Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

0600 VII CORPS TAC CP SAUDI ARABIA 25 FEBRUARY 1991

DURING the very brief — less than twenty-minute — morning update, I was interested in answers to the following questions: What was our situation? The enemy's situation? Where were we vulnerable? Where was the enemy vulnerable? What was happening on the flanks? Had higher HQ issued any changes? Did we need to make any adjustments to exploit an enemy vulnerability or to protect one of our own? Did anyone have any recommendations? Wherever I went, I looked for answers, for these formed the basis of my continuing running estimate.

I hadn't been away from the map long; things hadn't changed a lot.

G-2 went quickly over the enemy situation, then Stan reviewed the battle activities since midnight. Our units reported more prisoners. There were reports from 2nd ACR, as it approached Phase Line Smash, of battalion-sized units and heavy Iraqi equipment, such as tanks, which were early indicators that we could expect increased enemy actions the closer we got to the RGFC. As for the actual RGFC divisions, they did not appear to be going anywhere. They were still in position, attempting to set a defense. The earlier report that a brigade of the Hammurabi was moving out indicated that they might even be trying some kind of maneuver or repositioning north or west. As we had expected, they were not retreating. At this point, I did not know how much they knew about us. By now they were probably aware of a force out to the west, but I did not think they realized our size and capabilities. The early indicators showed some attempt at reorientation, but at this point it seemed to me they still believed the main attack was coming north up the Wadi.

I had no information otherwise from my own VII Corps sources or from Third Army. Because the Iraqi defense was hasty and not well coordinated, they were vulnerable to a massed fist attack. Good.

We had not gotten any change in orders from Third Army.

While I received this short briefing, the radios in the TAC continued to come alive with short-burst transmissions, as corps units reported moves, locations, and enemy contacts, and gave situation reports. Each staff section was busy on the phone getting longer messages or reports, and our NCOs were back and forth in both G-2 and G-3, posting the latest friendly and enemy situations on the map. Troops were already beginning to break the TAC down, getting ready to move as soon as I left. The breakdown of the TAC normally took less than an hour if you had had a lot of practice, and by now these soldiers had had a lot of practice.

Throughout all this, I was both thinking and listening — redoing my mental map of enemy and friendly units based on the briefing, looking forward to key decisions I needed to make that day in order to set corps action in motion to accomplish objectives the next day. First, I did not want to give the Iraqis any more time to set a defense. Second, this was the day to commit to our attack formation. FRAGPLAN 7[28] still looked like the best choice, though questions remained about 1st CAV, which was still being held by General Schwarzkopf in CENTCOM reserve.

I was also thinking of where I needed to go that morning to get information (or to confirm what I already had), to get a feel for the battles and their tempo, and reinforce what I wanted done face-to-face with the commanders.

Right now, I was getting maybe 20 percent of my input from my staff at the CP; 40 to 50 percent from what I was seeing and hearing myself, and from my commanders as I met them; and the rest came from my own professional knowledge, training, education, and combat experience.

As we saw in an earlier chapter (but it bears repeating now), most often you decide to decide. You ask yourself the question: Do I need to intervene and make an adjustment, or do I let the battle continue as it is? Most often a senior commander does not need to decide; he can leave things to subordinates rather than tinker at the margin. Senior tactical commanders really get to make only a few key decisions. It is better for them to focus their energies there, and trust their subordinates, who are in a better position to make their own decisions. Knowing the difference is the art of command. So is determining the tempo of the attack to keep your enemy off balance, and knowing when to be bold — when to take risks and gamble — and when not to.

I would take all those elements into consideration that day as I selected the attack formation to destroy the RGFC. I would also have to find a third division for the attack… or else do without and use the 2nd ACR. Earlier, I had told Don Holder to be prepared to go all the way to Objective Denver if the opportunity presented itself. (Denver was on Highway 8, just south of the Iraq-Kuwait border.) By looking at our unit locations on the map and the enemy situation, and by doing some quick mental time/distance calculations, I could sense the time for that decision getting close.

That meant I had to get on the move, and I needed to talk to my commanders face-to-face.

But I was going nowhere right now. High winds and blowing sand, which reduced visibility to a few hundred meters, had grounded us. I was now a prisoner of the CP and tied to the comms.

Meanwhile, I got reports from our flanks.

Word from our eastern flank was that the Egyptian attack was slow in getting under way. Earlier, that might have bothered me, but not now, because so far the Iraqis had been unable to react. More important, I would have the British out there shortly.

That was important, because until the British could attack out of the breach to the east, Iraqi forces now opposite the Egyptians could be ordered to back out in order to thicken the RGFC defense, or even retreat across our sector along the blacktop road that ran roughly northwest on our Phase Line Smash to al-Busayyah. If they did either, they would threaten the steady stream of fuel tankers moving north from Nelligen to the 1st and 3rd ADs. If any of those Iraqi units — even by accident — ran into one of our convoys on the way to refuel the enveloping units, it would be a disaster from which we could not recover. Leaving logistics that vulnerable was a gamble I was not prepared to take.

On our western flank, 1st AD 1/1 Cavalry was maintaining physical contact with XVIII Corps. Internal flank contacts were also good. In the desert, where there were no navigation features to act as guide points, we had to pay close attention to flank contacts. For navigation, units only had GPS, and at those times of the day when there were no satellites, most of them had to use old-fashioned dead reckoning. As a result, the risk of units running into, or else crossing in front of, one another was high throughout the war. When you have tank cannons that fire projectiles that are lethal past 3,000 meters at a mile a second, and when there are no natural terrain features to stop those projectiles, commanders at all levels pay close attention to flank contact.

At that point, I used the delay to talk to John Yeosock. Because John's liaison in my TAC CP, Colonel Dick Rock, had been keeping Third Army well informed of our locations and actions, John had a pretty good picture of our situation (Dick Rock was excellent at giving this information as he knew it; his challenge was that he often was not completely up-to-date, either because the TAC was moving or because he was not with me and could not hear my discussions with commanders). I explained to John what I anticipated doing today, and he agreed with it.

It was after that, though, that John dropped some surprising news on me: the CINC was concerned that we were not moving fast enough. For a moment, that hit me hard. It takes a lot of wind out of your sails when your theater commander seems disappointed in your progress. As a subordinate, you do not want to get on the bad side of your boss, so it was a blow when I learned that my boss's boss was not happy about our progress.

My first thought was defensive: We had done well even to have gotten to where we were this morning, given the fifteen-hour advance start, I said to John; you know what we have been doing and why. And he agreed: he was pleased with our progress and convinced that, as the commander on the ground, I had the best feel of what to do. And, in fact, he gave me no new orders, nor was there any change of mission.

When John told me that in fact he thought we were doing fine, I decided not to give the CINC's concerns much more thought (at the time). It looks like they don't have a good picture of the corps situation in Riyadh, I told myself, and when they do, this will blow over. It had just been a quick, passing comment. I chalked the whole thing up to the usual emotion of battle.

