Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

EN ROUTE

A defeated enemy's equipment rushed underneath the helicopter as we flew to link up with the Big Red One. As far as we could see, there were burning vehicles. Tanks without turrets, burning. BMPs burning and overturned. Some equipment obviously hit from the air by LGBs (Laser-Guided Bombs), as the tanks were without turrets and the hulls were almost flattened. Trucks were on fire. Black smoke rose in small columns from burning vehicles littering the sand. Iraqi dead lay on the battlefield. We could see, picking their way through all this, the logistics and support trucks of the 1st INF Division support command, commanded by Colonel Bob Shadley, attempting to keep up the pace to bring needed fuel.

I had seen battle destruction before, but never like this. Visions from World War II newsreels made their way into my head as I searched for something to relate it to. There was brown sand and hundreds of broken and burning Iraqi vehicles all the way to the 1st INF TAC CP.

I was not thinking back—"Don't look back" had been my code ever since I'd decided to have my leg amputated — but if I had been of a mind to, I would have concluded that I had made the right choice to pass the 1st INF through the 2nd ACR to continue the attack the night before.

0630 TAC CP 1ST INF DIVISION

We circled before landing. I wanted to get a good look around, and Mark needed to find a spot where he wouldn't hit any destroyed Iraqi vehicles.

After landing, I got out and started toward the M577s of the 1st INF TAC. On the way, I glanced around. There was the TAC, which at that point consisted of two M577s, its extensions stretched out the back, but the sides rolled up now that there was daylight. About a hundred meters away were maybe a hundred Iraqi prisoners guarded by two or three 1st INF MPs. A little farther away were Apaches and scout aircraft from the division's aviation battalion.

My senses told me that, here, at least, the Iraqis were a beaten army.

I took a good look at the prisoners, who avoided my eyes. They were reasonably clothed in military uniforms, but were dirty and unshaven, and were eating MREs our troops had given them. They looked tired, but no more so than the U.S. soldiers guarding them. Unlike our soldiers, though, they were passive, shuffling around, not talking much with one another. They looked defeated.

Around the TAC was more evidence of the destruction that had been brought on by the 1st INF attack the night before. Burning tanks and other vehicles were nearby. If Hollywood had wanted to create a scene of a defeated army, complete with prisoners and destroyed equipment, this is what they would have made it look like. Finally, there were the areas containing unexploded U.S. munitions, mainly artillery DPICM, that the troops had wisely marked off with white engineer tape. The whole war was here in microcosm.

Brigadier General Bill Carter greeted me when I walked into the TAC. He was assistant division commander for maneuver and was running the division TAC. Bill was an experienced infantryman and a decorated Vietnam veteran, and was quick-minded and aggressive. I had gotten to know him well as a tactician when we had run the 1st INF BCTP in March 1990 at Fort Riley. I liked Carter and trusted his judgments.

"Bill, hell of a fight last night," I said. "Saw the destruction on the way over. Give me a SITREP. By the way, where's Tom?"

"It was a tough fight last night. We think we've broken through. Resistance is much less organized than what we ran into last night. Our advance is continuing east toward Denver and Highway 8, per your orders. Not sure what the Iraqis are doing, but they are not in any coherent defenses, and we are taking many prisoners — as you can see. Terrain is slowing us down some. [Just east of where we were, the wadi got deep and wide.] We did have a number of casualties last night. Do not have a final count, but we had about eight KIA and maybe thirty wounded. General Rhame is forward with one of the brigades in a tank. I have him on the radio."

The casualty figure surprised me.

"Get him on the radio," I said.

"DANGER 6, this is DANGER OSCAR" — the TAC CP call sign—"JAYHAWK 6 is here and wants to talk to you."

"This is DANGER 6."

"This is JAYHAWK 6, give me a SITREP."

"We had a tough fight last night, but we have broken through. I estimate we can get to Denver by dark."

"Roger, DANGER, well done. I saw the wreckage. I want you to press your attack east. Attack to Denver. I'll give details to Bill."

"WILCO."

That was it. The evidence of my senses had been confirmed by Bill Carter's quick summary and now by the judgment of the division commander forward. It was then that I decided (though I was already leaning that way — especially after seeing the destruction on the way out here) to use the 1st INF as our southern envelopment arm, and not the British. Using them would get our southern division where I wanted them more directly and faster, and I would also exploit the success of the Big Red One. The 1st INF was now, technically, in an exploitation-and-pursuit. It had been a long time since a U.S. Army unit had been in that tactical situation. We surely had not practiced that situation in the Cold War, and not much in our training… Well, you must always be prepared for success on the battlefield, and to seize the opportunities opened by an action of one of your subordinate units. I had expected to be in this situation, and now we were ready to exploit it.

Bill Carter had overheard my conversation with Tom, and moments later, he and I and his planners were clustered beside a flat 1:100 000 map off the end of the M577 ramp.

The troops around me looked tired. They had been attacking now since 1500 on the twenty-fourth. They'd had some rest, but not much. The movement forward after the breach had begun at around 0430 on 26 February, and had gone on in blinding sandstorms. They had coordinated, then executed the complex night passage of lines, then fought their way through two Iraqi brigades past Norfolk, and were now heading east. A hell of a series of tactical moves and fights. I was never more proud of any unit than I was of the Big Red One that morning.

But I've been around tired troops, and these troops were tired… though clearly not down. They were running on fumes now, but they wanted to finish it. I could imagine what the troops who had fought all night felt like.

As I looked at the map, a piece of blue representing the Persian Gulf was just visible at the far eastern corner of the eastern map sheet. It caught my attention.

"Attack east," I told them. "Go for the blue on the map. That is what is bringing the ships to take us home when this is over. Go for that. Here!" I said, banging on the map. Not too military, but I wanted them — as clearly tired as they were — to have something to seize on to propel them forward another twenty-four hours. As Greg Fontenot was to tell me later, my remark "Go for the blue on the map" got all the way to the battalion commanders, and maybe further.

"Bill," I went on, "now, here is what I am planning for the corps to do." Then I quickly sketched out how the 1st CAV would attack around the 1st AD in the north later that day, while the 1st and 3rd ADs would be the pressure forces continuing to attack due east, and the 1st INF would attack east through Denver across Highway 8 toward the Gulf. At that time, I also planned to bring the 2nd ACR up to the inside of the 1st INF to an Objective Hawk (after the corps's JAYHAWK nickname) that I drew just west of Denver, in order to keep the 3rd AD and 1st INF from running into each other. The British would meanwhile continue due east to Highway 8, just north of Kuwait City.

As soon as I finished my sketch, Bill told me that he had it and they would execute. I then asked him to send a planner along with me back to the corps TAC, where we would quickly finish the graphic control measures.

Before I left the area, I walked over to talk to some of the aviators — scout and attack helo pilots — about what they had seen and done over the last hours. The aviation brigade was commanded by Colonel Jim Mowrey, a smart, aggressive aviator whom I had gotten to know as a war college student at Fort Leavenworth during 1986 and 1987. Jim was not there at the time.

The aviators were clearly tired from flying all night. Again, you could see it in their eyes. They described for me their attack in front of the close fight, during which they had surprised Iraqi units and destroyed numbers of vehicles. The scene they described fit my own visualization. Many Iraqi soldiers, they continued, had soon been running about trying to escape (they had been easily seen on night vision as white or black figures, depending on the mode of the sight). They had chosen not to fire on them, but instead focused their cannon fire on the equipment. I was proud of them. They had never forgotten who they were and what they stood for. I shook their hands, told them well done, and gave them VII Corps coins. Their accounts were more confirmation of a breakthrough.

