Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

WAR OF WILLS

In a commencement speech at Albright College in my hometown of Reading, Pennsylvania, on 14 December 2003, I said about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,

This world war will continue to be waged by force, and by other means of national and international power. It will also be waged with ideas. When force is the chosen instrument of power, that will be done by an Army and military that used the period of the 1990s to continue its remarkable rebirth, its transformation begun in the mid 1970s. It continues today and it will into the future. Just as we go from the 1970s to the force that fought so successfully in Panama and Desert Storm, so did our military get from the early 1990s to the force that fought again so decisively and continues in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere. I am certain the military will continue that trend so it is "relevant and ready," trained, manned, and equipped to fight future battles and win. It will fight those battles true to our values as a nation, so important in the war of ideas as it is a reflection of our own national character. The U.S. Army is a learning organization, constantly changing itself, transforming, in order to be of service to the Nation, to be "relevant and ready." The rest of this chapter is devoted to reflections on some of those factors of the 1990s that aided this continuing rebirth: versatility; experiments and continuity; people, training, and Leader Development, and the Army profession.

VERSATILITY

The Army is sometimes charged with being slow to exit the Cold War mindset. Nothing could be further from the truth. A look at the recent history of some U.S. Army divisions demonstrates nothing so much as a learning institution, showing flexibility to respond to diverse missions and forward-looking adaptability to lessons learned from the first Gulf War and other operations.

The 10th Mountain Division that fought so courageously at those high altitudes defeating Al Qaeda began the 1990s providing individual replacements for units in Desert Storm. In the summer of 1992 they were helping citizens in south Florida recover from Hurricane Andrew. That same year they were deployed to Somalia to conduct a humanitarian mission that turned into a combat mission. They next flew off the decks of aircraft carriers to land in Haiti in 1994, a change en route when the mission went from forced entry and combat to peacekeeping and humanitarian duties. Afterward, the 10th Mountain went to the Balkans twice for peacekeeping missions in the late 1990s and to the Sinai as part of that continuing mission. When Major General Hagenbeck got a call in the fall of 2001 from the Commander of Forces Command to be prepared to send a force to Afghanistan, elements of his division were in the Balkans and on another deployment. Yet, those who were available were trained and ready, and they and the division command element went from Fort Drum, New York, to Afghanistan where they accomplished their mission with great skill and courage.

1st Armored Division, Old Ironsides, was formed in July 1940 and for most of its history performed its duty as an Armored Division, right up through its magnificent performance in VII Corps in Desert Storm, where it smashed through Iraqi Republican Guard armored units. In December 1995, it deployed overland from its German bases to Bosnia in Task Force Eagle, for a peace enforcement mission. For that mission the division, reinforced with other units increasing its strength close to 25,000 troops, had some of the same leaders and noncommissioned officers who had fought just four years earlier in the Iraq deserts. Demonstrating versatility in both mission change and in assimilating new units, they rapidly made the adjustment from tank fighting in deserts, to crossing the Sava River in the dead of winter to enforce the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia. Following that deployment the division went to the Balkans three more times, twice to Bosnia, and once to Kosovo, all the while honing its proficiency to fight as an armored division. In 2003 it was alerted to deploy from its base in Germany to go to Iraq to be part of the warfighting maneuver. Upon arrival they replaced the 3d Infantry Division in and around Baghdad to conduct nation building and security operations a difficult mission to which again they skillfully adapted.

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) fought in Desert Storm, making air assaults to cut off Iraqi lines of retreat from the Kuwaiti theater. It took them two months to deploy from Fort Campbell. Following Desert Storm, the U.S. Army made an investment in a strategic mobility program that ensured next time deployment would be different. At installations around the country, the Army invested in trains, flat cars and locomotives, shipping containers enhanced with information technology so that each container and its contents could be continually tracked, barges, and staging buildings at airfields. They hired deployment experts for each brigade-sized unit, and conducted training in new deployment methods. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force invested in more capable ships and aircraft to deploy Army forces. The Army invested heavily in prepositioned stocks, placing almost everything needed, including major items like tanks and ammunition, in forward areas. They acquired fast-moving Army ships to move that equipment within the theater of war. As a result, when the 101st deployed this time they did it in about half the time it took in 1990.

