Fighter Wing: A Guided Tour of an Air Force Combat Wing

FACING THE FUTURE

Americans take many things for granted: freedom, prosperity, baseball, and air supremacy. None are guaranteed. Freedom had to be seized and periodically must be defended, at home and abroad. Prosperity comes and goes, while the sentimentality accorded "the boys of summer" can prove misplaced during contract negotiations.

But air supremacy seems eternal. The Air Force likes to remind us that no American soldier has been subjected to enemy air attack since the Korean War, and even then it was extremely rare. In the three decades since the Vietnam "conflict," America has owned the sky, dominating a variety of enemies with precious little loss. In 2003, at the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there was no reason to doubt that America would continue dominating any airspace it chose.

And therein may lie the problem. The United States armed forces are no more immune to complacency than any other bureaucracy. Consequently, we need the devil's advocates who continue asking, "What price air supremacy?"

First, a definition of terms:

"Air superiority" and "air supremacy" are often used interchangeably, but they possess distinct meanings to airmen.

Air superiority is more common than outright supremacy, but the difference is more a matter of degree than of substance. Some practitioners refer to air superiority as domination of the sky over friendly territory. Superiority exists when friendly aircraft have dominated the enemy, forcing him on the defensive, but opposition still exists "without prohibitive interference." The United States enjoyed a high degree of air superiority in the Korean War and, ultimately, over North Vietnam.

More important, though, the air superiority achieved over North Korea and North Vietnam yielded undisputed U.S. and allied air supremacy in South Korea and South Vietnam. The ability of friendly attack aircraft, transports, and helicopters to operate unimpeded is the goal toward which air superiority strives.

Air supremacy is air superiority writ large. It exists when the opposing air defense force (not merely its aircraft) is wholly suppressed in its own area as well as ours. The opposition may still inflict occasional losses, but far too few to affect the outcome of the conflict. Air supremacy existed over Normandy, over Japan, throughout most of Southeast Asia, and was quickly gained in Desert Storm. In fact, Coalition supremacy was never in doubt in "the sandbox." Nor was it even contested during Operation Iraqi Freedom, when, for the first time in history, more allied jet losses were attributed to friendly fire than enemy action.

Since the 1990s there has also been reference to "air dominance," which extends beyond supremacy. Air dominance involves joint operations which rule the enemy's ground territory as well as his airspace. The conclusion of the 2003 Iraq War is a classic example: We finally did it right and parked the Bradleys in downtown Baghdad.

In its simplest form, air supremacy exists when enemy tank drivers run over their own people while operating with their eyes on the sky instead of on the road.

Whatever the definitions, the 366th Fighter Wing is thoroughly familiar with air superiority and air supremacy.

A WING IN TRANSITION

The 366th has a long history of aerial combat. In World War II it ranked eighth among twenty fighter and recon groups in the Ninth Air Force, with 103 German planes shot down. In Vietnam the Danang Gunfighters notched twenty MiG kills. But by far the greatest contribution the 366th has provided in nearly sixty years has been in the air-to-ground role. "Mud movers" seldom make much press, but they are beloved of infantrymen.

Since 1943 the wing has flown an awesome variety of aircraft: at least nine fighters (both P and F), two bombers, and its own tankers. From Thunderbolts to Phantoms to Stratofortresses and Stratotankers, the 366th has adapted itself to changing equipment and missions. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect that the 366th eventually will operate F/A-22s and F-35s.

For ten years the 366th was the flagship of the Air Force's expeditionary concept. In 1991 it was redesignated the 366th Wing (no longer specifically Fighter) with a variety of attached units, including the 34th Bomb Squadron with B-1Bs, 22nd Air Refueling Squadron KC-135Rs, and EF-111A Ravens. The Air Force's battle laboratory focused on Mountain Home in 1997, laying extra emphasis on the quick deployment of a composite wing containing its own fighters, bombers, tankers, and support units.

But the force structure began changing: the Ravens left service in 1993, leaving the wing dependent on Navy and Marine jammers when deployed. Eventually the Lancers and Stratotankers were removed in 2002. The 389th Fighter Squadron's F-16Cs also departed. In September 2002, the 366th once again was a Tactical Fighter Wing, no longer in the expeditionary business but still highly capable with F-15Cs and — Ds in the 390th Wild Boars and Strike Eagles in the 391st Bold Tigers.

If the 366th's history proves anything, it is the constant change in force structure and mission emphasis. Therefore, we wonder where the next decade will take us. How will those developments affect the aircrews, maintainers, and planners of the 366th in the 21st century?

MILLENNIUM PLANNING

The Air Force began planning for the post-millennium era with a doctrinal study titled Global Reach-Global Power. But it became dated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, forcing the service to begin a year-and-a-half survey to determine the force structure through 2025.

The result was Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force. Like previous studies, it focused on the best means of achieving and maintaining the ability to deter, fight, and win future conflicts in air and space. Global Engagement was linked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff document titled Joint Vision 2010. While all services acknowledge the increasing reliance on mutual support and joint war fighting, the Air Force insists, "it embodies our belief that in the 21st Century, the strategic instrument of choice will be air and space power."

The Pentagon loves buzzwords and key phrases, and Global Engagement is no exception. Nor was Joint Vision 2010. The latter stressed a range of military operations under the umbrella of "full spectrum dominance." It includes joint operations featuring concepts such as Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics. It also realizes the increasing importance of superior intelligence in the information age: "the ability to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information while denying an adversary's ability to do the same." While probably few aircrews of the Wild Boars or Bold Tigers are thinking of such things when they tuck their gear in the well, the concepts govern tactical missions and capabilities.

