The Great Terror

INTRODUCTION TO 2008 EDITION

1

How did The Great Terror come to be written? And, first published in 1968, and in a revised edition in 1990, how is it that the book is still often treated as a historical landmark? Indeed, various historians, writing in several languages, credit me with the first use of the phrase ‘the Great Terror’, which has since become the conventional term for the purges of the 1930s.

Though inviting some amendment on a few points, the period’s history as given here has been substantially validated. There has meanwhile been a huge amount of fresh information to add to our knowledge. It is in that perspective that this introduction tries to place the book. A complete rewrite, or even a full re-editing, would, as to details, require the processing of many thousands of documents, and hundreds of often erudite analyses and presentations. I have tried to cover everything among the materials I have looked through that truly adds to or illuminates the terror experience.1 So what follows is to be read largely as commentary and perspective.

What was the condition of our previous knowledge of Stalinist actuality before, let us say, 1956? We had for decades had a large amount of real information about the purges, all often rejected or ignored, while little truth and much falsehood had emerged from Moscow. We had long been faced, especially from the 1930s on, with delusions about the Soviet system, and we still need to bear in mind how Sidney and Beatrice Webb, deans of Western social science, leaders of the Fabian Society, founders of the London School of Economics, deeply ‘researched’ their Soviet Communism: a New Civilisation. Rather than repeat their particular errors (see Chapter I), let me note as further examples a few of their subheadings: ‘the Emergence of a Communist Conscience’; ‘the Vocation of Leadership’; ‘Ethical Progress in the USSR’; ‘The Maximising of Wealth’; and ‘The Success of a Soviet Agriculture’. They praised ‘the sense of freedom and equality’ found there, and used as sources the vast apparatus of Soviet falsification – thus fully ‘documented’. It would be tedious to go into the whole array of those in one way or another misled, though it is still astonishing to read the disgraceful record of Joseph Davies – US Ambassador to Moscow from 1936 to 1938.

As to truths about the terror, the first point is that the official material available to the public before 1956 was worthless. Even British Cabinet records may not jibe with first-hand memoirs. The past is full of worse. There are records cut in stone in which successive pharaohs ostentatiously reattribute, in great detail, various (often non-existent) triumphs (from Sahure to Pepi II, and from Tuthmosis III to Rameses II to Rameses III). This is akin to the Soviet rewriting of history. And as to longer term official distortion, or concealment, we should remember that the highest level of Soviet secrecy was ‘word of mouth only’.

Up to 1956, our real sources were almost entirely from émigrés, ‘defectors', and such a rare document as the local files of the ‘Smolensk Archives’, which was captured by the Germans in 1941 and eventually reached the USA. When it comes to research on this ‘unofficial material’, were these sources reliable? Even to ask the question is to distort the nature of historical research. No ‘source’ can, strictly speaking, be relied on.

In the Soviet case, as late as 1968 there was still much that had to be deduced from sources judged merely as ‘hearsay'. These did indeed tend to give much the same general story. Of the testimony given by the anti-Soviet defectors, one – Victor Kravchenko’s – took it that ‘one can only look into this or that corner and judge the whole from its parts’. Another, the physicist Alexander Weissberg, put it a little differently – that the outside world would note that his and others’ testimony were mutually confirmatory, and eventually draw the right conclusions. Yet they – and the similar evidence of Alexander Barmine, Ivanov Razumnik and all the others – were still neglected.

Concerning deeper secrets, one often had to consider material still thought to be even more disreputable by some. For example, Alexander Orlov’s The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes was, for many, a thoroughly dubious source. A high NKVD officer who defected in 1938, he naturally aroused suspicion (and a later book of his was clearly an unreliable potboiler). And later still a further extraordinary revelation came – that he had written promising Yezhov not to give away any state secrets on condition that he and his family were left untouched – and Stalin had approved. The worst result being that the Philby spy ring was able to serve Stalinist nuclear espionage so effectively.

But Orlov’s Secret History (from deep inside the NKVD) was largely validated early on as to one or two points. Now, all his contribution to the Zinoviev Trial, and much elsewhere, is proven. Like all evidence of its type, Orlov is only reliable when he is repeating what he was told at first hand; and when giving more peripheral, indirect hearsay, he is often in error – as with, more recently, Sudoplatov. Yet just because a source may be erroneous or unreliable on certain points does not automatically invalidate all its evidence. It was none other than Edward Gibbon who said that ‘imperfect and partial’ evidence may contribute to a view of the whole, without making the historian ‘answerable… for all the circumjacent errors and inconsistencies of the authors whom he has quoted’.2

However, since 1956 and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech – followed by his openly published report to the Twenty-second Congress in 1961, with many accounts of torture and falsehood – it was (or seemed) indisputable that a regime of lies and terror had after all been in existence. And over the next few years, until 1962–4, the real fates – at one level – of high Party officials, the military and many intellectuals became known. There were many rehabilitations of those victims deemed never disloyal to the regime; and a number of books or booklets came out about some of the most important. There were also memoirs such as those of General Gorbatov. And above all, there came one of the main unforeseen cracks in the traditional Soviet story – the publication of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which, as Galina Vishnevskaya put it, let the genie out of the bottle, and however hard they tried later, they couldn’t put it back in’.3

Though much, nothing like the whole reality emerged. But by 1968 there was enough Soviet evidence, taken together with that given over a couple of decades by the various outsiders, to make a coherent whole.

2

What was my personal decision to tackle the missing history? When I first started to publish on Soviet subjects, one sceptic held that I was not qualified to write on these themes, since my two earliest books were a volume of poetry (Poems) and a science fiction novel (A World of Difference). I would argue that they both contribute to, or are signs of, the imagination’s grasp and scope. (And the first reference to me in the USSR is in the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia Yearbook for 1957, as a poet and anthologist.)

But I was able to plead other inputs. I had direct experience of Stalinism. In 1944–8 I was in Bulgaria, at first attached to the Third Ukrainian Front and later as Press Attaché to the British Political Mission. There, after a period of optimism, we saw the horrible realities of a Stalinist takeover.

