THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY
VOLUME X
THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY
SECOND EDITION
VOLUME X
The Augustan Empire, 43 B.C.—a.d. 69
edited by ALAN K. BOWMAN
Student of Christ Church, Oxford
EDWARD CHAMPLIN
Professor of Classics, Princeton University
ANDREW LINTOTT
Fellow and Tutor in Ancient History, Worcester College, Oxford
Cambridge
UNIVERSITY PRESS
published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
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© Cambridge University Press 1996
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CONTENTS
'List of maps page xiv
List of text-figures xv
List of tables xv
List of stemmata xv
Preface xix
PART I NARRATIVE
The triumviral period i by Christopher pelling, Fellow andPraelector in
Classics, University College, Oxford
I The triumvirate i
II Philippi, 42 b.c. 5
The East, 42—40 в.с. 9
Perusia, 41-40 в.с. 14 V Brundisium and Misenum, 40-39 b.c. 17
VI The East, 39-37 в.с. zi
VII Tarentum, 37 в.с. 24
VIII The year 36 в.с. 27
IX 35—33 в.с. 36
X Preparation: 3 2 B.C. 48
XI Actium, 31 в.с. 54
XII Alexandria, 30 в.с. 59
XIII Retrospect 65
Endnote: Constitutional questions 67
Political history, 30 в.с. to a.d. 14 70 by j. a. crook, Fellow of St John's College, and Emeritus Professor of Ancient History in the University of Cambridge
I Introduction 70
II 30-17 в.с. 73
III 16 b.c.—a.d. 14 94Augustus: power, authority, achievement 113 by j.a. crook
I Power 113
II Authority 117
III Achievement 123
The expansion of the empire under Augustus 147 by erich s. gruen, Professor of History and Classics,
University of California, Berkeley
Egypt, Ethiopia and Arabia 148 II Asia Minor 151
Judaea and Syria 154
Armenia and Parthia 15 8
Spain 163 VI Africa 166
VII The Alps 169
VIII The Balkans 171
IX Germany 178
X Imperial ideology 188
XI Conclusion 194
Tiberius to Nero 198 by т. e.j. Wiedemann, Reader in the History of the Roman Empire, University of Bristol
I The accession of Tiberius and the nature of politics
under the Julio-Claudians 198
II The reign of Tiberius 209
Gaius Caligula 221
Claudius 229
Nero 241
From Nero to Vespasian 2 5 6 by t.e.j. wiedemann
I A.D. 68 256
II A.d. 69—70 265
PART II THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE
The imperial court 283 by andrew wallace-hadrill, Professor of Classics at
the University of Reading
I Introduction 283
Access and ritual: court society 285
Patronage, power and government 296
Conclusion 306
The Imperial finances 309 by d. w. rath bone, Reader in Ancient History, King's
College London
The Senate and senatorial and equestrian posts 3 24 by Richard j.a. talbert, William Rand Kenan, Jr,
Professor of History, and Adjunct Professor of Classics, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
I The Senate 324
II Senatorial and equestrian posts 357
Provincial administration and taxation 344
by ALAN K. BOWMAN
I Rome, the emperor and the provinces 344
II Structure 351
Function 357
Conclusion 367
The army and the navy ■ 371 by lawrence keppie, Reader in Roman Archaeology, Hunterian Museum, University of Glasgow
I The army of the late Republic 371
II The army in the civil wars, 49-30 b.c. 373
The army and navy of Augustus 3 76
Army and navy under the Julio-Claudians 387 V The Roman army in a.d. 70 393
The administration of justice 397 by h. galsterer, Professor of Ancient History at the
Rheinische Friedrich- Wtlhelms- Universitdt, Bonn
PART III ITALY AND THE PROVINCES
The West 414
13a Italy and Rome from Sulla to Augustus 414
by m. h. Crawford, Professor of Ancient History, University College London
I Extent of Romanization 414
II Survival of local cultures 424
13 b Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica 434
by r.j. a. Wilson, Professor of Archaeology, University of Nottinghamijf Spain 449
by g. alfoldy, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Heidelberg
I Conquest, provincial administration and military
organization 449
II Urbanization 455
Economy and society 458
The impact of Romanization 461
13 d Gaul 464 by c. goudineau, Profosseur du College de France (chaire d' Antiquites nationales)
I Introduction 464
II Gallia Narbonensis 471
III Tres Galliae 487
13* Britain 43 в.с. to a.d. 69 503 by john wacher, Emeritus Professor of Archaeology, University of Leicester
I Pre-conquest period 503
II The invasion and its aftermath 5 06
Organization of the province 510
Urbanization and communications 511 V Rural settlement 513
VI Trade and industry 514
VII Religion 515
13/ Germany 517 by c. ruger, Honorary Professor, Bonn University
I Introduction 517
II Roman Germany, 16 b.c.-a.d. 17 524
III The period of the establishment of the military zone
(a.d. 14-90) 528
13g Raetia 535
by h. wolff, Professor of Ancient History, University of Passau
I 'Raetia' before Claudius 537
The Claudian province 541
13h The Danubian and Balkan provinces 545
by j.j. wilkes, Yates Professor of Greek and Roman Archaeology, University College London
I The advance to the Danube and beyond, 43 b.c.-a.d. 6 545
II Rebellion in Illyricum and the annexation of Thrace (a.d.
6-69) 5 5 3
The Danube peoples 5 5 8
IV Provinces and armies 565
Roman colonization and the organization of the native
peoples 573
13i Roman Africa: Augustus to Vespasian 586 by c.r. whittaker, Fellow of Churchill College, and formerly Lecturer in Classics in the University of Cambridge
I Before Augustus 586
II Africa and the civil wars, 44—51 b.c. 590
Augustan expansion 591
Tiberius and Tacfarinas 593
Gaius to Nero 5 96
VI The administration and organization of the province 600
VII Cities and colonies 603
VIII Romanization and resistance 610
IX The economy 615
X Roman imperialism 616
13/ Cyrene 619 by joyce Reynolds, Fellow of Newnham College, and Emeritus Reader in Roman Historical Epigraphy in the University of Cambridge and j. a. lloyd, Lecturer in Archaeology in the University of Oxford, and Fellow of Wolf son College
I Introduction 619
II The country 622
The population, its distribution, organization and
internal relationships 625
From the death of Caesar to the close of the Marmaric
War (c. a.d. 6/7) 630
a.d. 4-7O 636
14 The East 641
14л Greece (including Crete and Cyprus) and Asia Minor
from 43 b.c. to a.d. 69 641 by в. m. levic к, Fellow and Tutor in Ancient History, St Hilda's College, Oxford
I Geography and development 641
II The triumviral period 645
The Augustan restoration 647
Consolidation under the Julio-Claudians 663
Conclusion: first fruits 672
14b Egypt 676
by alan k. bowman
I The Roman conquest 676
II Bureaucracy and administration 679
Economy and society 693
Alexandria 699 V Conclusion 702
14c Syria 703
by DAVID Kennedy, Senior Lecturer, Department of Classics and Ancient History, University of Western Australia
I Introduction 703
Establishment and development of the province 708
Client states 728
Conclusion 736
iJudaea 737 by martin Goodman, Reader in Jewish Studies, University of Oxford, and Yellow of Wolf son College
I The Herods 737
II Roman administration 750
Jewish religion and society 761
Conclusion 780
PART IV ROMAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE UNDER THE JULIO-CLAUDIANS
Rome and its development under Augustus and his successors 782 by Nicholas purcell, Fellow and Tutor in Ancient
History, St John's College, Oxford
The place of religion: Rome in the early Empire 812
by s. r. f. price, Fellow and Tutor in Ancient History, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford
I Myths and place 814
II The re-placing of Roman religion 820
Imperial rituals 837
Rome and Her empire 841
The origins and spread of Christianity 848 by g.w. clarke, Director, Humanities Research Centre, and Professor of Classical Studies, Australian National University
I Origins and spread 848
II Christians and the law 866
III Conclusion 871
Social status and social legislation 873 by susan treggiari, Professor of Classics and Bass
Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University
I Legal distinctions 873
II Social distinctions 875
Social problems at the beginning of the Principate 883
The social legislation of Augustus and the Julio-
Claudians 886
The impact of the Principate on society 897
Literature and society 905 by Gavin townend, Emeritus Professor of Eat in in the University of Durham
Definition of the period 905
Patronage and its obligations 907
Rhetoric and escapism 916
The justification of literature 921
The accessibility of literature 926
Roman art, 43 в.с. to a.d. 69 930 by Mario torelli, Professor of Archaeology and the
History of Greek and Roman Art, University of Perugia
I The general characteristics of Augustan Classicism 930
The creation of the Augustan model 934
From Tiberius to Nero: the crisis of the model 952
Early classical private law 959 by bruce w. frier, Professor of Classics and Roman Earn, University of Michigan
I The jurists and the Principate 959
II Augustus' procedural reforms 961
Labeo 964
Proculians and Sabinians 969
Legal writing and education 973 VI Imperial intervention 974
VII The Flavian jurists 97^
Appendices to chapter 13a by м.н. crawford
I Consular dating formulae in republican Italy 979
II Survival of Greek language and institutions 981
Inscriptions in languages other than Latin after the
Social War 983
Italian calendars 985
Votive deposits 987 VI Epichoric funerary practices 987
VII Diffusion of alien grave stelae 989
Stemmata 990
Chronological table 995
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbreviations page 1006
A General studies 1015
В Sources 1019
Works on ancient authors 1 о 19
Epigraphy 1027
Numismatics 1031
Papyrology 1034
С Political history 1035
The triumviral period and the reign of Augustus 103 5
The expansion of the empire, 43.b.c.-a.d. 69 1044
The Julio-Claudians and the year a.d. 69 1047
D Government and administration 1050
The imperial court 1050
The Senate and the equities 105 1
Provincial administration 1053
The imperial wealth io54
The army and the navy 1056
The administration of justice 1059
E Italy and the provinces 1061
Italy 1061
Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica 1066
Spain 1068
Gaul 1070
Britain 1082
Germany 1083
Raetia 1084
The Balkans 1086
Africa 1089
Cyrene 1091
Greece and Asia Minor io93
Egypt 1097
Syria 1100
Judaea 1104
F Society, religion and culture 1111
Society and its institutions 1111
Religion 1114