CORE COMPETENCIES

The Air Force deals in what it calls "core competencies," those features that distinguish the aerospace mission. They include Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Global Attack, Air and Space Superiority, Information Superiority, and Agile Combat Support.

Most of the core competencies are self-evident. Rapid Global Mobility refers to aviation's inherent advantage of speed and range. In addition to deploying tactical units almost anywhere on earth in a matter of days, the Air Force can also transport Army or Marine Corps forces to a war theater or trouble spot. The problem, of course, tends to be bases — as the Tailhook Navy likes to remind Congress during appropriation hearings. Aircraft carriers represent four and a half acres of sovereign territory that moves at 30 knots without needing to play "Mother, may I?" with wavering allies, as we saw in Turkey during "Iraqi Freedom." On the other hand, due to mismanagement in the first Bush Administration, the Navy found itself out of the deep strike mission unless Air Force tankers were available. Jointness came on forced wings, but it came regardless.

Precision Engagement also speaks for itself. The "precision revolution" of the 1990s became standard television fare during Desert Storm, but since then the statistics have flip-flopped. During Desert Storm only about 10 % of the ordnance dropped were Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). When America retaliated for 9/11 in Afghanistan, almost 90 % of aviation munitions were laser or GPS guided. In some instances, the published "miss distance" of certain weapons was smaller than a typical target.

But precision has other components as well. Intelligence is part of the equation, with more and more "real time" targeting data from a variety of sources. Some aspects are technical, such as satellite coverage, unmanned drones, or radio intercepts. Others are the most basic, "Humint" in the trade, referring to human intelligence sources. One man (or woman) on the ground with an unobstructed view of the "subject" and a cell phone uplink can help put PGMs on target PDQ.

Global Attack is exactly what it says: the ability to strike almost anywhere on the planet's surface. Whether it's true or not, the accusation has been made that some airpower zealots insist that the United States can rule the world from Omaha. Certainly the ability to deploy intercontinentally has been demonstrated more than once, since the limiting factor in today's Air Force is not aircraft or weapons, but aircrew fatigue. It's one response to the never-ending one-upmanship with the Navy: if it's politically inconvenient for an ally to permit USAF basing, then all the Air Force needs is ample tankers to support B-1s or B-2s from ConUS to reach the target. The problem is, of course, a twelve-hour cycle time, which tends to limit sorties. For the 366th and other fighter wings, such extreme reach is possible but impractical under most circumstances.

Air and Space Superiority now go hand in glove. They are closely related to Information Superiority, since intelligence and targeting are inextricably mixed. In fact, it has been asserted that in reality America no longer has the U.S. Air Force but the U.S. Air and Space Force. Satellites for reconnaissance and communications have become invaluable, and their importance is in no danger of diminishing. Neither are recon drones such as the Predator, which may even take over part of the SEAD mission in suppressing enemy air defenses.

Agile Combat Support addresses the ability to respond quickly and flexibly to specific goals. Joint operations with the Army, Navy, and allied forces figure in the equation, employing varied assets to meet assigned tasks with responsiveness rather than massive logistics. "Reach back" is the operative buzzword, deploying from the continental United States more often than from overseas bases, which are expensive to maintain.

So much for the doctrinal aspects. What about the hardware of the future?

NEW TOOLS FOR OLD MISSIONS

The phrase is "block obsolescence." In 2003, the U.S. Air Force's inventory was beginning to show its age. The average airframe was twenty-three years old: 1980 construction. Like all statistics, this is misleading — it reflects forty-year-old B-52s and last year's F-16s. Increasingly, success in air combat depends on aircraft systems — mainly electronics — rather than on the airplanes themselves, but, especially in the fighter world, high time airframes present problems. With increasing stress and its attendant reduction in remaining fatigue life, combat aircraft just plain wear out. Though the Air Force's "howgozit" monitoring of critical airframe parts (especially wing spars) can track the trends, aircrews deserve a break. The last F-15Cs were built in 1988, and if an Eagle has a theoretical service life of 1,800 hours remaining, a fudge factor is needed to afford some velvet. That aircraft may well go the full 1,800 hours with no serious trouble. Or it may come apart prematurely. The solution is to replace the critical components or buy a new airplane. Either way, the taxpayer gets tagged again for an airframe or systems upgrade.

Systems: aye, there's the rub. Many aircraft built in the 1970s and 1980s lack compatibility with current avionics. For instance, the A-10 "Warthog" was built with an electrical system incapable of handling state-of-the-art radar and computers. The problem is aggravated by the growing demands and diminishing assets of the post-Cold War military.

ADVENT OF THE RAPTOR

The FA-22 is bound to become a landmark aircraft, and not only for its technological sophistication. At this writing, the Raptor and its stablemate, the F-35, could well be the last manned fighters in Air Force history.

As they say in Hollywood, lapse-dissolve. Fade to day. The Raptor, proposed in 1986 with a 1994 operational date, is now expected to enter service in 2005, for a nineteen-year development cycle. The Air Force Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35A, comes close at eighteen years between 1993 and the expected IOC of 2011.

Stealth does amazing things to development times, most of them bad. For instance, depending on how they're reckoned, the design to operational period for recent jet fighters has been seven to eight years. The landmark F-15 took longer, 1965 to 1976, but the F-16 and Navy FA-18 both ran around seven. Lockheed's storied Skunk Works produced the F-117 Nighthawk in eight (1975-83).

With two Pratt & Whitney F-119s producing 35,000 pounds of thrust in a 30,000-pound airframe, the Raptor is an aerial drag racer, if necessary. The thrust-weight ratio combined with thrust vectoring nozzles presents an awesome package: fast, agile, stealthy, and lethal. Additionally, high angle of attack profiles enable the FA-22 pilot to point and shoot in almost any flight regime.

