American War Machine

39. Theodore Shackley with Richard A. Finney, Spymaster: My Life in the CIA (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 281.

40. John Prados, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 165.

41. Corn, Blond Ghost, 96. It may or may not be pertinent that Shackley’s first overseas service in CIA was under Lucien Conein, who as an OSS officer in World War II “had some experiences in common with many of Saigon’s Corsican gangsters” (McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 249).

42. Joseph J. Trento, Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America’s Private Intelligence Network (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2005), 213.

43. Susan Lynn Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997),156. Stilwell was serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as deputy undersecretary for policy.

44. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 361. Trento writes that Colby had earlier sent emissaries to Khun Sa “to see if he would join with the other armies in fighting the Pathet Lao. After he refused, Shackley orchestrated a media attack . . . and painted the Burmese warlord as the biggest heroin dealer in the world” (Trento, Prelude to Terror, 32).

45. Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf, 427. As redacted in his new book, The Strength of the Pack, Valentine’s paragraph, with no additional evidence, ends more tendentiously: “The battle ended with Khun Sa and the KMT in retreat and the CIA in control of the opium trade, as it was conducted by Vang Pao and numerous Laotian political and military officials” (333). A more sympathetic account would acknowledge that the CIA was trying to foster a capitalist Laos with a capitalist ruling class, where the only obvious source of capital was, inevitably, opium.

46. Shackley, Spymaster, 208–9.

47. Prados, Lost Crusader, 168.

48. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 318, citing interviews with the president of Xieng Khouang Air Transport, a former USAID official, and high-ranking Hmong officials, 1971. Cf. Shackley, Spymaster, 182: “Lair also had visions of the Hmong having their own civil air transport. I supported that endeavor, and it resulted in our helping Vang Pao to set up Xieng Khouang Air Transport with an old DC-3.”

49. Curtis Peebles, Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations against the USSR (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 255.

50. See, e.g., William J. Chambliss, On the Take: From Petty Crooks to Presidents (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 186–89.

51. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 15.

52. Trento, Prelude to Terror, 38.

53. Trento, Prelude to Terror, 33.

54. Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World’s Most Corrupt Financial Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 130; U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, United States of America vs. Edwin Paul Wilson, Criminal Case H-82-139. Interestingly, Wilson, in 1968, while still a CIA staff agent under commercial cover, filed a report outlining his “limited” contacts with Edward K. Moss, a CIA–mob go-between to be discussed in chapter 7 (Memo of 14 May 1973 from Jerry G. Brown to Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff, CIA, NARA Record #104-10122-10376).

55. Scott Armstrong and Jeff Nason, Mother Jones, November–December 1991, quoted in Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 130.

56. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (1991), 471–72, 477. Cf. Corn, Blond Ghost, 328, 356; Christopher Robbins, The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in the CIA’s Secret War in Laos (New York: Crown, 1987), 131. The complex Shackley–Wilson story lends credibility to the thesis of Joe Trento that, when Jimmy Carter was elected with the promise to rein in the CIA, Shackley took steps to “create a totally private intelligence network using CIA assets” (Trento, Prelude to Terror, 113–14).

57. Jonathan Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots (New York: Norton, 1987), 291–92, 317, 385. In 1983 the Australian Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking released a report on Nugan Hand’s activities to Parliament that said that Shackley, Secord, Clines, [Rafael] Quintero, and Wilson were people whose background “is relevant to a proper understanding of the activities of the Nugan Hand group and the people associated with that group” (Joel Bainerman, The Crimes of a President [New York: S.P.I. Books, 1992], 75).

58. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 476, citing Australia-New South Wales Joint Task Force, Report, Volume 4: Nugan Hand, 747–48.

59. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair, 50, 74, 164. Cf. Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 134, 139.

60. Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 272–75. Richard Secord was allegedly attempting also to sell Israeli arms with the assistance of Israeli agent David Kimche, another associate of Oliver North. The mujahideen were recruited in Afghanistan by the drug trafficker Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leading recipient of CIA assistance in Afghanistan in the 1980s and most recently a leader of the al-Qaeda–Taliban resistance to the United States and its client there, Hamid Karzai. See Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 7, 8, 20.

61. John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (London: Pluto, 1999), 180–81.

62. Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 163–65.

63. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 305; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 363. Khun Sa died in 2007, but American tourists now flock to the hotel and casino run by his son near the Thai–Burmese–Laotian border (Bertil Lintner, Asia Times, November 1, 2007).

64. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 304. Lintner also reports that after the fierce battle, “soldiers from both sides were treated at hospitals in Chiang Rai [Thailand], where they often ended up in the same wards, chatting with each other and sharing cigarettes.”

65. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 382–83.

66. Lintner writes of a second Thai road built with USAID assistance that directly benefited Khun Sa (Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 179). Cf. William Stevenson, The Revolutionary King: The True-Life Sequel to The King and I (London: Constable and Robinson, 2001), 218–19.

Chapter 6: The War on Drugs in Asia

1. Alfred McCoy, Drug Traffic: Narcotics and Organised Crime in Australia (Harper and Row, 1980), 30.

2. Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), x–xi. Dayle made this statement during a videotaped teleconference in the presence of Marshall and myself.

3. Michael Levine, “Mainstream Media: The Drug War’s Shills,” in Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free Press, ed. Christine Borjesson (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002), 258.

4. In addition, the DEA spends millions each year on an education program, the first of whose priorities, according to its own Budget Summary, is “Anti-Legalization Education” (Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://www.ncjrs.gov/ond

cppubs/publications/policy/budget98/agency-09f.html).

5. Levine, “Mainstream Media,” 265.

6. Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Pack: The People, Politics and Espionage Intrigues That Shaped the DEA (Springfield, OR: TrineDay, 2009), xi–xii. Full disclosure: Both Levine and Valentine are friends, and I blurbed Valentine’s important book.

7. Richard Lawrence Miller, Drug Warriors and Their Prey: From Police Power to Police State (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 158–59; Edward J. Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America (New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1977), 165–66.

8. Valentine, Strength of the Pack, 6–8, 32–36. Cf. the stories of James Ludlum and John Cusack later in this chapter.

9. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 83.

10. The New York Times Encyclopedic Almanac, 1972, 29: “As a result of Operation Intercept, the federal attempt to restrict the flow of marijuana from Mexico, heroin sales have jumped among children in New York city, a joint legislative committee is told”; Humberto Fernandez, Heroin (Center City, MN: Hazelden, 1998), 214: “In response to the shortage of marijuana, which was either seized or delayed due to Operation Intercept, an increase in heroin smuggling was noticed in southern California and as far north as San Francisco during this time.” These reports are discounted by Eric C. Schneider, who writes that Operation Intercept “lasted a mere twenty days, not long enough to have an impact on anything except Mexican-American relations” (Smack: Heroin and the American City [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008], 148). But heroin is such an addictive drug that even a brief introduction to it may have lasting consequences.

11. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 84.

12. BNDD Bulletin, September–October, 1970; quoted in Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 26.

13. Warren Hinckle and William Turner, Deadly Secrets: The CIA-Mafia War against Castro and the Assassination of JFK (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), 373.

14. Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 26.

15. When Juan Restoy, one of those arrested, “subsequently broke out of jail and was killed in a shoot-out, Little Havana [in Miami] buzzed with a rumor that he had been set up and executed by a CIA execution squad to prevent his testifying about agency involvement in the narcotics traffic” (Hinckle and Turner, Deadly Secrets, 373).

16. Len Colodny and Tom Schachtman, The Forty Years’ War: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama (New York: Harper, 2009), 20.

17. New York Times, February 1, 1970; Peter Dale Scott, Paul L. Hoch, and Russell Stetler, The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond (New York: Random House/Vintage, 1976), 371.

18. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2003), 341, citing Washington Post, August 6, 1971.

19. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 86–87. At the time, Epstein pointed out, the CIA estimated that Turkey produced only from 3 to 8 percent of the world’s illicit opium. However, “Turkey was assumed to be the most convenient and proximate source for the European heroin wholesalers.”

20. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 86.

21. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 87.

22. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 45, summarizing Ludlum’s reading from his own notes of an “implementation” meeting on November 3, 1969.

23. Drugs in Lebanon were channeled largely through the Casino de Liban, where Marcel Paul Francisci was the gambling concessionaire. The casino was controlled by Yousef Beidas through the Bank Intra, which the criminal financier Robert Vesco tried but failed to take over after the death of its owner Yousef Beidas (Arthur Herzog, Vesco: From Wall Street to Castro’s Cuba [New York: Doubleday, 1987], 150). No one has ever satisfactorily explained Vesco’s mysterious connections to Nixon, his nephew Don Nixon, Nixon’s aide Richard Allen, Attorney General John Mitchell, and the CIA. See, e.g., James Rosen, The Strong Man: John Mitchell and the Secrets of Watergate (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 228.

24. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 381.

25. Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 90; Time, March 9, 1970.

26. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 53.

27. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 88.

28. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 92, cf. 310–11. Cf. also Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 46, quoting James Ludlum: Turkish “enforcement was weak, and the whole Turkish program eventually failed.” This foreseeable failure raises the possibility that the $35 million was at least partly with some other goal in mind. Kissinger was simultaneously working out a deal to use Turkey as a third party to evade congressional prohibitions on aid to Pakistan (Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, 181). Negotiations with the Turks began in 1970, at a time of political chaos in Turkey resembling that in Paris two years earlier. In this crisis the CIA station chief was Duane (“Dewey”) Clarridge, who worked closely with Counter-Guerrilla (the Turkish version of Gladio), and through Counter-Guerrilla, Martin Lee has associated Clarridge with the “armed bands of Grey Wolves [who] unleashed a wave of bombings and political assassinations that culminated in a coup in [March 1971]. . . . At the same time, members of the Grey Wolves were immersed in the international drug trade” (Martin A. Lee, The Beast Reawakens [Boston: Little, Brown, 1997], 202). Years later Turkish Defense Minister Hasan Esat Isik “harshly criticized the subversion of Turkish sovereignty through the U.S.-sponsored Counter-Guerrilla: ‘The idea came from the United States. The financing as well’” (Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe [London: Frank Cass, 2005], 233).

29. One of Liddy’s assistants on heroin matters, Gordon Minnick, toured the Golden Triangle and came back (according to Howard Hunt) “with a report that the White House found very disturbing” (E. Howard Hunt deposition, House Select Committee on Assassinations, November 3, 1978, RIF#180-10131-10342, http://www

.aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/hsca/secclass/pdf/Hunt_11-3-78.pdf, 35).

30. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 284–85, citing interview with BNDD agent, November 18, 1971.

31. New York Times, June 6, 1971; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 288.

32. New York Times, July 8, 1971.

33. For the case of Puttaporn Khramkhruan, see Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 254–56; David Corn, Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA’s Crusades (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 300.

34. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 410–14.

35. Egil Krogh, the White House liaison with the BNDD, later went to jail for his role in overseeing the break-in by the so-called White House Plumbers into the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist. Krogh is described by Len Colodny as “a lawyer with a CIA background. . . . Krogh . . . had worked for Ehrlichman’s firm in Seattle before joining the White House, but he had previously been involved with the CIA in Vietnam. Krogh bragged to Ehrlichman that he had hand-carried gold for the CIA to Vietnam. Ehrlichman and Haldeman later came to believe that Krogh maintained ties to the Agency even during his time at the White House. Neither allegation was ever proven” (Colodny and Schachtman, The Forty Years’ War, 101, 113).

36. Jeremy Kuzmarov, “From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drugs,” Journal of Policy History 20, no. 3 (2008): 358–59, citing many sources, including Southeast Asian Narcotics, Hearings before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st sess., July 12–13, 1977 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 2–3. See also Surachert Bamrungsuk, U.S. Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule, 1947–1977 (Bangkok: Editions Duangkamol, 1988).

37. I have read but have not been able to verify that often the tribes selected for this treatment were those not paying off the Thai police and BPP.

38. Jim Glassman, Thailand at the Margins: Internationalization of the State and the Transformation of Labour (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 67–68: “Red Gaur groups were controlled by General Withoon Yasawat, a former leader of CIA-hired Thai mercenary forces in Laos, and General Chatchai Choonhavan, son of Phin, brother-in-law of Phao, and later Prime Minister.”

39. William Shawcross, “How Tyranny Returned to Thailand,” New York Review of Books, December 9, 1976.

40. Chris Baker and Phasut Phongphaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 194–95; cf. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 235–36: “After a free-fire order was issued by the Bangkok police chief, the campus was stormed like an enemy army’s redoubt, with the . . . BPP troops in front.” This propaganda campaign built on earlier false reports in 1975, when Colby was still CIA chief (Handley, The King Never Smiles, 226). Still earlier, in the 1950s, “the CIA and the U.S. Information Service [were] manufacturing fake communist tracts in Thai that attacked the monarchy” (Handley, The King Never Smiles, 124).

41. Robert Harris, Political Corruption in and beyond the Nation State (London: Routledge, 2003), 181.

42. “The Murky Events of October 1973: A Book Proposal Reopens Thailand’s wounds,” AsiaWeek, February 3, 2000; http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/

magazine/2000/0128/as.thai.history1.html). See also Benedict Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9, no. 3 (1977), in Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons (London: Verso, 1998), 139–73.

43. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 229.

44. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 226. Cf. Shawcross, “How Tyranny Returned to Thailand”: “When the Thai foreign minister visited Hanoi in August [1976] the army disrupted his visit by provoking simultaneous attacks upon thousands of Thailand’s Vietnamese residents.”

45. K. J. Clymer, The United States and Cambodia (London: Routledge, 2004), 22.

46. Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 174, 182–83, citing, inter alia, Wilfred Burchett, The Second Indochina War: Cambodia and Laos (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 65.

47. See Peter Dale Scott, “Drugs and Oil: The Deep Politics of US Asian Wars,” in War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century, ed. Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 171–98.

48. Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1995), 94: “With the onset of the Cambodian conflict [in 1979], the Thai Communists were driven out of sanctuaries in Laos and their cause was sacrificed by China to the need to align with Thailand to challenge Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. From that juncture, the Thai Communist movement began to collapse until it had ceased to exist as a viable entity by the end of the Cold War.” Cf. Baker, A History of Thailand, 216–20.

49. Bertil Lintner, “Heroin and Highland Insurgency in the Golden Triangle,” in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 296. Cf. Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999), 278. McCoy, relying on USG data, disagrees tacitly with Lintner and claims that while Nelson Gross’s statement “was pure media hyperbole, Lo [Hsing-han] had in fact become the largest single opium merchant in the Shan states” (McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 424). But Adrian Cowell, a British filmmaker who spent time first with Lo Hsing Han and later with Khun Sa, agrees with Lintner that Lo Hsing Han “was by no means one of the biggest sort of merchants in the business” (Adrian Cowell, Frontline, 1977, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/heroin/interviews/cowell.html).

50. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 173–74.

51. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 279–81; cf. Cowell, Frontline.

52. San Francisco Chronicle, July 20, 1973, 18.

53. Epstein, Agency of Fear, 161; James Mills, The Underground Empire: Where Crime and Government Embrace (New York: Dell, 1986), 777 (two-thirds). Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (hereinafter FRUS) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), vol. 20, 328–30, Memorandum of February 29, 1972, from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). Egil Krogh, chairman of the White House Committee on International Narcotics Control, also traveled to the Far East and bought out heroin labs in the Golden Triangle (Epstein, Agency of Fear, 237; Russ Baker, Family of Secrets: The Bush Dynasty, the Powerful Forces That Put It in the White House, and What Their Influence Means for America [New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009], 225–26).

54. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 172–73. There is partially declassified discussion of the proposal in FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 20, 286, 297–98.

55. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 174, citing correspondence with Fred Dick.

56. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 174; cf. 399; Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 179.

57. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 172.

58. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 313–14. James Mills hoped to fly up from Chiang Mai in a Thai helicopter to meet Khun Sa, but the project was eventually vetoed not by Khun Sa but by the DEA regional director in Chiang Mai (Mills, The Underground Empire, 778–79, 786–88).

59. Mills, The Underground Empire, 787. One of Khun Sa’s many Western interviewers, Edith Mirante, wrote later that “Khun Sa was widely known to spend time in Chiang Mai and even occasionally visit his wife in Bangkok, but he was coyly going along with the Thai fiction that he was a wanted man with a price on his head” (Edith T. Mirante, Burmese Looking Glass: A Human Rights Adventure and a Jungle Revolution [New York: Grove Press, 1993], 170).

60. Francis Belanger, Drugs, the U.S., and Khun Sa (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1989, 102–4); cf. Mills, Underground Empire, 1071–72; Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 321–23; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 418–21. Before the attack, Khun Sa “initiated terrorist missions against American officials in northern Thailand. Following Khun Sa’s directives, two CIA agents were killed, a move that proved to be a big mistake. Families of U.S. officials were evacuated from the northern provinces to Bangkok for their protection, and the war against Khun Sa was stepped up dramatically. . . . In a few weeks [after the attack], things were back to normal for Khun Sa. When interrupted to ask why he had ordered the killings of Westerners, he replied, “Because they turned on me,” he shouted. “At one time, they were my partners—them, the DEA and the CIA, both” (Belanger, Drugs, the U.S., and Khun Sa, 102–4).

