Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941

177. An antifascist documentary, Ispaniya (Spain), by Esther Shub, had premiered on July 20, 1939. Short and Taylor, “Soviet Cinema.”

178. Anderson et al., Kremlevskii kinoteatr, 539. See also Luk’ianov, “‘Aleksandr Nevskii’: na s”emakh filma”; S. M. Eisenstein, “Zametkie rezhissera,” Ogonek, 1938, no. 22: 19, 20–1; and Izvestiia, Nov. 11, 1938. On Eisenstein’s self-critique of the film, whose commercial success puzzled him, see Eisenstein, Film Sense, 123–68. Five other recently made anti-German films were also pulled.

179. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 160, l. 1 (note to Dukelsky). The Comintern’s Dimitrov sent a long telegram admonishing Earl Browder, leader of the American Communists, that “now the issue is not just fascism, but the existence of the entire capitalist system,” and insisted there would be no more juxtaposing “democratic” capitalist countries to fascist ones. “This war is a continuation of the struggle between the rich great powers (England, France, the United States), which are the spine of the whole capitalist system, and the disadvantaged states (Germany, Italy, Japan), which in their struggle for a new division of the world are deepening and sharpening the crisis of the capitalist system.” Lebedeva, Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia voina, 132–6 (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 469, l. 108–12).

180. Quoted in Hosking, First Socialist Society, 218–9.

181. Leonhard, Betrayal, 90.

182. Uttitz, Zeugen der Revolution, 134.

183. Vishnevskii, “‘Sami peredem v napadenie,’” 104–5: Aug. 28, 31, and Sept. 1, 1939.

184. The Anti-Komintern agency inside Goebbels’s propaganda ministry, whose purpose was “a world anti-Bolshevik movement under German leadership,” was wound down with the signing of the Pact, but the Nazi regime’s identity remained founded upon German racial superiority and a crusade against “Judeo-Bolshevism.” Waddington, “Anti-Komintern,” 576, citing NA, GFM34/1265: Goebbels circular, Dec. 8, 1936. See also Waddington, Hitler’s Crusade.

185. Pravda, Sept. 1, 1939; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 581–3 (at 582); Mirovoe khoziaistvo i miroavaia politika, no. 9 (1939): 3; Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 363–71. In connection with the Pact, the Soviets talked out of both sides of their mouths, allowing subsequent scholars on opposite sides to find quotes supporting their arguments about whether or not Stalin ever wanted a deal with the West. For example, Voroshilov said, via the Soviet press, that “military negotiations with England and France were not broken off because the Soviet Union concluded a nonaggression pact with Germany. On the contrary, the Soviet Union concluded a nonaggression pact with Germany because, among other reasons, the military negotiations with France and England had run into a blind alley because of insuperable differences.” (Those differences, he said, came down to a failure to guarantee western transit rights to Germany for the USSR in the event of an aggression.) But to the Germans, Stalin said that “the Soviet government”—i.e., himself—“never had sympathies toward England.” Stalin told Dimtrov, “We preferred agreements with the so-called democratic countries and therefore conducted negotiations. But the English and the French wanted us for farmhands and at no cost! We, of course, would not go for being farmhands, still less for getting nothing in return.” Of course, these words on the Pact were precisely what the staunch antifascist Dimitrov would have wanted to hear. Izvestiia, Aug. 27, 1939, and Pravda, Aug. 27, 1939, in Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 444–5; Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 361–2; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 606–17 (at 609, Schulenburg’s papers); Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 115–6 (Sept. 7, 1939). See also Nekrich, Pariahs, 137; Roberts, “Pact with Nazi Germany,” 94–5; and Fischer, Life and Death of Stalin, 162.

186. Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 92.

187. Seraphim, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, 89–90 (Aug. 22, 1939); Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, VI: 985–8; Hoffman, Hitler Was My Friend, 103.

188. D’iakov and Bushueva, Fashistskii mech kovalsia v SSSR, 364–5 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1237, l. 413). Maisky fell into shock upon word of the Pact: “Our policy is clearly making a sharp turnabout, the sense and consequences of which are so far not entirely clear to me” (Aug. 24, 1939). DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 647 (AVP RF, f. 017a, op. 1, pap. 1, d. 6, l. 223: Aug. 24, 1939); Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, I: 441.

189. Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia, 314 (citing Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1115).

190. Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 147.

191. Bell, France and Britain, 224–5; Adamthwaite, France, 49–50. Toward the end of 1939, a falsified “transcript” of a supposed politburo meeting would be published in France depicting a devious Stalin, an effort to discredit him in Hitler’s eyes, and depicting the French Communist party as treasonous. Sluch, “Rech’ Stalina,” 113–39.

192. Just such a one-sided view of Chamberlain can be found in the once pro-appeasement foreign office official turned scholar E. H. Carr: German-Soviet Relations, 135–6. Carr’s influential history of international relations since 1919 mocked “the notion that the maintenance of British supremacy is the performance of a duty to mankind.” He sent his completed manuscript to the press in July 1939, and the book came out that Sept., when Nazism and Communism were together annihilating Poland. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 72.

193. This priority on Chamberlain’s part, however self-serving, had a strategic dimension: British success in maintaining the Commonwealth and empire in the interwar period would prove to be of considerable significance in the Allied victory over the Axis. Clayton, British Empire as Superpower, 517.

194. Neville Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham Library, 18/1/1091 (Chamberlain to Ida, March 26, 1939).

195. Chamberlain, according to Eden, had feared that “Communism would get its clutches into Western Europe” via the Spanish civil war. Smyth, “Soviet Policy,” 105. It has been asserted that Chamberlain should have accepted Soviet expansionism into Central Europe if that could have avoided a war on the scale of World War II. Shaw, British Political Elite.

196. Overy, 1939: Countdown, 15 (citing Magdalene College, Cambridge, Inge papers, vol. 36, diary 1938–9, March 16, 1939).

197. Other Brits went even further in the Hitler apologetics than did Chamberlain, at the time and after. A. J. P. Taylor infamously wrote that Hitler “aimed to make Germany the dominant Power in Europe and maybe, more remotely, in the world. Other Powers have pursued similar aims, and still do. . . . In international affairs there was nothing wrong with Hitler except that he was a German.” Taylor, Origins, 293.

198. Kennan in 1935 deemed the idea that Hitler intended to expand into the Soviet Union “the wildest stretch of the imagination.” George Kennan, “The War Problem of the Soviet Union,” in George F. Kennan Papers, Box 1, Mudd Library, Princeton University, in Hochman, Failure of Collective Security, 178. Looking back, Kennan would admit that he misread Hitler and the Nazi threat. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, 70–3.

199. Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 206–7 (the letter is dated March 26, 1939).

200. Conversely, the British ambassador to Germany had written in his annual report for 1935, a document read by Stalin, that “demanding a guarantee from Hitler vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is equivalent to demanding from the Church obligations to the devil.” Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 234–5 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 2, d. 315, l. 136).

201. Aster, 1939, 281.

202. Roberts, Holy Fox, 157.

203. Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, 190–1 (von Dirksen memo, Sept. 1939).

204. Overy, “Strategic Intelligence,” 455.

205. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 148.

206. Overy, 1939: Countdown, 11, 34.

207. Below, At Hitler’s Side, 29; Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 160 (Aug. 25, 1939).

208. Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 259.

209. Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations, 122–3; DBFP, 3rd series, VII: 230, 235, 239; Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, VII: 77 (Aug. 26, 1939); Domarus, Hitler: Reden, III: 1257.

210. Hofer, Die Entstehung des Zwieiten Weltkriegs, 237, 274; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 633–4; Das Deutsche Reich unde der Zweite Weltkrieg, II: 101–2.

211. Hartmann, Halder, 137.

212. Engelmann, In Hitler’s Germany, 150. Not all German units received the new order to stand down, which meant fighting erupted in a few places, notably in the Jablonka Pass on the Slovak-Polish border.

213. I documenti diplomatici Italiani, 8th ser., 13 vols. (Rome: Libreria dello Sstato, 1952–), XIII: 164–5. DGFP, series D, VII: 285–6 (Mussolini to Hitler, Aug. 25, 1939); Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 160–1 (Aug. 25, 1939); Gibson, Ciano Diaries, 128–9 (Aug. 25, 1939); Ciano, Diary, 264–5.

214. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 215. Italy had already informed Germany, in general terms, on May 31, 1939, that it would not be ready for war before 1943. In June 1939, Chamberlain told the committee of imperial defence that “the Italians would be on the lookout for any excuse to keep out of the war.” DGFP, series D, VI: 617–20; Overy, “Strategic Intelligence,” 470 (citing PRO CAB 2/8: Minutes of CID meeting, June 22, 1939, 6).

215. Overy, 1939: Countdown, 36 (citing NA, PREM 1/331a: Strang to Cadogan, Aug. 26, 1939, 1; Halifax Papers, A4.4103/10 (i): Birger Dahlerus, 11; and Le Livre jaune francais: documents diplmatiques 1938–1939 [Paris, 1939]), 312 (Coulondre to Bonnet, Aug. 25, 1939).

216. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 215; Hofer, Die Entstehung des Zwieiten Weltkriegs, 276.

217. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 60 (Aug. 27 and 29, 1939).

218. Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy,” 215–6; DGFP, series D, VII: 405–7 (Ribbentrop to Bernardo Attolico, Aug. 29, 1939). Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador to London, reported that Chamberlain was concerned that the Poles be “reasonable” vis-à-vis Hitler’s demands. FRUS, 1939, I: 392 (Kennedy telegram, Aug. 30, 1939).

219. De Felice, Mussolini, II: 670.

220. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 581 (German account); Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 12. Ribbentrop had first told Stalin of the joke making the rounds in Berlin that “Stalin will join the Anti-Comintern Pact.” Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 75.

221. Hillgruber, Die Zerstörung Europas, 212. The expression to play “va banque” (translated here as “go for broke”), from baccarat, connotes wagering an amount equal to that held by the banker of the game.

222. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, VII: 85–6 (Aug. 31, 1939). On Sept. 1, Hitler launched a tirade at Dahlerus to the effect that he was prepared to fight Britain for a decade if forced to do so. Dahlerus, Der letze Versuch, 130–1. On Aug. 28, 1939, Clare Hollingworth, a British correspondent traveling by car from Katowice to Gleiwitz, had glimpsed the vast German arsenal in the valley poised to attack and broken the news. Daily Telegraph, Aug. 29, 1939.

223. Dederichs, Heydrich, 89; Schellenberg, Schellenberg Memoirs, 68–70. On the bomber: Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe, 231; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 513–4.

224. DBFP, 3rd series, VII: 501 (Halifax to Phipps, Sept. 1, 1939), doc. 504 (Henderson Sept. 2, 1939).

225. French Yellow Book, 307 (François-Poncet in Rome to Bonnet, Aug. 31, 1939).

226. Dietrich, The Hitler I Knew, 47; Schmidt, Statist, 464; Eberle and Uhl, Hitler Book, 47–8.

227. Back on Aug. 22, 1929, in a secret speech to his military brass, Hitler had restated his original grand strategy preference for attacking the Western powers first, explained his reversal of that sequence, declared his intention to strike Poland even if the Western Powers upheld their vows to act, and concluded that his sole concern was that the Schweinhund Chamberlain would find a way to cheat him out of war, just as the PM had at Munich. Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 610–1, 643n80. See also Baumgart, “Zur Ansprache Hitlers”; and Meyer, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, 184.

228. The prospect of Poland’s destruction and the “emancipation” of the ethnic German minority there beguiled the Wehrmacht brass as well, despite the latter’s concern about preparedness for a general conflict. Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II: 654; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 321–2; Maiolo, “Armaments Competition,” 286–307.

229. Poland possessed only a provisional study for a western front, conducted in 1936. Prażmowska, Britain, Poland, 90–2, citing Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wajnie światowej, 3 vols. (London: Instytut Historyczny im. gen. Sikorskiego, 1951–86), I/i: 117–22, 209 (General Stachiewicz); Kirchmayer, 1939 i 1944 Kilka Zagadnień Polskich, 46–9; Colonel Jaklicz, typescript at the Polish Institute and the Sikorski Museum, London, 33, 121–2.

230. DGFP, series D, VII: 540–1; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 600; Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 86, 90.

231. Zaloga and Madej, Polish Campaign, 145–9; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 304–29.

232. Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy in 1939”; May, Strange Victory, 93; Frieser, Blitzkrieg Legend, 18. On Sept. 5, Halder recorded in his diary of Poland: “enemy practically beaten.” (Halder Diaries, I: 53.) In fact, Polish forces emerged victorious in a major engagement with Wehrmacht forces in southeastern Poland.

233. Bédarida, La Strategic sécrete, 95.

234. AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 7, d. 68, l. 3–4, 5–6; God krizisa, II: 359–60; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 6–7; Na prieme, 270–1. Accompanying Shkvartsev to Berlin was Vladimir Pavlov, sent as the new first secretary of the embassy; a new NKVD station chief, Amayak Kobulov; and a new military attaché, Maxim Purkayev (“Marble”). Shkvartsev had been received in the Little Corner on Aug. 19 (only with Molotov), and on Sept. 1 (again with Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Pavlov, Purkayev, Kobulov, and Dekanozov). Shkvarstev would be present in the Molotov’s office on Sept. 28 during Ribbentrop’s second visit. In late December 1940, Pavlov would be transferred to Moscow as head of the Central European desk at the foreign affairs commissariat—at age twenty-five—overseeing Germany, Hungary, and former Czechoslovakia (under German occupation).

235. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 55.

236. Konstantin Simonov, then a writer at Red Star, would recall viewing the German invasion as an attack of the strong against the weak and not wanting to see a German victory. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pololeniia, 309. See also Prishvin, Dnevniki, X: 276.

237. Semiriaga, “17 sentiabria 1939 g.”; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 25–6 (AVP RF, f. 011, op. 4, pap. 24, d. 5, l. 29: Molotov-Grzybowski, Sept. 5, 1939).

238. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 91, 100.

239. Shaposhnikov had crossed out the order’s date in red pen and written in Sept. 14. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 59–63 (TsAMO, f. 148a, op. 3763, d. 69, l. 1–3, 4–6); Mel’tiukhov, Sovetsko-pol’skie voiny (2004), 435–47.

240. “The distrust on my side toward Stalin,” Hitler would observe to Mussolini on Oct. 28, 1940, “is matched by Stalin’s distrust toward me.” Langer, Undeclared War, 136 (no citation). According to Zhukov, Zhdanov, too, said it was impossible to trust Hitler. Simonov, “Zametki k biogfraii G. K. Zhukova,” 49.

241. Legner held an NKVD officer’s rank. Rybin, Stalin v oktiabre, 65–6. In Legner’s workshop, Nina Matveevna Gupalo sewed the clothes for politburo and other high-placed spouses. Back in 1938, after half the government guard detail had been arrested in a single night, Alexei Rybin (b. 1908), a member of the construction team for the Nearby Dacha and once a bodyguard for Kaganovich, then Orjonikidze, became military commandant of the Bolshoi Theater. Radzinskii, Stalin, 401; Rybin, Kto otravil Stalina?, 59.

242. Sharapov, “Piat’sot stranits v den’”; Shefov, “Dve vstrechi,” 154; Ilizarov, Tainaia zhizn’ Stalina, passim; Medvedev and Medvedev, Neizvestnyi Stalin; Shepilov, Kremlin’s Scholar.

243. By some accounts, Radek had translated Mein Kampf for politburo members already in the early 1930s, before Hitler had come to power. The internal Russian translation of Mein Kampf would be published only after the fall of the Soviet Union: Adol’f Gitler, Moia bor’ba (Moscow: T-Oko, 1992).

244. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, 168.

245. Kalinin’s copy has been preserved with marginalia about “a prolix, contentless” book “for petty shop owners”: RGASPI, f. 78, op. 8, d. 140; Ilizarov, Tainaia zhizn’ Stalina, 137; Ilizarov, “Stalin” (no. 4) 190–1.

246. Khrushchev, Vospominaniia, I: 219; Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 216.

247. Gareev, Neodnoznachnye stranitsy, 20. Makhmut Gareyev (b. 1923) would rise to army general.

248. Heiden, Die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus; Geiden, Istoriia germanskogo fashizma, 60. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 23–26; Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 352–3. Heiden also produced the valuable Hitler: eine Biographie, 2 vols. (Zurich: Europa, 1936–7).

249. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/1: 25 (no citation); Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 352.

250. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 274–5.

251. Izvestiia, Sept. 16, 1939; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 446.

252. On the military orders, see Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, XVIII (VII/i): 133 (RGVA, f. 33977, op. 1, d. 28, l. 36); and Efimenko et al., Vooruzhennyi konflikt, 409 (RGVA, f. 33977, op. 1, d. 28, l. 38). On July 18, 1940, Japan would effectively recognize the boundaries as claimed by the USSR. Ikuhiko, “Japanese-Soviet Confrontation,” 174–5.

253. Ikuhiko, “Japanese-Soviet Confrontation.” See also Sorge’s report of Sept. 10, 1939: Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia oteechestvennaia, XVIII (VII/i): 159 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22407, d. 2, l. 455–6).

254. DGFP, series D, VIII: 79–80 (Schulenburg, Sept. 17, 1939)

255. Biegański et al., Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, I: doc. 69; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 94–96 (AVP RF, f. 011, op. 4, pap. 24, d. 7, l. 176–9: Potyomkin-Grzybowski, Sept. 17, 1939), 96 (f. 059, op. 1, pap. 313, d. 2155, l. 49–51: diplomatic note); Izvestiia, Sept. 18, 1939; Pikhoia and Gieysztor (eds.), Katyn’: plenniki, 65–7 (APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 410, l. 35–9: Potyomkin diary, Sept. 17, 1939); Cienciala et al., Katyn, 44–7; Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 211–12. Schulenburg had been shown the note and allowed to suggest changes. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 96.

256. Liszewski, Polsko-sowiecka wojna, 24 (citing the prophetic words of Marshal Rydz-Smilga).

257. Pravda, Sept. 18, 1939; Izvestiia, Sept. 18, 1939, in Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 446–8; New York Times, Sept. 18, 1939: 5. Zhdanov had written in Pravda (Sept. 14, 1939) that the Polish state was collapsing because of its repression of Ukrainian and Belorussian national minorities, which he blamed on the Polish bourgeoisie, capitalists, and landowners.

258. Zaloga and Madej, Polish Campaign, 131–8.

259. Kuznetsov, Krutye povoroty, 47.

260. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 86–7.

261. “Itinerar Hitlers vom 1.9.1939–31.12.1941,” in Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 659–98 (at 660–1); Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 205.

262. DGFP, series D, VIII: 92.

263. DGFP, series D, VIII: 104–5; Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 55. On Sept. 20, having received assurances from Berlin, both Schulenburg and Köstring separately offered assurances to Soviet officials.

264. RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 22, l. 62. Soon, rumors would spread of additional clashes. “In town there is more and more talk about the Russians returning and about battles between German and Soviet troops somewhere along the Bug River and other locations,” Dr. Zygmunt Klukowski recorded in his diary (Oct. 15, 1939). “Sorry to say, but some citizens are as equally brutal as the Germans toward the Jews.” Klukowski, Diary from the Years of Occupation, 41–2.

265. Wheeler-Bennett, “From Brest-Litovsk to Brest-Litovsk.”

266. Domarus, Hitler: Reden, III: 1354–66 (Hitler’s Danzig speech).

267. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 28–9 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 924, d. 2027, l. 19–20: Shkvartsev to Molotov, Sept. 5, 1939).

268. RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 22, l. 60–3.

269. Molotov did allow that Germany might claim the Suwałki triangle (between East Prussia and Lithuania), except for Augustovo. Rossi, Deux ans, 75n1, 75–6n1 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Sept. 20, 1939); Rossi, Russo-German Alliance, 62–3 (citing a telephone message from Ribbentrop to Köstring and a telegram from Schulenburg to Berlin, neither published in Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations).

270. Mel’tiukhov, Sovetsko-pol’skie voiny (2004), 496–7 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 22, l. 60–1); Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 176ff.

271. “Itinerar Hitlers vom 1.9.1939–31.12.1941,” in Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 661.

272. Mel’tiukhov, Sovetsko-pol’skie voiny, (2001), 303–350, (2004), 463–92; Erickson, “Red Army’s March,” 18–20; Włodarkiewicz, Lwów. Fifteen thousand Lvov defenders (1,000 of them officers) were taken prisoner; many would not survive captivity.

273. Krivoshein, Mezhdubur’e, 234–9; Schmidt-Scheeder, Reporter der Hölle, 101; Deutscher Allgemeine Zeitung, Sept. 25, 1939.

