Falaise: The Flawed Victory - The Destruction of Panzergruppe West, August 1944

Although the 1st SS Panzer Division was recuperating from the fighting on the Eastern Front in Belgium, it did not enter the fray in Normandy until mid-July. The British, intending to pivot at Rauray and swing over the River Odon, driving southeast in an attempt to isolate Caen, attacked on 25 June. The British VIII Corps managed to secure a bridge near Baron and by 30 June had forced a bridgehead two and a half miles (4km) wide and one mile deep (1.6km). Subsequently, tough resistance was encountered from battle-hardened elements of the 1st SS, 2nd SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. Then in early August the 1st SS were switched to the American sector and although escaping the chaos of the German collapse lost all its’ panzers.

Combat experience

The 1st SS dated back to 1925, with the creation of the Schutz Staffel (SS), Hitler’s protection squad, building on the Nazi’s short-lived Sturmabteilung (SA) Stabswache (Headquarters Guard). In March 1933 Joseph ‘Sepp’ Dietrich established the SS-Stabswache Berlin, consisting of 120 men, and these along with the SS-Verfügungstruppe were the forerunners of the Waffen-SS. Initially the unit was based at Berlin’s Alexander Barracks but was later moved to Berlin-Lichterfelde.

SS-Stabswache Berlin was re-designated SS-Sonderkommando Zossen and, along with the newly-raised SS-Sonderkommando Jüterbog, was merged in September 1933 and designated SS-Leibstandarte (Bodyguard) Adolf Hitler (LAH). The following year it was re-designated Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) and grew to regimental strength.

LSSAH took part in the Anschluss with Austria as a part of XVI Corps under General Heinz Guderian and later in the annexation of Czechoslovakia. During the invasion of Poland it served with Army Group South under the leadership of SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich. It later took part in the invasion of France and the Low Countries, where it was mainly held in reserve, though it was used against the retreating British troops at Dunkirk. LSSAH was attached to XIV Corps during the second and final phase of the invasion of France.

The LSSAH was then upgraded to brigade strength in August 1940 for the planned invasion of Britain (Unternehmen Seelöwe or Operation Sealion). When this was called off, LSSAH was transferred to Romania for the attack in the Balkans. It fought its way through Yugoslavia and Greece, chasing the Allied troops to Kalamata, from where they took flight by sea to Crete. Kurt Meyer, commanding Liebstandarte’s reconnaissance battalion, captured 11,000 men after attacking the Klussura Pass and the brigade took the surrender of at least sixteen divisions before the Greeks surrendered.

In June 1941 LSSAH expanded to a full motorised infantry division and took part in the invasion of the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa, as part of Army Group South and was involved in the fighting at Kiev and Rostov. The division was sent to France for refit in 1942 and upgraded to a panzergrenadier division. Sent back to the Eastern front in 1943 under SS-Brigadeführer Theodor Wisch, it fought at Kharkov and Kursk. After the failure at Kursk, LSSAH was sent to Italy on anti-partisan duty, but it soon was deployed back to the Eastern Front as a panzer division.

In January1944 the division was involved in the rescue of those troops trapped in the Cherkassy pocket. The tanks of SS-Panzer Regiment 1 cut through four Russian divisions and thanks to its efforts some 32,000 men escaped, but the depleted 1st SS was left with just three panzers and four assault guns. By mid-March the division had less than 1,250 men. LSSAH was one of the divisions encircled near Kamenets-Podolsk and, though rescued by the 9th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg and 10th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, it suffered heavy losses. The division was then sent to Belgium for rest and refitting in 15th Army’s area of responsibility.

On 18 April 1944 the remainder of 1st SS under Wisch was sent by train to northwest France and established its headquarters at Turnhout in Belgium, where it became part of the I SS Panzer Corps. The problems of manpower and equipment were soon addressed. Over 2,000 men from the 12th SS were transferred to the division and in early May Hitler ordered it should get new equipment, much of it straight from the factory floor.

A month later the 1st SS was far from combat ready. The week before D-Day the division stood at 19,618 strong, though many of the new recruits were untrained and 1,081 men, mainly drivers and vital technicians, were still in Germany. Wisch was still awaiting replacement Panzer Mk IVs and Vs and these did not arrive until the weeks following D-Day. Motor transport was lacking, the division only had 1,691 of 3,887 authorised trucks and over a third of those were in maintenance. None of the panzergrenadiers’ armoured halftracks were operational.