From what I had seen and heard, combined with earlier intelligence reports, I knew that whatever RGFC remained in our sector were now in a small area north of 1st INF's attack axis and east of 3rd AD and 1st AD. How many, I was not sure.

We now had work to do to get the order out and executed that I had just sketched. The normal time for a complete new corps order is seventy-two hours. Even a change to a basic order (called a FRAGO — short for fragment of an order) usually takes twenty-four hours, as our FRAGPLAN 7 had done. I had given a warning order for this double envelopment the day before. Now I ordered it to be executed later that day and the next.

0715 VII CORPS TAC FWD

We flew to our TAC FWD, close to the 3rd AD TAC, about a twenty-minute flight back over the smoking ruins of the better part of two Iraqi brigades. There I linked up with Lieutenant Colonel Dave McKiernan and his crew. They were beat. They had been up most of the night working, moving, keeping up with the battles in the 1st AD and 3rd AD, and keeping us at the TAC informed. By now the main TAC with Stan was displacing forward to this location, or close to it. I was reminded of the reasons why fitness is part of a professional soldier's creed. You have to have something in reserve in times like this.

I needed Dave to understand what I wanted done and to begin making the orders overlays, while I went to lay out my intent face-to-face with the commanders. I sketched out the maneuver for him in the sand and on the map and told him to get to work on it while I went to see Griffith and Funk. I would return at around 1030, I told him, and I wanted an orders group meeting of Tilelli, Holder, and Creighton Abrams at the TAC. If they could get our planners forward from the main CP to help, that would be a bonus. Then I left to go see Butch Funk.

I figured they would have the graphics posted on overlays of acetate ready to pass out by the time I got done with the face-to-face meetings. It would not be easy.

While I was at the TAC, I talked to John Yeosock twice to describe our progress and what I had seen, to go over our double-envelopment scheme of maneuver, and to discuss more maneuver room up north, in order to fit the 1st CAV in without some complex maneuver with the 1st AD. "I'm proud of what the corps is doing," he told me, "and I'll see what I can do to help you."

I have later learned that the day before (26 February), the Third Army G-2, John Stewart, and the G-3, Steve Arnold, had been on their way forward to link up with me to go over final plans for the RGFC destruction. They had gotten as far as King Khalid Military City, then John Yeosock had had to recall them to help him with a crisis with the CINC in Riyadh over our movement rate.

I cannot help but think that the end of the war might have turned out differently if they had been able to continue forward and we could have finalized the VII Corps-XVIII Corps coordinated final attack. As a minimum, I'll bet Steve Arnold would have been able to get our northern boundary changed and notify XVIII Corps about it. That would have allowed us to blitz the 1st CAV forward at about 1100 on the twenty-seventh, when they closed into Horse behind the 1st AD, and to slam into the Hammurabi Division (which was by then retreating). That would have completed the three-for-three heavy division RGFC destruction. It never happened.

0745 3RD AD TAC CP

I linked up with Butch Funk well forward in the 3rd AD's attack zone. With Butch was his aide, plus Brigadier General Gene Blackwell, and his command sergeant major, Joe T. Hill. Blackwell was a long-legged, six-foot-four Clemson graduate from South Carolina, all soldier — a warrior with fighter instincts, who went for the kill. As warriors and soldiers, he and Butch were much alike, but their personalities were very different. Gene was quieter than Butch, and you needed to draw him out. Butch was always explaining and teaching what he wanted done. But they were both very direct when they wanted orders carried out. They were a good team.

Joe T. Hill was a Georgian (with a clipped Georgia accent), a veteran tanker, and a Vietnam vet, who had commanded an M1A1 the four days of the ground war. If you ordered an archetypal CSM out of central casting — a combat-savvy, streetwise, troop-focused veteran tanker — you'd get Joe T. Hill. I had interviewed "Joe T" for the VII Corps CSM job after my CSM had abruptly left in late January, but he had declined. He was honored that I'd thought of him, he told me, but if it was all the same to me, he figured he could do the corps and the 3rd AD more good by staying in 3rd AD, considering they had been last into the theater. Unusual — but Joe T was a real soldier.

I was always glad to see Butch Funk. Butch has a soldier's heart, and I just flat-out trusted him. He also always told me exactly what was on his mind without any hidden agendas, and much of the time, he and I communicated without words. Later, he himself said pretty much the same thing: "I could tell from your voice what you wanted," he told me, "and of course, the shorthand of our common background — and, I daresay, kindred spirits — really helped. I always felt comfortable being candid with you, even though I may not be right. That sort of confidence in one's boss, I have found, is very rare."

He had every reason to feel good about the 3rd AD that morning. In the last twenty-four hours, he had gotten an order from me to turn right ninety degrees, pass around the 2nd ACR, and attack east, destroying the RGFC in his sector. He had coordinated with the 2nd ACR, made his own order, then disseminated it, maneuvered his 8,000-plus vehicle division into two brigades up and one back (from the division wedge they had been in), passed around the 2nd ACR, turned right, linked up the 42nd Artillery Brigade with their division artillery, and fought all day and all night. They were still fighting. He had maneuvered and fought his division about eighty kilometers in twenty-four hours, and had extended the fight a good thirty kilometers ahead of his tank forces with close air and his own attack helos. Early that morning, he had passed his third brigade through his second brigade to maintain the momentum of attack. The 3rd AD had driven the spearhead right through the best the Iraqis had. And they were still doing it.

After I told Butch what I was trying to get done that day, he clearly understood what I was telling him, and he even thought of a few ways the 3rd AD might be able to help. (They looked at an option later that day that I had not considered. It proposed attacking from south to north in front of the 1st AD and behind and into the flank of the Hammurabi, just in case the 1st CAV maneuver did not work. This would have worked if we'd had time.)

As a result, he so paced the tempo of his division attack that day that to the Iraqis they were a relentless, moving, thirty- to forty-kilometer-long-by-thirty-kilometer-wide armored death zone. He gave them no rest. He had them fixed and was now going to finish them. I added an attack helicopter battalion from the 11th Aviation Brigade to the 3rd AD to give them additional fresh combat power and to keep extending their zone deep.

"Butch, give me a SITREP," I said after I explained my intent.

We were leaning over the top of a HMMWV, and he was pointing to a portable map he had unfolded on the hood top. Butch showed me on the map where his units were, explained that he had decided to pass his third brigade through his second brigade, then described the fighting the night before. It had been a series of hasty attacks, he told me, but with stiffening resistance the farther east they went. As they had done elsewhere, the Iraqis had tried reverse-slope defenses, but ground and air reconnaissance and quick-reacting small-unit leaders had overcome this tactical adjustment. They also were running into elements of many divisions, confirming that this was a hasty defense. He even related that at places the 10th Iraqi Armored seemed to have abandoned their equipment and fled.

By now, he went on, he thought 3rd AD had defeated the RGFC in their zone and were into other forces that had been positioned in depth, or were just trying to get out of the theater. But he was clear that 3rd AD was still conducting hasty attacks and were not in any pursuit. Not yet. But soon.

Before I left, he and I shared a few lighter moments. It was a relaxed, yet intensely focused mood we all were in. It was good to loosen up with the welcome Diet Coke Butch handed me, and Joe T. Hill gave me some equipment he had gotten from an abandoned Iraqi bunker. There was an RGFC uniform shirt complete with red shoulder cord, a brand-new Iraqi helmet (which we all signed later and gave to Army Chief Carl Vuono), and a field phone that also looked brand new. And we had a good laugh as Joe T acted out for us (in his Georgia accent) the likely Iraqi conversations as the Spearhead Division slammed into their positions in the middle of the night… It was soldier humor while the battles continued all around us, but also a deeper indicator: We knew by now that the outcome was not in doubt. It was just a matter of how much longer and at what cost.