Then, in the Foreign Office, I worked on the whole – as yet little understood – phenomenon, and briefly at the United Nations, as a First Secretary attached to the United Kingdom Delegation, visibly serving in the Security Council. I helped draft a speech by Barbara Castle – there as a (very ‘left-wing’) Minister in the Labour government – on the Gulag, with data secret from the Soviet point of view, to the Economic and Social Committee. I even passed by that fearful villain Andrei Vyshinsky – next but two or three to me in the General Assembly. And I rejoiced as President Truman gave his uncompromising speech (on the Korea aggression).

Back in London, I covered Soviet internal politics, finally switching to a fellowship at the London School of Economics – to research and write a book on that subject, which became Power and Policy in the USSR. Though the CPSU does not emerge in a very favourable light, that book was concerned above all to discover the realities behind the Kremlin fog bank: to satisfy a curiosity, to provide a light. Meanwhile, I had written a number of books, with general, or highly particular, themes – such as an account of The Pasternak Affair (1962).

In 1964–5 I was at Columbia University. I had just finished a book – Russia after Khrushchev. In New York, I got to know some of the older, and some of the younger, writers and thinkers on Russia – from Boris Nicolaevsky himself to Stephen Cohen – and later, in California, Bertram Wolfe. Cohen was to be especially helpful over the years that followed.

So in 1964 or 1965 it had become plain that a huge gap in history needed to be filled, and that the facts released over the past few years, plus the often denied testimony of some of the regime’s hostile but increasingly justified witnesses, could be put together, if carefully done, to produce a veridical story, a real history. Back in London, as a freelance writer, I began to assemble The Great Terror.

The other great incitement to Stalin studies was Tibor Szamuely (nephew and namesake of the great Hungarian terror chief of 1919). Tibor had been in the Gulag, but was later released. Defecting from Accra to London, he became a splendid adviser. I still relish his reply when I said that one could see why Stalin had Marshal Tukhachevsky shot, but why Marshal Yegorov? Tibor’s answer was ‘why not?’.

When the book came out in 1968, the publishers were surprised to have to reprint it time and time again to meet demand. Reviews, from left and right, were almost all very favourable. And it was soon published in most Western languages – though also Hindi, Arabic, Japanese and Turkish.

Let me note here, to illustrate the scope of opinion, that the book, and my other work in the field, was soon warmly praised by (of course) Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, but above all – and earlier – by ‘Scoop’ Jackson and then Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the latter of whom wrote that my role was to ‘sense that the democratic contest with the Marxist-Leninist regime was not just a struggle over ideas but also over facts’. Nor did the book fail to have an effect further to the left. I learned, much later, that it was a set book, and compulsory reading, for Christopher Hitchens and James Fenton (perhaps England’s finest poet of that generation), as teenage members of a Trotskyite study centre.

From Russia there was much praise from Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner, and also Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn who (when I flew to Switzerland to meet him after his expulsion from the USSR) asked me if I could translate a ‘little’ poem of his into English verse. It was Prussian Nights4 – nearly two thousand lines in ballad metre! And there were too, on our whole theme, the praises of other poets: Czeslaw Milosz (especially warmly) – and Octavio Paz (who wrote that The Great Terror had ‘closed the debate’). So we come full circle …

3

In the late sixties when The Great Terror came out, it was still true that, as that great historian François Furet noted after the war and the demise of fascism, ‘All the major debates on post-war ideas revolved round a single question: the nature of the Soviet regime.’ He adds the paradox that Communism had two main embodiments – as a backward despotism and as a constituency in the West that had to be kept unaware of others’ reality. Those who had a generally favourable attitude to Communism were disinclined to face the truth. And, up to the last, this was often accompanied by a view of the ‘Cold War’ as an even exchange – with the imputation that any denigration of the Soviet regime was due to peace-hating prejudice.

This long-standing success of a false, or toned-down, version of events had been in part due to a large funding from Moscow, about which we had only had full accounts lately – just over $42 million to the CPUSA alone in 1953–84.5 But the weight of the Soviet version had also been in part due to the reality being understandably incredible to Western minds habituated to an inadequate perspective. This now largely crumbled. Meanwhile in the USSR the dissidents were viciously persecuted – but not silenced.

4

Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist offensive had produced inter alia a number of investigations into the terror. That chaired by N. Ya. Shvernik was given much, though inadequate, material from the KGB (its figures of victims can be shown from its own records to be far lower than the actualities for 1938–40, for example). Aleksei Snegov’s large-scale GULAG prisoner rehabilitation, with its many subcommittees, was effective, though incomplete. Olga Shatunovskaya of the Party Control Committee was more productive (but from 1962 her work was abandoned, then suppressed). Their evidence became known – and in general validated – later and has recently (2006–7) been usefully reassessed by Sergei Mikoyan and others.6

After 1964, and Khrushchev’s fall, there was a serious attempt to clear Stalin’s name publicly, as well as by implication (Raskolnikov, for example, was de-rehabilitated!). The old apparat still remained in charge of all the sources of knowledge. Most of the recorded facts stayed in the millions of secret files of the Party, State and Secret Police, and in myriads of minds.

Over the twenty years that followed, ‘the period of stagnation’ as it became known in Russia, there was little further public addition to our knowledge – or to that of the Soviet citizen. The numerically and institutionally dominant part of the apparat establishment was more than content to keep its – and the country’s – eyes closed to what seemed to invalidate their whole raison d’être.

Though fairly competent in the necessary sub-Marxist wordplay, the apparat had long been, as Weissberg put it, ‘morally and intellectually crippled’. And the sequence Lenin-Stalin-Khrushchev-Brezhnev was like (even physically, though that may be accidental) a chart illustrating the evolution of the hominids, read backwards.

But now there came many breaches of the official silence. Solzhenitsyn ‘illegally’ gave us Gulag Archipelago. From Sakharov came striking interviews and interventions. (The former was expelled from the country, the latter sentenced to internal exile.) There was flowering of samizdat and, to counter it, many arrests (and putting into penal ‘psychiatric’ wards – like my friend Vladimir Bukovsky and others – as well as GULAG). And there was Roy Medvedev’s Let History Judge – from, what is more, a devoted Leninist: a deeply detailed blow at the Stalin terror. There was a liberalism of the catacombs. Above all, the old falsifications lost credibility among anything describable as an educated class in Russia. The public acceptance of what they knew to be not merely falsehoods, but stupid and long-exposed falsehoods – the mere disgrace of it ate into the morale of even the official intelligentsia, as I remember noting in conversations with Soviet diplomats.