The Raptor's talons are two Sidewinders, six AMRAAM, and a 20mm Gatling with 480 rounds. The FA-22 also will (eventually) deliver two precision bombs, though how often that option will be employed remains to be seen. For better or worse, the Air Force decided that the Raptor needed the capability in order to convince Congress to continue funding the program.

The FA-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter constitute two of the Pentagon's most expensive programs. The Raptor was the last American fighter designed during the Cold War, and consequently the cost was extraordinarily high. The 2004 budget allocated $226.5 billion to JSF and $69.7 billion for the FA-22; the Navy's Virginia Class submarine joins them in the top three. The funding represented 2,866 JSFs and 295 FA-22s, for an average program cost of $236 million per Raptor and $79 million per JSF, the latter including models for three services. Raptor flyaway cost (excluding program "start-up" plus R&D) is likely in the $90 million range. However, the numbers keep changing, sometimes almost monthly.

RAPTOR ORIGINS

In 1985 the Air Force issued a request for proposal for the next-generation Advanced Tactical Fighter. Pratt & Whitney's YF-119 already had been identified as the likely engine, and P&W began producing the first parts that year. Meanwhile, stealth requirements were firmed up with Lockheed, Boeing, and General Dynamics signing a team memorandum.

Two years later the original YF-22 was declared unacceptable for a variety of technical and engineering reasons, and a new design was selected, leading to the final configuration. From that point the new fighter progressed well, and it was unveiled at Palmdale, California, in August 1990. Christened Raptor, it was flown by test pilot Dave Ferguson the next month and demonstrated supersonic cruise in November. By year-end, thrust vectoring and Mach 2 performance had been demonstrated. Shortly thereafter, an extensive wind tunnel program of nearly 17,000 hours began.

While technical progress met successive milestones, the Raptor's cost came under the budget axe. In early 1994 the "buy" was sliced from 648 to 422. Later reductions further chopped the type's acquisition process.

The Raptor also drew close attention abroad. In January 1999 the MiG consortium announced its new design, tentatively called Project 1.42. The Russians claimed that Project 1.42 would outperform the FA-22, when part of the Raptor's sales appeal was its technological superiority over anything flying. The Russian project, which became the MiG-35, featured many Raptor capabilities, including stealth and thrust vectoring, but was never built: it was unaffordable. Nevertheless, the Raptor must contend with its potential opponents as well as those currently flying around the world.

As with any advanced aircraft, the Raptor program has experienced its full share of embarrassments.

In the summer of 2002 another reduction was proposed, from 295 to 180 aircraft in comparison to the 750 previously planned. By then, some $26 billion of a budgeted $69 billion had already been spent. Yearly acquisition was ten Raptors in 2002 and twenty-three more (costing $4.6 billion) in 2003. In November 2002 the Air Force conceded an overrun of up to $690 million in engineering, manufacturing, and development costs, adding that neither technology nor performance figured in the equation. The overruns led to "replacement" of three senior overseers (people are not "fired" anymore) and the T&E folks were reprimanded for indulging in tactics development before the test program was completed.

As of 2003, Lockheed Martin had $43 billion to produce some 276 Raptors through 2013. However, the Air Force wants 381 for a minimum of ten air expeditionary squadrons with twenty-four planes each, with 105 attrition and force expansion airframes. Full-rate production is expected to reach thirty-six per year, with a goal of $75 million per Raptor. With a purchase of 760 or so FA-22s, the Air Force could field two squadrons per wing. First delivery is still expected in 2004, with the first squadron operational in 2005.

Later-production FA-22s are expected to carry small diameter bombs (SDBs) from 2007, a relatively simple process of moving some internal plumbing.

Discussion of the FB-22 fighter-bomber version continues, but much remains speculative. Structural changes over the FA version would include a larger wing, bigger bomb bay, and two-seat cockpit. Foreign sales appear to be authorized, and at least one nation has expressed serious interest. With its multiple sensors, additional possible uses of the FB include reconnaissance and ELINT gathering as well as defense suppression.

JSF TO F-35

The entire issue of force reduction—"downsizing" or "right sizing" became the buzzwords — is a separate issue, but clearly the first Bush and both Clinton administrations got it wrong. The professional optimists in Washington committed an old error: They made the wrong assumption. They assumed that with the demise of the Soviet Union, the need for a large military establishment would vanish. Quite the contrary: In the decade following Desert Storm, the Air Force was tasked with 450 % more missions with less than half of its previous assets. Few people anticipated the eruption of brush fires all over the planet: Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan, not to mention Iraq.

Consequently, bean counters and analysts began casting about for another option. They found it in the Joint Strike Fighter: a sort of one-size-fits-all warplane equipped to perform a variety of seemingly contradictory missions. JSFs became a growth industry.

The concept was not new. In the early 1960s the Kennedy administration pushed the multi-service TFX, the experimental fighter that would simultaneously serve the Air Force and Navy. It became the signature program of Kennedy's defense secretary, Robert Strange McNamara, previously a Ford executive. The F-111 struggled through an extraordinarily difficult gestation, earning the sobriquet "The Flying Edsel." From the Navy viewpoint, it was indeed a lemon: The B model proved too difficult to operate from aircraft carriers, with marginal landing characteristics. The Navy's top flying admiral, Tom Connolly, risked his career by undertaking a dangerous enterprise: he told Congress the truth, stating "There isn't enough thrust in Christendom to make that airplane into a fighter." The denizens of Camelot were furious. The Navy was grateful. A decade later it named the F-14 the Tomcat.