Certainly, nothing John had told me led me to change my mind about what I needed to do, and in fact, in the press of commanding and maneuvering the corps, I soon forgot all about it (and the episode did not get noted in either my own journal or in Toby Martinez's log). Changes of orders I understood; I would have executed them. But concerns were not orders. There were concerns all over the place. If commanders want to do something about them, they give orders to their subordinates, but neither the CINC nor John Yeosock had told me to do anything different.

After the war, I was to find out that John had been shielding me from an extraordinary emotional outburst from General Schwarzkopf during his morning update. He had — I have gathered from later reports — hit the ceiling. He had expected a VII Corps cavalry charge to the Republican Guards, and when he didn't get it, he blew up into one of his well-publicized rages. Since John Yeosock had much more experience with large armored maneuvers than Schwarzkopf, he knew that the CINC's expectations were illusory. And so he did what many commanders do — he absorbed the blow and shielded his subordinates. He toned down the CINC's blowup to "concerns" when we talked that morning. Yeosock did that a lot both before and during the war for both VII and XVIII Corps.

It is also important to note that Third Army HQ in Riyadh was three miles away from the CINC's underground war room. Most communications between Yeosock and Schwarzkopf were by phone.

Later commentators — including General Schwarzkopf — have claimed that from virtually the first moments of the G-Day attack, the U.S. Army should have been in "pursuit mode" rather than in what we call "movement to contact." More bluntly: they have accused VII Corps of failing to go into pursuit when we should have. However, you go into pursuit when your enemy is in retreat or fleeing. Though that's what Iraqi units elsewhere were doing, that was not the case with the RGFC. They were setting up a defense. Even if the CINC had told us to go into pursuit (which he did not do), it would have been a mistake. His concern should have been to isolate and cut off the RGFC, mostly by air, so that VII Corps and XVIII Corps could destroy them. Instead, he flew into a rage about how fast we were going, based on blue lines on a map in Riyadh that probably were not even accurately posted.

0725 VII CORPS TAC CP

Because we were co-located with 3rd AD (which was still corps reserve at that point), Butch Funk took the opportunity to come see me.

At that time, Butch, real pro that he is, was doing what any good reserve commander would do. He was trying to anticipate the possible commitment of his unit so he could make plans — and maybe even rehearse them. When he came into the CP at 0725, I had two things on my mind: I wanted to keep him moving toward the RGFC, but I also wanted him to continue protecting our right flank from stray Iraqi units or vehicles until the British got out there in force. Butch "rogered" that, then gave me a quick update: he was maneuvering his division from a column of brigades to two brigades up and one back. I acknowledged it, and told him my intent was to position my TAC CP with, or close, to his own, in the center sector.

It was a good, relaxed moment for both of us, and we were able to enjoy a paper cup of black coffee together from our coffeepot in the CP. The operation was going well. Because he and I saw eye to eye on the maneuver, we did not require a whole lot of communication. I was fortunate in all of my commanders — it worked that way with all of them.

After my talk with Butch, I had a few minutes to myself (for the time being, the weather made it impossible to go anywhere). It was a welcome respite, and it gave me the opportunity to go over again what it is we were doing and why. Before I went out to visit commanders, I wanted to take a hard look at our primary mission and our tactics. I wanted to be as certain as I possibly could that what we were about to do would destroy the RGFC, and I wanted to review for myself that my intent and orders to the corps were still the right ones. These thoughts had been on my mind constantly, and they remained on my mind until the battles with the Iraqis ended. I looked at them from every possible angle, again and again:

I had planned a rolling attack through Objective Collins into the flank and rear of the RGFC. We were not in pursuit of a retreating enemy, but preparing to attack a hastily defending enemy armored force.

I had not considered any maneuver except to aim VII Corps directly at that force. That was our mission: to destroy the RGFC, not surround them. The only way to do that, in my judgment, was to hit them in such a way that they could not contend with us, and to keep hammering them until they quit or we had destroyed them. I remembered again what George Patton III had said in Vietnam, in the Blackhorse: "Find the bastards, then pile on." After we had found them and fixed them, I wanted to maneuver VII Corps into a position from which we could not only attack them, but pile on.

In all of our briefings, it had been made clear that if the RGFC defended from where they were, the theater plan was for CENTAF — the Air Force — to isolate them. In Colin Powell's words, they were the ones who would "cut them off." We were the force that would "kill them."

After I thought about the mission, I thought again about the time it would take. From the first, I had thought the campaign would last eight days: two days to get to the RGFC, four days to destroy them, and two days to consolidate what we had done. Those first two days were not only a function of the Iraqi army, but of time/distance, the coherence of our formations, and the freshness of our troops for the anticipated fight. From our line of departure to Collins, our way point just past Phase Line Smash, it was about 150 kilometers. If I decided on FRAGPLAN 7, I wanted a three-division moving fist of reasonably fresh troops at Collins, with enough fuel to sustain the attack until the RGFC was destroyed.

Third Army had its own campaign timing figured out and it was well known to CENTCOM and to us. Third Army's planning had us taking seventy-four hours after H-Hour (i.e., BMNT on 24 February) to reach the RGFC. Our timing was in harmony with theirs.

And then there was the issue of "operational pauses." I wanted to go over that again as well.

As we saw earlier, my staff had estimated that if the corps moved continually to Objective Collins, we would need to make a preplanned halt so that our units could replenish themselves before they resumed the attack, and they were correct. The physical endurance limitations of soldiers and the need to fuel our vehicles meant that we could not move constantly for forty-eight hours, and then shift right into a major attack that might go on for up to four days.

While Cal Waller was acting Third Army commander, I had briefed him in a four- to six-hour "rock drill" at the VII Corps CP. All my senior commanders had been present, and they had moved their own markers around on the flat 1:100 000 map board. During the drill, Waller had suggested needing a twenty-four-hour operational pause at Collins as we shifted from a north-south to an east-west attack. But I did not want to stop at Collins, directly in front of the RGFC–I wanted a rolling attack right into them: "no pauses." Therefore, I adjusted the tempo during the first two days to meet that goal.

To get in the right attack formation without stopping meant a number of adjustments as we approached Smash. It also meant finding a third division for the fist. Today I would pick the third division or decide to use the 2nd ACR. As for the tempo adjustments, I had already begun making them the night before, and others would be made by my subordinate commanders as they maneuvered their units. For example, Don Holder was maneuvering the 2nd ACR at a tempo that would keep him about thirty minutes ahead of the divisions, and Butch Funk and Ron Griffith would do the same. Rupert Smith would move his division rapidly through the breach, then attack aggressively to the east. If I thought they needed to change their tempo to keep the corps physically balanced for our attack, I would tell them.

When Butch left the TAC, the weather had cleared enough for me to fly forward. By now I was getting antsy about remaining too long at the CP. I hated to listen to the battle in the CP. I did not belong there. The inputs I needed to make decisions were not all there. They were forward.

RENDEZVOUS WITH MAJOR GENERAL GRIFFITH SOMEWHERE IN IRAQ ABOUT 0830

Though the wind had slowed down enough to fly, the sky was overcast and the temperature was fifty degrees.

First, I went forward to meet Ron Griffith.

I spent the twenty minutes of flight time staring at the map. It was coming together. The time and distance factors, as well as the position of VII Corps's units resulting from last night, gave me the mental picture I needed. If the RGFC stayed fixed, we were in an excellent position to turn ninety degrees east with our main attack — FRAGPLAN 7.

