Stalin, Volume 1

196. Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-OGPU-NKVD, 133 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 71, l. 2–3); Pravda, June 8, 1927. See also Shishkin, Stanovlenie vneshnei politiki postrevliutsionnoi Rossii i kapitalisticheskii mir, 283–91; Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, II: 220–1, 228–31; Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-pol’skikh otnoshenii, V: 151–2; Zhukovskii, Polnomochnyi predstavitel’ SSSR, 202–5; Blackstock, Secret Road to World War Two, 136–61; Korbel, Poland Between East and West, 217–20.

197. Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-OGPU-NKVD, 137–8 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 3, l. 113–113ob.), 796, n60.

198. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 767, l. 35–6.

199. Pravda, June 10, 1927. As per Stalin’s directives, the OGPU also reinforced its agent networks with new recruits among so-called former people (members of the tsarist upper-class and priests). Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 313.

200. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU 130 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 5, d. 136, l. 10; d. 36, l. 3). On June 19, Mezynski limited “the quantity of [summary] executions by a relatively small number.” Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 24. Mezynski admitted (July 19, 1927) that “few active monarchist groups were unearthed in Belorussia, Smolensk, Moscow, Leningrad, and so on.” Vinogradov, “Zelenaia lampa,” 5.

201. Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-OGPU-NKVD, 135 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 71, l. 29). As if on cue, Stalin received a secret report on the smashing of a British spy ring in Leningrad, with agents in Finland, which supposedly aimed to ascertain the combat level of the Red Army and fleet, including chemical weapons capabilities; some two dozen people were arrested. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 1921–1928, 285 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 5, d. 136, l. 26–9).

202. Pravda, July 10, 1927.

203. Tepliakov, “Nepronizaemye nedra,” 194.

204. Zdanovich, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, 299 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 5, d. 269, l. 9).

205. Velikanova, Popular Perceptions, 74–5. See also Simonov, “Krepit’ oboronu stranam sovetov,” 157; and Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice, 66–7.

206. Sevost’ianov, “Sovershenno sekretno,” V: 362–78, 401–8, 411–83, 484–584, 855–906 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 5, d. 385, l. 256–361, 422–81; op. 4, d. 386, l. 45–84; op. 5, d. 394, l. 99–108; op. 6, d. 394, l. 109–12). Werth, “Rumeurs defaitistes et apocalyptiques”; Viola, “The Peasant Nightmare.”

207. Fischer spent several days with Chicherin in Wiesbaden, Germany, in August 1929. Fischer, Russia’s Road from Peace to War, 172; on the war scare episode as a whole, see 165–79. Chicherin’s deputy Litvinov felt out of his depth against the politburo. Sheinis, Maxim Litvinov, 194. “They say that we, the opposition, are exploiting the threat of war,” Trotsky remarked at the Central Committee in June 1927. “It is you who are exploiting the threat of war to persecute the opposition and to prepare to destroy it.” Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, III: 96.

208. Velikanova, Popular Perceptions, 47, 76–7; M. M. Kudiukhina, “Krasnaia armiia i ‘voennye trevogi’ vtoroi poloviny 1920-kh godov,” and A. V. Baranov, “‘Voennaia trevoga’ 1927 g. kak factor politischeskikh nastroenii v neposvskom obshchvestve (po material iuga Rossii),” Rossiia i mir glazami druga druga: iz istorii vzaimovospriiatiia (Moscow: IRI RAN, 2007), 153–74, 175–93.

209. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 25.

210. Lih, Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 135. On June 24, Stalin had Trotsky before the central control commission presidium (Aaron Solts); they debated the French Revolution!

211. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, III: 126–7.

212. Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 388–9.

213. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 767, l. 35–9, 45–8, 56–60; Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, “Stalin and his Circle,” III: 243–67; Pravda, June 26, 1927.

214. Trotsky archives, T 965 (June 28, 1927).

215. Sochineniia, IX: 315–21. Pokrovsky (b. 1905) would be arrested on January 16, 1934, for counterrevolutionary agitation. He would be sentenced to three years’ exile to Ufa. He would survive the Great Terror.

216. Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 339.

217. Lih, Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 136–7.

218. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 3–4. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 4, d. 767, l. 56–60.

219. Rigby, Communist Party Membership, 113.

220. Lih, Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 138, 139, 141–2, 143.

221. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 40–1 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 250, l. 60). Voroshilov, in top secret memoranda, was positive about the achievements of the military reforms and the condition of the army in 1927, but not when it came to the defense industry. Kudriashov, Krasnaia armiia, 161–71 (APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 257, l. 98–119).

222. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 21.

223. Velikanova, Popular Perceptions, 93.

224. Dyck, “German-Soviet Relations,” 80 (citing Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, L337/L100554–60: memorandum by von Brockdorff-Rantzau, July 24, 1927).

225. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 96–7; Dyck, “German-Soviet Relations,” 67 (citing Dirksen memorandum, September 19, 1927), 83. See also Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 66–107; and Erickson, Soviet High Command [1962], 144–63, 247–82.

226. The OGPU reported to him that the Mensheviks in exile believed the Communist party would fall because of him. In fact, the Mensheviks in exile correctly surmised that Trotsky and the opposition would be crushed. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 293–4 (Arkhiv INO OGPU, d. 672, tom 1, l. 196); Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, August 1, 1927.

227. “Zametki na sovremennye tenmy,” Pravda, July 28, 1929, in Sochineniia, IX: 322–61 (at 322, 327–30).

228. Nazarov, Stalin i bor’ba za liderstvo, 162 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 317, vyp. 1, l. 76, 50, 81).

229. Nazarov, Stalin i bor’ba za liderstvo, 163 (no citation).

230. Pravda, July 25, 1927.

231. Sochineniia, X: 3–59 (at 51).

232. Boersner, The Bolsheviks, 244–6.

233. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 5, l. 74–9, 86–8 (August 17, 1927). The Comintern agent Borodin had told a foreigner upon leaving China that “When the next Chinese general comes to Moscow and shouts, ‘Hail to the revolution,’ better send at once for the GPU. All that any of them want is rifles.” Strong, China’s Millions, 242. Borodin also told the Society of Old Bolsheviks that he had regretted his irresoluteness regarding Chiang Kai-shek: “a fateful error. The moment to liquidate Chiang Kai-shek after the capture of Nanjing was missed by our fault.” VKP (b), Komintern i natsional’no-revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae, II/ii: 926.

234. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 90.

235. Vatlin, Stenogrammy zasedanii Politbiuro, I: 579–80.

236. Vatlin, Stenogrammy zasedanii Politbiuro, II: 566, 573–4, 582. On September 12, Trotsky asked his supporter Yeltsin to look into Yenukidze’s party affiliation during the period April–October 1917: Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 176–7

237. Vatlin, Stenogrammy zasedanii Politbiuro, II: 586.

238. Vatlin, Stenogrammy zasedanii Politburo, II: 593–6.

239. Vatlin, Stenogrammy zasedanii Politbiuro, II: 597 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 705).

240. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 650, l. 1–2.

241. Vatlin, Stenogrammy zasedanii Politbiuro, I: 579–80, 595.

242. When they were done, Stalin put his own questions: why did only 3.5 million of America’s 18–19 million industrial workers belong to trade unions, and why did the AFL-CIO not support recognition of the USSR? “The working class of America,” one replied, “is not interested in international affairs.” Pravda, September 15, 1927; Sochineniia, X: 92–148; Na prieme, 25.

243. Serge and Trotsky, Life and Death, 148; Pravda, September 29 and October 1, 1927; Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, II: 35–6. Mrachkovsky, chairman of the State Sewing Machine Trust, along with Preobrazhensky and Leonid Serebryakov, who collectively took responsibility, were immediately expelled from the party.

244. Zdanovich, Organy gosudasrtvennoi bezopasnosti, 289–93, 382–3.

245. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 189; Zdanovich, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, 320 (citing TsA FSB, delo R-8209, l. 69; f. 2, op. 5, d. 98, l. 43, 98). Trotsky had admitted at the joint Central Committee–Central Control Commission plenum back in August 1927 that “some military workers, under the influence of the possible war threat, exchanged opinions recently on the situation in our armed forces . . . among those comrades I would name comrade Muralov (inspector of land-naval forces), comrades Putna and Primakov (commanders of corps), removed for opposition views, comrades Mrachkovsky and Bakayev.” They produced a document on necessary measures for the country’s defense, to raise the revolutionary and fighting mood in the army; Trotsky had intended to convey the document to Rykov, head of the government, for discussion at the politburo. This was a basis for accusations that Trotsky was preparing a military coup—an accusation Trotsky predicted. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 44.

246. Mezynski spoke to the October 1927 plenum; he told them that the OGPU had arrested five participants in the military coup preparations in late September: two were middle-range commanders, the others had been recently demobilized. He claimed they had been discovered in the course of the underground printing press operation. In fact, they had been first discovered before the printing press, but attention turned to them only after the printing press idea came to light. Central Control Commission member Yaroslavsky, a Stalin surrogate, instructed Mezynski not to interrogate all those in detention; the military coup idea was enough, no need for details or complications. Zdanovich, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, 321 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 5, d. 54, l. 88, 93–4).

247. Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 357–8; Sochineniia, X: 187.

248. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 291–3 (citing RGASPI, f. 505, op. 1, d. 65, l. 1–35). The motion to expel Trotsky from the Comintern was made by John Murphy, who soon quit the party himself: Murphy, New Horizons, 274–7.

249. Pravda, September 23 and October 25, 1927.

250. V. Ia. Bliukher v Kitae.

251. Pantsov, Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 156.

252. By 1914, Russia had accounted for 11 percent of global cross-border borrowing, second only to the United States in absolute terms. Because the United States engaged in significant lending as well, Russia was the single largest net borrower globally. Cameron and Bovykin, International Banking, 13.

253. Dallin, Soviet Espionage, 32–41 (quote at 36, citing New York Times, April 11, 1927).

254. Rakovskii, Kniaz’ Metternikh. Rakovski published a succinct survey of Soviet foreign policy practice for the U.S. audience: “The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,” Foreign Affairs, 4/4 (July 1926): 574–84.

255. Izvestiia, August 11, 1927. Kamenev, ambassador to Italy, also signed the manifesto, but Mussolini and the Italian government paid it no mind.

256. Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered, 273–80.

257. Le Matin, September 13, 1927.

258. Pravda, September 16, 1927 (Litvinov); Izvestiia, September 16, 1927; “Novaia ugroza franko-sovetskomu soglasheniiu,” Kommunisticheskii internatsional, October 7, 1927: 7–8; Senn, “The Rakovski Affair”; Carley, “Episodes from the Early Cold War.” The failure occurred despite the fact that the Soviets had added sweeteners and reduced the size of the loan requested. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, II: 248–54.

259. Conte, Christian Rakovski, 196–204.

260. Naville, Trotsky Vivant.

261. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 219–24.

262. Nazarov, Stalin i bor’ba za liderstvo, 164–5 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 321, l. 4–5).

263. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 223, 230–1; Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II: 19–20.

264. “Trotskistskaia oppozitsiia prezhde i teper’,” Pravda, November 2, 1927, in Sochineniia, X: 172–205 (at 172–6).

265. Pravda, November 2, 1927, in “Trotskistskaia oppozitsiia prezhde i teper’,” Sochineniia, X: 172–205; Stalin, Ob oppozitsii, 723. Stalin’s later Collected Works leave out the direct quotation from the Testament. Carr, Interregnum, 267.

266. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 230–1; Kun, Bukharin, 208–9 (no citation).

267. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh [1984], IV: 210–49.

268. Voprosy torgovli, 1927, no. 1: 63.

269. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, II: 41.

270. Stalin, Beseda s inostrannymi rabochimi delegatsiaiami, 44–8; Pravda, November 13 and November 15, 1927, reprinted in Sochineniia, X: 206–38 (at 237). The meeting was not recorded in Stalin’s office logbooks, evidently because the group was too large to be received in his office.

271. Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution, 314 (citing Inprecor, November 3, 1927).

272. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 254–6 (Trotsky letter to politburo and CC, November 9, 1927); Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, II: 42–3.