Eventually, the Air Force took a hard look at the F-111A. It was reworked and committed to combat in Vietnam with some success. Though technically a fighter bomber (FB-111), it was dedicated to a strike role and eventually became a countermeasures platform in the EF-111A "Raven" configuration. Australia became the only foreign user, with — C and — G models.

MEANWHILE, the best example of a joint-service aircraft had already proven itself: McDonnell Douglas's long-lived, enormously versatile F-4 Phantom. Originally a Navy design, it was also flown by the Marine Corps and became an Air Force icon. Nearly a dozen other nations also became "Phantom Pflyers."

Therefore, the JSF concept had some appeal, especially its multi-mission capability and lower cost. Two industry teams were awarded development contracts: Boeing and Lockheed Martin. It was touted as a head-to-head shootout; a financial dogfight with the winner taking home the biggest defense contract yet. Boeing's X-32 and LM's X-35 both had to meet design specifications, but were free to interpret the best approach.

It was a daunting task: meeting the needs not only of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, but of the British Royal Navy as well. The latter two organizations required a short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) capability to replace the aging Harrier and Sea Harrier. Consequently, the design teams opted for a modular approach in three iterations: a strictly land-based (Air Force) version, a conventional carrier aircraft (Navy), and the STOVL machine (Marines and Brits). The program called for at least 70 % commonality of airframe parts with the same basic engine. Both teams succeeded: Lockheed Martin's design was selected.

The USAF version is the F-35A. And, incidentally, don't ask why the American fighter series jumped from FA-18 to F-35, even discounting Northrop's dead-end F-20 Tigershark (a sad story, deserving the thanks of every taxpayer for Northrop's venture capital effort). Purists were justifiably upset, just as they were when the F-117 designation was chosen. The "stealth fighter" is no fighter at all — it cannot carry air-to-air weapons, but there is no requirement for consistency or logic in the U.S. government.

The best explanation available is from an industry source: "During the JSF down-select announcement on October 26, 2001, Air Force Secretary Roche referred to the JSF as the 'F-35'… and sort of looked around the room for confirmation. A few months later the government made F-35 the official designator!"

Beltway insiders compare the F-35 moniker with Lyndon Johnson's transposition of the designators in the RS-71 Blackbird. After Johnson referred to it as the SR-71 in a speech, the designation was changed in order to prevent a minor embarrassment to the commander in chief.

Meanwhile, students of aircraft nomenclature note that the JSF has a pure fighter designator (F-35), while the original Raptors (FA-22s) have no strike capability. "Go figure" is an oft-heard phrase.

Anyway, the Air Force wanted to streamline its tactical air wings, replacing existing types with JSFs. Consequently, the F-35A is slated to take the slots on the ramp currently occupied by A-10s and F-16s, beginning in 2011. The long-range goal was for "migration" (another Pentagon buzzword) to an all stealth fighter force around 2025.

ONE SIZE FITS ALL?

The Joint Strike Fighter became the closest thing to a one-size-fits-all warplane. In addition to the Air Force variant, the Marine version is an F-35B with 600 some aircraft to replace Harriers, as well as F/A-18C and — D Hornets. The Bravo model JSF will have the vertical and short takeoff capability of the Harrier, which also suits the British Royal Navy requirement.

The U.S. Navy F-35C differs in having catapult fittings and a tailhook plus larger wing and horizontal tail surfaces. The airframe is beefier to withstand the high sink-rate shock of carrier landings. The Navy buy is expected to run to 480 to relieve the early model Hornets. F/A-18E and — F (two-seat) Super Hornets are a growth industry and will be around well into this century. The naval JSF variants are expected to reach squadrons beginning in 2011.

Thus, the JSF is intended to replace most of a generation of current tactical jets: Warthogs, Falcons, Harriers, and the older Hornets.

Simply building the most efficient aircraft was not the be-all and end-all of the JSF contract. Maintainability figured heavily in the equation, as sortie generation rates were an important part of the concept. So were survivability and lethality, though the required stealth element was a given, as was the variety of ordnance required. Both competitors were capable of a "first look, first pass" kill of a variety of targets with current and planned ordnance. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were going to be a factor in JSF regardless of the version chosen.

According to industry reports, some 250 officials were involved in making the selection. That's a committee by any standard, and everybody knows what committees are like. Many of them tend to analyze, cuss, and discuss a subject to tears. But JSF was different. Rather than the traditional fly-off, the Boeing and Lockheed Martin prototypes were evaluated not head to head, but side by side. At a 2002 briefing a manager said, "They were evaluated not against each other but in comparison to how well they fit the requirement."

Experienced test pilots in the audience shifted in their seats, muttered to themselves, and essentially said, "Batguano." The explanation sounded like doublespeak, and in a sense it was. Whether the X-32 and X-35 flew against each other or were rated separately, it was still a competition. The winner was the one that looked most promising in the context of the criteria.

At least that was the official view. Some insiders postulated that there wasn't enough technical or operational difference between the two designs, so the contract went to the company with greater need. If so, that was LM, since Boeing had sold the Super Hornet and was doing well in other areas, including its acquisition of McDonnell Douglas (nee Hughes) Helicopters.

Or perhaps there was another factor at work. Two military pilots known to the author have stated, "Man, I'm not gonna fly anything as ugly as the Boeing JSF!"