The division’s SS-Panzer Regiment 1 was commanded by veteran SS-Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper, who had made a name for himself in the campaigns fought in Poland, where he had commanded 10 Kompanie of the LSSAH, and in France and Russia. He then commanded III Abteilung of the newly-motorised division’s SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 2.

Peiper fought with distinction during the recapture of Kharkov and at Kursk. In November 1943 he succeeded SS-Obersturmbannführer Schönberger as commander of SS-Panzer Regiment 1. He was later to achieve notoriety for the Malmedy massacre perpetrated by the 1st SS during the German Ardennes offensive in the winter of 1944.

SS-Panzer Regiment 1 mustered forty-two Panzer IVs in its I Abteilung under SS-Sturmbannführer Kling, thirty-eight Panthers in II Abteilung commanded by SS-Hauptsturmführer Pötschke and forty-four StuG IIIs in SS-Sturmbannführer Heimann’s SS-Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 1. A further eight Panzer IVs and a StuG were in the workshop. In total the 1st SS was to field 103 Panzer IVs, seventy-two Panthers and forty-five StuG IIIs during the fighting in Normandy. Divisional artillery also included five Hummel and eight Wespe self-propelled guns mounted on Panzer IV and II chassis respectively.

Nazi indecision ensured that the 1st SS were kept away from Normandy for two crucial weeks. Although not combat ready, just two days after the Allied invasion it had been decided to send what units it could to help. Fortunately for the Allies, the Germans changed their minds and the division was not embarked onto its freight trains until 17 June.

Stationed at Enghen, Belgium, on 9 June, expecting an attack across the Pas de Calais, the 1st SS was ordered to move east of Bruges as a safeguard. Five days later the Panther abteilung arrived east of Rouen and eight days later other units were unloaded west of Paris, but elements of the division totalling 5,800 men remained in Belgium.

Into action

Equally frustratingly for Rommel, Schweppenburg and the others, only the SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 1 could be committed belatedly to help resist the British Epsom Operation along National Highway175. A kampfgruppe under SS-Obersturmbannführer Albert Frey from SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 1 went into action on the 28th. Although the panzergrenadiers arrived in the Caen area it would be another week before other elements arrived. In the meantime the 12th SS were left to fend off the Epsom offensive, aimed at securing Caen, largely unassisted.

SS-Panzer Regiment 1 had not been brought together by 1 July and the bulk of the division was not in the line before the 9th. By early July, Kling had thirty Panzer IVs, Pötschke twenty-five Panthers and Heimann thirty-one StuGs. The division initially gathered south of Caen between Thury-Harcourt and Bretteville-sur-Laize, then to the north of Potigny between Caen and Falaise and also Bretteville-sur-Laize and Caen. Wisch reported to Sepp Dietrich’s I Panzer Corps, which included the battered 12th SS.

From 7 July, for three days, elements of 1st SS fought with the 12th SS to the southwest of Caen to halt Operation Charnwood, the British frontal assault on the northern outskirts. They found themselves up against Major General R F L Keller’s Canadian 3rd Division, which struck toward the Odon. The British attack opened with 460 bombers carpet-bombing the city and a regiment from the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division suffered seventy-five per cent casualties. Within two days the Germans had been driven from all of Caen north of the Orne. On 10 July the British tried to barge the Germans out of the way to the west with Operation Jupiter.

Following Charnwood, General von Obstfelder’s LXXXVI Corps, which included 21st Panzer, assumed I SS Panzer Corp’s responsibility for the whole sector east of Caen. The 1st SS then assumed responsibility for the sector taking over from the exhausted 12th SS. Between 12-17 July the division’s HQ was just to the northwest of Bretteville at Fresnay-le-Puceux. On the 15th the British launched Operation Greenline, pinning 2nd Panzer, 9th SS and 10th SS west of Caen and obliging 1 SS to return to the fight to hold the Orne.

In mid-July the 272nd Infantry Division gradually relieved the 1st SS. The former, part of Army Group G’s 19th Army, had been ordered to move from the Mediterranean coast on 2 July. After being sent by train to the Le Mans area, the 272nd began to move into defensive positions on the night of 13/14th. By 15 July the Germans had suffered 97,000 casualties, an attrition rate of 2,500 to 3,000 per day. Replacements numbered just 10,000, of whom only6,000 had reached the front. Tank losses totalled 225, with just seventeen replacements.