With the intelligence indicating that the RGFC was staying in position — or perhaps beginning a movement that might denote an offensive maneuver — I felt it more important than ever for Ron to move 1st AD fast to Objective Purple, and achieve a positional advantage on the northwest flank of the RGFC in case they came toward us. With that done, I wanted him to be in the northern part of Objective Collins by midmorning the next day. By this time, I felt sure enough of the RGFC indicators that I could now give that order to Ron. Even though I could still maneuver 1st AD in a different direction if intelligence on the RGFC changed during the day, this order would essentially start us into the ninety-degree turn east. However, since the conditions for the FRAGPLAN 7 decision were still not completely certain, for the rest of the day I looked for information that either would confirm my hypothesis or cause me to decide to do something else.

Either way, I knew I would make the go/no-go decision later in the day.

Ron and I met somewhere in the east of his sector, about fifty kilometers into Iraq. It was flat, empty desert, with no vegetation. Some of his units were visible moving forward.

Ron had landed his helo and was in radio contact with the division. His aviators had rigged up a portable generator so that they could set up quickly to power the radios. With him in his helo were his G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Keith Alexander; his G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Tommie Straus; and his aide. It was a good setup that allowed Ron both to move around the division and be present up front. While he was moving around, his ADC, Brigadier General Jay Hendrix, stayed on the ground at his TAC CP, while his chief of staff, Colonel Darryl Charlton, ran his main CP. Brigadier General Jarrett Robertson, ADC for support, moved around the division sector, making sure he and the DISCOM[29] commander, Colonel Verne Metzger, were on top of the division's considerable logistics challenges.

I did not care how the commanders arranged things as long as they were personally up front and knew what was going on and I could find them. I always tried to go to them rather than have them come back to me.

Ron was clearly on top of the situation and feeling good about his operation — I could see it on his face and hear it in his tone of voice. That was the way I liked to find my commanders, and it was also the way I felt about the entire corps just then. Up to now, they'd been facing parts of a brigade (and other units in the area, Ron estimated) of the Iraqi 26th Division in depth, but they'd had no problem defeating them (they had many prisoners).

In fact, he reported, their main problem so far wasn't the Iraqi army, but the Iraqi terrain in the forward parts of their sector (that is, for the first fifty kilometers or so after their line of departure). They had encountered boulder fields, sabquas (soft sand), and blowing sand on the previous day, which had made it difficult to maintain unit integrity and had caused them to consume more fuel than they had anticipated. Fuel vehicles had gotten stuck in the sand, and some rocky terrain had proved more difficult to get through in coherent formations than we had thought. (My staff had predicted — quite accurately — that the going would be tough early on in 1st AD sector. I had largely ignored this estimate!) As it happened, CENTCOM/ARCENT had earlier read this terrain as impassable for armored formations. The Iraqis had read it the same way. Thus, not only did the Iraqis not occupy it, they thought it would help their defense refuse the left flank.

Once through this area, the 1st AD tempo picked up dramatically. Its navigation challenges were exacerbated by the lack of GPS — the division mainly had LORAN[30] navigation devices. It sometimes took as long as two or three minutes to get accurate readings from LORAN towers (the Iraqis left these towers standing the whole war!). Because of the two- or three-minute lag time of readings, units wandered around some, and made some "S" maneuvers through the already difficult terrain. It was even more difficult for logistics to keep up. In other words, up to now, navigation, refueling needs, and changing division formations had regulated the 1st AD's tempo more than any Iraqi action.

Meanwhile, in order to maintain the momentum of his attack, Ron was about to shift the division formation out of its wedge. What he wanted to do was destroy the brigade of the 26th Division that had been out there refusing the flank while he bypassed with the other two brigades and moved rapidly to al-Busayyah. His third brigade got the mission of destroying the Iraqi brigade.

Finally, all along, he had kept his cavalry squadron well out in front of the division, much the same as I had the 2nd ACR out in front of the corps. He continued to do that now.

"Ron," I said, when he had completed his update, "I want you on Purple before it gets dark today. I'll get 2nd ACR out from in front of you."

"Roger, I understand and do not think that will be a problem," Ron answered.

I recalled then my own original estimate of eight hours from LD (line of departure — in this case, the border) to Purple. After I learned about the navigation problems the division had been facing, as well as the enemy action they'd run into along the way, I realized that my estimate had been overly optimistic.

Still, they had done very well, considering the problems they'd faced. On the twenty-fourth, 1st AD had moved all day. They'd started before 0500, after 2nd ACR had vacated the terrain in front of them, and they'd continued until well after 2100 (the process of collecting and refueling vehicles, plus local security and reconnaissance operations, went on all night). Then the troops were back into it at first light that day. The leaders got even less rest. Now they were about halfway to Purple — maybe seventy kilometers. So when I left Ron, I had every reason to believe they could be there and seize al-Busayyah by dark.

"I also want you to have 1st AD in the northern area of Collins by midmorning tomorrow," I went on to tell him. "It looks as though the RGFC will remain fixed. If that is the case, then our FRAGPLAN 7 will work. You are the northern part of that attack."

Ron gave me a WILCO and said they could do both. They would seize Purple and be in the northern part of Collins by midmorning the next day.

As he and I were meeting, Ron's division cavalry squadron was beginning a series of actions that went on for the rest of the day. At this point, they were about 20 kilometers in front of the division, close to 80 to 90 kilometers from the border, and about 50 to 60 kilometers from al-Busayyah, and they were already in a fight. During this early action, they destroyed a BMP and captured more than 200 prisoners, then, passing the action over to the newly arriving 1st Brigade, they had pressed on. Soon their Bradleys and Cobras had destroyed several more armored vehicles, including two T-55 tanks, and they had captured additional prisoners, bringing their total to more than 500 in a little less than three hours. More action followed. It kept up until they reached the outskirts of al-Busayyah just before dark.

Al-Busayyah, or Objective Purple, was a key in our planning. It was the major Iraqi VII Corps logistics base — thousands of tons of equipment and ammo there — and an airfield was nearby. After 1st AD took it, Third Army planned to use this area as a logistics base for XVIII Corps and to push supplies up to XVIII Corps through the 1st AD zone in order to avoid the circuitous and much longer route to the west. Getting it also secured XVIII Corps's flank.

In order to protect the follow-on logistics units of both XVIII Corps and 1st AD, I told Ron Griffith to clear the zone of all Iraqi combat units, which he did. Al-Busayyah was a significant battle. Ron attacked it with his 2nd Brigade (Colonel Monty Meigs, commander) and bypassed with the rest of the division so that they would arrive in Collins to the east by midmorning of the twenty-sixth, as I had ordered. Later, Ron told Meigs to leave a task force behind to clear al-Busayyah, and Meigs left Lieutenant Colonel Mike McGee and his Task Force 6/6 Infantry to accomplish that mission, which they did by killing the defending commando battalion after they refused to surrender.

