Falaise: The Flawed Victory - The Destruction of Panzergruppe West, August 1944

The 116th Panzer Division came into being in the spring of 1944, drawing on a cadre of battle-hardened Panzer grenadiers from the worn out 16th Panzergrenadier Division and a fresh unit, the 179th Reserve Panzer Division. This was not to be a happy marriage and the division suffered severe teething problems. The 116th did not go into combat until 30 July and by 12 August had just twelve panzers remaining. It took part in the last gasp of Panzergruppe Eberbach, trying to hold open the southern lip of the Falaise pocket; however, the division managed to escape Falaise without too many personnel losses.

Combat experience

Initially the 16th Infantry Division had been split to create the 16th Panzer Division and the 16th Motorized Infantry Division in November 1940. The latter, nicknamed Windhund or Greyhound, fought in the Balkans and then on the Eastern Front with Army Group South in the Caucasus. In November 1942 the 16th Infantry was re-designated the 16th Panzergrenadier Division under General der Panzertruppen Gerhard Graf von Schwerin. The new unit incorporated the former’s 60th Infantry Regiment and I Abteilung, Artillery Regiment 146; the infantry were drawn from the Rhineland-Westphalia region and this was to have a bearing on the division’s involvement in Normandy. The 16th Panzergrenadier Division was committed to operations on the southern sector of the Eastern Front through November 1942 to March 1944.

In early 1944 the commander of Panzer Abteilung 116, Major Tebbe, visited the Reserve Panzer Abteilung 1 in France with a view to incorporating this unit to boost the 16th Panzergrenadier Division to panzer division status. The events on the Eastern Front derailed these plans. In February 1944 the Russians broke through on the bend of the Dneiper north of Nikopol and the exhausted 16th lost most of its motorised vehicles. Although awarded the Swords to his Knight’s Cross, Schwerin initially refused them because the division was unfairly blamed for the collapse of the German line. When the division moved west some units were left behind with the 24th Panzer and 15th and 258th Infantry Divisions.Particular ill feeling was caused when a regimental combat group was ordered to stay with the 24th.

Its move west and reorganisation as a panzer division (it adopted the number 116th to avoid confusion with the existing 16th Panzer) may in part have been due to von Schwerin writing to Hitler on 29 June 1943. He requested that, in light of the destruction wrought by the Allied strategic bombing campaign on their homeland, the division be given the opportunity to confront the Anglo-American forces. ‘We have to settle the score with the English and the Americans in a special way’, said Schwerin. The following month Schwerin wrote to Hitler’s staff, again saying: ‘We will take great pleasure in soundly beating the hell out of those fellows in every way we can, according to the rules of warfare’.

General Schweppenburg’s Panzergruppe West began to oversee the reconstitution of the division and the supply of new tanks and other vehicles. In late April 1944, 7,500 men arrived northwest of Paris from the Eastern Front. Boosted by 3,000 men from the 179th Reserve Panzer Division, plus other troops, the 116th soon stood at 13,500. However, there was no way the 1 May combat-ready deadline could be met and this was pushed back to 20 June.

The 179th Reserve Panzer Division, whose units included Reserve Panzer Abteilung 1, Reserve Panzerjäger Abteilung 9 and Reserve Panzergrenadier Regiment 81, were incorporated into the new units of the 116th. Its recruits must have looked on in awe at the battle-hardened former members of the 16th Panzer grenadiers, some of whom had survived almost a year and a half of fighting in Russia.

Initially, Panzer Division Nr. 179 under General Walter von Boltenstern, along with Nr. 178 and Nr. 155, had been formed in April 1943 in France, but was re-designated the 179th Reserve Panzer Division three months later. Boltenstern’s main claim to fame was that he had commanded the 29th Motorised Infantry Division earmarked for the invasion of Britain in 1940, which was subsequently lost under Hans-Georg Leyser at Stalingrad in 1943.

While the 179th helped create the 116th Panzer Division and the 155th supplemented the battered 9th Panzer Division, the Nr. 178 commanded by General Friedrich-Wilhelm Löper was also in France during May to August 1944, presumably providing replacements for the other panzer divisions caught up in the fighting.

