The Great Terror

1

STALIN PREPARES

Resolv’d to ruin or to rule the state.

Dryden

It was while he was securing his victory in the countryside that Stalin made the first moves toward the new style of terror which was to typify the period of the Great Purge.

While the opposition leaders thrashed about ineffectively in the quicksands of their own preconceptions, lesser figures in the Party were bolder and less confused. Three movements against Stalin came in the period 1930 to 1933. The first, in 1930, was led by men hitherto his followers: Syrtsov, whom he had just raised to be candidate member of the Politburo (in Bauman’s place) and Chairman of the RSFSR Council of People’s Commissars, and Lominadze, also a member of the Central Committee. They had obtained some sort of support from various local Party Secretaries (among them the Komsomol leader Shatskin and Kartvelishvili, First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Party) for an attempt to limit Stalin’s powers.¹ They objected both to authoritarian rule in the Party and State and to the dangerous economic policies. They seem to have circulated a memoir criticizing the regime for economic adventurism, stifling the initiative of the workers, and bullying treatment of the people by the Party. Lominadze had referred to the “lordly feudal attitude to the needs of the peasants.”² Syrtsov had described the new industrial giants, like the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, as so much eyewash.³

Stalin learned of the plans of this group before they could complete their preparations, and they were expelled in December 1930. Lominadze committed suicide in 1935; all the others concerned were to perish in the Purges.

And now we come to a case crucial to the Terror—that of Ryutin. Throughout the ensuing years, this was named as the original conspiracy; all the main oppositionists in turn were accused of participating in the Ryutin “plot,” on the basis of what came to be called the “Ryutin Platform.” Ryutin, with the help of Slepkov and other young Bukharinites, produced a long theoretical and political document, of which, according to Soviet articles as late as 1988, no copy remained in existence. In 1989, it seems to have been rediscovered, and a summary was printed; it consisted of thirteen chapters, four of them attacking Stalin.⁴ It is believed to have run to 200 pages, and according to reports later reaching the West the key sentence was “The Right wing has proved correct in the economic field, and Trotsky in his criticism of the regime in the Party.”⁵ It censured BukharM, Rykov, and Tomsky for their capitulation. It proposed an economic retreat, the reduction of investment in industry, and the liberation of the peasants by freedom to quit the kolkhozes. As a first step in the restoration of democracy in the Party, it urged the immediate readmission of all those expelled, including Trotsky.

It was even more notable for its severe condemnation of Stalin personally. Its fifty pages devoted to this theme called forcefully for his removal from the leadership. It described Stalin as “the evil genius of the Russian Revolution, who, motivated by a personal desire for power and revenge, brought the Revolution to the verge of ruin.”⁶ Ryutin saw, far more clearly than his seniors in the opposition, that there was no possibility of controlling Stalin. It was a question either of submission or of revolt.

Ryutin was expelled from the Party in September 1930, and arrested six weeks later. However, on 17 January 1931 the OGPU Collegium acquitted him of criminal intent, and he was released and later restored to Party membership, with a warning.⁷

In June 1932, Ryutin and a group of minor officials wrote an “Appeal to All Members of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)” in the name of an “All Union Conference of the Union of Marxist-Leninists.” This much shorter document has lately been printed in Moscow, where Ryutin is now regarded as a model figure in the struggle against Stalinism. It speaks even more urgently of the destruction of the countryside, the collapse of genuine planning, the imposition of lawlessness and terror on Party and country alike under “dishonest, cunning, unprincipled people ready on the leadership’s orders to change their opinions ten times, careerists, flatterers and lackeys.” The arts had been crushed, the press reduced “in the hands of Stalin and his clique to a monstrous factory of lies.” Above all, it stated, “Stalin and his clique will not and cannot voluntarily give up their positions, so they must be removed by force.” It added that this should be done “as soon as possible.”⁸

The Appeal was first shown to Slepkov and the rest of the former “young Bukharinite” group, one of whom, Yan Sten, showed it to Zinoviev and Kamenev. And other ex-oppositionists like Ter-Vaganyan, Mrachkovsky, and Uglanov also saw it.

Stalin interpreted the Appeal as a call for his assassination. In the BukharinRykov Trial in 1938, it was to be spoken of at length as “registering the transition to the tactics of overthrowing the Soviet power by force; the essential points of the Ryutin platform were a palace coup, terrorism….”⁹ We may take it that such a remark, put into the mouth of the accused by the authorities, shows Stalin’s attitudes to the Ryutin case—that he regarded it as the occasion for starting to accuse the opposition of capital crimes.

