Fighter Wing: A Guided Tour of an Air Force Combat Wing

History tells us that the first time aircraft were used to attack enemy forces on the ground was in January 1912, when an Italian second lieutenant named Giulio Gavotti, assigned to the Squadriglia di Tripoli and flying a crude biplane armed with four small improvised bombs, attacked Bedouin tribes-men in the towns of Taguira and Ain Zara in Libya. Since that time, the basic destructive mechanism of the general purpose (GP) bomb has changed relatively little: a tubular metal case, filled with explosive, fuzed to go off when it hits the ground, with some sort of stabilizing fins to make its fall to the target reasonably straight. Today, the USAF uses GP bombs that are true to that basic design, though there have been some recent changes of note.

The basic family of GP bombs used by the U.S. military (including the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps) is known as the Mark (Mk) 80 series. Though some of the World War II-vintage Mk 117 (a 750lb./340.9kg. weapon) and Mk 118 (a 3,000 lb./1,363.6 kg. weapon) bombs are still in use on platforms such as the B-52, the standard family of weapons used on U.S. aircraft today are the 80-series GP bombs. Designed in the 1950s by the famous Ed Heinemann, the Mk 80 series are what is called low-drag, general purpose (LDGP) bombs. Previously, the designers of GP bombs which were carried internally, or on subsonic aircraft, gave little thought to how much parasitic drag they added to an aircraft in flight. This became a major issue, though, with the design of Heinemann's classic A-4 Skyhawk attack bomber, which carried all of its ordnance externally on pylons. Thus, he and his design team began with a clean sheet of paper, and came up with the LDGP shape so familiar to military enthusiasts around the world. The cases are made from cast steel, with relatively thin (less than 1 in./2.5 cm.) walls. This provides one of the bomb's primary damage mechanisms: fragmentation. Being relatively brittle, the steel case expands into a shower of fragments, deadly out to a certain radius. As for the explosive, the current generation of 80-series weapons uses an explosive called Tritonal 80/20. It is composed of an 80 % mix of TNT with 20 % of the volume of an aluminum binder/ inhibitor. The result is an explosive with slightly less explosive power than TNT but extremely stable in storage conditions such as ships and tropical sites. Also, it has a relatively high "cook-off" temperature, which makes the 80-series bombs able to survive for a time in conditions of flame, such as a shipboard fire. Just for added insurance against a cook-off, the U.S. Navy coats their bombs with an ablative coating to buy extra time to suppress the fire and "safe" the bombs.

About 50 % of the weight of an 80-series LDGP bomb is explosive, with the rest being taken up by the bomb case, mounting/attachment lugs, fin group, and fuze(s).

Fuzes are more important than you might think, since most modern explosives require a sequence of deliberate actions to detonate. Fuzes have evolved a great deal since the delicate glass/fulminate-of-mercury devices used in the American Civil War to detonate ground and naval mines. Today, you choose a specific fuze based upon how and when you want a weapon to blow up. The current generation of fuzes are notable because of the variety of conditions that they can be adapted to function in and their ever-increasing reliability. This issue of reliability is critical. If you lug a bomb into defended enemy airspace and drop it with pinpoint precision on an enemy target, and it does not explode because of a fuze failure, then you have just wasted fuel, time, and maybe a multi-million dollar aircraft (as well as your life) for nothing. Some of the more common fuzes include:

Another item critical to successful employment of bombs is making sure that bomb fragments do not hit the attacking aircraft. This can happen to an aircraft doing low-altitude drops with LDGP bombs in a "slick" configuration. To avoid such accidents, "hi-drag" kits were developed to slow the bomb down and provide enough separation for the launching aircraft to safely escape the effects of the weapons it has just delivered. In World War II, these kits took the form of an attached parachute. During the Vietnam War, the spring-loaded fins of the Mk 15 "Snakeye" kit were used on the Mk 82. Today, the standard hi-drag or retard kit is an air-inflated bag, or "ballute," mounted in a special fin-group assembly attached to the rear of the bomb. There are two varieties: the BSU-49/B for the Mk 82 and the BSU-50/B for the Mk 84. After launch, the ballute kits channel the slipstream surrounding the bomb into the ballute, inflating it from the incoming rush of air. Their big advantage is their vastly greater reliability over the Mk 15 units, as air moving at hundreds of knots/ kph. tends to be a more consistent mechanical medium than folded springs.

Penetration Bombs

A constant of warfare in the 20th century is that concrete has been one of the great equalizers among combatants. Cheap, available, and relatively easy to work with, it can be fashioned into a variety of structures which can protect even delicate, high-value items like aircraft and dictators from the ravages of the elements and the forces of modern warfare.

Ever since the end of the Vietnam War, the USAF wanted a bomb that could penetrate bunkers, runways, and other reinforced concrete structures — a bomb that didn't weigh 3,000 to 4,000 lb./1,363.6 to 1,818 kg., and wasn't nuclear. In 1984, the Air Force Armament Division initiated Project Have Void and awarded a contract to Lockheed Missile and Space's Austin (Texas) Division to develop the new bomb, to be known as the BLU-109/B. Forged out of hardened 4340 steel, the BLU-109/B is essentially a large "masonry nail," shaped to plow through concrete, earth, and armor plate, and then explode on the other side of the protection. Weighing in at 1,925.5lb./ 875.3 kg., it has a specially shaped nose that is designed to help it "dig in" to flat concrete at high grazing angles. While the BLU-109/B can be dropped as a "dumb" bomb, when married to a Paveway III-series or GBU-15 guidance kit, it becomes a killing machine of incredible power and accuracy.

With its capability of destroying, or "holding at risk," something like 99 % of all the hardened targets in the world, the BLU-109/B has transformed the nature of air warfare. Saddam Hussein found this out the hard way back in 1991, when these bombs blew up virtually every hardened target in his country. When the Iraqi Air Force tried to take refuge in Yugoslav- and European-built hardened aircraft shelters that were thought proof against even near-misses by tactical nuclear weapons, they were opened up like tin cans by the penetrating power of the BLU-109/B. After a couple of days of such pounding, the remnants of the Iraqi Air Force ran for Iran.

Cluster Bombs

Early in the Vietnam War, American airmen began to encounter more and more targets that were spread out — so-called "area" targets made up of "soft," unarmored vehicles, supply dumps, and lightly built structures. What was needed was a weapon which would spread its effects over a known area, with a well-understood set of weapons effects. Rather than try to smear flaming napalm onto all of these things, something more modern was needed. That something was the cluster munition. Cluster bombs were not new. The idea dates back to World War II, when both fragmentation and incendiary cluster bombs were used for many purposes, but suffered from restrictive delivery profiles and the lack of predictable dispersal patterns for the small bombs (called "bomblets" or submunitions) carried in the cluster. To overcome these limitations, the U.S. Navy developed a new concept — the munitions dispenser.

The dispenser would be a "truck" for the load of submunitions, which would be dropped like a normal GP bomb onto the target area. At a preplanned altitude, the fuze (proximity or time delay from aircraft launch) would activate, causing the outer skin panels of the dispenser to break loose. Then another charge (usually compressed air or a small pyrotechnic charge) blasted the load of bomblets loose into a preplanned pattern, which would then fall onto the target.

The Navy's first effort, which began in 1963, centered around a dispenser called the Mk 7. When activated by an Mk 339 time delay fuze, the dispersion charge has the effect of scattering the submunitions in an elongated, doughnut-shaped pattern whose size is controlled by the release height of the bomblets. Each submunition has its own fuze, which detonates upon contact with a target or the ground. When the whole package was put together, it was known as the Mk 20 Rockeye II Mod. 2. It carried a load of 247 M118 anti-tank munitions that looked for all the world like sadistic hypodermic syringes, weighed in at some 490 lb./222.7 kg., and was an instant success with American aircrews when it reached Vietnam in 1967. Adopted by both the Navy and Air Force, it was particularly welcomed by aircrews tasked with attacking SAM sites and AAA gun emplacements, which were particularly vulnerable to the deadly rain of cluster munitions. This classic piece of aircraft ordnance has been so effective that some 27,987 Rockeye IIs were dropped on targets during Desert Storm, more than any other cluster munition used. At only $3,449 a copy (in 1991 dollars), it is quite a bargain by current standards.

With the early success of the Rockeye, the Air Force quickly jumped on the bandwagon and started development of its own cluster bomb dispenser, the Suspension Underwing Unit (SUU-30H/B). A total of 17,831 SUU-30-series weapons were delivered by U.S. aircraft during Desert Storm. This dispenser became the basis for a whole family of USAF CBUs. Some of the versions currently in use include:

As you can see, the variety of submunitions and weapons effects is numbing. Again, fuzing is as critical to successful employment of the SUU-30 family as it is for the 80-series GP bombs. If the dispenser opens too soon, then the density of submunitions will not be high enough to ensure destruction of the target. Similarly, if the canister opens too late, then the bomblets will not spread out enough to cover the whole target. As might be imagined, it is a challenge for planners, ordnance technicians, and loaders to figure out the proper dispenser/submunition/fuze combination.

As good as the early CBUs were, they still imposed a number of restrictions upon fliers trying to deliver them. By the early 1980s the Air Force was beginning to realize that the early CBUs were shackled by a number of limitations in high-threat target areas. Most especially, the aircraft delivering them had to actually overfly the target in "laydown" delivery profiles, exposing them to ground fire. Thus, a new series of submunitions was developed by the Air Force, with a larger dispenser that would get enough of them onto a target array to be useful. And so was born the SUU-64/65 Tactical Munitions Dispenser (TMD).

The TMD is a 1,000 lb./454.5 kg.-class weapon, with three versions currently in service with the USAF. All three share the basic TMD dispenser components, with only the submunition load and other minor details differentiating them. Starting at the front is the optional FZU-39/B proximity fuze, which is designed to tell the TMD its exact altitude at all times. There is also a time delay fuze, which can be used by itself, or in conjunction with the FZU-39/B. Just aft of the nose/fuze section is the cargo section where the submunitions are packed. This is a tubular body section, with equipment designed to cut the body into thirds when the submunitions are ready to be deployed. This is topped by a structure called a strongback, where the mounting lugs are attached. At the rear is a tail assembly, with spring-loaded guidance fins designed to stabilize the entire TMD assembly.