The only other available reserve panzer divisions were the 273rd, stationed in France and the 233rd in Denmark. In May 1944 the men of the 273rd were sent to join the 11th Panzer Division in the south of France with Chevallerie’s 1st Army and the 10th Panzer grenadier Division refitting in Germany after fighting on the Eastern Front.

The 116th came under the tactical control of Army Group B and Rommel on 29 April, though training and organisation remained the responsibility of Panzergruppe West. Confusingly, logistical support was provided by the I SS Panzer Corps, 15th Army and OB West; while immediate tactical control was assigned to General der Panzertruppen Hans von Funck’s XLVII Panzer Corps in late May. The latter also eventually had responsibility for 2nd Panzer, as well as the 276th and 326th Infantry Divisions.

General von Schwerin’s command was moved southeast of Rouen during 13-15 May, exhausting its available fuel supplies and leading to a request to Army Group B and Panzergruppe West for help. By 1 June the division was almost at full strength, but its combat training school for squad and platoon leaders did not start until 14 June and the first course was not completed until 25 July.

Equipped with Panzer IVs, Reserve Panzer Abteilung 1 was transferred over, though some of the artillery regiment were trained separately in Pomerania. Staff from Panzer Regiment 69 were also incorporated into Panzer Regiment 116, which, confusingly, was re-designated Panzer Regiment 16.

Initially, the division was provided with the Panther abteilung from the Grossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division, while its own Panther battalion was still at Grafenwöhr in Germany. On 20 February Panzer Abteilung 116 was ordered to Grafenwöhr for refitting, where it was supposedly to be re-equipped with new Panthers. In the event, the Grossdeutschland battalion was ordered back to the Eastern Front before the 116th was directed to Normandy. An alternative Panther unit was then, ironically, provided by the 24th Panzer Division, although by the end of June this abteilung was not up and running either.

When the division did head for Normandy it had eighty-six Panzer IVs and seventy-six Panthers, while Panzerjäger Battalion 228 belatedly received twenty-one Jagdpanzer IVs in July. The division also had a range of other armoured fighting vehicles, including three Panzer IVs with the short-barrelled 7.5cm main gun, eight Panzer IIIs, six StuG IIIs and six self-propelled guns in early June. The Panzerjäger Battalion only had twelve anti-tank guns lacking prime movers, plus the six assault guns and six tank destroyers on loan from the 179th.

Like so many of the German armoured divisions in France, the 116th had the usual transport shortages. It was supposed to have 1,688 trucks but by 1 June only had two thirds of that number with some 1,065 vehicles and 163 armoured personnel carriers. Many of the trucks it did have were old and lacked spares. By 1 July the truck situation had not greatly improved though it could muster 252 armoured personnel carriers and its manpower stood a 14,358.

Just two days before D-day von Schwerin and his staff travelled to Army Group B’s HQ at La Roche Guyon. There they learned from Rommel’s Chief of Staff, General Hans Speidel, that an invasion was anticipated either side of the Somme and that in the event of this the 116th would thrust toward Dieppe. Eight days later, on 12 June, Rommel turned up at Schwerin’s command post at Perriers and ordered him to move toward the coast behind the 348th and 245th Infantry Divisions to protect the Somme, even though the division formed General von Salmuth’s 15th Army reserve.

Into action

Although the division was put on alert on 5 June, permission to commit the 116th was not granted until 19 July when 15th Army’s last panzer division was ordered to march on Caen. The only remaining free panzer units were the 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions still in the south of France. When the 116th Panzer Division moved to Normandy it had to laboriously cross the Seine by ferries as all the bridges were down.

The 116th traversed the river on 20 July and four days later the II Abteilung Panzer Regiment 16, Panzerjäger Abteilung 228, Panzergrenadier Regiments 60 and 156 and the reconnaissance unit, Panzeraufklärungs Abteilung 16, were gathering in the assembly areas. When they took stock, just sixty-three tanks and twenty-five assault guns were combat ready. Last to arrive was I Abteilung Panzer Regiment 24 and the situation greatly improved, rising to 121 tanks.

