenance, until the British armoured column was spotted outside Villers-Bocage. Wittmann decided to reconnoitre to the northwest to see if the rumour that the British 7th Armoured Division had pushed into the left flank of Panzer Lehr was in fact true. With four, possibly five, Tigers and one Panzer IV from Panzer Lehr, he fanned out and advanced on Villers-Bocage. Upon seeing the British armoured column moving east towards Point 213 Wittmann realised the vital road junction must be secured at once.
In the meantime, the British had halted on the hill past the junction with the Tilly road. At 0905 hours the lead elements had reached the base of Point 213. The main column of vehicles had stopped several hundred yards away on the hedge-lined highway, while most of the tanks, including four Cromwells and one Firefly, spread out to the north.
Wittmann’s gunlayer, SS-Oberscharführer Balthasar Woll, who had served him in Russia, and whose own tank was now under repair, grumbled: ‘They’re acting as if they’ve won the war already.’ To which Wittmann replied: ‘We’re going to prove them wrong.’
Two or three of the Tigers drove parallel to the British column, but Wittmann to the north decided to circle round and attack without waiting for the others. Heading from the east he rammed aside a Cromwell blocking his way and drove into the town’s high street, Rue Clemenceau. In the town square, the British tank crews had dismounted and were alarmed by the sight of a lumbering Tiger tank. Any six-pounder anti-tank guns that had been deployed were useless as their shells just bounced off the panzer’s armour. The latter knocked out four British tanks.
Wittmann descended the slope down towards the Seulles River valley, past some bombed-out houses. At the road junction he bumped into British tanks parked on the Caumont road. A Sherman Firefly had heard all the firing and was confronted by a scout car and its frantically-waving driver. It drove round a corner to find Wittmann’s Tiger 200 yards away, firing down a side street. The Firefly quickly poured four 17-pounder rounds into the Tiger which began to burn, but its turret rotated and a shell brought half a building down on the British tank. When it emerged the Tiger had vanished.
The battered and bruised Tiger beat a hasty retreat back up the hill, running into a Cromwell. Wittmann and his crew sustained two more hits before the Cromwell was brewed up and two of its crew killed. Lying to the left of, and parallel to, the highway was a narrow track. Clanking up this, Wittmann’s first victim was a half-track at the base of the waiting column; this was followed by an unsuspecting Honey light tank. Further up the road a 6-pounder crew hurriedly swung their gun round, but a well-placed German shell hit the Bren carrier loaded with ammunition in front of it.
Wittmann’s rampaging Tiger then proceeded to brew up the rest of the trapped column, knocking out a row of Bren Carriers and half-tracks as armour piercing shells continued to bounce off his impervious armour. British soldiers scattered in all directions, many taking shelter in the ditch behind the column. A tank tried to block Wittmann’s path on the track so he drove onto the road, crushing everything in his way. Wittmann withdrew to the woods to the southeast. In just five minutes he had reduced the British advance to a shambles, destroying twenty-five vehicles single handedly.
The 7th Armoured’s divisional reconnaissance regiment, to the north, advanced to help, but was engaged by four other Tigers and suffered heavy losses. In the early afternoon a triumphant Wittmann, rearmed and refuelled, returned to join the rest of his forces: four Tigers, the Panzer IV and possibly three other tanks (either from Lehr or 1 Kompanie) with infantry support. With these he attacked the remnants of the British forces trapped around Point 213. On the edge of the hill at least two Cromwells and one Firefly were knocked out blocking the road, while not far away, in the woods on the crown of the hill, two more Cromwells were brewed-up.
The battle for Point 213 was a one-sided affair with the Germans now pressing around Villers-Bocage and British attempts to send reinforcements failed. Three Cromwells and a Firefly under Lieutenant Bill Cotton tried to make contact. They managed to cross the town, but were unable to get over the railway embankment and turned back to take up positions in the square.
The survivors from the British 7th Armoured Division’s 22nd Armoured Brigade, spearheaded by the 4th County of London Yeomanry and A Company, 1st Battalion the Rile Brigade, were quickly overrun. The Riles lost four killed, five wounded and seventy-six missing; at least twenty Cromwell tanks, four Fireflys, three Honeys, three scout cars and a half-track were destroyed. A Company lost eighty men, including three Officers; about thirty infantry managed to escape. By late afternoon both units had ceased to exist, which left only B Squadron precariously holding onto Villers-Bocage.