On 23 September 1932, Ryutin was again expelled from the Party and arrested. Stalin seems to have hoped that the OGPU might shoot Ryutin without involving the political authorities. But it referred the question to the Politburo. There Kirov is said to have spoken “with particular force against recourse to the death penalty. Moreover, he succeeded in winning over the Politburo in this view.”¹⁰ Another account says that in addition to Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev, Kossior, Kalinin, and Rudzutak spoke against Stalin, who was only supported by Kaganovich. Even Molotov and Andreyev seem to have wavered.¹¹

Such a division of views was first officially confirmed (in connection with a lesser figure who happened to have been rehabilitated) by a Soviet article of the IChrushchev period. It represents Stalin attempting at this time to purge the Armenian Communist Nazaretyan, but being unable to do so because Ordzhonikidze defended him and Stalin knew that “Kirov and Kuibyshev would also speak out in the Politburo on the same lines.”¹² For the first time, in fact, Stalin was faced with powerful opposition from his own allies.

Like so much of the history of the period, this definite identification of a bloc of “moderate” Stalinists thwarting the leader’s will was thus first reported by credible and respectable unofficial sources as long ago as the late 1930s, was substantially confirmed in the 1960s, and was rejected by some Western writers on the subject until the late 1980s! It has now been clearly and fully stated in the Soviet press of the glasnost period.¹³

Ryutin’s would have been the first such execution within the ranks of the old Party.fn1 It was particularly unacceptable, in any case, to start applying such measures (even though the OGPU is said to have already concocted a story about a plot at the Military Academy to go with the Platform).¹⁴ The old Party loyalty, whatever its bad side, not merely had involved the submission of intra-Party oppositions to the will of the majority, but also had defended at least the skins of the oppressed Party minorities. Lenin could work amicably with Zinoviev and Kamenev, although he had for a time denounced them as traitors when they attacked the plan for the armed uprising in October 1917. Bukharin could later admit his talk in 1918 of arresting Lenin and changing the Government, without thereby forfeiting Party esteem. Now it emerged that Stalin’s new Stalinist Politburo would not automatically accept his decisions when they contradicated such deep-set Party traditions.

It is certain that the defeat rankled. In each of the Great Trials of 1936, 1937, and 1938, the accused confessed to complicity in the Ryutin plot, which marked, they said, the first coming together of all the oppositions on a terrorist basis. It was precisely four years after the exposure of Ryutin that Stalin significantly remarked that “the OGPU is four years behind” in unmasking Trotskyites. The four years from September 1932 to September 1936 were, in fact, for him a period in which he set himself the task of breaking resistance to the physical destruction of his Party enemies.

The first lesson he seems to have drawn was that he could not easily obtain his followers’ consent to execution of Party members for purely political offenses. The attempt to read an assassination program into the Ryutin Platform was too unreal. A genuine assassination might prove a better theme.

At the same time, he saw among his own adherents men whose resistance could not easily be broken, and for whose removal it was difficult to find any political excuse. Over the next two years, he was to put these two thoughts together and find a logical solution—the assassination of Kirov.

A joint session of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission took place from 28 September to 2 October 1932. (Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others had already been called before the Presidium of the Control Commission; Zinoviev and Kamenev had expressed regret, but Uglanov is reported “accusing his accusers.”) The Ryutin group were now expelled from the Party “as degenerates who have become enemies of Communism and the Soviet regime, as traitors to the Party and to the working class, who, under the flag of a spurious ‘Marxism-Leninism,’ have attempted to create a bourgeois-kulak organization for the restoration of capitalism and particularly kulakdom in the USSR.”¹⁵ Ryutin was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, and twenty-nine others to lesser terms.¹⁶

The plenum passed another resolution “immediately expelling from the Party all who knew of the existence of this counterrevolutionary group, and in particular had read the counterrevolutionary documents and not informed the CCC and CC of the All Union Communist Party (bolshevik), as concealed enemies of the Party and the working class.” It was signed “Stalin.”¹⁷ Zinoviev and Kamenev, thus again expelled from the Party, were deported to the Urals. Soon afterward, Ivan Smirnov, who on his readmission to the Party had become head of the Gorky Automobile Works, was rearrested and sentenced to ten years in jail, going to the “isolator” at Suzdal. Smilga received five years, and with Mrachkovsky was sent to Verkhne-Uralsk.

A resolution on a more general purging of the Party was passed by a plenum of the Central Committee on 12 January 1933. More than 800,000 members were expelled during the year, and another 340,000 in 1934.