I had given a lot of thought to assigning this mission and this sector to 1st AD. Assigning particular missions to particular units is one of the ways senior commanders influence the outcome of battles and engagements. Who do you put where in the formation and what objectives do you assign? Who is on the outside? Who is in the center? Who can move the fastest? Who needs detailed instructions and who does not? Who exercises initiative and who needs continuing instructions? You also consider the combat power available, the equipment and troops, and the state of training. A big factor is the condition of the troops. Are they tired? Have they been in the lead and in constant combat for some time? What success have they had recently? And have they taken losses? It is no small decision. All units are not the same.

The choice had been between the 1st AD and the 3rd AD. Whichever one it was, the division had to be able to move fast to Purple and to stay in contact on our west with XVIII Corps (to preclude cross-border fratricide and to prevent the escape of Iraqi units). Then, from Purple, I needed them to be able to rapidly turn ninety degrees east into the northern part of the RGFC, if that is what I decided, or else to accomplish such other maneuvers as the situation might demand. Of all my units, they would have the longest move (and maybe an open flank if we turned east, and XVIII Corps did not move east with us). Either division could do these missions, but of the two, I had commanded 1st AD; I knew them; they were a VII Corps division and used to our FARs; and, most importantly, they had been in Saudi longer than 3rd AD. So I picked 1st AD.

That meant I would put 3rd AD in the middle, and because they were getting into theater last, I would initially keep them as corps reserve and give them a wider number of contingencies to plan.

After I left Ron Griffith, I flew about forty kilometers to the jump TAC, manned by Lieutenant Colonel Dave McKiernan and Major Ron McConnell, which was now forward with the lead elements of the 3rd AD, or almost due east of the place where Ron Griffith and I had met. By this time, Stan Cherrie had the main TAC breaking down in Saudi Arabia south of the border and was starting to relocate toward the 3rd AD. Meanwhile, the jump TAC was with the lead elements of the 3rd AD. When I reached the jump TAC, they had no word on the release of 1st CAV, no change of mission from Third Army, and no change in intel from what I had gotten a few hours earlier.

At this point, I made a decision: 1st INF would be the third division in our fist. Now I needed to get them free of the breach and forward behind the 2nd ACR.

My aircraft and two M577s were by then at the jump TAC with its line-of-sight comms, but I anticipated that my main TAC, with its better comms, would be well into Iraq and set up by the time I finished moving around the corps that day and was ready to make the decision on FRAGPLAN 7. That did not happen.

1100 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION BREACH

After the quick stop at the VII Corps jump TAC, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Greenwald, my command pilot, an SOF veteran[31] and a ten-year Blackhawk pilot, flew us at about fifty feet over the forty to fifty kilometers to link up with Tom Rhame and Rupert Smith.

With me in the helo were Toby Martinez, my aide; Lieutenant Colonel Pete Kindsvatter, the VII Corps historian and an old 3rd ACR mate; Sergeant Park, who was in charge of the TACSAT radio; and Sergeant John McInerney, who was there for local security, if we needed it. Toby also helped navigate, listened to the corps TACSAT radio net with Sergeant Park when we were on the ground, and sat in on my talks to the commanders, so he could feed the result back to Stan at the TAC.

In the back was a map stand that Toby had gotten two engineer NCOs to build out of scrap lumber with hand tools. They'd painted it a dark red, the only paint they could find. It was close to the width of the helo, about four feet high, and had an acetate cover, under which we slid the 1:250 000 map on which Toby kept the current enemy and friendly situation posted. On the map stand was a small shelf, also covered with acetate, where I could make notes. And there was a crude drawer where we kept all kinds of "stuff," such as granola bars and MREs. It worked, but again it was far from high-tech.

At this point, the main communication available to me in my helicopter was my FM line-of-sight radio (which had about twenty or thirty kilometers' range at the altitude at which we were flying), but Sergeant Park also carried a portable TACSAT radio, which he set up when we were on the ground; the antenna went up like an umbrella. He and Toby would eavesdrop[32] on the VII Corps SATCOM command radio net and make notes on a card for me. We had only one TACSAT in the corps that could be used while flying. Park did a magnificent job keeping the radio working and setting it up in the rain and wind; I decorated him after the war.

When the common folks wanted to put the single air-carried TACSAT on my Blackhawk, I told them no, put it in the 11th Aviation Brigade. They needed the comms on the move for their deep strikes. I could wait until I got where I was going and use the portable, hand-carried TACSAT.

As we flew in, I could see evidence of success all around. Specifically, the 1st INF had pushed their third brigade forward in between their 1st and 2nd Brigades as they expanded left, right, and forward. The three brigades were now abreast of one another on a semicircular line that marked their expanded breach-head line, which they had named New Jersey, forty kilometers into Iraq. By doing this, they had cleared the breach so that the British could flow through it and attack to the east.

Moving a brigade in between two others that are simultaneously moving out of the way, moving forward, and fighting is a great feat of coordination. The 1st INF had done it in less than four hours without incident.

They'd also had additional combat: in expanding the breach head east and north, their 2nd Brigade had attacked into and destroyed the 807th Brigade of the neighboring 48th Iraqi Division.[33] In expanding west and north, their 1st Brigade had added to the destruction of the 26th Iraqi Division's 806th Brigade (the 3rd AD, 2nd ACR, and 1st AD also had run over elements of this Iraqi brigade). And I could see overrun Iraqi positions and destroyed Iraqi equipment.

I also could see a steady movement of 1st INF vehicles forward into the newly expanded breach-head area to make room for the British passage. Their biggest challenge, I knew, was handling the thousands of prisoners. Our combat units were just not able to spare the combat power to escort prisoners to the rear. Many times, all over our corps sector, prisoners were disarmed, given food and water, and sent south to the rear on their own. The 1st INF had started that practice here.

As we landed, I could not hear any firing.

Tom Rhame came out to greet me, cigar in hand, obviously animated. Rupert Smith was there as well, clearly ready and eager to get his division into the fight. Tom had a hastily set-up CP arrangement with two expando vans (one each for the G-2 and G-3) and a few other vehicles. His TAC CP was farther forward, closer to New Jersey. We went inside Tom's G-3 van and sat down.

"Boss, this operation is going great," Tom began. "We've pushed out to New Jersey, and Rupert is beginning his passage."

By this time, he went on to report, they had destroyed all of the Iraqi 26th Division, which had been facing them, a brigade from the adjacent 48th Iraqi Division, all artillery in range of the breach, and other unidentified units in the area; and they had marked the twenty-four passage lanes through the breach. They were now clear of the breach lanes and well forward to New Jersey. Tom was really pumped… and I think a bit relieved that the breach had gone so well and at such a small cost. He was proud of his troops, and rightfully so. They had trained hard for this mission and had done it superbly.

I was glad to get his report and see it for myself. Because of what we had done so far, now further confirmed by Tom's report, I felt we were building a momentum of success that would fuse with our physical force just as we were hitting the RGFC. Such momentum lifts the whole unit — from platoon to corps. It is contagious. Here, and earlier with Ron Griffith, I was seeing exactly what I had anticipated, and that pleased me a lot.

As he finished, he added, with the same enthusiasm with which he had made his report, "Don't leave us behind, Boss." What a great team we had.