Art and architecture 1120
Law 113 5
Index 113 8
NOTE ON THE BIBLIOGRAPHY The bibliography is arranged in sections dealing with specific topics, which sometimes correspond to individual chapters but more often combine the contents of several chapters. References in the footnotes are to these sections (which are distinguished by capital letters) and within these sections each book or article has assigned to it a number which is quoted in the footnotes. In these, so as to provide a quick indication of the nature of the work referred to, the author's name and the date of publication are also included in each reference. Thus 'Syme 1986 (a 95) 50' signifies 'R. Syme, The Augustan Revolution, Oxford, 1986, p. 50', to be found in Section a of the bibliography as item 95.MAPS
The Roman world in the time of Augustus and the Julio-Claudian Emperors page xvi
Italy and the eastern Mediterranean 2
Italy 416
Sicily 436
Sardinia and Corsica 444
Spain 450
Gaul 466
Britain as far north as the Humber 5 04
Germany 518 ro Raetia 536
Military bases, cities and settlements in the Danubian provinces 5 46
Geography and native peoples of the Danubian provinces 5 60
Africa 588
Cyrene 620
Greece and the Aegean 642
Asia Minor 660
Egypt 678
Physical geography of the Near East 704
Syria and Arabia 710
Judaea 738
The eastern Mediterranean in the first century a.d. illustrating the origins and spread of Christianity 850
TEXT-FIGURES
Actium: fleet positions at the beginning of the battle page 60
Distribution of legions, 44 в.с. 374
Rodgen, Germany: ground-plan of Augustan supply base 380
Distribution of legions, a.d. 14 386
Vetera (Xanten), Germany: ground-plan of a double
legionary fortress, Neronian date 390
Valkenburg, Holland: fort-plan, c. a.d. 40 392
Distribution of legions, a.d. 23 394
The geography of Gaul according to Strabo 467
Autun: town-plan 494 10 Sketch map of Rome 786
TABLES
New senatorial posts within Rome and Italy page 338
Provinces and governors at the end of the Julio-Claudian period 369
The legions of the early Empire 388
STEMMATA
I Descendants of Augustus and Livia page 990
II Desendants of Augustus' sister Octavia and Mark Antony 991
The family of Marcus Licinius Crassus Frugi 992
Eastern clients of Antonia, Caligula and Claudius 993 V Principal members of the Herodian family 994
Map i. The Roman world in the time of Augustus and the Julio-Claudian emperors,
PREFACE
The period covered in this volume begins a year and a half after the death of Iulius Caesar and closes at the end of a.d. 69, more than a year after the death of Nero, the last of the Julio-Claudian emperors. His successors, Galba, Otho and Vitellius had ruled briefly and disappeared from the scene, leaving Vespasian as the sole claimant to the throne of empire. This was a period which witnessed the most profound transformation in the political configuration of the res publico. In the decade after Caesar's death constitutional power was held by Caesar's heir Octavian, Antony and Lepidus as tresviri ret publicae constituendae. Our narrative takes as its starting-point 27 November 43 b.c., the day on which the Lex Titia legalized the triumviral arrangement, a few days before the death of Cicero, which was taken as a terminal point by the editors of the new edition of Volume ix. By 27 в.с, five years after the expiry of the triumviral powers, Octavian had emerged as princeps and Augustus, and in the course of the next forty years he gradually fashioned what was, in all essentials, a monarchical and dynastic rule which, although passed from one dynasty to another, was to undergo no radical change until the end of the third century of our era.
If Augustus was the guiding genius behind the political transformation of the res publico, his influence was hardly less important in the extension of Roman dominion in the Mediterranean lands, the Near East and north-west Europe. At no time did Rome acquire more provincial territory or more influence abroad than in the reign of the first princeps. Accretion under his successors was steady but much slower. Conquest apart, the period as a whole is one in which the prosperity resulting from the pax romana, whose foundations were laid under the Republic, can be properly documented throughout the empire.
It is probably true that there is no period in Roman history on which the views of modern scholars have been more radically transformed in the last six decades. It is therefore appropriate to indicate briefly in what respects this volume differs most significantly, in approach and coverage, from its predecessor and to justify the scheme which has been adopted, particularly in view of the fact that the new editions of the three
xix
volumes covering the period between the death of Caesar and the death of Constantine have to some extent been planned as a unity.
As far as the general scheme is concerned, we have considered it essential to have as a foundation a political narrative history of the period, especially to emphasize what was contingent and unpredictable (chs. i—6). The following chapters are more analytical and take a longer view of government and institutions (chs. 7—12), regions (chs. 13-14), social and cultural developments (chs. 15—21), although we have tried on the whole to avoid the use of an excessively broad brush. Interesting and invaluable though it was in its day, we have not been able to contemplate, for example, a counterpart to F. Oertel's chapter (1st edn ch. 13) on the 'Economic unification of the Mediterranean region'. We are conscious, however, that in the absence of such chapters something of value has been lost and we urge readers not to regard the first edition as a volume of merely antiquarian interest; the chapters of Syme on the northern frontiers (12) and Nock on religious developments (14), to name but two, still have much to offer to the historian.
The profound influence of Sir Ronald Syme's The Roman Revolution, published five years after the first edition of САН Volume x, is very evident in the following pages, as is that of his other, prosopographical and social studies which have done so much to re-write the history of the Roman aristocracy in the first century of the Empire. No one will now doubt that the historian of the Roman state in this period has to take as much account of the importance of family connexions, of patronage, of status and property relations as of constitutional or institutional history; and to see how these relations worked through the institutions of the res publico, the ordines, the army, the governmental offices and provincial society.
The influence of another twentieth-century classic, M. I. Rostovt- zeff's Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, first published in 1926, was perhaps less evident in the pages of the first edition of САН Volume x than might have been expected. That balance, it is hoped, has been redressed. Rostovtzeff's great achievement was to synthesize, as no-one had done before, the evidence of written documents, buildings, coins, sculpture, painting, artefacts and archaeology into a social and economic history of the empire under Roman rule which did not adopt a narrowly Romanocentric perspective. The sheer amount of new evidence accruing for the different regions of the empire in the last sixty years is immense. It is impossible for a single scholar to command expertise and knowledge of detail over the empire as a whole, and regional specialization is a marked feature of modern scholarship. The present volume recognizes this by incorporating chapters on each of the regions or provinces, as well as Italy, a scheme which will also be adopted in the new edition of Volume xi. As far as these surveys of the parts of the empire are concerned, the guiding principle has been that the chapters in the present volume should attempt to describe the developments which were the preconditions for the achievements, largely beneficial, of the 'High Empire', while the corresponding chapters in Volume xi will describe more statically, mutatis mutandis, the state of the different regions of the Roman world during that period.
Something must be said about the apparent omissions and idiosyncrasies. We have not thought it necessary to write an account of the sources for the period. The major literary sources (Tacitus, Suetonius, Cassius Dio, Josephus) have been very well served by recent scholarship and this period is not, from the point of view of the literary evidence, as problematical as those which follow. The range of documentary, archaeological and numismatic evidence for different topics and regions has been thought best left to individual contributors to summarize as they considered appropriate.
The presence in this volume of a chapter on the unification of Italy might be thought an oddity. Its inclusion here was a decision taken in consultation with the editors of the new edition of Volume ix, on the ground that the Augustan period is a good standpoint from which to consider a process which cannot really be considered complete before that, and perhaps not fully complete even by the Augustan age. Two of the chapters (those on Egypt and on the development of Roman law) will have counterparts in Volume xii (a.d. 193-337), but not in Volume xi; in both cases the accounts given here are intended to be generally valid for the first two centuries a.d. The treatment of Judaea and of the origins of Christianity posed difficulties of organization and articulation, given the extensive overlap of subject-matter. We nevertheless decided to invite different scholars to write these sections and to juxtapose them. It still seems surprising that the first edition of this volume contains no account of the origins and early growth of Christianity, a phenomenon which is, from the point of view of the subsequent development of civilization, surely the most important single feature of our period. Some degree of overlap with other standard works of reference is inevitable. We have, however, deliberately tried to avoid this in the case of literature by including a chapter which is intended as a history of literary activity in its social context, rather than a history of the literature of the period as such, which can be found in The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, Vols, i and 11.