WANTED: ONE BOMB TRUCK

One phrase often heard in JSF briefings during the 90s was "bomb truck." The services began sorely missing aircraft such as the Phantom and Grumman's veteran A-6 Intruder which could carry significant payloads long distances. The Navy was especially hurt by the first Bush administration's mismanaged A-12 Avenger II, intended to replace the A-6 in carrier air wings. The Intruder could carry up to twenty-eight 500-pound bombs with an unrefueled tactical radius of 200 miles. However, with one-fifth the external drag, the same Intruder could take four half ton Mk-84s some 450 miles from the carrier. But that wasn't all. Because KA-6Ds had provided most of the carriers' tankers, Navy battle groups became dependent upon the Air Force for tanking, and radius was limited to the Hornet's 300 miles. The capability tail was wagging the mission dog.

Therefore, nearly everybody in the TacAir business was interested in a next-generation bomb truck.

The problem with merely counting bomb racks is that it ignores the technological revolution of the 1990s. During Desert Storm, precision-guided munitions received a hugely disproportionate share of the ink, as PGMs accounted for barely 10 % of the tonnage dropped in Kuwait and Iraq. A decade later the numbers had nearly reversed: reportedly PGMs accounted for as much as 70 % of the ordnance used against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan during 2001-02, and the trend continued during the invasion of Iraq.

As one Air Force officer explained, "We used to talk about the number of aircraft needed to destroy a target. Now we talk about the number of targets per aircraft." One "fighter jet" with four PGMs aboard could strike four targets with an awesome probability of a hit, and an excellent chance of destruction. Restrikes remained important, but the ordnance millennium had arrived.

Meanwhile, the number of F-35s available to conduct those missions remained negotiable. In 2002 the Air Force's JSF buy was reduced from 2,036 to 1,763 at a flyaway price of $37 million to $48 million. Meanwhile, another 1,239 JSFs are on order for U.S. and British naval models. Further changes undoubtedly will occur in the Byzantine labyrinth of the American weapons acquisition process.

Says one consultant, "Three years of working in the Pentagon showed me some really squirrelly things in the area of procurement. The system is hosed and nobody wants to fix it because they may lose something."

IN SEARCH OF AIR SUPREMACY

To return to our question: What price air supremacy? Especially when superiority is likely good enough? The plain fact is, in the thirty years since the Vietnam air war, Americans have rarely been engaged in aerial combat. Through Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, U.S. aircrews shot down 53 hostile aircraft; 46 of those by Air Force Eagles and Vipers. In that same period the Air Force lost no planes to enemy aircraft; the Navy lost one and maybe two. Meanwhile, the U.S. lost nearly 60 combat aircraft to SAMs and AAA.

Therefore, how do we justify gold-plated fighters such as the FA-22? The Air Force is 48-zip against Libya, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. We have not engaged a major air power since Korea, though we certainly had problems with the Vietnamese. But occasional heavy losses to Hanoi's MiGs was in no way due to inferior technology; quite the opposite. Some MiG killers insist that part of our problem was overreliance on gadgets at the expense of tactical stick and rudder skills. Top Gun, Red Flag, and other programs obviously solved those problems.

JSF is likely to live a double life in tactical squadrons. It can be employed early in an air campaign, relying on its stealthiness to attack targets within the air defense envelope while other birds (presumably B-2s) attack the hard targets at the core. When the SEAD phase has largely been completed, F-35s can then become bomb trucks, packing larger (nonstealthy) loadouts to other targets.

Close air support also is a JSF mission, though the Air Force remains institutionally indifferent. A-10s have been related heavily to the Guard and Reserve, which deploys frequently, as joint operators constantly laud the Warthog as the most valuable bird in the barn. The type is long out of production but the CAS mission just won't go away. Therefore, the F-35 will likely have a 25mm cannon for tank busting, though a 27mm was considered.

SUPER SAMS

With no comparable enemy fighter on the horizon, the FA-22 is likely to remain semi-inviolate in the air-to-air arena. Not so from the ground. We may be entering an era in which the initiative is swinging toward the defense for a change, with the major opposition to FA-22 and F-35 coming from ground-based air defenses, primarily new or upgraded surface-to-air missiles.

In recent years, Russian SAMs have progressed from the "single digit" types (SA-2 through 9) into the next-generation "double digit" variety. The SA-10 Grumble, with a range of nearly 50 miles, is optimized for use against tactical aircraft, and, with a Mach 6 sprint speed, very quick off the mark.

The SA-12 Gladiator already is available in A and B models. Similar to the Patriot concept, it's intended to knock down tactical ballistic missiles within 60 miles but is probably adaptable to aircraft.

The SA-20 Triumph represents a major leap: with a published range of nearly 250 miles, it has three times the reach of the still formidable SA-6, and is automatically operated with digital programming.

Furthermore, all three double-digit SAMs can be integrated into a combined missile and radar network affording low to high altitude coverage of a considerable area. The Russians, perennially cash-poor, have exported the missiles individually but also collectively as the S-300 system. A follow-on S-400 option is likely.

For clients farther down the scale, improved SA-2s through -9s have been upgraded with digital avionics, more sensors, and improved guidance packages. That translates into greater range and reliability, which means more lethality.

New-generation SAMs will constitute a far greater threat than enemy aircraft. SA-20 in the S-300 air defense system has the potential to destroy tankers, AWACSs, and even J-STARSs, or at least push them farther from the combat arena. The latter would result in a denigration of the almost unlimited aerial refueling and battle control that we have taken for granted for so long. The actual loss of a tanker, let alone an AWACS, probably would produce the same result.

HOW MUCH AIR-AIR?

Over North Vietnam, U.S. aircrews faced a paradox. Well, all right, a lot of paradoxes, including running orders which, distilled to their essence, said, "Don't lose but don't win." From the tactical perspective, we found ourselves frequently opposed by motivated young men who may never have driven an automobile but could do a creditable job in a MiG-21. The Air Force's premier combat leader in that theater, Colonel Robin Olds, was an ace in two airplanes during World War II but he envied his Vietnamese counterparts. "Hell," he insisted, "if I'd have been one of them I'd have got fifty of us!"