Supported by units of the 2nd Panzer Division, Wittmann now turned his attention back on Villers-Bocage. This time the British were not going to be caught out. B Squadron, with four Cromwells and a Firely, took up defensive positions around the main square with a Queen’s Regiment 6-pounder guarding the main street from a side alley, where it was hoped they would catch the Tiger’s side armour.
Wittmann, over-playing his hand, noisily entered Villers-Bocage again, this time in strength, with two Tigers (possibly including Mobius) and a PzKpfw IV. Rounding the bend into the high street, he drove straight into the prepared ambush, ‘When the Tigers were about 1,000 yards away and were broadside to us I told 3 Troop and my gunner to fire’, recalled Lieutenant Cotton. ‘The Firefly did the damage, but the 75s helped and must have taken a track off one which started to circle out of control’.
Wittmann’s tank was hit by the anti-tank gun, the following Tiger by Sergeant Bobby Bramall’s Firefly. Corporal Horne’s Cromwell missed and the Panzer IV had driven almost past the second Tiger when Horne drove out behind the German and blasted him. It seems a third Tiger entered town but was also caught by B Squadron a few dozen yards from the main street at the crossroads of Rue Jeanne Bacon and Rue Emile Samson.
Lieutenant Cotton notes that the engagement was not all one way: ‘They shot back at us, knocked the Firefly out, as its commander was hit in the head. However, at the end of a very few minutes there were three “killed” Tigers’. The German crews escaped because too few British infantry remained. Later, Lieutenant Cotton, armed with an umbrella, alongside Sergeant Bramall, carrying blankets and petrol, walked in the pouring rain to the German tanks and set fire to them to prevent recovery.
This series of brutal engagements fought throughout the 13th rendered it impossible for the British to hold onto Villers-Bocage. Their forces were split in two, with one group at Villers-Bocage and another at Tracy-Bocage several miles west; also, the 7th Armoured was strung out along the road from Villers-Bocage to Livry.
Alarmingly, 7th Armoured’s intelligence estimated that up to forty Tigers from 2nd Panzer were in the area, with which it was feared the Germans would cut the road between Villers-Bocage and Caumont, trapping B Squadron. This estimate was not accurate; 2nd Panzer had no Tigers and its panzers did not arrive from Paris until 18 June, nor did the 12th SS Panzer Division have any Tiger tanks. It is doubtful that Abteilung 101 had anymore than a handful in the Villers-Bocage area on 13 June.
Panzer Lehr, likewise, had no spare tanks. It was being held down frontally by Major General D A H Graham’s 50th (Northumbrian) Division and Kampfgruppe Kauffman’s ad hoc forces showed what Panzer Lehr had in the way of reserves. Panzer Kompanie 316 (Funklenk), attached to Panzer Lehr, had six Tigers, of which only half were serviceable, and nine StuG assault guns. Therefore, the 7th Armoured Division even at this stage was still a considerable threat to the German lank. The British, though, in fear of the Tigers, were ordered to pull back at nightfall and hold Tracy-Bocage, concentrating on Hill 174.
At about 1700 hours, while the Germans were regrouping, the British withdrew two miles (3km) to the west. B Squadron was ordered to time its withdrawal to coincide with a covering barrage. In total the brigade lost 225 men, twenty-seven tanks, fourteen half-tracks, fourteen Bren carriers and a number of anti-tank guns. Wittmann’s prompt action in thwarting the British enabled Villers-Bocage to be retaken later in the day by the Panzer Lehr Kamfgruppe and units of 2nd Panzer; thus plugging the gap. A few days later he was promoted to SS-Hauptsturmführer.
Wittmann’s successful defensive action forced Montgomery to launch two more costly enveloping attacks, with Operation Epsom to the west on 25 June and Goodwood to the east on 18 July. In between these he launched Operation Charnwood, a frontal assault, on 8 July, losing 3,500 casualties and eighty tanks.
In the meantime, Schwere Panzer Abteilung 503 became the tactical responsibility of 21st Panzer Division. The tanks were entrained and shipped to Dreux by 5 July. They reached von Choltitz’s LXXXVI Corps area with about forty-five Tigers, though on 23 July the abteilung was shifted to the I SS Panzer Corps. In early July the abteilung’s HQ, at the Château de Canteloup near Argences, southeast of Caen, was visited by Oberst Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski, commander of 21st Panzer’s Panzer Regiment 22. The 503 departed the Dreux forest for Caen, going into action on 11 July alongside 21st Panzer, with III Kompanie claiming twelve enemy tanks near Cuverville.