61. James Gritz, A Nation Betrayed (Boulder City, NV: Lazarus, 1989), 86, quoted in Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 379. (Route 1285 can be seen on Google Maps.) Gritz’s detailed account is erratic and unreliable, but Lintner, who was present at the time on the Thai side of the border, assures me that his overall picture is accurate. Cf. Belanger, Drugs, the U.S., and Khun Sa, 108–9: “The road, capable of accommodating 10-ton trucks, was ironically built by the Thai Government with manpower, time, and materials financed by U.S. taxpayers’ money allocated to drug suppression funds.”

62. Khun Sa fared far better in Burma after 1982, when he ceased to be subordinate to the KMT generals and began to dominate the market himself.

63. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 392.

64. Alfred W. McCoy, “Lord of Druglords: One Life as Lesson for US Drug Policy,” Crime, Law, and Social Change, November 1998, 309.

65. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 392.

66. Mirante, Burmese Looking Glass, 147: “I suspected that Ne Win wouldn’t mind if it killed more than poppies in the hills of the Shan State.” A professor told Mirante that an environmental impact assessment was done before the program started. “It made clear that spraying in Burma would be environmentally risky and of dubious effectiveness. State buried the report and went ahead with the program anyway. . . . The U.S. ambassador to Burma, O’Donohue, told our conference that the spraying program was the greatest success in recent U.S.-Burma relations” (148). Cf. Mother Jones Magazine, February–March 1989, 41.

67. Shelby Tucker, Among Insurgents: Walking through Burma (London: Radcliffe, 2000), 93. For similar reports on the DEA’s use of 2,4-D against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia, see David Weir and Mark Schapiro, Circle of Poison: Pesticides and People in a Hungry World (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1981).

68. McCoy, “Lord of Druglords,” 454–55; Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 278, 380–81, 377–78.

69. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 70; cf. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 234.

70. Mills, Underground Empire, 201–3, 222 (quoting from internal DEA report on termination of Operation Durian); McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 431. Poonsiri’s main Bangkok purchaser, Lu Hsu-Shui, had established himself by trading opium for gold with the KMT in northern Thailand (Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 307). In San Francisco, Lu Hsu-shui and two of his sons paid one and a half million dollars for the Shaw Hotel, today the Renoir Hotel (Mills, Underground Empire, 214).

71. Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, New York Times, June 16, 1986.

72. Mills, Underground Empire, 1076–78.

73. Keith Quincy, Hmong: History of a People‎ (Cheney: Eastern Washington University Press, 1995), 163.

74. Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 73–75, citing Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah: Pakistan’s Struggle for Democracy (London: H. Hamilton, 1991), 222; cf. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 479. Fazle Haq was the governor of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province; at the same time he was also an important CIA contact and supporter of the Afghan mujahideen, some of whom—it was no secret—were supporting themselves by major opium and heroin trafficking through the province. However, after lengthy correspondence with Fazle Haq’s son, I am persuaded that there are no known grounds to accuse Fazle Haq of having profited personally from the drug traffic. See “Clarification from Peter Dale Scott re Fazle Haq,” 911Truth.org, http://www.911truth.org/article

.php?story=20090223165146219.

75. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 73–75, citing McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 475 (leading drug lords), 464 (60 percent).

76. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 461; citing interview with Dr. David Musto.

77. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 462.

78. Thomas Fuller, “No Blowing Smoke: Poppies Fade in Southeast Asia,” New York Times, September 16, 2007. Cf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia: Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand,” 2009, 3: “Opium poppy cultivation in Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand combined has decreased from an estimated 157,900 hectares in 1998, the year of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs, to only 29,400 hectares in 2007. Despite a 22% increase in 2007, this corresponds to an 81% overall reduction in only nine years.”

79. “Figure 2: Global Opium Poppy Cultivation (Hectares), 1990–2007,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia: Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand,” 4. Just over 250,000 hectares of opium were planted in 1990 and just under that figure in 2007. The biggest divergence from that level was in 2001, the year that the Taliban successfully banned opium production in their area of Afghanistan. Total opium production for that one year dropped to about half the average.

80. Catherine Lamour and Michel R. Lamberti, The International Connection: Opium from Growers to Pushers (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 190–92.

81. Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World’s Most Corrupt Financial Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 94–95.

82. William J. Chambliss, On the Take: From Petty Crooks to Presidents (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 153.

83. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 253.

84. Cynics have wondered whether Nixon’s initial overlooking of Asian drugs can be related to the funds raised for his election campaign in Asia by the previously mentioned “Committee of United States Citizens in Asia for Nixon,” headed by Chennault’s widow Anna Chan Chennault, for which see Renata Adler, Canaries in the Mineshaft: Essays on Politics and Media (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 65–68.

85. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 457, emphasis added.

86. McCoy has since made this point forcefully in an interview with an Australian journal, The Sun: “Suddenly, as the French connection dried up, we began getting large shipments of heroin from Southeast Asia in the United States. The Vietnam War was over, the last of the GIs were gone, and Southeast Asia’s producers had a surplus capacity, so they began flooding the US with heroin. So Nixon fought and won another battle in his drug war. He sent thirty DEA agents to Bangkok, where they had special relations with the Thai police, and did a very effective job of seizing heroin bound for the United States, imposing a kind of informal customs duty on heroin exports to America. So, the Southeast Asian traffickers turned around and exported to Europe, which had been virtually drug free for decades. The French syndicates had entered into something of an agreement with the government: they could manufacture heroin, but they could not sell in France and had to export it. With the French Connection out of the picture, the Southeast Asian syndicates flooded Europe with heroin. By the end of the 1970s, Europe had more heroin addicts than the United States. The syndicates also introduced significant heroin addiction to Australia” (“Tricks of the Trade: Alfred McCoy on How the CIA Got Involved in Global Drug Trafficking,” The Sun, May, 2003, http://www.derrickjensen.org/mccoy.html).

87. Cf. my remarks about Newsday’s The Heroin Trail in “Foreword,” in Henrik Krüger, trans. Jerry Meldon, The Great Heroin Coup—Drugs, Intelligence, and International Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1980), 4.

88. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 55.

89. Scott, “Foreword,” 3, summarizing Krüger, The Great Heroin Coup, 117–29.

90. Scott, “Foreword,” 4.

91. Alexander Werth, De Gaulle: A Political Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), 400.

92. Time, December 29, 1975; Krüger, The Great Heroin Coup, 4–5, 59–71.

93. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 457, emphasis added.

94. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 244.

95. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (2003), 393. McCoy has explained to me that the original paragraph was dropped to make space for the new material in his 2003 edition.

96. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 53: Cusack “produced statistics showing that Turkish opium was the raw material for 80 percent of the heroin emanating from . . . Marseille.” Cf. Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs (London: Verso, 2004), 468.

97. Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf, 370. Cf. Krüger, The Great Heroin Coup, 4–5, 59–74. Krüger is not aware of any link between Cusack and Ben Barka’s murder. However, he points to other misleading statistics of which Cusack was the author. Cusack’s false report that America’s addict population had dropped by 200,000, when it had in fact risen, is dismissed by Krüger as a “giant cover-up [which] hid the fact that Nixon’s heroin war was no more than window-dressing” (Krüger, The Great Heroin Coup, 171–73).

98. Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 4.

99. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 50; cf. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 73–75.

Chapter 7: The CIA, the Global Drug Connection, and Terrorism

1. Alan A. Block, East Side-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930–1950 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1983), 109.

2. Gaia Servadio, Mafioso (New York: Dell, 1976), 125–28; Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 174–77.

3. R. T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt (New York: Linden/Simon and Schuster, 1987), 295 (“laundromat”). For Helliwell’s ownership, see Alan A. Block, Masters of Paradise (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991), 165–66.

4. CIA Memo dated April 24, 1974, “RYBAT/JMSPUR/PLVWCADET Traffic Removed from C/WHD Personal Files during Watergate File Search. Traffic can be found in sealed sensitive envelope in safe No. 1322 located in WH/COG, Room 3D46,” NARA #104-10095-10326. C/WHD (Chief of Western Hemisphere Division) in 1974 was Theodore Shackley, discussed later. All the CIA and FBI documents discussed in this chapter can be seen on the Mary Ferrell website at http://www.maryferrell.org.

5. Block, Masters of Paradise, 161–62, 166.

6. Alan Block subsequently learned that it was the bank’s cofounder, Chicago lawyer “Burt Kanter, more so than Helliwell, who was instrumental in Castle’s formation.” He cites speculation that it was originally set up on behalf of the former Cleveland mob racketeer Morris Kleinman (Block, Masters of Paradise, 172).

7. Jim Drinkhall, “IRS vs. CIA: Big Tax Investigation Was Quietly Scuttled by Intelligence Agency,” Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1980.

8. Drinkhall, “IRS vs. CIA.”

9. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2003), 168–74; Block, Masters of Paradise, 169 (Thai police).

10. Alan A. Block and Constance A. Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire: Global Banking, Money Laundering, and International Organized Crime (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 38, citing Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1983), 119. Cf. Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Deep Politics of War (Ipswich, MA: Mary Ferrell Foundation Press, 2008), 47, 67.

11. Drinkhall, “IRS vs. CIA.”

12. CIA Memo of August 18, 1976, for Chief, Security Analysis Group, NARA #104-10059-10013. The margin of the memo carries the following handwritten reference to Sam Giancana, the major figure in the CIA–Mafia assassination plots against Fidel Castro: “for file/Sam GIANCANA/not mentioned.”

13. Jonathan Marshall, Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsurgency and Covert Operations in the Third World (Forestville, CA: Cohan and Cohen, 1991), 54, citing Drinkhall, “IRS vs. CIA.”

14. Block notes that the spin-off of I.D.C. from Benguet was accompanied by a “payment of $329,439 to a Hong Kong Bank” (possibly into a Marcos account) (Block, Masters of Paradise, 98).

15. Profits from the Philippine gold mine—and possibly gold itself—reached I.D.C. from Asia. But I have not seen corroboration for the claim of Sterling and Peggy Seagrave that Groves and Helliwell were actually moving parts of the Japanese wartime gold hoard to the Bahamas “out of the Philippines, masquerading as gold from Benguet Mines” (Sterling Seagrave and Peggy Seagrave, Gold Warriors: America’s Secret Recovery of Yamashita’s Gold [London: Verso, 2003], 147). It is, however, of interest that the Marcos family also entered into business dealings with the CIA-related Nugan Hand Bank (see the following discussion), which some say included negotiations for the surreptitious shipment of Marcos’s gold (Jonathan Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots [New York: Norton, 1987], 182, 186–87, 190).

16. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 279–80, 400–401. Lim Seng’s sources, Sukree Sukreepirom in Bangkok and Ng Sik-ho in Hong Kong, were part of the connection taken over by Ma Sik-yu and Ma Sik-chun, who as we saw in chapter 5 were believed by Hong Kong police to have met with Santos Trafficante in 1968 (McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 400, 404, 410–11).

17. Sterling Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 326; cf. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 400. In Gold Warriors, Seagrave and Seagrave argue that the Benguet–Nassau–Helliwell connection was used to move the Japanese war gold to the Bahamas “as part of an elaborate money-laundering scheme that included washing drug profits” (Seagrave and Seagrave, Gold Warriors, 147, cf. 209).

18. Penny Lernoux, In Banks We Trust (Garden City, NY: Anchor/Doubleday, 1984), 83.

19. Marshall, Drug Wars, 54–55. Cf. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), Hearings (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 909; Peter Dale Scott, Coming to Jakarta: A Poem about Terror (New York: New Directions, 1989), 99–103. It is not known if ID Corp. and I.D.C. were related.

20. For the CIA’s close involvement in Lockheed payoffs, see Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (New York: Viking, 1977), 137, 227–28, 238. The U.S. Air Force was also involved. San Francisco Chronicle, October 24, 1983, 22, describes one such air force–Lockheed operation in Southeast Asia “code-named ‘Operation Buttercup’ that operated out of Norton Air Force Base in California from 1965 to 1972.”

21. Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967,” Pacific Affairs 58 no. 2 (Summer 1985): 239–64, http://www.namebase.org/scott.html: “A 1976 Senate investigation into these [Lockheed] payoffs revealed, almost inadvertently, that in May 1965, over the legal objections of Lockheed’s counsel, Lockheed commissions in Indonesia had been redirected to a new contract and company set up by the firm’s long-time local agent or middleman. Its internal memos at the time show no reasons for the change, but in a later memo the economic counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta is reported as saying that there were ‘some political considerations behind it.’ If this is true, it would suggest that in May 1965, five months before the coup, Lockheed had redirected its payoffs to a new political eminence at the risk (as its assistant chief counsel pointed out) of being sued for default on its former contractual obligations.”

22. George Aditjondro, Washington Post, January 25, 1998, C1. The other was Liem Sioe Liong, noted earlier as one of the godfathers initially banked by Phao Sriyanon’s Sino-Thai banker Chin Sophonpanich.

23. A Senate amendment in 1964 to cut off all aid to Indonesia unconditionally was quietly killed in conference committee on the misleading ground that the Foreign Assistance Act “requires the President to report fully and concurrently to both Houses of the Congress on any assistance furnished to Indonesia” (U.S. Cong., Senate, Report No. 88-1925, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 11). In fact, the act’s requirement that the president report “to Congress” applied to eighteen other countries, but in the case of Indonesia he was to report to two Senate committees and the Speaker of the House (Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620[j]).

24. Tom J. Farer, Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Inter-American Dialogue Book (New York: Routledge, 1999), 65.

25. Ed Reid and Ovid Demaris, The Green Felt Jungle (New York: Pocket Books, 1964), 217–20. Levinson had fronted for Lansky at the Sands casino in Las Vegas.

26. Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 7, 60–61, 198, 207, citing Lernoux, In Banks We Trust, 42–44, 84.

27. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt, 22. It is impossible to describe Tibor Rosenbaum justly in a footnote. A wartime hero of the Jewish underground who at great risk saved the lives of many Hungarian Jews, he became a Mossad agent in 1951 and founded the International Credit Bank with Edmond de Rothschild to fund Mossad operations. In this capacity he became involved with Meyer Lansky. Rosenbaum was also reportedly invited by his friend Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands to join the elite 1001 Club, a club for the global overworld that also included Agha Abedi, founder of BCCI; Robert Vesco, Salem bin Laden, older brother of Osama; and Mobutu Sese Seko, the CIA-installed dictator and looter of Zaire (Joël van der Reijden, “The 1001 Club,” Socio Politica, September 18, 2008, http://www.biblioteca

pleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol_1001club01.htm).

28. Block, Masters of Paradise, 51. Intra Bank also had a Bahamian branch, Intra Bahamas Trust Ltd.

29. Staff and editors of Newsday, The Heroin Trail (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 137 (Francisi); McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 39 (Luciano). El-Khoury “used Luciano’s money to buy off Lebanese police and customs agents” (Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press [London: Verso, 1998], 131).

30. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 541.

31. James Mills, The Underground Empire: Where Crime and Government Embrace (New York: Dell, 1986), 70.

32. Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: The CIA, Drugs, and Armies in Central America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), x–xi. Dayle made this statement during a videotaped teleconference in the presence of Marshall and myself.

33. Drinkhall, “IRS vs. CIA.” Dalitz, Kleinman, and Tucker, all veterans of the gambling scene in Cleveland, later had a controlling interest in the Desert Inn casino in Las Vegas (Investigation of Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce: Hearings before the [Kefauver] Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, U.S. Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., and 82nd Congress, 1st sess., Part 10 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950], 907–26). Block’s and Weaver’s later and more detailed study claims that Dalitz did not have an account at Castle but adds former Lansky associate Lou Rothkopf to the list of mob figures who did (Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 45).

34. Block, Masters of Paradise, 189.

35. Lernoux, In Banks We Trust, citing Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1977, February 17, 1981; see also Parapolitics, Spring 1981, 88: “Like Castle, Mercantile was a conduit for CIA money, and Price Waterhouse accountants were ‘under orders’ to make sure ‘outsiders’ did not have access to the books. If they probed around, said a CIA source, they ‘could unravel a trail to the intelligence community.’”

36. Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 40; cf. Block, Masters of Paradise, 188–91, where Kleinman is called “perhaps a hidden owner” of Castle.

37. Block, Masters of Paradise, 163; New York Times, September 1, 1989 (“part owner”).

38. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Final Report, Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (March 1978), 173; Block, Masters of Paradise, 164.

39. CIA Inspector General’s Report of 1967 on CIA-Mafia Plots to Assassinate Castro, 15–16, NARA #151993.08.11.16:44:08:750007, 3–4. Cf. Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics II: The New Revelations in U.S. Government Files, 1994–1995 (Ipswich, MA: Mary Ferrell Foundation Press, 2007), 59–63.

40. Memo of September 5, 1975 to DDO from CI Staff Chief George Kalaris, NARA #104-1010-10003, 2. Mario Brod, a former U.S. Army Intelligence captain in Rome with Angleton, is not easily portrayed in a footnote. According to Richard Mahoney, when Senator John F. Kennedy ran for the presidency in 1960, his father sought out John Rosselli “to help him arrange a summit meeting with Mafia leaders. But the best Rosselli could do was to get the Chicago Outfit to attend and, interestingly enough, the attorney Mario Brod” (Richard D. Mahoney, Sons and Brothers: The Days of Jack and Bobby Kennedy [New York: Arcade, 1999], 43–44).

41. Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter (New York: Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, 1991), 314–15. For Jay Lovestone’s extraordinary life shift from Communist Party leader to anticommunist work with Angleton, see Ted Morgan, A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone, Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1999).

42. Douglas Valentine, “The French Connection Revisited: The CIA, Irving Brown, and Drug Smuggling as Political Warfare,” Covert Action, http://www.covertaction

.org/content/view/99/75.

43. Paul Buhle, “Lovestone’s Thin Red Line,” The Nation, May 6, 1999, http://www.thenation.com/doc/19990524/buhle.

44. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Appendix to Hearings, Volume 9 (March 1978), 47.

45. Ed Reid, The Grim Reapers: The Anatomy of Organized Crime in America (New York: Bantam, 1969), 174.

46. Mangold, Cold Warrior, 329–30, cf. 305, 337. Other authors have written that Dulles and Angleton maintained a “second agency,” or “agency-within-the Agency”; see, e.g., Mark Aarons and John Loftus, Unholy Trinity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 260.

47. Mangold, Cold Warrior, 105.

48. Memo of November 4, 1970, from John K. Greaney, Assistant General Counsel, CIA, NARA #104-10106-10374.

49. United States of America, Appellee, v. Leonard Russo, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

50. Memo of November 4, 1970, from John K. Greaney, Assistant General Counsel, CIA, NARA #104-10106-10374. Robert Sam Anson once claimed that two of the defendants in these kickback trials, John Larocca and Gabriel Mannarino, were acquitted in 1971 when “one of the star witnesses turned out to be the local head of the CIA” (Robert Sam Anson, “They’ve Killed the President” [New York: Bantam, 1975], 296). Anson told me that this witness was Brod, but I have found no court record of Brod’s testimony.

51. Dan E. Moldea, The Hoffa Wars: Teamsters, Rebels, Politicians, and the Mob (New York: Paddington Press, 1978), 130–31.

52. Time, June 9, 1975, 14.

53. Church Committee, Testimony of John Scelso, May 7, 1976, 41-42, NARA #157-10014-10083, 45–46. Angleton’s response suggests that he may have believed what Hank Messick and others later charged: that Lansky had somehow obtained protection from the bureau (Hank Messick, John Edgar Hoover [New York: David McKay, 1972], 229–31).

54. William R. Corson, Susan B. Trento, and Joseph J. Trento, Widows (New York: Crown, 1979), 71.

55. For details see Scott, The War Conspiracy, 387; Scott, Deep Politics II, 30–33.

56. See Scott, Deep Politics II, 17–18, 92; see also Peter Dale Scott, “Oswald and the Hunt for Popov’s Mole,” The Fourth Decade 3, no. 3 (March 1996): 3, http://www

.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=519798.

57. Scott, Deep Politics II, 30–33.

58. See discussion in Peter Dale Scott, “The JFK Assassination and 9/11: The Designated Suspects in Both Cases,” Global Research, July 5, 2008, http://www.globalre

search.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9511.

59. Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 50–54.

60. J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 139–75; John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2004), 190–98, 248–50. Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New Press, 2003).

61. McSherry, Predatory States, 95, citing White cable of October 13, 1978, http://foia.state.gov/documents/State/Chile3/000058FD.pdf (a URL inactive in 2008); see also Diana Jean Schemo, “New Files Tie U.S. to Deaths of Latin Leftists in 1970s,” New York Times, March 6, 2001.

62. “I can do no less, without producing a reaction in the U.S. which would lead to legislative restrictions. The speech is not aimed at Chile. . . . My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going communist” (Dinges, The Condor Years, 159–62), citing Department of State Bulletin 75 (July 5, 1976): 4 (public speech).

63. McSherry, Predatory States, 159.

64. McSherry, Predatory States, 161.

65. Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/07/

nation/na-posada7.

66. Kevin Phillips, American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush (New York: Viking, 2004), 280.

67. Joseph J. Trento, The Secret History of the CIA (New York: Forum/Prima/Random House, 2001), 436–37. In 1978, Trento himself was the recipient of a leak linking Wilson to Shackley.

68. Trento, The Secret History of the CIA, 395 (Helms), 344 (cadre). Shackley by this time was operating in conjunction with the secretive International Freedom Foundation, a group created by lobbyist Jack Abramoff (David Teacher, Rogue Agents: The Cercle Pinay Complex, 1951–1991, available at http://www.isgp.eu).

69. Block, Masters of Paradise, 191.

70. Block, Masters of Paradise, 192: “The major Pritzker link to the Teamsters was crafted by Stanford Clinton,” a lawyer “who represented some of Chicago’s leading hoodlums” and also had a Castle account.

71. Block, Masters of Paradise, 195.

72. Block, Masters of Paradise, 171, cf. 32–33.

73. Block, Masters of Paradise, 172–73, 182.

74. Scott, The War Conspiracy, 46–47, 60, 64–68, 263, 278–79.

75. OSS officer and Corcoran friend Ernest Cuneo, quoted in David McKean, Peddling Influence: Thomas “Tommy the Cork” Corcoran and the Birth of Modern Lobbying (Hanover, NH: Steerforth, 2004), 286.

76. “Lawyers and Lobbyists.” Fortune, February 1952, 142, quoted in Scott, The War Conspiracy, 47.

77. Joseph J. Trento, Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America’s Private Intelligence Network (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2005), 9.

78. Scott, The War Conspiracy, 278–79.

79. Block, Masters of Paradise, 170.

80. “In October 1934 Treasury Attaché Nicholson submitted reports implicating Chiang Kai-shek and possibly T.V. Soong in the heroin trade to North America” (Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs [London: Verso, 2004], 37).

81. McKean, Peddling Influence, 140–43; Scott, The War Conspiracy, 64–65.

82. McKean, Peddling Influence, 149–50.

83. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 107, 153; Trento, Prelude to Terror, 9.

84. Oral history interview with Arthur R. Ringwalt, June 5, 1974, Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/ringwalt.htm.

85. Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947–1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997), 214–15, cf. 206.

86. Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999), 192; Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 51, 187, 192–93.

87. Lernoux, In Banks We Trust, 82–83.

88. Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swann, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon (New York: Viking, 2000), 242.

89. Memo of August 18, 1976, to Chief, Security Analysis Group, NARA #104-10059-10013; also partially released as p. 6 of Meyer Lansky Security File, 1993.08.13.17:42:12:560059.

90. Memo of August 18, 1976, to Chief, Security Analysis Group, NARA #104-10059-10013; Reid, The Grim Reapers, 119–23.

91. Jeff Gerth, “Richard M. Nixon and Organized Crime,” in Government by Gunplay: Assassination Conspiracy Theories from Dallas to Today, ed. Sid Blumenthal and Harvey Yazijian (New York: New American Library, 1976), 138.

92. Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 242, 252; Jim Hougan, Spooks: The Haunting of America—The Private Use of Secret Agents (New York: William Morrow, 1978), 398. Cf. Denny Walsh, New York Times, January 21, 1974; Gerth, “Richard M. Nixon and Organized Crime,” 137–39.

93. Block, Masters of Paradise, 94–96; Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 244–45.

94. Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 244–45, 253–54.

95. Block, Masters of Paradise, 46, 101.

96. Inspector-General’s Report on CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, NARA #104-10213-10101, 29–30, quoted in Scott, Deep Politics II, 60.

97. San Francisco Chronicle, March 3, 1967, 41, quoted in Scott, Deep Politics II, 67.

98. David Kaiser, The Road to Dallas: The Assassination of John F. Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2008), 206–8.

99. Block, Masters of Paradise, 100–101.

100. Inspector-General’s Report on CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, 29–30, quoted in Scott, Deep Politics II, 59.

101. Some of the documents in this file, including the FBI report quoted in this paragraph, are incorporated into the Inspector-General’s Report on CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, 29–30, quoted in Scott, Deep Politics II, 59. In addition, the CIA’s report on its interest in Resorts International, quoted previously, carries the handwritten notation “for file/Sam GIANCANA/not mentioned.” The allusion to Giancana makes sense in the context of the CIA–Mafia plots but, as far as I know, not otherwise.

102. “Moss, Edward K. #172 646,” CIA Memo of May 14, 1973, in Meyer Lansky Security File, 9, NARA #1993.08.13.17:42:12:560059. The CIA used the misspelling “Verona,” which occurred just once in the FBI source document, and ignored the correct spelling “Varona,” which was abundantly used as well. They also used “Cellino” (rather than “Cellini”) and “Lenzieri” (for Lanzieri) in related CIA documents. By this device, both the FBI and the CIA could avoid responding to document searches for the correct name. For example, in the 1940s the CIA told the French that they had no documents on the SS war criminal Klaus Barbie, whom they were harboring. The American documents referred to him systematically as “Barbier.”

103. “Moss, Edward K. #172 646,” CIA Memo of May 14, 1973, from Jerry G. Brown for Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff, NARA #1993.08.13,17:42:12:560059.

104. “Moss, Edward K. #172 646,” CIA Memo of April 19, 1967 [at the time of the I-G Report mentioning Moss], NARA #104-10122-10006; Inspector-General Report on CIA-Mafia Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro (henceforth I-G Report), NARA #104-10213-10101, 38. Cf. memo of November 7, 1962, in CIA’s Edward K. Moss folder, 26, NARA #1994.05.03.10:54:53:780005.

105. “Manuel Antonio Varona,” FBI Memorandum of January 16, 1961, to A. H. Belmont, 105-76826-20; NARA #124-90055-10139.

106. “Manuel Antonio Varona,” FBI Memorandum of January 16, 1961, to A. H. Belmont, 2, 105-76826-20; NARA #124-90055-10139. Cf. “Moss, Edward K. #172 646,” CIA Memo of May 14, 1973, in Meyer Lansky Security File, 9, NARA #1993.08.13.17:42:12:560059; CIA letter of December 16, 1960, to FBI, FBI file 105-76826-18; NARA #124-90055-10133.

107. CIA letter of December 16, 1960, to Director, FBI, FBI File 105-76826-18; NARA #124-90055-10133. Apparently, no copy of this letter has been released from CIA files.

108. “Manuel Antonio Varona,” FBI Memorandum of January 16, 1961, to A. H. Belmont, 2, 105-76826-20; NARA #124-90055-10139.

109. Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 145, cf. 238–40.

110. “Moss, Edward K. #172646,” CIA Memo of November 28, 1962, NARA #1994.05.03.10:54:53:780005.

111. I-G Report, 38.

112. “Manuel Antonio Varona,” FBI Memorandum of January 16, 1961, to A. H. Belmont, 2, 105-76826-20, NARA #124-90055-10139.

113. FBI Memorandum to Attorney General, January 23, 1961, NARA #124-90055-10140.

114. Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 194, citing I-G Report.

115. Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations against Cuba (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 181.

116. Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 283 ($1 million); Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil (New York: Crown, 2003), 43 (briefcase); Ronald Kessler, The Richest Man in the World (New York: Warner Books, 1986), 170 (“several million”); Renata Adler, “Searching for the Real Nixon Scandal,” Atlantic, December 1976, 76–84 ($200 million). Khashoggi admitted publicly to a gift of $43,000 to the Nixon campaign in 1972.

117. Kessler, The Richest Man in the World, 170.

118. Kessler, The Richest Man in the World, 142, 181.

119. It has been alleged that at the Sands in 1960, the FBI saw the casino’s courtesy prostitutes “running in and out of” Senator Jack Kennedy’s suite, and a million dollars was allegedly given to Kennedy in a brown leather satchel by the hotel’s owners (John William Tuohy, “The Sands,” AmericanMafia, August 2001, http://www.american

mafia.com/Feature_Articles_155.html).

120. Omar Garrison, Howard Hughes in Las Vegas (New York: Dell, 1970), 48–49, 56, 58; Peter Dale Scott, Crime and Cover-Up: The CIA, the Mafia, and the Dallas-Watergate Connection (Palo Alto, CA: Ramparts Press, 1977), 29.

121. Kessler, The Richest Man in the World, 149–50.

122. Sally Denton and Roger Morris, The Money and the Power: The Making of Las Vegas and Its Hold on America, 1947–2000 (New York: Knopf, 2001), prologue. Sally Denton later enlarged on the details: “When it became clear 70 United States, American, banks were involved, had the complicity, knew about every single one of the wire-transfers and transactions—banks including Chemical Bank, Bank of New York, CitiBank, American Express— . . . President Clinton and Madeline Albright stepped in and intervened and stopped the entire investigation and closed all of the cases” (discussion at Taos Community Auditorium on October 12, 2002, http://www

.taosplaza.com/taosplaza/2003/pages/tmff_drugs.php).

123. Gigi Mahon, The Company That Bought the Boardwalk (New York: Random House, 1980), 136.

124. Kessler, The Richest Man in the World, 275–78. A friend of Khashoggi’s, Larry Kolb, reports that Khashoggi himself essentially corroborated the story that Khashoggi and John Kennedy had a friendship in the 1950s that “evolved primarily out of whoring together” (Larry J. Kolb, Overworld: The Life and Times of a Reluctant Spy [New York: Riverhead/Penguin, 2004], 236). The woman who destroyed the presidential aspirations of Senator Gary Hart in 1987 was one of Khashoggi’s many girls.

125. Kessler, The Richest Man in the World, 238, 240.

126. Prince Turki bin Faisal gave Georgetown University alumni a frank account of the Safari Club’s formation in response to post-Watergate restrictions: “In 1976, after the Watergate matters took place here, your intelligence community was literally tied up by Congress. It could not do anything. It could not send spies, it could not write reports, and it could not pay money. In order to compensate for that, a group of countries got together in the hope of fighting Communism and established what was called the Safari Club. The Safari Club included France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Iran.”

127. Kolb, Overworld, 238, 242–43.

128. Denton and Morris, The Money and the Power, 72, citing laudatory article on Greenspun in the Jerusalem Post, July 1993.

129. Investigative reporter Jim Hougan reports the incredulity of congressional investigators that Lockheed was the only large corporation not to have made a contribution to Nixon’s 1972 election campaign (Hougan, Spooks, 457–58).

130. Drinkhall, “IRS vs. CIA.” Drinkhall also reported that “Helliwell reputedly was one of the paymasters for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961,” a claim repeated in virtually every book dealing with Helliwell since that time (except my own). I have looked at dozens if not hundreds of CIA Bay of Pigs documents, many of them concerning financial payments to anti-Castro individuals and groups, and I have never seen any document involving either Helliwell or an unidentified cryptonym.

131. Pete Brewton, The Mafia, CIA and George Bush (1992), 296–97.

132. Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 36–37, citing Robin Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 377–78 (X-2 in Vienna).

133. Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World’s Most Corrupt Financial Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 384 (“ties”).

134. Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 86. Abbas Kassimali Gokal, whom British prosecutors accused of stealing $1.3 billion from BCCI, was a board member of the Inter Maritime Bank from 1978 through 1982. In 1997, Gokal was sentenced to thirteen years by a British court for his role in the BCCI fraud.

135. Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 384. Truell and Gurwin claim that Hartmann went from Intermaritime to BCCI; the Kerry-Brown BCCI Report claims that Rappaport recruited Hartmann from BCCI/BCP for his own bank.

136. Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 85.

137. U.S. Congress, Senate, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from Senator John Kerry, Chairman, and from Senator Hank Brown, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, September 30, 1992, 1–2 (cited henceforth as the Kerry-Brown Report), 69.

138. Jane Hunter, “Covert Operations: The Human Factor,” The Link 25, no. 3 (August 1992): 8, http://www.ameu.org/page.asp?iid=139&aid=183&pg=8.

139. Leonard Slater, The Pledge (New York: Pocket Books, 1971), 175.

140. Sindona had links to the Italian intelligence service SISMI, to drug traffickers like Rosario Gambino, and to the Nixon administration. See Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era (Boston: South End Press, 1987), 71, 73; Lernoux, In Banks We Trust, 178–79, 193–95.

141. Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 36, citing Winks, Cloak and Gown, 377–78.

142. Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 165.

143. Operation Safehaven began as a U.S. Treasury effort to trace the movements of stolen Nazi gold and possibly implicate Nazi collaborators in America. Taken over by OSS X-2, it recuperated SS assets that were used instead to support former SS agents like Klaus Barbie, who were now working for the United States.

144. Anthony Cave Brown, The Secret War Report of the OSS (New York: Berkeley, 1976), 565–66.

145. Kessler, The Richest Man in the World, 162, 300; Jonathan Beaty and S. C. Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI (New York: Random House, 1993), 54, 80, 263–64.

146. Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 83–87.

147. Kerry-Brown Report.

148. Beaty and Gwynn, The Outlaw Bank, 357.

149. Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 373–77.

150. Olmsted’s intelligence connections dated back to wartime service on the staff of General Albert Wedemeyer in China, where he was in charge of clandestine operations and in that capacity worked with OSS. He was thus a senior figure in what I am tempted to call the OSS China connection, which united so many of the people who were prominent in Helliwell’s postwar global drug connection. We have already mentioned Helliwell himself, who was head of the Special Intelligence branch of OSS in Kunming before he created Sea Supply Corp. in Bangkok. Willis Bird was the deputy chief of OSS China and then became the most important figure in Sea Supply after Helliwell’s return in 1951 from Bangkok to America. C. V. Starr, later represented by Corcoran, opened his insurance empire in China to the creation of an OSS network outside the OSS–KMT cooperation agreement. See Smith, OSS, 267 (Starr), 273 (Bird), 326 (Helliwell). But this is not the whole picture. Elsewhere, I have dealt with the postwar activities of other members of the small OSS Detachment 202 under Paul Helliwell in Kunming: E. Howard Hunt, Ray Cline, Lou Conein, John Singlaub, and Mitchell WerBell. All these men went on to develop postwar connections for the CIA with drug traffickers: Hunt in Mexico, Cline in Taiwan, Conein in Vietnam, WerBell in Laos, and Singlaub with the World Anti-Communist League, which Hunt and Cline had helped to create (Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 20, 207).

151. Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 41; cf. Block, Masters of Paradise, 191.

152. Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 41–42; Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 40–43.

153. Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 123–24, cf. 128–29: Expanding over seven pages on these and many other intelligence connections, they asked whether the bank’s illegal acquisition of an American bank holding company, First American Bankshares, was not in fact serving the purposes of U.S. intelligence: “No one can deny that virtually every major character in the takeover was connected in one way or another to U.S. intelligence: Olmsted who controlled the company [First American] for years; Middendorf, who headed the group that acquired it from him; Abedi, who arranged for clients of BCCI to buy the company from Middendorf’s group; [Mohammed Rahim Motaghi] Irvani, the chairman of one of the dummy companies set up to carry out the acquisition; [his partner Richard] Helms, who advised Irvani; [former Saudi intelligence chief Kamal] Adham, the lead investor in Abedi’s group; [Clark] Clifford, who steered the deal through the regulatory maze and then became the chairman of the company. . . . Can all this be a coincidence? Or is it possible that First American was affiliated with U.S. intelligence all along and that it was simply passed from one group of CIA associates to another, and then another? No proof has emerged that this is what happened, but it is certainly not a far-fetched theory.”

154. Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 96.

155. Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 162. BCCI also used Price Waterhouse as its auditor. In addition, BCCI and Nugan Hand used the same law firm and registered agent (Bruce Campbell & Company) in the Cayman Islands (Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 125).

156. Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 243.

157. Bangkok embassy intelligence officer Allan Parks, to Jonathan Kwitny, in Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 59. Kwitny, inquiring about Houghton, was put in touch with Parks by Alexander Butterfield, the revealer in the Watergate Hearings of Nixon’s taping system, who earlier had also been an intelligence officer in Asia. Cf. Russ Baker, Family of Secrets: The Bush Dynasty, the Powerful Forces That Put It in the White House, and What Their Influence Means for America (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 234–35.

158. Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 334–35.

159. Trento, Prelude to Terror, 313–14.

160. Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots, 207, 208.

161. James A. Nathan, “Dateline Australia: America’s Foreign Watergate?” Foreign Policy, Winter 1982–1983, 183, quoted in Marshall et al., The Iran-Contra Connection, 38.

162. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 126–27.

163. Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 272–75. Richard Secord was allegedly attempting also to sell Israeli arms with the assistance of Israeli agent David Kimche, another associate of Oliver North. The mujahideen were recruited in Afghanistan by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leading recipient of CIA assistance in Afghanistan in the 1980s and most recently a leader of the al-Qaeda–Taliban resistance to the United States and its client there, Hamid Karzai. See Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 7, 8, 20.

164. Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 90–97: “[IMU leader] Namangiani’s networks in Tajikistan and in Central Asia were used to smuggle opium from Afghanistan. It was partly thanks to Namangiani’s contacts in Chechnya that heroin reached Europe” (91). . . . “It was thanks to the mediation of Chechen criminal groups that the KLA and the Albanian mafia managed to gain control of the transit of heroin in the Balkans” (96). Napoleoni does not mention Azerbaijan, which, however, lies between Uzbekistan and Chechnya.

165. “KLA Funding Tied to Heroin Profits,” Washington Times, May 3, 1999.

166. Daniel Ellsberg with Kris Welch, KPFA, August 26, 2006, http://wotisitgood4

.blogspot.com/2006/10/ellsberg-hastert-got-suitcases-of-al.html.

167. Sibel Edmonds and Philip Giraldi, “Found in Translation: FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds Spills Her Secrets,” American Conservative, November 2009, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/nov/01/00006.

168. Vanity Fair, September 2005. According to the American-Turkish Council’s website, “As one of the leading business associations in the United States, the American-Turkish Council (ATC) is dedicated to effectively strengthening U.S.-Turkish relations through the promotion of commercial, defense, technology, and cultural relations. Its diverse membership includes Fortune 500, U.S. and Turkish companies, multinationals, nonprofit organizations, and individuals with an interest in U.S.-Turkish relations.” It is thus comparable to the American Security Council, the activities of which in 1963 are discussed in Scott, Deep Politics, e.g., 292.

Edmonds has been partially corroborated by Huseyin Baybasin, another Turkish heroin kingpin now in jail in Holland, in his book Trial by Fire: “I handled the drugs which came through the channel of the Turkish Consulate in England.” But, as he adds, “I was with the Mafia but I was carrying this out with the same Mafia group in which the rulers of Turkey were part.” Baybasin claimed he was assisted by Turkish officers working for NATO in Belgium (Adrian Gatton, “The Susurluk Legacy,” Druglink Magazine, November/December 2006, http://adriangatton.com/archive/1990_01_01_archive.html).

169. The major exception would appear to be the Gulf War of 1990–1991. But even here some argue that the United States shares some responsibility for inducing that war. See, e.g., Edward Mortimer: “It seems far more likely that Saddam Hussein went ahead with the invasion because he believed the US would not react with anything more than verbal condemnation. That was an inference he could well have drawn from his meeting with US Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, and from statements by State Department officials in Washington at the same time publicly disavowing any US security commitments to Kuwait but also from the success of both the Reagan and the Bush administrations in heading off attempts by the US Senate to impose sanctions on Iraq for previous breaches of international law” (New York Review of Books, November 22, 1990). It can also be argued that the Korean War itself deserves mention in both lists: see Peter Dale Scott, “Korea (1950), the Tonkin Gulf Incident, and 9/11: Deep Events in Recent American History,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, June 22, 2008, http://japanfocus.org/-Peter_Dale_Scott/2784.

170. Marshall, Drug Wars, 55, citing Tad Szulc, “The Money Changer,” New Republic, April 10, 1976, 10–11.

171. See Scott, The War Conspiracy.

172. Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–1967,” 239–64.

173. AMPO (Japan), January 1974, 44 (Indonesia); David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 90 (Deak); Marshall, Drug Wars, 54–55 (Katayama, Kodama). Both Kodama and Sasakawa were arrested by the United States for war crimes but not prosecuted. In 1941, Kodama had plotted the assassination of Japan’s Prime Minister Konoye by dynamite to block his attempted peace negotiations with the United States. Kodama then made a fortune in Shanghai during World War II, allegedly in part through his control of the drug traffic in conjunction with the kempeitai. Both Kodama and Sasakawa became staunch supporters of the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League, which, as we have seen, has had persistent connections to the postwar Asian drug traffic.

174. Beaty and Gwynn, The Outlaw Bank, 48; cf. Truell and Gurwin, False Profits, 160. As mentioned earlier, Haq’s son has persuaded me that there is no evidence to suggest that his father, the former military governor of the Northwest Frontier province, profited personally from the flow of drugs that Hekmatyar and others were moving through his province.

175. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House (New York: Summit, 1983), 279, 290.

176. Dinges, The Condor Years, 190–98.

177. Robert Parry, Secrecy and Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq (Arlington, VA: Media Consortium, 2004), 112–38; Scott, The Road to 9/11, 99–107. According to Parry, Michael Ledeen was also part of this effort.

178. “Turkey’s Pivotal Role in the International Drug Trade,” Le Monde diplomatique, July 1998, http://mondediplo.com/1998/07/05turkey. Cf. Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 237–38. Author Claire Sterling attempted to blame the KGB for the assassination attempt, and her view that the KGB was the heart of what she called a global “terror network” was forced on CIA analysts by William Casey and Robert Gates (see note 192).

179. Iran-Contra Affair, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 100th Cong., 1st sess., House Report No. 100-433, Senate Report No. 100-216, 164, 166, 228.

180. Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 95–116. Burt Kanter, the cofounder of Castle Bank, was recurringly involved in Rappaport’s IMB–BONY dealings (Block and Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire, 100, 102, 193, 105, 113).

181. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 163–65, 351; Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, 272–75.

182. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 167–68, citing Michel Chossudovsky, “Macedonia: Washington’s Military-Intelligence Ploy,” Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, http://www.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/2001/Chossudov

_WashingtPloy.html.

183. Lernoux, In Banks We Trust, 72; cf. Mother Jones, March 1984.

184. Fineman, A Special Relationship, 179–80; cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), vol. 12, no. 1: 689–90.

185. Trento, The Secret History of the CIA, 410.

186. Susan Lynn Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 156.

187. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 100th Cong., 1st sess., House Report No. 100-433, Senate Report No. 100-216, 164.

188. Trento, Prelude to Terror, 283–84.

189. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 52–53.

190. See Rowan Scarborough, Sabotage: America’s Enemies within the CIA (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2007); Kenneth R. Timmerman, Shadow Warriors: The Untold Story of Traitors, Saboteurs, and the Party of Surrender (New York: Crown/Random House, 2007).

191. “It works like this: Blackwater, for example, will win a U.S. government contract; it will then subcontract with itself—that is, with Greystone—to do the job. From there, Greystone looks to its network of international affiliates, firms like Pizarro’s Grupo Tactico in Chile or ID Systems in Colombia, which maintain informal relationships with what are known in the trade as “briefcase recruiters”—individuals with connections to the local paramilitary scene” (Bruce Falconer and Daniel Schulman, “Blackwater’s World of Warcraft,” Mother Jones, March–April 2008). Cf. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books, 2008).

192. This false ideology was enforced even inside the CIA. Author Claire Sterling wrote a book called The Terror Network, claiming “that all major terrorist groups were controlled by the Soviet Union.” The book, with little credibility today, was warmly endorsed by then Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who passed it to William Casey, who presented its thesis to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Casey also assigned top CIA terrorist analysts and Soviet experts to prepare a special national intelligence estimate based on Sterling’s book. When the experts reported that there was no merit to Sterling’s claims, Casey’s deputy director of intelligence, Robert Gates, had their negative assessment rewritten and reversed by new low-level personnel who had just arrived in the agency. See Mark Perry, Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA (New York: William Morrow, 1992), 47–49, 319–20. Today, Robert Gates is America’s secretary of defense, reappointed to that position by President Obama.

Chapter 8: Inside the War Machine

1. Dwight David Eisenhower, “Military-Industrial Complex Speech,” 1961, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp.

2. Former SAIC manager, in Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, “Washington’s $8 Billion Shadow,” Vanity Fair, March 2007, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/03/spyagency200703?currentPage=1.

3. Ed Soyster, MPRI, The Economist, July 8, 1999.

4. Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 7–9.

5. Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Holt, 1919).

6. Henry Kissinger, in Colin S. Gray and G. R. Sloan. Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999).

7. For the events leading to the displacement of Kissinger, see Scott, The Road to 9/11, 50–54.

8. Le Nouvel Observateur, January 15–21, 1998. In his relentless determination to weaken the Soviet Union, Brzezinski also persuaded Carter to end U.S. sanctions against Pakistan for its pursuit of nuclear weapons (David Armstrong and Joseph J. Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise [Hanover, NH: Steerforth, 2007]). Thus, Brzezinski’s obsession with the Soviet Union helped produce, as unintended by-products, both al-Qaeda and the Islamic atomic arsenal.

9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), xiii, 30, 40.

10. Memorandum of February 18, 1992, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukev

ault/ebb245/index.htm.

11. For specific parallels to The Grand Chessboard, see Scott, The Road to 9/11, 191–92.

12. “Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-Spectrum Dominance,” DefenseLink, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45289, emphasis added.

13. Brzezinski was so unafraid of Islamic jihadism that, when national security adviser, he convened a working group to deliberately stir up Muslim dissatisfaction inside the Soviet Union (Scott, The Road to 9/11, 70–71).

14. He has since taken credit for persuading President Aliyyev of Azerbaijan to commit to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Geopolitically Speaking: Russia’s ‘Sphere of Influence’—Chechnya and Beyond,” Azerbaijan International, Spring 2000, 24, http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/81

_folder/81_articles/81_brzezinski.html). This pipeline, a favor to U.S. and British oil companies, makes geopolitical but not economic sense and is further destabilizing an already tense region. See Pepe Escobar, “Liquid War across Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific: Postcard from Pipelineistan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/-Pepe-Escobar/3149.

15. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 70–79.

16. Dana Milbank and Justin Blum, “Document Says Oil Chiefs Met with Cheney Task Force,” Washington Post, November 16, 2005. This story noted that chief executive officers of three majors had falsely denied this: “A White House document shows that executives from big oil companies met with Vice President Cheney’s energy task force in 2001—something long suspected by environmentalists but denied as recently as last week by industry officials testifying before Congress. . . . In a joint hearing last week of the Senate Energy and Commerce committees, the chief executives of Exxon Mobil Corp., Chevron Corp. and ConocoPhillips said their firms did not participate in the 2001 task force. The president of Shell Oil said his company did not participate ‘to my knowledge,’ and the chief of BP America Inc. said he did not know. Chevron was not named in the White House document, but the Government Accountability Office has found that Chevron was one of several companies that ‘gave detailed energy policy recommendations’ to the task force.”

17. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 188–89, citing Linda McQuaig, “Crude Dudes,” Toronto Star, September 20, 2004; Jane Mayer, “Contract Sport,” New Yorker, February 16–23, 2004.

18. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 189; “Strategy Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century,” report of the James A. Baker Institute of Public Policy and Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, 40, emphasis added.

19. Seymour M. Hersh, “Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld Has His Own Special Sources. Are They Reliable?” New Yorker, May 6, 2003.

20. Michael Massing, “Now They Tell Us,” New York Review of Books, February 26, 2004, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16922.

21. Peter Bergen, “Armchair Provocateur—Laurie Mylroie: The Neocons’ Favorite Conspiracy Theorist,” Washington Monthly, December 2003, http://www.washing

tonmonthly.com/features/2003/0312.bergen.html.

22. For Israel links, see Michael Lind, Made in Texas (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 139 (Feith); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 166 (Libby); Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War (New York: Crown, 2006), 68–70 (Mylroie).

23. Jon Wiener, “Obama’s Limits: An Interview with Andrew Bacevich,” The Nation, August 28, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/blogs/notion/350252/obama_s

_limits_an_interview_with_andrew_bacevich. Cf. Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008). Michael Scheuer also argues that the campaign against terrorism took a big step backward when the United States invaded Iraq (Scheuer, “Experts Fears ‘Endless’ Terror War,” MSNBC, July 9, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8524679). Peter Bergen agrees: “Many jihadists are so happy that the Bush administration invaded Iraq. Without the Iraq war, their movement—under assault from without and riven from within—would have imploded a year or so after Sept. 11” (Bergen, “The Jihadists Export Their Rage to Book Pages and Web Pages,” Washington Post, September 11, 2005). So does Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terrorism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 246: “Nothing America could have done would have provided al Qaeda and its new generation of cloned groups a better recruitment device than our unprovoked invasion of an oil-rich Arab country.”

24. I am not the first to notice the analogy. See, e.g., Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel, Private Military and Security Companies (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 22; Eugene B. Smith, “The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications,” U.S. Army War College, Parameters, Winter 2002, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/smith

.pdf, 104.

25. Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1974), 22.

26. Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon, eds., Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002), 286.

27. “Iraq Reviewing Security Firms after Blackwater Shooting,” FoxNews.com, September 18, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297153,00.html.

28. “The former Betsy Prince—Edgar and Elsa’s daughter, Erik’s sister—married into the DeVos family, one of the country’s biggest donors to Republican and conservative causes. (‘I know a little something about soft money, as my family is the largest single contributor of soft money to the national Republican Party,’ Betsy DeVos wrote in a 1997 Op-Ed in the Capitol Hill newspaper Roll Call.) She chaired the Michigan Republican Party from 1996 to 2000 and again from 2003 to 2005, and her husband, Dick, ran as the Republican candidate for Michigan governor in 2006. Erik Prince himself is no slouch when it comes to giving to Republicans and cultivating relationships with important conservatives. He and his first and second wives have donated roughly $300,000 to Republican candidates and political action committees” (Ben Van Heuvelen, “The Bush Administration’s Ties to Blackwater,” Salon, October 2, 2007, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/10/02/blackwater

_bush). Cf. Robert Young Pelton, Licensed to Kill, Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: Crown Books, 2006); Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books/Avalon, 2007). On March 30, 2009, Erik Prince announced that he was resigning as chief executive officer of Xe.

29. David Isenberg, “Corporate Mercenaries—Part 2: Myths and Mystery,” Asia Times, May 19, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FE20Ak02.html.

30. Erik Prince, owner of Blackwater, also owned a PIC, Total Intelligence Solutions, whose leadership included J. Cofer Black, former director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center; Robert Richer, the former associate deputy director of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations; and Enrique “Ric” Prado, from the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and before that the CIA’s “paramilitary” Special Operations Group (Jeremy Scahill, “Blackwater: CIA Assassins?” The Nation, August 20, 2009, http://www.the

nation.com/doc/20090831/scahill1).