I left Butch and flew to meet Ron Griffith. Navigation to the 1st AD was always a challenge because of their LORAN, since the rest of the corps mainly used GPS. They weren't trying to be different. They used what we could get. We just did not have enough GPS. As we lifted off from 3rd AD TAC and Mark turned the Blackhawk to head north to find the 1st AD, we could clearly see Spearhead Bradleys and tanks firing at the Iraqis.

0815 1ST AD TAC CP

My positive feelings changed abruptly when I saw the 1st AD TAC in the middle of what appeared to be a stopped division. I was quick off the Blackhawk to find out what was going on.

Ron probably could read my mind as he greeted me. "I know you want us to continue the attack," he said, "but I'm just about out of fuel. I figure we have about another two hours, then the division will come to a complete halt. What killed us was the 75th Arty Brigade showed up almost out of fuel, and we had to refuel them." Friction.

"Shit," I said. "Damn it, we just have to keep moving, and I'll get you fuel from somewhere. Just keep attacking like you've been doing."

Very quickly, I went over to the 1st AD comms and called the TAC. "Get hold of Gene Daniel," I told them, "and get some fuel to the 1st AD. Top priority over anything else." I also ordered the 3rd AD to send some fuel to the north to 1st AD.

For a brief time, I was thinking that the worst sin for an armored corps would be to run out of fuel. We had made many logistics arrangements to prevent it, yet we were in danger of it anyway. Stopping because you are out of fuel is a fatal flaw, and to run out of fuel here, on top of the world's greatest supply of oil, was just too much.

The 1st AD had come farther than any other unit in the corps, and out of all the divisions had the most vehicles. They and the corps transportation units had been busting their butts to get to this point. But they were using about 500,000 to 750,000 gallons of fuel a day; and that is a lot of fuel trucks, especially when each one carries 2,500 or 5,000 gallons, and the turnaround time from corps fuel sites was by now twenty-four hours or greater. As an order of magnitude comparison, in Normandy in late August 1944, when there were eighteen divisions in the U.S. Third and First Armies, their total daily fuel consumption had been 850,000 gallons. For eighteen divisions! Ron's 1st AD used almost that much by themselves! It was no small deal.

I was not happy with this situation. It almost cost us. From that day forward, I would tell military and other audiences, "Forget logistics and you lose."

Our choices were really two. One was to stop the division and pass the 1st CAV through to take up the fight, a maneuver that would probably take us the rest of the day and well into the night. The end result: no pressure on the Iraqis for twelve hours or so. The alternative was for Ron to keep attacking and take the risk that the tankers would catch up and he would be able to sustain the momentum. We did not discuss these options. I ordered Ron to keep moving. I was counting on my logisticians.

Meanwhile (though I did not yet know this), the 3rd AD had learned even before I had of the 1st AD fuel situation; as a stopgap measure — on their own initiative, in a superb feat of teamwork — they had sent twenty HEMMT fuelers, each with 2,500 gallons, north to their flank division. This turned out to be the shot in the fuel tanks that 1st AD needed. Later, more fuel caught up, mainly due to the great efforts of the 1st AD logisticians and their ADC for support, Brigadier General Jarrett Robertson, a cavalryman and ex-commander of the 3rd CAV. Jarrett was aware of the situation in 1st AD and had already moved out to keep the momentum going. Likewise, Colonel Chuck Mahan, commander of 7th ASG, the VII Corps logistics unit that was assigned responsibility to support 1st AD and VII Corps units in that part of the battlefield, had gotten a helicopter from Ron and was scouring the desert LOC from 1st AD back to Nelligen for fuel tankers.

In other words, the solution to this mini-crisis had been under way before I got into it. The units and commanders knew my intent, felt a tight teamwork, and had gone ahead and worked the problem and were well on the way to solving it. However, by establishing priorities, I could focus greater awareness of the urgency of the situation at the VII Corps rear and get them into it faster. Delivery of the fuel was the result of "brute force" logistics and a lot of fast-moving, long columns of tankers through the desert. (I later awarded a Bronze Star to Captain Debra Clark of the Arizona National Guard, who had led one of the many such columns forward.)

By late that night, 1st AD got about 100,000 gallons of fuel, but it had been close. The division had certainly been within two hours of running out of fuel.

After dealing with that, I got into the back of the TAC M577 with Brigadier General Jay Hendrix, Ron's ADC, for a quick update on the 1st AD situation. Jay Hendrix was an experienced mech infantryman — another one of those mounted unit commanders who could keep five or six things suspended simultaneously in his head, picture the total situation in his mind's eye, and make fast and correct decisions.

Jarrett Robertson was of a similar cut and had an infectious confidence born of competence and experience. He was a superb soldier and a great cavalryman, and he was also a kindred spirit. Later — in June 1991—I chose Jarrett to be VII Corps chief of staff. (Jarrett, along with two other soldiers, was killed in a Blackhawk crash in 1993 in Germany, while serving as Major General and deputy commander of V Corps.)

Just as with 3rd AD, the past twenty-four hours for the 1st AD had been a textbook in maneuvering and fighting an armored division. From my order to Ron late Monday to execute FRAGPLAN 7, the division had done a masterful job. They had attacked and secured al-Busayyah, and had simultaneously gotten together their own plans (complete with intelligence picture) to turn right ninety degrees and attack due east without a halt. As they'd turned east, they'd had two brigades forward and their second brigade to the rear finishing the al-Busayyah fight. Rather than slow the division, Ron had left a task force (6/6 Infantry with Bradleys) and an engineer company at al-Busayyah and pressed on to the east (this turn had caused a big gap to develop between him and the 3rd ACR and 24th INF Division and left his northern flank open). Later that day, he had brought his brigades on line abreast in a sector about forty kilometers wide; and later, the 75th Artillery Brigade had joined the division and had been integrated into the fire planning. They had fought all night, maintaining contact with 3rd AD to their south, and had destroyed the northern brigade of the Tawalkana Division. They'd had two casualties.

Ron was pleased with their actions to date and the tempo of the division. So was I, as long as they kept attacking.

But I was also interested in turning their attention to the maneuver necessary to allow the 1st CAV to attack to their north and east toward Objective Raleigh and the Hammurabi Division. With everything else going on at that time — especially the fuel situation, the continued movement of the division, and the unknown RGFC reaction (they still had three divisions to Ron's north, plus artillery) — I was not sure I had their attention.

Consequently, I stressed to Ron that I wanted him to make room in the north by "necking down" the division zone and allowing the 1st CAV to pass to the north. That was not a precise military order, but the intent to Ron was clear: Make room north in your sector to pass 1st CAV forward toward Objective Raleigh. I left the tactics up to Ron. As far as I was concerned, he could back the second brigade out and continue his attack with two brigades forward, as 3rd AD was doing, or he could attempt to narrow each brigade sector to give them room in the north.

Because of his heavy contact with the Medina and his desire to keep maximum combat power forward, Ron chose the latter. Of the two maneuvers, it was the more difficult; but under the circumstances, it was the right move for continuing the mission I had given him.

As it happened, there was an unresolved question of priorities over Ron's two missions. Specifically, Ron assumed that his continued mission had higher priority than passing 1st CAV forward. I thought both were possible, so I never told him which had higher priority in my mind. As I saw it, whichever tactic Ron selected would leave their adjusted zone about as wide as the one 3rd AD currently had (later my planners drew an adjusted attack axis for 1st AD that directed them from east to more southeast, opening up room forward of Phase Line Lime for 1st CAV).

In any event, though both Ron and Jay Hendrix told me they understood what I wanted them to do, I left there with the uneasy feeling that Ron was not convinced of his ability to execute while he had the Medina battle going on.