273. “Big cloud, little rain,” noted a dismissive pro-regime foreign correspondent, using the peasant proverb. Reswick, I Dreamt Revolution, 205. Reswick understood that the quixotic actions gave Stalin a pretext for intensified crackdown (207–8). In the cleverest of opposition actions, Smilga, Preobrazhensky, and others were able to call out to marchers heading to Red Square from a balcony at the well-placed former Grand Hotel Paris, where, in the three-story structure on the corner of Hunter’s Row and Tver St. across from the Kremlin, Smilga had an apartment. Smilga had led the Baltic fleet into the Neva River to support the October coup in 1917, and he and his helpmates unfurled portraits of Lenin, Trotsky, and Zinoviev, as well as a slogan, “Fulfill Lenin’s Testament.” Evidently, some marchers cheered. But the party boss for the Krasnaya Presnya ward drove up in his car along with Red squads, who began to shout “Beat the Jew-opposition,” while hurling bricks up toward the balcony. In parallel, from the six-story National Hotel across the way, pro-regime personnel began throwing potatoes and blocks of ice at Smilga’s balcony. Soon, fifteen to twenty military academy and police academy cadets broke down the door, removed the banner, and smashed the place up. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 250–2 (note by Muralov, Smilga, and Kamenev, November 7, 1927), 258–60 (Smilga letter, November 10, 1927). The National was returned to its function as a hotel in the late 1920s; the Paris was torn down in 1935 when Tver St. was widened, and near its old site a new Council of People’s Commissars building arose. One historian has opposition figures speaking from the balcony of a building on the corner of Vozdvizhenka and Mokhovaya, which could have been Comintern headquarters or former party headquarters that housed offices of the central executive committee of the Soviet. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 173.

274. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 300–1. See also Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 256–7 (Nikolayev letter to the CC and Central Control Commission, November 10, 1927). A similar scene unfolded in Leningrad near the Winter Palace, where Zinoviev gave a brief speech from a window opposite and other members of the Leningrad opposition tried to disrupt the flow of official marchers on Palace Square. Mounted soldiers and sailors arrived and dispersed the counter-demonstrators. Lashevich, the former second in command of the Military Revolutionary Committee, and Bakayev, the former head of the Leningrad GPU, wearing their soldiers’ greatcoats shorn of insignia, shouted that policemen should be ashamed of themselves.At least eighty-one arrests were made. There were further disorders and arrests the next day. Velikanova, Popular Perceptions, 183 (citing TsGAIPD SPb, f. 16, op. 1, d. 8485, l. 258–9); Trotskii, Moia zhizn’, II: 280; Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 226–7. Marches by unemployed workers were to be blocked from joining up with the opposition marches by making sure all columns were pre-approved and supervised. Velikanova, Popular Perceptions, 181–2 (citing TsGAIPD SPb, f. 24, op. 5, d. 75, l. 69). Rykov had been sent to Leningrad for the anniversary celebrations, and in the old Tauride Palace, he delivered a speech at a jubilee session of the central executive committee of the Soviet, unfurling a colossal chart showing a V-shaped economic recovery, with the nadir in 1921 and 1927 well surpassing 1913 levels. Izvestiia, October 19, 1927; Rykov, Ten Years of Soviet Rule. The Institute of School Work Methods carried out a large-scale sociological study of 120,000 people and collected 1.5 million statements in connection with the tenth anniversary of the revolution. Kozlov and Semenova, “Sotsiaologiiia detstva,” 47–8.

275. Chertok, Stop-Kadr, 54. At a tenth anniversary exhibition of the Council of People’s Commissars, portraits of oppositionists were discovered and quickly removed. Matvei Shkiryatov, of the party Control Commission, managed to get the portraits removed, but he was still fighting to remove a sculpture of Lenin’s casket being carried not by Stalin and the comrades but by symbolic figures, so he wrote to Stalin apologetically asking for his intervention (the matter was placed on the politburo agenda). Voprosy istorii, 2004, no. 11: 16–7 (RGASPI, op. 11, d. 826, l. 1–2), reprinted in Pikhoia and Zelenov, I. V. Stalin: istoricheskaia ideologiia, I: 44–7.

276. Pravda, November 16, 1927.

277. Fel’shtinskii, Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, IV: 264.

278. In the summer of 1925, all residents of the Kremlin not related to state functions had had to relocate within a week; tourism had been reduced. More broadly, on Bolshevik colonization of the Kremlin, see Rolf, Sovetskie massovy prazdniki, 149.

279. “Mariia Ioffe, Nachalo,” Vremia i my, 1977, no. 20: 163–92 (at 178–82). Joffe, One Long Night. See also Joffe, Back in Time.

280. Trotskii, Portety revoliutsionerov, 396–8; Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 381–2; Volkogonov, Trotsky, 303.

281. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 174 (Mikhail Yakubovich, who spent twenty-four years in prisons and camps, and lived out his life in a home for invalids in Karaganda, Kazakhstan). Medvedev’s source, Yakubovich, claims to have seen Stalin’s wife, Nadya Alliluyeva, walking inconspicuously behind the coffin in the crowd, but this is not corroborated. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 174 (citing unpublished recollections of Mikhail Yakubovich). Yagoda and Yenukidze were on the scene. Of the 143 oppositionists who were expelled from the Moscow party organization in 1927, 82 were students and 41 were white-collar employees; 16 were workers. Merridale, Moscow Politics, 44. “The opposition consists mostly of intellectuals, who in their intellectual level stand above the rest of the mass of party members and that causes a certain distrust toward them,” noted I. Girs, head of a Czechoslovak diplomatic mission. “The strength of the Stalinist position consists in the fact that they represent the numerically dominant part of the party, that is, the intellectually middling people.” Shishkin, Vlast’, politika, ekonomika, 149.

282. Fischer, Men and Politics, 94; Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 383–4; Shishkin, Stanovlenie vneshnei politiki postrevliutsionnoi Rossii i kapitalisticheskii mir, 282. N. P. Ryutin and A. M. Lezhava were there on behalf of the Moscow party committee.

283. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 279, 303 (GARF, f. 5446, op. 2, d. 33, l. 19).

284. Pravda, November 25, 1927.

285. Moskovskie bol’sheviki, 106 (citing MPA, f. 63, op. 1, d. 153, l. 75; f. 3, op. 5, d. 2, l. 200: Pravda, December 2, 1927).

286. XV s”ezd VKP (b), I: 43–74.

287. XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 1596–8.

288. XV s”ezd VKP (b), I: 89–90; Sochineniia, X: 351.

289. XV s”ezd VKP (b), I: 291. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 175.

290. XV s”ezd VKP (b), I: 279–85.

291. XV s”ezd VKP (b), I: 411–21; Sochineniia, X: 354–71 (at 371).

292. XV s”ezd VKP (b), I: 623; Medvedev, Let History Judge, 86.

293. XV s”ezd VKP (b).

294. Bulletin no. 30, supplement no. 1: 35–7. Medvedev, Let History Judge. The Testament was published in a post-Stalin edition of the proceedings: XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 1477–8.

295. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 119–35 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 5, d. 386, l. 1–3, 15–45). A grim joke made the rounds: “They’re saying that they abolished the letter ‘M’—there’s no meat (miaso), no butter (maslo), no material to make clothing (manufaktura), no soap (mylo), and no reason to retain the ‘M’ just for the single surname Mikoyan” (the head of Soviet trade). Another pun was equally bitter: “The revolution gave workers a report (doklad), functionaries a salary (oklad) and their wives a treasure chest (klad), and the peasants hell (ad).” Ivanova, Gulag v sisteme totalitarnogo gosudarstva, 30.

296. Sevost’ianov, “Sovershenno sekretno,” V: 675.

297. Mif, “Kitaiskaia Kommunisticheskaia partiiia v kriticheskie dni,” 106.

298. “Iz istorii kollektivizatsii 1928 god: poezdka Stalina v Sibir’,” Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 7: 182–6.

299. XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 1599. See also Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 385–9.

300. XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 1599–1600.

301. XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 1398–1400.

302. A congress resolution formally submitted by Orjonikidze as chair of the Central Control Commission called for the expulsion of seventy-five prominent oppositionists; it passed without debate. XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 1468–70. The oppositionists were formally accused of creating “an ideological orientation” of defeatism that “has transformed the Trotskyite opposition into an instrument of petit bourgeois democracy within the USSR and into an auxiliary detachment of international social democracy outside its borders.” Pravda, December 20 and December 21, 1927; KPSS v rezoliutsiakh, IV: 13–74. In the aftermath of the congress, some 1,500 party members would be expelled, while around 2,500 would sign written recantations. Popov, Outline History of the C.P.S.U., II: 327; Conquest, The Great Terror, 11 (no citation).

303. Trotsky, My Life, 521.

304. Of Central Committee members only 49 percent were Great Russian between 1917 and 1923; that number would reach 54 percent in 1934, but become heavily Great Russian by 1939. Evan Mawsdley, “An Elite Within an Elite: Politburo/Presidium Membership Under Stalin, 1927–1953,” 74.

305. Grigorov, Povoroty sud’by i proizvol, 507. Trotsky [Bronstein] believed his, Zinoviev’s, and Kamenev’s Jewishness played a significant role in their defeat. Trotskii, Stalin, II: 224–5.

306. Pravda, December 18, 1927.

307. Mozokhin, VChK—OGPU, 24 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 5, por. 1, l. 31).

308. Gerson, The Secret Police, 269.

309. Shreider, NKVD iznutri, 22.

310. Cherniavskii, “Samootvod,” 67–70 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 335, l. 4–8: Rykov’s copy of the stenogram for correction). See also Murin, “Eshche raz ob otstavkakh I. Stalina,” 72–3.

311. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 335, l. 3–7. See also Cherniavskii, “Samootvod.”

312. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh [1970], III: 247; Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/i: 710.

313. Kvashonkin, Bol’shevistskoe rukovodstvo, 357–61 (GARF, f. R-5446, op. 55, d. 1338, l. 1–4).

314. XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 1132.

315. XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 1454–68; Pravda, December 20, 1927.

316. XV s”ezd VKP (b), dekabr’ 1927 goda, I: 66–7, II: 1419. One scholar asserted that not even close observers of the 15th Party Congress could have surmised that the country stood on the cusp of a revolutionary remaking. Pethybridge, One Step Backwards, 230.

317. XV s”ezd VKP (b), I: 63, 66–7, II: 1419–22.

318. Stalin held meetings in his office on his birthday: Na prieme, 773.

319. Pravda, December 18, 1927; Reswick, I Dreamt Revolution, 210–9. On November 6, 1926, Stalin had written to Leningrad Pravda refusing permission to publish a Russian version of his conversation with Davis.

320. Ivan P. Tovstukha, “Stalin,” in Gambarov, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, XLI/iii: 107–10; Tovstukha, Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. It was slightly expanded and published in Pravda in 1929 on the occasion of Stalin’s birthday. See Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, 1935, no. 6: 130; and Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 428.

CHAPTER 14: A TRIP TO SIBERIA

1. Sochineniia, XI: 170 (first published 1952); Viola, War Against the Peasantry, 101.

2. Chuev, Tak govoril Kaganovich, 1.

3. Sochineniia, XI: 369–70. The office logbooks have Stalin receiving visitors in his office on January 17—Antipov and Goto of Japan—but they were likely received by someone else in Stalin’s office, since he was gone. Stetsky is listed as being received on January 28, 1928, when Stalin was still in Siberia. Na prieme, 26, 768, 774, 781.

4. Paul R. Gregory, “National Income,” in Davies, From Tsarism to the New Economic Polic [1990], at 247.

5. Kindleberger, World in Depression, 46.

6. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/ii:943 (table 7).

7. Koniukhov, KPSS v bor’be, 66 (citing RGASPI, f. 17 op. [unnumbered], d. 95, l. 29–30).

8. Jasny, Socialist Agriculture, 223–7; Dohan, “The Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky,” 605; Davies, Socialist Offensive, 419 (table 1); Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/ii: 698, 916–9, 1,027 (table 38). The postrevolutionary record harvest of the NEP occurred in 1925–26: 76.8 million tons.

9. Davies, Socialist Offensive, 1–18.

10. Itogi vypolneniia pervogo piatiletnego plana, 135.

11. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 446; Davies, Socialist Offensive, 4, 13. Harvest data for the Soviet Union in the 1920s were estimates: statisticians asked a sample of peasants to estimate their harvests before the gathering had commenced, on a scale of one to five, then derived a percentage of a projected average, then multiplied by a prerevolutionary average. Finally, they would raise their guesstimates, believing peasants were lowballing anticipated harvests to evade taxes. The official results likely overestimated harvest size. In 1929, statisticians would invalidate the use of the prerevolutionary average, thereby invalidating all their estimates of the 1920s harvests. Tauger, “Statistical Falsification in the Soviet Union.” Collectivization made possible accurate assessments of the Soviet harvest, although that did not mean accurate results were reported.