31. David Isenberg, “Myths and Mystery,” Asia Times, May 20, 2004. While in the CIA, Bruner negotiated the deal for Ahmad Chalabi and the CIA to work together (Aram Roston, The Man Who Pushed America to War [New York: Nation Books, 2009], 76). Bruner later joined BGR and in 2007 became the full-time chairman of BKI Strategic Intelligence. In 2004, Bruner participated with BGR and an Israeli PMC operative in a scheme to help reelect George W. Bush (Laura Rozen, “From Kurdistan to K Street,” Mother Jones, November 2008, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/11/kurdistan-k-street).

32. Douglas Jehl, “Washington Insiders’ New Firm Consults on Contracts in Iraq,” New York Times, September 30, 2003.

33. Financial Times, December 11, 2003. Ed Rogers, Diligence’s vice chairman, was one of George H. W. Bush’s top assistants when he was U.S. president. On resigning from the White House, he negotiated a lucrative contract to act as lobbyist for the former Saudi intelligence chief and Bank of Credit and Commerce International front man Kamal Adham at a time when American and British prosecutors were preparing criminal cases against him. Rogers used Adnan Khashoggi as a go-between to secure the contract, which was canceled after White House criticism of it (Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World’s Most Corrupt Financial Empire [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992], 362–64).

34. Financial Times, December 11, 2003. Cf. Mother Jones, March/April 2004: “More recently, Bush scored a $60,000-a-year consulting deal from a top adviser to New Bridge Strategies, the firm set up by George W.’s ex-campaign manager to ‘take advantage of business opportunities’ in postwar Iraq. His job description: taking calls for three hours a week.”

35. Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 40, 41.

36. Two Booz Allen officers were also beneficiaries of the Paradise Island Bridge Company in Nassau, along with James Crosby of Resorts International, a company supplying the CIA with cover for its connections to the covert world of Paul Helliwell and Meyer Lansky (see chapter 7). Richard Nixon also had a financial interest in the Paradise Island Bridge Company (Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swann, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon [New York: Viking, 2000], 244–45).

37. Shorrock, Spies for Hire, 43, citing Information Week, February 25, 2002. In 2008, Booz Allen Hamilton split into two companies: Booz Allen Hamilton, now majority owned by private equity firm The Carlyle Group, handles the government business, while Booz & Company, with the commercial contracts, is owned and operated as a partnership.

38. Shorrock, Spies for Hire, 51.

39. Elizabeth Brown, “Outsourcing the Defense Budget: Defense Contractors Are Writing the President’s Defense Budget,” Center for Public Integrity, July 29, 2004, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=363&sid=200.

40. “SAIC, which employs 44,000 people and took in $8 billion last year—sells brainpower, including a lot of the ‘expertise’ behind the Iraq war. . . . [SAIC is] a ‘stealth company’ with 9,000 government contracts, many of which involve secret intelligence work” (Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, “Washington’s $8 Billion Shadow,” Vanity Fair, March 2007, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/fea

tures/2007/03/spyagency200703?currentPage=1).

41. Barlett and Steele, “Washington’s $8 Billion Shadow.”

42. Barlett and Steele, “Washington’s $8 Billion Shadow”: “Mark A. Boster left his job as a deputy assistant attorney general in 1999 to join SAIC, and was already calling Justice three months later on behalf of his new employers—a violation of federal law. Boster paid $30,000 in a civil settlement.” Yet another PIC for a while was Interop, combining former CIA director James Woolsey and former FBI director Louis Freeh with former Mossad chief Danny Yatom (Rozen, “From Kurdistan to K Street”).

43. Charlie Cray, “Science Applications International Corporation,” CorpWatch, http://www.corpwatch.org/section.php?id=17; cf. Barlett and Steele, “Washington’s $8 Billion Shadow.”

44. Barlett and Steele, “Washington’s $8 Billion Shadow.”

45. Fritz W. Ermarth, “Colin Powell’s Briefing to the Security Council: Brief Comments from an Ex-Intelligence Officer,” In the National Interest, http://inthenation

alinterest.com/Articles/Powell%27s%20UN%20Speech/Powell%27s%20UN%20speech%20ermarth.html. Ermarth’s remarks were also posted by Laurie Mylroie, “Fritz Ermarth, Iraq & Al Qaeda, In The National Interest,” February 5, 2003, http://www.mail-archive.com/sam11@erols.com/msg00040.html.

46. Anna Leander, “The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 33 (2005): 803, emphasis added. At the time, the Observer reported from “sources in the Bush administration” an allegation that “members of the al-Qaeda network, detained and interrogated in Cairo, had obtained phials of anthrax in the Czech Republic” (“Iraq ‘behind US Anthrax Outbreaks,’” Observer, October 14, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/14/terrorism.afghanistan6).

47. Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security, Summer 2004, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/interna

tional_security/v029/29.1kaufmann.html. Neither SAIC nor Diligence is mentioned in his essay.

48. Shorrock, Spies for Hire, 36–37.

49. Marilyn W. Thompson, “The Pursuit of Steven Hatfill,” Washington Post, September 14, 2003 (Hatfill-SAIC). At the time, Laurie Mylroie said on CNN that “it takes a highly sophisticated agency to produce anthrax in the lethal form. Not many parties can do that.” Saddam Hussein “continues his part of the war in the form of terrorism. It is unlikely that anthrax will remain in letters. It is likely that it will be used in the subway of a city, or in the ventilation system of a U.S. building. Saddam wants revenge against us. He wants to do to the U.S. what we’ve done to Iraq” (CNN, October 29, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/10/29/mylroie).

50. Glenn Greenwald, “Vital Unresolved Anthrax Questions and ABC News,” Salon, August 1, 2008, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/08/01/

anthrax.

51. Cf. Time, November 26, 2001: “While Daschle, the Senate majority leader, could have been chosen as a representative of all Democrats or of the entire Senate, Leahy is a less obvious choice, most likely targeted for a specific reason. He is head of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which is involved in issues ranging from antitrust action to antiterror legislation” (emphasis added). See also Anthony York, “Why Daschle and Leahy?” Salon, November 21, 2001, http://dir.salon.com/story/politics/feature/2001/11/21/anthrax/index.html.

52. Shorrock, Spies for Hire, 344.

53. Julian Assange, “The Spy Who Billed Me Twice,” Wikileaks, http://wikileaks

.org/wiki/The_spy_who_billed_me_twice. The March 2009 army manual “US Army Concept of Operations for Police Intelligence Operations” contains phrases such as “It [fusion] does not have constraints that are emplaced on MI [military intelligence] activities within the US, because it operates under the auspice and oversight of the police discipline and standards.”

54. Phil Leggiere, “Napolitano Praises Fusion Centers,” HSToday, March 13, 2009, http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/7616/149.

55. Assange, “The Spy Who Billed Me Twice.”

56. “Cheney Firm Won $3.8bn Contracts from Government,” Observer, July 21, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/21/globalisation.georgebush.

57. Novyi Region, November 27–30, 2006: English summary in “U.S. Companies Linked to Vice-President Cheney Supervised the Transfar of Ukrainian WMD to Iran,” Left.ru, http://www.left.ru/burtsev/ops/novyiregion.phtml.

58. PravdaInfo, September 2, 2005, http://www.pravda.info/news/3601.html.

59. Yuri Yasenev, “Rossiyu zhdet oranzhevaya revolytsiya” (“An Orange Revolution Is in Store for Russia”), compromat.ru, December 17, 2004, http://www

.compromat.ru/main/surikov/saidov.htm; partial translation at http://www.left.ru/burtsev/ops/yasenev_en.phtml: Yasenev implied that in 2003–2004, Georgia Far West had worked with KBR on the two Rose Revolutions that ousted Shevardnadze and installed Georgia’s present ruler, Saakashvili (Peter Dale Scott, “The Global Drug Meta-Group: Drugs, Managed Violence, and the Russian 9/11,” Lobster, October 29, 2005, http://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/articles/global-drug.htm).

60. “—Vladimir Ilyich [Filin], is it true that Americans are involved in drug business?

—Yes, they are in ideal situation for this. They control the Bagram airfield from where the Air Force transport planes fly to a U.S. military base in Germany. In the last two years this base became the largest transit hub for moving Afghan heroin to other US bases and installations in Europe. Much of it goes to Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia. From there the Kosovo Albanian mafia moves heroin back to Germany and other EU countries” (Alexander Nagorny, “Narkobarony iz CIA i MI-6,” PravdaInfo, September 13, 2004, translated into English at Left.ru, http://left.ru/inter/2005/

narkobarons.phtml).

61. John B. Dunlop, “‘Storm in Moscow’: A Plan of the Yeltsin ‘Family’ to Destabilize Russia,” Hoover Institution, October 8, 2004, http://www.sais-jhu.edu/programs/res/papers/Dunlop%20paper.pdf. This article disappeared from the Johns Hopkins University’s SAIS website shortly after my critique of it was published in October 2005.

62. David Satter, “The Shadow of Ryazan: Is Putin’s Government Legitimate: Is Putin’s Government Legitimate?” National Review, April 30, 2002, http://www.na

tionalreview.com/comment/comment-satter043002.asp. Cf. David Satter, Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), chap. 2.

63. Patrick Cockburn, Independent, January 29, 2000: “Boris Kagarlitsky, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Comparative Politics, writing in the weekly Novaya Gazeta, says that the bombings in Moscow and elsewhere were arranged by the GRU (the Russian military intelligence service). He says they used members of a group controlled by Shirvani Basayev, brother of the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, to plant the bombs. These killed 300 people in Buikask, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September. Mr Kagarlitsky, who, from internal evidence in the article, is drawing on a source with close knowledge of the GRU, says that invasion of Dagestan by Shamil Basayev himself in August was pre-arranged with a senior Kremlin leader at a meeting in France in July.”

64. Dunlop, “‘Storm in Moscow.’”

65. Letter of Anton Surikov to Oleg Grechenevsky: “I am personally acquainted with Mr. Ermarth as political scientist since 1996. It’s well known by many people and we never hid this fact.” Fritz Ermarth did not retire from the CIA until 1998. Cf. Argumenty i Facty, September 15, 1999, http://www.aif.ru/oldsite/986/art010

.html. That the two men met in 1996 was indeed public knowledge. (The Russian journal Commersant published a photo of the two men and others at the International Seminar on Global Security in Virginia in April 1996). However, in 2002, Surikov’s paper, Pravda.ru, published a front-page story (or, better, rumor) linking Ermarth to Surikov’s enemy Berezovsky: “Berezovsky is much more interesting from the point of view of different manipulations in domestic and partially in foreign political life. For this very purpose, British special services ‘handed Berezovsky over’ to American colleagues. We have information that Fritz Ermarth, former CIA officer and specialist on special operations in the East-European region, is in close contact with the oligarch. Russiagate, the scandal on Russian budgetary finance laundering through BONY in August to September of 1998, was one of his projects. He is in contact with Former CIA Director Woolsey, who has no official job in Washington but is known as a person close to Cheney. It is not ruled out that it was Ermarth who suggested that Berezovsky switch his attention from the weak and unpromising micro-party Liberal Russia to financing and cooperation with the Communist Party” (http://english

.pravda.ru/politics/2002/10/09/37954.html).

66. Left.ru Press Conference, http://left.ru/2005/11/preskonf_eng.html.

67. Scott, “The Global Drug Meta-Group,” http://lobster-magazine.co.uk/articles/global-drug.htm#_ftn9; and Peter Dale Scott, “The Tao of 9/11,” Jacket 34, October 2007, http://jacketmagazine.com/34/scott-p-d-5p.shtml.

68. Dunlop, “‘Storm in Moscow.’”

69. In a revised version of my paper I delivered at a symposium at the University of Melbourne, August 12, 2006.

70. Laurie Nowell, “Did an Aussie Sell Nukes to Iran?” Sunday Herald Sun, June 7, 2009: “‘He said my father had been killed because the people at Far West and their Iranian partners feared the Americans would get to him and make him tell them about the missiles. They feared that he knew too much information about their dealings, and knew more information than anybody else.’ Far West’s partners, all former Russian or Ukrainian military or intelligence officers, had close contacts with military figures and mafia groups within Russia and its former satellites. They spirited the missiles out of the Ukraine and shipped them to Cyprus under the auspices of a company called SH Heritage Holdings—whose owner and sole director was Sarfraz Haider.”

71. Kommersant-Ukraina, Kiev, July 17, 2007, 3, as reported by BBC Monitoring Kiev Unit, July 18, 2007.

72. “X-55 Long Range Cruise Missile,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecu

rity.org/wmd/world/iran/x-55.htm. Cf. Financial Times, March 18, 2005.

73. Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Anchor, 2006), 279–80.

74. “US Companies Linked to Vice-President Cheney Supervised the Transfer of Ukrainian WMD to Iran,” Burtsev.ru, http://left.ru/burtsev/ops/novyiregion.phtml.

75. PravdaInfo, November 16, 2005, reported in English by Left.ru, “‘Consulting’ Agency Far West, LLC Paid $3 Million Bribe to Ukrainian Official for Illegal Arms Deals with Syria and Iran,” Left.ru, February 18, 2006, http://www.left.ru/burtsev/ops/lysenko.phtml. According to Left.ru, Filin’s admission was in response to an article by Ivan Demidov in the Ukrainian journal Obkom. Demidov accused two of Filin’s Far West partners, Ukrainian Generals Leonid Kosyakov and Alexei Likhvintsev, and the Russian billionaire Vyacheslav Kantor, adviser to Yushchenko, of seeking to obtain control over two Ukrainian seaports, in Odessa and Ilyichevsk. Demidov’s article (“Who Squeezes Juice from ‘Drug-Injected Oranges’”) hinted that under the guise of fertilizers to be exported to South America by Kantor’s company Akron, the group planned to transport drugs. It also reprinted a letter from a Ukrspetsexport official listing Far West’s business partners: KBR Halliburton (United States), Diligence Iraq LLC (Kuwait), and Meteoric Tactical Solutions (South Africa). And according to

Left.ru, Demidov’s article “alleges that Fritz Ermarth, formerly high ranking official in the CIA, NSC, and NIC, plays the role of the ‘supervisor’ of this GRU group on the part of the FWL’s chief partner: KBR Halliburton and the Dick Cheney circle.”

76. Editorial staff of burtsev.ru, http://www.left.ru/burtsev/ops/bolivia.phtml, citing Vladimir Filin, PravdaInfo, July 29, 2005, http://www.pravda.info/news/3377

.html. Cf. Financial Times, March 18, 2005. The relocation followed Filin’s announcement that Far West had paid bribes paid to Ukrainian officials. Cf. Boston Globe, February 12, 2006, A1.

77. Natalia Roeva, PravdaInfo, February 24, 2006, partially translated. Roeva is herself a partner in Far West.

78. Far West has planted destabilizing rumors to discredit both the United States and Russia. Ruslan Saidov has “accused the high ranking officer of US military intelligence (DIA) Colonel Caleb Temple and his colleagues of running a heroin operation in the Near East and using the hawala money-transfer system for money laundering” (http://left.ru/burtsev/ops/hawala.phtml). In August 2009, Vladimir Filin claimed that the recently hijacked ship the Arctic Sea, under the cover of a load of Finnish timber, was delivering a shipment of weapons to Iran via Algeria (Cristina Batog, “The Truth Is Adrift with the Arctic Sea,” Asia Times, August 26, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KH26Ag01.html); cf. J. R. Nyquist, “Never Ask the Wolves to Help You against the Dogs,” GodlikeProductions.com, August 21, 2009, http://www.godlike

productions.com/bbs/reply.php?messageid=869607&page=1"e=13460278.

79. DIA Report of September 23, 2991, “Subj: (U) IIR [DELETED]/Narcotics—Colombian Narco-Trafficker Profiles,” http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB131/dia910923.pdf. Cf. New York Times, August 2, 2004.

Chapter 9: 9/11 and the American Tradition of Engineered Deep Events

1. James G. Hershberg, “Before ‘The Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against Cuba?” in The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, ed. James A. Nathan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 242.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Courses of Action Related to Cuba (Case II),” Report of the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1, 1963, NARA #202-10002-10018, 21, http://www

.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=167&relPageId=21.

3. John J. Farmer, The Ground Truth: The Untold Story of America under Attack on 9/11 (New York: Riverhead, 2009). 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer also told CNN on August 2, 2006, that “we were extremely frustrated with the false statements we were getting.”

4. Marilyn W. Thompson, “The Pursuit of Steven Hatfill,” Washington Post, September 14, 2003 (Hatfill–Science Applications International Corporation). At the time, Laurie Mylroie said on CNN that “it takes a highly sophisticated agency to produce anthrax in the lethal form. Not many parties can do that.” Saddam Hussein “continues his part of the war in the form of terrorism. It is unlikely that anthrax will remain in letters. It is likely that it will be used in the subway of a city, or in the ventilation system of a U.S. building. Saddam wants revenge against us. He wants to do to the U.S. what we’ve done to Iraq” (CNN, October 29, 2001, http://archives.cnn

.com/2001/COMMUNITY/10/29/mylroie).

5. Simon Reeve, “Scientists Link Iraq to Anthrax Terror Attacks,” Sunday Mail (London), October 28, 2001. It would be interesting to learn the identity of Reeve’s “scientists.”