"No chance of that," I said, then told him what I'd come to tell him, that the Big Red One was to become the third division in our fist. "I want you to leave a task force" — a battalion—"in the breach for security, and after 1st UK passes, move your division forward here." Pointing to the map, I gave Tom a location I had picked just south and west of the place where 2nd ACR would be by that time. "Be prepared to make a forward passage through 2nd ACR sometime late tomorrow afternoon to attack the RGFC."

"WILCO." Tom was not one to waste words.

Meanwhile, the British had been moving forward most of the day before and into the night to an area just south of the border berm. Although they had originally planned to come forward on HETs (in order to save wear and tear on their vehicles), they'd realized they didn't have time to load onto the HETs, move forward, off-load, then reassemble the division, and so they had rapidly changed their plans and moved the sixty to seventy kilometers forward on their own power.

They had done a splendid job of adapting rapidly to changed circumstances: they had had to change their plans, get the orders out, move in formation, and get the leaders into huddles to talk about adjusted times for their attack. They'd also needed to talk about the usual "machinery" of passage, such as recognition signals, exchange of routes, fire plans, logistics, co-location of CPs, and face-to-face coordination. There had been many things to get done simultaneously and they'd done them.

Although they'd gotten themselves assembled and ready to move through the breach quickly, however, the quick change in plans had strung the division out a good bit more than they would have liked. In spite of these difficulties, though, they were ready to pass their 7th Brigade through the breach as soon as the 1st INF expanded it forward and cleared their units from the lanes the British needed. As Tom, Rupert, and I met, they had already begun forward movement. I now wanted to explain to Rupert his part in what I had just ordered Tom to do.

Major General Rupert Smith was a fast-thinking, decisive commander, who had his 1st UK Armored Division ready for action. Although he had not had a lot of time in mounted units, he had a nose for the fight and permitted his subordinate units maximum freedom of action at small-unit level to accomplish their mission. I had watched him prepare his commanders in war games. He always sketched out what he wanted done, drew in some basic control measures, then left his brigadiers, Patrick Cordingly in 7th Brigade and Christopher Hammerback in 4th Brigade, to execute. At the moment, they had a series of objectives: to move out of the breach to the east, which would put them into the rear of the Iraqi frontline divisions and into the front and flank of the Iraqi 52nd Division. During the next few days, they performed those maneuvers skillfully, and they were in a series of stiff fights day and night.

I was proud and happy to have the British with us. They were fast off the mark, aggressive, and pressed the attack. I liked them. They were family.

"Rupert," I said, turning to him, "what I've just told Tom means your division must move through here as quickly as possible and clear out so that Tom can move forward."

As soon as he understood my intention, Rupert told me that he saw no problems, and that he and Tom would stay in communications and make it happen. They then estimated that it would take the Brits about twelve hours to make the passage through the breach — four hours longer than earlier staff estimates. But the estimates had not taken into account the number of vehicles now in the division. With the additional 142nd Artillery Brigade, U.S. Army National Guard from Arkansas, these now numbered about 7,500. Since the British had actual experience of two full-up rehearsals in our recent training, I figured Tom's and Rupert's estimate was accurate.

After I left Rupert and Tom, I huddled for a few minutes at my other jump TAC, which was at the breach.

While I was there, I got a flash report from the 2nd ACR: at 1240, they reported that they'd found the security area of the Tawalkana Division, and identified the unit as the 50th Brigade of the 12th AD.

The security area is a zone of about fifteen to twenty kilometers (sometimes less) in front of a main defense, and is intended to deceive the attacker as to the location of the main defense and to break up the momentum of the attacking force by causing them to fight, deploy, and thus expose their intentions early.

Finding the RGFC security area was a big deal for me, for it indicated that our main attack was beginning. Once that zone had been found, I wanted the CAV to attack through it and into the main defense, while I simultaneously maneuvered the corps into a fist and kept them concealed from the RGFC as long as we could.

Other reports from the 2nd ACR indicated that their Troop I had destroyed twelve Iraqi personnel carriers, and soon after, 2nd ACR reported another contact and combat with an Iraqi mechanized battalion reinforced by tanks. All this was happening around our Phase Line Smash.

My orders to 2nd ACR were to press on to develop the situation, but not to become decisively engaged. I wanted the regiment to collapse that security zone and find where the main defense was. I did not want them stuck in a situation they could not handle while I was maneuvering the heavy fist of the corps against the Iraqis' main defense area.

But as of now, the timing seemed about right to me. The 2nd ACR had the combat power to continue east through the Iraqi security zone, while I turned the rest of the corps ninety degrees to take up the fight they were now beginning to develop for us.

By now it was getting close to 1400, time to go forward and get a firsthand, face-to-face assessment from Don Holder.

We lifted off from near the 1st INF CP and flew the seventy or eighty kilometers forward to link up with Don Holder. This flight gave me a chance to look over the 1st INF's accomplishments, then to fly over the 3rd AD and the empty stretch between the 3rd AD and the 2nd ACR.

What I saw were signs of Iraqi defenses, now destroyed. Some destroyed Iraqi equipment was also visible. Bunkers and trenches were everywhere, either abandoned or destroyed by 1st INF vehicles running over them. Though I had seen no prisoners while I was on the ground, Tom had told me there were so many they had almost overwhelmed their capacity to move them to the rear. (This information gave me some concern, for the breach lanes needed to be running south to north. We didn't need EPWs moving south and clogging lanes.)

Moving south to north, meanwhile, was a steady stream of equipment: the British. The whole scene was just as Tom and Rupert had described it.

We doubled back and flew over the incredibly massive 3rd AD formation that was moving forward — vehicles as far as I could see, about 10,000 of them, counting corps support units. And this was only one of the four divisions! By this time, they were stretched from south of the border forward by sixty to eighty kilometers. Though I wasn't aware of it at the time, the 3rd AD was having some combat actions of its own as we passed over, and taking prisoners. The area they covered was simply too big for me to see everything they were doing in a quick overflight.

After we passed their lead units, flying very low and fast, there was nothing but sand until we reached the 2nd ACR. It was a strange feeling, flying over this now mostly empty "no-man's-land" through which the 2nd ACR had attacked earlier. Though there were bypassed Iraqi units in this area, plus who knew what else, I was too focused on the 2nd ACR to pay too much attention to what lay beneath us.

1530 2ND ACR MAIN CP

Right now I needed to look at the current situation in front of the 2nd ACR before confirming the attack formation for the corps. I also needed to decide whether to push the 2nd ACR straight to Objective Denver or to pass the 1st INF through and put 2nd ACR in corps reserve. We landed at the regimental TAC CP, where there were three M577s and a scattering of other vehicles under some canvas extensions. Inside the CP, I immediately sensed that the regiment was engaged with the Iraqis. Radios were alive with almost constant battle reports. Maps were being posted and adjusted with new information. Small huddles were taking place as officers exchanged battle information.

I could tell from Don Holder's voice and his eyes that he was in a fight. I also sensed he had it firmly under control and needed no additional help from corps assets at this point. He quickly confirmed the earlier report that the regiment had found the RGFC security zone. His third squadron, he added, had been engaging tanks, APCs, and MTLBs around the regiment's Objective May, close to Phase Line Smash.