The method of the Party purge was in itself an encouragement to informers, lickspittles, and conscienceless careerists. The local Purge commissions, in the presence of the entire local membership, would examine each member about every detail of his political and personal past. Intervention from the audience was welcomed. In theory, all this was a sign of Party democracy and comradely frankness. In practice, it attracted—and of course increasingly so as conditions got worse—first the inflation of true though pettifogging points from the past, such as distant relationship or acquaintance with former White Army officers, and finally simple invention or misrepresentation.

At the January 1933 plenum, too, the last of the new cycle of plots was exposed. The distinguished Old Bolshevik A. P. Smirnov, Party member since 1896 and formerly member of the Central Committee’s “Orgburo,” was charged with two other Old Bolsheviks, Eismont and Tolmachev (members since 1907 and 1904, respectively), with forming an anti-Party group.

A. P. Smirnov’s group is said to have had contact with Old Bolshevik workers, mainly in the trade unions, in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities. Realizing that no legal methods could break Stalin’s grip, they had to a large degree gone underground, with a view to organizing for a struggle. Their program seems to have covered the revision of the unbalanced industrial schemes, the dissolution of most of the kolkhozes, the subjection of the OGPU to Party control, and the independence of the trade unions. Above all, they had discussed the removal of Stalin. When taxed at the plenum Eismont said, “Yes, there were such conversations among us. A. P. Smirnov started them.” Unlike Ryutin and his friends, none of the three had had any connection with the Trotskyite or Rightist oppositions. The exposure of this plot was described in the Khrushchev era as “the beginning of reprisals against the old Leninist cadres.”¹⁸

In his speech on the matter, Stalin significantly remarked, “Of course, only enemies could say that to remove Stalin would not affect matters.”¹⁹

Again, an attempt to have the oppositionists shot seems to have been made and blocked. It appears that Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, and Kuibyshev again played the main role in opposing the death penalty. Kalinin and Kossior supported them; Andreyev, Voroshilov, and, to some degree, Molotov took a vacillating position, and once again only Kaganovich supported Stalin to the end.²⁰

The top Rightists had refused to have anything to do with Smirnov’s plans. And even in the published Resolution on this group, it is only alleged that Rykov, Tomsky, and V. V. Shmidt had “stood aside from the struggle with anti-Party elements and even maintained relations with Smirnov and Eismont, thus in fact encouraging them in their anti-Party activities.”

At the plenum, Bukharin, not implicated even to this extent, made a speech typical of the extravagant and insincere tone which was now conventional in exoppositionist statements, demanding “the severe punishment of A. P. Smirnov’s grouping”; and he spoke of his own earlier “Right-opportunist, absolutely wrong general political line,” of his “guilt before the Party, its leadership, before the Central Committee of the Party, before the working class and the country,” mentioning Tomsky and Rykov as his “former companions in the leadership of the Right opposition.”²¹

Eismont and Tolmachev were expelled from the Party, and A. P. Smirnov from the Central Committee.

The views of A. P. Smirnov and his followers mark an important crux. For we find veteran senior officials who had never been associated with any opposition speaking not merely of a policy change, but specifically of Stalin’s removal, and it was soon to be apparent that such an idea was widely held.

Neither the Ryutin group nor the A. P. Smimov group had any serious chance of success. The significance of the cases was, rather, in the opposition offered to Stalin by his own supporters in the Politburo on the issue of executing the conspirators. The revulsion of Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, and the others against the proposal was clearly quite genuine. The extraordinary strength of the idea of Party solidarity is nowhere better shown.

It is here that the true dvoeverye—double belief—of the Party “moderates” lay. It explains, as nothing else can, the horrified resistance of many who had cheerfully massacred the Whites, and at least uncomplainingly starved and slaughtered the peasantry, to the execution of prominent Party members, to “shedding the blood of Bolsheviks.” It reflects a double standard of morality comparable to the attitude of sensitive and intelligent men in the ancient world to slaves or of the French nobility of the eighteenth century to the lower classes. Non-Party people were hardly more taken into account, even by the better Old Bolsheviks, than slaves were by Plato. They were, in effect, non-men. One is reminded of a famous scene in Salammbii when Hamilcar discovers, but is not quite able to grasp, that a slave is capable of sorrow at the proposed death of his son. For it is not, indeed, wholly impossible to maintain humanist virtues within a limited circle and at the same time to treat outsiders with indifference or brutality.

A view of the Purges which requires us to sympathize with the loyal Party victim while withholding our sympathy from such men as those who suffered in the Shakhty Case is unlikely to be accepted very widely. It is, indeed, defensible, but only from a narrow and rigorist Party viewpoint. It may perhaps be argued, from the opposite viewpoint, that those at least of the Party victims who had themselves committed or connived at similar repressions against non-Party figures are entitled not to a greater, but to a considerably smaller, meed of sympathy for their own later sufferings.