Seven days later, German defences east of Caen were carpet bombed prior to Goodwood. One Tiger was burnt out, another tossed upside down like a child’s toy, trapping the crew, and a third was seriously damaged. The abteilung’s HQ in a nearby Chateau was also caught in the bombing, but Hauptmann Fromme escaped with his life. That day, eight Tigers went into action, but by evening III Kompanie had just one operational tank left.
Goodwood made good initial progress until it ran into the in-depth prepared positions of infantry and armour, including thirty-six Tiger tanks and elements of the 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. The offensive cost 6,000 British casualties and 400 tanks and was called off after just two gruelling days.
Abteilung 503’s III Kompanie was withdrawn from the line and received fourteen Tiger IIs during the first week of August at Mailly-le-Camp. The company left on the 11th but missed the battle for Falaise. I and II Kompanies were instrumental in helping halt the British breakthrough, which reached Cagny to the southeast of Caen. The British lost forty tanks, many of them falling to Abteilung 503’s Tigers. The battalion continued to fight with 21st Panzer and by the end of the month was in the Bretteville-sur-Laize area.
Tigers of Panzer Abteilung 102, supported by panzergrenadiers from the 9th SS Panzer Division, attacked Canadian positions at Hill 112 on 10 July. The battalion first went into action at Maltot to the northeast of the hill, when four Tigers securing the lank knocked out three Shermans, a surviving tank fleeing in the direction of Eterville. Fourteen Tiger tanks then struck toward St Martin to the southeast of Hill 112 and were met by more Shermans, which poured fire into the lead panzer.
Platoon commander Will Fey recalled the attack:
Three enemy tanks were already silenced; the others kept on firing without pause. Then we finally had the most eager one in our crosshairs. The two farthest to our right had already been knocked out by us with five anti-tank shells, when light bombers showed up above the battleground. Like eagles, they fell out of the sky, dropped their loads of bombs, pulled up, and climbed away again. They came at us like a swarm of hostile hornets and covered us with a hail of medium bombs. At the same time, smoke shells landed among us and covered everything around with an impenetrable white fog within minutes. This was a new way of fighting to us, something we had not encountered on any battleground before. We withdrew to the starting positions where at least the infantry was able to keep the enemy close-assault teams away from us.
The attack was renewed the following day, but an artillery barrage greeted the advancing Tigers, though they managed to knock out a few Churchill tanks. A smoke screen again descended on the panzers and Fey’s tank took several hits to the rear and the turret, before stumbling upon enemy trucks and personnel carriers. Two Churchills were quickly knocked out. By the evening the Tigers had secured Hill 112. It would be fought over until the end of the month when the Germans finally gave up its scorched earth. In the meantime it would change hands repeatedly.
During the night of the 11th, the British moved back onto the hill and the isolated Tigers withdrew to St Martin. Two days later they counterattacked, recapturing the wooded area of the cattle pen on the summit. The heavy and devastating Allied bombardment of the hill ensured that the supporting panzergrenadiers could not remain, and on the 15th the Tigers once again found themselves alone amid the shattered landscape. The following morning the 10th SS came to their assistance.
When the Canadians occupied Maltot, some Tigers were sent to clear them out. These were met by a deluge of artillery fire but caught a column of four Churchill tanks on the road, knocking out the first and last vehicle, trapping them. The two middle tanks were caught desperately trying to escape down the embankment; the last one was hit twice in the rear. Enemy anti-tank guns and fighter-bombers then greeted the Tigers and despite getting beyond Maltot, Will Fey and his comrades were recalled to their original positions.
On 24 July the Tigers intercepted eight Churchills striking from Maltot toward St Martin; none escaped. The next day the battalion was bombed when a raid covered Hill 112 all the way back to St Martin. Fey and his comrades were relieved by the III Kompanie and they withdrew, only to be thrown into the fight again on the 26th, around Hill 67 and the northern exit of St Andre, to the west of Feuguerolles.