274. Guderian, Vospominaniia soldata, 105.

275. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 85–6 (Sept. 20, 1939); Mel’tiukhov, Sovetsko-pol’skie voiny (2001), 319–23, 326–33 (citing RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 22, l. 60–5); Nekrich, Pariahs, 130–2.

276. Back in 1934, Stalin’s ambassador to Poland (Yakov Davtyan) had confided in the American ambassador his “doubt concerning the capacity of Poland to exist as an independent nation”—a widely held Soviet prejudice. The next year, Piłsudski, dictator of Poland, had died. “Piłsudski is the entire Poland,” Radek claimed he had heard Stalin say. Kuromiya, “Stalin’s Great Terror,” 8 (citing Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, I.303.4.3158, 235).

277. Wańkowicz, Po klęsce, 612.

278. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 77 (RGVA, f. 35084, op. 1, d. 8, l. 168), 78–83 (Tsentr khraneniia istoriko-dokumental’nykh kollektsii, f. 1/p, op. 1a, d. 1, l. 1–9), 89–92 (l. 63–7), 92–5 (op. 1e, d. 1, l. 17–18), 114–8 (APRF, f. 3 op. 5, d. 614, l. 228–30), and 118–9 (APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 410, l. 148–9).

279. Freidländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, I: 267–8; Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 467–9; Melzer, No Way Out, 22, 43, 91; Milton, “Expulsion of Polish Jews from Germany”; Heller, On the Edge of Destruction.

280. Buell, Poland, 307 (General Stanisław Skwarczyński).

281. Westermann, Hitler’s Police Battalions, 124–8; Madajczyk, Die Okkupationspolitik Nazi-Deutschlands, 19–20.

282. Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 41ff.

283. Fritzsche, Life and Death.

284. Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 48.

285. DGFP, series D, VIII: 77 (Schulenburg, Sept. 16, 1939). Stalin in Aug. 1923 had predicted the need for “a war against Poland, and possibly the other limitrofa states,” in connection with revolution in Germany. (“Naznachit’ revolutsiia v Germanii na 9 noiabria,” 133.) Tukhachevsky shared this view and his close friend, the Polish Communist Tomasz Dąbal, deputy general secretary of the fledgling Peasant International, in May 1925 had spoken openly in Red Star, the Red Army newspaper, of “a right to separate [the Ukrainians and Belorussians] from Poland and join them to the Soviet republics.” Krasnaia zvezda, May 7, 1925. According to French military intelligence, basing itself on a Polish source, the Soviet military commander Uborevičius, an ethnic Lithuania, had stated ingratiatingly at a banquet in Berlin with the German military brass on Feb. 1, 1930, “Have we not moved far enough in the past two years to be able to pose the question of a revision of the borders and a drubbing of the Poles? In fact, we ought to partition Poland again.” Castellan, Le réarmement clandestin du Reich, 185 (citing letter att. mil., Berlin, no. 152: 295, March 28, 1930).

286. Gross, Revolution from Abroad, chap. 1, 206. Sukiennicki, “Establishment of the Soviet Regime”; Vakar, Byelorussia, 164–5, 168–9. Perhaps ten thousand more Ukrainians were repatriated westward as labor power by Nazi intelligence under falsified German racial origin designations.

287. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia, 80–1.

288. Vernadsky also pointed out a lack of white bread even for those with the money to pay, a decline in the quality of black bread, queues for vodka, and general dissatisfaction and hardship. Vernadskii, Dnevniki, 1935–1941, II: 56. See also Nevehzin, “Pol’sha v sovetskoi propagande,” 69–88. Bolshevik, the party journal, in its Sept. 1939 issue called the Red Army’s crossing into eastern Poland “a liberation” of ethnic Ukrainians and Belorussians, while making no mention of the Pact. The same issue celebrated the first anniversary of the Short Course and the country’s pending progress in Marxist-Leninist training. Bol’shevik, 1939, no. 17: 6–11, 12–21. Identical treatment appeared in Ogonyok (no. 24 [1939]: 1–7), which had a thrice-monthly circulation of 300,000. On a poster by Viktor Korecki, printed in four languages and 800,000 copies, Stalin was quoted as declaring, “Our army is an army of liberators.”

289. “SSSR v voine,” Biulleten’ oppozitsii, no. 79–80 (1939): 8.

290. Iskusstvo kino, 1940, no. 1–2: 44. “In the heat of our work the radio brought news of the historic decision of the Soviet Government,” enthused the director Yefim Dzigan of First Cavalry Army. Kino, Nov. 7, 1939. Semyon Goldstab [b. 1906], who had debuted the Stalin role in Lenin in October, played him again. The real Stalin hand-corrected the screenplay. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 165, l. 1. See also Chernova and Tokarev, “‘Pervaia Konnaia’”; Vishnevskii, “Pervaia konnaia.” During the Nov. 7, 1939, commemoration of the October Revolution, Burning Years would be screened outdoors on Moscow’s Sverdlov Square, across from the Bolshoi Theater.

291. Krasnaia zvezda, Oct. 17, 1938.

292. Tokarev, “‘Kará panam! Kará,’” 49 (citing RGVA, f. 9, op. 36, d. 3792, l. 221), and Lebedeva, Katyn’: prestuplenie, 112.

293. Cienciala, “The Foreign Policy of Józef Piłsudski and Józef Beck,” 130–43; Kornat “Anna Maria Cienciala,” 37.

294. Stalin told the staunch antifascist Georgi Dimitrov, “Now [Poland is] a fascist state, oppressing Ukrainians, Belarussians, and so forth. The annihilation of that state under current conditions would mean one fewer bourgeois fascist state to contend with!” Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 116 (Sept. 7, 1939).

295. For example, Duraczyński and Sakharov, Sovetsko-Pol’skie otnosheniia, 67–70.

296. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 291.

297. Volobuev and Kuleshov, Ochishchenie, 157; Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen, 22 (citing Pravda, Dec. 21, 1994). Before the revolution, of Bogdanov’s critique of Lenin (which continued to circulate underground into the 1930s), Stalin had written privately in a letter, “How do you like Bogdanov’s new book? In my opinion some of Ilich’s blunders are very tellingly and correctly noted. It is also correctly pointed out that Ilich’s materialism differs in many ways from that of Plekhanov, which in spite of the demands of logic (and for the sake of diplomacy?) Ilich tries to cover over.” Dubinskii-Mukhadze, Ordzhonikidze, 92–3, n1. Stalin also wrote something similar in a letter to Mikho Tskhkaya: Istoriia KPSS, 6 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1967), II: 272.

298. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 3, d. 257–63. Van Ree, Political Thought, 107–8.

299. Jasny, Soviet Economy, 418; Allen, Farm to Factory, 107–8. Some 77 percent of Soviet camp inmates at this time were ethnic Russians or Ukrainians.

300. Afanas’ev et al., Istoriia Stalinskogo Gulaga, 158 (RGANI f. 89, op. 73, d. 3, l. 1–2). A “labor day” was worth nothing in 15,700 out of 240,000 collective farms. Hosking, First Socialist Society, 169.

301. Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 171–2 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 25, l. 156; f. 17, op. 3, d. 1015, l. 30; f. 17, op. 3, d. 1016, l. 33; f. 17, 163, d. 1237, l. 223–4); Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 242–4.

302. Fel’shtinskii, SSSR-Germaniia, I: 103–4; Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 102; Ulam, Stalin, 515. Warsaw fell on Sept. 26.

303. “Upon his arrival in Moscow, von Ribbentrop was welcomed by a group of Soviet officials and by Count Schulenburg,” wrote Herwarth. “I was standing next to Gebhardt von Walther,” who “seized my arm and pointed to a group of Gestapo agents who warmly greeted their counterparts from the NKVD.” Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 165.

304. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 606–17n226 (translation of Hilger’s official record, discovered in Schulenburg’s papers in 1990); in German in Fleischhauer, “Der Deutsch-sowjetische Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrag vom 28 September 1939.”

305. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 611, 614–5.

306. The pact with Estonia was printed the day after next (Izvestiia, Sept. 29, 1939), without the confidential protocol: Polpredy soobshchaiut, 62–4 (AVP RF, f. 03a Estoniia, d. 010).

307. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 614.

308. Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 223–7.

309. Fleischhauer, “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”; Chuev, Kaganovich, Shepilov, 118; Chuev, Sto sorok, 19, 24; Chuev, Tak gorovril Kaganovich, 90; Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 313–4.

310. Davlekamova, Galina Ulanova.

311. Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 179–80; Ilmjärv, Silent Submission, 365; Kuromiya, Stalin, 143; Izvestiia, Sept. 29, 1939. Already on Sept. 27, before seeing Ribbentrop inside the Kremlin, the Estonians had noticed a big airplane with a swastika at the Soviet aerodrome at Velikie luki. Rei, Drama of the Baltic Peoples, 264.

312. Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 309; Sommer, Das Memorandum; Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 103–7; Fleischhauer, “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”; Kaslas, “Lithuanian Strip.”

313. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 616–7.

314. Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 304–5. Apparently, Stalin promised to come to Germany’s aid if it fell into difficulties, a remark that appears to have stunned Ribbentrop. Stalin: “The fact is that for the time being Germany does not need foreign help, and it is possible that in the future they will not need foreign help either. But if, against all expectations, Germany finds itself in a difficult situation, then she can be sure that the Soviet people will come to Germany’s aid and will not allow Germany to be suppressed.” Zhilin, O voine, 185; Fleischhauer, “Der deutsch-sowjetisch Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrag,” 457–64.

315. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 267–8; DGFP, series D, VII: 92, 105, 109, 130. The “General Gouvernement for the occupied Polish territories” was proclaimed on Oct. 8, 1939.

316. Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 129–32 (at 132). Ribbentrop would call the Soviets old party comrades to Mussolini on March 10, 1941. DGFP, series D, VIII: 886. See also Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 76–7.

317. Pravda, Sept. 29, 1939. For the text and secret protocol, see: DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 134–5 (AVP RF, f. 3a Germaniia, d. 246), 135–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675a, l. 20). Facsimiles of the document in German and Russian can be found in Hass, 23 August 1939, 246–51; facsimiles of the maps, with Stalin’s signature, can be found in Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 98–9. See also Izvestiia, Sept. 29, 1939.

318. Golovanov, “1,367 dnei iz zhizni Andreia Tupoleva.”

319. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 90, 92.

320. Supposedly, Stalin, good-cop style, puffing his pipe, took to appearing from behind a curtain in Mikoyan’s office and offering “compromises” to the Germans.

321. The regime’s notetaker, Vyacheslav Malyshev, paid tribute to the effectiveness of the faux-populism, recording that “this was a characteristic trait of Stalin’s: to drill down to the smallest details, especially when those small details affected people.” Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 109; Na prieme, 275. This appears to have been a secret (non-published) decree. No such decree appears in late 1939 or 1940 in the account offered by Barber and Harrison, Soviet Home Front, chapter 9.

322. The “affinity thesis”—despite the profound ideological enmity—was subsequently re-presented by Tucker and Nekrich. Tucker, Stalin in Power; Nekrich, Pariahs.

323. More than four of every five Nazi Party members were male. A National Socialist Women’s League counted approximately 2 million members; it offered classes for schoolgirls and brides and promoted consumption of German-made products. Payne, History of Fascism, 184.

324. Rigby, Communist Party Membership, 52. Communist Youth League membership, for those from age fourteen (to maximum twenty-eight), shrank to just 400,000 in 1938. Hitler Youth membership, which was compulsory from age fourteen for Aryans and closed to others, exceeded 7 million by then.

325. The best overview remains Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, II.

326. To be sure, German state demand for goods and services had gone through the roof since 1932, as the state share of GDP more than doubled to 30.5 percent. The state also influenced foreign exchange, set some wages, and froze some prices, but it only rarely nationalized property. Jewish property was confiscated by forced sale, but usually to Aryan private owners. Buchheim and Scherner, “Role of Private Property.”

327. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 111 (May 26, 1940).

328. Herwarth would tell U.S. ambassador Charles Bohlen after WWII that “We were able to make a deal with the Soviets because we were able without any problems with German opinion to deliver the Baltic states and eastern Poland to Russia. This the British and the French, with their public opinions, were unable to do.” Bohlen, Witness to History, 86.

329. Weinberg, “Nazi-Soviet Pacts,” 185 (citing PRO, FO 371/24846, f. 10, N 6526/30/38, Cripps to the Foreign Office, July 16, 1940). For the mostly matching Soviet transcript: “Priem angliiskogo posla S. Krippsa,” in Sochineniia, XVIII: 190–7 (at 191). Versailles revision was something Chamberlain, too, pursued in his own way, albeit only with regard to Germany—not the Soviet Union.

330. XVIII s”ezd VKP (b), 27.

331. Nevile Henderson, in an unintentional self-indictment, would correctly note that “though Hitler was constantly talking of the hand which he had held out to England and complaining that England had rejected it, whenever definite advances were made to him, he always found some way of withdrawing and of refusing to meet us half-way.” Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 110.

332. Bullock wrote that from “1934 through 1939 Hitler’s priorities were the reverse of Stalin’s: foreign policy and rearmament, not domestic issues. If Stalin had to pay increasing attention to foreign policy and defense in 1938 and 1939, it was not because of expansionist ambitions of his own but because Hitler’s successes threatened the security of Stalin’s achievement within the Soviet Union.” This misses Stalin’s opportunism and intense resentment at British power. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin (New York: Knopf, 1991), 639.

333. Hitler had told his military commanders on May 23, 1939, “for us it is a matter of expanding our Lebensraum in the East and of making food supplies secure,” not merely the city of Danzig. Overy, 1939: Countdown, 2 (citing ADAP, VI: 479).

334. “I am certain that even if the Germans were given more than they ask for they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction,” Ciano recorded in his diary after meetings with Ribbentrop and Hitler on Aug. 11–12. Ciano, Diary, 118–20 (Aug. 11–13, 1939).

335. See the cryptic notes on Sept. 1939 by Orlova, Vospominaniia, 101. This passage was omitted from the translation: Orlova, Memoirs, 90–1.

336. Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 178.

337. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 451, l. 37–40, 57. On Oct. 7, 1939, the actor Boris Shchukin died suddenly, at age forty-five; he had been in the company of the Vakhtangov since 1920, where he played more than one hundred roles, including Lenin, and been named a USSR People’s Artist in 1936. But he had suffered some sort of nervous breakdown, after which he had developed a heart condition.

338. Trying to take advantage of the Pact, Boris Pasternak approached the journal Znamia in early Nov. 1939 to try to publish his three-year-old translation of the German writer Heinrich von Kleist’s Prince of Homburg (1809–10). The play, about the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders, was enjoying good runs in theaters in Nazi Germany. But Znamia (under Vishnevsky) rebuffed Pasternak. Still, the play was published in a collection of translations: Pasternak, Izbrannye perevody; Tarasenkov, “Pasternak.”

339. “Thus begins a politics resembling a fight between two wild animals,” the antifascist Vishnevsky recorded in his diary on Oct. 5, 1939. “Uncommon cunning, but diplomatic, military, and hunting tricks—a common phenomenon between wild animals. This is what our Russian person fears, when he hears about ‘friendship’ with fascism.” Vishnevskii, Sobranie sochinenii, VI: 298.

340. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 37.

341. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 262–71. In Nov. 1939, Halder did engage acquaintances in the officers corps, civil service, and counterintelligence in conversation about possibly arresting Hitler and putting Göring in power (who was known to oppose war with Britain and France), but the plotters panicked and abandoned their talks.

342. Moorhouse, Killing Hitler, 49 (citing Bundesarchiv, Elser interrogation file, BA R30001/310/106).

CHAPTER 12. SMASHED PIG

1. Biulleten’ oppozitsii, no. 79–80 (Aug.–Oct. 1939), 14–6.

2. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 124–5 (Jan. 21, 1940).

3. Monakov, “Zachem Stalin stroil okeanskii flot?”; Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet. A key motivation had been the Anglo-German Naval Agreement that had abandoned Versailles Treaty restrictions on the size of the German fleet. Ivanov, Morskoe sopernichestvo imperialisticheskikh derzhav; Morskoi sbornik, 1937, no. 9: 114–25. Contrary to some analyses, the key prompt was not the Spanish Civil War. Voroshilov, as early as the 17th Party Congress, in Jan. 1934, had promised that, as a result of industrialization, “we shall be able to create our shipbuilding industry and soon produce our fleets.” Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, 38–45; XVII s”ezd, 230. Naval commander Vladimir Orlov had presented the initial draft of a big-fleet program in early Feb. 1936 and later detailed it publicly in a speech to the Congress of Soviets (Nov. 28, 1936). Gromov, Tri veka Rossiiskogo Flota, II: 340–3; Pravda, Nov. 29, 1936; Orlov, “Rech’ tov V. M. Orlova.”

4. The naval commissariat was approved Dec. 30, 1937. Pravda, January 17, 1938. Between May 1937 and Sept. 1938, more than 3,000 naval officers were executed. During the second Five-Year Plan (1933–37) Soviet naval academies graduated about the same number of green officers. Gromov, Tri veka Rossiiskogo flota, III: 358. Admiral ranks would be restored on May 7, 1940; Kuznetsov, Galler, and Isaakov became admirals.

5. Rohwer and Monakov, “Soviet Union’s Ocean-Going Fleet,” 855.

6. “Thus ended the conversation about battleships,” Kuznetsov commented, “whose construction was already going full speed ahead, while I as a Navy commissar was still not quite clear in my head why they were being built at all!” Kiselev, Admiral Kuznetsov, 105. As Hauner explains of the impossible fleet plans, in 1939 “the Soviets lacked much basic industrial infrastructure: their gun factories could not yet produce or test guns of sixteen-inch caliber; boilers for the powerful steam turbines could not have been manufactured until after the war; there was no sophisticated optical equipment for fire control.” Hauner, “Stalin’s Big-Fleet Program,” 106. In 1939, the Soviets remained a one-ocean power—i.e., the Arctic, frozen much of the year.

7. Aselius, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy; Philbin, Lure of Neptune.

8. Kuznetsov signed off on the new plan on July 27, 1940. Kuznetsov, “Voenno-Morskoi flot nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny”; Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet, 71–106 (citing RGA VMF, f. 2, d. 39526, l. 1–33). Of the 25 billion rubles that would be earmarked for weapons systems in 1940, almost one quarter would go to the navy. The Soviets never completed the colossal battleships, but by the middle of 1941 they would have 267 submarines, more than any other country.

9. Stalin dispatched deputy commissar Admiral Ivan Isakov in May 1939 to the United States, but he proved unable to achieve a breakthrough in the negotiations (asking for the moon), and the attack on Finland ended them. FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, 457–91, 670–707, 869–903; Davies, Mission to Moscow, 208. See also Maddux, Years of Estrangement, 86–8, 96–8. Stalin had unexpectedly appeared at negotiations with then U.S. Ambassador Davies in 1938, offering to settle repudiated tsarist-era debts in return for access to naval technology. The disadvantage of the Komsomolsk shipyard was the Amur’s lack of depth, forcing larger ships to be towed downstream after launch to be fitted out at Pacific Coast shipyards.

10. On Oct. 26, 1939, a sixty-person Soviet delegation led by shipbuilding commissar Ivan Tevosyan arrived in Berlin with a breathtaking wish list: complete materials for building four light cruisers; two hulls of heavy cruisers (Admiral Hipper class); ship and coastal guns (all calibers); torpedoes and mines; optical range finders, fire control directors, and hydro-acoustical devices; and entire blueprints for the battleship Bismarck, the Hipper-class heavy cruisers, Scharnhorst-class battle cruiser, and aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin. Hauner, “Stalin’s Big-Fleet Program.” Bezymensky, “Sovetsko-Germanskie dogovory.” Thanks to Göring’s intercession, Tevosyan managed to inspect the Krupp plants in Essen twice in Nov. 1939. Von Strandmann, “Appeasement and Counter-Appeasement,” 167 (citing HA Krupp, WA 7, F 1044, Sept. 7 and Nov., 1114–5, 1939).

11. See Stalin’s self-justifying remarks on April 17, 1940, analyzing the Finnish campaign, in Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 263–75 (at 263). Stalin repeated this point a year later: Naumov, 1941 god, II: 599–608 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 77, l. 178–211).

12. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 85–112 (at 85–6: July 13, 1939). In 1932, Helsinki signed a nonaggression pact with Moscow, initially for just three years at Finnish insistence, but reaffirmed in 1934 for ten years. After the Nazis came to power, moreover, German-Finnish relations cooled for a time. But anti-Soviet agitation persisted on the part of Finnish nationalist pressure groups, whose activists the NKVD assessed as mere cover for the Finnish government. Stover, “Finnish Military Politics”; Rintala, Three Generations; Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 17–55 (1934), 58–82 (April 12, 1936); Backlund, “Nazi Germany and Finland.” The treaty and its subsequent modifications can be found in Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations, 23–37.