All the apparatus of oppression under which they themselves were to suffer was already in existence. They had raised no objection to its employment so long as the animus of the State was directed against men and women they too believed to be enemies of the Party. If Bukharin in the Politburo had spoken up against the Shakhty Trial, if Trotsky in exile had denounced the Menshevik Trial—if they had even objected not to the injustice as such, but merely to the blemish on the reputation of the Party and State—the oppositionists would have been on solider ground.

We are perhaps in danger of romanticizing the better actions of some of these men. When Isaac Deutscher—or even Arthur Koestler—puts the fate of the oppositionists in a tragic light, we should nevertheless recall that they themselves in their time had thought nothing, as Bukharin himself said at his trial, of killing political opponents on a large scale and for no other reason but to establish the power of their own Party against popular resistance. They had, moreover, at least not effectively protested against the trials in which non-Party people were convicted on patently falsified evidence. Few of them had stood for anything resembling democracy even within the Party (and it is notable that those few, men like Sapronov, never came to public trial).

All the same, even avoiding the romanticizing of revolution (a habit to which the British, who do not have to go through revolutions themselves, are perhaps particularly prone), we need not fall into denying any virtue to men some of whose actions may appear to us to be dubious. For this would be to lay down criteria as narrow in their way as those of the Stalinists themselves. Joseph Goebbels was one of the most unpleasant characters in Europe; yet it does not seem amiss to grant him a certain admiration for his courage and clearheadedness in the last days of the Third Reich, particularly in comparison with the cowardly and stupid intrigues of most of his colleagues.

In fact, courage and clearheadedness are admirable in themselves. And if they do not rank high among the moral virtues, we can see in some of the Soviet oppositionists something rather better. It is true that those who did not confess, and were shot secretly, demonstrated not merely a higher courage, but a better sense of values. In them, however touched by the demands of Party and revolutionary loyalty, loyalty to the truth and the idea of a more humane regime prevailed. But even among those who confessed, we can often see the struggle between Party habits and the old impulses to justice which had originally, in many cases at least, been one of the motives for joining the Party.

If the oppositionists were not spotless, it is at least true of their conduct during the Civil War that to have acted was different from planning the cold-blooded Terror shortly to be launched. Even the attempt to save Ryutin by those who had just decimated the Ukraine, absurd though it may appear to logical Stalinist and logical humanist alike, perhaps indicates not merely a wish to preserve privilege, but also a residuum of humane feeling.

right or wrong

Within that furious age

There is, after all, a moral difference between some restraint and none. Although indulgence in terrorist action against any section of the population may corrupt the entire personality, as it clearly had done in the cases of Yezhov and others, the contrary is also true: the preservation of more or less humanist attitudes, even if only in a limited field, may, when the particular motives for terror against others have lapsed, spread out again and rehumanize the rest.

Over the next few years, Stalin was to burn out the last roots of humanism. There was no longer to be a section of the community reserved from the operation of arbitrary rule. And, in itself, this was not unwelcome to the non—Party members. We often find in the prison and concentration-camp literature accounts of ordinary victims being cheered up at the sight of some notorious persecutor from the NKVD or the Party machine appearing in the same cell or barrack.

For the general objection to the Terror is not that it was to strike at the Party members as well as at the population, but that the sufferings of the population itself under it increased immeasurably. The true crux of the Ryutin dispute resides less in preserving the privileged sanctuary of Party membership than in the fact that it was the issue on which Stalin was to fight the battle with his own colleagues to decide if the country was or was not to submit unreservedly to his single will. In an oligarchical system, there is at lowest always the possibility of some members of the ruling elite taking moderate views, or at least acting as a brake on their more repressive fellows. In an autocracy, the question depends entirely on the will of one man. There have been comparatively mild autocrats. But Stalin was not one of them.

In this period when Stalin was the effective binding power of the State, the pressures he met penetrated his personal life as well. On 8 November 1932 his wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, committed suicide. But neither personal loss nor public crisis broke his will. And this was widely understood as the decisive factor in the terrible struggle just concluded. He had met wavering and refused it countenance. We are told that “in 1932 Stalin was adamant against the proposal to surrender the positions already gained.”²² An official of the period comments,

Loyalty to Stalin at the time of which I am writing [1932] was based principally on the conviction that there was no one to take his place, that any change of leadership would be extremely dangerous, and that the country must continue in its present course, since to stop now or attempt a retreat would mean the loss of everything.²³

Even a Trotskyite could comment, “If it were not for that so-and-so … everything would have fallen into pieces by now. It is he who keeps everything together….”²⁴

By the beginning of 1933, many circles in the Party previously unconvinced about the possibility of success began to alter their attitude and to accept that Stalin had in fact won through. As Kamenev was made to remark at his trial in 1936, “Our banking on the insuperability of the difficulties which the country was experiencing, on the state of crisis of its economy, on the collapse of the economic policy of the Party leadership had obviously failed by the second half of 1932.”²⁵ The “victory” did not amount to the creation of an efficient industry and agriculture. But the Party, which had staked its existence on winning the battle against the peasantry, had succeeded in crushing them, and a collective farm system was now firmly established.