12. Both the regime policies and the understandings of economics in support of industrialization—in circles far wider than the Stalin faction—were incompatible with the NEP before Stalin went to Siberia. Davies and Wheatcroft, “Further Thoughts,” 798. One scholar colorfully wrote that “NEP was a house built on sand.” But only because of the regime’s anti-market behavior. Pethybridge, One Step Backwards, 250.

13. L. A. Neretina, “Reorganizatsiia gosudarstvennoi promyshlennosti v 1921–25 godakh: prontsipy i tendentsii razvitiia,” in Davies, NEP, 75–87 (at 84).

14. Davies and Wheatcroft, “Further Thoughts,” 798; Dmitrenko, “Chto takoe NEP?,” 46. Designed to aid farmers, the harassment of private traders and imposition of price controls actually turned the terms of trade against farmers, while damaging the monetary stabilization, in a dynamic the Bolsheviks did not understand. Allowing the market to determine prices would have been better for farmers and for the overall macroeconomy. Johnson and Temin, “The Macroeconomics of NEP”; Gregory and Mokhtari, “State Grain Purchases.”

15. “V. V. Kuibyshev i sotsialisticheskaia industrializatsiia SSSR,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1958, no. 3: at 56.

16. Quoted in Bogushevskii, “Kanun piatiletki,” 478. See also Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution, 7.

17. Carr, Interregnum, 20–2; Barsov, Balans stoimostnykh obmenov mezhdu gorodom, 23; Millar and Nove, “A Debate on Collectivization,” 57; S. G. Wheatcroft, “Agriculture,” in Davies, From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy [1990], 79–103; Gregory, Russian National Income, 102–21, 194. For the results of a survey of peasants on their reasons for not selling grain, see Statistika i narodnoe khoziaistvo, 1928, no. 2: at 146.

18. Dohan, “Soviet Foreign Trade in the NEP Economy,” 343–5. During an earlier crisis of grain procurements, in 1925, the authorities had raised the price paid for grain. Davies, Socialist Offensive, 37–41. See also Woodruff, “The Politburo on Gold, Industrialization, and the International Economy, 1925–1926,” 206–8.

19. Harrison, “Prices in the Politburo, 1927,” 224–46. Rykov, during the 15th Party Congress, met with officials of grain regions and forbid them from even mentioning price rises for grain, a stance formulated in a politburo resolution on December 24, 1927: Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 112.

20. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/i: 46, I/ii: 724–30. The issue of summertime productivity is confounding. One study of textile workers in 1927, for example, claimed that average worker productivity rose during the months of May, June, and July, the time when workers who owned land generally returned to their village on holiday. Antropov, “Sviaz’ tekstil’nykh rabochikh,” 4–7. Even as averages went up, however, absolute production declined.

21. Sevost’ianov, “Sovershenno sekretno,” VI: 58–60 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 6, d. 575, l. 1–58).

22. Contemporary analysts attributed the goods shortage to difficulties in paying for imports of raw materials for light industry (cotton, cloth, wool, leather). Dohan, “Foreign Trade,” 223. The regime sought to cut costs and raise efficiency in the trade bureaucracy via mergers and staff reductions. Koniukhov, KPSS v bor’be, 95 (citing Molot, February 1, 1928), 131–2 (citing Izvestiia Sibkraikoma, 1928, no. 4: 4–5).

23. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevnia, I: 27, 108. See also XVI s”ezd VKP (b), 762–3, 975–7; Velikanova, Popular Perceptions, 86–8.

24. Cleinow, Neue Sibirien, 408. Mikoyan, perhaps the principal official at the top keeping track, in early December 1927 stated: “we believe that the drop in grain procurements is temporary and in the near term will be replaced by a rising tendency.” Ekonomicheskaia zhizn’, December 3, 1927. A week later, Rykov deemed the situation a “crisis,” but optimistically noted it could be overcome by supplying more manufactured goods. XV s”ezd VKP (b), II: 859–60.

25. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, I: 9 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 662, l. 3).

26. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 136 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 6, d. 982, l. 99). The use of article 107 against private traders had been especially concerted from 1927. On October 29, 1927, Yagoda had written to the head of the government, Alexei Rykov, warning “we need to implement quick repressive measures, in order to spur an immediate improvement on the markets,” and submitted a draft decree regarding “speculators” (private traders) to be issued in the government’s name. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 100–1 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 6, d. 567, l. 1–5). The OGPU already had the prerogative of extrajudicial investigation and sentencing (up to execution) for certain crimes, such as those committed by OGPU personnel in the line of duty, as well as counterfeiters and bandits; additionally, the OGPU could request such a prerogative for specific cases, but not usually for economic crimes. See also Nove, Economic History of the USSR, 137.

27. Mozokhin and Gladkov, Menzhinskii, 257 (no citation).

28. “Iz istorii kollektivizatsii 1928 god,” no. 5: 193–5; Viola, War Against the Peasantry, 32–4, 45–7.

29. Egorova, “Khlebozagotovitel’naia kampaniia 1927–1928,” 262 (PANO, f. 2, op. 1, d. 2571, l.310–1), 264–5.

30. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/i: 44–6. On Bolshevik understandings of peasant market behavior, see Larin, Sovetskaia derevnia, 217.

31. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 105–8 (at 107: TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 6, d. 53, l. 32–49).

32. Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR [1926], 31; Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR [1927], 178; Ugolovnyi kodesk RSFSR [1929], 64–5. On the turn to coercive measures, see Manning, “The Rise and Fall of ‘the Extraordinary Measures.’”

33. Pravda, January 8, 1928.

34. Andreev, Vospominaniia, 168–9 (letter dating to January 27, 1928). Pravda (December 24, 1927) had announced that central officials would descend upon the key grain regions—Andrei Zhdanov to the Volga valley, Nikolai Shvernik to the Urals, and Anastas Mikoyan to the North Caucasus.

35. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 193. One historian has asserted that the report of Orjonikidze’s illness was mere pretext for Stalin to go himself. But of course, Stalin could have assigned himself to go without inventing a pretext. Shishkin, “Poezdka I. V. Stalina v Sibir’,” 44.

36. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 193-5; Na prieme, 779.

37. Pavlova, “Poezdka Stalina v Sibir’,” 133–55; Kosachev, “Nanakune kollektivizatsii,” 101–5; Chuev, Sto sorok, 377. Two plenipotentiaries, Alexander Dogadov, a functionary in the central orgburo apparatus, and Pankratov, were already in Novosibirsk, and met with the Siberian leadership on January 6 and January 9, 1928; on January 10, Siberian officialdom established a special “troika,” with a military-style HQ in Novosibirsk, to direct grain procurement operations; it consisted of Syrtsov, Robert Eihe, an ethnic Latvian and the head of the Siberian Soviet Executive Committee, and the trade chief in Siberia, A. N. Zlobin (GANO, f. 47, op. 5, d. 68, l. 197–9). Copycat troikas to expedite grain procurements would be established lower down in all counties by the end of January. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 780, n55; Shishkin, “Poezdka I. V. Stalina v Sibir’,” 196–9; Gushchin, Sibirskaia derevnia, 185; Egorova, “Khlebozagotovitel’naia kam-paniia 1927–1928,” 262 (citing PANO, f. 2, op. 1, d. 217, l. 229); Gushchin and Il’inykh, Klassovaia bor’ba, 172. On January 12, 1928, seven hundred railway officials and workers in Novosibirsk met to discuss labor discipline and expediting grain shipments; a few bosses were fired, to make examples. Hughes, Stalin, Siberia, 136. Dogadov soon joined the so-called Right (1928–29), and in 1931 would be demoted to Transcaucasia.

38. Bazhanov had joined the orgburo staff in 1922 and served briefly as technical secretary for the politburo (August 1923–May 1924) in place of Maria Glyasser. On November 28, 1927, he was named head of the business directorate (upravdelami) in the Turkmenistan party secretariat. RGAE, f. 7733, op. 18, d. 527, l. 1–25 (Bazhanov’s personnel file). Balashov claims that Bazhanov begged the British consulate in Askhabad to organize his escape across the border, and that his married lover arrived from Moscow to join him in flight but that she was caught trying to cross the border.

39. Agabekov, OGPU, 132–8, 234; Bazhanov, Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin, 191. See also Bortnevskii, “Oprichnina.” Agabekov defected June 13, 1930, while stationed in Istanbul; in the summer of 1937 he was hunted down and killed near the French-Spanish border.

40. Brook-Shepherd, Storm Petrels, 19–84, 107–8 (no footnotes). On January 12, 1937, Bazhanov gave a briefing to Polish intelligence—a document that fell into Soviet hands during the 1939 capture of Eastern Poland (Western Belorussia). Duraczynski and Sakharov, Sovetsko-Pol’skie otnoshenii, 65–6 (RGANI, f. 453, op. 1, d. 54, l. 25–33).

41. Stalin, der rote Diktatur (Berlin: Aretz, 1931), 21.

42. Bazhanov, Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin, 105–6.

43. Kindleberger, World in Depression, 73–4; Malenbaum, World Wheat Economy.

44. This also meant selling goods abroad that were in deficit at home, such as cotton cloth. Dohan, “Soviet Foreign Trade in the NEP Economy,” 482–3; Dohan, “Foreign Trade,” 223.

45. Rieber, “Stalin as Foreign Policy Maker: Avoiding War, 1927–1953,” 141–2.

46. Cited in Danilov, “Vvedenie,” in Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 25 (June 1927). See also Ken and Rupasov, Politbiuro TsK VKP (b), 484–5, 491, 497.

47. Zdanovich, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, 382 (citing TsA FSB, d. PF 10289, t. 2, l. 393, 395). Pnevsky (b. 1874) died a natural death in 1928, unlike most other former tsarist officers in Red Army service.

48. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 103 (January 3, 1927).

49. Nazarov, Missiia Russkoi emigratsii, I: 43–4.

50. Based on hearsay, one Soviet emigre characterized Syrtsov’s efforts as setting up Potemkin villages, as if that were possible given Stalin’s reliance on the OGPU. Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Communist Party, 11–2.

51. Zakovsky had been posted to Novosibirsk at the same time as Syrtsov. He replaced Ivan Pavlunovsky, who had the misfortune of being transferred to the South Caucasus, where a young political climber named Lavrenti Beria ate him for lunch.

52. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 119, l. 1–2.

53. Soviet measurements were in poods (units equal to about 36 pounds). Stalin called for 60 million poods, out of 82 million, for the center.

54. On January 9, 1928, A. N. Zlobin, the third member of the Siberian grain procurement troika, had reported to Dogadov that the Siberian harvest was average. According to M. Basovich of the Siberian party organization, per capita harvest data came to 6.9 poods in Siberia, 7.5 in the Urals, 12 in the Middle Volga, 13.3 in the Lower Volga, 13.9 in Ukraine, and 14 in the North Caucasus. Pavlova, “Poezdka Stalina v Sibir’,” 134 (no citation). There had been almost no exports of Siberian grain from 1913 to 1925; it went to the Moscow and Leningrad industrial regions as well as the Russian Far East. In 1926–27, 345,000 tons of Siberian wheat were exported, but in 1927–28 just 5,700 tons would be exported. Gushchin, Siberiskaia dervenia, 108; Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 94, 110.

55. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 196–9; Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derveni, I: 152–4 (GANO, f. 2, op. 4. d. 24, l. 26–28ob); Viola, War Against the Peasantry, 69–71; Za chetkuiu klassovuiu liniiu, 76 (Syrtsov report at March 1928 Siberian party plenum); Gushchin and Il’inykh, Klassovaia bor’ba, 172–3.

56. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 121, l. 6–7, 47–9.

57. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 121, l. 2. Konstantin Sergeyev (b. 1893), the traveling aide who made the record of Stalin’s trip (including his remarks), listed the following brochures: Rodinskii raion Slavgorodskogo okruga: materialy obsledovaniia sibiriskoi derevni (Novosibirsk, 1927); Men’shikovskii raion Barabinskogo okruga: materialy obsledovaniia sibiriskoi derevni (Novosibirsk, 1927); Abakinskii raion Minusinskogo okruga: materialy obsledovaniia sibirskoi derevni (Novosibirsk, 1927). Sergeyev, originally from Tula, served as an aide to Stalin from January 1925 through June 1928.