Four days later the division moved into position behind Panzergruppe West. Graf von Schwerin and his men found themselves assigned the sector behind SS-Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich’s I SS Panzer Corps southeast of Caen, supporting his 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. The opening of American breakout efforts west of St Lô on the 25th drew the division onto the left flank of 2nd Panzer, deploying in the Vire area three days later. Despite being considered highly combat ready and having seen little action, available tank numbers had plummeted to just sixty-two. This may have been in part due to the loss of the Panthers of Panzer Regiment 24, which were allocated to the 2nd Panzer Division for the coming Mortain counterattack.

Someone had to take the blame for failing to hold Cobra, so General von Choltitz, commander of LXXXIV Corps, took the fall. General Elfeldt, his successor, was promised the 116th Panzer Division and recalled:

Alerted to the movements of 2nd Panzer on 27 July, the Americans moved the 30th Infantry Division and 2nd Armored Division to Tessy-sur-Vire and Percy. The 2nd Armored, colliding with 2nd Panzer outside Tessy-sur-Vire, were unaware of the threat from the 116th Panzer.

Fully in position by the 29th, the 116th’s first task was to help the 2nd SS trapped east of Coutances and then swing northwest of Villebaudon. This did not happen, though the 2nd SS managed to reach the 116th’s left flank near Percy. Instead, von Funck ordered the 116th and 2nd Panzer to strike across the Vire while Panzer Lehr held the Americans at Percy. However, General Eugen Meindl, commander of the II Parachute Corps, was not happy about von Funck’s plans. He wanted a limited attack to deny Percy to the enemy; otherwise his flank would be exposed. Meindl complained to General Hausser, commander of 7th Army, but it did him no good.

Schwerin’s division had it within its grasp to retrieve the situation. He visited Meindl’s command post south of Percy, only to be directed to Funck, who informed him 2nd Panzer had come to a halt. Next he pitched up at General Bayerlein’s HQ and found Panzer Lehr desperately clinging on at Percy.

Bayerlein warned him that the ground to the east was not suitable for an armoured counterattack; the best place was to the north, striking due west. Schwerin set his command post up near Courson and at this point von Funck turned up, saying 2nd Panzer needed help. This meant the 116th would have to attack south and not west.

On the morning of the 30th, the 116th pushed the Americans aside at Beaucoudray, north of Percy on the Bréhal-Tessy-sur-Vire road; but, as Bayerlein had predicted, the going was not good and Schwerin’s panzers were confined to the roads and this resulted in traffic jams. They were ideal targets for air attack.

Sure enough, then came the swarms of Allied fighter-bombers and Schwerin called a halt to his ill-fated attack and waited for 2nd Panzer to withdraw east over the Vire. It was to cost him his command. He planned to resume the attack the following day, but pressure on 2nd Panzer caused Schwerin to abandon his plans. The bulk of the division was now forced onto the defensive.

Elfeldt recalled that despite the Americans rapid progress, all thoughts turned to counterattack rather than an orderly withdrawal:

Elfeldt’s task was a tall order in light of the inadequacies of his forces. Kampfgruppe Lueder, which had been placed at the disposal of Elfeldt’s LXXXIV Corps was surrounded between Villedieu and Avranches after the Americans swung southeast. The battle group only just escaped by fleeing eastward and safely returned to the rest of the division.

By 1 August, 116th Panzer was fighting alongside the survivors of 353rd Infantry Division in the area of La Chapelle-Céceline. The following day elements of the division held onto Hill 290 and three kampfgruppen were then thrown into a counterattack with mixed results. Abteilung I, Panzer Regiment 16, alone accounted for nineteen American tanks, but the division then went back onto the defensive.

Mortain counterattack

On the night of 5/6 August the 84th Infantry Division relieved the 116th, though its divisional artillery remained in place to support the infantry. The 84th Infantry was a green unit and had to be bolstered with other units from the 116th, in particular the Panzerjäger Battalion. Stopping an American penetration at Sourdeval ensured that the two divisions were not cut off. Subordinated to von Funck’s XLVII Panzer Corps, the bulk of the 116th’s panzers were transferred to 2nd Panzer for the impending Avranches/Mortain counterattack.