6. Glenn Greenwald, “Vital Unresolved Anthrax Questions and ABC News,” Salon, August 1, 2008, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/08/01/anthrax. Cf. Richard Butler, ambassador in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York Times, October 18, 2001: “Meetings between Mohamed Atta, who is thought to have been an organizer of the Sept. 11 attacks, and an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague in June 2000 may have been an occasion on which anthrax was provided to Mr. Atta. There have also been reports of meetings between senior Iraqi intelligence officials and members of Al Qaeda.” Butler’s claims about Iraq, Atta, anthrax, and al-Qaeda have also since been discredited, although Richard Cheney and his colleague James Woolsey continue to assert them. Cf. The 9/11 Commission Report, 66, 228–29.

7. Cf. Time, November 26, 2001: “While Daschle, the Senate majority leader, could have been chosen as a representative of all Democrats or of the entire Senate, Leahy is a less obvious choice, most likely targeted for a specific reason. He is head of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which is involved in issues ranging from antitrust action to antiterror legislation” (emphasis added). See also Anthony York, “Why Daschle and Leahy?” Salon, November 21, 2001, http://dir.salon.com/story/politics/feature/2001/11/21/anthrax/index.html.

8. See, e.g., Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Deep Politics of War (Ipswich, MA: Mary Ferrell Foundation Press, 2008), 341–96.

9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 13, 1962 (Northwoods Document), 1, NARA # 202-10002-10404, 128, reproduced in Michael C. Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2004), 595.

10. Notes on National Security Meeting, July 20, 1961, in James K. Galbraith and Heather A. Purcell, “Did the U.S. Military Plan a Nuclear First Strike for 1963?” American Prospect, Fall 1994, 88; cf. James W. Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008), 235.

11. Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable, 239–40.

12. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Courses of Action Related to Cuba (Case II),” Report of the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1, 1963, NARA #202

-10002-10018, 21, http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/viewer/showDoc

.do?docId=167&relPageId=21.

13. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Courses of Action Related to Cuba (Case II),” Report of the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1, 1963, NARA #202-10002-10018, 4.

14. Gareth Porter, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 265, cf. 148.

15. E.g., Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Kennedy, November 16, 1962, JCSM-910-62, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/msc

_cuba186.asp: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are glad to report that our Armed Forces are in an optimum posture to execute CINCLANT OPLANS 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba)(1) and 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba). (2) We are not only ready to take any action you may order in Cuba, we are also in an excellent condition world-wide to counter any Soviet military response to such action.”

16. Telegram from the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, September 21, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 [hereinafter FRUS], vol. 10, 1082–83.

17. Hershberg, “Before ‘The Missiles of October,’” 242.

18. Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 107.

19. In the single month of March 1962, the Secret Army Organization (OAS) set off an average of 120 bombs per day (“The Generals’ Putsch,” http://countrystudies

.us/algeria/34.htm).

20. Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, DST, Police Secrète (Paris: Flammarion, 1999), 174.

21. Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 14, 181–82, citing Fabrizio Calvi and Frédéric Laurent, Piazza Fontana: La Verità su una Strage (Milan: Mondadori, 1997), 109.

22. James Bamford, Body of Secrets (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 82.

23. Gareth Jenkins, “Susurluk and the Legacy of Turkey’s Dirty War,” Terrorism Monitor, May 1, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php

?articleid=2374142.

24. Nicholas Birch, Irish Times, November 26, 2005, http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/world/2005/1126/1908792893FR26TURKEY.html. Former Turkish president and prime minister Suleyman Demirel later commented on this incident that “it is fundamental principle that there is one state. In our country there are two. . . . There is one deep state and one other state . . . . The state that should be real is the spare one, the one that should be spare is the real one” (Jon Gorvett, “Turkey’s ‘Deep State’ Surfaces in Former President’s Words, Deeds in Kurdish Town,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 2006, http://www.washington-report

.org/archives/Jan_Feb_2006/0601037.html).

25. Jenkins, “Susurluk and the Legacy of Turkey’s Dirty War.” A Google search on June 7, 2008, for “Semdinli + PKK” in major world English-language publications yielded 157 results. Of these, only two were from the United States. Of these one (Washington Times, December 6, 2005) did not mention the deep state’s involvement in the incident at all. The other (Newsweek, November 28, 2005) defined the deep state without mentioning its underworld involvement. A similar search for “deep state” revealed the same paucity of coverage in the U.S. media.

26. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 4–7, 14–17.

27. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 121–22, 124–27, 163–69.

28. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 139–42, 150–60; Peter Lance, Triple Cross: How bin Laden’s Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI—And Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him (New York: Regan/HarperCollins, 2006).

29. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 153, citing Toronto Globe and Mail, November 22, 2001. It is no accident that the mainstream U.S. press have been silent concerning not only this important fact but also the two books recording it: Lance’s Triple Cross and my own The Road to 9/11. Triple Cross finally got mentioned by name in the New York Times but only because its publisher, Judith Regan, was dismissed by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation (New York Times, December 19, 2006).

30. I have argued elsewhere that the FBI was possibly not informed for the same reason that the CIA, in October 1963, withheld important information from the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald—namely, that all three had already been selected as designated culprits for an ensuing disaster so that it was important that the FBI not interfere with their movements. See Scott, The War Conspiracy, 354–57, 387–91.

31. Lawrence Wright, “The Agent,” New Yorker, July 10 and 17, 2006, 68; discussion in Scott, The War Conspiracy, 388–89.

32. “The CIA believed that Jordanian physician Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi would help it infiltrate Islamist extremist groups—even find Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s elusive No. 2. But this informant, it turned out, was also an assassin, whose Dec. 30 suicide bombing of an Afghanistan CIA base killed seven agency employees” (Claire Suddath, “Brief History: Double Agents,” Time, January 25, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1953712,00

.html#ixzz0ccXO8nJI).

33. I include Laos in this list because of the staged charade in which Joseph Alsop, after being shown four villagers, one with a leg wound, then proclaimed that Laos had suffered a “full-scale artillery-backed invasion from Communist North Viet-Nam” (see chapter 4).

34. In addition, events in Colombia were misrepresented outrageously by Vice President George H. W. Bush and others to justify a secret U.S. National Security Decision Directive 221 in April 1986 that led eventually to Bush’s militarization of drug interdiction and aggressive “Andean initiative” in 1989. See Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: The CIA, Drugs, and Armies in Central America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 94–103; Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 87–88.

35. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1990), 611, 613, emphasis added, quoting William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New York: Dial, 1977), 315–21, whole passage quoted in Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 61. Nor am I prepared to add Panama in 1989 to the list, although it has been alleged that one of the incidents cited as grounds for the invasion—the killing of an unarmed marine named Robert Paz—was possibly the result of a provocation. (“It was also reported by the Los Angeles Times that ‘according to American military and civilian sources’ the officer killed was a member of the ‘Hard Chargers,’ a group whose goal was to agitate members of the PDF. It was also reported that the group’s ‘tactics were well known by ranking U.S. officers’ who were frustrated by ‘Panamanian provocations committed under dictator Manuel A. Noriega’” (Wikipedia, “United State Invasion of Panama,” citing Los Angeles Times, December 22, 1990, “Some Blame Rogue Band of Marines for Picking Fight, Spurring Panama Invasion”).

36. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, authorized ed. (New York: Norton, 2004), 261–62.

37. Bamford, Body of Secrets, 301. William Bundy took issue with this judgment, arguing that escalating the war north “didn’t fit in with our plans at all” (Robert McNamara, “The Tonkin Gulf Resolution,” in Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology, ed. Andrew Jon Rotter [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991], 83). But Ball was correct in reporting that bombing fit in with some people’s plans.

38. Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 200, citing John Prados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 51.

39. Porter, Perils of Dominance, 200–201. Cf. FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 1, 714–15.

40. “Department of Defense Actions to Implement NSAM No. 273, 26 November 1963,” Enclosure D for meeting of Admiral H. D. Felt with JCS, December 11, 1963, NARA #202-10002-10109. The same document points out that “CIA guidance to Saigon Station for intensified planning was dispatched following the Honolulu Conference (CAS 84972, November 25, 1963). As James Galbraith has commented pertinently, “In other words, the CIA began developing intensified plans to implement OPLAN 34A, the program of seaborne raids and sabotage against North Vietnam that would lead to the Gulf of Tonkin incident and eventually to the wider war, one day before President Johnson signed the directive authorizing that action” (James K. Galbraith, “Exit Strategy: In 1963, JFK Ordered a Complete Withdrawal from Vietnam,” Boston Review, November 24, 2003, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.5/galbraith

.html).

41. Galbraith, “Exit Strategy”; cf. John Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 434; Scott, The War Conspiracy, 294.

42. Scott, The War Conspiracy, 294–95.

43. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 13, 1962 (Northwoods Document), NARA #202-10002-10404.

44. Robert J. Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964,” Cryptologic Quarterly, declassified in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 132, http://www.gwu

.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/relea00012.pdf.

45. Ray McGovern, “CIA, Iran and the Gulf of Tonkin,” ConsortiumNews, January 12, 2008, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/011108a.html.

46. Scott, The War Conspiracy, 132, cf. 67, citing Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 314, 318.

47. Scott, The War Conspiracy, 88, 93–103.

48. “National Security Advisor Holds Press Briefing,” May 16, 2002, http://www

.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020516-13.html. We now know that on 9/11 there were a number of war games and exercises, including an exercise at the National Reconnaissance Office near Dulles Airport, testing responses “if a plane were to strike a building” (Scott, The Road to 9/11, 215–16; Evening Standard [London], August 22, 2002; Boston Globe, September 11, 2002, http://www.boston.com/news/packages/sept11/anniversary/wire_stories/0903_plane_exercise.htm).

49. 9/11 Commission Report, 259, 271; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 352–54 (FBI agent). After 9/11 another FBI agent was even more bitter: “They [CIA] didn’t want the bureau meddling in their business—that’s why they didn’t tell the FBI. . . . And that’s why September 11 happened. That is why it happened. . . . They have blood on their hands. They have three thousand deaths on their hands” (James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies [New York: Doubleday, 2004], 224).

50. Clarence M. Kelley, Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director (Kansas City, MO: Andrews, McMeel, and Parker, 1987), 268, quoted in Scott, The War Conspiracy, 389.

51. Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 196–98; discussion in Scott, The War Conspiracy, 387–88.

52. Wright, “The Agent,” 68; discussion in Scott, The War Conspiracy, 388–89.

53. Particularly conspicuous in the Iran-Contra scandal was, once again, the involvement of its major players—the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the Contras, and Contra supply network—in international drug trafficking. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2001), 480, 490–500; Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics.

54. Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 280.

55. Public Law 90-331 (18 U.S.C. 3056); discussion in Peter Dale Scott, Paul L. Hoch, and Russell Stetler, The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond (New York: Random House, 1976), 443–46.

56. George O’Toole, The Private Sector (New York: Norton, 1978), 145, quoted in Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 278–79.

57. Joan M. Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 244.

58. 9/11 Commission Report, 38, 326; Scott, The Road to 9/11, 228–29.

59. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 238, 240–41.

60. Alphonso Chardy, “Reagan Aides and the ‘Secret’ Government,” Miami Herald, July 5, 1987; Scott, The Road to 9/11, 241.

61. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 183–87.

62. Republican Senators Heinz and Tower also died in plane crashes but after collisions between two aircraft. Conservative Democrat Larry McDonald died when the civilian airliner KAL 007 was shot down by Soviet interceptors in September 1983.

63. Michael Parenti, Dirty Truths (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1996), 201, 206: “In the years before the fatal crash there had been assassination attempts against Walter and Victor [Reuther]. (Victor believes the attempt against him was intended as a message to Walter.) In each of these instances, state and federal law-enforcement agencies showed themselves at best lackadaisical in their investigative efforts, suggesting the possibility of official collusion or at least tolerance for the criminal deeds. . . . Third, like the suspicious near-crash that occurred the previous year, the fatal crash also involved a faulty altimeter in a small plane. It is a remarkable coincidence that Reuther would have been in two planes with the exact same malfunctioning in that brief time frame. . . . In a follow-up interview with us, Victor further noted: ‘Animosity from government had been present for some time [before the fatal crash]. It was not only Walter’s stand on Vietnam and Cambodia that angered Nixon, but also I had exposed some CIA elements inside labor, and this was also associated with Walter. . . . There is a fine line between the mob and the CIA. There is a lot of crossover. Throughout the entire history of labor relations there is a sordid history of industry in league with Hoover and the mafia. . . . You need to check into right-wing corporate groups and their links to the national security system.’ Checking into such things is no easy task. The FBI still refuses to turn over nearly 200 pages of documents regarding Reuther’s death, including the copious correspondence between field offices and Hoover. And many of the released documents—some of them forty years old—are totally inked out. It is hard to fathom what national security concern is involved or why the FBI and CIA still keep so many secrets about Walter Reuther’s life and death.”

64. See discussion in Jack N. Rakove, “Taking the Prerogative Out of the Presidency: An Originalist Perspective,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 85–100; Frederick A. O. Schwarz Jr. and Aziz Z. Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New York: Rodale, 2007), 153–58.

65. Interview with David Frost, aired May 11, 1977, in Schwarz and Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced, 159; Robert D. Sloane, “The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction,” Boston University Law Review 88 (2000): 341,

http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/SLOANE

.pdf, 346.

66. Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration (New York: Norton, 2007), 82.

67. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, 183.

68. Minority Report, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 100th Congress, 1st sess., House Report No. 100-433, Senate Report No. 100-216, 465.

69. Schwarz and Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced, 174.

70. Schwarz and Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced, 72; cf. Sloane, “The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century,” 347.

71. Cf. the investigative journalist and media critic Philip Weiss, “When Black Becomes White,” in Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free Press, ed. Kristina Borjesson (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002), 186: “The mainstream media’s response [to theories of the Kennedy assassination] has been a dull one—to solemnly and stoically report the government’s assertions, over and over.”

72. Scott, The War Conspiracy, 10, 383, 395.

73. Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), xii–xiii.

74. James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls,” New York Times, December 21, 2005.

75. Gareth Porter, “Attack Iran? Cheney’s Already Tried,” AlterNet, June 10, 2008, http://www.alternet.org/audits/87488: “Pentagon officials firmly opposed a proposal by Vice President Dick Cheney last summer [2007] for air strikes against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps bases by insisting that the administration would have to make clear decisions about how far the United States would go in escalating the conflict with Iran, according to a former George W. Bush administration official. J Scott Carpenter, who was then deputy assistant secretary of state in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, recalled in an interview that senior Defense Department officials and the JCS used the escalation issue as the main argument against the Cheney proposal. McClatchy newspapers reported last August that Cheney had proposal several weeks earlier ‘launching airstrikes at suspected training camps in Iran,’ citing two officials involved in Iran policy.”

76. Borjesson, Into the Buzzsaw, 13. Even former George W. Bush spokesman Scott McClellan has referred to the media in his book as “complicit enablers” of Bush administration war propaganda (Scott McClellan, What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception [New York: Public Affairs, 2008], 70, 125).

77. Washington Post, September 8, 2006. Cf. BBC, “Paranoia Paradise,” April 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1909378.stm. The common tactic of such essays is to focus on absurdly eccentric beliefs and try to pass them off as representative of all those criticizing received anticonspiratorial opinion.

78. E.g., Paul L. Atwood, “War and Empire Are and Always Have Been the American Way of Life,” Global Policy Forum, February 2006, http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/2006/022006history.htm.

79. Alexander Cockburn, “The Age of Irrationality: The 9/11 Conspiracists and the Decline of the American Left,” CounterPunch, November 28, 2006, http://www

.counterpunch.org/cockburn11282006.html.

80. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 123, cf. 13–14; Herbert Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics (New York: Random House, 1974).

81. Michael Klare, Beyond the “Vietnam Syndrome” (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981).

82. E.g., Robert Wright, “All Quiet on the Western Front,” Slate, October 11, 2001 http://www.slate.com/id/117170.

83. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 57–61. Cf. Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston: South End Press, 1983).

84. L. Fletcher Prouty, The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World (1997), http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST.

85. Prouty, The Secret Team, chap. 2.

86. G. William Domhoff, quoted in Conspiracies, Cover-Ups, and Crimes: Political Manipulation and Mind Control in America, by Jonathan Vankin (New York: Paragon House, 1991), 125–26.

87. Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK, 11.

88. Parenti, Dirty Truths, 188.

89. This has been doubted in the case of the JFK assassination, notably by Noam Chomsky. For my latest contribution to this old argument, see Scott, The War Conspiracy, 285–340.

90. Scott, The War Conspiracy, 14; Michael Standaert, Skipping towards Armageddon: The Politics and Propaganda of the Left Behind Novels and the LaHaye Empire (Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press, 2006), 112–14.

91. Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy (New York: Little, Brown, 2007), 51. Strangely, Savage does not mention COG by name, but he refers to the decade of COG planning in the 1980s as evidence for his case that a “cabal of zealots” has been planning for “the return of the imperial presidency” ever since Cheney and Rumsfeld lost their posts in the Ford administration.

92. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Senate Report 107-351.

93. Philip Shenon, The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation (New York: Twelve/Hachette, 2008), 54–55.