I left to go back to the TAC FWD to brief the order to the other commanders. Now that I had given the double-envelopment order personally to 1st INF, 3rd AD, and 1st AD, it was time to talk to 1st CAV and 2nd ACR, as well as to get the overlays out. The time for them to execute was compressed, but I thought we could do it.

1030 VII CORPS JUMP TAC

It was a quick fifteen-minute flight back to the jump TAC.

Not only were John Tilelli and Don Holder there waiting, but Dave McKiernan and Ron McConnell had by now drawn the basic maneuver scheme for our double envelopment on an overlay on top of their 1:100 000 map.

It had started to rain slightly. Since we had no shelter there, I asked Ron to lean the four-by-eight-foot plywood map board up against the side of the command M577. We huddled, and I went over the maneuver scheme. It was a good thing they had used permanent marker pens to draw the map overlay, or by the time I got finished it all would have been washed off the map.

I knew I was asking for a lot from these commanders and their units, but it was a simple scheme of maneuver, and I thought we could execute. Tom Rhame and Butch Funk were already doing it, and needed no further orders.

John was an old cavalry friend, had the quickest-reacting division in the theater, and had just broken enemy contact, completed a move through the breach, and raced 250 kilometers in less than twenty-four hours. It had been a magnificent move. My orders to him were simple: Pass north of the 1st AD but just south of the northern border of the corps, attack east toward Objective Raleigh, and destroy the Hammurabi Division. Though I had not planned to give him any additional combat power, I did attempt to have the artillery of 1st AD fire reinforcing fires as 1st CAV moved east beyond 1st AD.

I wanted 1st CAV in the fight that day before dark. John said he could make it happen if 1st AD would give him a lane. I knew he would. John had drilled them to be lightning quick.

The way my planners had figured to provide that lane was by adjusting the direction of attack of the 1st AD and 3rd AD from due east to slightly southeast. With our northern border running exactly east-west, this would open space for 1st CAV's attack. I liked the scheme and thought it would work, but it all depended on 1st AD getting east far enough to make the slight turn that would open the space north of them. Though the place where that would happen was only an estimate, we had to pick a point, since the turn involved not only 1st AD, but 3rd AD to their south.

I ordered Don Holder to follow 1st INF, then to attack north inside them toward Objective Hawk. That way the 2nd ACR would stay between the eastward-advancing 3rd AD and just west of 1st INF. First INF would be attacking generally due east toward the Gulf until they got across Highway 8, where they would turn north. In this way, I thought we would close in behind any Iraqi forces remaining in our sector from the south and from the north, closing the noose around the border between Iraq and Kuwait or just a little to the north around the town of Safwan.

"Roger, I can do it," Don said.

At about 1100, they both left to complete their own planning and to get orders out. We were working in what the Army calls parallel planning in compressed time.

A few others had been with us in our planning group: Chief Warrant Officer Bob Barfield from our corps G-2 section at the main CP; Bob Schmitt, my corps planner and a SAMS graduate (Bob knew what to do in the shorthand language we used and had been part of the quick final planning work since last night); Creighton Abrams; Colonel Carl Ernst, who had come forward from Lucky TAC, the Third Army TAC CP located in King Khalid Military City; and Stan Cherrie.

I told Stan to get in a helicopter with the double-envelopment order and go find the 1st INF so that they would have the graphics and could talk to the 2nd ACR. Meanwhile, Stan also kept the main TAC moving right past us to set up farther east.

From CWO Barfield, I got an updated intelligence read that confirmed what we were seeing on the battlefield: that is, the Iraqis were defending in depth as they retreated toward Basra, while also trying to get as many forces out of the theater as possible. It was not yet clear to me whether they thought we were going for Basra and were trying to defend it (as they had done so strongly in the war with Iran), or whether they were now in full retreat.

Bob Schmitt confirmed that XVIII Corps was still to our west, had not yet turned east, and would not come on line with the corps today. This information intensified my own sense of urgency to complete the envelopment, as it now increasingly appeared that we were the only ones who could close the mission out.

Creighton Abrams continued to have a nose for the fight and the fire-support dimension of the planning that needed to go into it. As of now, he told me, he had no visibility on theater air. By now, the FSCL was being more tightly controlled by CENTCOM, and was out of our hands. Previously, after quick coordination with Third Army when all decision-makers had been available, we had been able to move it at our order; now CENTCOM said they would control it for the rest of the war. That was not welcome news, but a planning factor we had to deal with. I was still under the impression that theater air was attacking targets in front of Basra and sealing off the escape routes over the Euphrates in the XVIII Corps sector.[50]

Colonel Carl Ernst had been chief of the BCTP team when we had war-gamed early in January, and had stayed in theater at the direction of General Carl Vuono to assist John Yeosock's chief of staff, Brigadier General Bob Frix, who was running Lucky TAC for John at King Khalid Military City. After I showed Carl our past and planned maneuvers, he praised the corps for what we had done, and supported us for what we were about to do to close it. I was glad to hear that, since I figured he was keeping Third Army informed about what we were trying to do. Unfortunately, he had no decision authority to change boundaries, or he would have given us more maneuver room in XVIII Corps sector (who were not yet even anywhere near there).

Though it would probably have been useful to do so, I did not talk directly to Gary Luck at this point, as the comms were not great. A quick meeting might have been possible, but I did not even know where Gary was on the battlefield. If we had managed to link up our comms, we perhaps could have worked out the final maneuver together (absent CENTCOM and Third Army), but we were running out of time, and I really did not even consider calling Gary.

Additionally, our flank contact with XVIII Corps at this forward location was poor, and I did not know where the XVIII Corps liaison officer was or what he was doing. As a point of fact, even if communication with XVIII Corps had been better, in the time I figured we had to get this next battle under way, it would not have been possible to do both the XVIII Corps coordination and planning with Gary and the internal VII Corps work that needed to be done. So I stayed inside the VII Corps and figured we'd do what we could do ourselves. It was a conscious choice.

At about 1330, I left to go see John Tilelli, while Stan Cherrie left with the 1st INF planner to find the Big Red One. I wanted to see the results of John's quick planning, then go forward to 1st AD and personally nail down the final arrangements with them. Everything else was well under way, and all of it would happen. But the critical point was the northern sector of 1st AD. With everyone tired and with time now very compressed, I felt I needed to make that happen myself.

1300 1ST CAV TAC CP

We had about a ten-minute flight to the 1st CAV TAC CP, during which we bypassed many Iraqi troops and some units. On our flight, we were at an altitude of about 100 feet and moving fast, when out of the door at a range of maybe 500 meters we could see five Iraqi soldiers holding up their hands as if to surrender. My pilot, CWO Tom Lloyd, asked what he should do. We could not see if they were armed, so we slid the door of the Blackhawk open, circled back toward them to see their intentions, and did a 360-degree turn around them to check them out. They clearly wanted to surrender and probably thought we were an attack helo. Because we had to get to the 1st CAV, and in any case had no room for the five of them, I did not want to land, so when we spotted an artillery unit close by, we went over and told them to police up "our prisoners," and then flew on to the 1st CAV TAC.

As soon as we arrived, John Tilelli briefed me on the passage and attack maneuver he planned toward Objective Raleigh. He was going to lead with his cavalry squadron (1/7 CAV, "Gary Owen"), then follow with one brigade behind the other until they were clear of the 1st AD, where they could then attack to Raleigh with two brigades abreast. His CAV squadron was already on the move. They could make it happen.

While I was at the TAC, I got a call from 1st AD: they were engaged with a brigade of the Medina Division in a large tank fight, and it was going well for the 1st AD. As it turned out, that call was about the Battle of Medina Ridge, our largest individual tank battle of the war.