Meanwhile the original 1968 edition of The Great Terror had been published in a Russian version (in Florence in 1972) and was soon being smuggled into the USSR where it was welcomed by many outside – and, as we now know, inside – official circles.

5

In the early 1980s came the realisation in Moscow that the whole regime had become non-viable economically, ecologically, intellectually – and even militarily – largely because of this rejection of reality. Records of Politburo meetings from 1985 on show that the highest leadership itself could not manage to find the facts about the fate of their own relatives! It has long been known, in much the same context, how the documents on the Katyn massacre, showing the whole case to have been falsified, were only found in a secret file sealed in the safe of the General Secretary.

When it came to Soviet history, and Stalin’s Terror, there was, as on other themes, some sharp disagreement in the Politburo – later to produce the attempted coup of 1991. It is only now that records of these disputes have been published.7 Much of this centred in the rehabilitation of Bukharin. It was even urged (in Gaidar Alley’s words) that ‘the liquidation of the kulaks as a class was a political concept, that did not imply the physical annihilation of people’!

More fundamentally one finds Gorbachev telling his colleagues: ‘Millions rehabilitated – that is the great service done by Nikita Khrushchev.’ Why did this ‘stop short?’ he asked: ‘because Khrushchev too had blood on his hands.’ As to his successors, they had done their best to keep the truth unknown: ‘Under Brezhnev, under Andropov, under Chernenko even members of the Politburo had no information.’8

Gorbachev goes on to tell the full story of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU in 1934 (long rejected in pro-Soviet circles) with the number of votes against Stalin – and that there was indeed a serious attempt to remove him from the leadership. As to what followed, Stalin’s ‘use of the Kirov murder to bring in repression’, the only motive being ‘the struggle for power’ is described. And, Gorbachev adds, ‘Plots against him – that’s all rubbish (chepukkha).’9

He then speaks of ‘three million sentenced, and that the most active part of the nation. A million shot. And that is not counting the share of dekulakisation and the fate of people at the time of deportations. And this was Stalin. How can that be accepted, let alone forgiven?’10

But the whole direction of glasnost, among other things, brought a mass of officially banned knowledge out of hiding. The first public mention in Russia of my book was when Katrina van den Heuvel interviewed me for Moskovski Novosti (2–9 April 1989). When I was in Moscow later that year, it was all over. Through the decade there had been little reply to the book from the Party establishment. But now the Stalinist writer Aleksandr Chakovsky called me ‘anti-Sovietchik number one’ at the last plenum of the Central Committee. By that time the Russian edition was being serialised (in a million copies each month) in Neva.

Over the next four or five years I was welcomed in Russia, making many friends, speaking to cultural and other groups and at conferences hosted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Going into Izvestiya to collect payment for a contribution to a Moscow journal, I saw Bukharin’s portrait hanging along with those of the other former editors. I spent some weeks being filmed round the country for Red Empire, a documentary series made by Granada Television, which aired not only in the West in English, but also in the Soviet Union (in Ukrainian, Kazakh and Russian).11 Among those I had met earlier abroad, it was hard not to relish Andrei Voznesensky’s saying the could hardly believe I was there: could he pinch me to make sure? As to the breadth of reception, I was interviewed by Kommunist12 – though only later having interesting meetings with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and others.

And now, for the first time in twenty years, the new openness had uncovered so much new material that it became possible, and even necessary, to produce a new edition of this book. The Great Terror: A Reassessment was published in 1990. Much had emerged seriatim in the years since the original 1968 edition, but particularly over the recent glasnost period.

6

The information now available – even what was available in the late 1960s – established the story clearly as to historical essentials, and in a generally correct way as to almost all crucial details. But we were soon like modem historians of an ancient empire who have had to rely on a few inscriptions, some only recently deciphered, when a huge store of first-hand records is discovered under some pyramid. Enough for generations of archaeologists…

Even under glasnost we had to search for information, for evidence. Now, into the twenty-first century, there is so much of it that to produce a truly new ‘version’ of this book would require a regiment of researchers, to sift out and to boil down the available myriads of documents that researchers have meanwhile found. Much has been printed from the presidential, the State, the Party and the police archives, both central and provincial. Russia’s Federal Security Service is reported to have declassified over two million secret documents in the past fifteen years, but of course there are more.13 The sheer amount of material is such that there is still something new every week or so. It is only as I draft this introduction that those astonishing 1985–91 Politburo reports have become available in book form.

A point not adequately covered in The Great Terror was the huge volume of paperwork produced. Even for minor ‘criminals’ there are long-winded, highly formal orders for arrest and identifications by age, nationality, address and status, signed by a local NKVD man. Then there are pages of interrogation, question-and-answer sessions, also so signed, with a more senior NKVD officer’s counter-signature, then longish verdicts by Troikas or courts. In fairly important cases these run into volumes. They often include ‘confrontations’ where the accused are questioned with other suspects: a practice earlier known to have been used with Bukharin, Pyatnitski, etc. with Stalin present. All this was typed up, employing a large secretarial staff. There are several tens of millions of NKVD files of this type in existence and as many relevant party files.

One now has the records of interrogation of major victims – even Yenukidze from Stalin’s own past (sent to Stalin ‘for information’), and Yagoda, and (later) Yezhov. Typically, Yagoda’s interrogation on 26 April 1937 is described as ‘the result of prolonged interrogation’ with eyewitness confrontations, during which he denied what was testified by fellow conspirators such as ‘Pauker, Volovich, Gay and others’. But at a later session he gives nine pages of suitable evidence – an improvement over the first effort also noted of Yezhov, Frinovsky and others.

As to the major high-level victims in general there is, at last, the full list of those of that description shot at the end of July 1938: 139 of them (countersigned by Stalin).14 The cemetery records, with prison photograph, of myriads of such victims are themselves astonishing. The charges are mostly routine, but (for instance) it is odd to find of Kamenev’s widow that in addition to terrorism, she was shot for ‘a counter-revolutionary conversation with a foreign diplomat’.15

The victims even of the mass terror are registered, with each individual’s identification – in the files and publications of that splendid organisation MEMORIAL, and in such collections as Leningradskii Martirolog and local equivalents over the whole country. Each such volume appears with expert editorial prefaces and so on that are often most illuminating.

