Russia under the Old regime

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opinion, nationalist-conservative and liberal-radical alike, turned hostile to serfdom. Indeed, serfdom had no genuine arguments in its favour: the best case that could be made for it held that after centuries of bondage the muzhik was as yet unprepared for the responsibilities of freedom and therefore that it would be best if it were given to him later rather than sooner. If, these growing abolitionist sentiments notwithstanding, serfdom was not done away with until 1861 the principal reason must be sought in the monarchy's fear of antagonizing the 100,000 serf-owning dvoriane on whom it relied to staff" the chief offices, command the armed forces and maintain order in the countryside. Within the narrow limits open to it, however, the government did what it would to reduce the number of serfs and to improve their condition. Alexander forswore to hand out any more state or crown peasants to private persons. He also introduced procedures by which Russian landlords could carry out private emancipations, and authorized the liberation (without land) of the serfs belonging to the German barons in Livonia. The cumulative effect of these measures was gradually to reduce the proportion of serfs in the empire's population from 45-50 per cent at the close of the eighteenth century, to 37-7 per cent in 1858. Serfdom was clearly on the wane.

The decision to proceed with emancipation, come what may, was taken very soon after the accession of Alexander 11. It was carried out in the teeth of strong resistance of the landowning class and in disregard of formidable administrative obstacles. Scholars had once believed that the step was taken largely on economic grounds, namely as a result of a crisis in the serf economy. This belief, however, does not appear well grounded. There is no evidence that economic considerations were uppermost in the government's mind when it took the decision to proceed with emancipation. But even had they been, it is questionable whether improvements in rural productivity required the liberation of serfs and the replacement of bonded with hired labour. The decades immediately preceding emancipation were a period of the most efficient utilization of serf labour because landlords, freed from compulsory state service, devoted more attention to rationalizing their rural economies to serve the expanding Russian and foreign markets. In his pioneering historical studies, Peter Struve has shown that serfdom attained the very peak of economic efficiency on the eve of its abolition."

It is much more plausible that the decisive factors behind the government's decision were political. Until Russia's humiliating defeat in the Crimean war it had been widely believed, even by persons unfriendly to the absolute monarchy, that at the very least it assured the empire of internal stability and external power. Internal stability remained as yet unchallenged, although the probability of another Pugachev uprising occurring if serfdom survived did not escape the new emperor. But the