Each contributor was asked, as far as possible, to provide an account of his or her subject which summarizes the present state of knowledge and (in so far as it exists) orthodoxy, indicating points at which a different view is adopted. It would have been impossible and undesirable to demand uniformity of perspective and the individual chapters, as is proper, reflect a rich variety of approach and viewpoint, Likewise, we have not insisted on uniformity of practice in the use of footnotes, although contributors were asked to avoid long and discursive notes as far as possible. We can only repeat the statement of the editors in their preface to Vol. viii, that the variations reflect the different requirements of the contributors and their subject-material. It will be noted that the bibliographies are much more extensive and complex than in earlier volumes of The Cambridge Ancient History; again a reflection of the greater volume of important work which has been produced on this period in recent years. Most authors have included in the bibliographies, which are keyed by coded references, all, or most, of the secondary works cited in their chapters; others have included in the footnotes some reference to books, articles and, particularly, publications of primary sources which were not considered of sufficient general relevance to be included in the bibliographies. We have let these stand.
Most of the chapters in this volume were written between 1983 and 1988 and we are conscious of the fact that the delay between composition and publication has been much longer than we would have wished. The editors themselves must bear a share of the responsibility for this. The checking of notes and bibliographies, the process of getting typescripts ready for the press has too often been perforce relegated because of the pressure of other commitments. Contributors have, nonetheless, been given the opportunity to update their bibliographies and we hope that they still have confidence in what they wrote.
There are various debts which it is a pleasure to acknowledge. Professor John Crook was involved in the planning of this volume and we are much indebted to his erudition, sagacity and common sense. We very much regret that he did not feel able to maintain his involvement in the editorial process and we are the poorer for it. For the speedy and efficient translation of chapters 14c, 14d and 20 we are indebted, respectively, to Dr G. D. Woolf, Dr J.-P. Wild (who also provided valuable bibliographical guidance) and Edward Champlin. Mr Michael Sharp, of Corpus Christi College, Oxford and Mr Nigel Hope rendered meticulous and much-appreciated assistance with the bibliographies. David Cox drew the maps; the index was compiled by Barbara Hird.
To Pauline Hire and to others at Cambridge University Press involved in the supervision and production of this volume, we offer thanks for patience, good humour and ready assistance.
A.K.B E.J.С A.W.L
CHAPTER 1 THE TRIUMVIRAL PERIOD
CHRISTOPHER PELLING
i. the triumvirate
On 27 November 43, the Lex Titia initiated the period of absolute rule at Rome. Antony, Lepidus and Octavian were charged with 'restoring the state', triumviri rei publicae constituendae\ but they were empowered to make or annul laws without consulting Senate or people, to exercise jurisdiction without any right of appeal, and to nominate magistrates of their choice; and they carved the world into three portions, Cisalpine and Further Gaul for Antony, Narbonensis and Spain for Lepidus, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica for Octavian. In effect, the three were rulers. Soon there would be two, then one; the Republic was already dead.
Not that, at the time, the permanence of the change could be clear. As Tacitus brings out in the first sentence of the Annals, the roots of absolute power were firmly grounded in the Republic itself: there had been phases of despotism before - Sulla and Caesar, and in some ways Pompey too — and they had passed; the cause of Brutus and Cassius in the East was not at all hopeless. But what was clear was that history and politics had changed, and were changing still. The triumviral period was to be one of the great men feeling their way, unclear how far (for instance) a legion's loyalty could simply be bought, whether the propertied classes or the discontented poor of Rome and Italy could be harnessed as a genuine source of strength, how influential the old families and their patronage remained. At the beginning, there was a case for a quinquevirate, for Plancus and Pollio had played no less crucial a role than Lepidus in the manoeuvrings of mid-43. But Lepidus was included, Plancus and Pollio were not; and Lepidus owed that less to his army than to his clan and connexions. In 43 those seemed to matter; a few years later they were irrelevant, and so was he. Money too was a new, incalculable factor. In 44-43 the promises made to the troops reached new heights; and there was certainly money around — money of Caesar himself; money from the dead dictator's friends, men like Balbus and Matius; money that would be minted in plenty throughout the Roman world — no wonder that so many hoards from the period have been found, some of them vast.1 But would that money ever find its way to the
1 Crawford 1969(8 318) 117-31, 198) (в 320) 252.
i
Map г. Italy and the eastern Mediterranean,
legionaries? They did not know; no one knew. The role of propaganda was also changing. Cicero had been one master of the craft — we should not, for instance, assume that the Philippics were simply aimed at a senatorial audience; they would have force when read in the camps and market-places of Italy. But what constituency was worth making the propagandist's target? The armies, certainly: they were a priority in 4443. But what of the Italians in the municipalities? Could they be won, and would they be decisive? Increasingly, the propaganda in the thirties turned in their direction, and they were duly won for Octavian. But was he wise to make them his priority — did they matter much in the final war? One may doubt it, though they certainly mattered in the ensuing peace. But it was that sort of time. No one knew what sources of strength could be found, or how they would count. The one thing that stood out was that the rules were new.
The difference is even harder for us to gauge than for contemporaries, simply because of our source-material. No longer do we have Cicero's speeches, dialogues and correspondence to illuminate events; instead we have only the sparsest of contemporary literary and epigraphic material, and have to rely on much later narratives - Appian, who took the story down to the death of Sextus Pompeius in his extant Civil Wars (he told of Actium and Alexandria in his lost Egyptian History)-, Cassius Dio, who gave a relatively full account of the triumviral period in Books xlvii-l; and Plutarch's fine Lives of Brutus and Antony. Suetonius too had some useful material in his Augustur, so does Josephus. The source-material used by these authors is seldom clear, though Asinius Pollio evidently influenced the tradition considerably, and so did Livy and the colourful Q. Dellius; but all the later authors may well have used other, more recherche material. Still, all are often demonstrably inaccurate, and there is indeed a heavy element of fiction throughout the tradition. Octavian's contemporary propaganda, doubtless repeated and reinforced in his Autobiography when it appeared during the twenties, spread stories of the excesses and outrages of Antony and Cleopatra; then the later authors, especially Plutarch, elaborated with romance, evincing sometimes more sympathy for the lovers, but scarcely more accuracy. And all these authors naturally concentrated on the principals themselves - Brutus, Cassius, Octavian, Sextus, Antony and Cleopatra. We are given very little idea of what everyday political life in Rome was like, how far the presence of these great men smothered routine activity and debate in the Senate, the courts, the assemblies and the streets. The triumvirs controlled appointments to the consulship and to many of the lower offices, but some elections took place as well; we just do not know how many, or how fiercely and genuinely they were contested.2 The plebs and
2 Cf. Frei-Stolba 1967 (c 92) 80-6; Millar 1973 (c 175) 51-3.
the Italian cities did not always take the triumvirs' decisions supinely; but we do not know how often or how effectively the triumvirs were opposed in the Senate, or how much freedom of speech and action senators asserted in particular areas. We hear little or nothing of the equiter. we cannot be sure that they were so passive or uninfluential. We no longer hear of showpiece political trials; it does not follow that they never happened. Everything in the sources is painted so starkly, in terms of the actions and ambitions of the great persons themselves. We have moved from colour into black and white.
ii. philippi, 42 b.c.
At Rome the year 42 began momentously. Iulius Caesar was consecrated as a god.[1] Roman generals were used to divine acclamations in the East, and divine honours had been paid in plenty to Caesar during his lifetime: but a formal decree of this kind was still different. Octavian might now style himself divifilius if he chose;4 and the implications for his prestige were, like so much else, incalculable. But a more immediate concern was the campaign against Brutus and Cassius in the East, a war of vengeance which the consecration invested with a new solemnity. Antony and Octavian were to share the command. The triumvirs now controlled forty-three legions: probably forty were detailed to serve in the East, though only twenty-one or twenty-two actually took part in the campaign and only nineteen fought at Philippi.[2] Lepidus would remain in control of Italy, but here too Antony's influence would be strong: for two of his partisans were also to stay, Calenus in Italy and Pollio in the Cisalpina, both with strong armies.
A preliminary force of eight triumviral legions, under C. Norbanus and L. Decidius Saxa, crossed the Adriatic early in the year: but the Liberators' fleets soon began to operate in the Adriatic, eventually some i jo ships under L. Staius Murcus and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and it would evidently be difficult to transport the main army. A further uncertainty was furnished by the growing naval power of Sextus Pompeius. His role in the politics of 44-43 had been slight, but he had appeared on the proscription list, and now it must have seemed inevitable that he would be forced into the Liberators' camp. By early 42 he had established himself in control of Sicily, his fleet was growing formidable, and he was already serving as a refuge for the disaffected, fearful and destitute of all classes. Many of the proscribed now swelled his strength. But Octavian sent Salvidienus Rufus to attack Sextus' fleet, and a great but indecisive battle ensued outside the Straits of Messana. After this Sextus' contribution was slight, and the Liberators gained very little benefit from potentially so valuable an ally. By summer, the main triumviral army managed to force its crossing.