The three different variants of the TMD are shown in the table below:

On the CBU-87/B, the SUU-65 dispenser is loaded with 214 BLU-97/B Combined Effects Munitions (CEMs), and is planned to replace almost every type of CBU. About the size and shape of a beer can, each CEM is equipped with its own ballute, making each a tiny high-drag bomb. It is designed to have excellent weapons effects against armored vehicles and exposed infantry, as well as superb incendiary effects against targets like fuel and ammunition dumps. The BLU-97/B accomplishes this through the use of a unique triple-function pyrotechnic package. Its anti-armor capability comes from a shaped charge capable of penetrating the top armor of virtually any tank or armored vehicle in the world. Surrounding the shaped charge is a serrated steel case, which fragments into hundreds of 30-grain size (about 1/4 in./6mm.) fragments. Finally, at the rear of the CEM is a ring of zirconium. When fragmented and heated to incandescence by the explosive of the shaped charge, it ignites violently as soon as it hits the oxygen of air.

Armed with the finest general purpose submunition in the world, the CBU-87/B functions by delivering its load more accurately than any other dispenser in the inventory. Also, the CBU-87/B can be dropped from as low as 400 feet/121.9 meters, and as high as 40,000 feet/12,192 meters. This means that in addition to making tactical aircraft more survivable in high-threat environments, the CBU-97/B can now be used from bombers like the B-52, B-1B, and B-2. Some 10,035 CBU-87/Bs were dropped during Desert Storm, and in time, it will become the primary CBU in the USAF inventory.

The second TMD derivative to be fielded is the CBU-89/B, which is designed to replace the earlier CBU-78/B in the mine deployment role. Composed of an SUU-64/B TMD, it is loaded with seventy-two BLU-91/B anti-personnel mines, and twenty-four BLU-92/B Gator anti-tank mines. The BLU-92/B Gator is an anti-vehicle mine with a highly sophisticated fuzing system, including the deployment of wire "feelers" to detonate the warhead. Once activated, the Gator fires a self-forging projectile or "spoon" into the belly of the target vehicle at a speed of over Mach 3, destroying the target. There were 1,105 CBU-89/Bs used during Desert Storm with great success.

The newest TMD variant to make it into the field is the CBU-97B, which is equipped with the new BLU-108/B anti-armor submunition. First fielded in 1992, each CBU-97/B is composed of an SUU-64/B TMD, loaded with ten of the BLU-108/Bs. Known as a "sensor fuzed weapon," the BLU-108/B looks like an oversized coffee can when it is ejected from the TMD. Once clear of the TMD, each BLU-108/B ejects four small devices called "skeets." The skeets, which look a lot like jumbo-sized hockey pucks, are flung spinning from the BLU-108/B in four different directions to maximize their coverage. Once armed, each skeet scans the ground with a sensitive infrared seeker, tuned to look for the heat signature of an internal combustion engine. Should the skeet sensor detect the heat of a vehicle below, it fires a self-forging projectile or "spoon" down into the engine compartment of the vehicle at a speed of roughly Mach 5! The projectile has so much energy, that it just punches through the vehicle, even if it is a tank, usually destroying whatever it hits.

With the coming of the SUU-64/65 TMD, most of the tactical limitations of previous types of CBUs have been eliminated. There is also a program, called the Wind Corrected Munition (WCM), which is designed to add a small, cheap, strapdown INS guidance system to the back of the TMD, along with guidance fins. The idea is that the inertial system would detect any course deviations resulting from crosswinds and correct for the wind drift. Given the hyper-accurate weapons delivery systems on various U.S. aircraft, particularly bombers like the B-1B and B-2, this would make truly accurate high-altitude CBU drops a reality.

Electro-Optical Bombs: The GBU-15/AGM-130 Series

Airpower enthusiasts have long dreamed of a munition which would drop a bridge or destroy a building with only one round. This has been the promise of airpower for over seventy-five years, and it has taken a long time to even get close to that. Like the AAM, the first real successes in the area of precision-guided munitions came from Nazi Germany in World War II. In 1943, the Luftwaffe deployed a pair of guided bombs, the FRITZ-X and the HS-293, for use as standoff precision strike weapons. Though they were quite primitive, they terrorized Allied shipping, and even sank an Italian battleship, the Roma, as it was on its way to surrender to Allied forces. After World War II, such efforts took a backseat to nuclear weapons development. Then, with the coming of the Vietnam War, the Air Force was forced to realize that there were a number of international situations where nukes were just not appropriate. Thus, the USAF went into Vietnam completely unequipped for the war they would spend the next decade trying to win.

Immediately, the air units involved in the war began to find that they had been the victims of an unanticipated paradigm shift. Where in the past the flattening of a town with a carpet of GP bombs was a politically acceptable option, in Vietnam, it was a war crime. The politics of appearance were taking over in the 1960s, with the result that politicians now wanted the "surgical" air strikes that airpower zealots had promised for decades. Unfortunately, such promises by the visionaries who had created airpower as a weapon had never anticipated flying into an integrated air defense system (IADS) of fighters, SAMs, and AAA guns all tied together with a computerized sensor network of radars and observation posts. No one had anticipated that crews of tactical aircraft would be trying to drop their loads of munitions while violently "jinking" and fighting for their lives against coordinated multiple threats such as American pilots and crews saw in the skies over North Vietnam. Worse than that was where some of those bombs fell after they were dropped. Collateral damage is a serious concern in any war, but even more so when the enemy is showing American newsmen the destruction wrought by errant bombs and contrasting it with the stories of "precision strikes" coming out of official channels in Washington, D.C.

In an effort to overcome the political problems of collateral damage, as well as the tactical problems of fighting in an IADS environment to precisely deliver ordnance onto a target, the USN and USAF initiated a series of programs known as Precision Avionics Vectoring Equipment (PAVE), designed to provide aviators with weapons that could hit high-value targets with some sort of standoff and precision. One promising technology was television electro-optics (TV E/O). This means that the guidance electronics package looks at the TV camera picture and locks onto the contrast "edge" or line between a dark and light zone on the picture. Integrated circuits and microprocessors were years away, and the early history of what we now call electro-optically (E/O) guided bombs was riddled with problems as a result.

The Air Force E/O guided bomb program, known as the Glide Bomb Unit (GBU)-8 (also known by its program nickname of HOBOS, which stands for Homing Bomb System), was designed to be what is called a "modular" bomb. This means that the guidance kit (the seeker and guidance fin sections) would be literally bolted onto a standard -80-series bomb, which would act as the warhead. This meant that the warhead could be tailored for any kind of target that was required, be it heavy demolition (where a 2,000 lb./909.1 kg. Mk 84 would be appropriate), or area suppression (where a cluster bomb dispenser would be best). The GBU-8 was designed and built by Rockwell International in Columbus. Unfortunately, the USAF HOBOS had a poor combat career in Vietnam. There were a lot of single-point failures in various subsystems that made proper development of E/O bomb delivery tactics nearly impossible. But the worst of the problems revolved around the GBU-8 seeker itself. Because they had to actually see the target, the E/O bombs of the period could not be used in times of darkness or reduced visibility. In anything but "perfect" conditions, the WSOs had to take manual control of the HOBOS through the data links and try to fly the bombs onto the targets. Frequently, they did not have time to make the necessary corrections before bomb impact.

By 1972, the shortcomings of the first-generation HOBOS were well understood, and the Air Force initiated a program to develop an improved family of E/O guided bombs. Now known officially as the Modular Glide Bomb System, the new program was designed to overcome the problems that had plagued the early HOBOS. Following a design competition under the Pave Strike program, the USAF selected Rockwell International as the winner to build what would now be called the GBU-15. The major improvements that the GBU-15 was designed to have over the earlier GBU-8 included:

• A longer standoff range to allow the launch aircraft to stay out of the range of SAMs and AAA guns.

• More maneuverability and cross-range performance, to provide greater tactical flexibility, and to improve endgame accuracy during approach to the target.

• An improved data link system, to allow greater control of the weapon during the terminal phase, the approach to the target.

• A greatly improved seeker system, with greater resolution and target discrimination capabilities.

• Options for improved seekers, including an infrared imaging (IIR) variant.

With these ideas in mind, the Rockwell International engineers got to work. Though they started fresh with the new design, Rockwell kept most of the good things that the GBU-8 had offered, starting with a standard Mk 84 2,000 lb./909.1 kg. bomb body as the warhead. This time, though, with the emerging miracle of integrated circuitry and microprocessors, Rockwell was able to do a much better job. Rockwell also added Hughes Missile Systems to the GBU-15 team; they produced the TV seeker from technology based on their highly successful AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile. As an added bonus, a version of the seeker based on technology from the Imaging Infrared (IIR) version of the Maverick was designed and eventually fielded.

The basic GBU-15 is composed of a guidance/fin section, a bomb warhead, and a cruciform wing group (with steering fins) at the rear of the weapon. The following table shows the details of the various GBU-15 variants:

The initial E/O version was known as the GBU-15(V)-1. Originally operational in 1977 with the Israeli Air Force (the USAF spent five more years testing and developing it), it is currently cleared for use on the F-111F and the F-15E Strike Eagle. It was followed by the IIR version, designated GBU-15(V)- 2, and is favored by crews and planners. Some seventy of the GBU-15(V)-2s were expended in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm in 1991. Like the earlier HOBOS, it is equipped with a two-way data link, with the instructions and seeker video data being fed through a pod, designated AN/AXQ-14. This allows the WSO of the launching aircraft, or another controlling aircraft, to actually fly the bomb onto a target with truly stunning precision. In addition, the data link system allows the seeker video to be recorded; this assists in bomb damage assessment (BDA), as well as providing CNN with exciting videos!

All the basic GBU-15s can be launched from a maximum range of 8 miles/14.6 km. at low altitude, and up to 20 miles/36.6 km. at higher altitudes. The key to this relatively long range is the lift capabilities of the cruciform wings at the front and rear of the GBU-15; these make the bomb an unpowered glider, with much greater maneuverability than previous HOBOS.