The Vietnamese quickly mastered the canned intercept: following GCI vectors to the point of a six o'clock low pop-up from the weeds, hosing a couple of Atolls at a formation of Yankee Air Pirates, and ducking back to paddy level to escape. One such loss per mission was enough to discomfit many Americans. Vietnamese hit-and-run tactics could not affect the outcome of the air war — and in fact did not — but they inflicted frequent losses on the strike package. Besides, it was humiliating to lose a $2 million aircraft flown by a professional with a master's degree to a former peasant.

The next enemy could plan to emulate the NVAF, though the God's-eye view provided by AWACSs and J-STARSs reduces the possibility. Nevertheless, it happened in Desert Storm when concern about blue on blue incidents allowed a red bandit to mix with the friendlies and bag a Navy F/A-18.

A lingering concern is adequate air-to-air training, as adversary units have been substantially reduced from the pinnacle of 1990. Things went so well in Desert Storm (34-0) that the Air Force did away with its aggressor squadrons entirely. The Navy and Marines retain dedicated "red bandits" but there are so few that civilian contractors now help to fill the gap. Meanwhile, other gaps remain…

THE ECM GAP

Electronics are here to stay: They have become at least as important as airframes. Electronic warfare (EW) goes hand in glove with electronic countermeasures (ECM), with an aviation heritage dating to the Second World War. Jamming hostile radars and communications has become even more important since Vietnam, as it not only helps prevent friendly losses but contributes to achieving the specific mission.

However, the U.S. Air Force got out of the ECM business after Desert Storm in 1991. With retirement of the EF-111 Raven, the blue suits were forced to rely on the Navy and Marine Corps to save their electronic bacon. EA-6Bs, or "Purple Prowlers," were integrated into operational plans (purple being the mixture of two shades of blue with Marine green).

It goes even beyond that. Air Force pilots and WSOs are flying Navy Prowlers today. But it does not solve the Air Force's long-term ECM problem.

The good news: Purple works. As usual, the operators sort things out and work together if for no other reason than their mission (and perhaps their existence) requires it. However, since the Navy and Marines decided to replace the long-serving Prowler with the EF-18G, the Air Force anticipates problems. The "Electric Hornet" lacks some of the Prowler's versatility, but at least it's a dedicated EW platform capable of operating with the strikers. However, some Air Force careerists are nervous about swabbies and jarheads becoming involved in USAF expeditionary wings. It looks bad, they admit behind closed doors, to remind budgeteers and congressmen that the USAF must rely on Brand X and Y for a crucial combat role: jamming enemy radars and radios.

The Air Force conducted a Prowler replacement study in 2002 and concluded that buying its own EF-18s was not an option. Certainly there was no historic reason for the decision, since the Air Force readily adopted the F-4 Phantom and A-7 Corsair II, both of which enjoyed long non-carrier careers. But, whatever its reason for passing on the Hornet, the Air Force decided to build new pods for the B-52H which will assume a stand-off jamming mission among its other tasks. The Air Force also intends to launch a hurry-up program for electronic warfare UAVs (Unmanned Air Vehicles) equipped with jammers, affording an "overhead" ECM capability to enhance the B-52. There have been references to a couple of "black" programs that may or may not work out, but in either case they will involve considerable expense.

We can expect the 366th Wing of the future to include both standoff and overhead jammers, with increasing reliance on UAVs. While some things may indeed last forever, not even B-52s fit that category!

The Air Force's current tactical aircraft have job security for the near term, and even beyond. Some 700 A-10s were delivered from 1976 to 1984, and though the latest Warthogs are nearly twenty years old, upgrades are planned on remaining aircraft beginning in 2004. The big, ungainly looking Thunderbolt remained beloved of infantrymen in both Iraq wars, and A-10 pilots insist there's nothing comparable on the horizon: not even the Joint Strike Fighter affords as much bang for the buck. Consequently, Warthogs could still be flying in 2028.

The F-15C/D is expected to retire in 2030, and though the air superiority Eagle has met only sporadic opposition since 1991, it's still the world standard. Meanwhile, the F-15E remains in low-rate production (as few as three per year), but the newest "mud eagles" are rated at 16,000 service hours: double the lifetime of earlier F-15s. Their dual-purpose mission ensures that they will be occupied well into the future.

Meanwhile, the F-16, still in production, remains a growth industry, especially for the export market. Even Poland is expected to obtain several dozen Falcons under generous terms.

FUTURE WARS

The past quarter century has tossed up some oddball wars: Britain versus Argentina; America versus Iraq (twice); and America versus Afghanistan, of all places. Even including the Balkan mini-wars of the 1990s, U.S. air supremacy never was remotely in doubt. Therefore, some pundits are inclined to wonder why we are spending (in the late Carl Sagan's words) billions and billions of dollars on gold-plated new flying machines when we do just fine with what we already have.

The official reason has to do with worldwide threats: We cannot assume that recent trends will continue indefinitely. After all, the last time an American plane was shot down by an enemy aircraft was 1991, and the previous air-air loss was 1972. One month's routine peacetime flying in the States is far more dangerous, statistically speaking. But there are still threats on the horizon, and some of them could represent serious opponents. We have to be ready to play in the big leagues, even if we practice in the minors.

The other reason, of course, is politics. Which is to say, money. Today, most large defense programs represent subcontractors in most states. Among 1,150 firms involved in the FA-22 program, the Raptor managed to miss only four states, while adding Puerto Rico for good measure. That translates into jobs, which translates into votes. If that seems cynical, so be it: scratch a cynic and I'll show you a realist. In short, expensive Pentagon projects combine powerful elements: jobs, votes, and power to defend America.