In Macedonia the news of the proscriptions and Cicero's death had sealed C. Antonius' fate: he was at last executed, probably on Brutus' orders.[3] Brutus himself had been active in Greece, Macedonia, Thrace and even Asia through the second half of 43, raising and training troops and securing allies and funds. He finally began his march to meet Cassius perhaps in the late summer, more likely not until early 4г.[4] Cassius himself was delayed far away in the East till late in 43: even after Dolabella's defeat in July, there was still trouble to clear up — in Tarsus, for instance, where he imposed a fine of 1,5 00 talents, and in Cappadocia, where unrest persisted until Cassius' agents murdered the king Ariobar- zanes and seized his treasure in summer 42. The troubles were doubtless exacerbated by the harshness of Cassius' exactions, but the wealth of the East was potentially the Liberators' greatest asset (extended though they were to support their army, the triumvirs' position was even worse), and Cassius naturally wanted to exploit it to the full. It was perhaps not until winter, when the triumvirs had united and there were already fears that the first of their troops were crossing to Greece, that Cassius began the long westward march.[5] He and Brutus met in Smyrna in the spring of 42. Between them they controlled probably twenty-one legions, of which nineteen fought in the decisive campaign.[6]
The story went that they differed over strategy, Brutus wishing to return quickly to Macedonia, Cassius insisting that they first needed to secure their rear by moving against Rhodes and the cities of Lycia.[7]Cassius had his reasons, of course. Lycia and Rhodes were temptingly wealthy, and there were even some strategic arguments for delay: with the Liberators dominating the sea, the triumviral armies might be destroyed by simple lack of supplies. But still he was surely wrong. Philippi is a very long way east, and the battles there were fought very late in the year. The friendly states in Macedonia and northern Greece, who had welcomed Brutus with some spontaneity the previous year and whose accession Cicero had so warmly acclaimed in the Tenth Philippic, were by then lost, and their wealth and crops were giving vital support to the triumvirs, not the Liberators. Rhodes and Lycia had strong navies, but Cassius and Brutus had very litde to fear from them: the Liberators would dominate the sea in any case. It would surely have been better to move west quickly, provide better bases for their fleet in the Adriatic, and seek to isolate the advanced force on the west coast of Greece — to play the 48 campaign over again, in fact; and those eight unsupported legions of Norbanus and Saxa would have been hopelessly outmatched. The Liberators' brutal treatment of Rhodes and Lycia did nothing for their posthumous moral reputation. Perhaps it also cost them the war.
Cassius moved against Rhodes, Brutus against Lycia, and both won swift, total victories: in particular, the appalling scenes of slaughter and mass suicide in Lycian Xanthus became famous. Perhaps 8,500 talents were extorted from Rhodes; the figure of 15 о talents for Lycia is hard to believe.11 The other peoples of Asia were ordered to pay the massive sum of ten years' tribute, although the region had already been squeezed dreadfully in the preceding years. Some of the money was doubtless paid direct to the legionaries, some more was kept back for further distributions during the decisive campaign: in the event the army stayed notably loyal, though this was doubtless not only for crude material reasons. The campaigns were rapid, but it was still June or July before Brutus and Cassius met again at Sardis, and began the northward march to the Hellespont, which they crossed in August.
Norbanus and Saxa had marched across Macedonia unopposed, and took up a position east of Philippi, trying to block the narrow passes; but the much larger force of Brutus and Cassius outflanked them, and reached Philippi at the beginning of September. Norbanus and Saxa fell back upon Amphipolis, where they linked with the main army under Antony: Octavian, weakened by illness, was following some way behind. Brutus and Cassius then occupied a strong position across the Via Egnatia. Within a few days Antony came up and boldly camped only a mile distant, in a much weaker position in the plain. Octavian, still sick, joined him ten days later. Despite the strength of their position, the Liberators at first sought to avoid a battle. They controlled the sea, the triumvirs' land communications to Macedonia and Thessaly were exposed, and Antony and Octavian would find it difficult to maintain a long campaign. But Antony's deft operations and earthworks soon began to threaten the Liberators' left, and Cassius and Brutus decided to
11 Plut. Brut. 32.4.
accept battle. There was not much difference in strength between the two sides: the triumviral legions had perhaps nearly 100,000 infantry, the Liberators something over 70,000; but the Liberators were the stronger in cavalry, with 20,000 against 13,000.[8]
Cassius commanded the left, Brutus the right, facing Antony and Octavian respectively. The battle began on Cassius' wing, as Antony stormed one of his fortifications. Then Brutus' troops charged, apparently without orders; but they were highly successful, cutting to pieces three of Octavian's legions and even capturing the enemy camp. Cassius fared much worse: Antony's personal gallantry played an important part, it seems, and he in turn captured Cassius' camp. In the dust and the confusion Cassius despaired too soon, and in ignorance of Brutus' victory he killed himself. So ended this first battle of Philippi (early October 42). On the same day (or so it was said) the Liberators won a great naval victory in the Adriatic, as Murcus and Ahenobarbus destroyed two legions of triumviral reinforcements.
Then there were three weeks of inaction. The first battle had done nothing to ease the triumviral problems of supply, and Antony was forced to detach a whole legion to march to Greece for provisions. But Brutus was under pressure from his own army to fight again; he was a less respected general than Cassius, and after the first battle he feared desertions; and he also soon found his own line of supplies from the sea threatened, for Antony and Octavian occupied new positions in the south. He felt forced to accept a second battle (23 October). His own wing may again have won some success, but eventually all his lines broke. The carnage was very great; and Brutus too took his own life. With him died the republican cause. Several of the surviving nobles also killed themselves, some were executed, others obtained pardon; a few fled to Murcus, Ahenobarbus, or Sextus Pompeius. Most of the troops came over to the triumvirs.[9]
Antony had long been known as a military man, but until now his record was not especially lustrous. His wing had played little part at Pharsalus, he had been absent from most of Caesar's other battles, and the outcome at Mutina had been shameful. All that was now erased. Octavian had given little to this victory; he had indeed been absent from the first battle — hiding in the marsh, and not even his friends could deny it.14 Before the fighting the forces had appeared equally matched: it was Antony's operations that forced the battles, his valour that won the day. He took the glory and the prestige. Now and for years to come, the world saw Antony as the victor of Philippi.
iii. the east, 42-40 b.c.
Antony's strength was reflected in the new division of responsibility and power. His task would be the organization of the East; he was also to retain Further Gaul, and take Narbonensis from Lepidus; he would lose only the Cisalpina, which was to become part of Italy. Italy itself was nominally left out of the reckoning, but Octavian was to be the man on the spot, with the arduous and unpopular task of settling the veterans in the Italian cities. He was also to carry on the war against Sextus Pompeius; he would retain Sardinia; and he too was to gain at Lepidus' expense, taking from him both provinces of Spain. Lepidus himself would be allowed only Africa; and there was some doubt even about that.15 Already, clearly, he was falling behind his colleagues. Antony was also to keep the greater part of the legions. A large number of the troops in the East had served their time, and were to be demobilized; the rest, including those who had just come over from Brutus and Cassius, were to be re-formed into eleven legions. Antony was to take six of these, Octavian five; he was also to lend Antony a further two. The position concerning the western legions is more obscure, but there too Antony's marshals seem to have controlled about as many legions as Octavian.[10]Antony promised that Calenus would transfer to Octavian two legions in Italy to compensate for the two he was now borrowing: but such promises readily foundered. The legions stayed with Calenus.
In Antony's lifetime two generals had successfully invaded Italy from their provinces, Sulla from the East and Caesar from Gaul. Both Gaul and the East would now fall to Antony. The menace was clear. The case of Gaul is particularly interesting. So much of the fighting and diplomacy of the last two years had been, in one way or another, a struggle for Gaul: and the province's strategic importance was very clear.[11] With hindsight, we always associate Antony with the East; Octavian's propaganda was to make great play with his oriental degeneracy. But nothing suggests that Antony yet planned any extended stay in the East. Naturally, he eyed its riches and prestige; he might of course have to play Sulla over again; but it was just as likely that he would return peaceably, as Pompey had returned in the sixties, to new power and authority in the West. In that case, and in the likely event of the triumvirs eventually falling out, Gaul would prove vital. Its governor would be Calenus, with eleven legions: Antony could rely on him. And, even if the Cisalpina were technically part of Italy, that too would not be out of Antony's control: Pollio was to be there, and he too had veterans under his command. The trusty Ventidius would also be active in the West, perhaps in Gaul, perhaps in Italy.[12] In the event Antony's possession of Gaul came to nothing, for Octavian took it over bloodlessly on Calenus' death in 40. It was that important historical accident that would turn Antony decisively towards the East. But, for the moment, possession of Gaul kept all his important options free.
The East came first. Its regulation would be a massive task, but a rewarding one; and it also offered the possibility of a war against Parthia. King Orodes had helped Cassius and Brutus,[13] and vengeance was in order; indeed, the republican commander Labienus was still at the Parthian court. No one yet knew what to expect of that; but, whether or not Parthia attacked Roman Asia Minor again, a Roman general could always attack Parthia, avenging Crassus' defeat, tickling the Roman imagination and enhancing his own prestige. He might even appear a second Alexander, if all went well: that always had a particular appeal to Roman fancy.