Following Desert Storm, several new variants, called the GBU-151 series, came into service with the Air Force. But at an FY-1991 cost of $227,000 per copy, a GBU-15 is anything but cheap, and further development is unlikely. There is, however, one GBU-151 variant which is rapidly gaining momentum, the Air-to-Ground Missile (AGM) -130. The AGM-130 is basically a GBU-151 with a small rocket motor strapped to its belly. This has the effect of extending the AGM-130's range to 16 nm./30 km. at low altitudes, and up to 40 nm./45.7 km. at higher release altitudes. It's an impressive set of capabilities for one family of weapons, though it places a great burden of responsibility on its operators. WSOs assigned to operate the GBU-15/AGM-130-series weapons have to be carefully trained, and have a delicate touch, to get the most out of this most accurate of PGMs.

Laser-Guided Bombs: The Paveway Series

Once there were two bridges that were the stuff of nightmares to U.S. pilots who flew over North Vietnam. The Paul Doumer Bridge over the Red River in Hanoi and the Dragon's Jaw Bridge (Ham Rung in Vietnamese) near Thanh Hoa were the toughest targets in a war full of tough targets. Prior to 1972, despite the efforts of thousands of U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine strike sorties, millions of pounds of bombs, and dozens of lost airplanes and killed and/or imprisoned aircrews, the Paul Doumer was only dropped for a few weeks at a time. Then it would quickly be repaired, to carry rail traffic south, laden with supplies for the ground war in South Vietnam. Even worse, despite every effort that the Department of Defense could devise in the 1960s, the Thanh Hoa bridge was never dropped.

Then, in just four days of May 1972, both targets went down for good, the most visible sign of a new weapons technology which saw its first use in 1967—the laser-guided bomb (LGB). On May 10th, 1972, sixteen F-4Ds from the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at the RTAFB at Ubon, Thailand, roared down on the Paul Doumer Bridge. Twelve of them were each armed with a pair of the new 2,000 lb./909.1 kg. LGBs. When the smoke and spray from the exploding bombs subsided, the bridge was heavily damaged and closed to all traffic. Amazingly, not one of the strike aircraft was damaged.

Then, the next day, four more 8th TFW F-4Ds again attacked the Doumer Bridge with LGBs, this time dropping several spans. After several more applications of LGBs, the bridge would not be rebuilt until after the cease-fire in 1973. As an added bonus, the control bunker for the entire North Vietnamese air defense system at Gia Lam airfield was destroyed by four more LGB-ARMED F-4Ds from Ubon.

The crowning achievement came two days later when the laser bombers of the 8th TFW went after the big one: the Dragon's Jaw. It took everything the ordnance shop and contractor techreps at Ubon could put together, including some specially built 3,000 lb./1,363 kg. LGBs; but when the smoke and limestone dust cleared, one whole end of the bridge had been lifted off of its abutment and heaved into the river.

The weapons that did this amazing job were certainly not the most advanced or sophisticated ever deployed by the U.S. to Southeast Asia. On the contrary, first-generation LGBs were extremely simple in concept and execution, yet they have been the most successful type of PGM in history. Like the ubiquitous AIM-9 Sidewinder, a simple concept behind the LGB paid massive dividends when it got to war.

If you are over forty, you probably remember when the magic of the laser beam was first touted by its inventors at Bell Labs. Laser stands for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation. What it means is that a coherent (composed of only one primary wavelength) beam of light with a very high amplitude (bright in the extreme) can be produced and manipulated. The first lasers relied upon solid materials like synthetic ruby to provide a medium to produce the laser light. Today, most lasers are based on gases like carbon dioxide (CO) or argon (AR). At the time of their introduction, lasers promised to become the "death beams" envisioned by science fiction authors like Jules Verne and H. G. Wells. But the truth was somewhat more modest, for the lasers of the 1960s had nothing like the power required to burn through the solid metal of a rocket or aircraft at tactical engagement ranges.

Then in 1965, a simple idea for using the laser in a weapons system came to a small engineering team at Texas Instruments (TI). Weldon Word, the brilliant engineer who led the team, decided that instead of using the laser as a weapon, he would use the laser as a way to guide a weapon. Laser light, because it is coherent and tends to stay in a tight beam, has the ability to mark a very small target from a long distance. This means that a seeker could be devised that would "see" only a specific (coherent) frequency of laser light and guide onto it, much as the AIM-9M seeker looks for specific "colors" of light to home in on. It's like shining a flashlight in a completely dark room. If you are human, all you can see is the target illuminated by the flashlight.

Simple as this sounds, it posed daunting technical and financial problems for Weldon Word and his TI team. As a starter, there was not much money to develop this new strike technology. In the mid-1960s, DoD was offering $100,000 for ideas that could be put to winning use in Vietnam. But only $100,000 until the ideas had been tested and proven. For Word and his team, this meant the entire system — the seeker/guidance package, the laser "flashlight" (designator), and the warhead — had to be made for that $100,000, and not one penny more. Even in 1965, this would buy only a few thousand man-hours of TI engineering and technical talent, and a small amount of technical hardware for testing the concept. With only a short time available for development, the team made some important decisions. One of the first was that the warhead sections of the new guided bombs, now called Paveway, would be composed of normal 80-series LDGP bombs. The seeker and guidance sections would literally be "screwed" onto the LDGP bombs, providing a solid airframe for the whole package. This meant that the warheads, fuses, and assorted other equipment could be supplied, at no cost to TI, as government-furnished equipment (GFE). Then, rather than building the laser designator from scratch, they adapted a design from a scientist in Alabama. Finally, the team obtained their parts for the laser seeker from a West German salvage firm. Wind-tunnel testing of the proposed bomb package was found to be too expensive, so Weldon Word had his team test the bomb shapes with subscale models in a swimming pool.

In spite of the "low ball" approach to the problem, the result was successful beyond the wildest dreams of anyone at TI or in the Air Force, even though the first Paveway laser designator (called Paveway I) was about the size of an old sheet-film camera, was bolted to the canopy rails of an F-4 Phantom, and was manually aimed through a telescopic lens by the backseater. Once this was done, then another aircraft had to fly over the target and drop the bomb. As might be imagined, this made the designating aircraft highly vulnerable to AAA guns and SAMs. Nevertheless, the results of the Vietnam combat tests held in 1967 were good enough for the Air Force to order the Paveway guidance kits into limited production. Eventually, the "limited" production wound up totaling over 25,000 units (each virtually hand-built) that were dropped during the Vietnam War. And amazingly, some seventeen thousand hits were scored, for an overall combat success record of some 68 %.

But maybe even more amazing was the way Paveway bombs redefined the word hit. With LGBs frequently generating average circular error probability (CEP) miss distances under 10 feet/3.05 meters (a typical Vietnam-era F-4D CEP with "dumb" LDGP bombs was commonly 150 feet/45.7 meters), it frequently only took a single bomb from one plane to destroy a target which previously took a whole squadron of fighter bombers to hit. Quickly, the cry of "one bomb, one target" became a hallmark of LGB performance around Southeast Asia. As if to highlight the economy of the LGB effort further, a Paveway I guidance kit cost only about $2,700 in 1972 dollars — cheap compared to over $20,000 for a GBU-8 E/O guidance kit.

Paveway caused a revolution in aerial warfare, and it showed during the final U.S. air campaigns of the war, Linebacker I/II. During these efforts, which ran from May 1972 until January 1973, Paveway LGBs were the "magic bullets" of the American arsenal. They were everywhere, doing everything. In the south, LGBs from the 8th TFW (the only unit equipped with them at the time) helped stop the armored drive of the North Vietnamese at An Loc with an early demonstration of what would become known as "tank plinking" during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the north, they were dropping every vital bridge between the Chinese border and Vinh, as well as a variety of other vital targets.

Now, with all this success, there also came problems. While the LGB seeker would guide the bomb to an almost perfect bull's-eye every time, the bomb had to be dropped within a fairly narrow "basket" in the sky (within a few thousand feet of a "perfect" ballistic launch point) for the bomb to have the necessary energy or "smash" to reach the target. This meant that in Vietnam, the Paveway I-series bombs had to be dropped from medium to high altitude (above 10,000 feet/3,048 meters); low-level drops (less than 10,000 feet/3,048 meters) were completely out of the question. In addition, clear visibility in daylight was a must, because the early Paveway I designators did not have low-light or thermal imaging systems. In fact, until the introduction of the AAQ-26 Pave Tack targeting and designation pod in the late 1970s, the designators were the major limitation in the use of LGBs.

The first designation system that made LGB drops in high-threat areas viable was the Pave Knife built by Ford Aeronutronic (now Loral Aeronutronic). Hand-built and fielded by a team led by the legendary optical engineer Reno Perotti, the six prototype Pave Knife pods that were available became one of the single most important factors to the continued success of the Linebacker campaigns in 1972.

In the late 1970s, DoD began fielding a new version of the bomb-guidance kit, the Paveway II. Essentially a production version of the hand-built Paveway I-series kits, they provided the USAF, USN, and USMC with their primary PGM capability well into the 1980s. They have even enjoyed a measure of export success, including use by the British in Desert Storm. In fact, Paveway II-series kits are still in the U.S. and NATO inventory, and will continue to soldier on well into the 21st century.

The Paveway II kits come in three varieties, broken down by the following bomb configurations:

The Paveway II-series bombs proved to be extremely successful, and have enjoyed a long and useful career. The first attempted combat use of Paveway II appears to have occurred in October 1983, when an A-6E from the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) dropped several LGBs on targets in the Beirut area. Unfortunately, problems with the ground-based laser designator caused them to miss their assigned targets. They saw their first really successful combat trials during Operation Prairie Fire in 1986, a series of confrontations between the U.S. Navy and Libya in the Gulf of Sidra. During the famous "Line of Death" confrontations, USN A-6Es used Paveway II-series bombs to help destroy/disable several Libyan patrol boats. Later, they were used during Operation Eldorado Canyon, the joint April 1986 USAF/USN/ USMC raid on Benghazi and Tripoli.

One of the Paveway II configurations, the diminutive 500 lb./227.3 kg. GBU-12, proved to be one of the most important weapons of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In late January and early February of 1991, CENTAF BDA teams showed that the "battlefield preparation" in the KTO (Kuwaiti Theater of Operations) was not destroying enough armored vehicles and artillery pieces with standard LDGP bombs to meet the proposed attrition target of 50 % prior to the start of the ground war.