This was both good news and not so good. The brigade in the fight was Ron's northern brigade, the 2nd, the same one that I had expected would give 1st CAV room to blitz forward. Now that they were in a big fight, I had some questions about how fast they could make room for 1st CAV, which meant that I wanted to go forward to nail this down. I would have liked John to come, too, but he needed to stay to begin moving his division forward, so I had him send his G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gunlicks, along in John's own UH-1 to meet me at the 1st AD TAC to finish the coordination.

I left to go find Ron.

1330–1400 FLIGHT TO 1ST AD

We headed east.

CWO Tom Lloyd was command pilot on the Blackhawk today. Tom had flown me when I was a division commander in the 1st AD, had gone to Blackhawk transition training, then moved to VII Corps. I trusted Tom just as I did Mark Greenwald. Ever since Vietnam, I had insisted that the pilots of my command aircraft be veteran aviators with both superior flying skills and the judgment to handle tough spots. The kind of flying we did put us in marginal situations from time to time, and I did not want rookies flying us.

Ron had meanwhile moved forward in his HMMWV to a position near the 2nd Brigade's battle with the Medina brigade. When we asked for location, they gave us a LORAN reading. That required Tom to translate in flight the LORAN to GPS. For a time, he and Toby were talking back and forth about it, and when I finally asked if they had the location, the answer was yes.

By then, I was not paying much attention to what was outside, as I was going over our maneuver on the map and thinking about everything else I needed to be doing right then.

A few minutes later, Tom said in a relatively calm voice, "Sir, I think we are over the Iraqi positions. I can see tanks and Bradleys firing this way."

"Well, turn around and let's go back," I said, in about the same tone of voice. But all of a sudden my senses came to life in a hurry. Not much I could do, except hope the Iraqis were so occupied with 1st AD that they did not notice us. I was, however, more concerned about the reaction from our own troops. Up to this point, we had not seen any Iraqi helicopters, but we knew they still had HINDs and other Soviet-made helos in theater, and they still had the capability to use them if they wanted to risk it. We also knew that the best way to disseminate chemical or bio was by aerosol spray from helos, so our troops were on the lookout for HINDs and other Soviet-made helos.

It just so happened that on the pylons on each side of our Blackhawk, the crew had mounted 250-gallon wing tanks that increased our operating range (or time of flight available) for almost an hour. Unfortunately, with those external tanks, if we were flying straight at someone (the normal attack profile of a HIND), we looked almost like a HIND ourselves.

That the Bradleys didn't open up on us as we flew back was a stroke of good luck, more than likely caused by the discipline of the soldiers and the fact that this was day four, and by now our troops no longer looked up.

Ron's crew popped some smoke, and we set down about 200 meters from Ron's HMMWV. As I got out of the Blackhawk, I noticed our own artillery firing outgoing, but I also thought I heard the unmistakable, low-sounding whuump of incoming. I told Tom to keep the helo running, and if anything got close to the Blackhawk, he was to lift off and meet me later at 1st AD TAC. Then, together with Toby and John McInerney, I walked over to Ron.

Since Toby and John also had seen the firing, they asked some of the 1st AD troops there what was happening. It was Iraqi fire, they said, but they didn't give it much thought, since they kept firing in the same place. (That meant that the Iraqi fire was what we call "unobserved fire." If they had been able to "observe" what they were hitting, they would have by now shifted it to be more effective.)

"Sir," Ron began, "although the Iraqis continue to fire artillery, we've had a hell of a successful brigade fight here and are just beginning to finish it. I estimate we've destroyed about a brigade of the Medina."

That was great news.

"Terrific. Proud of you and your troops. Keep the heat on the Iraqis." At that point I did not know what an overwhelming victory the Medina Ridge fight had been for 1st AD, and how badly they had hurt the Medina. "What I came to see you about is the passage of the 1st CAV around to your north later this afternoon."

Meanwhile, because our own artillery was firing continually, and this noise was added to the occasional thunks of our M1A1 120-mm tank rounds and the normal thunk, thunk, thunk three-round burst from the Bradley's 25-mm cannons, Ron and I could barely hear each other over the noise.

"Ron, this is a lousy place to do some future battle planning. Got a suggestion?" I shouted.

"Let's go back to my TAC. It's about five kilometers west of here, right in center sector. I'll drive in my HMMWV and meet you there."

"OK," I said, then went back and got in my waiting Blackhawk and flew the five kilometers to 1st AD TAC CP.

MEDINA RIDGE

First AD's battle at what they called "Medina Ridge" had been the biggest and, as it turned out, the fastest and most one-sided individual battle of the war.

By late morning, Ron had all three division ground brigades on line abreast. The 2nd Brigade, commanded by Colonel Monty Meigs (Monty's great-great-grandfather had been quartermaster general of the Union army for General Grant) had four battalions, but his 6/6 Infantry was still catching up, following their finish of the al-Busayyah fight. The day before, 1st AD had successfully fought off an artillery attack from out of XVIII Corps's sector in the north, and by a combination of artillery and attack helicopters had destroyed a brigade of the Adnan RGFC Division that the Iraqis had repositioned south to thicken their defense.

It was shortly after noon when the 2nd Brigade ran into a reinforced brigade of the Medina.

"The Republican Guards," Ron Griffith said later about 1st AD's battles, "were much more capable forces" than the ones opposite us initially, and the other Iraqi forces in the southern part of Kuwait were "better equipped, trained, fed, led, and disciplined. The battles that were fought out there in the desert were very large battles, and they were not with forces that were running. In fact, they were forces that continued to reinforce and tried with some determination to defend."

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Whitcomb's account of the fight gives a firsthand account of what happened (Whitcomb was commander of 2/70 Armor, consisting of three M1A1 companies and one Bradley company, and one of the three TFs in 2nd Brigade's fight).

"At 1140, brigade began moving forward. While intelligence had not pinpointed enemy locations, we expected the enemy to be twenty to forty kilometers out front.

"Within minutes, as BANDIT's [Company B's] lead platoon was crawling out of a small wadi, the tanks stopped suddenly and backed down to turret defilade. Almost immediately, both BANDIT and ASSASSIN [Company A] reported T-72s and BMPs to their direct front. We confirmed friendly positions and ranges (2,800-3,500 meters). The wadi provided excellent firing positions for the tanks and the task force commenced firing.

"It quickly became obvious that the Iraqis were totally outclassed by our soldiers and equipment. Fire commands were textbook, with only an occasional hint of excitement as a T-72 would explode in a ball of flame. The day had been very gray and overcast and visibility limited to perhaps 1,500 meters. The wind blew sand. Through the haze, one could see muzzle flashes as the enemy tanks attempted to return fire." Steve later told me that it looked to him as though "Hoffman devices" — the training device used to simulate enemy tank fire—"were going off." They were totally ineffective, and as the captured Iraqis would later confirm, they could see us shoot, and watch their comrades explode, but could not identify our vehicles by any means other than their general direction. Our tankers far exceeded their training ranges of 2,200 to 2,400 meters with precise but deadly shots, the longest being 3,650 meters.

"Soon, the horizon was a series of over seventy smoke plumes. In forty-five minutes, the task force's share of the annihilation of the 2nd Brigade of the Medina Tank Division, Republican Guards, would later be confirmed at 27 T-72 tanks, 8 BMPs, and 6 air defense command-and-control vehicles… In those forty-five minutes, the brigade would destroy 55 T-72s, 6 T-55s, 35 armored personnel carriers, and 5 SA-13 antiaircraft weapons systems."