58. Sevost’ianov, “Sovershenno sekretno,” VI: 58–60 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 6, d. 575, l. 1–58).

59. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 121, l. 4–4o, 9.

60. “At our own risk we issued a directive about repressions against kulaks in every grain procurement region,” Syrtsov later bragged. “We issued the directive of the Regional Committee thinking we could not delay it although we already knew that comrade Stalin was en route.” Demidov, “Khlebozagotovitel’naia akampaniia 1927/28 g. v sibirskoi derevne,” at 126. In a telegram to Syrtsov in early January 1928, Stalin had belittled “as a road to panic” party officials’ calls for bartering grain for manufacturing goods in Siberia. Za chetkuiu klassovuiu liniiu, 75–6.

61. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 201–2; Viola, War Against the Peasantry, 74–5. In the same January 19 (morning) telegram, Stalin also ordered that Molotov be sent to the Central Black Earth Region. Later that same day (5:35 p.m.), Stalin sent another telegram, this time to Molotov as well as Kosior, indicating the challenges were perhaps even greater, but reiterating that he anticipated success. It should be noted that Siberia’s procurement campaigns usually only began in September (the harvest took place a little later in Siberia, from August through early September). Also, in 1928, only four undersized grain elevators were in operation in all Siberia, thanks to underinvestment dating back to before the revolution, but belatedly several new ones were under construction. Lebedev, “Sostoianie i perspektivy razvitiia elevatornogo khoziaistva,” 34.

62. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 121, l. 11.

63. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 193–204 (199–201); Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, 154–6; Viola, War Against the Peasantry, 71–4. In 1930, Zagumyonny (b. 1897) would be deemed an invalid and granted a pension, but he would be elected a collective farm chairman and continue working, eventually becoming head of a state farm in his native Saratov province, where, on August 5, 1937, he would be arrested. He would stand trial publicly in May 1938 and be executed on November 28, 1938. Gusakova, “Veril v luchshuiu zhizn’ naroda.”

64. “Iz istorii kollektivizatsii 1928 god,” no. 6: at 212. See also Sochineniia, XI: 3. From January through March 1928, 3,424 people were convicted in the North Caucasus, including more than 2,000 middle and poor peasants (by the regime’s statistics). Osklokov, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia, 134.

65. The decision was taken at a meeting of the “grain troika” on January 26, 1928, in which Stalin participated. Papkov, Obyknovenyi terror, 33 (citing GANO, f. P-20, op. 2, d. 176, l. 92–3); Sovetskaia sibir’, January 29, 1928; Sochineniia, XI: 4.

66. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 118, l. 1–74 (stenogramma zasedaniia Sibkraikoma ot 20 ianvaria 1928 g.).

67. In 1928 all Siberia counted perhaps 700 agronomists, most of whom lacked higher education. Sibir’skaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, I: 17-8.

68. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 6: 203–5; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 118, l. 23–6.

69. Sochineniia, VII: 122–29 (April 1926), 286–7 (November 1926).

70. XVI partiinaia konferentsiia VKP (b), aprel’ 1929 g., 293. Bukharin had told the 14th party conference in April 1925, “The collective farm is a powerful thing, but not the royal road to socialism.” XIV konferetnisia RKP (b), 188.

71. “Partiia i oppozitsiia,” Pravda, November 24, 1927, reprinted in Sochineniia, X: 252–68 (at 259).

72. XVI Moskovskaia gubernskaia konferentsiia VKP (b), bulletin no. 10: 88. Stenografischeskii otchet, 492–520, 544–7. Stalin moved Bauman into the party secretariat in April 1928. He would be promoted to first secretary in Moscow in 1929, taking over for Molotov, then yield to Kaganovich in 1930. Bauman would get the Central Asian bureau from 1931 to 1934.

73. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 194–6.

74. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 172–92 (RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 137, l. 1–55).

75. Word of the general secretary’s presence spread, of course. One party secretary in Krasnoyarsk wrote to Stalin to convey a workers’ request that he speak at their factory, to which Stalin answered that he “has arrived unofficially for the instruction of comrades on an internal basis. To speak at a mass open meeting would be to exceed my mandate and deceive the Central Committee of the party.” RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 119, l. 1045.

76. Donald Treadgold, Great Siberian Migration, 155–83.

77. Ascher, P. A. Stolypin, 323.

78. After Stolypin returned from Siberia, he wrote privately to Nicholas II (September 26, 1910) that “my general impression is more than comforting,” but warned that “we are establishing the commune in a land that was accustomed to private property, in the form of squatter’s rights. . . . All this and much else are urgent and immediate questions. Otherwise, in an unconscious and formless manner will be created an enormous, rudely democratic country, which will soon throttle European Russia.” “Iz perepiski P. A. Stolypina s Nikolaem Romanovym,” Krasnyi arkhiv, 1928, no. 5: 82–3. See also Syromatnikov, “Reminiscences of Stolypin,” 86; and Pokrovsky, Brief History of Russia, II: 291. In Siberia, “free” land tenure developed whereby peasants just showed up and plowed and planted, but as arable land in any one place began to be fully occupied, a transition to “equalized” land tenure, with assignment and redistribution—that is, the appearance of the commune—began to be observed. Such a transition was usually not sudden or in a single leap. And it occurred only in the thickly settled areas (mostly in Tobolsk province, closer to European Russia), but this was an ominous sign for Stolypin, who was thinking about the long-term, when still more settlement would occur. Soldatov, “Izmeneniia form obshchinnogo zemlepol’zovaniiia,” 36; Kocharovsky, “Aleksandr Arkadievich Kaufman,” VIII: 550. Stolypin traveled to Siberia accompanied by minister of land and settlement Krivoshein, and sought to counter assertions that all arable land had already been settled. A 1910 crop failure did induce large numbers of settlers to retreat back to European Russia. Robinson, Rural Russia, 250–1; Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia, 177-8; Treadgold, Great Siberian Migration, 34.

79. Ascher, P. A. Stolypin, 325; Treadgold, Great Siberian Migration, 182–3.

80. Poezdka v Sibir’ i povol’zhe, 114, 117; Antsiferov, Russian Agriculture, 340–3; “Zemel’nye poriadki za uralom,” I: 537. In Siberia, land was owned by the state, the imperial household, or the Cossacks, but peasants viewed the land they had registered under right of usufruct (zemlepol’zovanie) as equivalent to property. Peasants already felt the land was theirs, de facto, but they needed to have it surveyed and registered in order to legalize the right of resale, especially where original migrants had made large claims but the plots were too big for them to farm and they were trying to rent them to later migrants. Treadgold, Great Siberian Migration, 182–3; Poezdka v Sibir’ i povol’zhe, 55–6, 64–5. In 1917 the Provisional Government transferred the Cabinet Lands (owned by the royal household) to the treasury; local officials issued land grants from them. Brike, “Ekonomicheskie protsessy,” 13–4; Zhidkov, “Krest’iane Altaia ot fevralia k Oktiabriu,” vyp. 2: 92–110.

81. Voshchinin, Na sibirskom prostore, 47–8.

82. As of January 1927 in the RSFSR, 95 percent of arable land, some 630 million acres (233 million desiatinas), was held communally; 3.4 percent was held as individual private property. Carr, Socialism in One Country, I: 214; Thorniley, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Rural Communist Party [Basingstoke], 10. By contrast, the Belorussian SSSR had a high percentage of consolidated farms persisting from before 1917. Pershin, Uchastkovoe zemlepol’zovanie Rossii, 46–7.

83. Danilov, Rural Russia, 160; Atkinson, End of the Russian Land Commune, 246.

84. Danilov, Rural Russia, 169.

85. The notion that Stalin may have visited a village derives from the line, in the amalgamated and edited stenogram of his Siberia speeches, that “I traveled around the districts of your territory” (Sochineniia, XI: 2). But this does not demonstrate he visited any villages. Avtorkhanov, relying on hearsay (Sorokin), has Stalin conversing with peasants. Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Communist Party, 12.

86. For example, Moshe Lewin asserted that Stalin searched for a solution to crises he had brought about, and did not impose a premeditated, ideological plan to collectivize: Lewin, Russian Peasants, 107–16, 296–302. Similarly, Carr and Davies wrote that “The pronouncements of Stalin and Molotov at this time were the utterances, not of men who had made a calculated move to the Left, and still less of men who believed that mass collectivization of the peasantry was a practicable policy for the near future, but of men hesitant and bewildered in the face of an intractable problem, and still hoping somehow to muddle through.” Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/i: 85. Lewin, Carr, and Davies were working under restricted access to many key documents; it is unclear whether the additional documentation would have induced them to alter their argument, and if so, in what direction.

87. Pavliuchenkov, Krest’ianskii Brest, 158 (citing RGASPI, f. 325, op. 1, d. 67, l. 5: March 1920).

88. Danilov, Sovetskoe krest’ianstvo, 233.

89. Fewer than one peasant household in 140 could claim a party member. Izvestiia Tsk RKP (b), 1928, no. 23 (255): at 9; Rigby, Communist Party Membership, 418. As one scholar wrote, “Whether the party sought to control or to woo, its manpower and points of contact were hopelessly inadequate for the task.” Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, II: 188. On the rural party numbers, see also Thorniley, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Rural Communist Party [New York], 11–7, 200–4.

90. Izvestiia Sibkraikoma VKP (b), 1928, no. 7–8: 1–2.

91. Pethybridge, One Step Backwards, 306–7.

92. Carr, for example, wrongly called Stalin’s Marxism merely “skin deep.” Carr, Russian Revolution, 163.

93. Pravda marked the occasion (January 15) by publishing letters that the OGPU had intercepted, under the rubric “Trotskyite subversion against the Comintern.”

94. Fel’shtinskii, Razgovory s Bukharinym, 14 (citing a letter of Natalya Sedova, February 29, 1960: Institute of International History, Amsterdam, papers of Sara Jacobs-Weber).

95. Scheffer, Sieben Jahre Sowjetunion, 158–61.

96. Serge, Le tournant obscur, 155. Also present were the widow of Adolf Joffe and a sister (Bertha) of Abram Belenky. On Belenky, see the note from Beria to Stalin, September 6, 1940: http://stalin.memo.ru/spravki/13-038.HTM.

97. Trotsky, My Life, 539–50; Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 391–4.

98. Trotsky, My Life, 539–42; Serge and Trotsky, Life and Death, 155–7; Patenaude, Stalin’s Nemesis, 88–9; Volkogonov, Trotsky, II: 92–5.

99. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 201, n2.

100. The politburo had discussed Trotsky’s exile on numerous occasions, with Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov opposed, Stalin and Voroshilov as the most vocal in favor, and the rest acceding. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 308 (citing APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 19, 20).

101. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 201. When Ivars Smilga, who was being sent to work in the planning department of the Far East in Khabarovsk, arrived at the Yaroslavl Station on June 9, 1927, his farewell turned into something of an opposition public demonstration; Trotsky and Zinoviev delivered speeches. Stalin moved quickly to have their actions condemned as a violation of their October 16, 1926, promise to desist from factionalism. Trotsky, My Life, 530–1.

102. Reswick, I Dreamt Revolution, 226–9. Reswick was afforded a Soviet-arranged exclusive on Trotsky’s deportation; his was the only journalist eyewitness account and won the AP’s award for outstanding story of the year.

103. Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 394.

104. After continuously protesting, the Trotsky family was soon moved to a four-room residence.

105. On the phrase, see Baumont, La faillite de la paix, I: 370.

106. Lerner, Karl Radek, 150. Radek was soon relocated to Tomsk.

107. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 280 (citing RGASPI, f. 326, op. 1, d, 113, l. 72: February 27, 1928). Radek, despairing over life in long-term exile, soon began to write criticisms of Trotsky in his letters, a way of ingratiating himself with Stalin, and a step toward his begging for rehabilitation.

108. Pravda, January 31, 1928; Koniukhov, KPSS v bor’be, 146–7.

109. Bezrukov, “Za chem Stalin priezhal na Altai?”; Bezrukov, Priezd I. V. Stalina na Altai; Dmitrieva, Barnaul v vospominaniiakh starozhilov, 97 (P. I. Zakharov). The sled driver was Ivan Sergovantsev.