By early summer, a certain relaxation took place in all fields. In May 1933, a decrease of peasant deportations to a figure of 12,000 households a year was ordered by a secret circular signed by Stalin and Molotov.²⁶ In the same month, Zinoviev and Kamenev were brought back from Siberia to make another confession of error. Pravda published a piece by Kamenev, condemning his own mistakes and calling on the oppositionists to cease any resistance.²⁷

The former theological students among them—and there were always a surprising number of these in the Party, from Stalin and Mikoyan down to men like Chernov—might have remembered the scenes which took place after the Council of Nicaea, when one of the more extreme Arians remarked to a colleague who had surrendered, “Thou hast subscribed to escape banishment, but within the year thou shalt be as I am.” But it is also true that even the opposition was often won over by the victory of Stalin’s line and the successes gained, at whatever cost, in industry.

Moreover, the rise of Nazism in Germany was a strong shock. Stalin had played on a quite implausible war scare in the late 1920s, trapping Trotsky in particular into implying that even in war he would oppose the leadership—a sure formula for accusations of “traitor.” But no serious figure had been shaken by the maneuver. Now Rakovsky and Sosnovsky, the last leading oppositionists in exile, finally made their peace with the regime, giving the war danger as their main motive. Rakovsky, who earlier seems to have been badly hurt in an attempt to escape, had pointed out that even Lenin had expressed qualms about the power of the Party, and that since his death it had become ten times more powerful. Getting to the heart of the dispute, he had said, “We have always based ourselves on the revolutionary initiative of the masses and not on the apparatus.” He had added that no more faith could be placed in “enlightened bureaucracy” than in “the enlightened despotism of the seventeenth century.”²⁸ But now he was persuaded. He was welcomed back by Kaganovich in person.²⁹ It was plain that an air of general reconciliation was prevalent.

Radek had long since become a shameless adulator of Stalin, detested by the less venal oppositionists. He pleased Stalin greatly by an article purporting to be a lecture delivered in 1967 at the School of Interplanetary Communications, on the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. At this date (now far behind us) the World Revolution had evidently triumphed and looked back on Stalin as its most brilliant architect. Radek was put up early in 1934 to distinguish between the old oppositionists who merely lacked “proper understanding and will” and the “alien” Trotsky—a striking token of peace with the Zinovievs and Bukharins.³⁰ (Trotsky himself had been meanwhile writing that the slogan “Down with Stalin” was wrong³¹ and that “at the present moment, the overthrow of the bureaucracy would surely serve counter-revolutionary forces.”)³²

If Stalin’s special talents had been vital during the crisis, he now no longer seemed quite so essential to the Party’s survival. But if it had been impossible to remove Stalin at a time when the Party and the regime were engaged in a desperate struggle, it now became difficult for a different reason: he was the victor, the man who had won against all the odds. His prestige was higher than ever.

It began to be hoped not so much that Stalin would be removed, as that he would take a more moderate line, lead a movement of reconciliation, adjust to the Party’s desire to enjoy the fruits of victory in comparative peace. He might be expected to retain the leadership but to let many of his powers devolve. Alternatively, he might be given a more senior, but less powerful post. “In seasons of great peril, ’tis good that one bear sway”; but when the danger is past, more constitutional ways return.

Stalin, Khrushchev later told the world, had not been to a farm since 1928; for him, the collectivization operation was a desk-bound one. Those who had to carry it out in the field had a more shaking time. With all the ruthlessness with which men like Kossior put through the Stalin policies, there seems no doubt that their nerves were strained and they felt something of the battle exhaustion which affected the entire organization in the field.

Now the worst tensions had somewhat slackened. The Party machine everywhere was firmly in the hands of operators who had shown their devotion to Stalin’s policies. If Stalin wanted only this—political victory and the enforcement of his plans—he had won. It was now only necessary to consolidate—to consolidate, and perhaps to relax, to reestablish the Party’s links with the people, and to reconcile the embittered elements in the Party itself.