The enemy "had positioned themselves in an eight-kilometer-long 'fish-hook'-shaped line the day prior and had dug fighting positions for their tanks. They had tied their defense in with what good terrain they found and actually had set up an excellent reverse-slope defense. The enemy was there to fight and knew the importance to the rest of the Iraqi army of their ability to stop us.[51]

"During the fight, incoming artillery, around several hundred rounds, was received to the left rear of our flank unit, behind us and TF 4/70. The intent of the enemy had been to hit us and force us back into the artillery… The brigade fire-support officer called for counter-battery fire, and within seconds of 'Shot,' the Iraqi guns fell silent…

"In addition, A-10s and Apache attack helicopters, which had been requested earlier, arrived at about 1250 and were able to clean out enemy forces behind the front line of destroyed vehicles. Our soldiers were treated to an aerial display, as repeated runs by the A-10s and engagements by the Apaches' Hellfire missiles silenced any enemy activity…

"It was truly an awesome sight as we passed the still-flaming hulks of the enemy. Explosions continued, even over two hours after the fight, as tank rounds cooked off inside the vehicles, shooting flames skyward. Prisoners were captured, wounded, some seriously, treated and evacuated, and quick examination of the area for intelligence value conducted."

The above account was not merely the story of one battalion, it speaks for the whole division. While Steve Whitcomb's tankers executed the direct-fire fight, the brigade commander, Monty Meigs, ensured maximum combat power forward and used his artillery in direct support and for counterfire. Ron Griffith at the division would see that Monty had all the firepower he could provide, and ensure that the division executed the counterfire, and simultaneously fight in greater depth with A-10s and division Apaches.

This was combined arms — AirLand Battle at division level — working in harmony at each echelon. General George Patton in World War II called it the "musician of Mars." We had the whole VII Corps combined-arms orchestra crashing down on the Iraqis.

This fight also was why Ron Griffith had had his attention drawn to the situation in front of him, rather than to the problem of finding room for 1st CAV. He needed to bring the full weight of the division to bear, just as he had done at the beginning of Medina Ridge and was continuing to do.

1ST AD TAC CP MEDINA RIDGE

The 1st AD TAC CP was not really a CP at all. To keep up with his fast-moving series of battles close and deep, Ron had been moving about the battle area in his HMMWV and a helicopter. While he was doing that, Brigadier General Jay Hendrix had been inside an almost continually moving G-3 M577, directing the close fight.

One M577, with Jay Hendrix inside. I was really pumped up and pleased with what 1st AD was doing in their sector. Clearly they were hitting the Medina hard and were hitting other Iraqi mech and armor units deep. The price of that was an inability to plan, let alone decide on a maneuver to allow 1st CAV to pass to the north. The sight of that lone M577 explained to me the difficulty we were having at the VII Corps TAC getting 1st AD on the radio. It also was a signal to me that getting the 1st CAV in the fight that day would be hard to do.

I met Ron behind the M577. The ramp was up (because of the threat of Iraqi artillery fire), but the ramp door was open. I could hear the crackle of reports over the 1st AD command radio net, as the three brigades attacked on line and the aviation attacked deep. The 2/1 Aviation that I had released from 2nd ACR had by now returned to 1st AD… just in time to take up the deep fight from 3/1, whose pilots were by now too fatigued to fly. The full division was committed.

Joining our huddle was Brigadier General Creighton Abrams (there to get the fire support right) and the 1st CAV G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gunlicks. Also there was the G-3 of the 1st AD, Lieutenant Colonel Tommie Straus.

The discussion went something like this:

"Ron," I said, "I want the 1st CAV to be able to attack east toward Objective Raleigh and destroy the Hammurabi. That means — as we talked about earlier — you need to make room in the north of your sector. I've got Jim Gunlicks here and I want you to get the graphics coordinated between you and 1st CAV. John is moving his division up now and will be ready to pass. I want it done prior to dark."

"Roger, I understand," Ron said. "But it would be a lot easier if we got a boundary adjustment in the north rather than for me to try to make my sector smaller right in the middle of our fight with the Medina. We'll give it our best shot."

"I understand about the boundary, but that will not happen. Get it done by dark. I want to envelop the Iraqis. First CAV is the northern force and the 1st INF is the southern force. Keep pressing your attack."

"WILCO."

I had asked a lot of Ron and the 1st AD. They were in a continuous series of battles stretching out about thirty kilometers in front of the division. His forward units were conducting mostly unplanned meeting engagements. We knew generally that the Iraqis were out there, but final locations were determined only when 1st AD troops slammed into them. That required the continuous focus of the division leadership in case forward brigades ran into an enemy force they could not handle, and they needed reinforcement from division. I had ordered Ron to continue that attack. I had also ordered him to make his sector smaller by slightly changing direction, and at the same time to pass 1st CAV to his north. It was a tough mission.

Though Ron was not enthusiastic about all this, that was irrelevant to me. Sometimes you do not get to choose your missions. You execute. So, as a loyal and skilled commander, and one who had his hands full at the moment, Ron had told me he would do it. Ron's WILCO cemented a lifelong friendship between us.

I left and returned to the TAC, which by now had displaced forward and was located just west of where the 2nd ACR had so soundly beaten the Iraqis. I was convinced that within four hours (more or less), Ron and 1st AD would pass 1st CAV through, and we'd have the remaining Iraqis in the bag by late morning the next day. At least in our sector.

1530 VII CORPS TAC CP

The TAC was set up in its usual configuration. The site was a bald, sandy hill (more like a knoll or rise in the desert of maybe fifty feet). Around the site were littered many Iraqi armored vehicles, some burning, some smoking, some just demolished from air attacks.

There also were Iraqi dead (I had not seen any when I was flying in). The next day, our VII Corps chaplain, Colonel Dan Davis — a Special Forces Vietnam veteran, and a troop chaplain if ever there was one — supervised the burial of twenty-eight Iraqi dead and sent the locations back through channels to ARCENT. As was the practice in theater, these would later be passed to the Red Cross.

When I got to the TAC, the first thing I wanted to do was get a quick SITREP on the Iraqi situation and see about the progress of the 1st INF. I also wanted to find out if Stan had found Tom Rhame and delivered the graphics.

Next I reviewed the double envelopment. I knew we could do it. Besides, it looked ever more certain that the final maneuver to finish off the RGFC was up to us. From the information I had received from 1st AD, it appeared that the Third Army two-corps maneuver to finish off the RGFC would not work. XVIII Corps was not going to get east fast enough to become the hammer to our anvil that the Third Corps plan envisioned.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi defense was crumbling. Most of their forces in our sector continued to be east of 1st and 3rd AD, right where I had aimed 1st CAV.

John Tilelli reported that 1st CAV was moving up in anticipation of attacking east. Good! His CAV squadron had an action against a bypassed Iraqi unit.

The Big Red One was continuing its attack to the east and would reach Highway 8 by dark. That was great news. On the other hand, there were a couple of things that I thought I'd have to keep an eye on: First, I noticed that their attack was beginning to take a slight turn to the northeast. With 3rd AD attacking due east, then slightly southeast, if 1st INF started to veer northeast, they would eventually run into each other. Second, we were having trouble keeping effective communications with their TAC. From where we were, the distance was causing us to lose line-of-sight FM comms, and we were relying more and more on TACSAT. On top of that, since Tom Rhame was forward in a tank, to be as close to the action as he could get, I no longer had direct voice comms with him… This was, in fact, no big deal, as Tom knew what I wanted done, and if something wasn't clear, Stan was now at their TAC to explain it in person.

I knew the 1st AD situation, as I had just come from there.

The 3rd AD attack was relentless. They had moved farther and faster, and were picking up momentum. They were the Spearhead Division for sure!