Besides, the record shows that on occasion America does need defending, even if only through deterrence.

China, for instance.

The PRC has one of the largest air forces on earth; it is also one of the least capable. RAND projections estimate that in 2005, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will count 120 bombers, 325 attack aircraft, and 2,000 fighters. Of the latter, half are aging J-6s (Chinese built MiG-19s of mid-1950s origin), while later designs such as Su-27s and -30s require Russian support. Airlift is surprisingly small: only 425 transports of all types for a 1.8 million man army with 40 maneuver divisions and as many brigades.

Other shortcomings include aerial tankers and airborne early warning types, while there seems to be no capability to suppress enemy air defenses. Foreign observers note a remarkable lack of integration in China's own defense network, partly due to interservice rivalry that negates joint operations.

China is upgrading some of its tactical squadrons, but slowly, and without the ability of indigenous support. In other words, 50 % of the PLAAF will be eligible for the Antique Aircraft Association. With large starting numbers, the Chinese could "surge" hundreds of sorties against a specific area on Day One; thereafter the figures would decline dramatically, both from attrition and deferred maintenance.

Meanwhile, China has acquired SA-10s and is working on something in the SA-20 class.

Obsolete technology represents only part of the PLAAF's problems. Institutionally, it has suffered from inexperienced leadership — the first pilot to command the service only took office in 1985; the first post-Korean War pilot to lead the PLAAF assumed command nine years later. The air arm exists primarily to support the army, and probably runs behind the navy in political influence.

According to one study, Chinese aircrews lack adequate flight time. Reportedly, bomber crews average eighty hours a year, fighter pilots barely 100. The published figure of 150 hours annually for attack pilots clearly demonstrates the PLAAF's priorities: supporting the army. By comparison, NATO standards call for at least 180 hours per annum with a far wider variety of capabilities: strike, air combat, night and all-weather flight, and low-level navigation. PRC sortie generation is classed as miserable: one flight per four or five days.

In the 1990s the PLAAF began acquiring small numbers of world-class aircraft, notably Russian-built Sukhoi-27s and -30s. SA-10 surface-to-air missiles appeared, as did Iluyshin-76 transports. But the PRC has been too cash-poor to obtain, let alone produce, such sophisticated equipment in quantity. That may explain Chinese efforts to acquire foreign technology by other means: the reputed scandals involving Israeli sales of Patriot missiles and airborne radars being two examples.

In short, if there's ever to be a fourth generation of American fighter aces, it may well come at expense of the PLAAF — though China could still win the war. In fact, in 2004 America's first Eagle ace may not yet be born.

Another potential opponent (we don't have "enemies" anymore), of course, is post-Soviet Russia.

Russian military aviation remains potent but aging. As of 1997, Frontal Aviation included 180 bombers, 940 fighters (mainly 400 MiG-23s and 345 MiG-29s), 1,070 attack types (including 360 Su-24s), 760 recce and EW types, and 1,450 transports.

The Air Defense Force (a separate organization) included 860 fighters (300 MiG-31s), while Naval Aviation numbered 270 bombers or strike aircraft, 210 fighters, and almost 100 recce/EW birds.

However, despite the impressive numbers, about 70 % are late 1970s to early 1980s models, and 80 % continue operating beyond their normal overhaul period. High fatigue life will only continue to reduce availability.

The most advanced bandit flying today — and likely in the foreseeable future — is the Sukhoi-30. It is highly capable, relatively affordable (flyaway cost is pegged at under $40 million), and may be built in China and/or India. However, as of 2003 it remains in low-rate production.

The Su-30 has demonstrated adaptability to thrust vectoring (tests were flown in 1997), so presumably the option for future models remains open. But nobody has tangled with the Sukhoi yet, and based on the historic record, there is little cause for concern.

Other regional competitors such as North Korea and Cuba are nonstarters. Their pilots typically log ten to twenty hours annually, and, according to one consultant, "They spend their flight time trying not to die."

If history is any indicator, the next war is likely to flare up in an unexpected corner of the globe. Most likely the opponent will be a relatively small nation or alliance of such states, short on hardware but possibly long on determination and innovation. (Who, for instance, anticipated that America would be run out of Somalia by local clansmen wielding rocket-propelled grenades as effective anti-aircraft weapons?)

JOINT TACTICS

How will Raptor and JSF be employed?

Nobody's speaking for the record yet, but here are some options:

Two-plane sections will penetrate enemy airspace at supercruise or better, perhaps with three or more UAVs preceding the fighters. Drones are likely to become a familiar aspect of Raptor ops, even an essential one. They can provide decoys, overhead jamming, and perhaps enhanced SEAD capability. Control of UAVs may be from ground or airborne operators.

Raptors will live and operate with JSFs. It's entirely possible that the Bold Tigers and Wild Boars will work together in those types.

Sometime after 2012, FA-22s and F-35As would be expected to fly complementary missions. Raptors would gain air superiority over perhaps more numerous, but less capable, enemy fighters, permitting JSFs to attack targets in hostile territory. Strike planners explain that in the opening hours of conflict, F-35s carrying two one-ton precision weapons internally would dash in at supersonic speed, stealthily delivering their ordnance against command and control targets: essentially the Desert Storm scenario. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defense mission is generally expected to proceed quickly. At least that's the plan.

Once the SEAD phase is accomplished, and stealth is presumably unnecessary, F-35s would switch to external ordnance loads. At that point, greater weight of bombs on target would offset the reduced stealthiness of the JSF, since external loadouts increase radar signatures.