110. “Iz istorii kollektivizatsii 1928 god,” no. 6: 212–4; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 118, l. 78–84.

111. Kavraiskii and Nusinov, Klassy i klassovaia bor’ba, 78 (citing PAAK, f. 4, op. 2, d. 27, l. 48).

112. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 119, l. 35.

113. “Stalin v Rubtsovske,” Khleborod Altaia, December 28, 1991 (recollections of L. A. Nechunaev); Popov, Rubtsovsk 1892–2000, 107–8.

114. Bol’shevik, 1927, no. 15–16: 90–9, 100–16. The author, Georgy Safarov [Voldin], had returned to Russia in 1917 with Lenin on the sealed train and become a leader in the Communist Youth League. Hughes, Stalin, Siberia, 88–96.

115. Sosnovskii, “Chetyre pis’ma iz ssylki,” 27. Sosnovsky wrote three letters that year to Trotsky in Kazakhstan. (A fourth, dated May 30, 1928, was addressed to Vardin.) Subsequently, Sosnovsky was arrested and imprisoned in the Chelyabinsk isolator.

116. Hughes, Stalin, Siberia, 58.

117. See the Left opposition analysis for their defeat by Christian Rakovski, in Trotskii, Predannaia revoliutsiia segodnia [1990], 61 (letter from Astrakhan to Trotsky in Alma-Ata, August 6, 1928).

118. Isaev and Ugrovatov, Pravokhanitel’nye organy Sibiri, 150–1; Tepliakov, “Nepronitsaemye nedra,” 262–4 (citing GANO, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 4, l. 57–8); Tumshis and Papchinskii, 1937, bol’shaia chistka, 7–78 (at 23–4).

119. Sochineniia, XI: 3–4.

120. Sochineniia, XI: 4. See also Pravda, July 3, 1928, reprinted in Sochineniia, XI: at 105. Later that year he denounced such officials as people who “do not understand the basis of our class policy and who are striving to conduct affairs in such a way that no one in the countryside is offended.” Sochineniia, XI: 235 (speech to the Moscow party committee and Control Commission, October 19, 1928).

121. Za chetkuiu klassovuiu liniiu, 56 (Syrtsov speech to the party active on February 17, 1928). “Stalin is right in saying that the party is ready for the slogan of dekulakization,” O. Barabashev, a leftist and former Zinovievite exiled to Siberia, concluded in the local newspaper. “Pressure on the kulaks implants in the power party ranks a mood for dekulakization in the old way.” Sovetskaia Sibir’, January 28, 1928.

122. Sovetskaia Sibir’, January 25, 1928. On January 22, the Siberia procurator general (I. D. Kunov) published an article in the local press, twisting himself into knots trying to explain the legal justification for how article 107 could be applied not just to private traders dealing in manufactures but also to peasants who refused to sell grain. Sovetskaia Sibir’, January 22, 1928.

123. Stepnoi pakhar’, February 8, 1928; Kavraiskii and Nusinov, Klassy i klassovaia bor’ba, 82; Koniukhov, KPSS v bor’be, 101.

124. Soverskaia Sibir’, January 27 and January 29, 1928 (report of a trial of fourteen kulaks in Biysk county accused of buying up grain in neighboring provinces for resale).

125. The authorities also seized 78 flour mills and 68 barns, and shuttered 1,500 leather workshops. Pravda, February 14 and February 29, 1928 (Syrtsov); Za chetkuiu klassovuiu liniiu, 251; Gushchin, Sibirskaia derevnia, 186, 190. The number of those arrested reached 1,748 by the end of May, of whom 92 percent were convicted. Many “middle” peasants and poor peasants were also convicted under article 107 in Siberia. Egorova, “Khlebozagotovitel’naia kampaniia 1927–1928,” 269 (citing PANO, f. 2, op. 2, d. 217, l. 744). By May 1928, around 8,000 households in Siberia had been “dekulakized.” Istochnik, 2001, no. 1: 64.

126. As of 1928, the GPU in Siberia had 36,674 names on watch lists. Ugrovatov, Krasnyi banditizm v Sibiri, 187. By February 29, 1928, the Siberian GPU had arrested 123 people under article 58 (counterrevolution), 64 of whom had been forwarded as required to the procuracy for verification (only 20 were approved). Tepliakov, “Nepronitsaemye nedra”: 222–3.

127. Leonidov and Reikhsbaum, “Revoliutsonnaia zakonnost’ i khlebozagotovski,” 36–40. See also Hughes, Stalin, Siberia, 211.

128. Na Leninskom puti, January 31, 1928: 3.

129. Izvestiia Sibkraikoma VKP (b), 1928, no. 13: 10.

130. Another delegate was quoted demanding reduced prices paid for peasant grain in the spring. Pravda, March 2, 1928.

131. Altaiskaia pravda, December 8, 1988.

132. Gushchin, Sibir’skaia derevnia, 188 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 67, d. 365, l. 9). On Syrtsov, see Hughes, “Patrimonialism and the Stalinist System”; Hughes, Stalin, Siberia, 200–4. Policy-wise, Syrtsov would identify with the Right, but he would support Stalin in the struggle against the Right.

133. Moletotov, Sibkraikom, 24.

134. III Sibir’skaia partiinaia kraevaia konfeterentsiia VKP (b), 33.

135. III Sibir’skaia partiinaia kraevaia konfeterentsiia VKP (b), 30–1, 43–4, 197; Hughes, Stalin, Siberia, 62.

136. In April 1932, Zakovsky would be transferred to Minsk as head of the GPU for Belorussia, where he brought a large team of those he had assembled in Siberia.

137. “Iz istorii kollektivizatsii 1928 god,” no. 6: 214–5.

138. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 119, l. 97, 112.

139. “Iz istorii kollektivizatsii 1928 god,” no. 7: 178–92.

140. Papkov, Obyknovenyi terror, 34–5 (citing Tsentr khraneniia i izuchenia dokumentov noveishei istorii Krasnoiarskgo kraia, f. 42, op. 1, d. 435, l. 2–2ob; d. 438, l. 1–8 [recollections of eyewitnesses, interviewed and recorded in 1953–4]), 36 (citing Krasnoiarskii rabochii, February 2, 1928).

141. Il’inykh, Khroniki khlebnogo fronta, 143 (citing GANO, f. P-2, op. 2, d. 217, l. 151), 158 (citing GANO, f. P-2, op. 2, d. 217, l. 472).

142. “Iz istorii kollektivizatsii 1928 god,” no. 7: 179–82. See also Pravda, February 10, 1928 (Mikoyan).

143. Sochineniia, XI: 10–19. An unsigned article in Pravda (February 15) repeated many of the lines in the secret circular (“The rural economy has increased and prospered. Above all, the kulak has increased and prospered”). Between February and May, 1928, 1,434 Communist officials were disciplined (278 of them expelled)—a small taste of what was to come. Ikonnikova and Ugrovatov, “Stalinskaia repetistiia nastupleniia na krest’ianstvo,” 74–7.

144. Shanin, Awkward Class, 1–2, 46–74; Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, 239.

145. Izvestiia TsK VKP (b), 1928, no. 12–13: 1; Istoriia kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 544–5. As many as 10,000 were sent just for Ukraine alone. Koniukhov, KPSS v bor’be, 118 (citing Visti, March 28, 1928).

146. Sovetskaia Sibir’, January 28, 1928. Barabashev, “Isil’kul’skie zheleznodorzhniki o klhebe,” 47–8; Carr, Socialism in One Country, II: 118, 177. Barabashev went on to work in Irkutsk, then Crimea, where he would be arrested and executed in 1937. “Kak skladyvalas’ zhizn’ O. V. Rissa”: www .oleg-riss.ru/files/Riss_part01.doc.

147. Senin, A. I. Rykov.

148. Trotsky archive, Houghton Library, Harvard University, T 1106; Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, July 23, 1928: 15; XVII s”ezd VKP (b) [1934], 210; Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/i: 61; “Materialy fevral’sko-martovskogo plenuma TsK VKP (b) 1937 goda,” 19 (Bukharin/Pyatakov). See also Medvedev, Let History Judge, 194–5; Lewin, Russian Peasants, 218–20; Cohen, Bukharin, 278, 444, n31.

149. Only Molotov and Kuibyshev had backed Stalin without reservation. Rykov would admit that he had underestimated the extent of the crisis; Molotov, its duration. Lewin, Russian Peasants, 217–9.

150. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 22–4.

151. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, I: 29–30.

152. Khlevniuk, Stalinskoe politburo, 113 (editor’s note). See also the sagacious essay by E. A. Rees, “Stalin, the Politburo, and Rail Transport Policy,” 104–33.

153. Mikoian, Tak bylo, 292.

154. Rosenfeldt, Knowledge and Power, 34.

155. Rosenfeldt, The “Special” World, I: 468–74.

156. Pravda, March 10, 1928: 1. At a March 16 meeting of the North Caucasus party secretariat, Andreyev directed Yevdokimov to compose a local editorial “in the spirit of the Prav-da editorial and the formulation of the question in Moscow.” Kislitsyn, Shakhtinskoe delo, 30–1. The politburo formed an investigatory commission, consisting of Molotov (sent to Stalino), Tomsky (sent to Shakhty), and Yaroslavsky (sent to Artemovsk), whose speeches were so rabid even Stalin had to send a telegram to rein him in, so as not to discredit the trial that had yet to take place. Kukushkin, Rezhim lichnoi vlasti Stalina, 96.

157. The settlement had originally been known as Grushevka (for the local river), but, in memory of the assassinated Tsar Alexander II, had been renamed Alexandrovsk-Grushevsky, a name it held until February 1920. In November 1923, 10,000 workers at Shakhty, nearly the entire workforce, had struck, disarmed the mine guards, and marched on the local GPU building, demanding higher wages and adherence to safety norms. Soldiers fired on the crowd, killing several protesters and dispersing the others. The GPU locked the miners out and arrested all presumed activists. Nikolai Krylenko arrived on November 4. When he demanded that workers beaten with whips identify themselves, no one did so, either afraid or distrusting. Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, 1924, no. 1: 7.

158. Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB, 1997, no. 1–2: at 321.

159. Yevdokimov’s circle of loyalists included Mikhail Frinovsky, Fomin, Elza Grundman, Nikolai Nikolayev-Zhuid, V. Kursky, and others.

160. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 382–5; Istochnik, 1995, no. 5, 140–51 (APRF, f. 3, op. 61, d. 648, l. 9–14).

161. Voprosy istorii, 1995, no. 2: 3–7. Yevdokimov’s proximity to Stalin was well known inside the secret police. Orlov, Secret History, 28.

162. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 130 (citing TsA FSB RF f. 2, op. 5, d. 29, l. 1). See also Wheatcroft, “Agency and Terror,” 30.

163. Yevdokimov got credit at the 16th Party Congress in 1930: XVI s”ezd VKP (b), 538ff; Ordzhonikidze, Stat’i i rechi, II: 230. The first arrests, evidently following denunciations by workers, had taken place on June 14, 1927, and initially the case involved six people. The GPU evidently had trouble getting the case in gear and continually had to request formal extensions of the deadlines for either bringing a case or releasing those under investigation. As of January 16, 1928, the disposition of the case remained unclear. But on February 9, 1928, the OGPU informed Rykov of the case. By then, the “investigation” was nearly six months old. Krasil’nikov, Shakhtinskii protsess, 822, n1 (TsA FSB, f. r-49447, t. 26, ch. 1, l. 213–4, 608–9), n2. See also Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Communist Party, 26–30 (citing conversations with Rezhnikov); Bailes, Technology and Society, 69–94; Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 44–5; and Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/ii: 584–90.

164. Andrei Andreyev, newly appointed to the North Caucasus, had inherited the Shakhty hot potato, and he wrote to Stalin (on February 27, 1928) that Yevdokimov would come in person for a direct report. Andreev, Vospominaniia, 209; Krasil’nikov, Shakhtinskii protsess, I: 72.

165. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, I: 348–400 (RGASPI. f. 558, op. 11, d. 132, l. 3–18); Na prieme, 27. Yevdokimov had brought along to Moscow Konstantin I. Zonov, the head of the North Caucasus OGPU economic department and the progenitor of the Shakhty case from the trenches: GARF, f. 3316, op. 2, d. 628, l. 20. See also Starkov, “Perekhod k ‘politike razgroma,’” vyp. 2: 260–1; Iu. A. Shchetinov, “Rezhim lichnoi vlasti Stalina,” in Kukushkin, Rezhim lichnoi vlasti Stalina, 9–97 (at 68, citing GARF without specifics).

