Falaise: The Flawed Victory - The Destruction of Panzergruppe West, August 1944 - читать бесплатно онлайн полную версию книги автора Anthony Tucker-Jones (Chapter 10 Fighting Withdrawal

Chapter 10 Fighting Withdrawal – 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen

Like so many of the panzer divisions, the 9th SS suffered during its move to Normandy from Allied airstrikes, and did not arrive until 28 June, almost three weeks after the Allied invasion commenced. Fending off British attacks on Caen, the division endured heavy casualties and was pulled back into reserve in mid-July.

Returning to the line, the division fought during the bitter battle for Hill 112 and helped beat off Operation Goodwood. In the face of Operation Totalise, the 9th SS conducted a fighting withdrawal and escaped encirclement in the Falaise pocket, helping to keep the escape route open. Eventually it was withdrawn for a refit near the Dutch city of Arnhem, having lost almost half of its manpower.

Combat experience

Under the direction of SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm ‘Willi’ Bittrich, 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen was mainly formed from conscripts, many of them from the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD or Reich Labour Service), in February 1943. Bittrich, an able tank commander, controlled the Deutschland Regiment during the fighting in Poland and France in 1939–40; he then assumed control of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich for just three months in late 1941.

Before the 9th SS had finished its training, it was placed under Sepp Dietrich’s I SS Panzer Corps, along with the remains of the 1st SS and the newly-raised 12th SS Panzergrenadier Division. However, in early 1944, along with the 10th SS, Panzer Lehr and the 349th Infantry Divisions, it became part of the II Panzer Corps under Paul Hausser. At the end of March 1944 the Red Army had surrounded the 1st Panzer Army and II Panzer Corps had been despatched to rescue it.

The 9th SS first saw action at Tarnopol in early 1944, where it took part in rescuing German troops from the Kamenets-Podolskiy pocket. On 9 April it successfully fought its way through to the 6th Panzer Division at Buczacz. Placed into reserve with Army Group North Ukraine, the 9th SS was refitting at Kovel when the Allies landed in Normandy. Hitler immediately ordered the division to join Panzergruppe West. Under Bittrich it was sent to Normandy on 12 June, though it was to have a series of commanders during the Normandy campaign. At the end of June it came under SS-Oberführer Thomas Müller.

SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Meyer (not to be confused with Kurt Meyer of the 12th SS) commanded SS-Panzer Regiment 9. At the beginning of June the regiment mustered forty-eight Panzer IVs, seven of which were in repair and forty StuG III assault guns. The Panther abteilung was at Mailly-le-Camp undergoing training, which was hampered by the slow rate of new tank deliveries. Its full complement of seventy-nine tanks was not received until mid to late June. In addition, the division left SS-Panzerjager Abteilung 9 behind, which meant it had no tank destroyers and had to make do with towed anti-tank guns. However, the artillery regiment was equipped with twelve Wespe and six Hummel self-propelled guns for mobile artillery fire support.

As part of Paul Hausser’s II SS Panzer Corps, the 9th SS moved to Normandy with its sister division, the 10th SS Frundsberg. It took them longer to reach Caen from the French border than it had taken to make the journey from Poland to France. All German reinforcements from the east were delayed by virtue of having to pass through the Chartres gap between the Seine and the Loire, this being vulnerable to air attack and French sabotage.

The division reached the French border on 16 June, but it was another four days before the lead elements were unloaded from their railway carriages between Paris and Nancy. It then deployed south of Aunay-sur-Odon with a total of 18,000 men, 170 panzers, twenty-one self-propelled guns, 287 armoured half-tracks, sixteen armoured cars and 3,670 trucks. This was a formidable array of hardware and the division knew how to employ it to best effect. Initially the 9th SS was deployed south of a line that ran from Falaise to Condé-sur-Noireau, but it then moved north between Caen and Villers-Bocage on a line between Tournay-sur-Odon and Neuilly-le-Malherbe.

Containing Epsom

Although the British VIII Corps’ Epsom offensive toward Evrecy south of Caen in late June, against the 12th SS Panzer Division, was a tactical failure, the Orne was crossed, Hill 112 taken and a deep salient driven into the German defences west of Caen. The II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to strike the corridor created by the 15th (Scottish) Division from the southwest. The 9th SS was to attack towards le Valtru and the Cheux bottleneck supported by 2nd SS and Panzer Lehr, while the 10th SS would assault the Odon bridgehead and Hill 112. Elements of the 1st SS, 12th SS and 21st Panzer Divisions were also to be involved in attacking the other lank of the exposed corridor.