In the fighting that followed, the Tiger next to Fey’s tank was hit, smoke pouring from its hatches as those uninjured crew sought to escape. He witnessed the awful carnage:
The driver of the knocked-out Panzer wildly waved the bloody stump of his arm from which his hand was dangling, held by some pieces of skin and flesh, and sought cover with the other survivors to the side. The radio operator had been killed by a direct hit. Our other Panzers then advanced from their stand by positions to the ridge of the hills. Across from us, there was no more movement. Everything remained quiet.
It appeared that the Canadian attempt to break through, which began with such high hopes, had been stalled by the valour and determination of our grenadiers. Its brutal force spent, it faltered. Then came another air attack. On the whole the Tiger tanks were able to weather these steel storms; the main damage seemed to be to the antenna, tracks, radiators and ventilators. The thing they most feared was naval gunfire as this delivered the heaviest shells.
The Tigers helped halt the Guards Armoured Division near Estry and stopped the 11th Armoured Division’s push toward the Vire–Vassy Road. On 1 August, Abteilung 102 was ordered to withdraw south under the cover of darkness to assist the 9th SS Panzer Division, which was involved in heavy fighting with British and Canadian armoured forces. Arriving in Vire, they found the place reduced to rubble by air attacks.
They then moved north to assist German paratroops under attack along the railway embankment. The following day, elements of Abteilung 102, along with the weak reconnaissance abteilung from the 10th SS and a company of paratroops, were ordered to counterattack north of Vire.
In the initial engagement the Tigers knocked out five Cromwell tanks. They then bumped into concealed Shermans, but these were also swiftly dealt with. In total, twenty-two tanks, belonging to the British Guards Armoured Division, were knocked out without any loss. The following day the battalion continued to take a toll on the British tanks. At 2300 on 3 August they withdrew, claiming twenty-eight enemy tanks and fourteen trucks destroyed, two armoured scout cars and two motorbikes captured.
Northwest of Vassy on 7 August the Tigers halted a massed armoured column with devastating effect. Opening fire at just 400 metres they knocked out fourteen of the fifteen attacking Shermans along with numerous other vehicles.
The next day, ten tanks of Abteilung 101 supporting Kampfgruppe Wald-müller, consisting of thirty-nine Panzer IVs, a battalion of panzergrenadiers and the escort companies from the 12th SS, were thrown against Operation Totalise, the British and Canadian attempt to break through to Falaise. The juggernaut of the Polish 1st Armoured and Canadian 4th Armoured Divisions were poised to roll.
Wittmann’s Tigers were gathered east of Cintheaux behind a hedge, ready to do Kurt Meyer’s bidding. The latter recalled:
Once more I shake Michael Wittmann’s hand and refer to the extremely critical situation. Our good Michael laughs his boyish laughter and climbs into his Tiger. So far, 138 enemy tanks in the East and West have fallen victim to him. Will he be able to increase this number of successes or become a victim himself?
The massive Allied air raid in support of their offensive failed to hit a single panzer. The Tigers, with the grenadiers behind them, struck toward the wood southeast of Carcelles where the Allied tanks were assembled. It was at this point that Wittmann’s luck ran out.
Hauptsturmführer Wolfgang Rabe MD, Abteilung 101’s physician, reported:
Wittmann was east of the road to Caen with four or five Tigers. I was off to the side. The panzers came under fire, reportedly from English 15cm guns. Some of the Tigers went up in flames. I tried to determine if anyone got out. When I did not see anybody, I thought they might have left the panzer through the lower hatch and I tried to get closer. This was impossible since I came under fire as soon as I left the ditch in an easterly direction. We waited another hour or two for anyone of the crews to show up. Towards evening I drove over to Brigadeführer Kraemer, Chief of the General Staff, I SS Panzer Corps, and reported on developments. He ordered me, since I was the senior Officer of the Abteilung, to lead the remains of the Abteilung back, and attached me to the SS Panzer Regiment 12, Wünsche.
Other reports stated that Wittman succumbed to Shermans and a Typhoon rocket attack. At the time of his death he was not only credited with 138 AFVs, most of them tanks, but also 132 anti-tank guns, which he had chalked up in under two years. His greatest victory, though, has to be inflicting the debacle of Villers-Bocage on the British. Through a mixture of luck and courage Wittmann, largely single-handedly, halted a British armoured thrust that could have encircled Panzer Lehr or even rolled up the entire German corps front. If this had happened the German collapse in Normandy could have been much swifter and perhaps even more catastrophic. General major Fritz Kraemer summed up the action very succinctly:
Early in the morning of 12 June the commander of five tanks (Tigers) which had been placed in readiness north of Villers-Bocage sighted an enemy motorized column, including tanks, on the march from Tilly toward Villers-Bocage. Without hesitation he [Wittmann] drove against this column and exterminated with his tanks about thirty enemy tanks and a like number of motor vehicles. Thus, by the personal courage of this Officer, the enemy’s intention to break through by way of Villers-Bocage was frustrated.