More generally, there are such collections as the fifty Rossiya XX Vek series, especially its Reabilitatsiya volumes 1–3. And, in addition to the new (for us) documentation, there are hundreds of well-researched books in the field, by Russian, Ukrainian, German, English, Dutch, French and Italian writers (though some excellent Russian research has been unbelievably mis-edited in an English version). Hundreds of sources are quoted, with thousands of footnotes – often to the archival number of fond, register and file page (the originals still, of course, in their old sites – though many of them are also copied to Western and other libraries). Some references are to Russian archives that are still, or again, restricted, and only quoted from researchers’ notes or memory.

The result is a long and highly detailed record of total and grotesque falsification, bringing us ever more deeply into the distance between untruth and reality. The sheer magnitude of the former stands out. It is a different world, a different universe.

7

By far the most substantial additions, or amendments, to our knowledge have been the set of decrees on ‘Mass Operations’ in 1937–8, of which I was not earlier able to present so coherent a picture.

The lists of those sentenced by the Military Collegium were sent to Stalin, and given his approval, with only a few Politburo members also signing. Nor did this informal leadership group have much time to spare. Records show that they had to make so many decisions on other urgent matters of policy that these terror orders were usually handled in twenty or thirty minutes. When it comes to the Mass Operations, one finds that the number of victims in these accounted for nearly twenty times the number of victims of the Military Collegium and other lesser tribunals.

I had, indeed, reported on a number of local examples of denunciatory hysteria. But it all had still registered as something like overspill from the main event; that it had worked its way down, as it were by inertia, into the general population. In reality the mass terror was ordered in detail from the top and was directed, with the numbers to be repressed laid down for each province and republic, for strata of the population – with individual crimes of terrorism, espionage and so on added later by the local Troika – and the lists of names then submitted to Moscow for final approval.

The Politburo decision of 2 July 1937, on Anti-Soviet Elements, is signed by Stalin, and addressed to all secretaries of provinces and republics, as a telegram. It starts by saying that many ‘former kulaks and criminals’ are guilty of ‘anti-Soviet and diversionary crime’. The NKVD is immediately to arrest and shoot the most hostile, and send the others to exile. For this purpose Troikas are to be created within fifteen days.

This is followed on 30 July 1937 by the crucial NKVD Operational Prikaz 00447 to ‘repress former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements’. In more detail its first paragraph adds, ‘churchmen, members of sects’, and of ‘anti-Soviet political parties, the SRs …’ and others, together with targets such as ‘“Aferisty”’. Various directives based on it were issued – one on the Social Revolutionaries on 18 January 1938, one on Mensheviks and Anarchists on 14 February 1938.

The second section of Prikaz 00447 lists the numbers to be shot or jailed at once in each of the sixty-four provinces and republics named – numbers often increased, frequently with Stalin’s signature, over the next fifteen months. This is followed by treatment of wives of the repressed, who are to serve sentences of varying harshness, depending on their complicity.

This Prikaz then lists by name the members of the Troika in each province or republic. Each Troika is to report its sentences, on a form indicated, six times a month by telegram or urgent post to the Head of the Eighth Department of the Central NKVD (at this time V. E. Tsesarski), though later transferred to the First Special Department (and I. I. Shapiro). The verdicts were sent in the form of ‘albums’, and Moscow’s men had only time to put in a figure (for GULAG years), or, more commonly, just the letter R for rasstrel (shoot).

This anti-‘kulak’ Prikaz was accompanied by orders targeting a different category – the ‘national’. Operative Prikaz 00485 is on the repression of ‘members of the Polish Military Organisation’ in the USSR. Then there is the German Prikaz, 00439, directed in the first place against German citizens, including political refugees from the Nazi regime. The Latvians are covered in Memorandum 49990 of 30 November 1937. The last of these ‘national’ decrees was on the Greeks – Directive 50216, to take effect on 15 December 1937.

Operative Prikaz 00693 of 23 September 1937, citing the original ‘National Prikaz’, covers all ‘border crossers’ – for political reasons or because of ‘better material conditions in the USSR, as a result of unemployment and famine in their own countries’. But the oddest of the ‘national’ categories (see Chapter 9) is that of the Harbintsy – former Russian subjects and their families working on the Chinese Eastern Railway, handed over by the Soviets to Japan in 1935 and until then run by the USSR. (Not a ‘nationality’ at all!)

One finds Frinovsky writing to the Sverdlovsk NKVD of the ‘national’ categories that the victims’ identification documents as sent to Moscow seldom register them as in their supposed national target. But of those arrested in the province as ‘German’ only 390 were German out of 4,142, as also with Poles and others. And similarly with the ‘kulak’ operation: only less than half of the charge sheets identify the victim as ‘kulak’ at all, and even of the 3,789 ‘former kulaks’, 3,552 were workers.16 Similarly, in the West Siberian Krai, those arrested under 00447 included almost as many SR victims as the ‘kulak’ component proper (9,689 and 10,541 respectively).17

It will be seen that the Prikazes do not specify any political or other crime, but merely sections of the population. The Troikas (or Dvoikas Commissions of the NKVD and Prosecutor) are to fill in the actual accusations afterwards. And it is clear, above all, that it was organised and controlled from the centre. So it is now beyond dispute that the mass terror was set in motion from above, and not on any objective basis, true or false, but by quotas of categories thought unamenable to Soviet rule. That is to say the strata were condemned as such and the mass terror is seen as a removal of all that seemed unassimilable to the Stalinist order. Stalin’s mass action against a section of the population was thus taken on ‘ideological’ grounds, merely disguising it as a purge of terrorists, spies and saboteurs necessary to the safety and survival of the regime.

Even local NKVD chiefs, though certainly incited to or predisposed to the currently raging paranoia, are reported as becoming exhausted. When things had got completely out of hand an NKVD Prikaz 00762 was given on 26 November 1938 (following a Politburo decision on 17 November), annulling eleven Prikazy and other instructions from July 1937 to September 1938, and immediately bringing to a close any sort of mass operation, noting too that ‘arrests are to be made on a strictly individual basis’.