At a critical moment before this counterattack the Germans were forced to conduct one of their habitual command reshuffles. Willi Bittrich suddenly found himself directing II Panzer Corps after Hausser succeeded General Dollmann as commander of 7th Army when he dropped dead on 28 June of a suspected heart attack; though his Chief of General Staff, General Max Pemsel, suspected he may have poisoned himself. The senior regimental commander, SS-Standartenführer Thomas Müller, briefly took command of the 9th SS. To make matters worse, Rundstedt and Rommel were en route to see Hitler. On his own, Hausser, with II SS Panzer Corps, organised the counterattack using the 9th SS.

The western flank of the British corridor was the weakest point and the ridge that rose out past Rauray to Cheux offered a sheltered approach for the massing panzers. The division’s SS-Panzergrenadier Regiments 20 and 19 were to be supported by I and II Abteilung of SS-Panzer Regiment 9 respectively. Unfortunately SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 20, sheltering in the woods north of Noyers prior to attacking Cheux, was caught by the RAF.

Late in the afternoon of the 29th, III Abteilung, equipped with armoured half-tracks of SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 20, had assembled for the attack together with Panther tanks from the panzer regiment. Preparing for action, it was not entrenched beneath the trees when about 100 Lancaster bombers struck. A huge pall of dust covered the area and it seemed certain that the battalion had been blown to smithereens; however, only about twenty men were killed and by the evening eighty per cent of the armoured vehicles, having been dug out, were operational again. The bombing also caught the panzer battalion but it pressed on to its assembly area.

The counterattack was scheduled for 29 June at 0700 with the 9th SS on the left of the Odon, but the attacks by the RAF delayed the preparations until 1430. In an additional stroke of bad luck, an officer from 9th SS with the plans for the coming attack was out early, reconnoitring the routes to Cheux, when he was captured.

The first group of SS captured Grainville-sur-Odon and the second group also reached Cheux, but everywhere else the British and Canadians held fast. Several flame-throwing tanks also assisted with the assault on Le Valtru, but although the panzers overran the British infantry, the latter held firm.

The 9th SS, who were used to the weak Russian air force and uncoordinated Russian artillery fire, found the resilience and firepower of the British forces something of a shock. The attack ground to a halt under a deluge of Allied air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire. Elsewhere, in the face of Allied firepower, the 10th SS got as far as Esquay and Gavrus on the southern edge of the corridor. The rest of the division was strung out along the road through Villers-Bocage.

Walter Harzer, then 1a (or Chief Operations Staff Officer) of the 9th SS, observed:

As it was, our counter-offensive broke down under air attack and artillery fire, particularly the heavy guns of the battleships. They were devastating. When one of those shells dropped near a Panther, the 56-ton tank was blown over on its side, just from the blast. It was these broadsides from the warships, more than the defensive fighting of the enemy’s troops, which halted our division’s Panzer Regiment.

During the fighting against the Epsom salient the 9th SS suffered 1,145 casualties and lost sixteen Panzer IVs, six Panthers and ten StuG IIIs. Over the next few days the division’s StuGs accounted for forty-nine enemy tanks, while its Panzer IVs and Panthers claimed another thirteen.

In July, SS-Brigadeführer Sylvester Stadler took command of the 9th SS, having previously commanded Panzergrenadier Regiment Der Führer of the 2nd SS Panzer Division. It was units of this regiment, under SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Diekmann, which conducted the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane during the division’s march northward to Normandy. Stadler was an experienced Eastern Front veteran, having gained the Knight’s Cross for his part in the capture of Kharkov in 1943. He had then gained the Oak Leaves after his involvement in the massive Battle of Kursk. Thomas Müller, who had been acting commander of the 9th SS, subsequently assumed command of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division for a brief period in September, after SS-Oberführer Eduard Deisenhofer was wounded.