Antony spent the winter of 42/1 in Greece, where he made a parade of his philhellenism.[14] In spring 41 he crossed to Asia; it seems that he visited Bithynia, and presumably Pontus too, before returning to the Aegean coast.[15] At Ephesus, effectively Asia's capital, he was greeted as a god — such acclamations were by now almost routine in the East;[16] but exuberance soon turned sour, as Antony addressed representatives of the Asian cities and announced his financial demands. Yet again, the East found it had to fund both sides in a Roman civil war: and this time vast sums were needed to satisfy the legions — perhaps 15 0,000 talents if all the promised rewards were to be paid.[17] That was well beyond even the East's resources, especially after the exactions of Dolabella, then Cassius and Brutus. Antony eventually demanded nine years' tribute from Asia, to be paid over two years;[18] and he would be fortunate if the province could manage that. Asia's normal tribute was probably less than 2,000 talents a year.[19] Even allowing for contributions from the other eastern provinces and for extra sums from client kings and free cities,26 Antony could scarcely hope for more than 20,000 talents, the amount which Sulla raised in a similar levy after the Mithridatic War. And not all of that could be spent on rewards. There were the running costs of Antony's army and staff; there was a fleet to build, for Murcus, Ahenobarbus and Sextus were still worryingly strong;27 there were preparations to be made for war with Parthia. The troops were still calling for their rewards a year later.28
Yet there was generosity, too, in Antony's dispensations. He pardoned virtually all the supporters of Brutus and Cassius, excepting only those who had participated in the tyrannicide itself; that was more merciful than many expected.29 The states that had suffered worst from the Liberators, Lycia and Rhodes, were excused from the levies; later he extended a similar clemency to Laodicea and Tarsus. Rhodes was indeed given some new territory — Andros, Tenos, Naxos and Myndus.30 From mainland Greece the Athenians soon sent an embassy, and they too were favoured: they gained control of several islands, including Aegina. Antony was clearly favouring the great cultural centres. Such ostentatious philhellenism doubtless came naturally to him, but it might also prove politically valuable, and not merely in certain circles at Rome: in the East itself it had become fashionable for monarchs to show their enthusiasm for the great cities of the past by benefactions, and they might applaud Antony when he showed similar indulgence. It was also probably now, and in line with the same cultural policy, that he granted various privileges and immunities to 'the worldwide association of victors in the festival games' - an association which, it seems, included artists and poets as well as athletes.31 Antony spent the rest of summer 41 in touring the eastern provinces, imposing further levies and beginning to reorganize the administration after the disruption of the war: Antony himself could refer to Asia's need to recover from its 'great illness'.32 The range and deftness of his dispositions were eventually to be peculiarly impressive, but as yet there was only time for a few piecemeal measures. The highest priority had to be the regions furthest to the east, for they would be vital if it came to war with Parthia. Syria was particularly sensitive. Its cities had greeted Cassius with enthusiasm, and he had supported tyrants who were (it seems) disturbingly sympathetic to Parthia:33 most of them clearly had to go. So, probably, did Marion, tyrant of Tyre.34 Herod of Judaea was similarly compromised by his
App. BCiv. v. 55.230. 28 Dio xLvni.30.2.
Dio XLvm.24.6 — perhaps guesswork, but as often intelligent.
PossiblyAmorgustoo:cf./Gxii 5.58 and xii Jo/i/i. p. 102no. 38, withSchmitt i957(e872) 186 n. 2; contra, Fraser and Bean 1954 (e 828) 163 n. 3.
EJ2 300, RDCE 57; but it is possible that these privileges were not granted till 32: see RDGE adloc. and Millar 1973 (c 175) 55, 1977 (a 59) 4)6. Cf. also the triumviral inscription from Ephesus concerning travel-privileges for 'teachers, sophists and doctors': Knibbe 1981 (c 138).
52 In his letter to the Jews, Joseph. A] xiv.j 12.
According to App. BCiv. v.10.39,42> 'bey fled to the Parthian king after their deposition: not improbable, cf. Buchheim i960 (c 49) 27.
Tyrant in 42 when he invaded Galilee (Joseph. BJ 1.238-9, AJ xiv.298); but Antony's letter in 41 (next note) is addressed only to the magistrates and council (AJ xiv.314). Cf. Weinstock RE xiv 1803.
support for Cassius, but here Antony knew better than to play into the hands of the anti-Roman nobility. Herod and his brother Phasael were recognized as 'tetrarchs'; Judaea even recovered some territory it had lost to the Phoenician cities.35 And Egypt, with all its wealth, would inevitably be important. Momentously, Antony summoned its queen to meet him in Cilicia.
Plutarch and Shakespeare have immortalized the famous meeting on the Cydnus - the marvellous gilded barge, the purple sails, Cleopatra's display as Aphrodite; and, delightfully, much of the description is likely to be true.36 The queen's relations with Antony swiftly became more than diplomatic: their twins were born only a year later; and he spent the winter of 41-40 with her in Alexandria - a winter of careless frolics, so the story later went.37 But there were bloody elements too. Cleopatra was still insecure on her throne, threatened by her sister Arsinoe; Antony had Arsinoe dragged from sanctuary in Ephesus and murdered. Tyre had to surrender Serapion, the admiral who had betrayed Cleopatra's fleet to Cassius and Brutus; Arados was forced to give up a pretender to the Egyptian throne. Later writers naturally dwelt on the infatuation which forced Antony to such gruesomeness; but he could reasonably feel that it made political sense to favour Cleopatra in this way. He was regularly to favour strong, talented rulers, people like Polemo in Pontus or Herod in Judaea, people on whom he felt he could rely; and he could certainly rely on Cleopatra. Any infatuation was clearly under control; at least, for the present. In the spring of 40 he left her, and did not return for nearly four years.
For by the spring Alexandria was no place for Antony. Worrying news had been arriving about disorder in Italy, and now there was a more immediate threat in Asia Minor itself. During 41 Antony had probably been preparing for an offensive war against Parthia - by the end of the season he had indeed taken the border town of Palmyra in Syria. It seems that Parthia, naturally enough, responded by gathering a force in Mesopotamia to meet the evident threat. But, after Antony had departed to Alexandria for the winter, the Parthians decided to seize the moment and attack Roman Asia Minor themselves;38 and, far from waging a glorious campaign of vengeance, Antony had to hasten to put up what defence he could. The Parthian command was shared between the crown-prince Pacorus and Q. Labienus himself, son of that famous commander of Caesar who went over to Pompey at the beginning of the civil war. Brutus and Cassius had sent him to seek aid from Orodes, and
35 Tyre, Sidon, Antioch and Aradus: cf. Joseph. A] xiv.304-23, quoting verbatim Antony's letters to the Jews and to Tyre. * Plut. Ant. 26, with Pelling 1988 (в 138) aJloc.
Plut. Ant. 28-9; cf. App. BCiv. v.i 1.43-4.
Dio XLviii. 24.6-8, explicidy placing the decision after Labienus had heard of Antony's 'departure to Egypt'.
he had still been at the Parthian court when news of Philippi arrived. Wisely, he stayed where he was; and we need not doubt that he played an important role in persuading Orodes to attack now, when he rightly gauged that Antony might be vulnerable. It is easy but unfair to see Labienus as a latter-day Coriolanus, a renegade turning against his country through pique. In fact, republicans had long since been playing for Parthian support. Pompey had sought an alliance with Orodes against Caesar;39 a few years later the Parthians had been helping the republican troops of Q. Caecilius Bassus against Caesarians in Syria;40 Parthian contingents had even fought in the Philippi campaign.41 Over in the West, men could equally toy with the notion of exploiting Gallic nobles in a Roman civil war; might they not show themselves worthier champions of liberty than the Romans themselves?42 Doubtless there was hypocrisy in such proud phrases; but it was not confined to Labienus. He was indeed largely welcomed by the Roman garrisons in Syria,43 and apparently in Asia too.44
The campaign began in the early spring of 40. Labienus - now styling himself Q. LABIENUS PARTHICUS IMPERATOR45 - and Pacorus swiftly overran Syria: it had fallen before Antony could even reach Tyre, then he anyway found it necessary to sail west to Italy. The Parthian successes continued. Pacorus took Palestine, and installed the pretender Antigonus on the throne; Phasael was taken captive, then contrived to kill himself; Herod fled to Rome. Meanwhile Labienus swept through Cilicia and onward to the Ionian coast. The Carian cities of Alabanda and Mylasa fell to him, and Stratoniceia and Aphrodisias clearly suffered terribly;46 so perhaps did Miletus;47 Lydia too was overrun.48 Labienus met no effective resistance till 39, and by then northern Asia Minor had also felt his power; his agents were raising money even from Bithynia.49
And Antony could do nothing about it; for by now the news from Italy was even more alarming.
iv. perusia, 4i-4o b.c.