Such were the ideas which seem to have entered the minds of many of the new Stalinist leadership. But they did not enter Stalin’s. His aim remained, as is now clear, unchallenged power. So far, he had brutalized the Party, but he had not enslaved it. The men he had brought to the top were already adequately crude and ruthless, but they were not all vicious and servile. And even the hard-won brutality might peter out if reconciliation were practiced, if terror became thought of as not an institutionalized necessity, but only a temporary recourse.

For the moment, however, the new “unity” of the Party was celebrated. In January 1934 its XVIIth Congress, the “Congress of Victors,” assembled. The 1,966 delegates (of whom 1,108 were to be shot over the next few years)³³ listened to the unanimously enthusiastic speakers.

Stalin himself set the theme:

Whereas at the XVth Congress it was still necessary to prove the correctness of the Party line and to fight certain anti-Leninist groupings, and at the XVIth Congress, to finish off the last supporters of these groupings, at the present Congress there is nothing to prove and, it seems, nobody to beat.³⁴

Former oppositionists were allowed to speak: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, Radek, and Lominadze. It is usually said that they were received respectfully, and it is true that on the whole there was much less bitterness expressed against them than at the previous Congress.fn2 The line they took was one of complete Stalinist orthodoxy, replete with compliments to the General Secretary and abuse of his enemies.

Kamenev said that the first wave of anti-Party opposition had been Trotskyism; the second, the right wing; and went on:

The third was not even a wave, but a wavelet; this was the ideology of the most rabid kulak scum, the ideology of the Ryutinites…. It would have been absurd to fight them by theoretical means, by ideological exposure. Other, more tangible weapons were needed, and these were brought to bear against the members of this group and their accomplices and protectors alike.³⁵

We have spoken of the miscalculation, as it turned out, in the oppositionist line of abject repentance, now repeated. The oppositionists’ basic error was that they did not understand Stalin. If he had been less determined and unprincipled, they might have succeeded. Doubtless Zinoviev had little chance of returning to power. But the Rightists, at least, were not in a bad tactical position. During the extreme crisis of 1930, they had not rocked the boat, and, as a result, the crisis had been overcome by methods which represented at least to some slight degree of concession to their views. Their admission of their faults to the Congress was received in much better part than had been the case on previous similar occasions. At the same time, there was everywhere hope that the worst strain was over, that the terrible efforts and sufferings of the first Five-Year Plan and of the collectivization drive could now be forgotten. The second Five-Year Plan pointed to a rather more moderate approach to the economy.

All these circumstances were favorable for the Right. They were most unfavorable to Stalin. The mood, in fact, was one of intra-Party reconciliation, and of an attempt to rebuild the bridges between the Party and the people. And such a formulation seems to have been the conscious line of thought of Kirov and others.³⁶

Between sessions, delegates discussed in this context the whole question of Stalin’s leadership. A Pravda account of the Khrushchev period remarks that Stalin was already “deviating further and further from Leninist norms,” becoming “more and more isolated” and “abusing his position”; the “abnormal situation” in connection with this “alarmed many Communists”; some delegates to the Congress got the idea that the time had come to transfer Stalin from the post of General Secretary to other work. This could not but have reached Stalin; “he knew that the old Leninist cadres of the Party would be a decisive hindrance to the further strengthening of his position and the concentration in his own hands of even greater power.”³⁷ The Pravda article immediately goes on, without logical connection, but with obvious implications, to speak of “that splendid Leninist S. M. Kirov,” whom it describes as “the favorite of the Party” and whose speech to the Congress is reported as arousing great enthusiasm. This story of a plan—or at any rate of conversations—on the desirability of transferring Stalin was repeated in a 1964 life of Kirov.³⁸

Thus “the old Leninist cadres,” including that “splendid Leninist” Kirov, were planning to limit Stalin’s power; their intention was to relax the dictatorship and effect a reconciliation with the opposition; and Stalin, having found out their plans, saw them as a “decisive hindrance” to his own desire to extend his power. Politically, in 1934, it looked as though Stalin was not indeed beaten, but on the point of being blocked in his drive for unlimited authority. And this may have been a sound view, within the limits of politics proper.

Such was the state of our knowledge when The Great Terror was written. A fuller story has now emerged. Some delegates indeed discussed installing Kirov as General Secretary. He refused, on the grounds that this would call the Party’s policies into question. Stalin learned of it, but Kirov told him that he himself was to blame because of the “drastic” way he did things. Moreover, at the voting for membership of the Central Committee, between 150 and 300 votes seem to have been cast against Stalin—though in the official count this was reduced to 3 (with 4 against Kirov). All this, as a recent Soviet article puts it, left Stalin with “hostility and a will to revenge against the whole congress, and of course Kirov personally.”³⁹

It had taken years of maneuver to defeat the old oppositionists. The new men who had blocked Stalin were neither so vulnerable nor so naive. Yet to allow the situation to stabilize while the oppositionists were still alive, and while men like Kirov were gaining popularity in the Party, must have seemed a dangerous policy to Stalin. Sooner or later he might have to face the emergence of a more moderate alternative leadership.