To help overcome this problem, Major General Buster Glosson, the CENTAF Director of Operations, came up with an idea called "tank plinking." General Charles A. Horner, the commander of CENTAF during the war, is said to have been told by the commander of CENTCOM, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, to never call this tactic "tank plinking." General Horner, always the obedient fighter pilot, promptly ordered his staff to make sure that everyone always called it "tank plinking."

Here is how tank plinking worked. A flight of F-111Fs or F-15Es would fly over an Iraqi artillery or armored unit shortly after sunset. Since the sand of the desert cooled faster than the military equipment dug in among the dunes, the vehicles and artillery tended to show up as "hot spots" in the aircraft's FLIR targeting systems. They would then drop one of the "old" GBU- 12s on the desired target, and the results were, in a word, spectacular. Despite what you might think, even a main battle tank cannot have armor everywhere, especially on top. Thus, when one of the "little" LGBs hit one, the target would go up in flames, and the BDA assessments were quite positive. The fact that an F-111F might carry four GBU-12s, and an F-15E up to eight, meant that tank plinking was a surprisingly economical way of killing targets up in the KTO. Every night, for several weeks in early February 1991, the 4th and 48th TFWs would send pairs of F-15Es and four ship flights of F-111Fs into the KTO to hunt artillery and armor targets. The results were spectacular. Often, the small formations would come home with anything from twelve and sixteen targets killed per mission.

Combined with the capabilities of an integrated thermal imaging/laser designation/weapons delivery system, the Paveway II-series LGB was a formidable weapon when properly employed. Formidable, but very limited. Paveway II still had a very small launch "basket," which diminished its utility in high-threat environments. In particular, its low-level capabilities were highly restrictive, making its utility in that mode marginal. Even with drops from 20,000 feet/6,096 meters, the favored altitude for Paveway II drops, there were challenges for the crews.

Even before Paveway II went into combat, the Air Force and TI had begun to develop the replacement for the Paveway II under a program called the Low-Level Laser-Guided Bomb (LLLGB). Begun in 1981, it was designed to overcome the shortcomings inherent in the previous Paveway II bombs and take full advantage of the new series of laser designator systems being deployed worldwide. The result was the Paveway III series of bombs, which came into service in the mid-1980s.

The key was to be an all-new guidance section, which would be equipped with a microprocessor-controlled digital autopilot adaptive to the flight and release conditions. There are a variety of settings for delivery aircraft, flight mode, warhead configuration, laser coding, and delivery profile. Even more important, with a change of the Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM) chips which hold the autopilot software, the basic guidance package can be adapted to a variety of bomb configurations and capabilities. The changes to Paveway III start at the front of the seeker with the seeker dome, which is made of Lexan plastic with a fine wire mesh. Inside this dome is an optics housing containing a four-quadrant laser sensor and optics to focus the spot of laser light from the laser designator. The simple four-quadrant detector in the seeker is the touchstone of the Paveway program's simplicity, and is one of the keys of its success. And the sensitivity of the seeker itself has also been improved, so that even low-power laser designators (or standard designators degraded by weather) can be used. The seeker housing is gimbaled in two axes, and can scan in a bar (horizontally, back and forth), box (rectangular), or conical (circular) mode. Aft of the seeker is the guidance electronics section, which contains the autopilot, laser decoding, and signal processing circuitry, as well as the rotary switches for programming the bomb. The control setting switches are mounted flush with the exterior of the airframe, and can be set with almost any flathead tool, though the "ordies" (ordnance technicians) from the 391st Fighter Squadron at Mountain Home AFB (they fly the F-15E Strike Eagle) tell me that a quarter works best for this job.

The laser seeker, guidance electronics, and control section form what is termed the Guidance and Control Unit (GCU), which is attached to the front of the selected warhead. Paveway LGBs have always made use of standard USAF munitions as the warhead; and Paveway III is no exception. It can be attached to any of the 80-series bombs, as well as the BLU-109/B penetrating warhead. At the rear of the warhead is mounted the cruciform airfoil group. This is a tail section equipped with four pop-out wings to help stabilize the weapon during its flight. Along with mounting lugs for the bomb rack on top of the weapon, this is the makeup of a complete Paveway III LGB.

The first production versions of the Paveway III were the GBU-24 family, which entered service in the mid-1980s. Designed as the general purpose LGB, the GBU-24 quickly became the primary weapon of the F-111Fs of the 48th TFW at RAF Lakenheath. It is the airfoil group, with its large spring-deployed planar wings, that makes all the difference in expanding the launch and delivery envelope of the GBU-24. When the wings are fully extended some two seconds after the bomb is dropped, they have twice the lift area of the Paveway II-series airfoil group, and give the GBU-24 a glide ratio of 5:1, meaning that for every foot/meter of altitude lost in flight, the bomb can travel forward five feet/meters. This means that the launch envelope for the GBU-24 is vastly greater than the Paveway II-series bombs, and gives it the energy and maneuverability for a lot of tricks.

The second version of the GBU-24 family, while a bit different, became one of the stars of Desert Storm. This variant has a BLU-109/B penetrating bomb warhead, designed to punch through heavy reinforced concrete and armor. Called a GBU-24/B, it was Saddam Hussein's greatest nightmare, and his worst tactical surprise when Desert Storm kicked off. With the exception of a handful of command bunkers outside of Baghdad, it was capable of destroying every hardened target in Iraq. This included the Yugoslav-built hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) that had been previously thought to be impervious, even to a near-miss by a tactical nuclear device! The GBU-24/B is composed of the same components as the basic GBU-24/B, with the difference of the BLU-109 being substituted for the Mk 84. In addition, there is a spacer attached to the bomb body called an ADG-769/B Hardback. This helps maintain the same tail clearances as the larger-diameter Mk 84. In addition, there is only one fuze, an FMU-143/B delayed action unit mounted in the rear of the BLU-109/B. Other than that, the two models are identical, with the necessary software to operate both models already being built into the common guidance and control unit. A third variant, the GBU-24B/B, is an improved GBU-24A/B.

The fourth variant of the Paveway III family is a unique version for the F-117A Nighthawk Stealth Fighter, the GBU-27/B. The reason for this is that the F-117A design was frozen before the new bomb was even in design, and the Lockheed designers had originally assumed that they would only have the older Paveway II-series weapons with their relatively small airfoil groups to fit into the weapons bays of the F-117s. With the coming of the Paveway III- series weapons, though, the USAF wanted to get the new bombs, especially ones equipped with the BLU-109/B, onto the new stealth birds. The problem was that the BSU-84/B airfoil group was too large to fit into the Nighthawk's weapons bays. This problem was overcome when the TI and Lockheed designers realized that the F-117A was almost never going to fly the kind of low-level delivery profiles that the F-111Fs and F-15Es were going to. In fact, the Nighthawk normally flies its weapons delivery profiles straight and level at various altitudes, dropping its precision weapons under the control of the pilot. Thus, the TI designers came up with a slightly different version of the fin group used on the Paveway II family, which fits nicely inside the limited volume of the F-117A weapons bay. The normal warhead of the GBU-27/B is the BLU-109/B, though the Hardback adapter is deleted because of the unique "trapeze" weapons handling gear of the Nighthawk.

The final version of the Paveway III family deserves special attention. It is the famous "Deep Throat" super penetrator bomb that was used on the last night of Desert Storm. Officially designated as the GBU-28/B. Its origins date back to August 1990, when the first planning for an offensive air campaign against Iraq began. As the planners in what was known as the Black Hole began to look at strategic targets around Baghdad, they noted a series of super-hard command and control (C) bunkers, so heavily built that there were doubts about the ability of the BLU-109/B warhead to penetrate and destroy them. With this in mind, a request was made to study the problem at the USAF Air Armament Division at Eglin AFB, Florida. Down at Eglin AFB, a quiet study was started to look over the problems associated with an improved penetrating bomb. In the study group, headed by Major Richard Wright, there was an engineer named Al Weimorts, who began to make some early sketches of a concept bomb that might just do the job. And that was where the idea stayed until the early BDA results from Desert Storm began to come in. By January 21st, 1991, it was clear that the BLU-109/ B-equipped LGBs were just not getting the job done. All they had done to the big bunkers was scab the surface, and not much else. Worse, with more and more of the other Iraqi C bunkers being destroyed, a greater percentage of the top Iraqi leadership was taking refuge in the big command bunkers and continuing operations. This made the destruction of those bunkers a top priority, and the word went out to the team down at Eglin to find a way to do so quickly.

Given their marching orders, TI, as well as the BLU-109/B team at Lockheed, got to work on a number of different problems at once. First there was the problem of the warhead. While the basic design of the BLU-109/B was sound, what was needed was something larger — longer and heavier, with a larger explosive payload. Also, because they had to bolt a modified Paveway III kit onto it, and because they had to maintain the necessary clearance to fly and drop it from either an F-111F or F-15E, it would not have a larger diameter than the BLU-109/B. This made for a long, skinny warhead section, with a long interior cavity, or "throat," for the explosive filler. Thus the bomb got the nickname "Deep Throat."

Next, to machine and finish a forged-steel blank would take months, and the Eglin team had days. Luckily, an engineer at the Lockheed plant where the BLU-109/Bs were made was a retired U.S. Army trooper who remembered a stock of old 8-inch/203mm howitzer gun barrels lying around (literally) at the Letterkenny Arsenal in Pennsylvania. Made of the same kind of hardened steel as the BLU-109/B, they had been happily rusting away for some time. By February 1st, 1991, a number of the old gun barrels were shipped to the Watervliet Army Arsenal in upstate New York and machined into the shape of what would become known as the BLU-113/B Super Penetrator. Eventually, around thirty-two of the BLU-113/Bs would be built for integration into what was going to be known as the GBU-28/B. Several inert (non-explosive) tests indicated that the new bomb was capable of doing the job. This included one test on a rocket sled at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, where it penetrated 22 feet/6.7 meters of reinforced structural concrete, and then continued on to careen downrange for another mile or so without any damage whatsoever to the BLU-113/B. Each of the new warheads eventually weighed in at 4,700 lb./2,136.4 kg., and had to be hand-loaded with some 1,200 lb./545.45 kg. of explosive, and then integrated with the guidance kits from TI.