So the ‘Great’ terror ends with the appointment of Beria to head the NKVD, which is to say that, even if not great by some standards, terror continued to flourish.

There are a number of other points in the 1990 edition that need input or correction from material not then available. One of these is on the victim totals of 1937–8, of which no full account had yet emerged. So I had little choice but to summarise the long Appendix on the subject in here of the 1968 edition, with estimates based on various sources. As it turned out, this was correct on the vital matter – the numbers put to death: about one million.’

‘Camps’ is a vague and general category; the dating is confused; and the figures given fail to cover various other forms of penal exile18 (or indeed the fate of families); ‘special exiles’ as given by Pavel Polyan for MEMORIAL are in the six–seven million range – and this is not including the eight million who had gone through Gulag by 1940.19 This of course affects the figures given for ‘Arrests’ – both as to dates and because including all arrested for minor offences (sometimes only held for days and often counted again on rearrest).

Even so apparently concrete a number as those dead in camps runs into problems – being affected by the practice of releasing prisoners on the point of death, so that they could be registered as civilian dead; or the writing off of the many deaths among the million-odd Gulag prisoners ‘released’ into penal battalions and driven into attacks by machine-guns. The subject is still full of uncertainties – the most highly detailed Russian analyses continue often to mix both particular categories and the periods covered. To this day it is hard to enumerate those directly suffering – though not so listed. Nor, of course, can we specify so simply the crucial matter of the effect on the general population.20

However, we are now much better informed than in 1990. In the absence of total documentation, estimates of large categories are always in dispute – even the numbers in peaceful ‘demonstrations’ in the West! In history, the numbers given by Herodotus for Xerxes’ army, or by Tacitus for the losses at Mons Graupius, are similarly a good deal too high – as are those given at the time on the medieval Anglo-Scottish border wars. So in this field some ‘revision’ must be taken into account, though not as to the crucial killings of 1937–8. Exact numbers may never be known with complete certainty, but the total of deaths caused by the whole range of the Soviet regime’s terrors can hardly be lower than some thirteen to fifteen million.

I have seen it argued, or implied, that the deaths might be seen as a necessary sacrifice to the expected creation of a perfect society. Yet the worst of the terror was not the killings, however excessive, but the regular accompaniment throughout of torture. How could anyone ignore or justify the torments inflicted on Meyerhold, or Babel, or all the many other victims?

It is accepted everywhere – well, almost everywhere – that these terrors were on a mass scale, enough to crush the country both physically and mentally – and, one should add, morally.

8

Meanwhile I should fill in a few other points.

One sphere which was inadequate in the 1990 edition was a complete coverage of the NKVD – the core of the terror. Its basic order of battle, as given in 1934, is there. But after that it becomes far less definitive. This was so even in the late 1990s. On some quite important points one had nothing (one typical, if minor nuisance was that one had no way of knowing that the NKVD ‘Economic Department’, so called, was no longer so listed). We now have the complete terror personnel of the NKVD. This does not, it is true, affect one’s view of the terror, but it needs attention.

It was known, for example, that the key figure in the Zinoviev case was a G. A. Molchanov – and it is now known that V. M. Kurski led the Pyatakov case (though then committing suicide while Acting Deputy People’s Commissar of the NKVD).

One major error I gave was the reported execution of the fearful Zakovski in 1939. In fact he was shot on 28 August 1938. His killing, together with other NKVD men shot with him, was later to be attributed to Frinovsky covering his tracks by ‘silencing’ fellow conspirators.

On the final reckoning of the Yezhov cadres and other victims left over from the earlier period I gave the little that was known in 1990. The full story has now been given. It took place from a list submitted to Stalin on 16 January 1940, of whom 346 were shot over the next couple of weeks. They included, as I noted, such figures as Isak Babel, Vsevolod Meyerhold and Mikhail Koltsov, and political high-ups like Robert Eikhe. Now one finds that Yezhov himself was among them, with his whole top following. He, Frinovsky, E. G. Evdokimov, and the worst NKVD torturers, were shot on 3 and 4 February (Frinovsky’s wife and son were also shot, as were those of E. G. Evdokimov); the more peripheral former Deputy People’s Commissar S. L. Zhukovski was also shot, but his wife only got a Gulag sentence (‘suitable for HEAVY physical labour’).21

It is perhaps rather an irony that Frinovsky, with a long record of torture, was himself tortured into a confession that he had thus broken socialist legality. And we now find that the supposed final document of the great terror, Stalin’s secret telegram of 10 January 1939 (saying that ‘physical pressure’ on prisoners had been permitted ‘since 1937’), was published during the early ‘de-Stalinisation’ phase without this crucial passage:

The method of physical pressure was abused by Zakovsky, Litvin, Uspensky, and other scoundrels … For these abuses, they have been given due punishment, but this in no way detracts from the value of the method itself when it is properly used.22

The interrogation of Yezhov himself, on 26 April 1939, starts ‘in the preliminary confrontation you said that for ten years you had been a spy for Poland’. In the long documentation of the question-and-answer session that follows he also (with such other names as Yakir, Chubar, Kossior) becomes a spy for Germany. Yezhov goes on to implicate most of the Chekists (all at immense length), but finally adds that he himself only became a British spy later – through his wife, who had by that time committed suicide.23

9

I cover the army purges fully, but should add that much more is now known about the results – in particular on how they affected the high command. A full list with the whole careers of the officers down to the brigade commanders, with dates and circumstances of death is given. A later analysis notes that the military education of a general staff major takes a minimum of ten or twelve years, and of an army commander twenty years; ‘and they were almost all liquidated’. Even Zhukov at the beginning of the war in no way matched Tukhachevsky or Yegorov in his training.24

In 1940 the German High Command rated the Soviet army as very powerful, but noted that it would not be effective for several years, because the lack of experienced commanders could not be quickly remedied. The material now available on the 1939–40 period includes much on the debacle of the Finnish War, followed by the almost ruinous effect of Stalin’s actions before and after June 1941.