Here is the essence of the rest of Don's update:

At 1245, Troop P (aviation) reported numerous enemy contacts just west of Phase Line Smash, and aviation was continuing to push east across Smash. Troops I and K (of 3rd Squadron, on the south of the regiment's northeast advance) engaged an Iraqi mechanized infantry battalion reinforced with tanks about five kilometers west of that sighting and destroyed thirteen BTR60s (wheeled infantry carriers), four T-55s, one BMP, and captured a lieutenant colonel.

At about 1321, Troop L (of 3rd Squadron) crossed Phase Line Smash.

At 1343, 4/2 (aviation squadron) reported Iraqi armor almost twenty kilometers east of Phase Line Smash but out of 4/2's range. At 1400, Troop G (of 2nd Squadron, on the north of the regiment's advance) reported that they had attacked and destroyed an Iraqi infantry company of MTLBs. This meant that Don had not only both his leading squadrons engaged with Iraqi defending units, but reports that his aviation, out front by twenty kilometers, had spotted additional Iraqi tanks. When close air support was available, the regiment was employing it. That day it would use twenty-four close-air-support strikes against the targets being located by the ground and aviation units. Don also had the 210th Artillery Brigade from VII Corps artillery, and a battalion of Apaches out of 1st AD that I had put under his operational control. He was using them all now, except for the Apaches. Those he was saving for that night, because their night-fighting capabilities were much better than those of the Cobras in his aviation squadron. These he used during the day.

At this point, we were at the 29 grid line (29 Easting) and these fights were going on at the 41 grid line (41 Easting), twelve kilometers away.

The desert was featureless, just as it had been at the spots where I had met Tom Rhame and Ron Griffith. There were small twenty- to fifty-foot rises and drops to which the small-unit commanders had to pay attention, but almost no vegetation. Despite the intermittent rain, where armored vehicles passed, sandy dust still got churned up quickly. Though the weather now was mostly calm, the cloud cover indicated that the weather would soon turn bad.

Don's conclusion was exactly the same as mine: he had found the RGFC — the Tawalkana — defending and moving units into position, with a hastily formed security force of other units to its west. From all these battle events, the regiment's intelligence assessment and Don's judgment was that the Tawalkana Division was along the 65 Easting (about twenty kilometers east of our Phase Line Smash), covering the Iraqi army's withdrawal from Kuwait, and with a security zone that extended eight kilometers west.

That got my attention… though I was far more fixed on the location of the Tawalkana and the rest of the RGFC than I was on the possibility of the Iraqis leaving Kuwait. True or not (it turned out to be correct), I had no way to confirm Don's judgment at that point. Instead, I focused on our mission. If the Tawalkana was along the 65 Easting, then that was where we would fight them. It also meant they were fixed or had fixed themselves — either way was fine with me — and that the Medina and Hammurabi Divisions, as well as other armored units, also would be in the vicinity and part of this forming defense.

That battlefield report and Don's judgment confirmed the conditions for FRAGPLAN 7.

Here is how I was thinking: We had the Tawalkana fixed. Other armored and mechanized units in the same vicinity would probably join the defense, as would the two other RGFC heavy divisions. At this point I did not know how much they knew about our enveloping attack. When the regiment hit them, however, they had to realize that they were now facing some forces west of the Wadi. If they were expecting us up the Wadi, they now had to adjust rapidly. They were not good at that (though they could rapidly reposition). After their adjustments, their defenses would not be well coordinated, their obstacles and artillery would not be tied in… unless we gave them time to get set. I was not going to give them that time. The regiment had done what I asked. The Iraqis were fixed. It was time to swing into our attack formation.

One other question remained: If I passed the 1st INF through the 2nd ACR, then where and when should I do it?

In Don's judgment, the regiment did not have the combat power to attack through the Tawalkana and other forming Iraqi units to Objective Denver, and I agreed. That settled the if. As to the rest, it was a matter of a quick time/distance mental calculation. There was no time for detailed staff work. This was an in-your-head commander-to-commander mounted maneuver (and again, the reason why a mounted commander must be up front in the attack with his finger on the pulse). The 1st INF was in the breach securing it, while the British passed through them and attacked to the east. Rupert and Tom had estimated it would take the British twelve hours. If they were correct, the 1st INF could begin moving forward sometime after midnight on the night of the twenty-fifth to the twenty-sixth. Given the almost 100 kilometers separating the 2nd ACR and the 1st INF, and given my imperative that the 2nd ACR keep the pressure on the Tawalkana (so that they would not have time to set their defense), I had much to consider. My first thinking was for the passage to happen late the next afternoon, but that was beginning to look doubtful. If they could not make it by then, I had another decision: should I continue to push the 2nd ACR and pass the 1st INF early in the morning of the twenty-seventh, or pass them forward tomorrow night? That decision was coming, but I didn't have to make it now.

I had a quick huddle with Don and his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Robinette. Don was a superb commander, with a great feel for covering force operations and the tempo of the covering force in relation to the main body. A year before, during REFORGER 90, when he had been in a covering force mission in front of VII Corps, he had developed a situation that exposed an enemy vulnerability (an opening for a preemptive attack), but the main body (or follow-on force) had been too far behind them to exploit the vulnerability. Neither of us wanted that to happen again. I had known Steve Robinette in the Center for Army Tactics at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and I had seen him in action at Hohenfels and in REFORGER in Germany. He was a superb tactician, who could picture the tactical situation in his head and accurately assess friendly abilities as well as any officer I knew. I trusted both their judgments completely. Tactically, we were in one another's heads.

What Don had in mind just then — based on my mission to him not to get decisively engaged, and on the expectation that the 1st INF was closer than they actually were — was that the regiment should go over to the defense very soon and let the 1st INF pass through the next day. (More accurately, he wanted to get into a stationary position that would allow the follow-on division to pass through the regiment with the fewest potential complications.) He was unaware that the British were just now only partway through their passage, or that the time/distance to get the 1st INF forward was greater than he thought.

After I clarified the actual time/distance for 1st INF, I pointed out that I was not yet ready for him to go on the defense. "What I want you to do," I said, "is continue to maintain contact with the enemy. Keep pressure on the Tawalkana. Fix the RGFC. Locate flanks. And then be prepared to pass 1st INF to the east."

Don understood.

It was not an easy mission. He'd have to revise his formation alignment, then go into the teeth of the stiffening Iraqi defense in order to both fix and find the flanks of more than a division, and figure out the tempo to do all of that. And he'd have to do it all without getting so tangled up that I'd have to rescue him by committing combat units at a time and place dictated by the enemy and not by our own initiative… with the end result that I wouldn't be able to pass the 1st INF through. I trusted Don and the 2nd ACR to get the job done. And I knew I'd go back to see how they were doing it.

What I had just done with 2nd ACR was to reinforce the offensive cover mission. So far, 2nd ACR's mission had been to protect the movement of the main body from enemy action, and Don and the regiment had been adjusting their tempo to stay about thirty minutes in front of the main body. Now that was about to change.