Even before Philippi, eighteen Italian cities had been marked down to provide land for the triumvirs' veterans; and it fell to Octavian to organize the settlement. It was a hateful task, involving widespread confiscation and intense misery for the dispossessed, who received no compensation: a hideous climax to a half-century of rural violence and horror. Virgil's Eclogues, especially the first and ninth, leave a moving imprint of a small farmer's suffering. But the tiniest holdings were eventually exempted, and so, often, were the largest: in particular, senators' estates were excluded; and, as in most of the cities some veteres possessores managed to hold on to their property, one may assume that the most influential local citizens often secured exemption. That left a great range of the middling well-off who were dispossessed, some who farmed at not much more than subsistence level, others who were quite wealthy people with slaves and fine villas. Their holdings were replaced by the standardized chequer-boards of the new allotments, usually it seems of up to 50 iugera for an ordinary soldier and perhaps 100 iugera or more for an officer. Eighteen cities turned out to be too few, and perhaps as many as forty were eventually involved. The most usual method was to extend the confiscations into the territory of a neighbouring town, as, famously, into Virgil's Mantua when nearby Cremona could offer too little land: 'Mantua, vae miserae nimium vicina Cremonae'.[20]
It all came at a time when Italy was anyway torn by famine, as Sextus grew stronger and his fleet prevented the vital corn-ships from coming to port. (Ahenobarbus' and Murcus' ships were doing the same, though still acting independently of Sextus.) Unsurprisingly there were violent protests, from landowners, from the magnates in the country-towns, from the urban plebs, even from the veterans themselves: they were becoming anxious at the slow pace of the settlement, and also concerned to protect the holdings of their own families and those of their dead comrades. There was soon rioting throughout Italy, with clashes between the new colonists and those they threatened; armed bands were roving the countryside. It was to take years for the disorder to settle.51 Antony's brother L. Antonius was consul in 41, and far from helping Octavian he served as a rallying-point for the discontented. Initially he was perhaps opposed by Antony's wife Fulvia,[21] but she soon lent her full support. To the dispossessed they urged resistance in the name of liberty and the established laws.[22] Perhaps we need not take their own commitment to freedom too seriously,[23] but it is interesting that they thought the slogans worth airing; and, indeed, old republicans were regularly to find Antony's cause more appealing than Octavian's.55 The veterans were encouraged to believe that all would be well once Antony returned: their debt of duty to the great man became another slogan. L. Antonius even, rather absurdly, took the cognomen Pietas.[24] There were charges, too, that Octavian was favouring his own veterans above Antony's in the distributions, and demands that the Antonian settlements should be supervised by Antony's own partisans.[25] The charges seem to have been conspicuously untrue: the Antonian colonies turned out to be the more numerous and the more strategically based.[26] But Octavian still felt it best to accede to the demand for Antonian commissioners, whatever might have been said at Philippi about his freedom to organize the settlement as he chose. That agreement of Philippi was indeed looking increasingly frail. The other Antonian marshals were less blatant than the consul Antonius, but they too were adding to the tension. Calenus never gave the promised two legions; Pollio blocked the route of Salvidienus Rufus as he tried to march with six legions to Spain.
At first Antony, far off in the East, thought it best to send no clear response, though he certainly knew what was going on. Everyone made sure of that, with Octavian sending confidential messengers and the colonies too taking care that their plight was known.[27] He had probably not planned or encouraged the troubles himself: it was a nice judgment whether he really stood to gain more than lose by the exchanges. Now he might naturally relish Octavian's embarrassment, but he could hardly come out openly against him; Octavian after all was merely pursuing his part of a shared bargain. Besides, Antony could not let his own veterans down, or allow Octavian to win more of their gratitude. He might need them again soon. A studied vagueness about his own views would indeed make sense, allowing him to exploit the outcome whichever way it went: there were times in antiquity when the slowness and unreliability of communications could be useful. But the consequences were very unfortunate. Unsure of his wishes, confused by various reports and missives,60 his supporters in Italy were bewildered. Just as on several occasions in 44 and 4 j, army officers and the veterans themselves pressed for a compromise,61 and so did two senatorial embassies to L. Antonius; but in the summer of 41 it came to war.
L. Antonius occupied Rome with an army, then marched north, hoping to link with Pollio and Ventidius. Operations in Etruria were complex and confused, but in the autumn L. Antonius was forced into Perusia and besieged by Octavian, Agrippa and Salvidienus Rufus. Still unsure of Antony's wishes, Pollio and Ventidius decided not to intervene. Plancus, arriving from the south, made the same choice. That made thirteen Antonian legions which stood by, inactive; L. Antonius himself had no more than eight.62 The siege wore on, bitterly. Both sides occupied idle moments by adding obscene graffiti to their sling-bullets, musing on Antonius' baldness, Octavian's backside, and Fulvia's private parts; Octavian himself wrote some peculiarly rude elegiacs at Fulvia's expense.63 The city eventually fell, amid scenes of dreadful bloodshed, in the early spring of 40. L. Antonius' veterans were spared: interestingly, their old comrades on Octavian's side interceded for them.64 Antonius himself was received honourably by Octavian, and indeed was sent to govern Spain (he died soon afterwards). Fulvia was allowed to flee to Athens. The ordinary dwellers of Perusia were not so fortunate. All the town-councillors except one were killed. Octavian's enemies soon elaborated the story, with talk of a human sacrifice of 300 senators and knights at the altar of Divus lulius\bb but the unembroidered truth was horrifying enough. The city itself was given over to Octavian's troops to plunder, and it burnt to the ground. A few years later the Umbrian Propertius chose to conclude his first book of witty love elegies with a disquieting and unexpected coda, two short stark poems on the suffering of the Perusine war (1.21, 22).
If a generation before Pompey had seemed an adulescentulus carnufex, Octavian was surely emerging as his equal. But he had not let the veterans down, and he had emphatically established his control of Italy. Soon, indeed, he would seem master of the entire West, when Calenus died in the summer of 40 and he swiftly occupied Gaul as well. Calenus' legions seem to have come over fairly readily, and so did two legions of Plancus in Italy. Perhaps they felt Octavian was now the more reliable champion of their interests.66
Cf. App. BCiv. v. 29.11 2 (a letter which Appian sensed might have been forged), 31.120.
App. BCiv. v.20.79-23.94.
App. BCiv. v.50.208, cf. 24.95, 29.114-30.115; Brunt 1971 (a 9) 494-6.
ILLRP 1106-18; cf. Hallett 1977 (c 109). Mart. x:.2o quotes Octavian's verses.
App. BCiv. v.46.196—47.200.
Suet. Aug. 15.1; cf. Dio XLVin.14.4: but App. BCiv. v.48.201-2 makes clear that senators and knights were spared. In general, Harris 1971 (e 55) 301—2.
Cf. Dio XLVin.20.3; Aigner 1974 (c 3) 113.
No wonder Antony was concerned. He hurried back to Italy in the midsummer of 40; and he arrived in some strength.
V. BRUNDISIUM AND MISENUM, 4O-39 B.C.
As relations had worsened, both Antony and Octavian had thought of wooing Sextus to their side. He was indeed worth wooing: Murcus had recently joined him, and Sextus' combined fleet now numbered something like 250 ships.67 Now, in the summer of 40, Octavian married Scribonia, the sister of Sextus' associate and father-in-law L. Scribonius Libo. But Sextus was always particularly distrustful of Octavian, and preferred to look to Antony: indeed, Antony's mother Iulia had fled confidently to Sextus after Perusia's fall, which may suggest that there was already some secret understanding. Sextus sent a prestigious escort, including Libo, to accompany her to Antony, and took the opportunity to offer him an alliance. Antony replied in measured but encouraging terms: if it came to war with Octavian, he would welcome Sextus as his ally; if he and Octavian made their peace, he would try to reconcile Octavian with Sextus as well. The understanding was sufficiently strong for Sextus to raid the Italian coast in Antony's support;68 and a little later he occupied Sardinia and displaced Octavian's governor M. Lurius.
Octavian's ruthlessness in Italy, and perhaps his uncompromising response to L. Antonius' proclamations of freedom, had a further sequel. Domitius Ahenobarbus was also persuaded by the consul Pollio to join Antony, and his seventy ships joined Antony's two hundred as they sailed towards Brundisium. The alignments of early 43 had been paradoxically reversed. Republicans and Antony, with Sextus in the background, now stood together to confront the isolated Octavian; Brundisium might well turn out a Mutina in reverse, except that both Antony and Octavian were now much stronger. But, as in 43 but this time before serious bloodshed, Antony and Octavian were to find it prudent to come to terms.
There was some initial military activity. Brundisium, guarded by five of Octavian's legions, would not admit Antony's fleet, and was laid under siege; meanwhile Sextus was still continuing his raids on the coast. Octavian sent Agrippa to the town's aid, and himself swiftly followed; his troops were numerically superior69 but reluctant, and some of them turned back. There was some skirmishing; Antony had the better of it. But by now deputations of each army were urging compromise, and it was not at all clear that either side would fight. The two men's friends began to discuss terms, with Maecenas negotiating for Octavian, Pollio
App. BCh>. v.25.100; Veil. Pat. 11.77.3.
Dio XLvm.20.i—2, clearly dating to midsummer.. и Brunt 1971 (a 9) 497.
for Antony, and L. Cocceius Nerva as something of a neutral. Lepidus, unsurprisingly, was not represented. (He had been notably ineffectual in Italy during the Perusine War, and by now he was out of the way in Africa.) Thus was reached the Treaty of Brundisium (September 40).