For the attack on Avranches on the night of 6/7 August a panzer battalion from the 116th and 1st SS were assigned to 2nd Panzer. The 116th was ordered to support the attack north of Sée creek and to seize Chérencé-le-Roussel. Lacking its armour this was an impossible task, especially as the Americans had been in the town for a number of days.

The 116th, with just twenty to twenty-five tanks, was to attack north of La Sée to keep the enemy occupied, thereby protecting the northern flank of the counterattack. The 116th’s right group was supposed to attack Hill 211 and its left La Mardelle, but in the event was unable to make any head way.

During the night of the 7/8th the left wing was able to reach the railway crossing 500m northeast of Chérencé. Elements of Panzer grenadier Regiment 156 reached Chérencé on 7 August and dug in. Unfortunately, word did not filter back that an old railway track was open and so no armoured support was pushed up it.

In the face of vigorous American counterattacks, the division was unable to hold its ground. Funck accused the 116th of dragging its feet, especially as its tanks had not reached 2nd Panzer in time, and he wanted Schwerin relieved. In fact, I Abteilung Panzer Regiment 24, forming the right attack group, successfully reached Le Mesnil-Adeleé, two and a half miles (4km) southwest of Chérencé. American firepower, though, soon drove it back and subsequent attacks by the panzer grenadiers met a similar fate. Nonetheless Schwerin was relieved of command and told to report to La Roche Guy on.

On 9 August the 116th, still under XLVII Panzer Corps, was strongly attacked by the Americans in the sector around Perriers-en-Beauficel, but managed to repel these assaults. The division counterattacked southwest of Perriers-en-Beauficel the following day to alleviate the pressure before withdrawing. On the 11th it was sent to the Alençon area.

By 12 August, Panzer Regiment 16 was deployed north-south between Argentan and Sées with just fifteen tanks. After the liberation of Alençon on the 12th and the trapping of 9th Panzer in the Ecouves forest, the French 2nd Armoured Division drove back the 116th Panzer into Carrouges, south of the developing Falaise salient.

With the French in Argentan, Hitler’s planned counterattack against General Haislip’s XV Corps was rendered redundant. Instead of striking south from Carrouges towards Le Mans, the intention was to attack east through the Forêt de Ecouves to blunt the advance of the French 2nd Armoured and the US 5th Armored Divisions.

By late afternoon on the 13th, General Eberbach, commander of the grandly-titled Panzergruppe Eberbach, had gathered the remnants of the 116th, 2nd and 1st SS Panzer Divisions in the Argentan area with about seventy panzers. That day, elements of Panzer Lehr, en route to Argentan for the Alençon attack, bumped into strong enemy armoured units. Exhausted by all the fighting, it withdrew east of Argentan, heading for Fontainbleu.

Final days

On 16 August, Hitler finally authorised a withdrawal on the proviso that Panzergruppe Eberbach widened the exit by attacking the US XV Corps at Argentan. The Germans simply did not have the strength for such an operation. Nevertheless, the 116th and 2nd SS were thrown against the US 90th Division’s roadblocks at Le Bourg-St Leonard with a view to driving the Americans off the ridgeline that dominated the escape routes to the north. This represented the last gasp of Panzergruppe Eberbach and the Americans were briefly dislodged.

The French, by passing Mortrée where the Americans were blocked, were in the vicinity of Ecouché, to the west of Argentan, by the evening of the 20th. The following day, at dawn, they took the Germans by surprise. In front of them were the remains of the 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions.

In the fighting that followed the French destroyed many vehicles of the 116th Panzer on the RN 24 bis and, liberating Ecouché, they crossed the river Orne just to the north. The 116th Panzer Division remained in the Alençon-Argentan area until the 20th, managing to break out of the Falaise pocket, escaping across the Seine either side of Rouen. In total the 116th lost some 4,348 men during the campaign, its performance having been far from noteworthy.