13. It was led by Major General von der Golz. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 27. Jakobson based his account on unpublished Finnish foreign ministry sources, but did not cite them. He was a sixteen-year-old schoolboy in Helsinki when the war broke out.

14. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 147 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 18, l. 32: June 19, 1939).

15. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 97; Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” I: 114 (citing Bundesarchiv-Miliätrarchiv, N 220/19; AVP RF, f. 0135, op. 22, d. 7, l. 8–9, 12–4); Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 221 (citing Falin, Soviet Peace Efforts, doc. 352: Derevyansky, June 28, 1939; and FO 371/23648: Snow to Halifax, July 3, 1939).

16. Before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Finnish military attaché in Moscow had managed to obtain information about the secret consultations from the wife of a high-level Soviet figure, an indication of Finland’s obvious concern for its security, but, for Stalin, of something more sinister. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 47 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 5, d. 172, l. 2). One of the Soviet sources in Finland was the former Kronstadt rebel leader Stepan Petrichenko, who had escaped into exile. V. P. Naumov and A. A. Kosakovskii (eds.), Kronshtadt, 1921 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratiia, 1997), 402; APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 283, l. 27, Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 27 (Yagodato Stalin).

17. Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 4.

18. Dullin, “Understanding Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy,” 179. Secret planning through May 1940 in the Black Sea fleet specified the “likely enemy” as “England, France, Romania, Turkey.” The fleet’s aviation staff were studying the routes to India, while war contingency plans included Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt as well as India—all colonies or allies of Britain.

19. Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym, 26 (Mikoyan on Molotov); Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 390–1; Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 288.

20. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 282 (APRF, f. 45, op., 1, d. 178, l. 35, 37). “Yartsev” also donated funds to the Finnish Small Farmers Party, which agitated for “peace” with the Soviet Union.

21. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 296–309; Na prieme, 234. Zoia Voskresenskaya (b. 1907) had been sent to Finland in 1936 as an intelligence operative, operating under Intourist cover; Rybkin, the new station chief, arrived six to seven months later, without his family, and she became his deputy. Half a year later, they asked NKVD intelligence in Moscow for permission to marry, which was granted. Her account has the correct Kremlin meeting date and the fact that Molotov and Voroshilov were also there, and gives a description of his impressions of the visit, as relayed via a conversation Rybkin had with Kollontai. Voskresenskaia, Pod psevdonym Irina, 150–5.

22. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 7–11; Peshcherskii, “Kak I. V. Stalina pytalsia predotvarit’ voinu s Finliandiei.” Gerrard, Foreign Office and Finland, 88–9 (quoting Lascelles’s and Lawrence Collier’s minutes on a report from Helsinki, Oct. 8, 1939), 28 (citing FO 371/22270/N2338: Snow to Halifax, April 26, 1938).

23. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 301. Rybkin-Yartsev does not appear again in Stalin’s office logbook, but he could have been received at the dacha.

24. Tanner, Winter War, 5; Sharapov, Dve zhizni, 345–51; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 302.

25. Sudoplatov, the assassin who had leapt into the leadership rung of Soviet intelligence, surmised that Yartsev’s work was also a device to sow dissension in the Finnish leadership. Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 94, 266. Sudoplatov is off by one day on the meeting: Na prieme, 234.

26. DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 163 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 297, d. 2054, l. 33: Litvinov to Derevyansky).

27. Litvinov, on March 11, told the Finnish representative that the “Soviet government did not expect such an answer.” Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 34 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 17, d. 183, l. 80–2; pap. 18, d. 198, l. 6); “The Winter War (Documents on Soviet-Finnish Relations in 1939–1940),” 53–61.

28. Semiriaga, Tainy stalinskoi diplomatii, 143. Litvinov complained to the Swedish envoy to Moscow that “we cannot be sure that Germany, embarking on some sort of adventurism, might not demand from Finland even temporarily the transfer of its islands, and that Finland, either voluntarily, or involuntarily would, under threat, perhaps earlier agree to accede to such a demand.” Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 34 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 198, l. 8: March 11, 1939).

29. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 63–5; Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 34 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 17, d. 183, l. 61–5). The politburo designated Stein an envoy of Litvinov (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 24, l. 120). Stein left Helsinki on April 6. On April 19—the same day Litvinov was received in the Little Corner to discuss the failure of collective security negotiations—Stein wrote a memo to Stalin arguing that Helsinki could not respond positively to Soviet proposals prior to the upcoming Finnish elections, but predicted that afterward there would be some chance of success. He was also received that day (in the company of Litvinov and Potyomkin, as well as inner regime cronies). DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 297–9 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 2, d. 11, l. 224–8), XXII/ii: 526n65; Na prieme, 257. Very soon, of course, Litvinov was removed. Stein would be transferred out of Italy on Oct. 7, 1939; he would get a teaching post at the USSR higher diplomatic school.

30. The Soviets had a plan of attack against Finland (and Estonia) already by March–April 1939, but that is what all militaries do: they plan wars, just in case. Aptekar’, Sovetsko-finskie voiny.

31. Chuev, Sto sorok, 34; Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 24.

32. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 177. Voroshilov visited the Karelian Isthmus sometime in April and ordered that combat readiness be raised and plans be developed for evacuation of women and children should war break out. Semiriaga, Tainy stalinskoi diplomatii, 146 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 4, d. 366, l. 134). Also in April 1939, the NKVD transport directorate produced an internal assessment of all the ports and military bases of all countries on or near the Baltic Sea. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 250.

33. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 177–80. Meretskov (Na sluzhbe, 178) claims that he was present during a conversation between Kuusinen and Stalin in late June 1939, and that Stalin expressed alarm over the situation with Finland. Neither appears in the logbooks for summer 1939. Na prieme, 646, 661. In summer 1939, the Finnish-Soviet border was largely quiet. Chugunov, Granitsa nakanune voiny, 10.

34. Fel’shtinskii, SSSR-Germaniia, II: 17 (Oct. 10, 1939).

35. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 85–112 (Leningrad-province state security, July 13, 1939); Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 150–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 405, l. 200: Beria, no earlier than July 10, 1939).

36. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 7 (citing PRO FO 371 23648, N3199). The British general might have been trying to induce London to help the Finns.

37. Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations, 42; Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 229. On Latvia, see Dr. Alfred B ī lmanis: Latvian Russian Relations, 192–8; Polpredy soobshchaiut, 75–86 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 12, d. 119a, l. 3–8, 9–17); Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 184; Izvestiia, Oct. 6, 1939.

38. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 201–3; Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” I: 116–7.

39. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1235, l. 99); Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 160–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 30, l. 225–6). On the formulation of Soviet demands, see Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” I: 119–21.

40. Raskol’nikov, “Otkrytoe pis’mo Stalinu” (Aug. 17, 1939). He died Sept. 12. See also Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo, II: 420–53; and Magerovsky, “The People’s Commissariat,” II: 342–3. Speculation on the cause of Raskolnikov’s death—poisoning, nervous breakdown—is inconclusive. Konstantinov, F. F. Ilin-Raskol’nikov, 153; “Smert’ Raskol’nikov,” Vorozhdenie, September, 29, 1939; Barmine, One Who Survived, 21; Ehrenburg, Memoirs, 469. Raskolnikov evidently did lose his mind. N. P. V., “Sumashestvie Raskol’nikova: beseda s A.G. Barminym,” Poslednie novosti, Aug. 28, 1939; I. M., “Raskol’nikov soshel s uma,” Vorozhdenie, Sept. 1, 1939.

41. Raskolnikov added: “He does not like people who have their own opinion, and with his usual nastiness drives them away.” Medvedev, Let History Judge, 592.

42. Gerrard, Foreign Office and Finland, 88–9 (quoting Lascelles’s and Lawrence Collier’s minutes on a report from Helsinki, Oct. 8, 1939). For the argument about Finland being a pawn in British strategy, see Pritt, Must the War Spread? (Pritt was expelled from the Labour Party, partly as a result of his pro-Soviet views in the Soviet-Finnish War.) On Britain’s possible lack of inside information concerning the Helsinki government, see Sotskov, Pribaltika i geopolitika, 64–5 (Oct. 16, 1939).

43. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 167–9 (Maisky, Oct. 7, 1939); Maisky, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 28–31 (Oct. 6, 1939); Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 232. Churchill continued this line in further discussions with Maisky: DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 2 (Nov. 13, 1939). See also Gerrard, Foreign Office and Finland, 95 (citing FO 371/23683/N6384: British War cabinet, Nov. 16, 1939). Back in the Russian civil war, the lengthy Helsinki-London plotting had come to naught, opposed by the British cabinet, the Finnish parliament, and newly independent border states wary of collaboration with the Russian nationalist Whites. Ruotsila, “Churchill-Mannerheim Collaboration.”

44. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 196 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 76, l. 12). Mobilization was complete by a second report, on Oct. 13 (199: l. 16).

45. Izvestiia, Oct. 11, 1939; SSSR i Litva, I: 205–46; Polpredy soobshchaiut, 94–144; Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 193.

46. Zonin, Admiral L. M. Galler, 309.

47. DPV SSSR, XXII/ii: 178 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 297, d. 2053, l. 197).

48. Stalin had received Molotov and Derevyansky that afternoon, just prior to meeting the Finns: Na prieme, 276.

49. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 35 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 193, l. 4); Tanner, Winter War, 25 (who claims his account of Stalin’s presentation is based on the Finnish interpreter’s notes). Paasikivi had been born Johan Gustaf Hellsten and Finnicized his name at age fifteen, in 1885, after he had been orphaned.

50. The Beria report was dated Oct. 12, 1939. Vrang had become a celebrity in Moscow diplomatic circles as a result of the circumstance that in a Soviet espionage film, the actor who played the role of the main bad guy, a foreign military attaché, happened to be a dead ringer for the Swede. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1091, citing U. A. Käkönen, Sotilasasiamiehenä Moskovassa 1939 (Helsinki, 1966), 62; Norberg, “Det militära hotet.”

51. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 162–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 393, l. 122–4: Oct. 12, 1939), 163–4 (op. 6, d. 31, l. 117–9, Oct. 12), 164–5 (d. 31, l. 122–4: Oct. 13), 165–6 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 393, l. 122–4), 166–7 (l. 147–9: Oct. 14, 1939); Volkogonov Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1. See also Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1091–2. One clandestine Soviet source in Helsinki, Cay Sundström, a pro-Communist Social Democrat in the Finnish parliament (his NKVD code name was “the Count”), complained to the NKVD that when the parliamentary foreign-affairs committee discussed Soviet demands in his presence, other members told the rapporteur to stop speaking. He informed Moscow that Erkko had stated there was no need for any concessions to the Soviet Union because Finland could count on the support of Britain, the United States, and Sweden. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions”; Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 163–4 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 117-9: Oct. 12); Volkogonov Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1 (identifying the source as Sundström); Sinitsyn, Rezident svidel’stvuet, 21. See also Manninen and Baryshnikov, “Peregovory osen’iu 1939 goda,” 119.

52. Stalin received Molotov for fifteen minutes prior to meeting the Finns: Na prieme, 276.

53. Erickson, Soviet High Command, 474.

54. Upton, Finland, 29–30 (quoting J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 45–6); Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 114–8; Tanner, Winter War, 27–8; Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 35 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 193, l. 1–2). Apparently, the Soviet side made no formal record of the talks: Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 237–8.

55. Stalin also suspected that a coup could bring an avowedly fascist regime to power in Helsinki. The NKVD in Leningrad characterized the Cayander-Tanner government in Helsinki as proto-fascist. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 85–112 (July 13, 1939).

56. Tanner, Winter War, 30.

57. A Soviet military intelligence on Finnish civilian evacuations from frontline areas was dated Oct. 14, 1939; the evacuations would be pronounced complete seven days later. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 199–200 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 76, l. 17), 200 (l. 20).

58. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 120.

59. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 170–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 282–4: Oct. 19, 1939).

60. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 169–70 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 216–8: Beria, Oct. 17, 1939), 170–1 (l. 282-4: Oct. 19); Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1093. See also Voskresenskaia, Pod psevdonym Irina, 112–8. On German policy toward Finland, see Jonas, Wipert von Blücher, 105–58. Stalin prohibited engaging ethnic Finns in espionage work, reminding Proskurov (head of Soviet military intelligence) that a radio operator working for them in Mongolia (under the name of Voroshilov, no less) had been exposed as a Finn. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i NKVD, 123 (Aug. 25, 1939).

61. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 172–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 341–3: from Colonel Doi).

62. Stalin’s ultimate aims are not spelled out in internal Soviet documents. We are left, like the Finns, to deduce his aims from his statements in the negotiations, and, above all, from his actions.

63. Rentola, “Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” 596.

64. Upton, Finland, 35.

65. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 35 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 193, l. 3–6).

66. Tanner, Winter War, 42.

67. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 125.

68. Tanner, Winter War, 40–56. Stalin had been warned the Finns would drag out the talks. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 184.

69. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 173 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 145–6: Oct. 27, 1939).

70. Roberts, “Soviet Policy and the Baltic States.” On pogroms against Jews by Poles in Wilno, following the arrival of Soviet and Lithuanian troops, see Senn, Lithuania, 55–67.

71. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 119–20. Dimitrov does not appear in Stalin’s office logbook for Oct. 25 (no one does): Na prieme, 277. Dimitrov published his article “The War and the Working Class in the Capitalist Countries,” in Communist International, 1939, no. 8–9.

72. Izvestiia, Oct. 31, 1939; Kabanen, “Dvoinaia igra.”

73. Kollontai, Diplomaticheskie dnevniki, II: 466. Molotov instructed Kollontai to ensure the neutrality of Sweden in a Soviet-Finnish War. In the scholarly publication of her diplomatic notebooks, the Nov. visit to Moscow occurs without a meeting with Stalin. Kollontai is not recorded in the office logbooks after 1934. Kollontai, Diplomaticheskie dnevniki, II: 467. Another version has her meeting Stalin: “Beseda Stalina s A. M. Kollontai,” in Sochineniia, XVIII: 606–11 (originally published in Dialog, 1998, no. 8: 92–4). Kollontai knew she was closely watched by the NKVD. Vaksberg, Alexandra Kollontai, 414–21.

74. Pravda (Nov. 3) stated defiantly in an editorial, “we will defend the security of the Soviet Union regardless, breaking down all obstacles of whatever character, in order to attain our goal.”

75. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 135; Tanner, Winter War, 67. Khrushchev recalled that at a dinner sometime in Nov. 1939, Stalin, along with Molotov and Otto Kuusinen, agreed “the Finns should be given a last chance to accept the territorial demands,” otherwise “we would take military action.” Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 177–8.

76. It is not clear that Paasikivi and Tanner were familiar with theses islands. Rzheshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, I: 127; Tanner, Winter War, 67–8; Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 136.

77. Molotov delivered a speech from the stage, followed by music and dancing. Stalin sat in the tsar’s box, obscured. At intermission, as the guests took advantage of the buffet, Derevyansky, the Soviet envoy to Helsinki, approached Tanner, who claims to have told him the negotiations were going poorly. Tanner, Winter War, 69.

78. Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, XIII (II/i): 100–2 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 15, d. 25, l. 636–38). Pravda, in articles and cartoons (Oct. 6, 25, and 26, Nov. 12 and 20), relentlessly pounded home the view that the imperialist powers (Britain and France) were inciting war to garner profit and suppress freedoms at home, while scheming to drag “neutral powers” such as the Soviet Union into their bloody game—meaning a Soviet-German war.

79. “There can be no doubt that Stalin was genuinely anxious to reach a settlement,” concluded the scholar Max Jakobson: Diplomacy of the Winter War, 144. Stalin watched the morning Revolution Day parade on Nov. 7 atop the Mausoleum, as massive columns of Red Army soldiers and armor passed, followed by columns of workers bearing aloft portraits of him, then attended the late-afternoon luncheon with the retinue at Voroshilov’s apartment. “I believe that the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war (during the first imperialist war) was appropriate only for Russia, where the workers were tied to the peasants and under tsarist conditions could engage in an assault on the bourgeoisie,” he told those assembled. “For the European countries that slogan was inappropriate, for there the workers had received a few democratic reforms from the bourgeoisie and were clinging to them, and they were not willing to engage in a civil war (revolution) against the bourgeoisie.” Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 120–1.

80. Tanner, Winter War, 71–2.

81. DGFP, series D, VIII: 293 (Hitler to Sven Hedin); Tanner, Winter War, 82–3.

82. Upton, Finland, 43–44; Tanner, Winter War, 82; Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 142; Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 172; Ken et al., Shvetsiia v politike Moskvy.

83. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1091 (citing report by the Swedish military attaché to Moscow, Major Vrang, no. 44, Oct. 4, 1939, KrA, FST/Und, E I: 15).

84. Mannerheim, Memoirs, 300–3, 315; Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 64, 150–1; Virmarita, “Karl Gustaf Emil’ Mannergeim,” 65–6.

85. Rei, Drama of the Baltic Peoples, 259–60. Rei was the notetaker for Estonian foreign minister K. Selter with Molotov. “Soviet Russia’s period of weakness was over,” Paasikivi observed of the Pact. Paasikivi, Meine Moskauer Mission, 56.

86. Tanner, Winter War, 73.

87. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 21 (citing AVP RF, f. 0135, op. 22, pap. 145, d. 1, l. 22–3: Yeliseyev to Dekanozov, Nov. 12, 1939). Sinitsyn captured the rivalry between Beria and Molotov firsthand. He also had an audience with Stalin, evidently on Nov. 27, 1939, which is not recorded in the office logbooks. He noted that “Mikoyan, Zhdanov, Kaganonovich and even Voroshilov behaved like bad pupils in front of a strict teacher, or, more accurately, like mannequins.” Sinitsyn, Rezident svidetel’stvuet, 20–56 (quote at 40).

88. Tanner, Winter War, 75–6.

89. Na prieme, 279.

90. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 221 (citing RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2076, l. 31ob.), 225–6 (l. 68). The very same day, the all-Union Society of Cultural Ties Abroad demonstratively assembled novelists, film directors, composers, painters, journalists, and more to affirm friendship with Nazi Germany, according to the head of the import agency International Book (A. Solovyev). The next day, Vishnevsky told a meeting of screenwriters that “the question of the British empire, the destruction of this gigantic colonial empire, has been sharply posed, and here, paradoxically, . . . Germany is doing a progressive thing.” Solov’ev, “Tretrady krasnogo professor, 1912–1941 gg.,” IV: 205; Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 221–2, citing RGALI, f. 2456, op. 1, d. 445, l. 23).

91. Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 55–8; Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 238. Isolationist sentiment in Britain had not receded despite the guarantees to Poland. “What concerns me is the fate of the British empire!” Lord Beaverbrook, the conservative press baron, told Maisky in London on Nov. 15, 1939. “I want the empire to remain intact, but I don’t understand why for the sake of this we must wage a three-year war to crush ‘Hitlerism.’ To hell with that man Hitler! If the Germans want him, I happily concede them this treasure and make my bow. Poland? Czechoslovakia? What are they to us?” Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 60–1; Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 239.

92. Upton, Finland, 25–50; Tanner, Winter War, 80–1; Spring, “Soviet Decision for War.”

93. A Soviet protocol official improbably reported that he found the departing Finns in high spirits. Baryshnikov, Ot prokhaldnogo mira, 259 (citing AVPRF, f. 06, op. 1, p. 1, d. 7, l. 64 [B. Pontikov]).

94. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh sem’i, 63 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 1552, l.15–6).

95. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 66, l. 13.

96. DGFP, series D, VIII: 427–8. Molotov would blame the “Social Democrat” Tanner, rather than the prime minister and foreign minister back in Helsinki. See also Kollontai, “‘Seven Shots’”; and Kollontai, Diplomaticheskie dnevniki, II: 466–7. Paasikivi would make telling criticisms of Tanner in his memoirs.

97. Domarus, Hitler: Reden, III: 1422–4; Domarus, Hitler: Speeches, III: 1882–91; DGFP, series D, VIII: 439–46.

98. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 171 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 31, l. 282–4). Tanner recorded a different version of Stalin’s flippancy (“You are sure to get 99 percent support”). Tanner, Winter War, 30.

99. Paasikivi later recalled, “The proposals Stalin made to us in the fall of 1939 were completely different from those to the Baltic countries . . . Stalin from the very beginning backed off discussing with us a mutual assistance pact.” Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 238.

100. Tuominen, Bells of the Kremlin, 154–5.

101. Upton, Finland, 30–2.

102. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1094, citing V. Vladimirov, Kohti talvisotaa (Helsinki, 1995), 163–4; Rentola, “Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” 598n27; Kolpakidi, Entsiklopediia sekretnykh sluzhb Rossii, 711–2. Unexpectedly, a report by the general staff for the Leningrad military district (Nov. 10, 1939) praised Finnish military training and judged “the morale of the Finnish army, despite the class difference between the officers and soldiers,” as “sufficiently steadfast.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 205–7 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 17, l. 194–200). Stalin finally posted a new military intelligence officer to Helsinki, Colonel Ivan Smirnov, who replaced the man executed in the terror. Sinitsyn, in his posthumously published memoir, would claim he had conveyed the opposite of what he had actually reported.