The only point that one has not seen fully stressed is how the repulse of the Germans from Moscow in December 1941 was such a near thing – partly because Hitler had diverted the troops’ attack. But it was not until 28 July 1942 that there came Stalin’s ‘Backs to the Wall’ Order No. 227, saying that so much territory and population and so much industry and production has been lost, that no further retreat was possible. Here again the Germans had diverted half their blow away from Stalingrad. And even so (and even after Hitler’s ban on a breakout), it took years of hard fighting to reach Berlin, although now the Soviets had enormous inputs of war material from the West, without which, as Marshal Zhukov said, ‘victory would have been impossible’.

A crucial point is one of the direct results of the downgrading of the High Command: that the replacements’ ‘lack of training’ resulted, even after 1942, in reliance on frontal attack, as back on the Somme or on the Chemin des Dames. Untrained in tactics and minor strategy, the commanders had little choice – particularly as Stalin seems to have judged a commander by the level of his casualties. One sadly ironic result was that Moscow was to claim moral superiority over the Allies on the grounds of higher losses. Alexander Yakovlev, himself badly wounded, once told me that the first grain of his scepticism about Party rule was sown when he noted the pointless casualties ordered.

A striking footnote is that the wives of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Kork and Gamarnik, who had only been given eight years’ imprisonment, were retried and shot after the outbreak of war, whose disasters their husbands might have helped the country avoid.

After the war, the extreme re-Stalinisation has been blamed in Russia on Stalin’s fear of the new spirit to be found among the returning veterans. At the more senior level we have Generals Gordov and Rybalchenko, in 1946, bugged by the Secret Police. They speak of ‘only the government living, the broad masses beggared’; that ‘it was necessary for us to have genuine democracy’; that ‘the people is silent, it is afraid’.25 Both were arrested in January 1947 and, together with ex-Marshal Kulik, shot.

10

We must remember that both Stalin and the refractory members of the leadership were Old Bolsheviks. So those who, to one degree or another, tried in the early thirties to ‘liberalise’ the Soviet regime were as much committed as Stalin himself not only to a variety of Marxism-Leninism, but also to Stalin’s collectivisation and industrialisation projects – but not to unconditional obedience.

The circumstances of the Kirov murder on 1 December 1934 are still disputed. The sticking point, for those who do not credit Stalin’s responsibility, is the supposed absence of any sign of his distrust of Kirov – indeed, of any post-1930 dispute in the Politburo. This can be refuted on several grounds. We now know from his personal records of Kirov’s own notably ‘incorrect’ attitudes over the whole period – and, indeed, even earlier.26 A long-known, and heated, dispute between Stalin and Kirov over food supplies in Leningrad was confirmed in Khrushchev’s time. Even lesser documents give evidence of such clashes, including a sharp dispute between Kirov’s number two, I. F. Kodatsky, and Molotov – i.e. between the Party and State machines (which the Russian historian Oleg V. Khlevniuk covers at length). They balked, in general, at what they saw as an unjustified extension of the class struggle to include themselves on the wrong side.

We do not have final ‘proof’ or ‘certainty’ of Stalin’s responsibility for the murder. Let me quote a competent historian. Macaulay writes, in his essay on Warren Hastings, ‘The rules of evidence in law save scores of culprits whom judges, jury and spectators firmly believe to be guilty… But it is clear that an acquittal so obtained cannot be pleaded in bar of the judgement of history.’ Instead of proof, we have an accumulation of suspicious facts and a highly suspicious suspect. Khlevniuk, when it comes to the Kirov murder, does not exculpate or accuse Stalin, saying merely, ‘there are not enough facts available to settle the question.’ ‘Political murders’, he adds, ‘are prepared in strict secrecy, and orders for them are not registered in documents.’27

As to the absence of direct written evidence, let us look at the murder of the Soviet Yiddish actor and director Solomon Mikhoels in 1948. If Stalin had survived Beria, or the latter had not repudiated the anti-Semitic line, no evidence of this supposed car accident would have emerged. As it is, we know the order came directly from Stalin to the MGB chief Viktor Abakumov, and from him to the actual murderers.

As to Kirov, it is not hard to construct a scenario: Stalin lets it be known to Yagoda that the interests of the Party require a terrorist act – and also the removal of a member of the Politburo, Kirov. Half of that membership was eliminated over the next few years, so that Stalin’s own attitude is clear, and that would also apply to the portion of the Party mind to be expected in Yagoda. Kirov had opposed and prevented an attempt of his to impose as head of the Leningrad NKVD the appalling E. G. Evdokimov. We now know that Evdokimov lasted three days. Kirov would not accept him, so he clearly got the post behind Kirov’s back. My unofficial source gave the date wrong (it was 1931, not 1933), but as so often is the case with these indirect reports, the facts were right.

But the case for Stalin’s supposed innocence seriously distorts a more important question: did Stalin meet any opposition, or reluctance, from the wholly pro-Stalin, anti-opposition Politburo after 1930? The argument put forward was that there was no ‘record’ of such. But this was based not on records of discussion, which indeed hardly existed, but on the documents finally agreed on in the Politburo. There have always been reports, from several good sources, of sharp disagreements.

Evidence of such was indeed unregistered. But when Stalin was on holiday, Lazar Kaganovich reported to him. We have for some time had a letter from him to Stalin of 2 August 1932, saying that two (unnamed) members of the Politburo had objected to or criticised the draft of the 7 August 1932 terror decree’s vital second and third paragraphs. On 29 August of that year Stalin complained that in his absence Kaganovich and Molotov had (on another issue) allowed the Politburo to take an ‘incorrect’ and dangerous position, sponsored by Ordzhonikidze, with even Kaganovich ‘in the camp of reactionary elements’ – soon overruled by the lone absentee.28 This question of opposition, also clear from Gorbachev’s testimony, is important to our understanding of the period. Stalin was later to obtain a more acceptable Politburo.

The finally revealed full text of Stalin’s speech at the crucial ‘February—March 1937’ plenum that followed the suicide of Ordzhonikidze (presented at the time as a heart attack) has him several times praising Ordzhonikidze, then deploring his having, behind the Party’s back, kept up a relationship with the deviationist V. V. Lominadze (himself a suicide in 1935).29 Such an accusation levelled at a living Communist at the time would have been followed by arrest and purge.