94. “Addressing the nation from the Oval Office in 2005 after the first disclosures of the NSA’s warrantless electronic surveillance became public, Bush insisted that the spying program in question was reviewed ‘every 45 days’ as part of planning to assess threats to ‘the continuity of our government’” (Christopher Ketcham, “The Last Round-Up,” RadarOnline, May 15, 2008, http://circleof13.blogspot.com/2008/05/last-roundup.html). Cf. President’s Radio Address, December 15, 2005, http://www

.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html: “The activities I authorized are reviewed approximately every 45 days. Each review is based on a fresh intelligence assessment of terrorist threats to the continuity of our government and the threat of catastrophic damage to our homeland.”

95. Robert Parry, “Gonzales Questions Habeas Corpus,” Baltimore Chronicle, January 19, 2007.

96. 9/11 Commission Report, 38, 326; Scott, The Road to 9/11, 228–29.

97. White House Notice of September 20, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070920-9.html.

98. White House Press Release, September 10, 2009, http://www.whitehouse

.gov/the_press_office/Notice-of-continuation-from-the-president-regarding-the-emergency-declared-with-respect-to-the-September-11-2001-terrorist-attacks. A press briefing by Obama’s spokesman Robert Gibbs the same day did not mention the extension.

99. Jerome Corsi, “Bush Makes Power Grab,” WorldNetDaily, May 23, 2007, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=55824.

100. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, “National Emergency Powers,” updated August 30, 2007, p. 10ss, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf.

101. Washington Post, May 10, 2007.

102. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 183–87, citing James Mann, “The Armageddon Plan,” Atlantic Monthly, March 2004, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200403/mann; James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), 138–45; Bamford, A Pretext for War, 70–74. Cf. Peter Dale Scott, “Congress, the Bush Administration and Continuity of Government Planning: The Showdown,” CounterPunch, March 31, 2008, http://www.counterpunch.org/scott03312008.html.

103. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 184; Ross Gelbspan, Break-Ins, Death Threats, and the FBI: The Covert War against the Central America Movement (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 184.

Chapter 10: Obama and Afghanistan

1. John Nichols, “Obama’s Campaign Merits a Peace Prize,” The Nation (blogs), October 10, 2009, http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat/482916/obama_s

_campaign_merits_a_peace_prize.

2. Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 65–69.

3. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 66–67.

4. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 67–68, referring to the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Cf. Len Colodny and Tom Schachtmen, The Forty Years War: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 365–66.

5. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template,” Military Review, November–December 2009, 1.

6. Johnson and Mason, “Refighting the Last War,” 5, citing Jeffrey Record, “How America’s Own Military Performance in Vietnam Aided and Abetted the ‘North’s’ Victory,” in Why the North Won the Vietnam War, ed. Marc Jason Gilbert (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 119.

7. New York Times, October 28, 2009.

8. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1997), 239; A. J. Langguth, Our Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 99; Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2003), 203 (drugs).

9. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 203.

10. Gareth Porter, “Tajik Grip on Afghan Army Signals New Ethnic War,” IPS News, November 28, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49461. Cf. James Denselow, “How National Is the Afghan Army?” Guardian, October 2, 2009. In February 2010 the U.S. Marines launched Operation Moshtarak in Marja, at the heart of the Pashtun province of Helmand. As the U.S. press noted, “Moshtarak” means “Together”—not in Pashtun, however, but in Dari.

11. Spencer Tucker, Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 87.

12. Eric Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 3, quoted in Johnson and Mason, “Refighting the Last War,” 5.

13. Thomas H. Johnson, “Ismail Khan, Heart, and Iranian Influence,” Strategic Insights, July 2004, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/jul/johnsonJul04.asp.

14. Johnson and Mason, “Refighting the Last War,” 7–8.

15. Rory Stewart, “Afghanistan: What Could Work,” New York Review of Books, January 14, 2010, 62.

16. Rory Stewart, “The Irresistible Illusion,” London Review of Books, July 9, 2009, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/rory-stewart/the-irresistible-illusion.

17. Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 127–29.

18. The southern provinces were administered directly by a résident supérieur in Vientiane who also supervised—but indirectly—the quasi-independent northern Kingdom of Louangphrabang.

19. Corruption within the USAID program (or boondoggle) in Laos, centered about bribes paid by CIA contractor Willis Bird, produced a congressional investigation. See Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 196; Martin E. Goldstein, American Policy toward Laos, 186–87; U.S. Congress, House, U.S. Aid Operations in Laos, House Report No. 546, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959).

20. Time, March 17, 1961; discussion in Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Deep Politics of War (Ipswich, MA: Mary Ferrell Foundation Press, 2008), 78.

21. Guardian (London), October 14, 1971. Cf. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 320–21.

22. Cf. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1979).

23. Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

24. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 300.

25. John Prados, Lost Crusader: the Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 168.

26. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 40.

27. Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7.

28. I agree with the following assessment by Thomas H. Johnson: “The characterization of Afghanistan by the 19th Century British diplomat Sir Henry Rawlinson as ‘consist[ing] of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and divergent habits, which are held together more or less closely, according to the personal character of the chief who rules them. The feeling of patriotism, as it is known in Europe, cannot exist among Afghans, for there is no common country’ is still true today and suggests critical nuances for any realistic Afghanistan reconstruction and future political agenda” (Thomas H. Johnson, “Ismail Khan, Heart, and Iranian Influence,” Strategic Insights, July 2004, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/jul/johnsonJul04.asp).

29. Railways approach Afghanistan from the north, east, south, and west. The only two with foothold terminals in Afghanistan itself are those built by the Soviet Union in the 1980s, from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

30. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 461, citing interview with Dr. David Musto.

31. David Musto, New York Times, May 22, 1980, quoted in McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 462.

32. Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 16, quoted in Scott, The Road to 9/11, 77.

33. Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 223; Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 16–17, 23–28.

34. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 77–79; Little, American Orientalism, 150.

35. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 46, 49; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 475–78.

36. New York Times, March 13, 1994.

37. Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Random House, 1990), 68–69.

38. See discussion in Scott, The Road to 9/11, 73–75, 117–22.

39. Brzezinski, e.g., writes that “I pushed a decision through the SCC to be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country’s independence” (Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981 [New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983], 427). On the same page he writes that “I also consulted with the Saudis and the Egyptians regarding the fighting in Afghanistan.” He is silent about the early, decisive, and ill-fated contact with Pakistan.

40. Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 163.

41. M. Emdad-ul Haq, Drugs in South Asia: From the Opium Trade to the Present Day (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 188. According to a contemporary account, Americans and Europeans started becoming involved in drug smuggling out of Afghanistan from the early 1970s; see Catherine Lamour and Michel R. Lamberti, The International Connection: Opium from Growers to Pushers (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 190–92.

42. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 447.

43. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 458; Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 148 (labs); Emdad-ul Haq, Drugs in South Asia, 189 (ISI).

44. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 73–75, citing McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 475 (leading drug lords), 464 (60 percent).

45. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 461–64, 474–80; Lawrence Lifshultz, “Inside the Kingdom of Heroin,” The Nation, November 14, 1988; Peters, Seeds of Terror, 37–39.

46. Ralph Blumenthal, Last Days of the Sicilians (New York: Pocket Books, 1988), 119, 314.

47. John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 128–29; Jonathan Beaty and S. C. Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI (New York: Random House, 1993), 305–6.

48. Beaty and Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank, 306, cf. 82; see also Stéphane Allix, La petite cuillère de Schéhérazade (Paris: Ramsay, 1998), 35, 95; Peters, Seeds of Terror, 45–46.

49. Maureen Orth, Vanity Fair, March 2002, 170–71. A Tajik sociologist added that she knew that “drugs were massively distributed at that time” and that she often heard how Russian soldiers were “invited to taste.”

50. USA Today, January 12, 2009.

51. Newsweek, April 7, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/129577.

52. Times of India, November 29, 1999.

53. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), 536.

54. Philip Smucker, Al Qaeda’s Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror’s Trail (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), 9. On December 4, 2001, Asia Times reported that a convicted Pakistani drug baron and former parliamentarian, Ayub Afridi, was also released from prison to participate in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CL04Df01.html); Scott, The Road to 9/11, 125.

55. Peter Dale Scott, “Afghanistan, Colombia, Vietnam: The Deep Politics of Drugs and Oil,” http://www.peterdalescott.net/qov.html.

56. U.S. Congress, Senate, Minority Saff Report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities, November 9, 1999, http://hsgac.senate

.gov/110999_report.htm. These figures are both much used and much disputed. But even if the real figures are only half those estimated by the Senate report, dirty money would appear to be a structural part of the U.S. economy. Those who deny this remind me of the economists who, as late as the 1950s, argued that U.S. foreign trade (then listed at about 2 percent of gross national product) was too small to be a significant element in the U.S. gross national product. No one would make that argument today.

57. Independent (London), February 29, 2004. Cf. Michel Chossudovsky, “The Spoils of War: Afghanistan’s Multibillion Dollar Heroin Trade,” Global Research, May 5, 2005, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO404A.html.

58. James Petras, “‘Dirty Money’ Foundation of U.S. Growth and Empire,” La Jornada, May 19, 2001, Narco News, http://www.narconews.com/petras1.html.

59. Asad Ismi, “The Canadian Connection: Drugs, Money Laundering and Canadian Banks,” AsadIsmi.ws, http://www.asadismi.ws/cancon.html. The Bank of Boston laundered as much as $2 million from the trafficker Gennaro Angiulo and eventually paid a fine of $500,000 (New York Times, February 22, 1985; Eduardo Varela-Cid, Hidden Fortunes: Drug Money, Cartels and the Elite Banks [Sunny Isles Beach, FL: El Cid Editor, 1999]).

60. Rajeev Syal, “Drug Money Saved Banks in Global Crisis, Claims UN Advisor,” Observer, December 13, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2009/dec/13/drug

-money-banks-saved-un-cfief-claims.

61. RAND Corporation, “How Terrorist Groups End: Implications for Countering al Qa’ida,” Research Brief, RB-9351-RC, 2008, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research

_briefs/RB9351/index1.html.

62. Gilles Dorronsoro, “Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009, http://carnegieen

dowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf.

63. Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), quoted in David Michael Smith, “The U.S. War in Afghanistan,” The Canadian, April 19, 2006, http://www.agoracosmopolitan.com/home/Frontpage/2006/04/19/01181.html, emphasis added. Cf. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 169–70.

64. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 166, 170; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 159–80. Senator Hank Brown was a supporter of the Unocal project and welcomed the fall of Kabul as a chance for stable government (Rashid, Taliban, 166).

65. Brooke Shelby Briggs, “The Taliban, Unocal and a Pipeline,” Pacific News Service, http://130.94.183.89/magazine/pipeline.html.

66. BBC, September 18, 2001.

67. Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan/Henry Holt, 2004), 176.

68. Phyllis Bennis, “Annotate This: President Obama’s Afghanistan Escalation Speech,” Institute of Policy Studies, Foreign Policy in Focus, December 2, 2009, http://www.fpif.org/articles/annotate_this_president_obamas_afghanistan_escalation_speech. Amy Goodman, summarizing an important article by Jeremy Scahill in The Nation, has reported that “Blackwater is also said to be involved in a previously undisclosed U.S. military drone campaign that has killed scores of people inside Pakistan. Blackwater operatives have been working under a covert program run by the Joint Special Operations Command, the military’s top covert operations force. The previously undisclosed JSOC operations would mark the first known confirmation of U.S. military activity inside Pakistan. A military intelligence source said Blackwater operatives are effectively running the drone bombings for both JSOC and the CIA. The CIA drone program is already public knowledge. But the military source says some of the deadliest drone attacks in attributed to the CIA were actually carried out by JSOC. The article also reveals Blackwater operatives have taken part in ground operations with Pakistani forces under a subcontract with a local security firm. The operations have included house raids and border interdictions in northwest Pakistan and other areas. Blackwater has also been given responsibility for planning JSOC operations in Uzbekistan” (Democracy Now, November 24, 2009, http://www.democracynow.org/2009/11/24/blackwaters_secret_war_in_paki

stan_jeremy).

69. Stewart, “The Irresistible Illusion.”

70. Stewart, “Afghanistan,” emphasis added.

71. Andrew Bacevich, Democracy Now, December 2, 2009, http://www.democra

cynow.org/2009/12/2/vietnam_vet_scholar_andrew_bacevichon_obama.

72. Democracy Now, December 2, 2009.

73. Andrew Bacevich, “Obama, Tell Me How This Ends,” New York Daily News, December 23, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2009/12/23/2009-12-23

_obama_tell_me_how_this_ends_is_afghanistan_just_a_new_war_of_attrition

.html?page=1.

74. An article in the New York Times reports a new army history of the Afghan War in support of counterinsurgency doctrine: “This year, a resurgent Taliban prompted the current American commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, to warn that the war would be lost without an infusion of additional troops and a more aggressive approach to counterinsurgency. President Obama agreed, ordering the deployment of 30,000 more troops, which will bring the total American force to 100,000” (New York Times, December 31, 2009).

75. “Deep Events and the CIA’s Global Drug Connection,” 911Truth, http://911truth.org/article.php?story=20081012142525948.

76. U.S. Congress, Senate, Minority Saff Report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities (November 9, 1999), http://hsgac.senate

.gov/110999_report.htm.

77. William Byrd and Christopher Ward, “Afghanistan: Drug Industry and Counter-Narcotics Policy,” Report to the World Bank, November 28, 2006, http://web

.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21133060~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html.

78. Australian journalist Michael Ware, Time magazine’s correspondent in Kandahar, “Afghanistan—America’s Blind Eye,” ABC/TV (Australia), April 10, 2002, Reporter: Mark Corcoran, http://www.mickware.info/2002/files/2b3c5632e1c8fa1ad68b6f83ae91a8c3-93.php.

79. Kirk Kraeutler, “U.N. Reports That Taliban Is Stockpiling Opium,” New York Times, November 27, 2008.

80. Jeremy R. Hammond, “New York Times Misleads on Taliban Role in Opium Trade,” Foreign Policy Journal, November 29, 2008, http://www.foreignpolicyjour

nal.com/2008/11/29/new-york-times-misleads-on-taliban-role-in-opium-trade: “The Times misleads on other counts, as well. The UNODC does suggest that opium is being stockpiled as one possible explanation for why costs haven’t dropped in direct correlation with the vast over-supply. Mr. Costa has said that ‘Lack of price response in the opium market can only be the result of stock build-ups, and all evidence points to the Taliban.’ But Mr. Costa himself appears to be politicizing the report’s actual findings with this remark. The market price of opium against the estimated supply does suggest stocks are being withheld, and the Taliban does profit from the trade. But there appears to be only this circumstantial evidence that the Taliban is responsible for the theoretical stockpiling; and even if we assume that stockpiling is indeed taking place, there are also non-Taliban warlords and drug lords who may be responsible.”

81. “Afghanistan: Drug Industry and Counter-Narcotics Policy,” Report to the World Bank, November 28, 2006, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21133060~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html, emphasis added.

82. London Daily Mail, July 21, 2007.

83. Matthieu Aikins, “The Master of Spin Boldak,” Harper’s, December 2009, http://harpers.org/archive/2009/12/0082754.

84. Independent (London), April 13, 2006; James Nathan, “Ending the Taliban’s Money Stream: U.S. Should Buy Afghanistan’s Opium,” Washington Times, January 8, 2009.

85. Afghanistan News, December 23, 2005, http://www.afghanistannewscenter

.com/news/2005/december/dec232005.html.

86. Independent, March 9, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/former-warlord-to-fight-karzai-in-afghanistan-polls-1640164.html#mainColumn. When Obama visited Afghanistan in 2008, Gul Agha Sherzai was the first Afghan leader he met. The London Observer reported on July 21, 2002, that in order to secure his acceptance of the new Karzai government, Gul Agha Sherzai, along with other warlords, had “been ‘bought off’ with millions of dollars in deals brokered by US and British intelligence.”

87. Mark Corcoran, Australian Broadcasting Company, 2008, http://www.abc

.net.au/foreign/blog_mark.htm. “In an affidavit in his criminal case, he traced a history of cooperating with U.S. officials, including the CIA, dating to 1990. In early 2002, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Noorzai said he turned over to the U.S. military 15 truckloads of Taliban weapons, including “four hundred anti-aircraft missiles of Russian, American and British manufacture” (Tom Burghardt, “The Secret and (Very) Profitable World of Intelligence and Narcotrafficking,” DissidentVoice, January 2, 2009, http://www.dissidentvoice.org/2009/01/the-secret

-and-very-profitable-world-of-intelligence-and-narcotrafficking). Cf. James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006), 165–66.

88. USA Today, October 26, 2004. Noorzai was finally arrested in New York in 2005, having come to this country at the invitation of a private intelligence firm, Rosetta Research. The U.S. media reports of his arrest did not point out that Rosetta had failed to supply Noorzai the kind of immunity usually provided by the CIA (Washington Post, December 27, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/26/AR2008122602099.html; New York Sun, January 29, 2008, http://www.nysun.com/foreign/justice-dept-eyes-us-firms-payments

-to-afghan/70371).

89. Personal communication, December 29, 2009, citing UNODC reports of 2008 and 2009; cf. New York Times, October 22, 2009.

90. Sibel Edmonds and Philip Giraldi, “Found in Translation: FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds Spills Her Secrets,” The American Conservative, January 28, 2008, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2008/jan/28/00012. Others have written about the ties between U.S. intelligence and the Turkish narcointelligence connection; see, e.g., Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 224–41; Martin A. Lee, “Turkey’s Drug-Terrorism Connection,” ConsortiumNews, January 25, 2008, http://www.consortium

news.com/2008/012408a.html.