During the three-week attack to Baghdad, the 101st gave V Corps Commander, LTG Scott Wallace deep reach with their air assault and attack helicopter capability. The division, which had also deployed forces earlier to Afghanistan, also gave V Corps needed versatility during the attack. They showed the enormous versatility of American infantry. Whether it was air assault, fighting Iraqi fedayeen at close quarters in cities and towns, protecting supply lines, attacks on Iraqi Army units, or deep attacks by Apache helicopters, soldiers and leaders of the 101st accomplished their missions. After the capture of Baghdad they moved north to Mosul and rapidly switched operations in an innovative and creative approach to nation building and peace operations.

Finally, it is worth noting the increased versatility shown in this decade by division headquarters. They have served a wide range of command duties directing a wide variety of force packages, from the Balkans to Iraq and Afghanistan. The range of successful missions show the continual Army vision to gain more rapid deployability, while at the same time having the versatility to be able to tailor organizations quickly for what the U.S. Army calls full spectrum operations. It also demonstrates the versatility and adaptability in leaders and soldiers as they make the necessary adjustments to adapt standard organizations to be successful, regardless of the mission, place, or conditions. Learning and adapting from these operations, the U.S. Army continues to provide land power capabilities to Combatant Commanders and the Joint team by making units, including headquarters elements, more "modular" or capable of being tailored and rapidly deployed.

IDEAS, EXPERIMENTS, AND CONTINUITY

Ideas. To get to the future with organizations and equipment you have to begin with ideas then experiment while also drawing conclusions from operational experience. How you think about the future determines what you think about the future and what you do about the future.

How the Army thinks about the future is to lead with ideas. Earlier on in these pages, we described so-called "warning lights" used at TRADOC that were key indicators of when and in what direction to revise key warfighting ideas. They were: threats and unknown dangers, national military strategy, history and lessons learned from it, the changing nature of warfare, and technology. You are always watching those and scanning the horizons for change. Sometimes all those lights are lit and you need to revise your ideas and change your warfighting methods and how you train and equip soldiers, organize units, and develop leaders. So it was that all through those years of its previous post 1970s rebirth the Army revised its basic set of warfighting ideas to lead change.

The U.S. Army records those ideas in what it calls its capstone doctrine, FM 100-5 and now FM 3.0. The successful rebirth of the Army from the 1970s started with ideas laid out in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5. That book was continuously revised. Following Desert Storm all those indicators were lit again and the Army responded in a new edition of FM 100-5 in June 1993. The manual focused on a set of ideas that described how the Army should think about operations in the post-Cold War world and in an increasingly interdependent joint military team of all services.

Thus, even though a campaign in Afghanistan was not predicted, in its 1993 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, the Army had recognized the need to break away from the linear battlefield of the Cold War and laid the groundwork for how to think about devising future campaigns:

Those thoughts were a marker in 1993 for new conditions as the Army thought they might appear. As those strategic conditions became more clear and national strategy changed, military doctrine would be revised to deal with them. So, there was revision in Army doctrine published in June 2001, called FM 3.0—a set of ideas about Army forces operating as part of the joint military team in the early twenty-first century in what is termed a "contemporary operating environment" and full spectrum operations. It also in ways was a continuum, informing battle commanders that they must create an operational framework to fit the particular situations and missions they were given, just as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Experiments. How you think about the future also involves using an experimental method, which can inform the Army about what ideas to change and which to retain. Technology investments tied to those ideas in what the Army calls concept-based requirements will provide that continuing battlefield edge for soldiers. Experiments can also sharply cut development time if they are done in a collaborative way.