The agreement closely duplicated the compact of Philippi, except for the important change that followed from Calenus' death. Octavian's occupation of Gaul was now recognized; he was also to have Illyricum. Antony was no longer simply entrusted with the organization of the East, he was also recognized as its master. The division of the world was correspondingly neater, with Antony controlling the East and Octavian the West: Scodra in Illyria was given unprecedented prominence as the dividing-point of the dominions. Lepidus might retain Africa, for what that was worth. Antony was to avenge Crassus by carrying through the Parthian War, Octavian to assert his claim to Sardinia and Sicily by expelling Sextus — unless (an interesting qualification) Sextus came to some agreement. There was also to be an amnesty for republican supporters. The consulships for the next few years were allocated; there was also a reallocation of legions, with Antony receiving some recompense for Calenus' army.[28]
This division of East and West was less clear-cut than it appeared. For instance, eastern as well as western states could address petitions to Octavian, and Octavian could answer them with authority;[29] he even sent cvtoAcu, a 'commission' (the Latin mandata), to Antony to restore loot to Ephesus.[30] But, rough though it was, the division had momentous consequences. First, Antony faced a more exclusively eastern future. If it came to war, he could no longer think of fighting the campaign of 49 over again, descending from the Alps as a new Iulius Caesar into a quavering Italy. Secondly, Octavian's position in Italy was a priceless asset. In 42 it might have seemed an embarrassment, with all those veterans to setde; but he had ridden that storm. Italy was now supposed to be shared by both men, open to each for his recruiting. But Octavian was there, Antony was not. It proved steadily more possible for Octavian to pose as the defender of Roman and Italian traditions against the monstrous portent of a degenerate Antony, declining into eastern weakness and eastern ways. The control of Italy, in 42 a sign of Octavian's inferiority, became an important element in his final success.
The new accord of Antony and Octavian was confirmed by a further bond, one which was to add richness to the latter romantic legend. Antony was now a widower, Fulvia having conveniently died in Greece. Octavia, the sober sister of Octavian, was to be his new bride. The great dynastic marriage was to seal the union of the dominions. There was no need to complicate the matter with any thoughts of Cleopatra.
Italy rejoiced at the treaty. It is probably wrong to connect Virgil's Fourth Eclogue with this: it was more likely written earlier, in the miserable days of late 41, and was designed to greet Pollio as he entered his consulship on the first day of 40. But more mundane celebration is clear enough. On 12 October the magistrates of Casinum erected a monument to mark the accord, a signum Concordiae.12, Coins too were struck in celebration, one for instance showing a head of Concordia and two hands around a caduceus (a symbol of concord) with the inscription M.ANTON.C.CAESAR.IMP.[31] Both Antony and Octavian celebrated ovationes as they entered Rome a few weeks later. But the festivities again swiftly soured. For one thing, the impoverished triumvirs again imposed unprecedented taxes.[32] Just as serious, Sextus - who could reasonably feel let down by the treaty's terms — was maintaining his pressure. There was fighting in Sardinia within a few weeks of the accord, with Octavian's general Helenus recapturing the island, then in his turn expelled by Sextus' admiral Menodorus. Sextus had by now taken over Corsica as well, and penetrated to Gaul and Africa;76 and his blockade of the Italian corn-ships was more effective than ever. By November Rome was again reduced to famine, and Antony and Octavian were confronted by violent popular riots. Both men also had troubles of their own, and the atmosphere was heavy with strain and suspicion. Antony executed his agent Manius, who had been very active in the Perusine War. Still more striking, Octavian recalled his general Salvidienus Rufus from Gaul, and had him killed. This extraordinary man had been consul designate for the following year, the first man since Pompey to be awarded a consulship before even entering the Senate: now his fall was just as abrupt. It was said that he had been plotting with Antony earlier in the year — indeed, that Antony frankly admitted it. That strains belief; but the truth is wholly elusive.77
Salvidienus' killing was prepared by the passing of the senatus consultum ultimum. The triumvirs' own extraordinary position was itself sufficient to authorize such emergency action; but, as usual with the s.c.u., it was moral rather than legal justification which was really in point. The Senate's moral backing was still worth having, and this was one of several occasions when the triumvirs paraded a certain constitutionalism. For instance, Octavia's marriage to Antony was technically difficult, for she had not completed the legal term of mourning after the death of her first husband, Marcellus: a dispensation was scrupulously secured from the Senate.[33] And Herod was to be recognized as king of Judaea: Antony and Octavian had agreed it - but the formal decision was deferred to the Senate, with Antony himself joining in the debate; a solemn procession to the Capitol followed, led by the consuls.[34] At some time during 39 the triumvirs also secured a senatorial decree to ratify all their past and future acts:[35] constitutionalism again, though of a rather quizzical kind. Like L. Antonius two years earlier, they evidently felt that traditionalist public sentiment was worth impressing.
But peace would surely impress people more. The Brundisium agreement had explicitly envisaged the possibility of coming to terms with Sextus as well. But it was not clear if Sextus himself would agree: there seems to have been some difference of view among his supporters, who were very disparate. The pirate-admiral Menodorus, we are told, pressed Sextus to continue the war, Staius Murcus and others took the opposite view; and here too the issues were fogged by suspicion, with Sextus by now deeply distrustful of Murcus. Murcus duly died, mysteriously. But Sextus still saw the force of his advice: he himself had always been realistic about his chances in a full-scale war. There was a preliminary meeting of negotiators at Aenaria in spring, 39. Scribonius Libo, once again emerging in a context of conciliation, represented Sextus. Octavian, Sextus and Antony then met at Cape Misenum in full summer, perhaps as late as August,[36] and terms were agreed. Sextus was to retain Corsica as well as Sicily and Sardinia, and take the Peloponnese as well; he was to hold this dominion for five years. Consulships were agreed for every year till 32: Libo was promised 34 and Sextus 33, just after the expiry of his quinquennium. For the present, he could have an augurship. In return for all this, he was to raise his blockade of Italy and remove his troops, to undertake to build no more ships and to receive no more runaway slaves, to guarantee Rome's corn supply, and to 'keep the sea free of pirates'. His supporters were to be allowed to return to Italy, with an amnesty for the proscribed: they were to receive some compensation for their vanished property. His slave supporters were to be freed, and his free soldiers were to receive the same rewards on retirement as those of the triumvirs. These last concessions were ones that Antony and Octavian were doubtless very ready to grant: they would placate many of Sextus' supporters, and, if it came again to war, he would not find it easy to recall them to arms.[37]There was also some more constitutionalist talk, this time more grandly of 'restoring the Republic': in eight years' time, perhaps.[38]
The agreement was celebrated by a banquet on Sextus' galley — once again rich material for later legend, with tales of the swashbuckling Menodorus eyeing the cable and thinking of cutting it, to make Sextus master of the world.[39] The agreement was indeed a precarious one, though for less romantic reasons - largely because it diminished and threatened Octavian distinctly more than Antony. It also freed Antony to return to the East. He left Rome shortly after 2 October 39, accompanied by Octavia.[40] He was not to see the city again.
vi. the east, 39—37 b.C.
During the summer of 39 news from the East had been reaching Rome. It was astoundingly good. A year earlier Antony had despatched Ventidius to try to recover Asia Minor:[41] and it seems that Ventidius took Labienus by surprise, forced him to flee eastwards, and finally trapped and defeated him near the Taurus range, perhaps at the Cilician Gates (midsummer 39). Labienus himself fled to Cilicia, but was overtaken there and presumably killed. Later in the summer Ventidius won another great victory at Mt Amanus over Phranipates, the satrap of the newly conquered Syria. Phranipates was killed, and the rest of the Parthian forces fell back beyond the Euphrates. Ventidius had done magnificently, and by the autumn of 39 it was already time for the Senate to reward certain states for their resistance to Labienus — Stratoniceia, Aphrodisias-Plarasa, and (now or a little later) Miletus.[42] The war seemed over. Indeed, there was uncomfortably little left for Antony to do himself.
Still, after spending the winter in Athens he prepared to depart eastwards in the spring of 38. There were a few preliminaries to take care of. The Parthian evacuation made this a sensible time to reorganize some parts of the East, at least provisionally; this time he concentrated on a great swathe from north to south of central Asia Minor. Twenty-five years earlier Pompey had ascribed a considerable tract of western Pontus to Bithynia, but allowed control to remain largely with the cities he had fostered: Antony now reversed the process, weakening the cities and establishing a new strong kingdom of Pontus.88 It was to be ruled by Darius, a descendant of Mithridates Eupator. Deiotarus of Galatia had died, and his possessions in Pontus were assigned to Darius; however, Deiotarus' grandson Castor was recognized as king of Galatia, and he was also allowed the interior of Paphlagonia.89 So far Antony was following the traditional Roman policy of supporting kings from the old regal families; thus also Lysanias was confirmed as king of Ituraea.90 And so far he was not especially concerned with rewarding past loyalties: Lysanias for one had taken the Parthian side.[43] But he also had new, able favourites of his own. Amyntas, once Deiotarus' secretary, was given Pisidia; Polemo of Laodicea-ad-Lycum, whose father Zeno was one of the few who resisted Labienus, received a dominion combining the western part of Cilicia with some parts of Lycaonia.[44] Like Ituraea and parts of Pontus, these were rough, unpacified regions: the new kings evidently had work to do. It was also probably now that Cleopatra was given Cyprus and a region of eastern Cilicia: she too perhaps had a task, for Cilicia and Cyprus were peculiarly rich in timber, and she was presumably to build ships to replenish Antony's fleet.[45] Herod of Judaea also received some further backing. Ventidius and his lieutenant Poppaedius Silo had apparently not tried very hard to displace the rival claimant Antigonus for the throne:[46] he had more pressing concerns. Stronger support could now be given. It seems that Antony began, rather oddly, by recognizing Herod as 'king of the Idumaeans and Samarians': possibly he acknowledged that Jerusalem was for the moment beyond recovery, and granted him this new title in provisional compensation.[47]
It was also now that Antony entered on a new religious policy, and began to insist more emphatically on his identification with Dionysus:[48]a god of liberation and eastern conquest, of course, as well as of vitality and exhilarating release. In Athens, he was duly celebrated as deos Neos
Magie 1950 (e 8jj) 1282П. 15. If Reynolds 1982(8270) doc. 7 refers to the Labienus war (cf. lines 3-4 with her commentary), rewards were also voted to Rhodes, Lycia, Laodicea and Tarsus. On the campaign in general cf. Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 303-4.