I had now ordered Don on a reconnaissance mission — part of an offensive cover — which meant that he now had to orient himself more directly on the enemy in front of him than on the corps behind him. It also meant that the movement tempo could change, that is, he was no longer restricted to keeping about thirty minutes ahead of the lead elements of the rest of the corps. Don and the 2nd ACR were now focused on the enemy, while at the same time estimating a place where they could pass the 1st INF through. I would rely on Don's tactical judgment to decide the tactics and to adjust the tempo for this mission.

Estimating where to make the forward passage of two moving units is more art than science. You could attempt a passage of one unit through another while both are moving in the same direction, like a relay team in track, but in my experience that does not work. You must designate some battle handover point, a clear separation of the responsibilities for where the passing unit is to take up the fight.

In our NATO missions, all our passages of lines had been in the defense, called a rearward passage of lines, where a defending unit on the move backward had passed the fight to a stationary unit in a defensive position. We had done it many times when I had commanded the Blackhorse in the Fulda Gap from 1982 to 1984.

Those were easy compared to the maneuver facing us soon. For one thing, we were attacking. In the attack, I wanted the maximum out of the 2nd ACR, that is, I wanted them to find, fix, and locate the enemy flanks, and also to push as far east as they could go before passing the 1st INF. Sooner or later, however, the 1st INF would be ready to pass, and the 2nd ACR must stop, either of their own accord or because of enemy actions. As they tried to fix that point (judging both enemy resistance and the availability of the 1st INF to pass), the 2nd ACR would almost surely have to go through some fits and starts, and there would also almost surely be some frustrations among junior leaders in the regiment who wanted to press east. I liked that aggressive attitude, but it was better for the larger 1st INF to keep moving steadily while the 2nd ACR did the fits and starts; a cavalry regiment is much more agile and able to handle the interruptions than an 8,000-vehicle, three-maneuver-brigade division.

All this was in my mind as Don, Steve, and I worked things out.

Based on his estimate that the Tawalkana security zone started at 65 Easting and extended about eight kilometers west, Don figured that from where they were, the 2nd ACR should attack to about 60 Easting in order to collapse the security zone. By that time, the 1st INF would be ready to pass through. However, if the RGFC turned out to be farther east than that, or if the 1st INF turned out to be farther behind than we expected, or if the 2nd ACR was able to go farther east than the 60 grid line, then they would continue to attack east.

I thought about that for a second — and about a larger issue that I had to keep forcing into my thinking. Just then I was intensely focused on the present. As tempting as that might be, I knew I had larger responsibilities. I could concentrate on the present only to the extent that its outcome affected future operations. It was not easy — I had commanded a cavalry regiment and there I was in the middle of combat with one — but I had to let that pass and force myself to look to the future — and especially at the decision on FRAGPLAN 7. It was up to Don to fight the regiment in the present.

After a quick look at FRAGPLAN 7 on the map, I looked ahead at both 3rd AD and 1st INF in relation to the 2nd ACR. We needed to pass both divisions through the 2nd ACR to take up the fight against the Tawalkana and the developing RGFC defense, but the two divisions were in different circumstances.

The 3rd AD was immediately available to execute, and was to the west-southwest of the 2nd ACR by about thirty minutes to an hour — just about right. It'd been a hell of a feat for them to get there only twenty-four hours after we had launched — they'd had to start fifteen hours early, and in a column of brigades; they'd had few cuts in the border berm to use, and so the tactical integrity of their formations had been fractured, forcing the units to go through single file, and then reassemble on the far side into two brigades forward and one back. The 3rd AD had taken hundreds of prisoners, some bypassed by the 2nd ACR, and they'd had some combat: Iraqis retreating away from the 1st INF attack had run into the 3rd AD's eastern flank. Because we were concerned about fratricide on that flank, I had placed a five-kilometer buffer zone in between the two divisions. Some Iraqi units in that zone had been attacked by both divisions. In other words, it had not been an idle or combat-free twenty-four hours for the 3rd AD.

On the other hand, the 1st INF was in the breach about sixty to eighty kilometers away from the 2nd ACR, and fixed in place until the British could pass through. By the time the British finished passage, the 1st INF would be a good eight or ten hours behind the 2nd ACR. The next day I would need to make the tactical judgment about how to keep the 2nd ACR attacking east while moving the whole 1st INF forward to catch them, pass through, and take up the attack.

It was all coming together. I knew what I wanted to do. I would use FRAGPLAN 7—but with the 1st INF in place of the 1st CAV, who were still held in CENTCOM reserve. This would cause major adjustments to be made in the 1st INF and adjustments in graphics overlay at corps. To do both on the move would require many orders to be oral rather than written, and maps would have to be hastily marked. But it all could be done.

With the decision came an assumption: Since the Tawalkana was fixed, the other two RGFC heavy divisions would also doubtless fight in that defense. So far, I had the Tawalkana intelligence I needed from the 2nd ACR. I would soon confirm my assumption about the other two RGFC heavy divisions from the intelligence update from my G-2, and from Third Army. Earlier, I had figured with the Third Army G-2, Brigadier General John Stewart, that this was about the point in the fight when we would have to make a prediction about the disposition of the RGFC. I was confident they would have that intelligence for me when I rendezvoused a little later at the TAC with John Davidson, VII Corps G-2.

Meanwhile, the orders that set the plan in motion were clear. I had ordered Tom to move forward. I had ordered Don to continue to attack. I had ordered Ron Griffith to be in the northern area of Collins by midmorning the next day. Now it was time to get an update from my staff and see if Third Army had any orders for us before I gave FRAGPLAN 7 orders to the corps.

I left Don and the advancing 2nd ACR and flew about forty kilometers to the southwest to a spot in the desert where my jump TAC was co-located with the 3rd AD TAC CP. The sky was dark and the wind was picking up; it looked like rain.

Earlier, I had asked my chief, John Landry, to bring a small staff group forward so I could review the situation, compare what they had with what I had seen and gotten from the commanders, and confirm the deep attack by our 11th Aviation Brigade that night.

1630 SOMEWHERE IN IRAQ

After a few radio calls back and forth, and some flying that was in less than a straight line, we found the jump TAC, JAYHAWK Forward, located with the 3rd AD TAC CP. Waiting for me were John Landry, John Davidson (G-2), Colonel Johnnie Hitt (11th Aviation Brigade commander), Colonel Ray Smith (corps deputy fire-support coordinator), Colonel Bill Rutherford (G-4), and Stan Cherrie. Much to my disappointment, the TAC CP were stuck somewhere in the sea of vehicles behind us that stretched all the way back to the Saudi border. Considering the 8,000 vehicles of the 3rd AD, plus those of the 42nd Artillery Brigade that had linked up with them, plus the corps support groups that were moving supplies behind the 3rd AD, it should not have surprised me. But it put me in a slow burn that I had only two M577s and one PCM line[34] with which to command an entire attacking armored corps.

In the fast-fading daylight, we huddled around a HMMWV hood, with a map spread over the top. The jump TAC was still setting up.