But what action was open to him? These trends could only be contained by force. Stalin had manned the machinery of terror with his own men. But it was necessary that the highest Party organs should approve his using it, and they had refused. To create a situation in which they could be panicked or bullied into consent—such was Stalin’s problem.

For the moment nothing was done on either side. A Central Committee was elected, consisting almost solely of Stalinist veterans of the intra-Party struggle, but including Pyatakov among its full members and Sokolnikov, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky among its candidates. Of the 139 members and candidate members now elected, 99 (that is, more than 70 percent) were to die violent deaths over the next five years—and eight others later on.⁴⁰

The leading organs elected by the new Central Committee reflected a stalemate. The Politburo was no more satisfactory to Stalin than the one which had blocked him over the Ryutin issue in 1932. And, in particular, this time Kirov was elected not only to the Politburo, but to the Secretariat as well, where he joined Stalin, Kaganovich, and Stalin’s equally sinister protégé Zhdanov.

The Central Control Commission which had failed Stalin in 1932 was reduced in status and lost its remnant of independence from the political leadership; Kaganovich became its head. But Rudzutak was brought back to the Politburo, though with reduced seniority. He had been a full Politburo member before taking up the CCC post. Now he was the junior candidate member. This was the only change in the Politburo apart from the addition to candidate membership of Pavel Postyshev, “tall and thin as a lath, with a grating bass voice. No fool … but careless of others’ feelings,”⁴¹ Stalin’s latest and toughest emissary in the Ukrainian campaign.

The leading Party organs elected by the Congress were not to be the only bodies to play important roles in the forthcoming period. While the overt political struggle of the past decade had been going on, more sinister developments were taking place in what might be called the technical side of despotic rule. The Secret Police, founded in 1917, had become a large and highly organized body, and had gained great experience in arbitrary arrest, repression, and violence. None of the oppositionists had objected to it; Bukharin in particular had been effusively enthusiastic about its role.

In July 1934 the OGPU was abolished, or rather subsumed into a new All-Union NKVD. The thin-faced terror veteran Genrikh Yagoda was placed at the head of the new organization. His First Deputy was an old adherent and friend of Stalin, Ya. D. Agranov, who had been in charge of the brutal “investigation” of the Kronstadt rebels.⁴²

The new body was to be efficiently deployed over the following years. Its increasingly privileged and powerful officers were to make its emblem—a serpent being struck down by a sword—prevail everywhere against the hammer and sickle of the Party membership. From Politburo members down, no one was to be exempt from their attentions. They themselves were to remain under the careful control of the supreme political authority, Stalin. In addition to police organization proper, a number of key measures date from this period. After the announcement in January 1933 of the forthcoming purge of the Party, a central Purge Commission was formed (on 29 April) which included Yezhov and M. F. Shkiryatov.

It is at this time, too, that what was to be, in many respects, the most important body of all came to the surface: the “Special Sector” of the Central Committee,⁴³ headed by Poslcrebyshev. It was in effect Stalin’s private secretariat, the immediate organ for carrying out his will. It has been compared with Nicholas I’s Personal Chancellery of His Imperial Majesty. All sensitive issues were effectively handled through this channel—for example, the assassination of Trotsky.⁴⁴

In connection with this personal secretariat, a special State Security Committee appears to have been organized; the main figures are believed to have been Poskrebyshev, Shkiryatov, Agranov, and Yezhov, at that time head of the Records and Assignment Department of the Central Committee.⁴⁵ Shkiryatov’s key role is implied in an official description of his being “representative of the Central Control Commission to the Politburo and the Orgburo.”⁴⁶

On 20 June 1933 a Prosecutor-Generalship of the USSR was established. Andrei Vyshinsky, though at first ranking only as First Deputy Prosecutor-General, was the most important figure. Links with the OGPU, the “legality and regularity” of whose acts the Prosecutors were supposed to check, were provided for.