Those guidance kits were a whole story on their own. Meanwhile, the original Paveway III development team had long since moved onto other jobs within TI, and had to be reconstituted as quickly as possible. Murl Culp from Lockheed contacted TI and discussed the feasibility of guiding the new penetrator with a derivative Paveway III GCU. Luckily, Bob Peterson, an original Paveway III engineer, was still with the company, and was able to reassemble enough of the original team to get the ball rolling. And other members of the team were pulled off of other important TI programs to staff the effort. By February 12th, the TI/Lockheed team was down at Eglin AFB briefing guidance concepts to the Air Force.

Once the new guidance software was completed, the major testing normally associated with development of a new Paveway GCU would have to be accomplished in days rather than years. A key problem was access to the only wind tunnel in the Dallas/Fort Worth area capable of doing the testing required to develop and validate the new LGB's software. Owned then by LTV/Vought, it was heavily booked with projects, and the security around the GBU-28/B precluded doing anything special to "force" the owners to provide access for TI. Thus, TI would have to use the only open "window" on the tunnel's calendar, on the weekend of February 16/17, just four days away. Now, it should be remembered that at the time all of this was going on, TI, Lockheed, and the Air Force did not have any sort of contract for this project. What they did was done on a handshake and good faith, and TI decided to trust in that when they scheduled the tunnel time. They constructed a 1/4 subscale model to establish the ballistics of the new BLU-113/B/Paveway III combination, which was designated the GBU-28/B.

The tunnel testing was completed by the early hours of Monday, February 18th, and the effort now fell completely on the shoulders of the TI team. Over the next week or so, they worked around the clock to produce the software that would allow the bomb to guide successfully to a target. Almost as an afterthought, the Air Force called with an order for the first two guidance kits on the 19th, and the GBU-28/B was finally an official project, financially and contractually. Two days later, on the 21st, a TI-chartered aircraft loaded with four large airfoil groups took off from Love Field in Dallas, bound for Eglin AFB. These would be part of the actual kits that would be shipped to the Taif RSAFB, where the 48th TFW was based. The decision had been made that the F-111F would deliver the new bombs, mainly because the airframe was more mature than that of the F-15E.

On February 22nd, TI was asked to produce two more of the GBU-28/B guidance kits and ship them ASAP out to Nellis AFB, Nevada. The Air Force wanted to do a full-up test of the new bomb being dropped from an F-111F before it went to combat over Iraq. The ground war into Iraq and Kuwait was only hours from starting, and the Air Force wanted to be sure the system worked.

On the morning of February 24th, the final test of the new bomb took place. A fully integrated bomb (with an inert warhead; the explosive charge was not loaded) was dropped by an F-111F at a target on the Nellis AFB range. The results were stunning. Not only did the GBU-28/B hit the target as advertised, but it dug a hole over 100 feet/30.5 meters deep in desert caliche (hard clay soil with roughly the same consistency as concrete!). The BLU- 113/B-equipped LGB was buried so deep, it could not be retrieved. It remains there to this day.

After the single "event" (as tests are sometimes called), TI programmed two GBU-28 GCUs (designated WSU-36A/B), and flew them out to Eglin AFB on Monday, February 25th. These were mated with two of the previously shipped airfoil groups, strapped to a pallet along with a pair of BLU- 113/B warheads, loaded aboard a USAF C-141B StarLifter, and flown to Taif RSAFB on February 27th. Since the normal BSU-84/B planar wing section was too big to allow the proper ground clearance and separation from the F-111F, and a gliding bomb was not really required (the GBU-28/B was to be dropped from high altitude), a modified version of the GBU-27/B tail fin assembly was developed for attachment to the new bomb. Covered with signatures and messages from everyone who had handled them during the program, they were two of the oddest-looking weapons ever built.

Within five hours of landing at Taif, the two bombs were loaded aboard a pair of 48th TFW F-111Fs, and their crews were briefed to hit a very special target that very night. For some time, a bunker known as Taji #2 had been monitored closely by elements of the U.S. intelligence community. Located at the al-Taji Airbase, approximately 15 nm./27.4 km. northwest of Baghdad, it had been hit no less than three times by F-117As with GBU-27/Bs early in the war. In the words of General Horner, they only "dug up the rose garden." Since that time, various estimates had suggested that the top national command authorities of Iraq, including possibly Saddam Hussein himself, were running the war from this bunker. With less than twelve hours left before the planned cease-fire, scheduled for 0800 Local Time (0500 Zulu) the next morning (February 28th), CENTAF was ordered to hit the bunker with the bombs. Each F-111F was loaded with a GBU-28/B under one wing and a single 2,000 lb./909.1 kg. GBU-24A/B under the other, for balance. Even so, while they taxied to takeoff position, the F-111s "leaned" to one side because of the weight imbalance.

On the night of February 27th/28th, 1991, the two F-111Fs took off and headed north towards the airfield northwest of Baghdad. The aircraft made their runs and dropped their bombs. They aimed for an air shaft on the top of the bunker, and at least one of the bombs hit its target. Penetrating the thick, reinforced concrete, it detonated in the heart of the bunker. The results were horrific. All six of the bunker's armored blast doors were blown off their hinges; then a huge glut of flame and debris swelled up. Anyone inside was clearly dead, though to this day we do not know who was there. Though they have never been confirmed, postwar rumors claim that a number of senior Iraqi civilian and military personnel perished in the destruction of Taji #2. But it's certain that the GBU-28/B did the job exactly as designed; it was an unqualified success.

With the war won, the quick-reaction program transitioned to a more normal type of USAF procurement. Approximately twenty-eight additional sets of BLU-113/Bs and GBU-28/B kits were produced so that a proper test program could be conducted. And some additional units were kept in reserve for combat use, should the need arise. In addition, the Air Force has contracted with TI for an additional one hundred GBU-28/B guidance kits; and a firm up in Pennsylvania is forging one hundred new production BLU- 113/B warheads to go along. The idea is to provide U.S. national command authorities with a non-nuclear option to hit hardened targets like command bunkers and missile silos with precision munitions that do not generate a lot of collateral damage.

It's a staggering idea, and it is all due to the original vision of folks like Weldon Word, and his idea for a bomb with a beam of light for its guide. As for the future of the Paveway-series weapons, they may finally be coming to the end of the line. While new Paveway III kits are being manufactured by TI for U.S. and overseas customers, there are no new versions planned. The tactical limitations of LGBs, along with the rapid maturing of GPS technology, is making satellite navigation the guidance system of choice for the next generation of U.S. precision munitions. Nevertheless, Paveway LGBs will be the backbone of the USAF PGM capability well into the next century.

The Future: JSOW and JDAM

By now your head may be hurting slightly from the array of air-to-ground munitions in the previous pages. For what it is worth, USAF strike planners have similar problems when they consider the targets that need to be struck, the damage required to negate those targets, and the weapons required to do the job.

The folks down at Eglin AFB, Florida, who run the conventional munitions programs for the Air Force, are attacking the problem of what kinds of bombs to develop and buy. In particular, they're trying to buy fewer kinds of weapons that do more kinds of things. That was the basis for the TMD series of CBUs like the CBU-87/B, as well as the Paveway III-series guidance kits; and it's at the core of the development of new weapons.

Several new and exciting kinds of air-to-ground weapons are being prepared for service with the Air Force. As might be expected in these days of limited budget dollars, weapons are usually joint-service ventures like the AIM-9X. In addition, they have been designed with many of the following criteria in mind:

• The use wherever possible of available, off-the-shelf components and technologies to lower risks and costs.

• Safe carriage and employment on the widest possible range of aircraft from all services, including fighters, bombers, and even attack helicopters.

• Improved accuracy over existing types of weapons, without the requirement of designation or data link guidance equipment.

• Enhanced weapons-delivery options, including greater standoff range and less exposure of the delivery aircraft to enemy air defenses.

With these requirements in mind, let's explore two new programs that the Air Force is getting ready to put into service in the next few years.

The first of these is the ultimate answer to the problem of delivering cluster munitions into an impossibly heavy air defense environment, the AGM- 154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). JSOW is the result of a joint Air Force/Navy/Marine effort to produce a new munitions dispenser which can be launched at long range toward the target, completely outside the range of enemy defenses. It started life as a Navy/Marine program called the Advanced Interdiction Weapons System (AIWS), which had a requirement for a full man-in-the-loop data link control system like the GBU-15. Texas Instruments won the AIWS competition in 1991, and in 1992, the AIWS requirement and program was merged with the Air Force's own standoff cluster munitions program to become JSOW. Like the TMD, it is designed to function as a submunition "truck," capable of carrying a wide variety of payloads; it can also be used from almost any tactical or bomber aircraft of any service. The key to JSOW is a technology I have often praised, the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), which will be the primary baseline guidance system for every variant of the AGM-154. For the first time in history, a satellite navigation system will guide a weapon throughout its entire flight, from launch to weapons impact.

The AGM-154 is composed of a nose section containing the GPS-based guidance and flight control system, a weapons carriage bay topped by a folding planar wing system to provide lift during flight, and an aft guidance fin section. The 13.3 foot/4.1 meter-long JSOW, while not exactly stealthy, is definitely of a low-observable design. As designed, the JSOW is capable of gliding unpowered for up to 40 nm./73.1 km. before delivering its load of submunitions on target. Guidance accuracy for the GPS-based system is expected to be within 32.8 feet/10 meters in three dimensions, more than good enough for delivery of cluster weapons. The GPS-based guidance systems used on the new generation of precision munitions are actually hybrid systems, with a GPS receiver feeding positional updates to a small strapdown inertial guidance system which actually controls the flight-control system. In this way, the weapon can continue to the target with acceptable accuracy should the GPS system fail or be jammed.