103. They took along Nikolai Voronov, the artillery specialist. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 134; Na prieme, 279–80. The Main Military Council in Moscow, with Stalin in attendance (Nov. 21), approved a plan for an expansion to a peacetime army of 2.3 million. Glavnyi voennyi sovet RKKA, 269–86 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 18, d. 49, l. 1–26), 440–53 (RGVA, f. 40442, op. 2, d. 128, l. 120–39: Smorodinov and Gusev).

104. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 140.

105. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1090.

106. Meretskov reported to Stalin that the deadly attack had originated from the Finnish side. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 182; Dvoynikh and Eliseeva, Konflikt, doc. 8 (RGVA. F. 33987, op. 3, d. 1240, l. 115).

107. Manninen, “Vystreli byli” (citing the recollections of a Soviet officer who took part). See also Zhdanov’s cryptic but suggestive notes: Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” I: 137 (RGASPI, f. 77, op. 3, d. 163, l. 3120). Khrushchev recalled that “Kuusinen and I . . . found out when we were at Stalin’s apartment that the first shots had been fired from our side. There’s no getting around that fact.” Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 254.

108. Na prieme, 282; Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 200–3.

109. Balashov, Prinimai nas, 23; Pravda, Nov. 29, 1939.

110. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096 (citing KrA, FST/Und E II: 15); Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 37 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 188, l. 22–3, 26).

111. Dvoynikh and Eliseeva, Konflikt, doc. 16 (RGVA, f. 34980, op. 1, d. 794, l. 1). See also Azarov, Osazhdennaia Odessa, 5.

112. Vehviläinen, “Trudnaia doroga k miru,” I: 228. See also Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 142.

113. For a top-secret Finnish intelligence assessment (Nov. 25, 1939) translated into Russian, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 195–200.

114. Upton, Finland, 50 (citing J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 116); Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations, 72–3; Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” 135 (citing Finnish officials).

115. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 227–9 (GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 528, l. 228–30: Dec. 1, 1939).

116. Na prieme, 279. On Stalin’ s corrections of Kuusinen dating back to Aug. 1928, see Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Komintern, 545–6 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 755, l. 116–7); RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 755, l. 164.

117. Tuominen judged Stalin’s humor offbeat (mostly from stories he heard from Kuusinen, with whom he had shared a flat in the House on the Embankment). Tuominen, Bells of the Kremlin, 158, 166, 173.

118. A few days after Tuominen’s initial summons by Kuusinen, the Soviet embassy in Stockholm followed up; again he refused. On Nov. 21, he claimed, he received a third order, this one delivered by a courier; Tuominen still refused. He also claimed that he decided not to inform the Finnish regime in Helsinki of the sensational news of a pending Soviet attack. Tuominen, Bells of the Kremlin, 315–8; Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 147. After seeing the Finnish resistance, Tuominen would issue feelers to Finland’s Social Democrats and publicly break with Moscow in spring 1940.

119. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 38 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 192). More broadly, see Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second Word War, 30–73; and Kirby, Concise History of Finland, 197–216.

120. Pravda, Dec. 1, 1939.

121. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 39 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1380, l. 3; f. 25888, op. 13, d. 76, l. 1).

122. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 351–2 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 1, d. 4, l. 75–8: Molotov to Schulenburg, Nov. 30, 1939).

123. Bor’ba Finnskoogo naroda, 11. The protocols of the first official meeting of the “government” were recorded in Russian by Kuusinen’s son. RGASPI, f. 522, op. 1, d. 46, l. 1, as cited in Baryshnikov and Baryshnikov, “Pravitel’stvo v Teriioki,” 179.

124. Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 261 (citing RGVA, f. 25888, op. 1, d. 17, l. 199: report of the Leningrad general staff); Volkogonov, “Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov,” 316. Krasnaia zvezda, Nov. 30, 1989 (A. M. Noskov); Volkogonov, “Drama of the Decisions,” 32; Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?” 100n2 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 889, l. 1–10, 15–6; d. 891, l. 1–3). See also Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?,” 100n2 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 889, l. 18–25: Dec. 26, 1939).

125. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 144–8; Spring, “Soviet Decision for War,” 217; Balashov, Prinimai nas, 43.

126. Dongarov, “Pravitel’stvo Kuusinena,” 74–5, 76–9 (facsimile).

127. A Feb. 1, 1940, “Appeal to the soldiers of the Finnish army,” issued in the name of the “People’s Government” and written by Zhdanov, initially declared that “the Soviet Union does not want anything other than a government in Finland that would not fashion intrigues with the imperialist powers threatening the security of Leningrad.” Zhdanov excised this passage in the final draft. Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?,” 100 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 891, l. 14–5).

128. Rentola, “Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” 600 (citing RGASPI, f. 495, op. 269, d. 134, 1. 36: autobiography of Esa Kuusinen, Aug. 1, 1940). See also Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen, 316.

129. Kuusinen, Rings of Destiny, 225, 230, 231. Aino last saw Otto in 1935.

130. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 77, l. 178–212, in Rzeshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II: 272–83; Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 268; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 46.

131. Na prieme, 282–94; Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 179.

132. Kuznetsov, Nakanune, 309, 328.

133. Zakharov et al., 50 let Vooruzhenykh Sil SSSR, 230; Baryshnikov, “Sovetsko-Finliandskaia voina,” 33 (citing RGVA, f. 25888, op. 14, d. 2, l. 1). Mekhlis and Kulik, both deputy defense commissars, mocked Voronov, the artillery specialist, in the presence of Meretskov when Voronov said the Soviets would be fortunate to achieve their combat aims in two to three months; they told him the war plan was for ten to twelve days. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 136. Meretskov later admitted that the forces under his command were not ready to attack. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 171, 173–4, 179, 181–2.

134. Shaposhnikov would learn of the outbreak of hostilities from the press. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moeogo pokoleniia, 442–3; Simonov, “Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia,” 79.

135. Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” I: 133 (RGVA, f. 37977, op. 1, d. 233, l. 4: telegram to Shaposhnikov, Nov. 19, 1939); Meretskov, Serving the People, 100–1.

136. Mannerheim, Memoirs, 366. See also Tillotson, Finland at Peace and War, 121–75. During only 10 of the 105 days of the campaign was the temperature above freezing. The record low was on Jan. 16, 1940.

137. Chew, White Death; Trotter, Frozen Hell.

138. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 252.

139. Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU, 112.

140. Rittersporn, Anguish, 235 (citing GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 87, l. 17).

141. Davies, Popular Opinion, 100 (citing TsGAIPD SPb, f. 24, op. 2v, d. 3723, l. 62, 50).

142. Zenzinov, Vstrecha s Rossiei, 37, 138. Zenzinov’s book includes the full text of 277 out of the 376 surviving letters.

143. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 253–61 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 185, l. 454–71: Dec. 7, 1939).

144. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 115–266.

145. “The pessimist Mannerheim raised his marshal’s baton, the would-be appeaser Tanner emerged as the most resolute political leader, and workers and peasants, who had voted the Centre-Left government into power, fulfilled their duty as soldiers,” as one historian aptly remarked. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096.

146. Maisky recorded in his diary (Dec. 1): “The British reaction is rabid. The press, the radio, the cinema, Parliament—all have been mobilized.” Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 75; Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 243. See also Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, 40; Carley, “‘Situation of Delicacy,’” 195–6; and Stalin’s comments to the chief of the Estonian armed forces, Dec. 11–12, 1939, as recorded by Rei, in Sotsialisticheskie revoliutsii v Estonii, 109. In Dec. 1939, Kollontai wrote from Stockholm to Molotov (a copy went to Voroshilov), calling the working situation “difficult and serious” and concluding, “I cannot fail to point out I still have no aide, and no one even to consult with, since everyone is new and they all need to be taught.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 218–20 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1202, l. 99–101ss). On the lack of experienced staff in Moscow, see Kraminov, V orbite voiny, 79.

147. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 134; Philbin, Lure of Neptune, 61, 129.

148. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 361 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22407, d. 2, l. 586), 363 (op. 22410, d. 2, l. 196: Dec. 8, 1939), 372–3 (RGASPI. F. 495, op. 74, d. 618, l. 12, 13–4, 16). See also Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, XVIII (VII/i): 162.

149. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096, citing Paasikivi’s notes from the Government of Finland foreign affairs committee, Dec. 2 and 3, 1939, in O. Manninen and K. Rumpunen (eds.), Murhenäytelmän vuorosanat: Talvisodan hallituksen keskustelut (Helsinki, 2003).

150. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 230–3. Molotov refused to meet with the Swedish mediator to hear the Helsinki government’s proposed concessions; Molotov told the American mediator that the Soviets would have no dealings with the Finnish government in Helsinki, especially since Tanner (the Social Democrat) had become foreign minister. FRUS, 1939, I: 1008–9, 1014–5.

151. The NKVD leadership demanded and received an accurate picture of the Red Army. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 406–7 (Dec. 31, 1939).

152. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 324 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. f, d. 351, l. 212-6).

153. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 57–61, 77–78. These German officials do not appear in the logs for Stalin’s office.

154. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 251–2.

155. At the Johannisthal airfield outside Berlin Göring had paraded before them “twin-engine Junkers 88 and Dornier 215 bombers, single-engine Henkel-100 and Messerschmitt-110 fighters, Focke-Wulf-187 and Henschel reconnaissance planes, a twin-engine Messerschmitt-110 fighter, a Junkers 87 dive bomber, and other types of aircraft,” as Alexander Yakovlev described the scene. General Ernst Udet, Göring’s deputy, took Hovhannes “Ivan” Tevosyan, head of the Soviet delegation, up in a Fiesler Storch reconnaissance plane, then executed a “splendid landing, stopping exactly where it had started from.” Tevosyan was impressed. Later, Göring made him a gift of the aircraft. The delegation, according to Yakovlev, “returned to the Adlon strongly impressed.” Tarpaulins and ropes curtained off whole areas of the sites the Soviets visited—Messerschmitt in Augsburg, Focke-Wulf in Bremen, Junkers in Dessau, BMW in Munich, Henschel and Siemens in Berlin. Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, 117–8; Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 81–2.

156. DGFP, series D, VIII: 472–5 (shopping list), 513 (Ribbentrop, Dec. 11, 1939), 516–7 (Ritter to Schulenburg, Dec. 11, 1939).

157. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 289–91 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 35, l. 154–60: Dec. 12), 292 (d. 540, l. 266: Dec. 12), 312–4 (l. 225–9: Dec. 14), 319–21 (l. 276–9), 321–2 (l. 280–3), 326 (l. 290).

158. Na prieme, 9, 279, 284–5.

159. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 109–10.

160. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 122–3 (Dec. 21, 1939). Some guests at the banquets were known to carry home candies, nuts, fruit, and other portables for their families.

161. Raikin, Vospominaniia, 195–7.

162. Pirogov, S otsom, 133–4. Pirogov was not again invited to perform at Kremlin banquets, but escaped arrest.

163. Vladimir Orlov, “Prokofiev.”

164. I. S. Rabinovich, in Stalin i liudi sovetskoi strany, 3. See also Rabinovich, “Obraz vozhdia”; Grabar’, “Stalin i liudi sovetskoi strane”; and Kravchenko, Stalin v izobrazitel’nom iskusstve.

165. Pravda, March 18, 1939. The painting had first been exhibited at the show “Twenty Years of the Red Army.”

166. Stalin had also supposedly sat for the painter Dmitry Sharapov in the 1930s, but did not like the result; in any case, Sharapov was arrested. Medvedev, “O Staline i stalinzme.”

167. Chegodaeva, Dva lika vremeni, 152–8. Perhaps the most striking image of all appeared in USSR in Construction, a Stalin profile portrait formed from a vast abundance of tiny multihued flecks of millet, alfalfa, and poppy. USSR in Construction, 1939, no. 11–2; Margolin, “Stalin and Wheat.”

168. Pravda, Dec. 20 and 21, 1939; Heizer, “Cult of Stalin.” The thousands of congratulations in Pravda ran until Feb. 2, 1940.

169. Komsol’skaia pravda, Dec. 22, 1939.

170. For example: RGAKFD, ed. khr. 1–3553 (year 1939). A model of the hovel was on display in the Georgia pavilion at the all-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow.

171. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1499, l. 39–54. Yaroslavsky incorporated many “reminiscences” in his book, O tovarishche Staline (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1939), in English, Landmarks in the Life of Stalin (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), printed in some 200,000 copies, which, unusually, included a chapter on Stalin’s childhood. The work was based on a long speech on Stalin’s life that Yaroslavsky had delivered at a conference of agitprop cadres on Sept. 17, 1939, which had been published in two parts in the agitprop journal: “Vazhneishie vekhi zhizni i deiatel’nosti tovarishcha Stalina,” V pomoshch’ marksistsko-leninsokomu obrazovaniiu, 1939, no. 10: 33–61, no. 13–4: 22–92. Also, some of the “reminiscences” Beria’s minions had gathered and published in Tbilisi about Stalin’s youth were republished in the mass-circulation youth periodical Molodaya Gvardiya (1939, no. 12). In Sept. 1940, Stalin forbade publication in Russian of the Georgian-language book Childhood of the Leader, by the famed children’s writer Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, issued the previous year in connection with Stalin’s sixtieth birthday. Galleys had been readied. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 524–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 730, l. 190); d. 787, l. 1–2. See also Davies and Harris, Stalin’s World, 159.

172. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 3226, l. 1; d. 1281; Koniuskaia, “Iz vosponinanii,” 3; RGASPI, f. 629, op. 11, d. 55, l. 52.

173. K shestidesiatiletiiu, 177. See also Barmine, One Who Survived, 258. The regime published recommended readings for Stalin’s jubilee: Markovich, O Staline. See also O Staline: ukazatel’ literatury. Yaroslavky described the three earliest meetings between Stalin and Lenin: Dec. 1905 in Tampere, Finland at the 3rd Party Congress; April 1906 in Stockholm, at the 4th Party Congress; and in May 1907 in London, at the 5th Party Congress (the numbers were disputed by non-Bolshevik members of the Russian Social Democrat Workers Party). Iaroslavskii, “Tri vstrechi.”

174. Pravda, Dec. 23 and 25, 1939, reprinted in Iu. Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 170–1. Stalin’s name, one author wrote in a biographical note, “glows like a torch of freedom, like a battle flag of the toilers of the whole world.” Badaev, “O Staline.”

175. Time, Jan. 1, 1940.

176. Mydans, More than Meets the Eye, 119.

177. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 77 (citing an unpublished essay by G. A. Kumanev).

178. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 332, 357.

179. Volkogonov, Hoover Institution Archive, box 1 (Voroshilov, Stalin, and Shaposhnikov order to frontline commanders); van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 103, citing N. F. Kuz’min, Na strazhe mirovogo truda, 1921–1941 gg. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), 238.

180. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 210–2 (RGVA, f. 33988, op. 4, d. 13, l. 197ss–200ss), 212–4 (l. 247ss–249ss), 215–16 (l. 244ss–246ss), 216–8 (239ss–243ss).

181. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 203. She sent the message on Dec. 8, 1939. When and in what form Stalin received this information remains unclear. On German troop positioning in the West, see Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 257–63 (Jan. 1940).

182. Semiriaga, Tainy stalinskoi diplomatii, 163–4; Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 185–7; Na prieme, 288.

183. Stalin also permitted selection of quality troops from various military districts for Finland. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 104 (citing RGASPI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 59).

184. RGVA, f. 33 987, op. 3, d. 1386, l. 169–71, Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 17; RGASPI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 6861, l. 411–4. On Jan. 13, 1940, Beria reported that Soviet military communication codes had been carelessly distributed on the battlefield and fallen into enemy hands. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 428–9 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 280, l. 18-20).

185. In Moscow Choibalsan also met with Voroshilov and Beria, who “helped” the Mongol leader reinforce his personal security detail, which increased Soviet surveillance. Baabar, Twentieth-Century Mongolia, 366–78 (citing sources with Mongol archives). After victory at the Halha River over the Japanese, Choibalsan had traveled again to the Soviet capital, arriving in Dec. 1939. He had last been there from Sept. 1938 through Jan. 1939, when Kremlin doctors diagnosed him with “physical and intellectual fatigue” and prescribed treatment at the Matsesta baths, after which, upon returning to Mongolia, he had Prime Minister Amar publicly tried and extradited to the NKVD in Siberia for execution.

186. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 157–61. Yakovlev indicates he met Stalin twice, in late Dec. 1939 and on Jan. 9, but the logbooks give dates of late Oct. 1939 and Jan. 8, 1940. Na prieme, 277, 288. Yakovlev’s father had worked for Alfred Nobel’s oil concern. Mikhail Kaganovich was removed on Jan. 10, and demoted to the directorship of a military aviation factory (no. 124) in Kazan. In Feb. 1941, after being told by his brother Lazar that Stalin had criticized him, Mikhail would shoot himself.

187. Emel’ianov, Na poroge voiny, 154–8; “Vospominaia Velikuiu Otechestvennuiu,” 56; Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 109. Yemelyanov recalls the meeting as taking place sometime in Dec. 1939, but the office logbooks indicate the Jan. date. Na prieme, 289.

188. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 431–2 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 189, l. 69–71: Beria, Jan. 13, 1940).

189. Finnish intelligence passed to the British a Soviet codebook that “bore the marks of a bullet.” Jeffrey, MI6, 371–2 (no citation).

190. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1098 (citing Brig Ling notes on Interview with Mannerheim on Jan. 8, 1940; Mannerheim to Ironside, Jan. 9: TNA War Office 208/3966; and Memo by Gen. Ironside, “Operations in Scandinavia,” Jan. 12: TNA, WO 208/3966).

191. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 431–2 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 189, l. 69–71: Jan. 13, 1940), 409 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6: Jan. 1940); DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 53–6 (Maisky to Molotov, Jan. 26, 1940); Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 195. Maisky feared British-Soviet diplomatic relations again would be severed and he himself deported. In the event, he remained in London but as a pariah. The British intended to publish a book of documents on the failed negotiations with Moscow, exculpating themselves, which would have exposed Maisky’s initiatives beyond his instructions. Maisky procured a microfilm of the never-published text, which would turn up in a search of his possessions and figure in his trial in 1955.

192. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1098–9.

193. Stalin had learned back on Oct. 13, 1939, that Paasonen, the Finnish military intelligence officer, had told Major Vrang, the Swedish military attaché, that, just as during the historic battle in 1808 against the invading Imperial Russian Army, the Finns would slowly withdraw toward the north and Sweden. Stalin had had the Soviet battle plan adjusted to include the goal of cutting Finland in two at Oulu (Oleaborg) on the Finnish far coast, to interdict Helsinki’s land contact with Sweden. The thought had sunk in so deeply that Stalin had reiterated the need to pay attention to the 1808 battle in a directive as late as Dec. 29, 1939. But by Jan. 8 the Finns had won what became known as the Battle of Suomussalmi, which protected the axis toward Oulu. The objective of slicing Finland in half appeared plausible on a map, but the territory was mostly forested marshland with only logging trails for roads. Nor had the Finns withdrawn the way Soviet intelligence had reported they would. The Soviets lost huge stores of war material and men. (It was in the drive toward the Oulu where Mekhlis had almost been killed.) Volkogonov Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1 (Leningrad military district cipher telegram to the general staff, Nov. 29, 1939; order, Voroshilov to Shaposhnikov, Dec. 2).

194. Hastings, Inferno, 36–7 (no citation).

195. Pospelov, Istoriia Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, I: 275; Richardson, “French Plans.”

196. RGVA, f. 33988, op. 4, d. 35, l. 35ss, in Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 227.

197. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1100 (Jan. 20, 1940).

198. APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 177, l. 116–36.

199. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 124–5, 144–5. In a lecture on June 26, 1940, at the Frunze Military Academy concerning the lessons of the Finnish war, Meretskov would claim that the Finns had built 150 airfields to receive foreign aircraft. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 31n55 (citing RGVA, f. 34980, op. 14, d. 6, l. 1).

200. Na prieme, 290.

201. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 481 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 12, l. 59). See also Tanner, Winter War, 125–63.

202. West and Tsarev, Crown Jewels, 144 (citing an inaccessible secret History of the London Rezidentura, in Russian, file no. 89113, I: 434).

203. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1509, l. 82–4. Stalin was responding to E. Gorodetsky’s article in Pravda (Feb. 4, 1940), which was a summary of M. Moskalev’s article in Istorik-Marksist (Jan. 1940). Later, on April 27, 1940, when Yaroslavsky sought to rebut Stalin by citing many sources, Stalin again exploded (“sycophancy is incompatible with scientific history”). RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 842, l. 35–44.

204. Zhukovskii, Lubianskaia imperiia NKVD, 214–5.

205. http://alya-aleksej.narod.ru/index/0-181; Voronov, “Palach v kozhanom fartuke”; Nikita Petrov, “Chelovek v kozhanom fartuke lichno rasstrelial bolee desiati tysiach chelovek” http://discussiya.com/2010/08/26/blokhin-executioner. Stalin signed the list, containing 457 names, including Yezhov’s, on Jan. 17, 1940: APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 177, l. 116–36. Another principal executioner was the Latvian Pēteris Mago, Russified as Pyotr Maggo (1879–1941), who would soon die of cirrhosis of the liver.

206. Ushakov and Stukalov, Front voennykh prokurorov, 75 (USSR deputy military procurator Nikolai Afanasev, who was present). Among the many rumors that would circulate inside the NKVD about Yezhov’s execution, one had Beria ordering that Yezhov undress and be beaten before being shot, just as Yezhov had done to humiliate his predecessor Yagoda. Kamov, “Smert’ Nikolai Ezhova.”

207. “Poslednee slovo Nikolai Ezhova,” Moskovskie novosti, Jan. 30–Feb. 6, 1994; Petrov and Jansen, Stalinskii pitomets, 536 (citing TsA FSB, sledstvennoe delo No. N-15302, t. 1, l. 184–6); Getty and Naumov, Road to Terror, 560–2.

208. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 212.

209. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 153; Solovev, My Nine Lives, 119; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 13; Baryshnikov et al., Istoriia ordena Lenina, 137.

210. Valedinskii, “Vospominaniia,” 124. Vyborg fell roughly three weeks later. On Stalin’s illness and treatment in mid-February 1940, see also Chigirin, Stalin, 115–20 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1482, l. 101–5ob.).

211. In Nov. 1939, thanks to Gerhard Kegel, the Soviet agent, the NKVD managed to photograph a long document on the German negotiating strategy in the talks, including the maximum prices the Germans would pay for various Soviet goods. “The negotiations were difficult and lengthy,” the German trade negotiator Karl Schnurre wrote in an internal memorandum, adding that, because “the Soviet Union does not import any consumer goods whatsoever, their wishes concerned exclusively manufactured goods and war materiel. Thus, in numerous cases, Soviet bottlenecks coincide with German bottlenecks, such as machine tools for the manufacture of artillery ammunition.” On top of that, “psychologically the ever-present distrust of the Russians was of importance as well as the fear of any responsibility. And people’s commissar Mikoyan had to refer numerous questions to Stalin personally, since his authority was not sufficient.” DGFP, series D, VIII: 752–9 (economic agreement), 814–7 (Schnurre memorandum); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 131–4; Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 97–106; Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 439.

212. Pravda did not crow in its announcement. Pravda, Feb. 18, 1940. See also Werth, Russia at War, 62–71.

213. After his Dec. 1939 offensive quickly petered out, Chiang, in Feb. 1940, had convened a military conference in Liuzhou (Guangxi). He attributed Japan’s strength to its surprise attacks (on poorly defended places), stout defense of occupied positions, and disguise of movements. He saw its weakness in a failure to deploy sufficient forces, sustain its operations for sufficient time, and prepare sufficient reserves. Ryōichi, “Japanese Eleventh Army,” 227–8, citing Dai Tōa Sensō (Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan, 1977), in the series Shō Kaiseki Hiroku, XIII: 47–8.

214. Taylor, Generalissimo, 171 (citing Chiang Diaries, Hoover Institution archives, box 40, folder 15: Dec. 30, 1939).

215. The Chinese Communists were receiving $110,000 to support their armed forces from the Nationalist government and themselves collected some $200,000 in local currency via local governments under Communist control in northern regions, likely through traditional land taxes. Party dues amounted to another $40,000. But they were spending around $700,000 per month. Dallin and Firsov, Dimitrov and Stalin, 123–5 (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 317. l. 53–5).

216. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 126 (Feb. 23 and 25, 1940). On Feb. 25, 1940, Yan Xishan, the warlord ruler of small, poor, remote Shanxi region, who had an off-again, on-again collaboration with the Communists against the Japanese, halted his offensive against the Communists. The Eighth Route Army was based there.

217. A memo from the Comintern’s personnel department to Dimitrov denigrated Wang Ming, Mao’s rival, as possessing “no authority among the old cadres of the party,” and recommended that he not be given “leading positions,” while proposing promotion of a long list of Mao loyalists (including a young military leader in the Eighth Route Army named Deng Xiaoping). “Mao Zedong is certainly the most important political figure in the Chinese Communist party. He knows China better than the other CCP leaders, knows the people, understands politics and generally frames issues correctly.” Pantsov and Levine, Mao, 333–4 (citing RGASPI, f. 495, op. 225, d. 71, t. 3: l. 186–9).

218. Taylor, Generalissimo, 172; Suyin, Eldest Son, 170.

219. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 384–90 (APRF, f. 3, zakrytyi paket no. 1, with facsimile). Between late Sept. 1939 and March 1940, the Soviets and the Nazis had held a series of meetings (apparently four in total) to discuss anticipated Polish resistance, coordination of the respective occupations, POWs, and refugees. Contrary to some claims, the Feb. 20, 1940, meeting (at the Pan Tadeusz villa of the Zakopane spa, in the Tatra Mountains) did not coordinate or precipitate the Soviet Katyn massacre. Vishlёv, Nakanune, 119–23; Bór-Komorowski, Secret Army. Beria’s March 1940 report and recommendation to Stalin is in Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 476–8.

220. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 390–2 (APRF, f. 3, zakrytyi paket no. 1); Cienciala et al., Katyn, 118–20; Ubyty v Katyni; Kozlov et al., Katyn’ mart 1940–sentiabr’2000 g. The total includes approximately 14,500 POWs held in NKVD camps in Kozelsky, Ostaskhovsky, and Starobelsky, and more than 7,300 in remand prisons in the western regions of the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics. The execution sites included Smolensk city, Kalinin, Kharkov, and other places, as well as Katyn forest. Documents establishing the fact of Soviet culpability survived, but the full story will never be known because the files were purged. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 42n21.

221. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 16. See also Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 276–7, 295.

222. Osborn, Operation Pike, 92–6. Overflowing camps and prisons placed a strain on NKVD resources in the western regions. Of course, the inmates could have been deported eastward to labor camps rather than executed without trial.

223. In Nov. 1939, Mekhlis, as head of the army’s political administration, had told a gathering of Soviet writers that Polish officers held as prisoners of war could form the leadership of Polish legions of up to 100,000 men, which were being constituted in France, and therefore that they should not be released. Jasiewicz, Zagłada polskich Kresów, 175 (Vishnevsky diary, Nov. 11, 1939). This passage was not included in Vishnevskii, Stat’i, dnevniki, pis’ma, 372.

224. Boiadzhiev, Maretskaia, 100; Kalashnikov, Ocherki istorii sovetskogo kino, II: 169–84.

225. Izvestiia, March 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1940; Pravda, March 9, 1940. That month, a “short biography” of Molotov, barely ten pages, went to press in a print run of half a million. It recounted his days in the underground, the 1917 revolution, and the civil war, and stressed his orthodox Leninism, organizing prowess, and close association with “the Supreme Leader of peoples comrade Stalin.” Tikhomirov, Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, 15.

226. Shvarts, “Zhizn’ i smert’ Mikhaila Bulgakova,” 126. Pasternak, having learned Bulgakov was terminally ill, had paid a last visit.

227. Upton, Finland, 140 (citing J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 187, 191); Tanner, Winter War, 235. For brief excerpts of the Finnish record of the March 12 discussions, in Russian translation, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 497–503.

228. For a Finnish police summary (March 15, 1940) of the domestic shock from the peace terms, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 519–22.

229. Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 190.

230. Vakar, “Milukov v izgnan’e’,” 377.

231. “The USSR, to be sure, received strategic gains in the northwest, but at what price?” Trotsky wrote in March 1940. “The prestige of the Red Army is undermined. The trust of the toiling masses and exploited peoples of the whole world has been lost. As a result the international position of the USSR has not been strengthened but weakened.” He added that Stalin “personally has emerged from this operation completely smashed.” Trotskii, “Stalin posle finliandskogo opyta [March 13, 1940],” in Portrety revoliutsionerov, 162–66 (at 166). Trotsky later clarified that “it does not follow from this that the USSR must be surrendered to the imperialists but only that the USSR must be torn out of the hands of the bureaucracy.” Trotsky, “Balance Sheet of the Finnish Events.” See also Trotsky, “A Petty-Bourgeois Opposition in the Socialist Workers Party” (Dec. 15, 1939), published posthumously in In Defense of Marxism, 44–62 (at 56–9).

232. This concession appears to have been connected to Finland’s efforts to sign a defensive alliance with Sweden and Norway, which Molotov warned Helsinki would be considered a violation of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty. Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 196; van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 190.

233. Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 263–75.

234. Waltz, Theory of International Relations, 194–5; Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas.”

235. Solodovnikov,”My byli molodye togda,” 210.

236. Timoshenko told the Finnish military attaché in Moscow, “the Russians have learnt much in this hard war in which the Finns fought with heroism.” Mannerheim, Memoirs, 371. Altogether, from Sept. 1939 through March 12, 1940, Red Army call-ups had amounted to 3.16 million. About half were demobilized, leaving an army of 1.547 million. Mikhail Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 360 (citing RGVA, f. 40443, op. 3, d. 297, l. 128).

237. Krivosheev, Grif sekretnosti sniat’, 93–126 (esp. 125); RGVA, f. 34980, op. 15, d. 200, 203, 204, 206, 208, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219; f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1301, l. 165–8; Rossiiskaia Federatsiiia, Kniga pamiati; Manninen, “Moshchnoe Sovetskoe nastuplenie,” I: 324–35; “O nakoplenii nachal’stvuiushchego sostava Raboche-Krest’ianskoi Krasnoi Armii,” 181; Balashov, Prinimai nas, 182, 186. Neither Hanko nor the islands would prove to be any protection for Leningrad, since the future Nazi onslaught against the city would not come from the Baltic Sea/Gulf of Finland but from overland.

238. Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, 130. In early spring 1940, right after the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, the Soviet ambassador to Paris, Surits, would be declared persona non grata after sending a telegram to Moscow, intercepted by the French, in which he referred to the French and British as warmongers. It was payback.

239. The German ambassador to Finland (Wipert von Blücher) sent a report to Berlin in Jan. noting that “the Red Army has such shortcomings that it cannot even dispose of a small country and the Comintern does not even gain ground in a population that is more than forty percent socialist.” Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 411; Semiryaga, Winter War, 63–4 (no citation). German circles were said by a Swedish Soviet agent to be stunned by the dismal Soviet effort, and wondered about the necessity of abiding by the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 220–1, 224–8.

240. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI: 981–2 (Dec. 31, 1939).

241. Förster and Mawdsley, “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective,” 68. See also Förster, “German Military’s Image of Russia,” 123–4.

242. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, xii-xiii, 103–27, 189–193.

243. Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War.”

244. Mannerheim, Memoirs, 367. See also Liddell-Hart, Expanding War, 72. One Soviet political commissar observed, “Regiments and divisions were sometimes given to incompetent, inexperienced, and poorly trained people who failed at the slightest difficulty in battle.” Rzheshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II: 21–2. The inadequacy of the Soviet officer corps was a long-standing point of critique. Zaitsev, “Krasnaia armiia,” 12.

245. This testimony is second-hand, from Vasilevsky, Shaposhnikov’s top subordinate at the general staff. Vasilievskii, Delo vsei zhizni, I: 102; Bialer, Stalin and his Generals, 132.

246. Vasilevsky, Lifelong Cause, 108–9. Vasilesvsky was in the Little Corner between March 2 and 17, 1940, on all the days Stalin received visitors except one—thirteen visits total. Na prieme, 293–5.

247. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh sem’i, 64–5 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 1553, l. 38–9).

248. They would marry on New Year’s Eve 1940–1, just before Vasily would be scheduled to return to his officers’ study courses in Lipetsk, where they would live together in the dormitory. In May 1941, they would return to Moscow; Stalin would order that they move into his Kremlin apartment, which would be subdivided for them. Mamaeva, “Vasily Stalin.”

249. Sheinis, Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov, 367–8; Haslam, “Soviet Foreign Policy,” 116–7; Watson, Molotov, 180.

250. Voroshilov, “Uroki voiny s Finliandiei.” Much of the lively discussion of operations and strategy, prominent through 1936, had been killed off by the terror, but the disastrous Finnish war experience forced its revival. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 500–7.

251. Supposedly, Stalin privately fumed of Voroshilov, “He boasted, assured us, reassured us, that any strike would be answered by a triple strike, that everything is good, everything is in order, everything is ready, Comrade Stalin.” Simonov, “Zametki k biogfraii G. K. Zhukova,” 50. This conversation evidently transpired when Timoshenko was sent to Finland and after Zhukov was put in charge of the Kiev military district.

252. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 128 (March 28, 1940); Rubtsov, Alter ego Stalina, 135 (quoting, without citation, recollections of General Khrulev); Voroshilov, “Uroki voiny s Finliandiei” (APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 261, l. 114–58); Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 426–49 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 121, l. 1–35: Voroshilov report).

253. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 128. See also Gorodetsky, Grand Illusion, 117–8.

254. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 110.

255. Stalin, Schulenburg added, could at most be expected to meet Hitler in a border town. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 134–6.

256. Pravda, March 30, 1940.

257. Duraczyński and Sakharov, Sovetsko-Pol’skie otnosheniia, 153–4 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1305, l. 210–1). Tevosyan’s sister (Yuliya) was married to Levon Mirzoyan, the Armenian party official, who fell afoul of Beria. She was arrested. “Stal’noi narkom” (Jan. 15–31, 2011): http://noev-kovcheg.ru/mag/2011-02/2363.html.

258. The first issue of the KFSSR newspaper Pravda in Finnish came out on April 10, 1940. Bol’shevistskaia pechat’, 1940, no. 8: 71.

259. For the complete proceedings, see Rzheshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II (excerpts in Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 450–516, and Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 235–48); Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War.

260. Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 450–5, 464–5. See also Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 182. Later, Khrushchev, citing a conversation with Timoshenko, said that “every pillbox the Finns had built on the whole Mannerheim line—all that was well known and even mapped out.” Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 253.

261. Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” I: 133 (RGVA, f. 37977, op. 1, d. 722, l. 410–1); Elliston, Finland Fights, 142 (citing German military attaché in Finland, General Arniké).

262. Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 264 (citing RGVA, f. 37977, op. 1, d. 722, l. 411). Meretskov claimed he asked but could not get the necessary information on what to expect in the war. Meretskov, “Ukreplenie severo-zapadnykh granits SSSR,” 123.

263. Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU, 109.

264. Novobranets, “Nakanune voiny,” 170.

265. Proskurov added that “If on the paper it is written ‘secret,’ then people will read it, but if it is just a simple publication, they’ll say it’s rubbish. (Laughter). I am convinced that big bosses treat materials thusly.” Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 464–5, 492–504.

266. Stalin received Proskurov, alone, on July 7, 1940, for an hour. Four days later came the announcement that he had been replaced by Golikov. Proskurov was transferred to command of the Far East military district.

267. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 602 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 77, l. 178–211).

268. Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 267, 268; “Zimniaia voina”: rabota nad oshibkami, 36. See also Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/1: 47; Volkognov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 365–6 (citing TsAMO, f. 132, op. 264 211, d. 73, l. 67–110). Stalin would also criticize army political work. “It is not enough that the political worker in the army will repeat ‘the party of Lenin-Stalin,’ it is no more than repeating ‘Hallelujah, Hallelujah,’” he complained of the Finnish war campaign. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 27.

269. Khrushchev added, “It was the only time I have ever witnessed such an outburst.” Khrushchev, Vospominaniia, I: 257; Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 256. Khrushchev is the only source for this incident. He gives no date, though it seems likely to have occurred in 1940 after the Finnish war debacle.

270. “Military history—especially Russian—is being studied poorly,” Mekhlis, head of the army’s political directorate, complained in a speech to the Main Military Council (May 10, 1940). “We have a lot of unfair ridiculing of the old army despite the fact that we had such notable tsarist army generals as Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Bagration . . . All of this leads to the ignoring of concrete historical experience despite the fact that history is the best teacher.” Brandenberger and Dubrovsky, “The People Need a Tsar,” 881 (citing “O Voennoi ideologii,” RGVA, f. 9, op. 376a, d. 4252, l. 121, 138–40). In 1940, the war of 1812 against Napoleon once again became known as the Fatherland War: Nechkina, Istoriia SSSR, II: 76.

271. More than twenty top officials received copies of these top-secret documents. Rybalkin, Operatisia “X,” 105–6. Stalin had received a long analysis, forwarded by Orlov and dated Dec. 31, 1938, on the performance of Soviet aviation in Spain. The analysis was written by F. A. Agaltsov (b. 1900), a commissar of the Red Air Force in the Spanish Republic army. Stalin wrote on the cover letter, questioning why Orlov and not Loktionov was sending him materials on aviation. Kudriashov, SSSR i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii, 433–53 (APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 228, l. 38, 39–84), 532n585.

272. Helmuth Klotz, an émigré German writer living in France, argued of Spain that the tank had been overtaken by the new German anti-tank guns. Klotz, Les leçons militaires de la guerre civile en Espagne (Paris, Édité par l’auteur, 1937); Militärische Lehren des Bürgerkrieges in Spanien (Paris, Selbstverlag des Verfassers 1938); Uroki grazhdanski voiny v Ispanii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1938). In the preface to the Russian translation, Soviet editors took Klotz to task for wrongly minimizing the role of the air force in Spain.

273. Roberts, Stalin’s General, 64 (citing RGVA, f. 32113, op. 1, d. 2). Stern wrote up a report, too. “In many ways, this operation resembles Hannibal’s campaign at Cannae,” he would boast, comparing Khalkin-Gol to Carthage’s battle against the Romans (216 B.C.). “I think it will become the second perfect battle of encirclement in all history.” Vorozheikin, Istrebiteli. Stern would later complain officially that Zhukov and his men were gossiping that Stern had had nothing to do with drawing up the battle plan. Krasnov, Neizvestnyi Zhukov, 121–2.

274. Rzheshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II: 276.

275. For example, Russian observers of the Crimean War (1853–6) had come to see the necessity of replacing the .70-caliber smoothbore musket, in use since Peter the Great. In 1857, Russia decisively opted for the .60-caliber muzzle-loader (manufactured abroad) and, by 1862, had acquired more than a quarter million of these shoulder rifles, nicknamed the vintovka. But in a head-snapping turnabout, the 1866 Austro-Prussian War demonstrated the inferiority of muzzle-loaders to breechloaders. Here was a very expensive decision for Russia: junk its huge stock of rifles, or try, somehow, to adapt them. After emotional debate, experiment, and testing, Russian strategists could not make up their minds and pursued both replacement and adaptation, which were at cross-purposes. Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, 30–3.

276. Despite failing to obtain approval, Gorky Factory No. 92 began producing the superior 76.2-mm F-34 guns, and they ended up being available for inclusion on the tank. Zaloga and Grandsen, Soviet Tanks, 130.

277. Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 600.

278. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 606, 658–59; Kowalsky, Stalin, paragraphs 670, 784; Rybalkin, Operatisia “X,” 118. In 1937, Italian aviation also stalled (industry could not build reliable motors above 1,000 horsepower). Maiolo, Cry Havoc, 199. The Soviets had captured a Messerschmitt Bf 109, which they discovered was superior to the Soviet Il-16. This would prompt a scramble to upgrade the latter with fourteen-cylinder, two-row radial engines, but that would take time.

279. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 166–7. The meeting in the Little Corner may have been Aug. 5, 1940: Na prieme, 308.

280. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 24, citing APRF, f. 56, op. 1, d. 298, l. 29–32 (Stalin-Ritter, Feb. 8, 1940) and AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 315, d. 2174, l. 153–4 (Shkvartsev, March 5, 1940); APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 688, l. 58–64 (Mikoyan Schulenburg, April 5, 1940), l. 72–8 (Mikoyan meeting Hilger, April 21, 1940); Sipols, “Torgovo-ekonomicheskie otnosheniia mezhdu SSSR.” See also Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 317.

281. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 202: table 3.2; Musial, Stalins Beutezug, 28–9.

282. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 205: (table 3.5, 210: table 5.1.

283. “Zimniaia voina”: rabota nad oshibkami, 215–43.

284. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 296 (citing RGVA, f. 9, op. 36, d. 4252, l. 160); van Dyke, “Legko otdelalis’,” 115.

285. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 317–24.

286. Erickson, Soviet High Command, 555. Timoshenko got an apartment in the turn-of-the-century building on the former Romanov Way, renamed Granovsky Street, which was the most prestigious address for those living outside the Kremlin; this is where Mikhail Frunze had lived when he became defense commissar. Budyonny had his apartment here as did the functionaries Yaroslavsky, Malyshev, and Khrushchev. This is where Trotsky was exiled from.

287. See also Mikoian, Tak bylo, 386.

288. Kira was evidently seized on May 5, 1940, by a squad overseen by Merkulov; she was executed by Blokhin without indictment or trial. “Beria protiv Kulika,” in Bobrenev and Riazantsev, Palachi i zhertvy, 197–264 (esp. 195–201, 211–3); Sokolov, Istreblennye marshaly, 300–1; Leskov, Stalin i zagovor Tukhachevskogo, 53–5; Montefiore, Court of the Red Tsar, 293–4.

289. DGFP, series D, VIII: 942; Erickson, Soviet High Command, 508, 553.

290. One scholar gives the reason as Stalin’s desire to show the world that the lessons of the Finnish War had been absorbed by replacing both the defense commissar and chief of staff, even though Stalin acknowledged that Shaposhnikov had gotten the war right. Balandin, Marshal Shaposhnikov, 317–23.

291. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 717.

292. Komandnyi i nachal’stvuiushchii sostav Krasnoi Armii, 4–14; Kirshin, Dukhovnaia gotovnost’ Sovetskogo naroda k voine, 379; van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 198–9; Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 63–4.

293. Osokina, Za fasadom, 206–18; Khanin, Ekonomicheskaia istoriia Rossii, I: 29.

294. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 13–49.

295. Kuznetsov, Krutye povoroty, 37.

296. Zhukov, Vospominaniia, II: 283–7. Zhukov recalls Kalinin being present. The logbook lists Zhukov on June 2, 1939, only in the presence of Molotov and Stalin, and on June 3 in the presence of twenty-five people, almost all military men, but not Kalinin. Kalinin and Zhukov both appear on June 13, but not at overlapping times. Na prieme, 300–1, 302–3.

297. Already by May 1940, 12,000 repressed Red Army officers and troops had been reinstated (not including the air force or navy). “O nakoplenii nachal’stvuiushchego sostava Raboche-Krest’ianskoi Krasnoi Armii,” 182, 187, 188–9.

298. Konstantinov, Rokossovskii, 42. See also Gorbatov, Gody i voiny, 162–72.

299. Drug plennykh, Jan. 27, 1940: 1.

300. Aron, Mémoires, 158.

301. Dullin, “How to Wage Warfare,” 224. See also Borkenau, Totalitarian Enemy, published in March 1939.

302. Schapiro, Totalitarianism; Gleason, Totalitarianism; Jones, Lost Debate. Stalin was likely unaware of these adverse currents. For May Day 1940, he altered the draft slogan for the Young Pioneers from “the cause of communism” to the “cause of Lenin-Stalin.” RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1257, l. 137.

303. Hilferding, “Gosudarstvennyi kapitalizm ili totalitarnoe gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo?” The Mensheviks, just before the Nazis would occupy Paris, would relocate to New York, while Hilferding would stay behind and fall into the clutches of the Gestapo. Liebich, From the Other Shore, 240–3.

304. Harrison and Davies, “Soviet Military-Economic Effort,” 373–93.

305. Adamthwaite, France, 269–79. There is little solid evidence on German intelligence assessments of Soviet capabilities. Germany used Iran, which in 1939 had declared its neutrality, as a platform for reconnaissance and covert action against the Soviet Union (the Shah shared with Hitler fear of the spread of Bolshevism; nearly half of Iranian trade was with Nazi Germany, mostly raw materials and oil for German weapons). Richard August, who went by the name Franz Meyer, an SS officer and spy working undercover as a representative of the Reichsgroup for Industry in the USSR from Sept. 1939 through Feb. 1940, was among those based in Tehran. He evidently reported that the Red Army was strong and the Russian émigré predictions of a pending anti-Bolshevik uprising fantastical. Dolgopolov, Vartanian, 16–7.

306. Emets, “O roli russkoi armii,” 64.

307. Adamthwaite, France, 232–4; Gates, End of the Affair, 57–8; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 295.

308. Erickson, Soviet High Command, 513. For British views, see Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 274; and Adamthwaite, France, 51. On Stalin’s respect for the French army (“worthy of consideration”), expressed to Ribbentrop on Aug. 23, 1939, see DGFP, series D, VII: 227.

CHAPTER 13. GREED

1. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, VIII: 196–7 (June 28, 1940).

2. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 374–5 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 339, d. 2315, l. 35, 35 a, 36, 38, 39).

3. Osborn, Operation Pike. See also Richardson, “French Plans”; Millman, “Toward War with Russia.”

4. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 317–8.

5. Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 180.

6. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 223 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 745, l. 34).

7. Solonin, “Tri plana tovarishcha Stalina,” 44.

8. On May 10, 1940, the same day Hitler attacked France, Moscow was invaded by Leningrad culture. After so many Ten-Day festivals for the various Union republics—beginning with Ukraine in 1936 and most recently with Armenia in Oct. 1939—now came the star turn of the Union’s second capital, with performances by the latter’s principal theaters, symphony orchestras, choral group, and the fabled Leningrad choreography school, cradle of the country’s ballet dancers. Altogether, 2,765 cultural figures from Leningrad would take part (by one press account, closer to 4,000). On May 29, Stalin hosted a banquet for them in the Grand Kremlin Palace. Izvestiia, May 10, 26, and 28, 1940; Kul’turnaia zhizn’ v SSSR, 1928–1941, 732; Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 120–1. Also in May 1940, the Nazis sealed off the Jews of German-occupied Łódź into a ghetto behind barbed wire.

9. Gilbert, Churchill and America, 131–3.

10. Self, Neville Chamberlain, 432–3; Lukacs, Five Days in London.

11. In a May 24–28, 1940, Cabinet debate, Churchill prevailed. Reynolds, “British ‘Decision’ to Fight,” 147–67.

12. Firsov, “Arkhivy Kominterna,” 22 (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 184, d. 4, l. 53: Sept. 29, 1939). Stalin evidently harbored a certain admiration for the new British PM, Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 152n1.

13. Von Strandmann, “Appeasement and Counter-Appeasement,” 168. Germany sent a team under retired Rear Admiral Otto Feige (b. 1882) to fit out the 690-foot battleship’s superstructure above the first deck. Philbin, Lure of Neptune, 121–2.

14. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 117, 121n101 (citing PA, R 106232, E0418717 and PA/Schnurre, Leben, 97).

15. While dancing the ancient dance with her, Feige was said to have heard a clicking noise, started probing, and found a hidden camera in a large wall painting (it had a small hole cut out). Feige remained impassive to Beria’s clumsy blackmail recruitment effort, while Hitler became indignant about the Soviet entrapment effort. According to Khrushchev, Stalin laced into Beria. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 258.

16. Just before midnight, Stalin evidently invited Beria and Sudoplatov to stay for supper. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 454; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 98–9; Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 76–7.

17. Ribbentrop in fall 1939 had wanted to make a public declaration to counter British press assertions that while in Moscow he had requested Soviet military assistance but been rebuffed. Stalin rewrote the German foreign ministry’s draft of his words to read, “The attitude of Germany in declining military aid commands respect. However, a strong Germany is the absolute prerequisite for peace in Europe, where it follows that the Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong Germany. Therefore, the Soviet Union cannot give its approval to the Western powers creating conditions which would weaken Germany and place her in a difficult position. Therein lay the community of interests between the Soviet Union and Germany.” Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 124–27; Fel’shtinskii, SSSR-Germaniia, II: 18.

18. British policy-makers had discussed a possible seizure of Sweden and Norway, which were also major German suppliers, as well as the deployment of British naval squadrons to the Baltic Sea, in order to cut off Germany and confront the Soviets militarily. Such offensive operations remained largely in the realm of fantasy, however, their costs higher than the Western publics or even Western leaders were willing to incur. In any case, Hitler had beaten Britain and France to the punch, invading Norway.

19. Shirer, Rise and Fall, 731–8 (citing Halder letter, July 19, 1957). Hastings, Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord (London: Harper, 2009), 1–59; Lukacs, Duel, 97–103.

20. The June 10 issue of Poslednie novosti, the émigré newspaper of Paul Miliukov, announcing the Nazi triumph over France, would be its last in Paris; the next day it was shut down.

21. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 297.

22. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10339678.

23. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 419–25. The Germans removed the railway carriage to Berlin.

24. On June 21, 1940, Köstring, the German military attaché, met his Soviet liaison officer, Colonel Grigory Osetrov, who asked about the terms imposed on France. Köstring stated, “I do not know the intentions of our command staff, but I think that there will still be something with Britain.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 333–4 (RGVA, f. 33988, op. 4, d. 36, l. 69s); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 33 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 674, l. 128).

25. France’s military budget had jumped from 12.8 billion FF in 1935 to 93.7 billion FF by 1939; it was investing 2.6 times as much on weapons production as it had on the eve of the Great War. Doise and Vaïsse, Diplomatie et outil militaire, 402; Frankenstein, Le prix du réarmement français, 34–35.

26. Of Germany’s 93 combat-ready divisions, only 9 were panzer divisions, with a total of 2,439 tanks; France had 3,254 tanks (4,200 with Belgian, Dutch, and British ones included). Stolfi, “Equipment for Victory”; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 371–2.

27. Forcade, “Le Renseignement face à l’Allemagne,” 126–55.

28. French intelligence (the Second Bureau of the General Staff) had monitored the transfer of German divisions westward following completion of the Polish campaign, and by early May 1940, despite Germany’s minimizing the use of radio communications, the Second Bureau nailed the number of German divisions almost exactly (estimating 137 for an actual 136). The Germans had altered their compromised codes on May 1, cutting off French signals intelligence for a time, making the already skeptical decision makers at the top that much more so when it came to intelligence, however. Schuker, “Seeking a Scapegoat,” 81–127, citing Col. Ulrich Liss, “Die Tätigkeit des französischen 2. Bureau im Westfeldzug 1939/40,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 10 (1960): 267–78.

29. Bloch, Strange Defeat, 36, 52.

30. France’s Maginot Line, mocked by subsequent analysts, proved difficult to overcome even when the Germans attacked it from the rear, toward war’s end; not one of its major fortresses was captured in the fighting. Doughty, Breaking Point, 69–70.

31. Förster, “Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” III: 204. In 1939, French intelligence had taken note of Guderian’s new, controversial strategy of using combined tank and air power to smash through and get behind enemy artillery and wreak havoc, but very few German generals, even in 1940, expected an armored blitzkrieg to succeed in delivering a knockout blow (based on the experience of World War I). Young, “French Military Intelligence,” 288–90.

32. Jacobsen, Dokumente zum Wesfeldzug 1940; Jacobsen, Fall Gelb” der Kampf; Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, 66–116; Goutard, Battle of France; May, Strange Victory, 215–26; Geyer, “Restorative Elites,” 139–44.

33. “The great western offensive was a one-shot affair,” one historian aptly explained. “Success, and Germany would acquire the economic base to fight a long war; failure, and the war would be over.” Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 361.

34. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, 3. The same day—May 20, 1940—the Nazis opened a concentration camp at Oświęcim/Auschwitz for Polish political prisoners. It would later be expanded and specialize in gassing Jews.

35. Hooten, Luftwaffe at War, II: 61; Schuker, “Seeking a Scapegoat,” 114, citing Villelume, Journal, 333 (May 12, 1940). As the historian May has observed of France, “When Germany opened its offensive against the Low Countries and France in 1940, not a single general expected victory as a result.” May, Strange Victory, 7.

36. Nord, France 1940. See also Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered.

37. Deutscher, Stalin, 437–41; Erickson, Soviet High Command, 537. In France, the advocates of armor, such as de Gaulle, lacking a patron, had been stymied by traditionalists.

38. Hillgruber, “Das Russlandbild,” 296–310; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 297–300.

39. Haffner, Meaning of Hitler, 31.

40. Khrushchev, Vospominaniia, I: 267; Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 266.

41. Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misconceptions,” esp. 475–6. “The vozhd,” the contemporary Konstantin Simonov would later observe, “had created for himself a situation in the party and the state such that if he decided something firmly, no one contemplated the possibility of direct resistance. Stalin did not have to defend his correctness before anyone, he was by definition correct if he had taken the decision.” Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia, 82.

42. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 115–6 (Sept. 7, 1939). “Hitler without knowing it leads to shattering [of the] bourgeoisie,” explained a secret cipher in early Oct. 1939, from the Dimitrov to Earl Browder of the American Communist party, in reference to the Pact. Jaffe, Rise and Fall of American Communism, 46–7.

43. DGFP, series D, IX: 585–6 (June 18, 1940); Naumov, 1941 god, I: 40–2 (AVPRF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 14, d. 155, l. 206–8).

44. Lemin, “Novyi etap voiny v Evrope,” 28; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 373–4; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 296–7. Halifax, British foreign secretary, wrote in his diary on May 25, 1940: “the mystery of what looks like the French failure is as great as ever. The one firm rock on which everybody had been willing to build for the last two years was the French Army, and the Germans walked through it like they did through the Poles.” Colville, Footprints in Time, 92; Reynolds, “1940,” 329 (citing Halifax diary: Hickleton papers, A 7.8.4, Borthwick Institute, York).

45. Schwendemann, Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, 373. The German air attaché in Moscow, Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Aschenbrenner, called upon the international liaison department of the defense commissariat back on May 21, 1940, and in a jolly mood attributed German successes in the West to Soviet support. “Before my departure for your country,” he told his Soviet interlocutor, “I was received by Hitler, who said to me: ‘Remember, Stalin did a great thing for us, about which you should never forget, under any circumstances. Remember this, and do not turn yourself into a merchant, but be a worthy representative of our army in a country friendly to us.’” Later that same day, Köstring, the German army attaché, visited the international liaison department and passed on photographs from the war with France. (The package was marked solely for Stalin.) When asked how events would now unfold, Aschenbrenner had made ostensibly definitive statements; the shrewder Köstring had answered, “only Hitler and a very narrow circle of people close to him know. I am given very limited information.” Aschenbrenner asked that his conversation not be reported to Köstring, for the latter “is jealous, like a girl, and might be offended that I got here before him.” Gavrilov, Voenaia razvedka informiruet, 315–6 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1305, l. 374s–375s; report of Colonel Grigory I. Osetrov [b. 1901]).

46. Trotsky, “Stalin—Intendant Gitlera.” Biulleten’ oppozitsii, 79–80 (Aug.–Oct. 1939).

47. Wager, Der Generalquartiermeister, 106. “All in all,” Karl Schnurre, the German economic official, had crowed on May 10, 1940, the day Germany struck France, “trade with Eastern Europe, as a result of the Economic Agreement with the Soviet Union, has attained a volume that it never reached in previous years.” Der Deutsche Volkswirt (May 10, 1940), in RGAE, f. 413, op. 13, d., 2856, l. 5–6, cited in Nekrich, Pariahs, 154; Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 116–7. Hitler had written (March 8, 1940) to mollify Mussolini that “the trade agreement which we have concluded with Russia, duce, means a great deal in our situation!” DGFP, series D, VIII: 876 (March 8, 1940); Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 111.

48. In addition, the Soviets lent Germany a submarine base near Murmansk for refueling and maintenance, as well as launching raids on British shipping. An oil tanker with Soviet oil arrived to refuel Nazi warships and landing craft during the attack on Norway in April 1940.

49. “Friendship with Germany, the Pact, and so on is all a temporary move, tactical devices,” wrote Vishnevsky in his diary in May 1940. “Will we win? Or will we only give the Germans time, a breathing space, supplies?” Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 228–9 (RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2077, l. 63, 64ob.).

50. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 172. Speer gets the date wrong. See also Reynolds, “1940.”

51. He had settled upon the novella after a long search for a vehicle, as he had once explained, to explore “the heroism of construction, the new [Soviet] man, struggle and the overcoming of obstacles.” Morrison, People’s Artist, 88 (citing RGALI, f. 1929, op. 3, ed. khr. 30, l. 1); Vecherniaia Moskva, Dec. 6, 1932.

52. Richter, “On Prokofiev,” 187–8.

53. Final approval had come only after Vyshinsky, deputy commissar for foreign affairs, saw it and the film’s depiction of the German occupation of Ukraine was toned down. Morrison, People’s Artist, 102–4 (citing RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 950, l. 99); Perkhin, Deiateli russkogo iskusstva, 607–8n4. See also Shlifshtein, “Semyon Kotko,” 3.

54. Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml. A Greek diplomat speculated, in an intercepted and deciphered communication, that “Moscow would like above all to drag out the war [in the West], from which it is trying to extract advantages—which, by the way, it is achieving, as evidenced by the example of the new impositions on the Baltic states.” Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 256 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 22, l. 106: June 1940).

55. DVP SSSR, XXIII/1: 350–2 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 2, d. 13, l. 103–4, 127).

56. Sabaliunas, Lithuania in Crisis, 54.

57. Kirby, “Baltic States,” 27 (citing Third Interim Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Aggression and the Forced Incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR [Washington, 1954], 315–6; File N 4794/803/59: Preston to Order, April 19, 1940).

58. Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskoi partii Latvii, II: 429. Stalin had murdered the entire Estonia Central Committee. Many of them had spent fourteen years in Estonian prisons following the 1924 failed coup, before being released in an amnesty in 1938 and emigrating to the USSR.

59. Gross, Revolution from Abroad. See also Kotkin, “The State.” Lithuania had emerged from Stalin’s gratuitous massacres with just 1,220 Communists.

60. Gross observes that “the Polish Military underground organization, the ZWZ, which thrived under the Nazi occupation in spite of persistent Gestapo efforts to destroy it, never had a chance under the NKVD.” Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 148.

61. Gross, “Nature of Soviet Totalitarianism.” Because Poland underwent Nazi and Soviet occupations simultaneously, it would seem the ideal (if that is the word) place to make the case for “totalitarianism” as a concept encompassing both regimes, yet Gross, a proponent of the term, also noted significant differences between the nature and consequences of Nazi and Soviet rule. Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 230–1. After a trip to newly acquired western Ukraine and western Belorussia as a Pravda correspondent, the writer Avdeyenko returned with a new Buick. (On Sept. 9, 1940, he would be taken to task for being a “serial goods pursuer.”) Babichenko, Pisateli i tsenzory, 22–31. The writer Vishnevsky, afforded a visit to the front in Finland, had written in his diary (Jan. 2, 1940), “I am ashamed to the point of horror to see how our people soiled many homes in Finland, how they carried off everything.” Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 226–7 (citing RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2076, l. 2).

62. Khabarovsk OGPU materials of the early 1930s (to which I was given access in 1993) contain extremely specific, comprehensive characterizations for the population, right down to dwellings drawn to scale, in the émigré settlements across the border in Manchuria, even as the Soviet authorities could not feed or clothe the population in Khabarovsk region.

63. In the 1940 Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language, the word sovetizirovat’ (to Sovietize) was defined as “To implant Soviet ideology, worldview, and understanding of the practical tasks of Soviet power.” Amar, “Sovietization as a Civilizing Mission in the West,” 31.

64. Beria wrote to Stalin that in the summer of 1940, the police archive in Kishinëv, seized from Romania, had been burned before the NKVD could seize it. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 308 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 22, l. 301).

65. “The capitalists succeeded for a time in playing on the national distrust of Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish peasants, as well as shopkeepers, toward the Great Russians,” Schcherbakov would admit after the annexations to the Supreme Soviet (Aug. 1, 1940), in connection with the failures in 1918–20 to reconquer these lands. When the transcript was getting ready for publication, he crossed out “national distrust” and inserted a passage about “bourgeois politicians” in cahoots with the “imperialist bourgeoisie,” “deceiving” these peoples. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 86 (citing RGASPI, f. 88, op. 1, d. 1015, l. 5).