The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) began Battle Labs in 1992 to do just that. Those Battle Labs followed a long lineage of positive experience in all the military services with the experimental method in getting to the future. Specific Force XXI experiments were an outgrowth of the work done in Battle Labs and the overarching Army experimental program Army Chief General Sullivan called the Louisiana Maneuvers. The Battle Labs continue their work, adjusted now for the times, conditions, and technology opportunities needed by the Army in the twenty-first century. The Army has also now invested formally in a "futures center" at TRADOC to accelerate such methods to look ahead to sustain that battlefield edge. The Army is a pragmatic profession, wanting to see proof that concepts work before trying them in battle, so it continues its experiments while simultaneously tapping into operational lessons learned from recent battles and operations. Army Chief General Schoomaker has directed the 3d Infantry Division, so spectacularly successful in its attack on Baghdad, to tap into that experience and explore the formation of a new generation of modular combat units.

Continuity. One azimuth for experiments in the 1990s was called Force XXI. In the final chapter of this book we had said, "Army Chief General Sullivan directed that an experimental unit named Force XXI (after twenty-first century) be established at Fort Hood, Texas, with the goal of a full-brigade war-fighting experiment at the NTC (National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California) in 1997. The Army had come a long way toward the future since 1991."

Progress since 1997 would be even more stunning. That unit was formed, and it was the 4th Infantry Division. TRADOC, under the command of General Bill Hartzog, set up that brigade experiment at the NTC in 1997, followed by a division experiment in a BCTP (Battle Command Training Program). For the division experiment, the commander was General Scott Wallace, who commanded V Corps in the 2003 attack to Baghdad, using many of the technologies and battle command techniques he had used in the 4th Division. Major General Buff Blount was able to drill his 3d Infantry Division in Kuwait training areas on live-fire exercises and major maneuvers using these new Force XXI battle command technologies (Blount, notes, February 2004). Just as there was great continuity in the generations in the 1980s to continue that transformation, the Army saw to it there was continuity in this generation to field Force XXI and make it work in battle.

The best endorsement comes from LTC John W. Charlton, who commands 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry in the 3d Infantry Division. Charlton and his battalion fought eight major engagements during twenty-one days of intense combat operations in Iraqi Freedom.

All these ideas and all these experiments, however, must fit within a common set of joint warfighting ideas. Before 1991, and even until the mid 1990s, each military service had relative autonomy in developing their own set of warfighting ideas that were then amalgamated into joint operations doctrine. Services also conducted almost exclusively their own training programs without an overarching program to train their service headquarters to function as a joint command. All that began to change with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Colin Powell. Their leadership and directions were followed and adjusted as necessary by subsequent Secretaries of Defense and Joint Chiefs Chairmen. They all saw the value and necessity of having a Joint Command lead change first with a set of joint warfighting ideas. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made the final decision that calls for all these experiments to go on within the framework of joint experiments by the newly formed Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) at Norfolk, Virginia. The emergence of this Joint Command, not only to write joint doctrine for interoperability among all the services, but also to oversee experiments for future capabilities as well as train headquarters and senior commanders in joint battle command, is a major transformation since Desert Storm in 1991. JFCOM will have a continuing transforming effect on the military services' already impressive abilities to fight and win as joint teams.

In addition to JFCOM, other external continuity and support has been important to the Army. In the early 1990s I was briefing then Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Perry at Fort Monroe on Desert Storm and some of the "glimmerings" or new concepts of warfare we had seen and where we needed to begin experimenting. As a result of Secretary Perry's interest and vision, as with a previous visit from Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, we got continued and needed support from the Department of Defense. John Hamre, later Deputy Secretary of Defense, at the time was a staffer for the Senate, saw the virtue of the Army's approach to the future and the need for resources. We also had other forward thinkers come to visit TRADOC, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Colin Powell and then Congressman and later House Speaker Newt Gingrich. They contributed to our ideas and helped us think our way through these glimmerings and their implications for the future. As a result we got needed resources and added dimensions to our ideas. We began those experiments. In a spirit of continuity just as in the previous rebirth of the Army, they were continued by the next generation at TRADOC and the Army, and now they are carried forward within JFCOM. As a result their lineage reached from Panama and Desert Storm to Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. That continuity of Army vision from generation to generation, the very same continuity that had been so successful from the middle 1970s to the early 1990s, was key.