According to most sources Stadler replaced Müller on the 10th, however they may have been a handover period. Stadler recalls:

My assumption of command of the Division was accomplished by 0800 on 3rd July 1944. During the preceding night, the last elements of SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 19 had been pulled out of the main line of resistance (MLR) north of Esquay and replaced by the 10th SS Panzer Division. The combat units of the Division were assembled in the area of Maizet-Vacognes-Montigny-Division Command Post at Le Mesnil – so that they could be used as tactical reserves of the II SS Panzer Corps right behind the MLR and, if necessary, launch counterattacks.

For this purpose, the Division was to investigate the possibilities of commitment in the sectors of the 10th SS Panzer Division and the 277th Infantry Division, determine routes of approach, and move the Artillery Regiment into such a position that it could support counterattacks in any direction and at anytime.

Battle for Hill 112

Stadler quickly found his division being thrown into action and recalled the details of the battle at some length:

Within one hour after the Division had been taken over, orders for a counterattack on Maltot, Eterville and on Baron by way of Hill 112, were received from the Corps by telephone, and a short time later confirmed in writing. So the attack on Baron was to be launched at 2000 and that on Eterville at 1200. Although the time was very short, the execution of this task was still possible thanks to the fact that the SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 20 was not too far away and that a tank abteilung, together with the artillery, could support the operation from the positions they were in at the time. The units just mentioned received their orders accordingly by telephone and, after hasty assembly into position, were able to launch the counterattack at about 1300. Around Maltot a vigorous battle developed, in which reorganized elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division, which had been forced back early that morning from Eterville and Maltot – participated, on our side.

At about 1500, Maltot was again in our hands. The enemy answered with increased air activity and concentrated very strong artillery fire on Maltot. In these circumstances, it was out of the question to continue the counterattack on Eterville by daylight, in spite of the support given by the entire Corps Artillery, which, however, consisted only of a few sudden concentrations. Therefore the Division ordered an attack on Baron to be launched at 2000, together with other elements. In the meantime, the Command Post (CP) had been transferred to the group of farmhouses, one kilometre northwest of Grimbosq. The advanced Division CP was located in the thicket one kilometre northwest of Bully [east of Esquay and Maltot].

Things did not run smoothly as the Allies did all they could to impede the massing of the 9th SS; in addition, its position was compromised by the loss of Hill 112. The latter was to become the scene of heavy casualties for both sides. Stadler discovered flexibility was an increasing prerequisite of such operations:

Concentration of the Division was greatly impeded and delayed by serious traffic jams on roads, harassing fire from the enemy artillery directed on villages along the routes of advance, and on road junctions, as well as by the strong enemy air activity. In addition to that, the enemy managed at about 1800 to capture height 112, which dominated the entire Corps sector. Thereupon the mission assigned to the Division was altered by the Corps, to the effect that only height 112, and later Eterville, had to be recaptured.

Having changed the combat plan accordingly, the counterattack was now launched at about 2100, (line of departure time). In spite of the extremely strong enemy artillery fire, our forces advanced toward Eterville and those operating in the area between Eterville and height 112, made good progress. Eterville was recaptured toward 0100. However, it was impossible to get near height 112 because of the concentrated artillery fire maintained for hours by all the enemy’s heavy weapons. It was not until daybreak that the wooded strip of land – in other words, the southern edge of the plateau on this height could be taken. Thus the gap torn open in the MLR on the preceding day had been closed again and the mission assigned to the Division accomplished. Height 112 was no longer defended in the same way as before, i.e. on the northern edge of the plateau; the Division ordered the construction of a new MLR in the southern part of the plateau, near the northern edge of the wooded strip of land, continuing toward the west, a line which was not visible to the enemy.

The British quickly contested the 9th SS successes at Eterville and Hill 112 on the 4th, giving the division no respite from the bloodletting. The panzers managed to knock out a number of British tanks, for little loss, but the panzergrenadiers suffered from the enemy’s artillery. Stadler recalled, perhaps with some pride:

In the course of the forenoon the enemy, in turn, resumed his attacks and managed to take Eterville once again, whereas his attacks on height 112 were repelled with considerable losses. A counterattack launched immediately on Eterville succeeded and, by noon, the village was again in our hands. An extremely heavy and fluctuating battle ensued afterwards for the ruins of Eterville, which place changed hands repeatedly until, finally, it was firmly in our possession late in the evening of 4 July 1944. The losses suffered during these engagements in the rocky terrain offering almost no cover, were considerable (Grenadiers about 10%), and mainly caused, of course, by the excessively strong artillery fire, which could be countered by next to nothing from our side, since only some 700 rounds of ammunition were available for the entire attack on 4 July. Nevertheless, the panzer Abteilung operating near Eterville managed to destroy twelve–fourteen enemy vehicles, whereas they lost only two tanks. Thus, it could be figured out that the enemy losses were at least as high as ours.