Reports of their actions would tell me two things: First, their lead attacking units were telling us of actions around the 83 to 87 north/south grid line. That told us that the division was about to enter Kuwait, which was the 88 grid. By 1700, they were almost ten kilometers inside Kuwait, and closing in on the direction of attack of the 1st INF. The 3rd AD also continued to report that they were attacking and destroying T-72s and BMPs, as well as bunker complexes, but that the Iraqi resistance seemed less and less organized than it had been earlier in the day (these no longer seemed to be brigade actions, but more battalion- and even company-sized).

I was fired up about their success. Was there something I could do to capitalize on it? An option was to take advantage of their forward progress and attack them northeast in front of 1st AD toward the Hammurabi… No, I concluded. Not yet. If we could not get the 1st CAV around to the north of 1st AD, then I would consider that option.

One thing at a time for now. Keep it simple. Everyone was tired: soldiers and leaders were falling asleep in turrets; planners were having short-term memory lapses; so was I. This was not the time to overcomplicate what we were trying to do.

As I've mentioned before, as soldiers and leaders get more tired, you have to "work hard" at simplifying, and must communicate in direct, unambiguous language — even get more dramatic in gesture and language to get people's attention.

Since success in the attack always opens up opportunities, you also have to try to reinforce success where you find it — to seize an opening presented by the initiative of one of your subordinate units.

Recognizing success ("exploitation") and totally finishing the enemy ("pursuit") were skills we had not practiced much in our Cold War training because we had always stressed fighting outnumbered against tough enemies in the Warsaw Pact. The last time the American army had been in an exploitation-and-pursuit had been after the Inchon landing behind the North Koreans in September 1950. Some of my early training and education had been conducted by veterans of both World War II and Korea, and somewhere in the back of my mind, the ability to recognize signs of exploitation-and-pursuit on the battlefield had stuck. I had seen them earlier in the day in the 1st INF. Though I hadn't yet seen them in the 1st and 3rd AD, which were still in hasty attacks and meeting engagements, I knew I soon would.

At about 1700, Stan returned. Because Tom Rhame was forward in a tank, Stan had not been able to find him to deliver the order and brief him personally. He had been able to leave the order with the 1st INF TAC CP, however, so that was reassuring. But the lack of comms with Tom, the fact that we hadn't been able to get to him, and the fact that all of us were tired raised my concerns.

A little after 1700, Ron Griffith called.

"JAYHAWK 6, this is IRON 6," he said.

"JAYHAWK 6."

"My 3rd Brigade is in contact and we had some casualties. Cannot execute maneuver to get 1st CAV through in north. Believe it hazards my force to do that while we are in contact."

Damn, I thought. All that work racing around all day to personally tie this together, and now at the last minute we can't do it.

Chance. The unpredictable. It is part of war. My first emotion was anger that it was intervening to screw up our scheme of maneuver, but I let it pass. I had to adapt the plan to the circumstances. There is not much you can do about chance. And if in Ron's judgment they could not do it, then I had to consider options, not act as though chance never happened.

"IRON 6, JAYHAWK 6, confirm you cannot execute maneuver for PEGASUS."

"Affirmative. We have contact in 3rd Brigade sector and deep, plus casualties, and cannot execute by dark."

"Wait," I said. I wanted a minute to consider this.

That radio call was the biggest personal tactical disappointment I had ever experienced in my army life, either in training or in war. We had the Iraqis on the run. The Hammurabi was within our reach, and the majority of that division (we still thought) was in our sector. With the double-envelopment maneuver, we would have completed the destruction of at least the heavy forces of the RGFC — our mission. Additionally, it is not often in training or in war that you have an opportunity to execute a double envelopment. It is like a grand-slam home run for the whole unit. The disappointment was not so much personal (though it was that) as it was for the entire VII Corps. If we could end this war with an envelopment of Iraqi forces, our troops would have that success to point to for the rest of their lives. It would have been not only mission accomplished, but rather mission accomplished with a bang at the end.

That's what I had in mind. And now this news from Ron. I pushed the anger down and forced myself to consider the options:

First, I could force it. Tell Ron, just do it. You handle your contact, but get it done. I need the 1st CAV in the fight tonight, so we'll bull our way through this. That is sometimes a workable option.

Second, I could adapt tactics; that is, order 1st CAV and 1st AD to make a forward passage of lines, just as the 1st INF had done with the 2nd ACR, rather than have 1st CAV pass to the north. But the 2nd ACR was well practiced in passage of lines and had time to set it up. This would be from a standing cold start, with planning and execution in the dark. Not only was there the risk of fratricide, it would probably take them all night. Besides, in the morning I'd have two exhausted divisions on my hands from all the coordination and passage, and the Iraqis left alone most of the night.

Third, I could absorb the chance by adjusting for time; that is, we could wait until Ron got things under control and then pass the 1st CAV, probably by first light next morning. We had that time, it would involve less risk, and even though we would be giving the Iraqis who weren't in contact with the 1st AD another twelve hours, we would still get the mission done. On the other hand, the RGFC still seemed to be fighting rather than running away (after the Medina Ridge fight experience, it did not look as though the RGFC would be going anywhere soon), and we had theater air to isolate the battlefield and keep them from running.

Fourth, I had to consider Ron's judgment, which I totally trusted. He knew what I wanted to do and had ordered him to do. He knew the significance of attacking east into the Hammurabi. He also knew his current situation. He wanted to finish the fight. I had always trusted the loyalty and judgment of my subordinates. I had never given a mission that I knew was not possible to execute. That principle had never failed me in over thirty-one years, not once in peace and war. Why abandon it now? Besides, we had the next day — or so I thought at the time.

"IRON 6, this is JAYHAWK 6. Roger your situation. I want you to pass PEGASUS at first light tomorrow without fail. Contact him directly and coordinate."

"WILCO."

"PEGASUS 6, JAYHAWK 6, did you monitor my call to IRON 6?"

"Roger, JAYHAWK, understand BMNT to attack east same axis and objective." It was John Tilelli talking; I could hear the disappointment in his voice. They had busted their ass to be in Area Horse by 1100 that day, moving almost 250 kilometers in a little more than twenty-four hours. And now this.

"Affirmative, coordinate directly with IRON for passage."

That was it. We still had time, I thought.

Stan and the troops had heard both ends of this exchange. They made the necessary adjustments.

At 1800, I made my usual call to John Yeosock to give him a SITREP before his 1900 meeting with General Schwarzkopf. I reported that Iraqi resistance was becoming less coherent, and that 1st INF was in pursuit, but that 1st and 3rd ADs were still in hasty attack mode. I then updated him on our double-envelopment maneuver. We needed another twenty-four hours or so, I told him, and it would be all over: by then we would have run out of maneuver room and would have the remaining Iraqi forces surrounded. John agreed with my assessment. Another twenty-four hours was about what we would get, he thought.

I learned after the war that John had already given what was essentially the same message to the CINC on the morning of the twenty-seventh, and that General Schwarzkopf had used that judgment as the basis of a report he had given to General Powell that afternoon.[52] In that report, General Schwarzkopf stated that he wanted to continue the ground attack one more day to destroy everything to the Persian Gulf.

I was also at that time totally unaware of General Schwarzkopf's briefing the evening of 27 February that has been called "the mother of all briefings," during which the CINC essentially said that the escape door was shut and declared victory.

After that call, Stan, Creighton Abrams, and I went over the next day's operation. We looked at the objectives assigned, the fire-control measures (including placement of the FSCL), and other fire-support and control measures. This was the closest to a war game we could get during our attack — that is, we looked at moves and countermoves by the Iraqis. We figured there was nothing they could do to stop us from our double-envelopment maneuver.

I was satisfied that all of it would work, and by the end of the day — or at the latest by Friday morning — it would all be over, and we would have done what we had come to do. The RGFC would be destroyed, not only in our sector but in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, as XVIII Corps closed in from the north.