In a report on counter-revolutionary groups in Georgia (dated 20 July 1937) to Stalin (addressing him as ‘Dear Koba’) from Beria, then only Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia, we read ‘evidence has been given that Sergo Ordzhonikidze had, willingly or unwillingly, given much moral and material support to former Georgians and Transcaucasians transferred from Georgia and Transcaucasia, giving factual help to them in their counter-revolutionary work against the Party’.30 Obviously Beria would not have dreamt of such a suggestion unless sure of a welcome. And he follows it up with a letter (20 September 1937) quoting the ‘confession’ of Orakhelashvili telling of Ordzhonikidze being ‘the soul of our counter-revolutionary struggle with the Party leadership of Georgia’.31

So now there is even a better reason than before to see a hostile relationship, already deducible from the later arrest of his family, the change of place names previously given in his honour and so on. And now, too, in the decensored version of Anastas Mikoyan’s Memoirs, the point is made that for several years Stalin suggested to his circle that Ordzhonikidze might have been a British spy.32

11

This book has been faulted for giving too little attention to the context of Russia and of the Russian historical and mental backgrounds.

George Orwell wrote more than half a century ago, ‘Till recently it was thought proper to pretend that human beings are very much alike, but in fact any one able to use his eyes knows that the average of human behaviour differs from country to country. Things that could happen in one country could not happen in another.’

Much of that is implicit in the whole story. But I perhaps need to develop it a little more broadly and not merely in a general way, but as a particular insight into the minds of the main characters. How does this affect our subject? We find what seem to be contradictions. Any reader of the country’s great literature may feel an especially Russian humanism arising from the depths of the ‘national character’. On the other hand, Ronald Hingley (in his classic The Russian Mind) saw the fictional and the real Russian as living in great dullness interspersed with, or accompanying, extreme arbitrariness, but also possessed by a view of the country’s past and present as deplorable yet containing as recompense a wonderful future with some sort of national glory compensating for everything. A complementary trait often reported is the fear that a Russian, or Russia, is being deceived or cheated – the sort of thing we see in Gogol’s Dead Souls, and in Soviet xenophobia.

The broader problem is – to this day – not primarily economic or even political. It is a certain lack of much feeling for community in the sense of a civic or plural order. Both the new Western liberal element and the old traditional Christian element of Russia, facing their crisis before a truly successful amalgam had been attained, were to be crushed by a compound of a different kind, formed from an archaic brutality and an imported theoretical-terrorist tradition. An odd fideism.

Thus the ‘ruling class’ appears as the product of centuries of history of personal and collective experiences, of indoctrination, and of psychological suitability to surviving those experiences and accepting that indoctrination, while the country’s recent and present political structure derives in part from the entire Russian background and in part from the specific Communist inheritance.

But this does downgrade Russia’s other option – liberalism or pluralism. As Pasternak put it, in the 1880s came ‘the birth of an enlightened and affluent middle class, open to Occidental influences, progressive, intelligent, artistic’.33 There are many historical and modern examples of this more ‘Western’ style of thought in Russia, deep-set, and though often disenchanted continuing to present a more viable and civilised future. Today’s Russia is not totalitarian. The Terror is not denied. The economy is viable. But one can have ‘reform’ without liberalism – as with Peter the Great and Pyotr Stolypin. Above all we are still far from the rule of law – much more important than ‘democracy'. As elsewhere, the problem seems to be to free the idea of the ‘nation’ from both archaic barbarism and from the more recently bankrupted verbalisms that have partly melded into it. To turn inwards, outwards and upwards?

12

Except to that degree I have scarcely covered the specific mindsets, or motivations, behind the terror.

The Western sentimentalisation of the Soviet order was to a large extent overcome in the past half-century, at least as far as the Stalin period is concerned. But it is still maintained that he perverted Bolshevism – not merely that Stalin was worse than Lenin (not in itself much of a humanitarian criterion) but even that Lenin and Leninism are to some extent admirable. Without going deeply into this, one may adduce a few fundamental points.

First, of course, is the basic Marxist theory of history driven by economic class struggle – but in particular Lenin’s version in What is to be Done?, with its addition that the proletariat, in itself lacking the capacity, needed a professional, paid, ideologically trained, full-time leadership. But his most lasting, and worldwide contribution – the principle on which the Party was to be organised – is ‘Democratic Centralism’. For this meant that once a decision on action, or abstract belief, was taken by the leadership, all members had to accept it. With it went Lenin’s clearly stated ruling that any act, however immoral by bourgeois standards, was justifiable if helping the ‘Party’. Taken into the basic rules of his Comintern, it discouraged even the half-open mind. And in non-Soviet Communist parties it meant infiltrating and taking over any independent group. One result was that Ernest Bevin, head of the large and powerful Transport and General Workers Union in Britain, a prime target for fierce CPGB intrigue, was able to complain, when Foreign Secretary in the Labour government, that Molotov was behaving just like a Communist. A similar lesson seems to have been learned by Ronald Reagan from experience in Hollywood.

Utopian activism is nothing new in history. Norman Cohn, in his classic study of apocalyptic movements in medieval and post-medieval Europe, writes of their seeking a future of ‘unanimity’ and that in modern totalitarians ‘the crudeness and narrowness of this thinking strikingly recalls the prophetae of medieval Europe’. He sees these as ‘a true prototype of a modern totalitarian party; a restlessly dynamic and utterly ruthless group which, obsessed by the apocalyptic phantasy and filled with the conviction of its own infallibility, set itself infinitely above the rest of humanity and recognised no claims save that of its own supposed mission’, concerned with ‘bringing history to its preordained consummation’. And ‘for all their exploitation of the most modern technology Communism and Nazism have been inspired by phantasies which are downright archaic’. Indeed, Cohn sees Western misunderstanding of Communism as due to ignoring, or forgetting, our own earlier history.34

Lenin, it should hardly need adding, suppressed all non-Bolshevik parties (and all moderate tendencies with the Bolshevik Party) and, as far as possible, all independent thought. The revolutionary heroine Rosa Luxemburg had always rejected Lenin’s organisational methods as turning the Party into ‘an automation’. After the October Revolution she took issue in 1918 with the Soviet suppression of freedom of discussion as ruinous to socialism, and tending not merely to stupefaction but inevitably bound to cause ‘a brutalisation of public life …’35 Above all in the ruling caste, though also to a great extent with society as a whole, the narrow ideological criteria produced what has long been diagnosed in Moscow as ‘negative selection’.