During the night of 4/5 July the division was relieved on the eastern sector by elements of the 12th SS and on the western sector by the 10th SS. The divisional forces were reassembled in almost the same area as on 3 July. They were assigned the task of constructing prepared positions in the rear in the line along the course of a stream and along the heights south of it, and occupying the line with weak forces.

The Panzer Pioneer Abteilung was put in charge of the construction of this position, assisted by an abteilung from each of the SS-Panzergrenadier Regiments. The Artillery Regiment was then ordered to move into position to provide covering ire for the entire Corps sector. In the meantime the rest of the division was instructed to refit and rest up as best they could.

The British renewed their attacks on 6 July this time along the road running from Caen to Noyers. To help the 277th Infantry Division recapture Noyers, the 9th SS despatched its armoured reconnaissance battalion. The latter successfully retook the town and remained supporting the 277th.

The panzers’ regimental HQ was established at Bully, about two and a half miles (4km) east of Point 112, between Caen and Evrecy, on 12 July. When the British attacked between Gavrus and Noyers-Bocage four days later, the division’s tanks were undergoing maintenance. However, the 227th was ordered to counterattack, supported by the 9th SS. About twenty panzers were mustered to the right of Point 113 north of Evrecy, but the British put down smoke and they were forced to withdraw. While Point 113 remained unoccupied, the panzers took Bougy and reached Gavrus, moving up the Orne valley. During the various engagements they knocked out a total of forty tanks, including eighteen around Bougy and eight at Point 113, for the loss of just five panzers. Sylvester Stadler recalled the battle:

A serious crisis occurred only once on the occasion of a concentrated attack carried out by British armoured troops with some forty to fifty tanks late in the evening of 16 or 17 July1944, on Height 113. All day, the enemy had pounded the hill with undiminished intensity and covered it with a smokescreen. Sometimes, the smoke was so dense that the majority of the troops felt sick and therefore believed that the enemy was using gas. An immediate investigation proved that this was incorrect. Besides the physical discomfort caused by this heavy smoke, the visibility was very bad, the result of which was that the troops became rather nervous and overstrained, as it was impossible to see what was going on ahead of the positions. With the duration of the smoke-shell firing, the situation naturally grew worse and worse. On the occasion concerned, the firing was maintained all day.

Stadler remembered the sudden British armed assault which came late in the day and threatened to overwhelm his men. The 9th SS though were quick witted and swiftly turned the tables on their attackers as their commander noted:

At about 2100, enemy forces all of a sudden appeared with tanks in the MLR and managed to break through on a width of 400-500 meters just east of Height 113. The Grenadiers committed on that part of the front (about fifty to sixty men) were all taken prisoner. Our own tanks, a battalion of about fifteen to twenty tanks, were located on the rear slope of the hill and noticed the enemy only at the very last moment, either on account of the dense smoke, or perhaps owing to the swift and surprising advance of his forces. During the ensuing tank battle, fifteen enemy tanks were destroyed with no losses at all on our side. Thereupon, the enemy quickly withdrew to his original position. At the same time, a smaller group advanced along the lane from Gavrus to Evrecy under cover of smoke, and darkness, which in the meantime had fallen. They managed to break through the forward elements, but then, also, ran right into our tanks on the rear slope, which overwhelmed them after a very short fire duel, or took them prisoner (two tanks and about twenty men).

By the 17th, the exhausted division could muster thirteen Panzer IVs, twenty-five Panthers and fifteen assault guns, while the infantry amounted to little more than a regiment. The 9th SS was called back from the left flank of the 10th SS at the height of the Goodwood battle and positioned in the Orne valley, guarding the southern suburbs of Caen. Over the next few days the 9th SS helped the 1st SS defeat Montgomery’s Goodwood armoured offensive. Notably, on 18 July the division captured sixty-seven tanks, fifty-six of which were destroyed, the rest still running.