Currently, two versions of the AGM-154 have been approved for production, one loaded with 145 BLU-97/B CEMs and the other with six of the BLU-108/B SFWs. These are expected to enter service late in the 1990s. There are also plans to produce versions with large (1,000 lb./454.5 kg.) unitary warhead and terminal guidance systems. Given the recent cancellation of the AGM-137 Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM), this idea has to be considered a possibility. The new Northrop Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) weapon, which homes in on the sounds of enemy vehicles, and the Gator mine have also been considered for use on JSOW. And there are growth provisions for the addition of rocket and turbojet motors to extend range, as well as the possibility of enlarging the weapons carriage bay. There have even been proposals to produce "non-lethal" versions of JSOW, to provide logistical support for forward deployed troops such as special operations forces. Before you laugh too hard, consider how many Meals, Ready-to-Eat would fit into the 5.7 foot/1.7 meter-long bay of an AGM-154. It may be the ultimate expression of the statement that "every bomb is a political bomb."

The other munitions program the Air Force has pinned its hopes to is the Joint Direct Attack Munition System, or JDAM. Trust me when I say this, JDAM is the program that must work if the Air Force is to be a viable force into the 21st century. There is that much riding on it. The JDAM family of munitions is designed to replace the old Paveway II-series weapons, which are starting to show their age. Like JSOW, the JDAM program began as a pair of Navy/Marine and Air Force programs that were combined into a single joint requirement. Currently, the program is being competed for by two contractor teams consisting of McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell International on one side with Lockheed Martin and Trimble Navigation on the other. Rockwell and Trimble are on the teams to supply GPS/inertial guidance system expertise, since that, as in JSOW, will be the primary guidance system for the JDAM family of munitions. Selection of a final winner is expected in 1996, with the weapons entering service in the late 1990s.

The idea is to produce a weapons family with the accuracy of the early LGBs, utilizing only a GPS/strapdown inertial-guidance system to find the target. This is the critical requirement. For the first time, aircraft without a laser-designator or data-link pod will be able to deliver precision weapons onto known targets. And it will do so without exposing the launching aircraft to direct fire by enemy defenses. Thus, stealth aircraft like the F-117A, F-22A, and B-2A will be able to use JDAM without generating telltale data link or laser designator emissions which might be detected by an enemy.

The basic features of the baseline JDAM family of weapons (called Phase I) include the following:

• 32.8 foot/10 meter three-dimensional accuracy at the point of impact.

• A common guidance kit for every version of the weapon, independent of the warhead used.

• Interfaces with the most popular bomb warheads (Mk 83, Mk 84, and BLU-109/B).

• In-flight targeting and delivery, independent of weather and/or lighting conditions.

• Good standoff range (more than 8.5nm./15.5km. downrange and 2 nm./3.7 km. cross-range) and the ability to target more than one target /weapon at a time.

While this may sound like quite a lot to ask of a munition which has yet to even undergo its first engineering drop tests, the principles behind the JDAM system are both sound and mature. GPS/inertial guidance systems proved their worth during Desert Storm, and are more than capable of doing the job with JDAM. And as we have mentioned earlier, JDAM may not even be the first GPS-aided bombs, if Northrop and Rockwell have their way.

As currently planned, there will be five separate versions of the Phase I JDAM family. They include:

Each JDAM kit will be composed of an aerodynamic nose cap which is bolted onto the nose fitting of the bomb warhead, and a guidance section/fin group which is bolted onto the rear. Contained in the fin group at the rear of the bomb will probably be a small GPS/receiver antenna system to pull in the signals from the satellites and feed navigational updates to the inertial guidance /steering system. Other than that, all mounting, fusing, and arming hardware will be identical to other PGMs.

As for their employment, all the pilot of an attacking aircraft will require is a known target location (preferably one with coordinates correlated with GPS accuracy), and a weapons delivery system capable of plotting a ballistic course to the target. While an onboard GPS receiver would be of great help, it is not necessary to the delivery of the JDAM munition. Once the bomb has been fed the target position and is launched, it will do its best, within the limits of the energy imparted by the launch aircraft, to head for the three-dimensional position of the target. Once there, it acts like any other bomb and explodes — in short, a very simple, yet very elegant solution to getting PGMs on target. Early tests of JDAM hardware on test benches are already showing accuracies in the 3.3-to-9.8 foot / 1-to-3 meter range, without any other added guidance systems. This is the future of PGMs, where the attacking aircraft only has to know the position of a target to kill it.

Ever since young David used a stone projected by a sling to slay the giant warrior Goliath from a safe distance, warriors have dreamed of weapons that allow them to attack from a distance that makes counterattack impossible. Standoff. This has been the idea behind almost every weapon innovation — from the catapult, to the cannon, to the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). During the 1940s and 1950s, a generation of designers and engineers worked to create long-range weapons. For Nazi Germany, there was the Fi-103 flying bomb, known better as Vergeltungwaffe-1, or V-1. Called the "Doodlebug" or "Buzz Bomb" by its victims, it was the first practical example of what we now call a cruise missile. Later, in the 1950s, standoff cruise missiles were produced to extend the reach of nuclear bombers and maritime strike aircraft.

None of these early standoff weapons had any real precision; the mission was simple delivery of a large warhead to the general target area. True stand-off precision weapons had to wait for the development of electronic seeker technology in the 1960s. Earlier, we saw how the first precision seekers were developed for guided bombs like the Paveway-series LGBs, and the GBU-15, so that they could destroy point targets like bridges and bunkers. A precision-guided missile combines seeker technology with a propulsion system to extend its range.

As we head towards the 21st century, the USAF has a growing array of standoff air-to-ground missiles (known by their AGM designator) for use against heavily defended targets. These weapons are highly specialized for the targets they are designed to destroy. They also tend to be expensive, with typical unit prices in the six-figure range. However, when compared to the cost of a lost aircraft ($20 million and up) and the human and political costs of lost or imprisoned aircrews, these weapons can be very cheap indeed.

AGM-65 Maverick

We'll start our look at what pilots like to call "gopher zappers" with the oldest air-to-ground missile in the USAF inventory, the AGM-65 Maverick. Maverick draws its roots from two different programs, the early electro-optical guided bomb projects and the Martin AGM-12 Bullpup (originally designated the ASM-N-7 Bullpup A by its first user, the U.S. Navy). Bullpup was an attempt to extend the range of the basic High Velocity Artillery Rocket (HVAR) used by U.S. aircraft since World War II. Bullpup provided a large warhead (250 lb./113.6 kg.), a rocket motor, and a guidance package to keep the whole thing on course. From a safe distance (8.8 nm./16.1 km.) one Bullpup could kill targets that previously required many aircraft with lots of bombs or unguided rockets. Guidance was provided by a command line-of-sight system, which sent the missile flying down a radio "pencil beam." All the operator had to do was keep the nose of his aircraft on the target, and the missile would fly down the beam and impact the target. When it came into service in 1959, it was a wonder to its operators, who saw it as something of a "silver bullet." The problem was that the AGM-12's guidance system compelled the combat aircrew to fly straight and level toward the target during the missile's entire time of flight.

In 1965, the Air Force began a program to develop a successor to the Bullpup. After a three-year competition between Hughes Missile Systems and Rockwell, Hughes won the contract in 1968. The development of the new missile proceeded smoothly, and it came into service in 1972 as the AGM-65A Maverick. Aircrews who saw the new weapon thought it looked like the big brother of the AIM-4/GAR-8 Falcon air-to-air missile, which was no surprise, since Hughes had also designed and built the Falcon. The Maverick shows its Hughes family roots, having the same general configuration as the Navy's much larger AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile. Externally, the Maverick has changed very little in the last two decades that it has been in service. The airframe is 12in./30.5cm. in diameter and 98in./ 248.9 cm. long. Wingspan of the cruciform guidance and stabilization fins is 28.3 in./71.9 cm. These dimensions make it the smallest, most compact AGM in the USAF inventory, one of the major reasons for its popularity.

It's what's inside that counts, and that is what differentiates the various versions of the AGM-65. The — A model Maverick, which first entered combat service during the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam in 1972, is an E/O guided weapon, much like the GBU-8 or GBU-15. Its main characteristics were a 5deg field-of-view (FOV) DSU-27/B seeker, with a huge 125 lb./56.8 kg. shaped charge warhead (that's really big for one of these!) that could cut through virtually any armor or bunker in existence. Weighing in at 463 lb./ 210 kg., it was powered by a Thiokol SR 109-TC-1/TX-481 two-stage (boost and sustainer) solid propellant rocket motor, giving it a maximum range of roughly 13.2 nm./24.1 km. To fire it, the operator (the backseater of an F-4D Phantom II fighter) selected a missile and powered it up. Once the missile was "warm" with the onboard gyros running, the operator would view the picture from the missile's onboard black-and-white TV seeker and select a target with a set of crosshairs. Like other early E/O weapons, the — A model Maverick tracked its targets by looking for zones of contrast between light and dark areas. For example, a tank or bunker might appear as a dark shape on a lighter background, and this was what the TV seeker of the early Maverick was designed to track. Once the operator had the target in the crosshairs, he would press a switch to lock on the target, and the seeker would begin to track the target, regardless of the motion of the launching aircraft or the target. After confirming lock-on, all the operator had to do was to press the firing button to send the missile on its way, and the firing aircraft was free to maneuver or evade. All models of Maverick are very accurate. If the missile functions properly, it should place the warhead well within 5 feet/1.5 meters of the aimpoint, which makes it a deadly anti-tank weapon.

Early combat Maverick shots went extremely well, helped by favorable environmental conditions. About sixty were fired in North Vietnam in December 1972 (fairly cool, clear air), and hundreds more by the Israelis in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War (good contrast background, along with dry, clear air). Both situations favored the TV seeker of the — A model Maverick. But in the hazy, muggy summer weather of Central Europe, its effective range was often reduced; an E/O TV tracker had a hard time seeing the camouflaged tanks of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. Combined with the different lighting conditions and heavy air pollution, this limited the effectiveness of the AGM-65A. From a pilot's point of view, these conditions forced the user to get much closer to the target than is desirable. This problem was partially solved by reducing the FOV on the next version, the AGM-65B, to only 2.5deg, which allowed for twice the magnification of the target scene by the missile optics. Also, for AGM-65s produced in FY-1981 and later, the rocket motor was replaced with an improved reduced smoke model. Nevertheless, the TV-series Mavericks remained difficult to use, especially in conditions of haze or ground cover, particularly by single-seat aircraft like the A-10 (the Warthog) and the F-16.