As to ‘terror’ itself, we can compare the views of Engels and of Lenin on the 1793 Reign of Terror in France. Lenin wrote of ‘that genuine, popular, truly regenerative terror for which the Great French Revolution became famous’.36 Engels, on the other hand, wrote (in a letter to Marx, 4 September 1870), ‘Terror consists mostly of useless cruelties perpetrated by frightened people in order to reassure themselves. I am convinced that the blame for the Reign of Terror in 1793 lies almost exclusively with the over-nervous bourgeois, demeaning himself as a patriot, the small petty bourgeois crapping their pants with fright and the mob of riff-raff who know how to profit from the terror.’37

So Marxism in itself did not insist on terror. Indeed, Lenin’s ‘terror’ outlook seems to have come from the earlier Russian fanatics. He was a revolutionary, following Chernyshevsky, before he became a Marxist. One element in his specifically Russian background was, of course, the absence of experience of real politics to be found everywhere – reminding one of de Toqueville’s analysis of eighteenth-century France, where writers and theorists, left out of the polity, fell into violent messianisms.

There should be no need to describe the repression that followed the Bolshevik seizure of power, culminating in the openly designated ‘Red Terror’ – with Lenin personally ordering the killing of local groups of class-enemy hostages. Lenin documents kept secret for seventy-odd years, on the grounds that they did not fit his image, are full of calls to hang such. Bertrand Russell writes, when he met Lenin, ‘His guffaw at the thought of those massacred made my blood run cold.’

It is in Lenin’s time too that we see the first Bolshevik ‘show trial’ (recalling that of Danton in 1793). This was that of the Social Revolutionaries (1922) when Lenin was enraged at a compromise reached with the Second International not to use the death penalty.

Though dropped in the present volume the 1968 edition of The Great Terror, had an eight-page Appendix on the other show trials that preceded those of 1936–8. In 1928 came the Shakhty Trial (followed by the Menshevik Trial in 1931 and the Metrovick Trial in 1933). The first of these was very indicative – a total frame-up of engineers, for sabotage (though opposed by some of the Communist leadership). When it comes to collectivisation, Molotov comments ‘they say that Lenin would have carried out collectivisation without so many victims. But how could it have been carried out otherwise?’38 He adds that Lenin would probably have done it even earlier, that he was ‘sterner’ than Stalin and had often decided on ‘extreme measures’ while ‘rebuking Stalin for softness and liberalism’. At any rate, ‘kulak’ in the absence of any surviving bourgeoisie, remained a plausible object of attack right through the 1930s.

It is true that much of the veteran membership felt that the regime, committed to the crushing of the peasantry and facing the ensuing crisis, could survive only by holding firm under the accepted leadership. But the whole Marxist-Leninist vocabulary or credo combined such justifications with at least some appearance of civilised conduct, as presented on the world stage.

One remarkable example of an attempt to present hardly defensible actions as humane, in order to give a suitable impression to Westerners, was when Stalin gave the French progressive, and usefully pro-Soviet, writer Romain Rolland his reasons for bringing in the published law of 7 April 1935, extending the death penalty down to twelve-year-olds (which had had a bad press in France). Their conversation was recorded, but with a note that it was not to be published without Stalin’s permission, which it never got. Stalin’s barely credible defence of the law was

This enactment has a purely educational importance. We have thus sought to deter not so much juvenile delinquents as those who involved children in crime. Groups of ten to fifteen boys and girls were identified in our schools that set out to kill or corrupt the foremost students of both sexes. Foremost students were drowned in wells, assaulted, battered and terrorised. It was established that such children’s gangs were organised by adult criminals. The enactment was promulgated to intimidate and disorganise adult gangsters.39

There is a later decree, of 15 August 1937, on the treatment of children of enemies of the people. Those over fifteen were to be tried like their mothers. ‘Socially dangerous children’ were to be sent to labour camps or colonies or ‘children’s homes of special regime’. Nursing babies up to one or one and a half years old were to remain with their mothers. Under Stalin that was unpublished, but in the case of Rolland it appears that Stalin wanted to have it both ways – to publicise terror without losing his Western admirers – just as, in a more demonstrative way, with the ‘democratic’ New Constitution of 1936, presaging or accompanying, with as huge a propaganda uproar, the great show trials.

I have suggested that there were veterans who, though submissive to the ‘Party line’, held remnants, or remembrances, of the idea of the open mind. There had always been in the past a certain tendency (often denounced) to ‘rotten liberalism’. It had given trouble, right from the October days of 1917, when a majority of the leadership wanted a coalition government, to the ‘Right’ opposition of the late 1920s – always denounced, but even so representing some revulsion against mass repression and thought control.

In the Politburo debates of the late eighties the point is several times made that Stalin held power already in 1934 at the time of the Seventeenth Congress, so that he did not need to struggle. It was ‘the Congress of Victors’. Most of the former opposition had conceded. That is to say there was, by any standards, no call for a Party purge – even less for a full-scale tyranny. If Stalin had been deprived of power in 1934, might some sort of Dubček near miss have arisen in Moscow? Perhaps.

That is, as far as progress and any idea of ‘inevitability’ are concerned. The logic of Stalinism, and Stalin, was different. The crushing of the enemy classes was complete. The non-Communist views on socialism had long since been rejected. Deviationism was defeated, but there were signs of its revival. A new elite, with none of the detritus of their past, was needed for total triumph. He had accomplished much. But the class enemy was becoming ever more vicious and more subtle, infecting the Party and indeed the whole country. All ways to combat this were urgently needed. Terror means terrorising. Mass terror means terrorising the whole population, and must be accompanied by the most complete public exposure of the worst enemies of the people, of the Party line and so of the truth. We know the results.

One of the strangest notions put forward about Stalinism is that, in the interests of ‘objectivity’ we must be – wait for it – ‘non-judgemental’. But to ignore, or downplay, the realities of Soviet history is itself a judgement and a very misleading one. Let me conclude with Patrick Henry saying in 1775 ‘I know no way of judging of the future but by the past’.40 The corollary is that misreading of the past incapacitates us as regards our understanding of the future – and of the present too.

Robert Conquest, September 2007