166. Krasil’nikov, Shakhtinskii protsess, 163–4, 177–81.

167. Krylenko attended a March 30 plenum of the North Caucasus party committee, at which Yevdokimov delivered the main report. Krylenko stated “that the issue of specialists should be clear for all, that without them we could not manage.” Andreyev echoed him: “With our hands alone we cannot build socialism, we need to use specialists. . . . I think that among us, among the managers, there is internal distrust of our GPU organs, that the latter busy themselves with finding crimes, that they overdo it, and so on. Such distrust exists. I think we need to extirpate this distrust.” Mozokhin and Gladkov, Menzhinskii, 267–93.

168. Kislitsyn, Shakhtinskoe delo, 51–2.

169. Mikhhutina, “SSSR glazami pol’skikh diplomatov,” 58; Rosenbaum, Community of Fate, 248.

170. In January 1928, a clarification had been issued regarding the criminal statute on wrecking (article 58.7) to the effect that proof of “counter-revolutionary intent” was not required for prosecution. Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice, 139–40. Already, a 1927 OGPU circular had equated negligence (khalatnost’) with sabotage, if it resulted in industrial fires, cave-ins, or explosions, with or without criminal intent. The circular granted the OGPU the power to impose sentences outside the courts. Viktorov, Bez grifa “sekretno,” 147.

171. Kuromiya, “The Shakhty Affair,” 46–7 (citing GARF, f. 1652, d. 49, l. 1–9 [no opis’]).

172. Mezynski’s leg pain subsided, but his hearing deteriorated sharply, said to be from arteriosclerosis; doctors noted a small enlargement of his heart and aorta as well. Mozokhin and Gladkov, Menzhinskii, 345–6 (no citation).

173. When Yagoda was being destroyed, Yevdokimov had this to say in 1937: “I ask, you, Yagoda, you were then my boss, what help did you provide from your side? (Yagoda: ‘In the Shakhty Case? You yourself did not believe in it.’) Don’t give me that rubbish.” Voprosy istorii, 1995, no. 2: 6–7.

174. Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, 148–52 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 328, l. 20–5).

175. Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, 148–61; Krylenko, Ekonomicheskaia kontr-revoliutsiia. Yevdokimov is said to have possessed “intercepted letters” between the engineer and people abroad, claiming their innocuous content was actually a code, but the documents would not be introduced at trial. Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Communist Party, 28–29. Back in 1927, the cynical Radek—perhaps sensing the political winds, perhaps out of conviction—had condemned bourgeois specialists, naming names, while criticizing corrupt, “rightist” bureaucrats and worker alienation from the regime’s industrialization drive. Graziosi, “Stalin’s Antiworker Workerism,” 252.

176. Rosenbaum, “The German Involvement in the Shakhty Trial.” Litvinov had suggested forming an authoritative commission solely for determining the guilt of the Germans, and guaranteeing the presence of a representative of the German foreign ministry at their interrogations. No such special commission was formed; Voroshilov, who oversaw Soviet-German military relations, was added to the Shakhty politburo commission on March 13.

177. Krasil’nikov, Shakhtinskii protsess, I: 164–5; ADAP, Serie B, VIII: 300–1; Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 129–30 (citing Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, 2860/D559468–70: Rantzau to Stresemann, March 6, 1928, and 2860/D559755-6: Rantzau to Stresemann, March 16, 1928); Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 217–8.

178. Akhtamzian, “Sovetsko-Germanskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia,” 53; Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 119–29.

179. Krasil’nikov, Shakhtinskii protsess, I: 163–4.

180. Torgovaia promyshlennaia gazeta, March 17, 1928: 1; Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 131 (citing 5265/E319203–5: Stresemann to Rantzau regarding a conversation with Litvinov).

181. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 824, l. 54–64.

182. Kislitsyn, Shakhtinskoe delo, I: 218–9 (March 19, 1928).

183. Kislitsyn, Shakhtinskoe delo, I: 231–3, 239–41; Rosenbaum, Community of Fate, 254–5. The disorganization and mismanagement in the Soviet coal industry is well detailed in “Report of Stuart, James & Cooke, Inc. to V.S.N.H.,” ch. 1, p. 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Charles E. Stuart papers, box 1. In the late 1980s, the USSR procuracy invalidated the charges of deliberate wrecking or working on behalf of emigre former mine owners or foreign intelligence, citing insufficient evidence. Mozokhin, VChK-OGPU, karaiushchii mech diktatury proletariat, 315.

184. Kislitsyn, Shakhtinskoe delo, I: 839, n48. On March 21, the politburo resolved that the GPU verify “an exact list” of those arrested and being held. Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, 153–4 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 328, l. 195); Kislitsyn, Shakhtinskoe delo, I: 222–3.

185. Chicherin wrote to Stalin (March 12, 1928) about the strong foreign reaction, not just in Germany, and recommended the formation of a commission headed on the German citizens who were accused, but Stalin refused. Krestinsky, the Soviet envoy in Berlin, wrote a long, plaintive letter to Stalin (March 16–17, 1928) about the consequences for Soviet-German relations (“we are heading for a difficult, prolonged conflict with German industry and, it happens, with the government, and with public opinion”). Krasil’nikov, Shakhtinskii protsess, I: 203–4, 210–1, II: 856–61.

186. Rosenbaum, Community of Fate, 258–63.

187. Terpigorev, Vospominaniia gornogo inzhenera, 183; Starkov, “Perekhod k ‘politike razgroma,’” 255–6 (March 15, 1928, police mood summary).

188. The letter went on: “Could it be that the cause of Lenin will die?” Mozokhin and Gladkov, Menzhinskii, 291–2 (Boris Sysoev, June 9, 1928). Vlas Chubar, the head of the government in Ukraine, had sent the suicide note to Stalin, who distributed it to the politburo.

189. Bailes, Technology and Society, 79.

190. Sovetskoe rukovodstvo: perepiska, 28 (Voroshilov to Tomsky, March 29, 1928); Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution, 30–1. Voroshilov knew Yevdokimov from his time as commissar on the southern front during the civil war and as head of the North Caucasus military district (1921–24). On Rykov and Shakhty, see Pravda, March 11, 1928; and Reswick, I Dreamt Revolution, 246–51.

191. Pravda, March 28, 1928. The politburo already had a standing commission for political cases, but it had formed a special Shakhty commission consisting of Rykov, Orjonikidze, Molotov, Kuibyshev, and Stalin; Voroshilov, responsible for German-Soviet military cooperation, was soon added.

192. Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta, March 6, 1928. The announcement of the Shakhty case in the newspaper of Kuibyshev’s agency had been muted. Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta, March 10 and March 11, 1928; Khavin, U rulia industrii, 79–81.

193. Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta, March 29, 1928.

194. Trotskii, Portrety revoliutsionerov, 228.

195. Stenograficheskii otchet pervoi Leningradskoi oblastnoi konferenetsii VKP (b), 19.

196. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 28 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 45, l. 4–4ob, 6–60b).

197. Pravda, April 19, 1928; Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, I: 417–37. See also Bukharin, Izbrannye proizvedenie, 376.

198. Trud v SSSR, 61; Schwarz, Labor in the Soviet Union, 6–7. See also Krzhizhanovskii, Desiat’ let khoziiastvennogo stroitel’stva.

199. Merridale, Moscow Politics, 18, calculating from Statisticheskii spravochnik goroda Moskvy i Moskovskoi gubernii (Moscow: Mosgorkomstat, 1927); Davies, Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 84.

200. Duranty, I Write as I Please, 145–7.

201. Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror, 104–5 (citing GARF, f. 9474, op. 7, d. 259, l. 110), 141.

202. Chase, Workers, Society, and the Soviet State, 278–82; Chase, “Workers’ Control and Socialist Democracy,” 235–6.

203. Graziosi, “Stalin’s Antiworker Workerism,” 228.

204. Kislitsyn, Shakhtinskoe delo, II: 943–6.

205. Storella, Voice of the People, 244–5 (RGAE, f. 396, op. 6, d. 114, l. 748–50).

206. Kuromiya, “The Shakhty Affair,” 51 (citing GARF, f. 5459, op. 9, d. 354, l. 5); Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 116.

207. Kislitsyn, Shakhtinskoe delo, II: 940–2.

208. Sanukov, “Stalinist Terror in the Mari Republic.”

209. Kuromiya, “Crisis of Proletarian Identity.”

210. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 5: 195–6.

211. Just 452 of the 1,017 arrests in Ukraine in the first several months of 1928 were of kulaks; 1,087 of the 2,661 arrests in the North Caucasus over the same period; and 272 of 903 arrests in the Urals. Even in Siberia, where initially “kulaks” predominated in the arrest statistics, arrests of those officially classified as middle peasants began to rise. Manning, “The Rise and Fall of ‘the Extraordinary Measures,’” 15 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 6, d. 567, l. 498–504).

212. Manning, “The Rise and Fall of ‘the Extraordinary Measures,’” 15 (citing GARF, f. 353s, op. 16s, d. 6, 16–17: February 23, 1928). Mikoyan, in Pravda back on February 12, had admitted “irregularities” and called for arrests to be limited to actual kulaks, defined as peasants possessing at least 36 tons of grain (2,000 poods), and the politburo the next day had urged officials to follow these guidelines strictly.

213. Shemelev, Bor’ba KPSS. See also Brower, “The Smolensk Scandal and the End of NEP.”

214. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, I: 156–68. See also Lutchenko, “Rukovodstvo KPSS formirovaniem kadrov tekhnicheskoi intelligentsia,” 29–42 (at 33, citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 354, l. 790); and Gimpel’son, NEP, 254 (citing Pravda, October 3, 1988).

215. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, I: 203, 214–24.

216. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, I: 233–5.

217. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh [8th ed.], IV: 84.

218. Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, 158–61 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 329, l. 32–7: April 25, 1928).

219. Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, 156–8 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 329, l. 28–31).

220. Carr and Davíes have argued of April 1928 that “It would be premature to assume that at this time a majority of the leaders, or Stalin in particular, was committed to coercion, or had decided to abandon the methods of the market for a policy of direct action.” But the full scope of Stalin’s actions indicates otherwise. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I: 65–6.

221. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh [1984], IV: 315–6; Manning, “The Rise and Fall of ‘the Extraordinary Measures,’” 13.

222. As Bukharin would point out in a report on the plenum to the Leningrad party organization: Bukharin, Put’ k sotsializmu, 284.

223. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 6 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 38, l. 30).

224. Campbell, who was in high demand globally, was brought to the Soviet Union twice, the first time in January 1929, when he met Stalin, then in June 1930. He was shown large mechanized farms in the North Caucasus. Campbell, Russia: Market or Menace.

225. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 462–5.

226. Pravda, April 18, 1928, reprinted in Sochineniia, XI: 54 (at 46, 48). See also Fitzpatrick, “The Foreign Threat During the First Five Year Plan.”

227. Zima, Chelovek i vlast’ v SSSR, 77–8 (citing GARF, f. 5446, op. 89, d. 11, l. 94–5: F. Cherepanov).

228. Manning, “The Rise and Fall of ‘the Extraordinary Measures,’” 22 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 13, l. 5).

229. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 683, l. 89.

230. Moskovskie b’olsheviki, 251 (citing Ob”edinennyi plenum MK i MKK VKP (b), 23–25 aprelia 1928 g.: doklady i rezoliutsii. Moscow, 1928, 34–5).

231. Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 236 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 683, l. 1–2), 261–2 (d. 684, l. 18–20), 255–62. On April 21, the regime had replaced the poll tax with a progressive tax on farm income that included an “individual” tax on high incomes and a wealth surtax on the absolute top stratum or kulak elites, in line with the sentiment to press the kulak by economic means. Atkinson, End of the Russian Land Commune, 329. Pyotr Wrangel, the former White Guard officer, died suddenly on April 25, 1928, aged forty-nine, in Brussels, of a severe form of tuberculosis, which by most accounts he had not contracted before. Family members believed he had been poisoned by a suspected Soviet agent, either in the household or in the guise of a former orderly who visited him ten days before his death. Bolezn’, smert’ i pogrebenie general-leitenanta barona Petra Nikolaevicha Vrangelia.