91. London Sunday Times, January 6, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article3137695.ece: “‘If you made public all the information that the FBI have on this case, you will see very high-level people going through criminal trials,’ she said.”

92. Risen, State of War, 154.

93. Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 90–97: “While the ISI trained Islamist insurgents and supplied arms, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, several Gulf states and the Taliban funded them. . . . Each month, an estimated 4–6 metric tons of heroin are shipped from Turkey via the Balkans to Western Europe” (90, 96).

94. Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, x–xi.

95. International Herald Tribune, January 25, 2009, http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2009/01/25/europe/OUKWD-UK-FINANCIAL-UN-DRUGS.php. Cf. Daily Telegraph (London), January 26, 2009.

96. James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Lords Tied to Taliban,” New York Times, August 10, 2009: “United States military commanders have told Congress that . . . only those [drug traffickers] providing support to the insurgency would be made targets.”

97. Nick Mills, Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007), 79.

98. New York Times, October 27, 2009.

99. Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Pack: The People, Politics and Espionage Intrigues That Shaped the DEA (Springfield, OR: TrineDay, 2009), 333.

100. Shaun McCanna, “It’s Easy for Soldiers to Score Heroin in Afghanistan,” Salon, August 1, 2007, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/08/07/afghan_heroin. Cf. Megan Carpentier, “Is The Military Ignoring the Heroin Problem in the Ranks?” AirAmerica.com, October 20, 2009, http://airamerica.com/politics/10-20-2009/

military-ignoring-its-heroin-problem/?p=all; Gerald Posner, “The Taliban’s Heroin Ploy,” The Daily Beast, October 19, 2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and

-stories/2009-10-19/the-heroin-bomb/full.

101. Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 171, cf. 103.

102. General Mahmut Gareev, “Afghan Drug Trafficking Brings US $50 Billion a Year,” RussiaToday, August 20, 2009, http://russiatoday.com/Top_News/2009-08-20/afghanistan-us-drug-trafficking.html.

103. Jeremy R. Hammond, “Pakistan: General Hamid Gul on Destabilizing Pakistan,” Foreign Policy Journal, August 27, 2009, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_56790.shtml.

104. “Occupiers Involved in Drug Trade: Afghan Minister,” PressTV, November 1, 2009, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=110130§ionid=351020403.

105. See William Blum, “The Anti-Empire Report, No. 6,” January 6, 2010, http://killinghope.org/bblum6/aer77.html; Rick Rozoff, “2010: U.S. to Wage War throughout the World,” StopNATO, December 31, 2009, http://rickrozoff.wordpress

.com/2009/12/31/2010-u-s-to-wage-war-throughout-the-world.

Chapter 11: Conclusion

1. This was always true but has been hastened by digital technology. Sandra Braman has described how the welfare states are being progressively displaced by informational states, the latter being defined as states in which governmental bureaucracies “deliberately, explicitly, and consistently control information creation, processing, flows, and use to exercise power” (Sandra Braman, Change of State: Information, Policy and Power [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006], 1, emphasis added).

2. A good survey of what others have called the trend toward “authoritarianism,” “inverted totalitarianism” (Sheldon Wolin), or “soft” or “friendly fascism” (Bertram Gross) can be found in Henry A. Giroux, “Democracy and the Threat of Authoritarianism: Politics beyond Barack Obama,” Truthout, February 15, 2010, http://www.truthout.org/democracy-and-threat-authoritarianism-politics-beyond

-barack-obama56890.

3. For example, an intelligent overview of Afghan history by Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould endorses the sane proposal of the Senlis Council, an international think tank, that “would see the conversion of Afghan opium into medicine, with the ultimate beneficiary being the rural Afghan villager” (Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould, Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story [San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2009], 322). But sanity does not guide the formation of narcotics policy, highly positioned traffic protectors do (as David Musto discovered in 1980).

4. Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: The CIA, Drugs, and Armies in Central America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 180.

5. David S. Hilzenrath, “Hill Panel Finds No Evidence Linking Contras to Drug Smuggling,” Washington Post, July 22, 1987.

6. Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press (London: Verso, 1998), 31.

7. U.S. Congress, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., House Report No. 100-433, 630–31. The staff report was published as Appendix E to the minority House Republican report submitted by then-Congressman Dick Cheney.

8. Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Contras and the CIA: Government Policies and the Cocaine Economy: An Analysis of Media and Government Response to the Gary Webb Stories in the San Jose Mercury News (1996–2000) (Los Angeles: From the Wilderness Publications, 2000), http://www.drugwar.com/cv4.shtm, citing CIA, Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation Concerning Allegations between CIA and Contras in Trafficking Cocaine to the United States, January 19, 1998, paras. 237, 287, 308, 1099.

9. See discussion in Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 125–77, esp. 142–46.

10. Ben Bradlee Jr., Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North (New York: D.I. Fine, 1988), 426; Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 145.

11. Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 41–42 and passim, quoting Newsweek, May 13, 1985.

12. 9/11 Commission Report, 171. I find this statement one-sided and misleading but less so than the opposite claim of Yossef Bodansky: “The annual income of the Taliban from the drug trade is estimated at $8 billion. Bin Laden administers and manages these funds—laundering them through the Russian mafia” (Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America [New York: Random House/Prima, 2001], 315).

13. “US ‘Seizes al-Qaeda Drugs Ship,’” BBC News, December 19, 2003.

14. E.g., CBS News, March 11, 2004.

15. CBS News, April 14, 2004: “Investigators say the explosives were obtained from criminals who took drugs as payment. And proceeds from drug sales also paid for detonators, cell phones, a car and a rented apartment.”

16. 9/11 Commission Report, 72; discussion in Peter Dale Scott, The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 141–47, 155–60.

17. New York Times, July 20, 1993. Cf. J. R. de Szigethy, “Crime Scene—World Trade Center,” AmericanMafia.com, September 2004, http://www.americanmafia

.com: “The murders [from the 1993 WTC bombing] were the result of a plot by members of an organized crime syndicate involved in drug trafficking.”

18. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), 320.

19. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 427.

20. James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006), 154, 160–63.

21. Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). Referring to the protection of the drug traffic in this fashion and to the court orders prohibiting her from speaking out about it, Sibel Edmonds has asked the following pertinent questions: “Is this due to the fact that the existence and survival of many U.S. allies; Turkey, almost all Central Asian nations, and after the September Eleven attack, Afghanistan; greatly depend on cultivating, processing, transporting, and distributing these illegal substances? Is it caused by the fact that a major source of income for those who procure U.S. weapons and technology, our military industrial complex’s bread and butter, is being generated from this illegal production and illegal dealings? Or, is it the fear of exposing our own financial institutions, lobbying firms, and certain elected and appointed officials, as beneficiaries?” (Sibel Edmonds, “The Highjacking of a Nation,” National Security Whistleblowers Coalition, November 29, 2006, http://nswbc.org/Op%20Ed/Part2-FNL-Nov29-06.htm).

22. In describing this split between public and covert policies, I am not suggesting that the CIA is a “rogue agency.” As I have written elsewhere, the CIA is an institution reflecting the wishes of the country’s financial element, which, in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s memorable phrase, “has owned the government ever since the days of Andrew Jackson” (Scott, The Road to 9/11, 1–7).

23. “You Created the Taliban, Pakistan’s President Tells His Critics in the US,” Daily Telegraph (London), December 12, 2009: “In its fight against the Soviets, the US supported the most radical elements within the mujahideen, who would later become the Taliban and al-Qaeda. When the Soviets were defeated and left in 1989, the US abandoned Pakistan and created a vacuum in Afghanistan, resulting in the current horror.”

24. Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan/Henry Holt, 2007).

25. Cockburn and St. Clair, Whiteout, 265–69, 285–90, http://aangirfan.blogspot

.com/2005/05/drugs-business-in-indonesia.html.

26. Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin, False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World’s Most Corrupt Financial Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 135–37, 384; Bartholomew B. J. Henderson, A Conflict of Interest: “Fraud and the Collapse of Titans” (Bloomington, IN: IUniverse, 2002), 214.

27. Paul Thompson, The Terror Timeline: Year by Year, Day by Day, Minute by Minute (New York: HarperCollins/Regan Books, 2004), 259.

28. Washington Post, February 17, 2002, http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/qdagold.htm.

29. U.S. Congress, Senate, Minority Staff Report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities, November 9, 1999, http://hsgac.senate.gov/110999_

report.htm.

30. Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 6, (November–December 1999): 21–35.

31. Misha Glenny, McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underground (New York: Knopf, 2008), 122–44. Ibrahim has been trafficking drugs since 1993, after he was forced to flee India.

32. Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 165.

33. Peters, Seeds of Terror, 165.

34. U.S. Treasury Fact Sheet, “Dawood Ibrahim,” http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/fact_sheet.pdf; Peters, Seeds of Terror, 166.

35. “A Godfather’s Lethal Mix of Business and Politics,” U.S. News, November 27, 2005. However, Ibrahim also had influence and protection in India and the United Arab Emirates, even before being picked up by the ISI. After a 2003 wave of bombings in Mumbai, the police in Dubai twice, at India’s request, picked up Dawood Ibrahim’s brother Anees. And twice, thanks to the Ibrahim’s influence with the ruling families of the United Arab Emirates, Anees was then released.

36. Times of India, July 30, 2007.

37. Times of India, August 7, 2007.

38. Times of India, March 28, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/ISI_reach_will_expand_with_D-Company_merger/articleshow/2905397.cms: “‘Many members of Dawood’s gang have been indoctrinated and trained in the use of weapons in the Bahawalpur centre of the LeT near Lahore. Funds are being raised by investments in real estate and SRA projects in Mumbai and through smuggling of diesel and other essential commodities through the western coast spanning from Raigad to Mangalore along the Arabian Sea. We have warned Delhi about the smuggling being carried out by the Dawood gang with impunity,’ a security official said.”

39. Jeremy Hammond, “Role of Alleged CIA Asset in Mumbai Attacks Being Downplayed,” Foreign Policy Journal, December 10, 2008, http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_4113.shtml.

40. Yoichi Shimatsu, “Was Criminal Mastermind behind the Mumbai Attacks?” http://theragblog.blogspot.com/2008/11/was-criminal-mastermind-behind-mumbai

.html. operations; cf. Milt Bearden, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House, 2003), 94–95.

41. “Alleged Terrorism Plotter David Headley,” Time, December 9, 2009.

42. “Mumbai Terror Suspect David Headley Was ‘Rogue US Secret Agent,’” Times (London), December 17, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6960182.ece. Cf. National Post (Canada), December 17, 2009.

43. E.g., Washington Post, December 3, 2008: “In a speech Tuesday [December 2], U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell said U.S. intelligence believes the group that attacked trains in Mumbai in 2006 is the same one that carried out last week’s strike. Although he did not name the group, India has attributed the train bombing to Lashkar, and McConnell’s remarks appeared to be a corroboration of Indian findings that Lashkar is once again to blame.”

44. James Mills, Underground Empire: Where Crime and Governments Embrace (New York: Dell, 1986), 789. Mills also quotes General Tuan as saying that the Thai Border Patrol Police (BPP) “were totally corrupt and responsible for transportation of narcotics.” Mills comments, “This was of some interest, since the BPP, a CIA creation, was known to be controlled by SRF, the Bangkok CIA station” (Mills, Underground Empire, 780). For details on the CIA–BPP relationship in the 1980s, see Douglas Valentine’s account (from DEA sources) (The Strength of the Pack: The People, Politics and Espionage Intrigues That Shaped the DEA [Springfield, OR: TrineDay, 2009], 254–55.

45. R. T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt (New York: Linden/Simon and Schuster, 1987), 267.

46. Peters, Seeds of Terror, 165, emphasis added, citing interview with Robert Charles, May 23, 2007.

47. U.S. Congress, Senate, Minority staff report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities, November 9, 1999, http://hsgac.senate

.gov/110999_report.htm.

48. In 1998 Zardari was tried in a Pakistani court on charges of drug trafficking, but he was acquitted in 2008 (Dawn, May 20, 2008, http://www.dawn.com/2008/05/20/top8.htm).

49. U.S. Congress, Senate, Minority staff report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities, November 9, 1999, http://hsgac.senate

.gov/110999_report.htm.

50. Tom Burghardt, “Organized Crime, Intelligence and Terror: The D-Company’s Role in the Mumbai Attacks,” Global Research, December 13, 2008, http://www

.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11385.

51. Pepe Escobar, “The Secrets of Obama’s Surge,” Asia Times Online, April 2, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KD02Df03.html.

52. Aftab Maken, “TAPI Gas Pipeline Finalized,” The News [Pakistan], April 25, 2008, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=14300.

53. “Progress on TAPI Pipeline in Doubt,” UPI, June 18, 2008, http://www

.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2009/06/18/Progress-on-TAPI-pipeline-in-doubt/UPI-29261245335324/. Cf. The Hindu, October 18, 2008, http://www.hindu

.com/2008/10/18/stories/2008101859541000.htm; Eurasianet, March 26, 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav032609c.shtml.

54. Bruce Pannier, “What Are The Prospects for Iran-Pakistan ‘Pipeline of Peace’?” Radio Free Europe, May 25, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/What_Are_The

_Prospects_For_IranPakistan_Pipeline_Of_Peace/1739236.html.

55. As Ahmed Rashid quotes in Taliban, “Peace can bring a pipeline, but a pipeline cannot bring peace” (Ahmed Rashid, Taliban [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001], 169).

56. Peters, Seeds of Terror, 227–28. In fact, the so-called Senlis proposal to buy the crop envisages the creation of new markets in Third World countries that cannot presently afford opiates for medical purposes.

57. Glenny, McMafia, 226–27.

58. A vivid memory from my six months in Washington is a congressman thumping his desk on hearing the word “legalization” and spluttering, “I will not have that word spoken in this committee.” Subsequently I learned that his law firm in New York represented, I am sure lucratively, Louis Cirillo, who by 1970 was said to be “responsible for roughly twenty percent of the heroin consumed in America” (Valentine, The Strength of the Pack, 141).

59. “[The U.S. missile attacks] have caused sadness; but the mujahideen network is strengthened by it, not weakened by it. The blood of martyrs will create more martyrs. Because of these attacks, the number of mujahideen brothers has increased, not decreased. The U.S., the enemy, had planned to besiege the Taliban in Afghanistan and terminate the Islamic movement of the Taliban; but after that the mujahideen emerged from this side [in Pakistan]; they could not finish them off. Whenever there is an attack here [in Waziristan], the number of mujahideen swells.” (Mullah Nazeer Ahmad, the emir of the Taliban Mujahideen in Pakistan’s tribal district of South Waziristan, February 2009 interview, reprinted in Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch No. 2392, June 10, 2009, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi

?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP239209).

60. Laura Kasinof, “A New Base? Al Qaeda Rises in Yemen,” Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=7880681&page=1. Erich Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and Yemen,” New York Times, June 11, 2009.

61. New York Times, June 2, 2009.

62. New York Times, November 9, 2009.

63. “While the bombers may have been inspired by Bin Laden, a two-year investigation into the attacks has found no evidence that al-Qa’ida helped plan, finance or carry out the bombings, or even knew about them in advance” (Independent [London], November 7, 2006); cf. James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 439: “Trading in hashish and ecstasy was critical to the operation and paid for cars, safe houses, and explosives.”

64. Peter Dale Scott, “‘Continuity of Government’ Planning: War, Terror, and the Supplanting of the U.S. Constitution,” The Asian-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, May 2010, http://japanfocus.org/_Peter_Dale-Scott/3362; Peter Dale Scott, “To All Readers: Help Force Congress to Observe the Law on National Emergencies!!!” (with Dan Hamburg), March 24, 2009, http://www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20090324183053848#r7.

65. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2003), 16, 191.

66. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 93, 431. After the final American withdrawal in 1975, Laotian production continued briefly to rise, thanks to the organizational efforts of Khun Sa, a drug trafficker whom Thailand was relying on as protection against the communists in Burma and Vientiane (McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 428–31).

67. Peter Dale Scott, “Honduras, the Contra Support Networks, and Cocaine: How the U.S. Government Has Augmented America’s Drug Crisis,” in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U. S. Narcotic Policy, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 126–27. I presented these remarks at a University of Wisconsin conference.

68. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999, released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, March 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics

_law/1999_narc_report. Production has since decreased but is still well above 1990 levels.

69. Richard Holbrooke, “Breaking the Narco-State,” Washington Post, January 23, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012202617.html.

70. I use “jihadi salafism,” an admittedly clumsy expression, in place of the more frequently encountered “Islamism” or “Islamic fundamentalism”—both of which terms confer on jihadi salafism a sense of legitimacy and longtime history that I do not believe it deserves. The jihadi salafism I am talking about, with roots in Wahhabism and Deobandism, can be seen in part as a response to British and American influence in India and the Muslim world. Osama bin Laden points to the earlier example of Imam Taki al-Din ibn Taymiyyah in the thirteenth century, but ibn Taymiyyah’s jihadism was in reaction to the Mongol ravaging of Baghdad in 1258. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, history abundantly shows that “outside interventions are likely if not certain, in any culture, to produce reactions that are violent, xenophobic, and desirous of returning to a mythically pure past” (Scott, The Road to 9/11, 260–61).

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