Another major element in the Stalinist State had already emerged: the show trial. In 1922, a trial expressly designed by Lenin to crush the Social Revolutionary Party had been presided over, ironically enough, by Pyatakov. Although there was an important element of falsification, in that many of the supposed prisoners were agents provocateurs, the genuine Social Revolutionaries were given reasonable freedom of defense. And death sentences (much to Lenin’s anger) were abandoned under heavy pressure from the Socialist parties of Western Europe. In 1928 came the first trial in a newer mode—that of the Shakhty engineers, presided over by Vyshinsky. This was the first testing ground of the more recent technique of founding a case on false confessions extracted by terror. Over the following years came three similar great set pieces: the so-called Industrial Party of 1930, the Mensheviks in 1931, and the Metro-Vic engineers in 1933. The oppositionists, including Trotsky in exile, made no public objection to these horrible farces.

Thus a positive machinery of despotism had been created outside of and independent of the official political organs. Everywhere, in fact, the potential mechanisms for further terror were in existence, and manned for Stalin not by allies who might balk, but by accomplices who could be relied on against enemies, or friends, inside or outside the Party.

Meanwhile, the official leadership retained its power. The Stalinist writer Alexander Fadeyev commented on the Politburo, “They are bound together by the manly, principled, iron, gay friendship of the bogalyrs.”⁴⁷ Half were to meet death or disgrace in the next four years. Kirov was the first to go.

There is little in his past record to suggest that he could have been a major leader. Even if Stalin had dropped dead, the Politburo contained men at least equally forceful, and more experienced, who would not willingly have submitted to Kirov. Pyatakov’s opinion was that if Stalin went, Kaganovich would be able to take over. Even granted the defeat of the entire Stalinist wing, we have no ground for any certainty that Kirov could have coped with his seniors among the “moderates.” But meanwhile, he seems to have presented the most awkward immediate problem from Stalin’s point of view.

Kirov was the best orator the Party had produced since Trotsky. And the concern he had shown, now that the Stalinist victory was complete, for the welfare of the Leningrad workers was beginning to gain him a certain amount of personal popularity. In the Party itself, this popularity was genuine and unqualified. But the most significant thing was the fact that Kirov controlled a definite source of power—the Leningrad organization. When the Leningrad delegates demonstratively led the applause for Kirov at the XVIIth Congress, it may have reminded Stalin of the similar support given by an earlier Leningrad Party generation to Zinoviev.

Throughout Stalin’s career this powerful fief was viewed as a seedbed of rebellion—from his removal of Zinoviev in 1926 to his slaughter of the third generation of Leningrad Communists in 1950. And it is true that in the great northern metropolis, no longer—since 1918—the country’s capital, a certain alienation from the great mass of the hinterland was still present. Russia’s “window on Europe” had always been a sort of advanced outpost. Its citizens thought of themselves as far ahead, even dangerously far, of the rest of the country in civilization and the arts of the West. In this youngest of the great cities of Europe—founded, indeed, after New York, Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia—Kirov was truly showing signs of a certain independence.

It was not easily possibly for Stalin to attack Kirov for deviationism. He had never belonged to the oppositions and had fought them firmly. But he had been generous to them in defeat. The NKVD had already turned up the fact that a number of minor oppositionists or former oppositionists were working quite freely in Leningrad. Officials taxed with permitting this were able to say that Kirov had personally ordered it. In particular, encouraging the cultural life of the city, he had allowed many of them to take posts in publishing and other similar activities. He had also worked in Leningrad in reasonable concord with Party veterans who were not strictly speaking oppositionists, but whose views tended well to the right of the Party line. If he and his Politburo colleagues with similar views had come to power, their standing was scarcely great enough to enable them to rule the Party without appealing to the old oppositionists and effecting a reconciliation with at least the right wing. One could perhaps envision a situation in which Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, and Kuibyshev sat in the Politburo with Bukharin and Pyatakov, and even Kamenev, on a moderate program.

Meanwhile, Kirov had used his position in Leningrad in other ways unwelcome to Moscow. He was in dispute with the Stalinist members of the Politburo on various issues. On the matter of the food supply to the Leningrad workers, he and Stalin had an exchange of sharp words, witnessed by Khrushchev.⁴⁸

Kirov’s election to the Secretariat seems to have been made with a view to his transfer to Moscow, where he would be under Stalin’s eye. In August, Stalin asked Kirov down to Sochi, where he was holidaying with Zhdanov. Here they discussed the proposed transfer, and Stalin eventually had to settle for Kirov’s agreement to come to Moscow “at the end of the second Five-Year Plan”—that is, in 1938. But Stalin clearly believed that the political issues before him must be settled one way or another in the immediate future.⁴⁹

It must have been about this time that Stalin took the most extraordinary decision of his career. It was that the best way of ensuring his political supremacy and dealing with his old comrade—Secretary of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, First Secretary of the Leningrad Party organization—was murder.