By 9 August the last of Abteilung 102’s Tiger tanks were withdrawing from the Vire area toward Falaise. Their kampfgruppe was attached to the remains of the 271st Infantry Division, which was holding a line from St Germain to the southern edge of Bernay to the northern edges of Fresnay, Espins and Coisilles, against the British 59th (Staffordshire) Division.
The following day enemy armoured cars probed the 271st’s left lank, followed by forty tanks advancing on Espins and Le Monsul. German infantry dropped their weapons and led when twelve tanks supported by the armoured cars broke through southwest of Le Monsul. The Tigers of the II Kompanie rallied the reluctant infantry and counterattacked, claiming four tanks and putting the rest to light northward.
During 12 August Abteilung 102 continued to support the 271st Infantry Division and the I and II Kompanies attempted to trap the advancing British armour. The latter broke through east of Barberie and II Kompanie moved to secure the roads to Espins and Fresnay. Six tanks also occupied the height on the northern edge of Zingal, catching seven enemy tanks. The British then brought down a massive barrage which stunned Ernst Streng, commander of II Kompanie:
The English shells hit the roofs, walls, windows, and streets like hailstones. The force and violence of the artillery fire, never experienced at such intensity before, raced through the town [Bois Halbout] like a hurricane. Wounded soldiers were trapped under the rubble of crumbling roofs and walls. Helpless injured over flowed the hallways and rooms of the main dressing station. Whoever was still breathing was buried under the falling walls.
Five Tigers at Tournebous had to make a fighting retreat to Bois Halbout or face being overwhelmed. The Tigers then withdrew southeast of Claire-Tizon to refuel and take on ammunition. Six tanks needed repairing and were handed over to the mechanics. The retreating Tigers were then caught at the junction of the western ring road just outside Falaise on 13 August by rocket-firing fighter-bombers. They sought sanctuary in a nearby wood without loss and were ordered to defend the Tournebous area. Soon the British were in amongst the three Tigers that formed the command post of II Kompanie and two were quickly knocked out.
The remaining panzers retreated and north of Soulangy, at Hill 184, they found German infantry fleeing twelve Sherman tanks. The Tigers knocked out three as the daylight began to fail and the infantry dug in. The following day, Will Fey and his crew, returning from the repair company, were ordered to hold the Caen-Falaise road between Soulangy and St Pierre. Although Soulangy had fallen, a few panzergrenadiers from the 12th SS screened Fey and his men.
At the approach of the Canadians, Fey drove forward to engage them but they disappeared in Soulangy. Moving to rescue some trapped panzergrenadiers, he spotted a line of ten Sherman tanks threatening the foxholes of the German infantry. At 400 metres the Tiger knocked out the first and last Sherman and then finished off the rest at leisure. Covering the retreat of about thirty men from 12th SS, the Tiger knocked out an approaching column of armoured personnel carriers. After all this success, Fey’s tank now refused to start and, in danger of being outflanked, had to be towed back to St Pierre.
The Tiger tanks withdrew to the Falaise road junction and on the night of the 15th the local Maquis were foolish enough to tangle with the abteilung’s sentries. By the morning the Tigers were at Versainville, just north of Falaise, and they moved forward to engage the Canadians just as the village was flattened. Their machineguns mowed down the numerous exposed advancing Canadian infantry; as long as no one surrendered they kept firing and it was soon the turn of the supporting Shermans.
When the Tigers fell back, the Canadian infantry bravely but vainly tried to deal with them. After abandoning Versainville, the Canadians continued to press them closely as they retreated to Eraines. The end was now in sight as Will Fey stoically noted:
On the horizon, we saw columns of tanks and vehicles rolling east in the evening sun, tank after tank, with no break. This meant that the encirclement, which had been obvious around Falaise for days, was to be completed. But it was not the first encirclement we had to break out of!
It was only a matter of time before the last of the lumbering Tiger tanks had to be abandoned.