66. Kul’turnaia zhizn’ v SSSR, 1928–1941, 734.

67. The Taras Shevchenko Theater of Ballet and Opera performed Natalka-Poltavka, The Zaporozhets beyond the Danube, and other folk favorites. Literaturnaia gazeta, March 27, 1936; Sovetskaia kul’tura v rekonstruktivnyi period, 517. Pravda, March 24, 1936; Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 115 (citing RGALI, f. 962, op. 21, d. 1, l. 10); Cherushev, Komendanty Kremlia, 477–8. A Kazakh Ten-Day followed (May 17–26), with 350 participants, including the Kazakh Musical Theater, which performed the first Kazakh opera, a form that was a Soviet implant but, in this case, with a story based on the sixteenth-century oral epic Kyz Zhibek. The sensation proved to be the traditional improviser-troubadours (akyns), who sang tales accompanied by a dombra. Literaturnaia gazeta, May 10 and 15, 1936; Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 115–6 (citing RGALI, f. 962, op. 21, d. 1, l. 10). See also Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building, 169–70. Maya Plisteskaya, the ballerina, condescendingly observed that “Soviet Leaders positively loved these showy-imitation Ten-Days,” then admitted that “these parades mobilized creative people to an extreme. Everyone worked to the limits (otherwise, you look up, and you don’t get the little medal, and they don’t summon you to the final banquet). So you forget all the negatives. . . . These Ten-Days gathered the best forces.” Plisetskaia, Chitaia zhizn’ svoiu, 93.

68. Uzbekistan’s Ten-Day had taken place May 21–30, 1937, with some 600 participants; they performed Farkhad and Shirin by V. A. Uspensky and Giulsara by R. M. Glier and T. D. Jalilov, with a Kremlin reception on May 31, 1937. Literaturnaia gazeta, May 30, 1937; Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 116–7 (citing RGALI, f. 962, op. 21, d. 1, l. 11). Azerbaijan’s took place on April 5–15, 1938, with more than 600 participants and a banquet on April 17 in the St. George’s Hall and the Palace of Facets. Fadeev, Vstrechi s tovarishem Stalinym, 168. Armenia’s would take place Oct. 20–29, 1939, with 550 participants. The Spendiarov Opera and Ballet Theater performed Spendiarov’s opera Almast, A. T. Tigranyan’s opera Anush, and Khachaturyan’s ballet Happiness. Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 119–20 (citing RGALI, f. 962, op. 21, d. 20, l. 70; d. 1, l. 11); Chegodaeva, Dva lika vremeni, 301.

69. The committee had sent the conductor Vasily Tselikovsky (b. 1900) of the Bolshoi to Frunze, the Kyrgyz capital, already in 1936 for the Ten-Day in Moscow (planned for 1938). Ballet master L. I. Lukin, also sent to Frunze, would be imprisoned there as an enemy of the people, but released five days before the much-delayed Ten-Day opened in Moscow on May 25, 1939, with more than 500 participants. Bakhtarov, Zapiski aktera, 85–86. A Kyrgyz ensemble performed Altyn Kys as well as Aichurek (Moon Beauty), the first Kyrgyz opera, co-written by Vladimir Vlasov and Vladimir Feré from Moscow. Ivanov, Dnevniki, 28. Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 113–4. Bakhtarov, Zapiski aktera, 82. Brusilovsky wrote the Kazakh operas, Bogatryev, the Tajik ones. “The resourceful officials of the Committee on Artistic Matters,” Jelagin wrote, “even managed to conjure up a Buryat-Mongol opera.” Elagin, Ukroshchenie iskusstv, 262, 263.

70. Jelagin, Taming of the Arts, 232–3.

71. Latyshev, “I eshche odin tost ‘vozhdia narodov,’” 141–2; Sovetskaia kul’tura v rekonstruktivnyi period, 517–20. Gromov, Stalin, 330.

72. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 120. See also Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 98–102.

73. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 163 (Ribbentrop to Fabricius, June 27, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 483–4 (June 25, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, I: 371–3; Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, 387–91. Gafencu resigned as foreign minister; Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 489 (no citation).

74. Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata, 41; Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 488–9 (no citation). The secret protocol (clause 3) of the Pact was ambiguous: “With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.” Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 78n34.

75. Izvestiya (June 29, 1940) trumpeted “the new victory of the USSR’s politics of peace,” and called the northern part of Bukovina “a typically Ukrainian province.”

76. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, VIII: 196–7 (June 28, 1940). Stalin had even obtained approval for this action from Mussolini, Hitler’s ostensible ally, in exchange for recognition of Italian primacy in the Mediterranean. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 29 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 20, d. 229, l. 1–6: Molotov-Rosso, June 20, 1940; f. 059, op. 1, pap. 330, d. 2269, l. 84–5: Molotov to Gorelkin, June 27, 1940); Schramm-von Thadden, Griechenland, 27. See also Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina, 26.

77. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 158–9 (Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, June 25, 1940), 159–60 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, June 25, 1940), 161–2 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, June 26, 1940), 163; Rossi, Deux ans, 153 n2 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, July 17, 1940). Romanian oil production had begun to decline after 1936. Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State, 201–3. On July 4, 1940, Moscow asked Tokyo, which had long agreed not to recognize Romania’s annexation of Bessarabia, to recognize the Soviet annexation. Elleman, “Secret Soviet-Japanese Agreement,” 294 (citing Gaimushō, B100–JR/1).

78. Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, 390–2.

79. German occupation authorities in Belgium sought to shutter the Soviet trade mission. Mikoyan urged Stalin and Molotov not to allow that to happen, for “we have unfulfilled orders from Belgium and the Belgian Congo totaling 8,578,000 rubles.” Pavlov, Anastas Mikoian, 125 (citing RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 62, l. 39: July 20, 1940).

80. Soviet counterintelligence personnel did not trust even the Communists installed in power there by Moscow, especially in Estonia. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 306–7 (TsA FSB, f. 8os, op. 1, d. 81, l. 2; f. 14os, op. 1, d. 15, l. 201–2). On July 27, 1940, Stalin’s “big fleet” program was reined in: ten instead of fifteen battleships, eight instead of sixteen battle cruisers, even as two small aircraft carriers for the Pacific Fleet were added. Hauner, “Stalin’s Big-Fleet Program”; Rohwer and Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet, 113.

81. The report reached Stalin the very next day. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 20–6 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 435, l. 39–51).

82. Of Chamberlain and the Tories, Cripps had publicly written, “I am convinced that our reactionaries have no genuine desire to enter into a reciprocal agreement with Russia, but rather wish to use Russia for our own purposes so that by embroiling Russia with Germany they may save their own skins.” Tribune, March 24, 1939.

83. Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 42–3.

84. Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 197–99; Jones, Lloyd George, 247–8; Rudman, Lloyd George. Lloyd George had met Hitler in Sept. 1936, gushing that the Nazi desired friendship with the British people, had “achieved a marvelous transformation in the spirit of the [German] people, and was the greatest German of the age, the George Washington of Germany—the man who won for his country independence from all her oppressors.” He even concluded that “the establishment of a German hegemony in Europe, which was the aim and dream of the old pre-war militarism, is not even on the horizon of Nazism.” “I Talked to Hitler,” Daily Express [London], Nov. 17, 1936; Jones, Diary with Letters, 269.

85. Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps”; Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow; Clarke, Cripps Version, 183–241.

86. “I am sorry for Sir S. Cripps, who is now entering the humiliating phase which all British negotiators in Moscow have to go through when they are simply kept waiting on the doormat until such time as the Soviet Government considers it desirable, as part of their policy of playing off one Power against the other to take notice,” a perceptive foreign office official in London observed on June 23, 1940. “Stalin hopes to be able to counter any German browbeating and nagging by pointing to Sir S. Cripps on the doormat, threatening to have him in and start talking with him instead of the German Ambassador.” Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps,” 59 (citing TNA, FO 371/24844 5853: Sir Orme Sargent).

87. The logbooks for Stalin’s office for July 1 list only Molotov, 5:35 p.m. until 6:25 p.m., but also note “last ones departed at 9:40 p.m.” It is likely that Molotov left to retrieve Cripps, who noted that the meeting commenced at 6:30 p.m., and returned with Cripps, but neither was recorded in the logbooks. Na prieme, 305. Cripps had handed Molotov the letter from Churchill at 5:00 p.m., according to the Soviet translator-notetaker Pavlov: DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 399 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 10, d. 100, l. 1–2).

88. For the Soviet transcript of Cripps’s July 1, 1940, conversation with Stalin, see “Priem angliiskogo posla S. Krippsa,” Diplomaticheskii vestnik (Moscow, 1993), 74–7, reprinted in Sochineniia, XVIII: 190–7, and in DVP SSSR, XXXIII/i: 394–9 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 278, l. 4–11). For the British version, see Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 52 (citing PRO, FO 371/24846, f. 10, N 6526/30/38: Cripps to the Foreign Office, July 16, 1940); and Clarke, Cripps Version, 192.

89. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 19–22; Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps in Moscow, 52–5; Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 60. For Churchill’s message to Stalin: Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 466–7. British embassy staff concluded that “nothing of importance emerged from this interview” with Stalin. Clarke, Cripps Version, 192 (citing FO 371/29464, f. 128).

90. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 19–22. Maisky was convinced the foreign office was sabotaging Cripps. Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 211–3 (July 1, 1940). Churchill later sought to scapegoat Cripps, but Gorodetsky exposed Churchill’s distortions. Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 116–22. Still, there was some truth to Churchill’s remark concerning the Labourite Cripps that “we did not at that time realise that Soviet Communists [read: Stalin] hate extreme Left Wing politicians even more than they do Tories and Liberals.” Churchill, Second World War, II: 118.

91. Paxton, Vichy France, 43; Lukacs, Duel, 160–5. Maisky also claimed to have been received by Churchill at 10 Downing Street on July 3. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, 96–100.

92. “The ‘Vienna to Versailles’ period has run its course,” wrote the Polish-born British historian Lewis Namier in Feb. 1940. “The first task is to save Europe from the Nazi onslaught—a difficult task; but even greater will be the work of resettling a morally and materially bankrupt world on a new basis.” Namier, “From Vienna to Versailles,” 17–8.

93. On the Baltics as a sticking point for Britain, see Henderson, Failure of a Mission, 251.

94. A corrective, in domestic political terms, to those who see a gulf between the two Conservatives, Churchill and Chamberlain, can be found in Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics of War, 88–111.

95. “Russia and the West,” The Economist, July 27, 1940: 113.

96. Lukacs, Duel, 72–7, 184–6, 207–10; Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i (Dec. 29, 1940: Lloyd George surmise).

97. Amid rumors of a Soviet-British rapprochement, Schulenburg reported that Stalin remained loyal to Berlin and only wanted some tin and rubber from Britain. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 142–3.

98. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 38 (citing APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 435, l. 39–51: Proskurov to Stalin, June 4, 1940).

99. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 399 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 326, d. 2238, l. 149–51: July 13, 1940); DGFP, series D, X: 207–8 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, July 13,1940); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 166–8; Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 258–60.

100. Back in Feb. 1940, German violations of Soviet airspace had drawn fire, and the intruders turned tail. On March 17, thirty-two German fighters and bombers entered Soviet airspace on the path to Moscow, and again Soviet border guards opened fire; one German plane was hit and crashed. On March 29, Beria, following Stalin’s instructions, sent a directive to the border guards: no opening fire; airspace violations were merely to be registered. On April 5, 1940, came a further prohibition against the use of firearms anywhere on the frontier (with the inflow of diversionists, the order was sometimes ignored). A June 10, 1940, border convention specified that any plane crossing the border accidentally was to be returned. Pogranichnye voiska SSSR, 1939–iuin’ 1941, 292; Sechkin, Granitsa i voina, 53–5 (citing TsAPV, f. 14, op. 224, d. 110, l. 1, 17, 21).

101. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 490 (July 3, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 6-7.

102. This was before, it turned out, secret feasibility studies had even been completed by the Wehrmacht. Alt, “Die Wehrmacht im Kalkül Stalins,” 107–9; Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, 90–2.

103. Golovanov, Zapiski komanduiushchego ADD, 299. In the 1920s, Shaposhnikov, along with the Voroshilovs and Mikoyans, had used the dacha Zubalovo-2 when Stalin and his wife Nadzezhda used the dacha Zubalovo-4 next door. Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters, 27.

104. Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, XVIII (VII/i): 86 (RGVA, f. 40442, op. 2, d. 170, l. 112).

105. A. M. Vasilevskii, “Nakanune voiny,” 5–8 (citing TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 239, l. 1–37, l. 197–244: Sept. 18, 1940), (d. 242, l. 84–90: Oct. 5), d. 239, l. 245–77 (not later than Dec.).

106. Pavlov, Anastas Mikoian, 125 (citing RGASPI, f. 84, op. 1, d. 15, l. 82).

107. Ogonek, Sept. 1940, Jan. 1941.

108. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 487–500. See also Weinberg, World at Arms, 164. “Cripps argues that we must give everything—recognition, gold, ships and trust to the Russians,” Cadogan wrote in his diary (Aug. 17, 1940): “This is simply silly . . . Extraordinary how we go on kidding ourselves. Russian policy will change exactly when and if they think it will suit them. And if they do think that, it won’t matter whether we’ve kicked Maisky in the stomach. Contrariwise, we could give Maisky the Garter and it wouldn’t make a penn’orth of difference.” Dilks, Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 321.

109. On July 9, 1940, Pavel Fitin, head of NKVD intelligence, reported that “the former King Edward together with his wife, Simpson, are currently in Madrid, whence they maintain contacts with Hitler. Edward is conducting negotiations with Hitler on the question of forming a new English government and the conclusion of a peace with Germany on the condition of a military alliance against the USSR.” This could well have been disinformation from MI6 to push Moscow into talks with London. Shirokorad, Velikii antrakt, 99. See also Varga, “Mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie,” 15–6.

110. “Vansittart spoke eloquently and at length about the misunderstanding and underestimation of the English character abroad,” Maisky would record in his diary (Dec. 12, 1940). “It has been so ever since time immemorial. Napoleon, Bismarck, the Kaiser, and now Hitler, Ribbentrop and Mussolini—they were all grossly mistaken in fancying the English to be a ‘nation of shopkeepers,’ ‘degenerate gentlemen,’ ‘depraved plutocrats,’ etc., who cannot and will not fight whatever the circumstances. A profound mistake.” Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/I: 305–6; Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 324. On British arms exports, see Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine.

111. Golubev, “Esli mir obrushitsia na nashu Respubliku,” 174–5. All propaganda outlets, from TASS on down, continued to trumpet the Soviet pursuit of “peace.” Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 76 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 57, l. 59–74).

112. Zhukov later stated that “the only one in Stalin’s inner circle, in my memory and in my presence, who voiced another point of view about the possibility of a German attack was Zhdanov. He consistently spoke very sharply about the Germans and insisted that Hitler could not be trusted in anything.” But Zhdanov distrusted the British no less. Simonov, “Zametki,” 49. A table of Stalin’s inner circle visitors appears in Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 290. Zhdanov had observed to the Leningrad party in spring 1940 that for the USSR, “it is more pleasant, useful, and valuable to have alongside us not anti-Soviet Anglo-French allies, who harbor the intention of attacking either Germany or Leningrad . . . [but] a country that is in friendly relations with us”—i.e., Germany. Nevezhin, “Sovetskaia politika,” 26.

113. “‘He’s a thoroughly likeable person,’ I remember thinking as we sat there, and thinking it in astonishment,” Lyons had recalled of the conversation in 1930. “‘Are you a dictator?’ Stalin smiled, implying that the question was on the preposterous side. ‘No,’ he said slowly, ‘I am no dictator.’” Lyons, Stalin, 196, 200, 203; Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 387. Waldemar Gurian rightly noted of Lyons’s book that “the most valuable parts are based upon Souvarine’s monumental study of Stalin.” Review of Politics 2/4 (1940): 506–8. Sourvarine’s work had been translated into English the year before.

114. Lyons, Stalin, 278, 291–2.

115. Gregory and Harrison, “Allocation under Dictatorship.”

116. Osokina, Za fasadom, 206–18; Khanin, Ekonomicheskaia istoriia Rossii, I: 29. Harvests had stabilized (at overreported levels), and state procurements were high, but grain exports and their revenues had declined. In 1940 the Soviet state procured 33.8 million tons of grain and exported 1.2 million, earning the hard currency equivalent of 51.2 million rubles, compared with 26 million tons and exports of 2.1 million, earning 48.8 million gold rubles, in 1937. Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 1918–1966, 20–1.

117. Pykhov, Ekononomika, 12. Annual per capita consumption of absolute alcohol was estimated at 0.6 gallon (2.24 liters) in 1940, and that was excluding brandy, champagne, fruit and berry wines, and imports. Prot’ko, V bor’be za trezvost’, 129.

118. The police labeled them “black commodity exchanges” and noted their shadowy existence in nineteen cities, but also that some instituted an arbitration panel to resolve disputes, and bribed investigative officials to avert their eyes. Those involved often legally worked as plenipotentiaries tasked with pushing along fulfillment of the official orders for state companies. Rittersporn, Anguish, 225 (citing GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 87, l. 8–14, 18, 20ob.).

119. Rittersporn, Anguish, 220 (citing GARF f. 8131, op. 37, d. 242, l. 103–4).

120. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity, 280; Filtzer, Soviet Workers.

121. Pravda, June 26, 1940; Filtzer, Soviet Workers, 233–53. Back at a meeting on June 19, 1940, Stalin had explained that workers in capitalist countries worked ten to twelve hours, and that the Bolsheviks had “understood the economy poorly” when introducing the seven-hour workday in 1927. The new labor law restored the eight-hour workday (without additional pay). He partly blamed indiscipline and turnover on Soviet trade unions (“not a school of communism, but a school of self-seekers”). Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 112 (June 19, 1940); Khlevniuk, “26 iiunia 1940 goda,” 89.

122. “Vot gde Pravda, Nikita Sergeevich!,”17.

123. Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice, 300–1, 327; Rittersporn, Anguish, 233 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 88, d. 550, l. 922–3, 101–3; GARF, f. 8131, op. 37, d. 137, l. 53–4; f. 9415, op. 5, d. 205, l. 5).

124. Filtzer, Soviet Workers, 239. Some managers were demoted or demonstratively arrested for failing to apply the draconian law, but job turnover and absenteeism persisted. “O kontrole nad provedeniem v zhizn’ ukaza presidiuma verkhovnogo soveta SSSR ot 26 iiunia 1940,” RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 676, I: 41–42ob.

125. Khlevniuk, “26 iiunia 1940 goda.” See also Markevich and Sokolov, “Magnitka bliz Sadovogo kol’tsa.” “We cannot be indifferent to who is joining the working class,” Stalin would lament later. “If this goes on in spontaneous fashion, the composition of the working class may be ruined. And correspondingly, the regime as a dictatorship of the working class may be ruined. But at present they latch on to anyone who turns up for a job.” Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 113 (Sept. 26, 1940).

126. Davies and Harris, Stalin’s World, 225 (citing RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 46–7).

127. Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, II: 368–74.

128. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 168.

129. Trial of the Major War Criminals, XXXIV: 277 (Raeder for Assmann, Jan. 30, 1944).

130. Churchill, Second World War, II: 200 (letter to Smuts).

131. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie; Martin, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik.

132. Raeder explained on July 11 that “in her weakened state, Britain will seek the support of the United States, in whose interests it is to preserve England as a powerful European state. This will automatically make the United States Germany’s enemy. The two Anglo-Saxon powers will retain or rebuild their maritime resources in order to defend their empire and will thus become the next natural enemies of Germany to be dealt with.” The next day Hitler ordered redirection of armaments investment to the Luftwaffe and the navy, with highest priority to U-boats. None of that would be achieved quickly. On July 13, Hitler convened a military conference at the Berghof. “He sees the answer (as we do) in Britain’s hopes on Russia,” General Halder wrote in his diary. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 147 (citing Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung, Teil A, July 11, 1940); Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 394 (citing BAMA RW19/164; and IWM EDS al 1492, Chef Wi Rue Amt, Aug. 20, 1940, Aktennotiz); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 504–6 (July 13, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 19–22.

133. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 355–6.

134. Churchill, Second World War, II: 230–1. Ciano, who met with Ribbentrop that day before the speech, recorded it as “a last appeal to Great Britain.” The next day, he met with Hitler and recorded: “He would like an understanding with Great Britain. He knows that war with the English will be hard and bloody, and knows also that people everywhere today are averse to blood.” Gibson, Ciano Diaries, 277 (July 19, 20, 1940).

135. “Telegramma I. F. Dergacheva I. I. Proskurovu,” 220 (June 6, 1940).

136. Dietrich, The Hitler I Knew, 124–5; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 306–7; Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 107–8; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 91 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22434, d. 4, l. 261: “Meteor,” July 9, 1940).

137. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 440–1 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1305, l. 438s), 443–5 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9171, d. 4, l. 61–9: July 20, 1940).

138. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 442 (RGVA, f. 29, op. 35, d. 98, l. 11ss–12ss: July 16, 1940).

139. Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I: 81; Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion, 43 (quoting naval staff diary, July 21, 1940).