The 10th SS and the 272nd Infantry Division were instructed to retake St Martin, St André and May-sur-Orne east of the river and south of Caen on the 22nd, with support from the 9th SS. However, the Panthers of the 9th SS were still engaged around Bougy and could only be freed up slowly. Some were assigned to two companies of the 10th SS while the rest were to attack south of May. Few of the Panthers materialised except for those directed to take the high ground northeast of May.

Two of the division’s Panthers led forward a panzergrenadier battalion. They surprised the British but, lacking armoured reinforcements, the infantry had to attack May-sur-Orne unsupported. The rest of the panzer battalion did not arrive until about midday and ran into heavy anti-tank gunfire. Three were caught broadside on and knocked out and the order was given to withdraw under a smoke screen. By the end of the day, nine of the division’s twenty-four Panthers were out of action, but the key villages were secured. The division remained stalled north of Fontenay at Point 88.

Mont Pinçon

As Operation Spring got under way against the 1st SS on 25 July, the 9th SS was also hit hard by Canadian troops. When the enemy made a new large-scale attack in the sector of the 272nd Infantry Division and managed to achieve a deep penetration, the 9th SS launched a concentrated counterattack east of the Orne, which was successful and prevented a breakthrough by the Canadians. By the evening of the 25th, the 9th SS was able to muster eighteen Panzer IVs, eighteen Panthers and eleven assault guns; but, with their maintenance teams working full out, three days later the total stood at twenty-two Panzer IVs, twenty Panthers and twenty-two assault guns.

To restore the line, the division’s panzer regiment and 102 SS Battalion’s Tigers rolled forward on the 28th, inflicting heavy losses on the attacking tanks and stopping the Canadians in their tracks. At the end of July, General Eberbach, convinced that the British were attempting a big breakthrough, deployed the 9th SS into the woods west of Bretteville-sur-Laize and the 10th SS to Bretteville.

On 30 July, Montgomery launched Operation Bluecoat southwards towards Vire and Mont Pinçon, with the battered 7th, 11th and Guards Armoured Divisions in the lead. II SS Panzer Corps was now diverted to block this move that punched a hole in the thinly-held sector of the German line. By the 31st, the 9th SS had lost thirteen Panzer IVs, twenty Panthers, fourteen StuG IIIs, four armoured half-tracks, fifty-two trucks and six prime movers.

The 9th SS remained southwest of Caen until early August, when it moved northeast of Vire. British tanks got to within five miles (8km) of the town, the very heart of 7th Army’s resistance against the Americans. Wanting to counterattack against the Americans, who were considered inferior fighters, the Germans first had to secure Mont Pinçon against the British to control the network of roads westwards. The division was relieved by1st SS on 1 August and that night a kampfgruppe under Otto Meyer, including seventeen panzers and assault guns, moved west to take up positions on a line from Arclais to Montchauvet and Montchamp, to the west of Mont Pinçon and between Villers-Bocage and Vire. RAF Typhoons soon located the SS tank columns in the afternoon of the 2nd, launching 923 sorties, destroying thirteen tanks and seventy-six trucks, and holding up the deployment of the German panzers for most of the day.

The advance guard of the 9th SS Panzer kampfgruppe managed to engage the 11th Armoured Division near le Beny-Bocage on the afternoon of the 2nd, knocking out five Cromwells in the process. They fought furiously to regain the Périers Ridge and the bridge over the Souleuvre. The following day, the 9th SS successfully drove the British from Plesles, but the 11th Armoured Division countered their efforts at Périers.

The 9th then held the 15th (Scottish) Division with dug-in tanks, 8.8cm guns and Nebelwerfer rocket launchers. Those troops at Montchauvet were embroiled in heavy fighting round Point 170 and, although surrounded, managed to escape. On the 4 August, the 9th SS attempted to cut off the British breakthrough at Chênedollé, knocking out thirty-nine Allied tanks in the process. Otto Meyer, near Estry with thirty-two panzers and assault guns, had to block the road northwest of Chênedollé and went over to the defensive. From 11-12 August the division claimed another twenty-two enemy tanks in the unrelenting fighting.

Final days

The division was redeployed on the 13th to the Putanges area, where they were vulnerable. They then moved to the Vimoutiers area, having lost up to 5,000 casualties. The 12th SS commandeered some of their remaining tanks, but, along with the 2nd SS, the tired division attacked from outside the Falaise pocket to help some of those trapped escape.