New versions of the Maverick were already on the way by the late 1970s. One idea was to make it into a laser-guided weapon like an LGB. A developmental version with a laser seeker, designated AGM-65C, was built by Rockwell. But the Air Force did not choose to put it into production (the USMC did, as the AGM-65E). This version also introduced a 300 lb./136.4 kg. blast fragmentation warhead with excellent penetration against everything from warships and bunkers to armored vehicles.

What everyone did want — including the Navy and a variety of foreign air forces — was a missile with a seeker that was immune to the problems of a visible-light TV tracking system. The answer was something entirely new — an Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker. Like the Sidewinder missile, it would see the infrared (IR) energy given off by an engine or the body heat of a human being. However, instead of using a single detector element like the Sidewinder's seeker, the new Hughes seeker would use multiple elements clustered into a matrix called an imaging array. This array is similar to the photo-electronic pickups used in a home video camcorder. This made the seeker head, designated WGU-10/B, essentially a "poor man's" FLIR. Hughes designed the WGU-10/B to be a "common" seeker, which eventually was used on the IIR versions of the GBU-15, AGM-130, and the AGM-84E Standoff, Land Attack Missile (SLAM).

The IIR seeker integrated into a Maverick airframe proved to be a winner. The seeker was sensitive enough to see through smoke, haze, and fog to find its targets. Initially, the Air Force simply installed the new seeker onto the existing AGM-65B airframe with its 125 lb./56.8 kg. shaped charge warhead. Weighing in at 485 lb./220 kg., the AGM-65D, as it was designated, first arrived in service in 1983 and was very popular, especially in the A-10 community. They even found it could be used as a sensor during Desert Storm, when they would power up one missile on the rack and use its IIR seeker head video to help them navigate on night missions! The Navy and Marine Corps were also quick to see the advantages of the IIR seeker; and as soon as the production of the laser-guided — E model was completed in 1985, Hughes began production of the Navy variant, the AGM-65F. This model utilized the large 300 lb./136 kg. blast fragmentation/penetrator warhead of the AGM-65E and was designed to provide U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft with a serious punch against heavy land targets or ships like patrol craft and amphibious vessels. It too was a great success during Desert Storm. IIR Mavericks can be distinguished from their earlier TV E/O brethren by their drab green or gray paint (versus white for the TV Mavericks); and they have either a milky silver or translucent amber colored optical seeker window (the TV seeker uses a clear optical window).

The latest IIR Maverick variant, the AGM-65G, is still being produced for the U.S. Air Force. Weighing in at 670 lb./304.5 kg., this version takes advantage of everything that has been learned about building Mavericks to date. The AGM-65G's features include the WGU-10/B IIR seeker head, the 300 lb./136.4 kg. warhead, more reliable and accurate pneumatic control surface actuators, a digital autopilot, and the TX-633 reduced smoke rocket motor. Additionally, the — G model Maverick has a ship track "aimpoint biasing" mode, which allows the operator to pick an exact spot on a target where the missile will hit. This allows a pilot to designate the missile to hit at the water-line of a target vessel, greatly increasing the chance of critical flooding. When tied to a FLIR-based targeting system like LANTIRN, the AGM-65G is a weapon of deadly capability. (The unit price is $50,000 per missile in FY- 1991 dollars.)

So, how do you fire a Maverick? Suppose that you are flying in the backseat of an F-15E Strike Eagle equipped with LANTIRN pods and carrying four AGM-65G IIR Mavericks. You are told to attack a column of enemy armor, stopping them for other aircraft following you to finish them off. You ingress (pilot talk for "approach") the target area and locate the armored column along a road. Using the LANTIRN hand controller, you target the lead vehicle in the column and automatically "hand-off" to the seeker the first missile. Then you repeat this setup for the last vehicle in the column (effectively trapping the vehicles in the middle of the column). Closing in for the attack run, you verify that both missiles are tracking their assigned targets, set the MASTER ARM switch to ON, wait for the missiles to come into range (up to 14 nm./25.6 km. at higher launch altitudes), and launch the missiles as fast as your finger can cycle on the firing button. The missiles should now be on their way to their targets. When each missile impacts, the AN/ AAQ-14 will record the result (to provide BDA footage of the event). Before you say this sounds like an advertisement for Hughes and Raytheon (the primary and secondary source contractors respectively), be aware that over 90 % of the Mavericks fired during the Gulf War successfully hit their targets, and most of these were TV E/O and early IIR versions of the missile.

Today, the Maverick missile program is going strong, with fairly bright prospects for the future, given the current defense budget climate worldwide. A number of other nations have continuing Maverick procurement programs of their own, with orders continuing to come in. As for new Maverick developments, there are several ideas being kicked around the engineering shops of Hughes's Tucson, Arizona, plant. Under evaluation is a variant with a new seeker that uses an active millimeter wave (MMW) radar to determine the exact shape of a target in virtually any weather conditions. Millimeter wave guidance uses radar waves small enough (less than a centimeter/0.4 inch) to resolve fine details on a target. The Maverick MMW seeker is only 9.45 in./24 cm. in diameter, so it fits neatly within the current dimensions of the AGM-65. Another option under consideration is to replace the rocket motor used on all previous versions of the Maverick with a turbojet power plant. Called the Longhorn project, it could triple the range of the AGM-65 without increasing the weight or significantly reducing the explosive payload. Neither modification is currently planned for production. Nevertheless, with over thirty thousand Mavericks built to date, the weapon has to be considered a success, with a long career still ahead of it.

AGM-88 HARM

On May 1st, 1960, over the farmlands of central Russia, a small air battle took place that forever changed the nature of air warfare. Almost 13 miles/21 kilometers in the sky, PVO-Strany was desperately trying to shoot down one of their most hated enemies, a CIA Lockheed U-2 spy plane. It was a costly battle. Several of their own fighters were lost to "friendly fire," and the American intruder almost escaped. What won the day for them was the first success of a new tactical weapon, the surface-to-air missile (SAM). When Francis Gary Powers's U-2 was shot down by the proximity detonation of an S-75 Dvina/SA-2 SAM (NATO code-named Guideline), it set off a scramble to counter this new and lethal weapons technology.

"The best ECM in the world," said an Israeli general famously, "is a 500 lb./ 227.3 kg. bomb down the feedhorn of the missile-tracking radar." He was right. But how many aircraft would he lose getting into position to hit a given SAM radar? Fixed SAM sites tend to be protected by layers of optically tracked AAA guns. Thus early USAF plans to hit such sites in Cuba (during the 1962 missile crisis) with tactical fighter bombers loaded with unguided rockets and canisters of napalm would have undoubtedly exacted a high price.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy, long a leader in SAM technology, began to think about the problem of suppressing SAM sites. In 1961, out at the same Naval Ordnance Test Station laboratory that had developed the Sidewinder and Sparrow AAMs, an idea was born that might provide a remedy. Known as an anti-radiation missile (ARM), it was quite simply a missile designed to home in on the emissions of the SAM tracking radar, guiding in to kill the radar. By killing the radar, and hopefully its skilled operators, the SAM site would effectively be "blinded" and unable to function. The first of these missiles was known as the ASM-N-10, later designated the AGM-45 Shrike, taking its name from a predatory bird that kills its prey by impaling them on the thorns or spikes of plants or fences. Simple in concept, the Shrike took some time to perfect; the first AGM-45 Shrike missiles entered fleet service in 1963.

Along with the development of the ARM came a vital piece of equipment which was required to make it functional, the radar homing and warning receiver (RHAW), or radar warning receiver (RWR) as it is known today. Amazing as it may sound, no U.S. tactical aircraft sent to Southeast Asia in 1965 went with any sort of warning system to tell the aircrew they were being tracked by enemy. Thus, when President Lyndon Johnson began the systematic bombing of North Vietnam, with Operations Flaming Dart and Rolling Thunder, USAF, USN, and USMC aircraft began to fall in numbers that were more than just disturbing.

Interestingly, the USAF took a different approach to suppressing SAMs than the Navy or the Marine Corps. The Navy/Marine policy on SAM suppression was just that: prosecute to suppress just long enough for the strike force of attack aircraft to hit their targets, and then run for the safety of the aircraft carrier or home base. In fact, the policy of avoiding duels with air defense sites is at the foundation of USN/USMC strike warfare doctrine even today. Thus, from early 1966, USN defense suppression efforts centered around A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft equipped with an early RWR and a pair of the new ARMs.

The USAF doctrine is completely different. For the Air Force, it was not enough to scare the operators of the SAM and AAA radars. In the view of the Air Force leadership, those individuals, and their machines of war, were there to be killed. Thus, the Air Force formed a small force of specially configured aircraft and handpicked highly trained aircrews to do the critical job of radar hunting. These were the famous "Wild Weasels," initially flying two-seat versions of the famous F-100 Super Sabre, configured with RWR gear, rocket pods, and napalm canisters. Although they were successful in lowering losses from SAMs to the aircraft of the strike forces going "up north," their own losses were prohibitively high. Thus, integrating the new AGM-45 Shrike became a "crash" priority with the USAF. When this was done, losses among the Wild Weasel F-100Fs began to drop, and the crews began to have a future. Not much of one, though. Being on a Weasel crew was statistically suicidal in the early years of the Vietnam conflict.

However, the Shrike had significant tactical limitations and shortcomings. One big one was range. At high altitudes, the Shrike could hit radars some 21.7 nm./40.3 km. distant, while low-altitude launches could be up to 15.6 nm./ 29 km. away. But in practice, launch ranges were usually less than half of the maximum, because certain functions necessary to targeting the missile had to be performed. Most dangerous of these was a maneuver known as a "Shrike pull-up." The launching aircraft had to go into a 15deg climb just before launching the ARM; otherwise it would not successfully hit the target radar van. And if the enemy radar shut down while the Shrike was streaking down onto the target, the ARM was likely to miss, lacking as it did the necessary radar emissions for it to home in on. It was, as they say, a very tough business.