140. Halder, as a result of hearing from Brauchitsch about the July 21 meeting, noted in his diary: “reasons for continuance of war by Britain: 1) Hope for a change in America . . . 2) Puts hope in Russia.” He added that “crossing the channel appears very hazardous to the Führer. On that account, invasion is to be undertaken only if no other means is left to come to terms with Britain. . . . Stalin is flirting with Britain to keep her in the war and tie us down, with a view to gain time and take what he wants. . . . Our attention must be turned to tackling the Russian problem and prepare planning.” Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 515–8 (July 22, 1940), I: 519 (July 24, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 30–4, 35–6.

141. By fall 1940, this would take the form of Germany declaring Japan’s “preeminence” in East Asia. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 396 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22425, d. 3, l. 668).

142. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 28; DGFP, series D, VIII: 631–3. Jodl’s original memorandum on the peripheral strategy dated to Jan. 1940. By the end of June, with France defeated, he fleshed it out. “England’s will must be broken,” he wrote, via “a) Warfare against the British isles. b) Extension of the war to the periphery.” Trial of the Major War Criminals, XXVII: 301. See also Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 109–10.

143. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 30–4.

144. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 294–337 (at 306).

145. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 112.

146. Leach, German Strategy, 63.

147. Halder noted in his diary: “Russia’s aspirations to the Straits and in the direction of the Persian Gulf need not bother us. On the Balkans, which falls within our economic sphere of interest, we could keep out of each other’s way. . . . We could deliver the British a decisive blow in the Mediterranean, shoulder them away from Asia, help the Italians in building their Mediterranean empire and, with the aid of Russia, consolidate the Reich which we have created in Western and Northern Europe. That much accomplished, we could confidently face war with Britain for years.” Brauchitsch agreed. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 527–30 (July 30, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 46 (July 30, 1940); Leach, German Strategy, 60–71. Halder as well as Jodl could see that the navy was proposing a force inadequate to an invasion of Britain. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 523–4 (July 28), I: 527–30 (July 30); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 39–40, 43–6.

148. Attendees were Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Brauchitsch, Halder, and Puttkamer (naval adjutant at Hitler’s headquarters). The Luftwaffe was not represented.

149. This represented a change: from “prepare a landing” (July 16) to “prepare the ground” for a landing. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 106–7; Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 510–2 (July 19, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 26–8.

150. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 47–8 (July 31, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 530–4. Fabry quotes a letter (Oct. 5, 1954) from Halder to the historian Hillgruber stating that neither Halder nor Brauchitsch had understood the July 31, 1940, conference as an “irrevocable decision” to invade the USSR, only as the “start gun for foreseeable possibilities.” Fabry, Der Hitler-Stalin Pakt, 498n272.

151. Keitel ordered planning for production of armaments for 180 divisions on Aug. 17; within four days planning was under way for 200 divisions. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 119.

152. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 120.

153. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 109–17; Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 111–4; DGFP, series D, X: 321; Vishlev, Nakanune, 11.

154. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 305–6.

155. Pravda, Aug. 11, 1940; Paletskis, V dvukh mirakh, 346.

156. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 451–4 (RGVA, f. 33988, op. 4, d. 35, l. 134ss–135ss, 138ss–141ss).

157. Leach, German Strategy, 80 (citing Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv N 22/7, Fedor von Bock, “Tagebuchnotizen,” Aug. 18, 1940). The Germans also now had confiscated French oil stocks.

158. Pavlov, Anastas Mikoian, 121–2 (citing RGASPI, f. 84, op. 1, d. 150, l. 1–5).

159. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1592, l. 4–7. In July 1940, after the two sides had hashed out a new demarcation of the Mongolia-Manchukuo frontier, the Japanese had proposed a neutrality pact, but Molotov told Ambassador Tōgō that “the Japanese had committed serious violations, and as a result we cannot consider the [1905] Portsmouth Treaty to be valid in its entirety.” Molotov sought to terminate Japanese oil and coal concessions on Soviet-controlled Northern Sakhalin, and reclaim Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, restoring Russia’s pre-1905 position in the Far East. After Nov. 1940, the Japanese would propose a bilateral nonaggression pact, but Molotov remained adamant. Another five months of negotiations would ensue. Presseisen, Germany and Japan, 273–7.

160. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 454–69.

161. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 182–4. Stalin further inserted into the Pravda report of Trotsky’s demise a hint of the biblical Cain and a reference to the old saw of Trotsky as Judas, making him not just a supposed murderer (à la Cain) but a traitor. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 521–4 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 63–6). Stalin had also edited the Pravda editorial about the Soviet-Finnish Friendship Agreement (Dec. 4, 1939) and the Izvestiya editorial (Oct. 9, 1939) about a Reichstag speech by Hitler. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 516–21 (citing RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1123, l. 41–51), 513– (d. 1124, l. 32–7).

162. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 254–9.

163. Biulleten’ oppozitsii, no. 81 (1940): 5; Volkogonov, Trotsky, 342–4. “Whatever the circumstances of my death,” Trotsky had written in his will, “I will die with unshakeable faith in a Communist future.” Trotskii, Dnevniki i pis’ma, 167–8. On July 17, 1940, just weeks before his murder, Trotsky’s personal archive was shipped to the United States by train, arriving at Harvard University. Trotsky, Stalin, rev. ed., 863.

164. Deutscher, Prophet Outcast, 419–21.

165. Langer, Undeclared War, 129–46.

166. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 470–4 (Sept. 21, 1940); McMurry, Deutschland und die Sowjetunion, 214.

167. Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 217.

168. Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 48–55.

169. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 198 (citing RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2077, l. 56: May 7, 1940). Other coveted dachas also changed hands, sometimes in unorthodox fashion. Sartakova, “Nash pisatel’skii les,” 25; Antipina, Povsednevnaia zhizn’, 156–7 (citing RGALI, f. 631, op. 15, d. 457, l. 19).

170. Babichenko, Pisateli i tsenzory, 41. Many writers worked at factory clubs or publishing houses and were paid bureaucratic salaries, which in some cases exceeded their honoraria (royalties). Not many could count on reissues of their works, which paid 60 percent of the normal honorarium. Alexei Tolstoy, who had become chairman of the administration for protection of authors’ rights, got the latter organization’s staff to award him an advance of 83,000 rubles—an act that precipitated a special meeting in Sept. 1940. “His receipt of such an advance cannot in any way be justified,” stated Lev Nikulin, a member of the writers’ union apparatus. “This is when his average monthly earnings are 9,745 rubles.” Tolstoy answered that he had no savings, and that the theatrical season had ended. “I think there is nothing to be surprised about here,” he asserted. “Every month I pay 6,000 rubles to my first family.” The writers’ union decided to sack the functionary who had signed off on the advance. Antipina, Povsednevnaia zhizn’, 72–3 (RGALI, f. 631, op. 15, d. 451, l. 80, 85, 99, 4).

171. Antipina, Povsednevnaia zhizn’, 20 (citing RGALI, f. 631, op. 15, d. 501, l. 61: July 3, 1940).

172. Pravda, Aug. 15, 1940 (unsigned); RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 907, l. 1–5; Miller, Soviet Cinema, 67. The film was based upon a screenplay by Avdeyenko, who was subjected to withering criticism at the meeting. He was expelled from the writers’ union and the party, but not arrested.

173. Anderson et al., Kremlevskii kinoteatr, 573–604 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 134–45; f. 77, op. 1, d. 907, l. 12–82); Artizov and Naumov, Vlast’, 450–5.

174. Anderson et al., Kremlevskii kinoteatr, 587–9, 597.

175. Anderson et al., Kremlevskii kinoteatr, 599–600 (RGASPI, f. 71, op. 10, d. 127, l. 391, 396).

176. Na prieme, 311.

177. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 123–6, 134–6.

178. Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 69; Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 143. At the time, the journalist William Shirer remarked upon Hitler’s dependency on Stalin: Berlin Diary, 173–4.

179. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 459–62 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9181, d. 7, l. 17–23). See also Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 107–8, 119; Trial of the Major War Criminals, VII: 263 (Brauchitsch); Deitrich, The Hitler I Knew, 124–5; and Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 306–7. Altogether, between 1937 and 1940, five military intelligence chiefs had been arrested: Uritsky, Berzin, Nikonov, Gendin, and Alexander G. Orlov; Proskurov would be arrested in 1941. Golikov (b. 1900), a former member of the flying “Red Eagles” of the civil war, had been a commander in the 1939 Polish campaign and Finnish Winter War; in summer 1940 he commanded the Sixth Army, based in Lvov. He had never worked in military intelligence before; no one had spoken with him prior to the announcement of his appointment on July 11, 1940. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 718 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 71, l. 278–9), 719 (op. 15a, d. 496, l. 7: July 26, 1940). Military intelligence—officially the fifth department of the Red Army—was formally transferred to the army general staff, but Stalin had Golikov report directly to him. In 1939–1940, 326 new people were hired, the majority of whom did not know foreign languages and had little or no experience of the outside world. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 57.

180. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 546–7 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 156, l. 96–8), 552–3 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 316, d. 2176, l. 180), 553–4 (l. 185–7).

181. Izvestiia, Sept. 3, 1940.

182. Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 109 (Aug. 17, 1940); Lota, Sekretnyi front, 155–6. See also Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 443–5 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9171, d. 4, l. 61–9: July 20, 1940).

183. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 216–7; Schramm, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando, I: 973.

184. Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, II: 17–21, 22–23.

185. Cherkasov, IMEMO, 31–3 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 716, l. 26: facsimile of Stalin’s letter). Stalin was encouraging designs for bombers with payloads weighing a ton that could travel 2,000 miles, even 3,000, while the distance from Minsk to Berlin was all of 600 miles, and Vladivostok to Tokyo, 750. These weapons made sense only in terms of attacking far-off British colonies, and possibly the United States.

186. Bismarck, Mysli i vospominaniia. Mikhail Gefter, a professional historian who came upon Stalin’s pencil edits, deemed them “reasonable editing, pointing to quite a good taste and an understanding of history.” Gefter, Iz etikh i tekh let, 261–2. The Central Committee propaganda department was raised at this time to a directorate.

187. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 113; Na prieme, 312 (Malyshev wrongly dates it to Sept. 21).

188. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 188–9 (Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Sept. 16, 1940), 198–9 (Tippelskirch to Ribbentrop, Sept. 26, 1940), 202 (text of German-Finnish diplomatic agreement on transit of German troops and equipment: Sept. 22, 1940), 201–2 (Ribbentrop to Tippelskirch, Oct. 2), 203–4 (Tippelskirch to Ribbentrop, Oct. 4).

189. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 247 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 5, d. 67, l. 28).

190. Iklé, German-Japanese Relations, 181–2 (citing International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Documents Presented in Evidence, exhibit 1215: privy council, Sept. 26, 1940); Chihiro, “Tripartite Pact 1939–1940,” and Ikuhiko, “Japanese-Soviet Confrontation,” 191–257.

191. Hosoya Chihiro, “The Tripartite Pact 1939–1940,” “Japanese-Soviet Confrontation,” 256 (citing Japanese Foreign Ministry archives, “Nichi-Doku-I sangoku jōyaku,” 228). In 1940, Japan celebrated the 2,600th anniversary of its empire, traced to mythical origins. Ruoff, Imperial Japan.

192. Trefousse, Germany and American Neutrality, 69.

193. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 24–5. “There is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies of the West.” Fest, Hitler, 589–90.

194. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 197–9 (Tippelskirch to Ribbentrop, Sept. 26, 1940).

195. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 136, citing NG–3074: 1–2 (memorandum).

196. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 129. Moscow did not know but on that very day—the two-year anniversary of the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the Border—Hitler issued a directive to ramp up military outlays. Thomas, Geschichte, 432; Leach, German Strategy, 72. Stalin had begun to talk about disbanding the Comintern as early as spring or summer 1940, when the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states; he would raise the issue again in April 1941. Dallin and Firsov, Dimitrov and Stalin. The Comintern would be dissolved in May 1943.

197. Bezymenskii, “Vizit V. M. Molotova v Berlin,” 126–7 (citing APRF, f. 56, op. 1, d. 1161, l. 3). Molotov also received a clarification on Sept. 26, 1940, from Tippelskirch. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 627–30 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 328, d. 2253, l. 144).

198. Elleman, International Competition, 131 (citing Gaimushō, file B100–JR/1, 2.1.00–23).

199. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 466–70 (Sept. 1940), 474–5 (RGVA, f. 29, op. 35, d. 98, l. 149ss–152ss: Oct. 2, 1940); Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/i: 245–6 (TsA FSK). See also van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 69–72; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 41. Germany was also moving its troops through Finland to other locations, such as Norway.

200. Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, 133–6.

201. DGFP, series D, IX: 40–1 (Ribbentrop to embassy in Moscow, March 28, 1940), VIII: 53–4 (Schulenburg reply, March 30). Fabry, Die Sowjetunion und das Dritte Reich, 227; DBFP, 3rd series, V: 544 (Seeds to Halifax, May 19, 1938); Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 145. Ribbentrop sincerely strove to bring about a Hitler-Stalin meeting, “but this came to nothing because Hitler said that Stalin could not leave Russia and he could not leave Germany.” Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 148; Davidson, Trial of the Germans, 162.

202. Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 402. On May 31, 1940, in light of the German successes in the West against France and Britain, Sorge had offered views on the basis of conversations with Germans in Tokyo, including some who had had contact with Ribbentrop. One group, according to Sorge, consisted of “young fascists” who wanted to follow a victory in the West with an immediate settling of scores with the USSR. Another group (“more important people”) sought continued peaceful relations with the USSR, given its political, economic, and military superiority over Germany. Of course, Hitler was the decider. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 433–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22425, d. 3, l. 359, 357).

203. Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 244.

204. “Iz istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” 200.

205. Berling, Wspomnienia, I: 103–13, 168–76; The Katyń Forest Massacre: Hearings, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., March–April 1952, Part 3: 431–3, 488–90 (Henryk Szymanski), Part 4: 1233–4 (Józef Czapski). There is some discrepancy over the date of the meeting concerning the list; Berling gives Jan. 1941, Czapski and Szymanski, who heard about it, give fall 1940.

206. Kenez, “Picture of the Enemy,” 104. Other indications of war preparation included a secret inventory of films compiled in Oct. 1940, which listed some 200 titles, including the “particularly recommended” Circus (1936)—seen by more than 40 million Soviet inhabitants—Chapayev (1934), and Lenin in October (1938), to be relied upon for shoring up morale. Fomin, Kino na voine, 60–3. See also Salys, Films of Grigorii Aleksandrov, 295 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 908: Zhdanov complaints, Sept. 1940).

207. Saraeva-Bondr’, Siluety vremeni, 199; Aleksandrov, Epokha i kino, 220. See the review by Grigory Roshal, “Melodiia i dissonans,” Kino, 1940, no. 44: 1–3. Alexandrov had seen a Soviet version of the Cinderella story, Zolushka, by Viktor Ardov, at the Moscow Satire Theater in 1938. Salys, Films of Grigorii Aleksandrov, 281–340.

208. Pravda, June 18 and Oct. 31, 1940; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 147–8 (letter to Bolshakov, Oct. 11, 1940), reprinted in Sochineniia, XVIII: 199–204, 205. See also Artizov and Naumov, Vlast’, 460–1 (RGASPI, f. 71, op. 10, d. 127, l. 399–400).

209. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 57 (citing Gafencu, Misiune la Moscova, raport 2384, 69–78: Gafencu to Sturdza, Sept. 21, 1940); Gibson, Ciano Diaries, 299–303 (Oct. 8, 12, 14, and 22, 1940).

210. Pravda, Oct. 16, 1940.

211. New York Times, Oct. 16, 1940.

212. It is said that Stalin disliked The Great Dictator. In any case, it was never released in the USSR. Konchalovsky, Inner Circle, 27.

213. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 674–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 341, l. 80–4: Vyshinsky); Dilks, Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 331 (brackets).

214. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 677–9 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 3, d. 17, l. 50–5).

215. DGFP, series D, XI: 291–7; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 148 (Oct. 15, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 622–6; Fabry, Der Hitler-Stalin Pakt, 343–5.

216. DGFP, series D, XI: 291–7 (Ribbentrop to Stalin, Oct. 13, 1940); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 207–16; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 302–5 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 157, l. 47–51), 305–10 (Russian version, APRF, f. 45, op. 1., d. 296, l. 9–20), 317–8 (Stalin’s reply, APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 1); “‘Ia pochtu za udovol’stvie vnov’ priekhat’ v Moskvu’: obmen poslaniiami mezhdu I. Ribbentropom i I. V. Staliym v oktiabre 1940 g.” 21), 141–5 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 296, l. 31–3: Ribbentrop, Oct. 21); DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 680–2 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 1576, l. 47–51: Schulenburg-Molotov conversation); Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 474–5; Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 321; Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor, 120.

217. DGFP, series D, XI: 508–10. Ribbentrop later quoted Hitler to the effect that “Ribbentrop, we have achieved many things together; perhaps we shall also pull this one off together.” Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 151.

218. Santa Olalla, at Himmler’s invitation, would lay plans for joint study of Visigoth tombs in Spain. Treglown, Franco’s Crypt, 246–7.

219. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 41. See also Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 124 (Aug. 3, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 538.

220. Preston, Franco, 392–400; DGFP, series D, IX: 311. The account of Hendaye by Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, is fraudulent: Schmidt was not there. Pike, “Franco and the Axis Stigma,” 377–9.

221. The Germans were put off by the Guardists’ indiscipline. Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 59–63. Germany had inserted economic (not military) advisers into the Romanian state in spring 1939.

222. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 154 (Oct. 29, 1940), 158 (Nov. 1, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 641–2, 669–71; Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, II: 32–6; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 185–8, 193–9; van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 47 (citing German Foreign Ministry 1247/337515: H. von Etzdorf note, Oct. 28); Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 131–41; Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 199.

223. Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 137 (citing Ciano).

224. Schmidt, Statist, 516–7.

225. Schramm, Kriegstagebuch der Oberkommando, I: 148–9 (Nov. 1, 1940), 150–1 (Nov. 4, 1941), 152, 157, 158 (Nov. 7, 1940), 160 (Nov. 8, 1940), 182 (Nov. 19, 1940); Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, 39–43.

226. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 163–4 (Nov. 4, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 672–5.

227. Seidl, Die Beziehungen, 239 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Oct. 19, 1940), 243 (Schulenburg to Dörnberg, Oct. 30), 243–4 (Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Oct. 31), 244–5 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Nov. 1).

228. Rossi, Deux ans, 173n3; Rossi [Tasca], Russo-German Alliance, 163.

229. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 62–5. Germany had become the number-one trading partner with southeastern Europe, accounting for between 30 and 60 percent of each country’s trade, paying above world market prices for agricultural goods, preferring the stable, long-term market access, which also did not require hard currency (they used clearing accounts). The Yugoslav and Romanian prime ministers understood this dependence on German markets, and refused to listen to French or British political pitches. Despite their racial condescension, the Germans did not view the Balkans through a Lebensraum prism. Gross, Export Empire. On Oct. 25, 1940, NKVD transport secretly reported the construction of border fortifications and a concentration of pontoon bridges on the frontier with Ukraine. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 324–6.

230. Berezhkov would meet Stalin in 1941. He would claim that in Berlin he observed “the same idolization of the ‘leader,’ the same mass rallies and parades . . . Very similar, ostentatious architecture, heroic themes depicted in art much like our socialist realism . . . massive ideological brainwashing,” but that he did not recognize this at the time (1940). Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 7, 72.

231. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 311–4 (AVPRF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 157, l. 55–60), 316–7 (l. 61–2), 326–7 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 686, l. 120–4). Gorodetsky stresses the Balkan dimension: Grand Illusion, 67–75.

232. Bezymenskii, “Vizit V. M. Molotova v Berlin,” 125. Stalin, in the company of Molotov, had spent five full hours with the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, on Oct. 1, 1940, discussing a mutual assistance pact, which Turkey wanted, but only if Ankara was not obliged to act in the event of a Soviet conflict with Britain and France. DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 12, 49–51.

233. All this information emanated from the Latvian journalist Berlings. Internally, Nazi circles had discussed how Hitler would try to push Moscow out of Europe and toward a clash with British interests in India. Sipols, Tainy, 273–4 (citing ADAP, XII/i: 255, XI/i: 212–3).

234. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 248 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 342, l. 21).

235. Stalin also stated, “We are not prepared for the sort of air war being waged between Germany and England.” Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 131–4 (italics and ellipsis in the original). On Stalin feeling alone, especially with the weight of military matters, see also Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 273. See also Genkina, Bor’ba za Tsaritsyn; and Melikov, Geroicheskaia oborona Tsaritsyna, which was reissued in 1940.

236. Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 291 (no citation); Nevezhin personal communication.

237. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 349–51 (APRF, f. 36, op. 1, d. 1161, l. 147–55); Bezymenskii, “Direktivy I. V. Stalina V. M. Molotovu pered poezdkoi.” See also “Poezdka Molotova v Berlin v noiabre 1940 g.”