The Army had seen early the possibilities of a revolution in Battle Command, using that term beginning in 1992 to focus on the art of command and also emerging technologies able to assist command on the move and increase tempo. This generation has made those possibilities a reality. That reality translated into the speed and precision seen as so vital to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 by LTG McKiernan and others in current and future contemporary operating environments (McKiernan, David, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, notes, February 2004).

Each generation of leaders not only provided for growth in capabilities, but also kept their focus on staying trained and ready. Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki reiterated that focus when, soon after he assumed his duties he ordered all combat divisions to be manned at 100 percent of requirements to increase their readiness. He also fended off calls for reductions in the size of the U.S. Army by some who thought wars might be able to be won from a distance. The Army also published a vision in 1999 to increase its deployability in the present while also investing in a future force. Such continuity of vision and purpose is the same tough-minded strategic leadership that got the Army from the 1970s to victory in Desert Storm and got it from post-Desert Storm to victory as part of the joint team in Afghanistan and Iraq.

That continuity with room for adjustments as required, combined with those experiments, intense training, wise, talented, and adaptive leaders and soldiers, and rapid fielding led to battlefield realization in Iraq of a vision first expressed in a TRADOC concept pamphlet published in 1994,

In earlier pages of this book we said, "Quality soldiers and leaders whose full potential is realized through the application of information-age technologies and by rigorous and relevant training and leader development." It does not always happen the way it was envisioned, but sometimes it does in the Army profession. When that happens it is the result of a lot of teamwork, shared vision, decisive change, and courageous continuity.

PEOPLE, TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND THE ARMY PROFESSION

Yet with all the doctrine evolution, the leading with ideas, the experiments that proved their worth on recent battlefields, the wise investments in information technologies that have dramatically assisted commanders and soldiers on those battlefields, one issue stands paramount and that is people. Army Chief General Pete Schoomaker has said, "Train and equip soldiers and grow leaders."

What the Army really pays attention to is people. You develop your soldiers and leaders from a value base with the ability and confidence to adapt, to think their way through situations where there is no precedent, where they have to apply their expert knowledge gained from years of study and practice, to situations they have never seen before, to be able to operate effectively in ambiguity. It is the essence of military professionalism. Nothing makes a difference in battle like training and leadership. Colonel Arnie Bray, commander of the 82d Airborne 2d Brigade in combat in Iraq in 2003, said, "Especially useful were the heavy light drills in the pre-command courses and the two rotations in which my battalions were involved at the NTC… These skills were developed by repeated live fires… training that always included some twist that made the conditions more unpredictable" (Bray, notes, December 2003).

Each of the Army's capstone doctrinal manuals since 1976 has said a version of this: "Once the force is engaged, superior combat power derives from the courage and competence of soldiers, the excellence of their training, the capability of their equipment, the soundness of their combined arms doctrine, and, above all, the quality of their leadership."

To get that, you need a continuing investment in professional education and training. That investment is a combination of actual classrooms for study, interaction, and reflection; realistic computer simulations for war games with opposing forces as in BCTP; and open-air classrooms in relevant terrain and urban environments with field work with full equipment and live fire where all the normal frictions of lots of moving parts apply against an opposing force who has an equal opportunity to win. All this must be done under the watchful eye of mentors and trainers who can coach and teach, helping participants to be better able to interpret their experiences. It requires an investment so that professionals can educate and train professionals. Each of the military services has made such a continuing investment and, even in the budget-scarce times of downsizing, has protected those investments and adapted them to the current security environment because they knew the battle payoff.

Following Desert Storm TRADOC showed in various briefings noncommissioned officers and officers from the time they had entered the force and the opportunities they had to develop through the Army's intensive training and leader development system. We did that because every unit and commander paid tribute to the importance of training as key to winning in battle. The Army reached the same conclusion after Afghanistan and Iraq.

That absolute focus and passion for training soldiers and units and developing leaders continued through the 1990s to the current war. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki commissioned a series of studies on training and leader development in early 2000, done by a TRADOC team under the leadership of Lieutenant General Mike Steele (later Lieutenant General Jim Riley) and Major General Dave Huntoon at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. They concluded that you must develop leaders who are "adaptive and self aware." The studies resulted in needed adjustments, as well as revised training doctrine, FM 7.0, faithful to continuing battle-focused training but more relevant to the current operational environment. As the noncommissioned officer study said, you also develop leaders with a warrior ethos, a credo recently restated and reinforced by General Pete Schoomaker for the entire Army.