232. Ugrovatov, Informatsionnaia deiatel’nost’ organov bezopasnosti, 82–4; Sovetskaia derevnia glazami VChK-OGPU-NKVD, II: 7–8, 21, 38, 46; Krasil’nikov, Shakhtinskii protsess, I: 242–83.

233. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 1921–1928, 420–1 (citing TsA FSB, f. 66, op. 1, d. 187, l. 227ob). That same day, Stalin told a Communist Youth League congress, “No, comrades, our class enemies exist. And they not only exist but are gaining strength and trying to act against Soviet power.” He urged them to “organize mass criticism from below.” Pravda, May 17, 1928, in Sochineniia, XI: 66–77 (at 69).

234. Izvestiia, May 19, 1928. There had been some trials in the interim: in 1925, some engineers and former employees of once foreign-owned metallurgical plants had been tried and convicted of espionage. Pravda, June 4–16, 1925. In 1926, perhaps 50 percent of the technical staff in the Donbass coal basin were put on trial as a result of industrial accidents. Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror, 143 (citing GARF, f. 5459, op. 7, d. 2, l. 139, 150), 144–5.

235. Ivanovich, “Finliandskie shpioni,” 193–7; Vozrozhdenie, January 6, 1928; Pravda, January 1, 1928.

236. Markova, “Litso vraga,” 79–99 (at 80–1).

237. Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 42.

238. Bailes, Technology and Society, 90.

239. One scholar speculated that Stalin aimed to undermine their technocratic ethos and possible political solidarity. Bailes, “Politics of Technology,” 464.

240. Bailes, Technology and Society, 91–2.

241. Reswick, I Dreamt Revolution, 247.

242. Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 219–20. Hilger attended the trial. Bashkin had been educated in Germany.

243. Mozokhin, VChk—OGPU, 274–75 (TsA FSB, f. ugolovnoe delo N-3738). The Soviets also discovered that the German technical director of the Junkers concession was listed in tsarist-era archives as the former head of intelligence for the German eastern army during the Great War. This prior history, akin to unchangeable physical attributes, was taken as prima facie evidence of ongoing espionage activity on his part.

244. Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 125–6.

245. Torgovaia promyshlennaia gazeta, July 4, 1928.

246. Kuromiya,”The Shakhty Affair,” 48–9 (citing GARF, f. 9474, op. 7, d. 253, l. 106–16).

247. Walter Duranty, New York Times, May 19, 1928.

248. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 29–31 (RGASPI, f. 78, op. 7, d. 120, l. 1–3; f. 17, op. 162, d. 6, l. 100, 113).

249. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/ii: 702–4.

250. Zima, Chelovek i vlast’ v SSSR, 78 (citing GARF, f. 5446, op. 89, d. 11, l. 110: A. Lesnikov).

251. Plekhanov, VChK-OGPU, 1921–1928, 420 (citing TsA FSB, f. 66, op. 1, d. 187, l. 8, 15, 280).

252. Papkov, Obyknovennyi terror, 39 (citing GANO, f. P-2, op. 2, d. 289A, l. 69ob). Nikolai Zimin, the head of the Irkutsk regional party committee, under Syrtsov in Novosibirsk, had denounced Syrtsov to Moscow in March 1928 for failing to implement regime policy, sparking what would be called the Irkutsk Affair: Moletotov, Sibkraikom, 44; Hughes, “The Irkutsk Affair.”

253. Gushchin, Sibirskaia derevnia, 187 (citing PANO, f. 2, op. 2, d. 279, l. 6); Il’inykh, Khroniki khlebnogo fronta, 165–6 (citing GANO, f. P-2, op. 2, d. 217, l. 738); Rosenfeldt, The “Special” World, I: 164.

254. The harvest of 1927–28 came in at least 5 million tons below that of 1926–27, but by June 30, 1928, state procurements of wheat and rye equaled those of 1926–27. Carr, “Revolution from Above,” 321.

255. Bordiugov and Kozlov, “The Turning Point of 1929.”

256. The journal passed the letter to Rykov, head of the government. Zima, Chelovek i vlast’ v SSSR, 75 (citing GARF, f. 5446, op. 89, l. 12–15, 25, 56–64: V. Repin).

257. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I: 67. Grain delivery quotas risked provoking what one scholar has rightly called “the two traditional replies of the peasant: the short-term reply of concealment of stocks and the long-term reply of refusal to sow more land than was necessary to feed his own family.” Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, II: 154.

258. Avtorkhanov, Tekhnologiia vlasti, 7–11.

259. Avorkhanov, Tekhnologiia vlasti, 11–2.

260. Pravda, June 2, 1928, in Sochineniia, XI: 81–97.

261. Carr, Socialism in One Country, II: 106–7 (citing Shokhin, Kratkaia istoriiia VLKSM, 115–6); Kenez, Birth of the Propaganda State, 168–9; Balashov and Nelepin, VLKSM za 10 let v tsifrakh, 21–2.

262. Manning, “The Rise and Fall of ‘the Extraordinary Measures,’” 30 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 6, d. 599, 1. 385–7).

263. Zima, Chelovek i vlast’ v SSSR, 81–2 (citing GARF, f. 5446, op. 89, d. 9, l. 9–10).

264. Zdanovich, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, 306 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 6, d. 48, l. 15–6).

265. Kun, Bukharin, 229–34, citing a copy of Frumkin’s letter in the Trotsky archive, Houghton Library, Harvard University; Sochineniia, XI: 116–23.

266. In a published document collection, Bukharin’s letter is dated August 1928, but in April 1929, when Bukharin would read this letter aloud at a plenum, he would date it to June 1–2, 1928. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 38–40 (RGASPI, f. 329, op. 2, d. 6, l. 58–60); Bukharin, Problemy teorii i praktiki sotsializma, 298–99.

267. Stalin did respond to a letter (June 15, 1928) from Moisei “Mikhail” Frumkin, the deputy agriculture commissar, inveighing against Stalin’s coercive agrarian line, which he said was playing into the hands of the international bourgeoisie. Party rules specified that such a letter was to receive a collective answer from the politburo within a week. Stalin, in his fury, responded in his own name without waiting. Sochineniia, XI: 116–26.

268. On June 27, 1928, Rykov received a letter from a well-known acquaintance from a village in Ukraine’s Chernihov province. “Alexei! Having received from Lenin such wealth in terms of experiments, you with your false apparatus are leading the country to ruin. . . . You know, us old revolutionaries need to go into the forest and start another revolution.” Zima, Chelovek i vlast’ v SSSR, 79 (citing GARF, f. 5446, op. 89, d. 9, l. 5–6: T. S. Tregubov).

269. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, IV: 558–63 (RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 40, l. 2–11); Larina, This I Cannot Forget, 117.

270. Storella, Voice of the People, 235–6 (RGAE, f. 396, op. 6, d. 114, l. 747–8).

271. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 184–7, 448. See also “Foreign Trade,” 225–6.

272. Aaron Solts, a member of the Central Control Commission presidium, wrote to Orjonikidze on July 1 regarding the launching of emergency measures at the beginning of the year that “the trips of Molotov and Stalin, whether they desired this or not, were a comprehensive summons to arbitrariness and spitting on the law.” Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 31–4 (RGASPI, f. 85, op. 1/s, d. 156, l. 2–15: July 1, 1928).

273. Scheffer, Sieben Jahre Sowjetunion, 323. Brockdorff-Rantzau died in Berlin on September 8, 1928.

274. Unpublished transcripts in GARF, f. 9474sch, op. 7s, d. 181–261.

275. Krumin, Shakhtinskii protsess. Krumin (1894–1943), shortened from Kruminsh, a graduate of the Petrograd University history department (1916), edited the newspaper Ekonomicheskaia zhizn’ and, in 1928, joined the editorial board of Pravda.

276. Sochineniia, XI: 47. For evidence of working-class enthusiasm for the Shakhty trial and the 1928–31 terror against “class enemies” see Kuromiya, “The Shakhty Affair,” 51, 56.

277. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, I: 361; Sochineniia, XI: 158–87. On the transcript given to him for editing his remarks, Stalin inserted: “Is it not a fact that the grain collection crisis was the first attack of capitalist elements in the village against Soviet policy.” He then invoked Lenin, using a rhetorical question: “Should not Lenin’s slogan about reliance on the poor peasant, alliance with the middle peasant, and battle with the kulak be the basis for our work in the countryside?” (I: 360).

278. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 354, 513.

279. Sochineniia, XI: 159, 188–9 (first published in 1949).

280. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, 354–5. Later in the discussion, Stalin stated that an increase in the grain price of 40 percent, to induce peasant grain sales, would cost 300 million rubles annually, and “in order to get this money it would be necessary to take something from either industry or trade” (II: 519, the uncorrected typescript).

281. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 360–1; Sochineniia, XI: 170–1.

282. In notes for a pamphlet on the dictatorship of the proletariat that he jotted down September–October 1919, Lenin wrote of a “special (higher) ferocity of class struggle and new forms of resistance in connection with capitalism and its highest stage (conspiracies + sabotage + influence on the petty-bourgeoisie, etc. etc.) . . . The resistance of the exploiters begins before their overthrow and sharpens afterwards from two sides.” “O diktature proletariata,” PSS, XXXIX: 261–3. Similarly, a joint circular by Dzierzynski and Molotov (February 1921), for example, asserted that “having lost the battle on the external front, the counter-revolution is focusing its efforts on overthrowing Soviet power from within. It will use any means to attain this goal, drawing on all of its experience, all of its techniques of betrayal.” Lauchlan, “Young Felix Dzerzhinsky,” 1–19 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 228, l. 52).

283. Van Ree, Political Thought of Joseph Stalin, 114–5.

284. Sochineniia, XI: 45; Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution, 6 (citing Trotsky archive, Houghton Library, Harvard University, T-1835).

285. Kun, Bukharin, 233–4.

286. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 380.

287. On April 19, two thousand unemployed people smashed the Leningrad labor exchange; on May 3, ten thousand revolted at the Moscow labor exchange, bloodying the regular police (militia) and attacking trading stalls; and on May 15 in Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan), three thousand people forced their way into the town hall and looted stores. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 5–6 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 85, d. 307, l. 28–31, 41–5).

288. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 382–7.

289. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 460–1.

290. Fel’shtinskii, Razgovory s Bukharinym, 43. See also Lewin, Russian Peasants, 306.

291. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, II: 516–7.

292. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh [1984], IV: 351; KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh [1984], II: 516–7.

293. Pravda, August 5, 1928 (Molotov).

294. At the same time, procurator general Krylenko instructed the judicial machinery to be ready for mass application of article 107 against speculators and those trying to corner the grain market. Pravda, July 20, 1928; Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, III: 6. Fainblitt’s amnesty for arrested peasants was belatedly passed and on August 7, justice commissar Yanson ordered all poor and middle peasants sentenced under article 107 to be released from prison. Manning, “The Rise and Fall of ‘the Extraordinary Measures,’” 41 (citing TsA FSB, f. 66, op. 1, d. 243, l. 243). Fainblitt, Amnistiia i sudebnyi prigovor.

295. Stalin told the Leningrad party organization, in a summary report on the plenum, that “all the same, the grain had to be got.” Pravda, July 15, 1928, in Sochineniia, XI: 204–18.

296. Kumanev and Kulikova, Protivostoianie, 142–4.

297. “In early 1927,” Trotsky would write, “Zinoviev had been ready to capitulate,” until events in China rescued him from his fecklessness, but only temporarily, for whereas Trotsky and his supporters had refused to recant at the 15th Party Congress, Trotsky pointed out that Zinoviev and Kamenev had gone begging back to Stalin. Trotskii, Moia zhizn’ [1991], 502.

298. Nazarov, Stalin i bor’ba za liderstvo, 119–20 (citing RGASPI, f. 326, op. 1, d. 99, l. 12). In January 1928, Zinoviev stated that there had been a “struggle” inside his bloc with Trotsky. Nazarov, Stalin i bor’ba za liderstvo, 119 (citing RGASPI, f. 324, op. 1, d. 363, l. 7).

299. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 196–8.

300. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, IV: 558–63 (RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 40, l. 2–11). See also Daniels, Documentary History of Communism [1960], I: 308–9 (from the Trotsky archive, Houghton Library, Harvard University, T-1897); and Kun, Bukharin, 251–61.

301. Larina, “Nezabyvaemoe,” 120; Larina, This I Cannot Forget, 118.

302. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, IV: 561.