Stopping Goodwood

By the 18th, the 1st SS was in reserve at Falaise, way to the south of Caen, when the British launched Operation Goodwood. Just prior to this, the 1st SS between Eterville and Mondeville were directed eastward towards Cagny. Subsequently the 1st SS and 12th SS were redeployed to the south and east of Caen on a line from Bras-Bourguébus-Frénouville-Emiéville, while 21st Panzer lay between Emiéville and Troarn along with the Tiger tanks of Abteilung 503.

British intelligence underestimated the German defences, which were almost 10 miles (16km) deep, supported by 230 panzers, although other armoured fighting vehicles brought the total for this force to nearly 400. The initial defences, comprising of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division and 21st Panzer’s inadequate assault gun battalion, were unlikely to hold up the British tanks for any length of time, especially once they had been pulverised by the Allied bomber fleets. A lot rested on the panzergrenadiers of Kampfgruppe von Luck, drawn from 21st Panzer.

To the south, the German gun line on the Bourguébus Ridge included seventy-eight 8.8cm guns, 194 field guns, twelve heavy flak guns and 272 Nebelwerfer rocket launchers. In reality, much of this equipment was spread throughout the entire German defensive zones. Most of the 8.8cm anti-aircraft guns belonged to General Pickert’s III Flak Corps, which was under strict orders from Panzergruppe West to defend the Caen-Falaise road from air attack. Most of his guns were therefore to the south and east of Bourguébus, with air defence a priority.

The anti-aircraft 8.8cm Flak 36, while it could be used in an anti-tank role, was not much better than the 7.5cm anti-tank gun, which German units had plenty of. In addition, its inability to achieve a first-time kill at long range, and its high silhouette, meant that it was very vulnerable in ground combat. The III Flak Corps had three flakkampfgruppen intended to help the ground forces resist enemy tanks; they arrived just in time for Goodwood but were to prove largely useless. They claimed about twenty tank kills for the loss of thirty-five 8.8cm guns and another seventy light Flak guns. This meant that responsibility for holding the ridge rested squarely with the 1st SS and elements of the 21st.

Goodwood opened at 0745 on the 18th and the 1st SS rushed north to join 21st Panzer to halt the British attack on their left lank. About forty-six panzers of I Abteilung, SS-Panzer Regiment 1, were thrown into action against the British in the area of Bourguébus at 1620. Taking up positions on the Bourguébus Ridge, the division inflicted heavy casualties on the British 7th and 11th Armoured Divisions, who received a very nasty surprise with the appearance of the 1st SS.

The British armour had 3,000 yards of open ground to cover before they reached the ridge marked by the villages of Bras, Hubert Folie and Bourguébus itself, all of which were German strongpoints. They got to within a few hundred yards before the Germans opened fire, knocking out four tanks in quick succession, followed by at least another seven to their right. A Squadron of the 3rd Battalion Royal Tank Regiment swiftly lost thirty-four of its fifty-two tanks.

Exhausted by the fighting, the panzers of 1st SS wanted to break off combat on the Bourguébus Ridge, but their request was denied due to the activity of Allied fighter-bombers, presumably on the grounds that if they stayed in close proximity to the British they were at less risk of air attack. Although German losses were high, they achieved the desired effect and the 11th Armoured Division lost 106 of its tanks. West of Cagny, the Guards Armoured Division was also held up, having lost sixty tanks.

On the eastern side of the British corridor General von Obstfelder’s LXXXVI corps was able to deploy a number of anti-tank battalions, including elements of Artillerie-Pak Abteilung 1039 and 1053, which between them could muster twenty-seven 8.8cm Pak 43 and sixteen 7.5cm Pak 40. The British lost a total of 200 tanks on that first day of Goodwood. Just as it was getting dark, Panthers and two captured Shermans from the 1st SS counterattacked after the 2nd Northants Yeomanry tried once more to force the ridge.

Now that the Bourguébus Ridge was such a bloody killing ground, when the panzergrenadiers from 1st SS moved up on the night of 18/19 July they must have been fearful that the Allied bombers would repeat the previous day’s attack. The British brought up artillery on the 19th to cover the advancing tanks. The Northants Yeomanry, however, veered towards Ifs, to the west of Bras, and were driven back toward Caen. At Bras the 1st SS defenders were not so lucky and were ejected at 1900 with the loss of a dozen self-propelled guns and many dead. By 1740 the entire III Abteilung, SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 1 had been destroyed in and around Bras. Although I SS Panzer Corps had been prevented from moving west to fight the Americans it had been at great cost.