By the time of Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraqi Freedom in Iraq in 2003, the U.S. Army had a generation of battle commanders, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers who trained with a single-minded passion for meeting combat-ready standards. Combat Training Centers, begun in the mid to late 1980s and only available a short time before 1991, are a way of life for this generation. One battalion commander had more than seventeen rotations through these major training areas before commanding his battalion in combat in 2003. Those training centers at Fort Irwin, California, Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Hohenfels, Germany, along with the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) made a huge difference even more so than in 1991 for all ranks. Also making a difference is a generation of noncommissioned officers schooled in the Army's Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). Moreover, all ranks of Army officer and NCO leadership benefited from assignments during the 1990s in actual operational areas like the Balkans or other unit deployments where they could gain valuable command wisdom from conducting actual operations. The result would be a savvy group of deployment and operationally experienced battle commanders in both Afghanistan and Iraq, who also knew each other from other operations, thus further enhancing teamwork and trust.

As before, all unit post operations reports, as well as individual discussions have credited tough training to battle standards as making the difference in combat performance. Some of that training and leader development took place in those training areas in Kuwait. Devotion to combat readiness is interwoven in the total fabric of Army culture. That the U.S. Army kept such a focus during the 1990s, unlike the similar period from 1945 to 1950, is evidence of a significant permanent transformation in the culture of the Army.

Finally, during the late part of the 1990s and early twenty-first century, the U.S. Army began renewed thinking about the nature of the Army as a profession to draw attention to both institutional Army values and to the role of the military as a learned and honored profession in America.

In 1997, U.S. Army senior leadership spent the better part of their winter commanders' conference agreeing on a new set of Army "values." It was not that the U.S. Army had no values before. It was just that they had not been part of the official language, part of the ways to evaluate behavior and performance, part of the ways the Army could speak to itself in a common language about what it held inviolate as it served our nation. Those commanders, led by then Army Chief of Staff General Denny Reimer, devised a set of values: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. One could argue (and correctly) that such values were present at Valley Forge, at Gettysburg, in WWI at the Marne, in WWII at Buna and Normandy, in Korea at Inchon, in Vietnam in the Ia Drang Valley and Cambodia, in Panama, in Desert Storm, and in the streets of Mogadishu. Yet, the fact of such focused work by the senior leadership said two things: First, here are the values that are not negotiable as the Army serves the nation, and second, they are now an official part of the profession.

These developments in the professional fabric of the Army are examples of the U.S. Army changing its culture even as it was embarked on tough operations for the nation, recording these thoughts in its manual FM 1, 14 June 2001. As former Army Chief General Eric Shinseki would say on 8 November 2001,

General Pete Schoomaker, as he seeks to accelerate the Army's transformation to fight and win this war and meet warfighting needs of the future, has said those seven values are not negotiable. From General Creighton Abrams who reaffirmed, "the Army is people" to focus rebuilding the Army from the early 1970s to the present, there is an unbroken and unshakable commitment to focus on people, to training soldiers and growing leaders. That commitment has only grown stronger with this generation of soldiers and leaders in the 1990s as it has in this early twenty-first century of service to America.

CONCLUSIONS

What then of war in 1991 and war now? Of the continuing readiness of the U.S. Army to be of service to our nation in peace and war following the attack on our citizens on 11 September 2001?

Our earlier statement still holds true today:

I went back and looked up some words we were using in October 1994.

The job did get done then, despite obstacles and uncertainty and is still getting done now. There was no timeout from 1991 to 2001 or any strategic pause. That rebirth we described from the early 1970s to Panama in 1989 and Desert Storm in 1991 continued and was accelerated by this new generation of professionals. It is a great good-news story for America and it continues now.

I have fought with my fellow soldiers in the 11th ACR (Blackhorse) in Vietnam and VII Corps in Desert Storm and follow this war closely. It just does not get any better than this. This is as good as it gets in battle execution for the Army and for the joint team. That is not to say that this war does not point to changes for the future because it clearly does. It is not magic how all that happens. When I see campaigns that accomplished what this team did, I immediately go to the people to discover the keys to victory. I think there are two that are enduring.