303. “He’s lost his mind,” Bukharin is said to have remarked of Stalin, in the presence of Trotsky, before the latter’s exile to Kazakhstan. “He thinks that he can do it all, that he alone can shoulder everything, that all others are only a hindrance.” Trotsky, “Iz chernovikov nezakonchennoi Trotskim biografii Stalina” [1939?], in Trotskii, Portrety revoliutionerov [1991], 180–1 (at 181); [1988], 141.

304. Kamenev was evidently frustrated by Trotsky’s continued scolding of him and Zinoviev for “capitulation,” and in September 1928 would tell a few Trotsky supporters outside the Bolshoi Theater that Trotsky was a “stubborn person,” adding that Trotsky would never ask to be summoned back to work in Moscow, like Kamenev and Zinoviev, “and will sit in Alma-Ata until they send a special train for him, but they’ll send that train only when the situation in the country is such that Kerensky will be standing on the threshold.” “Vstrecha i razgovor tt. K. i P. s Kamenevym 22 sentiabria 1928 goda,” in Fel’shtinskii, Razgovory s Bukharinym, 51–4 (at 53).

305. Stalin’s alleged remarks circulated in many forms: Trotsky’s Diary in Exile [1958], 64; Ioffe, Odna noch’, 33–4; Serebriakova, “Oni delali v chest’ idee,” 3.

306. Kamenev would be forced to insist that he and Zinoviev were upholding the conditions of their reinstatement to the party. RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 40, l. 12–3.

307. Bukharin added that “as a whole, the document is not reliable and false.” Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, III: 572–6 (RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 40, l. 25–31: letter to Orjonikidze, January 30, 1929).

308. Sokolnikov added that Bukharin had not sought a bloc with Kamenev and Zinoviev, but their neutrality in the struggle against Stalin. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, IV: 564–5 (RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 40, l. 14–5: letter to Orjonikidze, January 28, 1929).

309. Larina, This I Cannot Forget, 115–7. Larina was fifteen years old at the time of the incident.

310. Danilov, Kak lomali, NEP, II: 531, 535.

311. McDermott and Agnew, Comintern, 70.

312. Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel’no!,” III: 404–10 (August 16, 1928).

313. Vatkin, “Goriachaia osen’ dvadtsat vos’mogo,” 103.

314. Trotsky sent a critique of the draft program to the congress from Alma-Ata supported by nearly two hundred oppositionists in exile. Degras, The Communist International [London], II: 446–55.

315. Adibekov and Shirinia, Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Komintern, 541–3 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 700, l. 1–2), 551–2 (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 19, d. 228, l. 129); McDermott and Agnew, Comintern, 68–90.

316. According to Bukharin’s third wife, Anna Larina, Stalin once said to Bukharin’s father, “How did you make your son? I want to adopt your method. Oh, what a son, what a son!” Larina, This I Cannot Forget, 221–3.

317. Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters, 31; and Gregory, Politics, Murder, and Love, 16–8; Young, “Bolshevik Wives.”

318. The draft program had not been discussed by any party other than the Soviet one; no less tellingly, the theses that would be voted up had not even been available when the congress opened. Eudin and Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy, I: 106–20; Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, III/i: 193–222.

319. Firsov, “N. I. Bukharin v Kominterne,” 189–90; International Press Correspondence, August 23, 1928: 941.

320. International Press Correspondence, September 4, 1928: 1,039.

321. The British delegation issued a declaration (August 22, 1928) against the so-called right-wing deviation: “We wish to express our emphatic protest against the time and method of polemics introduced by Comrade Kuusinen and certain other comrades,” especially “the method of hurrying to tie labels on comrades who hold different opinions.” International Press Correspondence, December 27, 1928: 1,743–4; McDermott and Agnew, Comintern, 233–4.

322. Molotov turned over no letters from Stalin for that year. Lih, Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, xiv. Stalin’s last recorded meeting in Moscow was August 1 (Jay Lovestone, the American Communist); his first recorded meeting back in Moscow was October 5, 1928 (Fadeyev, the writer). Na prieme, 28, 774, 780–1.

323. Valedinskii, “Organizm Stalina vpolne zdorovyi,” 68–73.

324. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, IV: 689; Trotskii, Moia zhizn’, II: 111.

325. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 22 (no citation or date given).

326. Dohan, “Foreign Trade,” 223.

327. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, III: 591–3 (at 592: RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 765, l. 48–49ob).

328. Vernadskii, Dnevniki, 76, 87. V. G. Yakovenko, chairman of the land and election commission under Kalinin at the Soviet executive committee, following a trip to actual Siberian villages in June–August 1928, wrote to Stalin on October 3, 1928, that “farmers are decidedly of the opinion that Soviet power does not want them to live decently.” Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 7: 186–90.

329. Pribytkov, Apparat, 87–90 (with facsimile from Mikoyan’s archive). Stalin ended the letter by inquiring about Orjonikidze’s health.

330. Pribytkov, Apparat, 100 (with facsimile: 98–9).

331. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovidstvo, 44–8 (RGASPI, f. 669, op. 1, d. 30, l. 124–9).

332. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, III: 591–3 (at 592–3: RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 765, l. 48–49ob).

333. Tauger, “Grain Crisis or Famine?,” 167 (citing Visty, September 27, 1928: 2).

334. International Press Correspondence, October 19, 1928: 1337–8, October 26, 1928: 1383, in Daniels, Documentary History of Communism [1993], I: 164–6.

335. Daniels, Documentary History of Communism [1993], I: 166–9. See also Cohen, Bukharin, 295–6.

336. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, III: 12.

337. Vaganov, Pravyi uklon v VKP (b), 161–3, 174–5.

338. Pribytkov, Apparat, 108.

339. Danilov, “Vvedenie,” in Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, I: 59. See also Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/i: 237.

340. Izvestiia, February 7, February 19, and February 22, 1929.

341. Bukharin, Problemy teorii i praktiki sotsializma, 306–7 (April 18, 1929).

342. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 58–9 (RGASPI, f. 669, op. 1, d. 30, l. 133–42).

343. Danilov, Kak lomali NEP, III: 16 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 417, l. 125).

CODA: IF STALIN HAD DIED

1. Viola, Peasant Rebels, 238; Danilov, Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, II: 787–808 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 679, l. 36–72: March 15, 1931).

2. Nove, The Soviet Economy, 186. Courtois, Black Book of Communism, 167–8.

3. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, 67.

4. Alec Nove, “Was Stalin Really Necessary?” 86–92, reprinted in Nove, Was Stalin Really Necessary?, 17–39, and review of Nove’s book by Gregory Grossman, Europe-Asia Studies, 17/2 (1965): 256–60; von Laue, Why Lenin?; Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. See also Kotkin, “Left Behind.”

5. Nove, “The Peasants, Collectivization, and Mr. Carr”; Lih, “Bukharin’s ‘Illusion.’”

6. Davis, Economic Transformation, 11–13.

7. Cohen, “The 1927 Revaluation of the Lira.”

8. Sloin and Sanchez-Sibony, “Economy and Power in the Soviet Union.” This is based upon a reading of Dohan, “Soviet Foreign Trade in the NEP Economy”; Dohan, “The Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky.”

9. Analyses of Soviet debates are cogent, except on the issue of ideological narrowness: Ehrlich, The Soviet Industrialization Debate; Lewin, Political Undercurrents.

10. Ustrialov, Pod zankom revoliutsii; Bukharin, Tsezarizm pod maskoi revoliutsii.

11. Sakharov, Politcheskoe zaveshchanie, 645.

12. Bukharin, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 146–230 (at 196–7). See also Siegelbaum, Soviet State and Society, 228.

13. Bukharin, “O novoi ekonomichheskoi politike,” 3–15.

14. Manning, “The Rise and Fall of ‘the Extraordinary Measures,’” 15 (citing GARF, f. 374, op. 217, d. 1556, l. 22–8).

15. Brovkin, Russia After Lenin, 168. On Bukharin’s downplaying of the kulaks, see Cohen, Bukharin, 187–92.

16. Davies, Socialist Offensive, 27.

17. Liberman, Building Lenin’s Russia, 65–8.

18. Carr and Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, I/ii: 733–5. R. W. Davies, who wrote the best analysis of the New Economic Policy and its dilemmas, maintained that the NEP was doomed by the Soviet industrialization program. That may or may not be true. But what drove the industrialization program, and indeed everything pushed by Bolshevism, was the commitment to socialism (anti-capitalism). It was ideology. Davies, Socialist Offensive, 36–7. See also Carr, Socialism in One Country, I: 520.

19. Johnson and Temin, “The Macroeconomics of NEP”; Chaudhry, “The Myths of the Market.”

20. Sokol’nikov, Finansovaia politika revoliutsii, II: 479–90.

21. Pravda, May 8, 1927. Others found the Soviet delegation disappointing: Runciman, “The World Economic Conference at Geneva.”

22. Pravda, August 3, 1927.

23. In 1926, partially to discredit Sokolnikov, Stalin railroaded through a conviction and execution of a finance commissariat official for allegedly disorganizing the foreign exchange markets; in fact, publicity about the arrest and execution essentially froze foreign exchange markets, which, however, Rykov applauded. “The black market in foreign exchange is Sokolnikov’s creature, he gave birth to it, nourished it, cared for it the whole time,” Rykov told the July 1926 party plenum. “And we annihilated this creature of Sokolnikov. . . . And we do not have to spend more money” (supporting the exchange rate of the convertible chervonets). Mozokhin, VChK-OGPU, 208–10 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 57, d. 91, 1. 58; TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 5, pro. 581, 1. 121–2); RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 246, 1.53.

24. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin, 329.

25. Khrushchev Remembers, 222.

26. Pravda, August 10, 1928.

27. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, vol. II. There is cause for doubt about whether the USSR could have managed without massive Western technical assistance, a circumstance not peculiar to the USSR, except for the politics involved. Keller, Ost minus West = Null.

28. Sanchez-Sibony, “Depression Stalinism.”

29. Soon, the OGPU would create prison research institutes (sharashki) for “bourgeois” specialists. Viktorov, Bez grifa “sekretno,” 108, 146–7.

30. Avtorkhanov, Tekhnologiia vlasti, 26.

31. Moshe Lewin posed the question of what would have happened had Stalin died, but did not answer it fully: Journal of Modern History, 47/2 (1975): 364–72 (review of Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary).

32. Lenin wrote to his secretary Fotiyeva (December 28, 1921), “I ought to meet with Stalin and before that connect me by telephone with [Doctor V. A.] Obukh to talk about Stalin.” PSS, LIV: 99; Golikov, Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, IX: 565, 572. On Stalin’s appendix, see one of the first extant documents on his health: RGASPI, f. 558, op. 4, d. 675, l. 1–23 (March 25, 1921).

33. Nikolai Nad, “Kto ubil Mikhaila Frunze,” Izvestiia, October 26, 2010.

34. Golikov, Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, VI: 390, IX: 348, 618, X: 348, 566, 588, 639, XI: 47, 113, 128; Meijer, Trotsky Papers, II: 26–9, 66–7; McNeal, Stalin, 50.

35. Golikov, Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, IX: 565, 572.

36. RGASPI, f. 558, d. 1279, d. 1482.

37. Plekhanov and Plekhanov, F. E. Dzerzhinskii, 583 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 3, d. 4, l. 2: February 8, 1925).

38. Bosworth, Mussolini’s Italy, 240.

39. Tumshis and Papchinskii, 1937, bol’shaia chistka, 52. Mikhail Frinovsky (b. 1898), then the head of the OGPU Special Department for the Moscow military district, caught the terrorists some fifteen miles out on the Serpukhov Highway. The captured perpetrators were Georgy Radkovich and Dmitri Monomakhov. In November 1928, Frinovsky would be promoted by Yagoda to head of the Kremlin garrison.

40. Loginov, Teni vozhdin.

41. Fel’shtinskii, Razgovory s Bukharinym, 43. See also Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 442.

42. “Samoubiistvo ne opravdanie,” 93. Tomsky would never mention the incident again (except in his suicide note to Stalin of August 22, 1936), but Tomsky’s aides (A. Slepkov, D. Maretsky, and L. Ginzburg) retold the story of Tomsky’s threat in the fall of 1929.

43. “Few great men,” Carr also wrote, “have been so conspicuously as Stalin the product of the time and place in which they lived.” Carr, Socialism in One Country, I: 151, 192.