Our own actions were to continue to attack in the sector while setting the double envelopment in motion. Yet I also was becoming increasingly focused on ensuring that major corps units did not run into one another, since our success was beginning to run us out of maneuver room.

Here is what I was seeing. The 1st INF was approaching Highway 8, and their axis of advance had them moving northeast rather than the more due east I had ordered earlier. Third AD was into Kuwait and also approaching Highway 8, attacking east-southeast. Looking at the map, it appeared we might have to do something to change their directions or establish a limit of advance, or else they would run into each other. First AD also was approaching Highway 8, to the north of 3rd AD.

I left the TAC and walked outside to clear my head. Not much else I could do right now. We had the corps attacking due east against the RGFC, the 1st CAV committed for a first-light attack, and the 2nd ACR (in reserve) also committed to follow the 1st INF, then attack north inside them to Hawk. I also had my one remaining Apache battalion in our 11th Aviation Brigade in reserve for deep attacks, although that appeared unlikely, given the cramped space deep. I walked around, ate some MREs, then relaxed for a few minutes and smoked a cigar in the small tent the troops had put up for me, about twenty feet from the TAC entrance.

At about 1845, when I went back inside the canvas enclosure of the TAC, Stan pointed out to me that the 3rd AD attacks had, in fact, taken them so far east and southeast that if the Big Red One were to keep its current axis of attack, then 3rd AD might run into them. Since all we had to go on was the friendly situation we had posted on our map, this information was not certain enough for me to make a decision to adjust. Figuring how long it takes to get orders out and executed, and wary of map postings not current, I told Stan to confirm the information and, if correct, to give 3rd AD a limit of advance, and to redirect the 1st INF attack farther east (and toward the blue as I had ordered early that morning), then north once they were across Highway 8.

But at 1900, when the call went to the 1st INF Division, it was interpreted as an order to stop. And so they ordered a halt to their movement, and came to a stop sometime later, at around 2200 to 2300 (although unit moves and combat actions continued most of the night).

What I had wanted them to do was to cease their northeast movement and continue due east toward the Gulf. Then, once they were across Highway 8, I wanted them to turn north. They never got the part of the order that told them to resume attacking east.

Meanwhile, their cavalry squadron, by now far forward and out of radio contact with division and the lead or second brigade, knew of my intent from earlier that day and kept attacking east. In the best example of initiative in accordance with the commander's intent that I knew of in the war, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson and the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (known all over the Army as the quarter horse for 1/4 CAV) moved across and cut Highway 8 at around 1900. Afterward, his squadron was inundated with prisoners. His small unit had to handle almost 5,000 of them, which overwhelmed his capability. But by the early evening of 27 February, we had control of Highway 8.

At least that arm of the envelopment was working.

I did not find out until two days later that the 1st INF had interpreted the order from the TAC to stop completely. That was my fault. If an order can be misunderstood, it will be, as the old Army saying goes. After I learned of it, I asked Tom Rhame, "Who the hell ordered you to stop?"

"We thought you did," he said.

"Damn," I said, then explained what I had intended.

G+3… THE REST OF THE THEATER

In the west, on the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, XVIII Corps changed its orientation from north toward the Euphrates to east toward Basra, and then moved to close the by-now-expanding gap with VII Corps. The 3rd ACR, now under operational control of the 24th MECH, was the first XVIII Corps unit to make the turn.

Meanwhile, the airfield at Umm Hajul (which straddled the east-west boundary with VII Corps, a few kilometers north of al-Busayyah, and thirty kilometers south of the more important Iraqi airfield at Jalibah) was converted by elements of the 101st Airborne into FOB (Forward Operating Base) Viper. From this base, 101st Apaches attacked 145 kilometers farther east into what was called EA (Engagement Area) Thomas and shot up with Hellfires, rockets, and chain gun rounds everything that moved between Viper and Thomas. EA Thomas was a kill box directly north of Basra through which ran the highway north that was thought to be a major exit route for Iraqi armor. As it happened, four hours of continuous attack by 101st Apaches destroyed personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, antiaircraft guns, trucks, and grounded helicopters, yet no tanks were found to be moving through EA Thomas.

The next morning, the 101st commander, General Peay, planned to air-assault his 1st Brigade into Thomas. If they could get forces on the ground to cut the highway north out of Basra, it was thought they would strangle the last escape route of the Republican Guards. The cease-fire put a stop to this plan.

Meanwhile, the heaviest punch out of XVIII Corps, the 24th MECH, attacked and captured Jalibah airfield, and moved eastward along Highway 8 at about 1300. By 1000, the airfield, which was defended by an Iraqi armored battalion, was secure. The battalion had lost all of its vehicles, and fourteen MiG fighters, abandoned by the Iraqi air force, also were destroyed.

Not far from Jalibah, the division ran into huge logistics and ammunition storage sites; the area just beyond that was defended by scattered elements of RGFC divisions — the al-Faw, the Nebuchadnezzar, and the Hammurabi (the first two were infantry divisions, the last armored). Though Iraqi artillery tried to lay fires down on the rapidly advancing columns, they didn't do any damage. That afternoon, the 24th took more than 1,300 Iraqi ammunition bunkers and captured more than 5,000 Iraqi soldiers.

In Kuwait, the Marines had come close to completing their mission. While Tiger Brigade cut the highway out of Al Jahrah, and the land route north toward Iraq, the 2nd Division had halted on Mutlah Ridge. And at 0600 the morning of the twenty-seventh, elements of the 1st Division made the final assault on the international airport. It wasn't long before they took down the Iraqi colors and raised the U.S. and Kuwaiti flags (the U.S. flag soon came down, for the sake of diplomatic decorum).

By 0900, Kuwaiti forces, supported by Egyptian armor and other Arab forces, entered Kuwait City.

Coalition forces found a city that had been sacked. Many of its citizens had been tortured (with acid baths, electric drills, and electric prods), killed (dismemberment, shooting, or beating to death were frequent methods), or raped.

Some Iraqi looting had been systematic — a million ounces of gold from the Kuwait Central Bank, jewels from the gem market, marine ferries, shrimp trawlers, baggage-handling equipment, airliners, runway lights, granite facing from skyscrapers, thousands of plastic seats from the university stadium, and grave-digging backhoes, to name a few. Most government and public buildings had been looted and pillaged — many were burned. So too were hotels, department stores, and telephone exchanges. Other looting had been more opportunistic — rugs, drapes, toilets, sinks, light fixtures, lightbulbs, most of the country's cars, buses, and trucks, and books from libraries. The Iraqis sabotaged all but a few of the country's 1,330 oil wells and twenty-six gathering stations. Every day, something approaching 11 million barrels of crude escaped from these broken wells. About half of those 11 million barrels burned up. The rest made vast crude oil lakes. Ships were scuttled, to block channels through the harbor. Water and electrical utilities were sabotaged.

Scattered along the so-called Highway of Death, littered around the ruined — and mostly stolen — cars and trucks, was a partial "inventory" of the loot from Kuwait City — television sets, washing machines, carpets, scuba gear, jewelry.

After the Arabs took the city, the Marines entered. When they did, the Kuwaitis came out like Parisians in August 1944. "God bless Bush!" they cried. "Thank you, U.S.A.! Thank you! Thank you! Thank you!"

By evening in Riyadh, momentum was growing in Washington for a cease-fire. And at 2100 (1300 in Washington), General Schwarzkopf gave the live, televised "mother of all briefings" that, in essence, declared victory. Although he allowed that armored battles were still going on, the CINC indicated that he would happily stop fighting if the order came to do that.

He did not have long to wait.