From the very beginning of its use, the Navy and Air Force were unhappy with the Shrike's performance. In 1969, the U.S. Navy conducted a Tactical Air Armament Study which looked into shortcomings of Shrike and the whole range of USN/USMC air-launched weaponry. From this study came a whole set of requirements which led to the beginning of a development program for a new ARM program. The new missile would be small, with the same general weight and shape as the Shrike, but with greater range, speed, accuracy, and lethality. Also, it would operate from the full range of USN/USMC tactical aircraft, both planned and in service, and would both outrun and outsmart the SAMs and radar operators for every Soviet and other potentially hostile SAM system, even those still under development. It was a tall order for the program engineers at NWC China Lake, California, when they began the new program in 1972. Called the High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, or HARM, the new missile, designated AGM-88, would take over a decade to bring into service, and would undergo many of the same trials and problems suffered by other advanced missile systems, such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

HARM was the first really "smart" air-to-ground missile developed by the United States, using for the first time the new technology of microprocessors and computer software. In other words, HARM was a technical "stretch" — betting that a number of immature technologies ranging from high-impulse rocket motors to a new generation of RWRs would come together all at once, some years in the future, within some sort of cost ceiling. Not everything went as planned. Still, by 1974 Texas Instruments was selected as the prime HARM contractor, and advanced development was under way. And by 1978 the first test firings were under way at NWC China Lake. By FY-1981, the first eighty missiles were under contract, and they headed into fleet service in 1982.

The new missile was called the AGM-88A. And the AGM-88C1 (Texas Instruments) variant is the most common version produced today. The basic — C model missile weighs in at 798 lb./362.7 kg., is 164.2 in./417 cm. long, and is based on a 10.5 in./26.7 cm. diameter airframe with a forward (guidance) fin wingspan of 44 in./112 cm. At the front of the missile is the radome for the Texas Instruments Block IV seeker, which has vastly more capability than even the — B model birds of just a few years ago. Behind the bullet-shaped seeker dome are a series of broadband antennas, which are designed to provide all the functions of an aircraft RWR system, as well as providing passive targeting for the missile guidance system. When we use the term "broadband," we're talking about everything from.5 to 20 GHz; this covers everything from UHF radio transmissions to short-wavelength fire control and ground-mapping radars. These antennas feed into a microprocessor-controlled digital signal processor, which is capable of breaking down all the incoming signals and translating them into a prioritized target list. This is accomplished via the reprogrammable onboard threat library, which can be used "as is" by an aircrew or customized for a specific threat or situation. With the new seeker, even rotating air traffic control and phased array radars (like those used on the Aegis and Patriot SAM systems) can be effectively targeted and attacked.

Just aft of the seeker section is the warhead section. This is a 145 lb./65.9 kg. blast fragmentation-type unit, with a laser ranging proximity fuze, similar to that of the Sidewinder and the AMRAAM, which spews its twelve thousand tungsten cubes into the heart of the target radar. Behind the warhead section is the guidance/control section, which flies the missile during flight. This is accomplished by a digital autopilot equipped with a strapdown inertial guidance system, driving a series of electro-mechanical actuators which control the large guidance fins mounted along the mid-body of the AGM-88 airframe. Like the Paveway III, the autopilot allows the missile to fly the most energy efficient flight profile and make the most of the "smash" provided by the HARM's rocket motor. Located just aft of the guidance section is a TX- 481 dual-grain (two-stage), low smoke (to prevent observation), solid fuel motor supplied by either Thiokol or Hercules. It is this motor that generates the incredible speed that gives the missile the first letter in its designation. The top speed, while classified, is probably greater than Mach 3, possibly as high as Mach 4 or 5. This allows it to outrun almost any SAM system in a "quick draw" contest, should that occur. It also provides for a vast increase in range over the Shrike, probably up to a maximum of perhaps 80nm./ 146.3 km. from high altitudes (say 30,000 feet/9,144 meters), and 40 nm./ 73.2 km. when launched as low as 500 feet/152.4 meters. Normally, these ranges would probably be halved, to maintain a performance advantage over any SAMs that might be counterfired against the launching aircraft. The AGM-88 is normally carried on an LAU-118 standard launcher.

From the very beginnings of the HARM program, the Air Force maintained an interest in the new ARM. They too wanted the benefits of such a weapon, and joined in the program at their first opportunity. Initially, their participation included the development and integration of the APR- 38 (later upgraded to the APR-47 standard) RWR suite on the F-4G Wild Weasel variant of the Phantom, which was the primary USAF aircraft assigned to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission at the time. The APR-38/47 is a group of RWR systems, tied together to allow the F-4G WSO (technically called an Electronic Warfare Officer or EWO, but known traditionally as the "bear") to accurately plot the positions and characteristics of hundreds of enemy threat emitters. By integrating HARM with this system, the F-4G became a radar hunter of amazing lethality, taking only one loss during Operation Desert Storm — and that happened because an Iraqi AAA round punched a hole in the aircraft's fuel tank; it wasn't able to land before running out of fuel. The crew survived the mishap without injury.

In addition to the dedicated Wild Weasel aircraft, the Air Force made several of their other new aircraft designs capable of carrying and firing the new ARM. Both new variants of the F-15 and F-16 can do so, given the right RWR systems, launch hardware, and software. And the F-16C has been extensively used to augment, and now replace, the aging F-4Gs that are on their last legs of service. As the last of the precious F-4Gs are going to the boneyard for a well-earned retirement, the F-16 is taking over all of the SEAD/HARM mission, thanks in part to the introduction of the ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS) pod. By combining the HTS pods with data exchanged from other F-16s via the Falcon's IDM, a rough approximation of the F-4G's SEAD capabilities can be reconstituted, without a gap in this badly needed resource.

So how would a pilot fire such a weapon? Well, let's imagine that we're flying a Block 50/52 F-16C, equipped with an ALR-56 RWR and an ASQ-213 HTS pod attached to the Station 5 (right) pod mount point. You and your wingman each have two HARMs on LAU-118 launchers at Stations 3 and 7. The two of you are flying a loose hunting formation ahead of a strike force, with a lateral separation of about 5 nm./9.1 km. You have been briefed about hitting a pair of Buk-1M/SA-11 Gadfly SAM sites on the ingress route of the strike force, and told to look out for possible mobile SAM launchers, which may have been moved into the area. The two of you have set up your IDMs to exchange HTS data and are flying subsonic at about 350 kt./640 kph into the target area. Down on the multi-function display at your right knee is the readout for the HTS pod data, showing a rotating acquisition radar of the type used to pass targeting information to SAM transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicles. At approximately 30 nm./54.9 km. to the target area, the two of you set up a pair of diagonal racetrack-shaped patterns and wait for the action to begin.

As the strike force begins to come up, you see a pair of symbols titled STA 11 come up on the MFD, with indefinite range indications. You call a warning to the strike force to go "heads up" for a possible SA-11 threat, and go to work. In a matter of seconds, your and your wingman's HTS pods have worked out approximate range and bearing to both sites. This done, the two of you each set up a HARM in RK MODE (RANGE KNOWN) and get ready to launch. Within a few seconds, the range to both SA-11 TELARs has settled down, and been fed automatically to the HARM, and you see the two vehicles going for a lock-on with their radars on your RWR. You select MASTER ARM ON and pull the trigger once to launch the missile from Station 3. As the missile flies off, you turn to keep on the edge of the TELAR's maximum range. Thirty seconds later, you see the symbology from both TELARs go off the air as they are destroyed by the two AGM-88s. The two of you now move out in front of the strike force to continue escorting them to the target area. About 10 nm./18.2 km. to the target, you get a sudden warning alarm from your RWR, indicating that a missile-tracking radar has just locked up your Viper. A quick look at the RWR shows the STA 8 symbology indicative of an SA-8 Gecko TELAR somewhere off to the right front. You quickly select the SP MODE from the HARM options, the azimuth setting being automatically sent to the remaining HARM at Station 7. You squeeze the trigger one more time, call a warning to the force, and begin evasive maneuvers, punching out chaff as quickly as you can. Within a matter of seconds, the SA-8 TELAR goes off the air, another victim of the superior speed of the AGM-88. Meanwhile, the one missile it launched at you goes "stupid," flying off to self-destruct somewhere else. The force is safe for now, and you move to a covering position to make sure no wandering MiG tries to hassle your wingman or the rest of the force. Just another day's work.

Today the Texas Instruments AGM-88 production line is going strong, continuing to build the 2,018 replacement HARMs that were contracted to replenish the stock fired during Desert Storm, as well as the foreign orders that are being serviced. There are no known plans to replace the AGM-88 at this time; and there will probably be none in the near future, given the general stagnation in the worldwide SAM development market and the remaining growth potential in the HARM airframe. As for the AGM-88 HARM, it should remain the premier ARM in the world for at least the next ten years.

THE FUTURE: TSSAM AND BEYOND

The future of U.S. long-range air-launched standoff weapons is, to put it mildly, in disarray. This is the unhappy result of the cancellation of a weapon that the USAF and USN had bet the farm on — the Northrop Grumman AGM-137 Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile. TSSAM was to have been a stealthy, superaccurate, long-range (180 nm./300 km.) guided missile with versions for the Navy and Air Force, and even a ground-launched version for the Army. Unfortunately, development and program management problems drove up the cost of the program. And it took a severe hit when the Army dropped out several years ago.

Since the TSSAM program was canceled, the Air Force has been scrambling to figure out how to provide their combat aircraft with a viable precision standoff missile. The current plan has the USAF buying more of what they already have, ALCM-Cs. Several different options are under consideration to fill the gap left by the cancellation of TSSAM. Some of these include:

• Buying the clipped-wing version of the AGM-142 Have Nap, and fitting it to the B-1B, the F-15E Strike Eagle, and the F-16C. This would provide a large part of the capability promised by the original TSSAM program.

• Retrofitting the IIR seeker developed for TSSAM to existing missile airframes like the AGM-86C/ALCM-C or the AGM-84E SLAM/ SLAM-ER, which is a development of the Navy Harpoon anti-ship missile.

• Producing a reduced-cost version of the AGM-137 TSSAM, with the stealth features installed only on the frontal surfaces of the airframe. This is probably the least likely option, given the current budget climate and the general lack of funding for new weapons systems.

Whatever the decisions reached in the halls of Congress, the Pentagon, and the USAF Material Command, there will have to be new gopher zappers, which will undoubtedly be joint programs with the Navy, and perhaps even foreign partners. That is perhaps the greatest impact of the New World Order on the worldwide weapons market — only through cooperation will the industry survive.