Heavy rain and the actions of the 1st SS and 21st Panzer Divisions brought Goodwood to a halt on 20 July. The Churchill, Cromwell, Honey and Sherman tanks of the three British armoured divisions suffered extremely heavy casualties in men and equipment. In just two days the British 2nd Army had lost 413 tanks – some thirty–six per cent of its total tank strength.

The 1st SS, 12th SS and 21st Panzer had effectively hemmed in Goodwood. By this point, the 1st SS had gathered seventy Panzer IVs and Panthers west of Bourguébus at Verrières on the far side of the Caen-Falaise road. Also, a kampfgruppe from 2nd Panzer and the 272nd Infantry Division were also on the ridge, while the 116th Panzer was in the process of moving up behind the 12th SS. When word of the assassination attempt on Hitler on the 20th filtered through to the SS there was a sense of outrage. SS-Hauptsturmführer. Hans Bernhard of the 1st SS summed up their feelings:

Bernhard was also amused by the visits from neighbouring army generals keen to prove their loyalty and the Nazi party salute was enforced on all. Also on the 20th, the 1st SS launched their counterattack from Verrières against Major General C Foulkes’ Canadian 2nd Division, which had been foolish enough to renew the attack on the Bourguébus Ridge under the guise of Operation Atlantic.

The 1st SS remained engaged between the N158 Caen–Falaise and N13 Caen–Lisieux roads and on 25 July took part in the counterattack at Tilly-la-Campagne. The division held the Caen–Falaise highway until the end of the month, by which time it had suffered 1,500 casualties, but, through a combination of new deliveries made in the face of Allied air attack and the maintenance staff pulling out all the stops, 1st SS could field sixty-one Panzer IVs, forty Panthers and twenty-three StuGs. In fact by now all of Peiper’s SS-Panzer Regiment 1 had arrived in Normandy, although some artillery, rocket launcher, flak and reconnaissance units remained behind in Belgium.

Final days

The exhausted 1st SS were pulled out of the line on 4 August and replaced by the 89th Infantry Division. The latter was right in the firing line when Operation Totalise was launched on the 7th. The 89th had only been raised in Germany in January and deployed to Norway for training before arriving in France in late June. Sent to Normandy at the end of July it had just been subordinated to Dietrich’s I SS Panzer Corps on 3 August. Notably, elements of the division were in the Falaise-Bretteville area and moved into the line supported by thirteen Sturmpanzer IVs from Sturmpanzer Abteilung 217.

The 1st SS was withdrawn from the Caen sector and moved southwest toward Avranches, falling prey to Allied fighter-bombers en route. On the night of 5/6 August, the two tank abteilungen, two Panzergrenadier abteilungen, one self-propelled abteilung, one engineer kompanie and the flak kompanie deployed west to take part in the Mortain counterattack. Allied fighter-bombers helped ensure that the 1st SS Panzer Division’s contribution to the Avranches counterattack was stillborn.

The 1st SS Panzer was halted just over a mile (2km) east of Juvigny-le-Terte at about 1300 on 7 August, after RAF Typhoons set about the panzers. It was not until 2200 that the remains of 1st SS, including twenty-five assault guns, were made available to continue the attack. Eberbach’s 5th Panzer Army brought forward elements of the 331st Infantry Divisions to relieve pressure on 1st SS. Although the latter unit was a veteran of the Eastern Front, when it had been withdrawn in March 1944 it left behind all its combat-experienced Officers and men who were distributed to other local units.

It was not until 28 July that the 331st had been ordered to join Panzergruppe West and it had only arrived on 4 August. A kampfgruppe was assigned to General Adolf Kuntzen’s LXXXI Corps. The 1st SS were in the process of pulling out so they could renew the attack, when the Americans penetrated their left wing up to Hill 307 northeast of Mortain; those units that had withdrawn were required to seal the penetration. Within three days of the Avranches counterattack being launched it was clear that it was a lost cause and the 1st SS were withdrawn to defensive positions around St Barthélemy.

SS-Panzer Regiment 1 by12 August was at Carrouges with just thirty panzers, eleven of which were lost during the fighting the following day. On the 13th, Wisch and his men arrived at Argentan on the Orne, southeast of Falaise. One of SS-Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 1’s last assault guns was lost in the Orne at Putanges south of Falaise.

On the 16th, the division was forced to fall back and regrouped on the River Dives. The remains of the 1st SS, consisting of a weary kampfgruppe, broke out from the Gouffern Forest on the afternoon of 20 August, escaping from the Falaise Pocket via the St Lambert-sur-Dive corridor. Although free by the 22nd, the survivors had no operational panzers or artillery.