I believe the first key to victory that transcends all others is motivated, courageous, disciplined, and adaptable soldiers and leaders, joint and Army, at all levels.

The other is that officer and noncommissioned officer leaders at all levels have developed professional judgment over years of the right kind of training practice and operational assignments to make timely decisions to adapt plans to battlefield realities at all levels and as part of a joint team.

Additionally, the level of joint interaction, integration, and teamwork in these campaigns is unprecedented. I mention nothing of technology, except that common situational awareness enabled by cutting edge information technology clearly allows those professional judgments to be made at a tempo and in a way as never before.

I am certain such innovation and transforming will go on to continue the same battle edge in the future. What is also going on is the remarkable way young men and women are volunteering to serve, knowing what it takes. Their families are also part of this remarkable story. This world war will go on because it must on many fronts and campaigns.

As President Bush said on 7 October 2001,

Many who fought in Afghanistan and in the attack to Baghdad and then transitioned rapidly to another phase are back home. Many serve again forward deployed on missions, and others will soon go again. Their duty is all about the values they hold precious for our nation. Some who fought did not come back. They gave, in Abraham Lincoln's words, "that last full measure of devotion" to protect and defend our freedoms. They are the personification of the inscription at the base of the soldier statue at Antietam, Maryland, that commemorates that 1862 Civil War battle: "Not for themselves but for their country." They follow in the long line of their fellow Americans on other fields of battle who gave their lives so we and others might be free. There is nobility to what these Americans are doing. They know that and have a fierce devotion to each other and to their duties. America can remain proud of and inspired by her Army and military.

Before we attacked into Iraq in 1991, I was visiting a tank company in the 1st Armored Division with Sam Donaldson. The passage is earlier in this book. One of those soldiers, Specialist Shawn Freeney, said, "It lets you know that, when it comes down to it, you're around family. All of us here are family — right here is my family."

In a larger sense we are all family in this war. Americans with our allies soldier on in this fight as I write this. They deserve our undying support and thanks for what they do for us all. When you see them tell them thanks. When you see their families tell them thanks as well. And when you see the families of those who did not come back and who gave it all they had, tell them thanks and say a prayer for them as they endure the pain of that loss.

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS PAUL R. SMITH

On 4 April 2003, TF 2–7 IN ordered B/11th Engineers to build an enclosure to hold enemy prisoners of war. Bravo Company moved into an Iraqi military compound and began to emplace wire to connect with the walls of the compound to serve as an initial cage to hold prisoners taken by the task force.

Desert Storm veteran Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith, platoon sergeant of the 2nd Platoon, was directing the efforts of his soldiers. At one end of the compound, a 1st Platoon armored personnel carrier pushed in a gate to gain access to the compound — revealing some fifty to one hundred SRG troops. Simultaneously, the SRG soldiers reoccupied a tower in the compound and began firing RPGs, small arms, and directing mortar fire onto the engineers. The enemy wounded three soldiers in the armored personal carrier that knocked down the gate.

Smith immediately ran to the wall near the gate and lobbed a grenade over the wall, momentarily driving the enemy back. Smith dragged the wounded out of harm's way and then jumped in the APC and backed it into the center of the compound. He then moved to the vehicle commander's position to fire the.50-caliber machine gun. Using the.50, Smith engaged the enemy in the tower and those attempting to rush the gate. Private Seamen came to his assistance and supported him by passing ammunition cans up to Smith. By suppressing the enemy and killing a great many of them, Smith enabled the Company First Sergeant to organize a counterattack that ultimately stopped the enemy.

Sometime during that fight, enemy fire mortally wounded Smith. The action at the compound was part of a large enemy counterattack that, if it had succeeded, may well have reached the tactical operations center of the task force. Sergeant First Class Smith's courageous action saved the wounded and enabled Bravo Company to withdraw from the compound, thus enabling CAS and artillery to destroy the remaining defenders. (On Point, final draft, p 369).