Raptors also are likely to escort B-2s on deep penetration missions, affording an all stealth strike package. Based on previous experience, however, ultra high ticket items such as B-2s will still have jammer support, contrary to the Spirit's "sales brochure" which convinced Congress that stealth bombers are self-supporting. (Before World War II, Congress accepted the Air Corps' concept of the self-escorting bomber, which would "always get through." While dedicated crews inevitably reached their targets, equally dedicated young National Socialists extracted a potentially prohibitive price until the advent of the P-51 Mustang. There may be a lesson for today's world.) At more than $2 billion per airframe, however, the Air Force understandably wants to hedge its bets.

Still, despite fighters and jammers, there will be losses, to our own defenses if not to the enemy. And therein lies the next phase in military aviation: pilotless aircraft.

PLANES, NOT PILOTS?

Almost fifty years ago, test pilot Scott Crossfield stated that there will always be a need for pilots because no other guidance system can be produced so cheaply by unskilled labor. While the wisdom of his humor remains uncontested, there is a growing trend toward unmanned aircraft for aerial combat.

Today, Pentagon pundits anticipate the day when drones will rule the sky. The buzzwords are many: "pilotless aircraft," the un-PC "unmanned air vehicles," and the more politically correct (and more absurd) "uninhabited air vehicles." All refer to the same concept — an airframe remotely controlled from the ground or another aircraft.

The phrase "pilotless" aircraft is not strictly correct. Drones or UAVs will certainly have pilots — but not on board. The "pilots" will control their birds via data link from afar, safely out of danger from flak, SAMs, and interceptors. There are advantages and disadvantages:

While the FA-22 may be the Air Force's last manned "pure" fighter, the close air support mission is another matter. Though forward air controllers presumably could direct drones to battlefield targets, that's a separate issue from air superiority. At present, few people are standing up to predict CAS drones as an alternative to strike and interdiction vehicles. Friendly fire incidents are too common now: adding remote-controlled aircraft to the mix does not seem to bode well for drone use.

However, for air-to-air combat, a drone should be unbeatable. Theoretically, anyway. Once at the merge, no human could compete with a UAV pulling 20 or more Gs. With thrust vectoring, a drone would be an even more formidable dogfight opponent. The preceding, of course, assumes that the ninety-year history of aerial combat continues unimpeded, and that even in the advanced missile era, aircraft will continue meeting at "the merge" and maneuver for a firing solution. All aspect missiles are a reality, and it remains to be seen how often increasingly rare fighter versus fighter encounters develop. "Launch and leave" missiles that provide their own homing have vastly simplified the pilot's combat tasking, but they are complex systems that do malfunction. If history is any yardstick, there will still be some yanking and banking after the initial AAM picket is launched.

With the potential for in-flight refueling, UAVs possess almost unlimited range or endurance, since aircrew fatigue is not a factor. Looming brightest of all, of course, is the human factor. With no onboard pilot or crew, the UAV may be exposed to high threat levels without endangering a life. Or, more precisely, without endangering friendly lives.

Rating high on the disadvantage scale is SA: situational awareness. At present a drone operator, no matter how well informed by various media, cannot visually track multiple bogies (let alone bandits) like an experienced fighter pilot. On the other hand, it's been noted that drones don't come with oversized wristwatches or egos, and they don't require retirement pensions. It should be noted, however, that it's far too early to speculate upon the individual and collective mindset of increasingly youthful computer nerds who provide a growing pool of potential UAV pilots.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

All of this is well beyond the theoretical stage. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) jointly manage the effort to produce unmanned fighter aircraft. The Future Aircraft Technology Enhancements (FATE) program is working toward UAVs for air superiority, among other things.

First in line was the X-39, a designation requested by AFRL. The concept combines several technologies including advanced materials, wings that change shape rather than use ailerons, advanced computer flight controls, and artificial intelligence (no snide remarks about the intellect of fighter pilots is implied, nor should any be inferred). The project is so "black" that at this writing it is uncertain whether an X-39 aircraft has actually been produced. Some observers speculate that its various components have been tested without assembling an entire airframe.

Other Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) certainly are under way, including designs meant to perform their missions in space. But we are concerned with air combat within the Earth's atmosphere, and several designs are taking wing. Most notable is the X-45A, which first flew in May 2002. Resembling a baby B-2, the X-45 has met with initial success, and Popular Mechanics quoted the program manager who described the flight as "a significant jump in our quest to mature the technologies and systems required to integrate UCAVs into the future Air Force."

According to industry reports, an X-45 (with a 33-foot span versus 172 for the B-2) can be produced and operated for 65 % to 75 % less than conventional stealth aircraft. Consequently, it's far more expendable: capable of flying into the teeth of tomorrow's more lethal air defense networks and knocking off some of those radars and SAMs. That means that UCAVs lend themselves to the dangerous SEAD mission — suppression of enemy air defenses — which are vastly more threatening than any hostile fighters now flying or likely to fly in the near future. As of 2003, the X-45 was expected to become operational in 2008.

Not to be left behind, the Navy X-46 and X-47 concepts are being developed by Boeing and Northrop Grumman, respectively. The latter first flew in 2003. Meanwhile, the Army and Marine Corps are interested in the X-50, which is intended to operate without conventional runways. A combination fixed- and rotor-wing aircraft, the Dragonfly offers VSTOL performance and then some.

How UCAVs are likely to be employed in combat is an exciting what-if. Tactical integration is well under way with current fighters and attack aircraft, but the path to the future assumes an all-drone force later this century.

That eventuality certainly will be no cause for celebration in the 366th Fighter Wing.