"The RGFC situation is about what we reported to you this morning," John Davidson began. "It looks as though they are forming a defense along here." He pointed to a location that was close to an estimate that the 2nd ACR S-2, Major Dan Cambell, had given to me earlier. "We talked to Third Army. Brigadier General Stewart knew you wanted to make a decision about now and that you needed his best estimate on the RGFC. The way it looks, he told me, the RGFC will defend from where they are now."

That was the final intelligence piece I needed, which confirmed everything I'd learned at the 2nd ACR.

Bill Rutherford, G-4, reported that our logistics situation was green for now, but that fuel would continue to be a close call. Log Base Nelligen, north at the breach, would be operational by sometime tomorrow and available to provide fuel to trucks returning empty from the divisions. He also reported an emergency resupply of ammo to 2nd ACR by CH-47,[35] because some of the CAV ammo vehicles had gotten stuck in soft sand. In major end items, that is, major pieces of equipment such as tanks, Bradleys, and the like, we were in excellent shape. Over 90 percent of them were available, as combat and maintenance losses had been few.

"That does it," I said, voicing the decision I had already made. "We execute FRAGPLAN 7. Get the orders out. I want 1st INF to pass through the 2nd ACR and continue the attack tomorrow afternoon. I want 3rd AD to pass through and around to the north of the 2nd ACR and attack east. I already told Ron Griffith I want him in the northern part of Collins by midmorning tomorrow to attack east from there."

VII Corps would now turn ninety degrees east and activate the new Third Army northern boundary between us and XVIII Corps, which would open an attack lane for them and make possible the mutually supporting corps attacks I thought we needed. It also meant that the RGFC was now in two sectors, ours and XVIII Corps's — or rather, in a Third Army sector, as drawn in the contingency plan of 18 February and amended just the day before, on the twenty-fourth.

I knew I needed to call John Yeosock right away to tell him what we were doing. It would confirm what I had told him that morning.

Earlier, there had been some differences over how and when to commit to this Third Army contingency plan. As we have already seen, while Cal Waller was Third Army commander, he had committed to it ahead of time — in fact, he had thought we might even have to pause to make sure we had a coordinated VII and XVIII Corps attack against the RGFC. When John Yeosock had returned, however, he was not ready to commit. Instead, he had published the plan, to be executed "on order." I knew, however, that it was his intent to order its execution if the RGFC stayed fixed, and so when I became convinced that the RGFC was indeed fixed, I thought I had the green light from Third Army to make this decision. And I did it.

Getting hold of him did not prove to be easy.

G+1… THE REST OF THE THEATER

Meanwhile, many other things were going on in the theater of operations. On Monday morning, 25 February, this was the state of affairs in the Iraqi-occupied emirate that the Iraqis called Al Burqan Province and everyone else called Kuwait.

The Marines were in possession of the better part of the Kuwaiti bootheel, twenty to forty kilometers into the Iraqi defense. In the process of taking it, they had mauled three Iraqi divisions and captured 8,000 Iraqi prisoners. JFC-North, to their west, with only enough breaching equipment to open eleven lanes, had not by then made much of a dent in Iraqi lines. Even so, though they were deliberate, the Egyptians were getting the job done. And on the coast, the forces of JFC-East had advanced steadily, though not especially speedily, toward Kuwait City.

The Iraqis in Kuwait were in a wretched condition, and that was just fine, as far as the Marines and the Arabs fighting them were concerned. At least five frontline Iraqi divisions were, for all practical purposes, no longer in existence, and several other divisions, including some heavies, were so severely battered they were close to ineffective. A number of other divisions and special forces brigades remained facing the coast, still waiting for the Marine amphibious assault that was never to come. These units were effectively tricked out of the war. In the end, the Iraqis in Kuwait proved more efficient at destruction and looting than at organizing a defense and fighting a determined, well-trained foe. Most notably, the Iraqis had sabotaged refineries and more than 150 oil wells. Black, greasy plumes of smoke darkened the skies over Kuwait.

Meanwhile, in Iraq, several hundred kilometers to the west, the 101st Airborne was preparing to be airlifted out to Highway 8 and the Euphrates valley, while the 3rd ACR and the 24th MECH were moving north, without opposition, on VII Corps's western flank.

The rest of G+1 was not to go so smoothly.

Early that morning, in Kuwait, T-55s from the 3rd and 8th Armored Brigades of Iraqi Lieutenant General Salah Abdoul Mahmoud's Iraqi III Corps (Mahmoud had been the Iraqi commander at the Battle of Khafji) attacked the eastern flank of the 1st Marine Division out of the oil smoke-grimed fog covering the Burqan oil field. The Iraqi counterattack that everyone had expected had finally come, and from an unexpected direction. Iraqis traditionally took attacks head-on. This time they tried a surprise out of the oil field on the Marines' flank. It was a sharp battle — perhaps the largest tank engagement in Marine history. It was also, for all practical purposes, a rout. The poorly trained Iraqis were no match for the Marines, with their M-60 tanks, their LAVs (APCs), their Cobra attack helicopters, and their Harrier fighter-bombers — not to mention TOWs and other missiles. The Iraqis did not have effective artillery, their tankers couldn't shoot straight, and their attack was piecemeal and uncoordinated. If they had hit the Marines in a coordinated fist (the kind of fist Fred Franks was aiming at their Republican Guards), it could have been a very nasty morning for the Marines.

As it happened, the Iraqi defeat was not a total loss for them. It bought time. The battle put an end to the Marine advance for the rest of the day, and this gave major elements of the Iraqi army time to pull out of Kuwait City.

To the west, the French 6th Light Division and the 82nd Airborne were advancing to as-Salman to secure the Coalition's left flank. Meanwhile, that afternoon, a thousand paratroopers from the 101st Airborne's 3rd Brigade were lifted by Blackhawks north to a spot in the Euphrates valley near the town of Al Khidr, between the larger towns of as-Samawah and an-Nasiriyah. They carried with them their M-16s, their machine guns, a few TOW missiles, and their mortars. Their artillery and most of their TOWs, with most of their launchers mounted on Humvees, came in nearby on big Chinook helicopters. Because the Chinooks didn't have range enough to reach the 3rd Brigade landing zone, they landed about forty kilometers south of Highway 8. From there the Humvees and cannon would travel overland to rendezvous with the paratroopers.

Both landing zones, it turned out, were a sea of mud, which made it hard — and miserable — for everybody, but especially for the artillery. It took the entire night and most of the next morning to plow through the axle-deep slop and reach the other men.

Meanwhile, because the weather was so grim, Colonel Robert Clark, the brigade commander, decided to hold off on reinforcing the 1,000 who had already landed. That left a lightly armed force of paratroopers to spend the very cold, wet night between G+1 and G+2 setting up ambush positions to close off Highway 8, and waiting nervously for Iraqi armor to counterattack. The Iraqi armor, blessedly, never showed up. The worst the Americans had to face, as it happened, were fifteen Iraqi infantrymen, whom they drove off with mortars. Later they stopped a convoy, whose trucks turned out to be carrying onions (which they gave to hungry local villagers the next day).

Though the 101st's hold on Highway 8 was just then tenuous (they were soon reinforced), it proved real, lasting, and effective. For the rest of the war, if the Iraqis wanted to drive from Basra to Baghdad, they didn't do it on Highway 8.