App. BCiv. v.75.319; cf. esp. Buchheim i960 (c 49) 49-51; Hoben 1969 (E 840) 34-9.
Cf. esp. Hoben 1969 (e 840) 116—19. 50 Cf. Dio xlix.32.3j Buchheim i960 (c 49) 18-19.
" Joseph. A] xiv.3^o, BJ 1.248.
72 App. BCiv. v.73.319 with Gabba 1970 (в 55)0*/on 'he date, Buchheim i960 (c 49) j 1-2. The realm extended as far as Iconium (Strab. xii. 5.3-6.2 (j68Q);cf. Mitford 1980 (e 860) 1242. For Zeno's resistance to Labienus cf. Strab. xiv.2.24— 5 (660Q.
,J Cf. Joseph. A] xiv.392-7, 406, BJ 1.288-92, 297; Buchheim i960 (c 49) 67.
Strab. xiv. j. 2-3 (669C), 671,68 j: cf. R. Meiggs, Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World (Oxford, 1982) 117. On the date cf. the inscription published by Pouilloux 1972 (c 189), attesting an Egyptian orpanfyos of'Cyprus and Cilicia' in 38-7; Mitford 1980 (e 860) 1293-4.
App. BCiv. v.75.319 w'th Gabba 1970 (в 5 5) adloc.; Buchheim i960 (c 49) 66-7.
Dio xlvin.39.2.
Aiovvoos, in 39/8,[49] and he and Octavia were hailed as deot Evepyerat.[50]There were even perhaps hints of a divine marriage between Antony- Dionysus and the city's goddess Athena;[51] he issued cistophori representing himself as Dionysus;[52] and stories were later told about his extravagant Dionysiac displays - a platform above the theatre, decorated with Dionysiac tambourines and fawnskins, where he drank with his friends all day; then torchlit Dionysiac processions to the Acropolis.101 Some of the detail is surely fantastic, but the general policy makes sense. His future now more clearly lay in the East; eastern states often worshipped their rulers; and he would be the greatest master of all. Divinity was the only comfortable status.
In spring 38 Antony made a rapid visit to Brundisium, where Octavian had invited him for talks about the worsening situation in Italy; but Octavian did not arrive. Antony issued a public letter of rebuke, and crossly sailed back. This irritating distraction must have delayed his departure to the East (that may even, in part, have been Octavian's intention), but Antony still reached Syria, with an army, by midsummer. He arrived to discover that Ventidius' triumphs had continued. The winter of 39/8 had been spent in consolidation: there was little sign, for instance, of any more energetic support for Herod, who had returned to Judaea during the summer and linked with Silo's troops. By the autumn he was encamped against Jerusalem, but Silo was still unco-operative, and his army soon scattered to its winter billets. In the spring Ventidius recalled Silo to Syria, anticipating a further attack from Pacorus. It soon came, but Ventidius had time to occupy a strong position at Gindarus, north east of Antioch in the Cyrrhestica region of Syria. As at the Cilician Gates the previous year, the Parthians attacked rashly; as at Mt Amanus, their leader fell, and they were wholly routed.102 Ventidius most effectively brought many of the Syrian cities over by sending around Pacorus' head on a stake.
Now there was little left to do. It was even possible to support Herod more openly, and Ventidius sent two legions and 1,000 cavalry to his help. (They turned out to be notably ineffective.) Otherwise there was only a pocket of resistance in Commagene, whose wealthy king
Antiochus was recalcitrant, refusing to surrender the Parthian survivors who had fled to him. Ventidius besieged him in Samosata, then Antony arrived to take over the campaign. Antiochus was eager to negotiate, but Antony refused; yet the siege proved more difficult than he expected, and he later, rather ingloriously, accepted terms.[53] Ventidius returned to Rome, and celebrated the triumph he richly deserved on 27 November 38; he died a little later, and was given a state funeral. Antony returned to Athens, where he spent the winter of 38/7. He had little more to fear from the Parthians in Asia Minor; it might even be time to think of carrying the war into Parthia itself, the richest way of winning glory that could be imagined. But first events in the West were again calling for attention.
vii. tarentum, 37 b.c.
The pact of Misenum was fragile. Antony, now a wary ally of both Sextus and Octavian, was the man who could preserve it: but he was soon away in the East, and the uneasy division of the West between Sextus and Octavian began to show strain. Signs of a rift emerged only a few months after the pact, when in autumn 39 Octavian divorced Scribonia, the bride he had married when courting Sextus' favour the previous year. (A few months later he married Livia instead: a love- match, perhaps, as people said[54] - but she certainly linked him to another great clan, and that was not imprudent.) And the Italian famine continued, with pirates continuing to ravage the shore of Campania and harry the grain ships: Octavian publicly blamed Sextus. Antony too was contributing to the instability, prevaricating about the surrender of the Peloponnese to Sextus. During the winter of 39/8 matters came to a head. Sextus' admiral Menodorus went over to Octavian and gave him control of Sardinia and Corsica, three legions and sixty ships. War between Octavian and the outraged Sextus naturally followed, and in spring 3 8 there were two great sea-battles, one off the coast of Cumae near Naples and one in the Straits of Messana. Both were considerable victories for Sextus, but he still followed his distinctive defensive policy, and did not press home his advantage. Octavian retired safely to Campania.
Antony must have heard of this with mixed feelings. He will not have been dismayed to see Sextus and Octavian assiduously weakening one another; but one of them might win, and an undisputed master of the
West was a disconcerting prospect. Before the two battles in the spring of 38, he had been worried enough to make the journey back to Brundisium, despite his urgency to move to the eastern front; at this point he was still pressing Octavian to avoid a breach with Sextus.[55]Octavian had then avoided a meeting, but after his defeats stood in much greater need of Antony's support. In Autumn 38 Octavian sent Maecenas to seek a pledge of help against Sextus. We are told that Antony gave it;[56] and indeed the odds now favoured Sextus, so that moderate aid to Octavian might seem the best way to preserve the balance of power. But Antony's pledge doubtless carried its conditions, and relations were very strained.
Octavian had further problems too. There had been trouble in Gaul since the previous year, which had culminated in a full-scale revolt in Aquitania. By the end of 3 8 this had been dealt with by Agrippa, but this merely replaced one embarrassment with another: Agrippa's glory contrasted too obviously with Octavian's own defeats, and Agrippa tactfully went without a triumph.[57] And Octavian's control of Italy was not beyond reproach. Public life was unusually disordered, with a shortage of candidates for some offices, while in other cases magistrates were hastening to resign their offices: in 3 8 there were no less than sixty- seven praetors.[58] And the popular riots were continuing, including some support of a new favourite, a certain M. Oppius. Predictably, he soon died.[59] Any pretence of normality was wearing very thin.
Another meeting was clearly needed. Antony sailed for Italy in early spring 37: he was accompanied by 300 ships. The menace was unmistakable. Perhaps he claimed he was coming to help Octavian against Sextus;[60] if so, he was naturally disbelieved, and it seems that the townsfolk of Brundisium refused to admit the fleet.[61] Bewildered and nervous, they doubtless trusted that Octavian would applaud them. Antony sailed to Tarentum instead, and Octavian travelled there to meet him. Lepidus was again unrepresented. Negotiations were slow, and it was perhaps latejuly or August before agreement was reached.[62] The questions were indeed delicate: it was certainly not clear that it was in
Antony's interests to support Octavian at all emphatically against Sextus. The mediation of Octavia, it was said, was crucial113 - possibly romantic fiction once again, but she may indeed have played a part.
Finally Antony agreed to back Octavian against Sextus, who was stripped of his priesthood and his promised consulship. Octavian was to carry through the war, but it was agreed that he should delay his attack on Sextus to the following year: it was doubtless Antony who pressed for this, for it offered him the hope of synchronizing his invasion of Parthia with this further war in Italy. The propaganda possibilities were clear: while Sextus and Octavian were refusing to let the civil wars die, Antony would be doing what Roman generals should always have done, advancing the empire and spilling foreign blood. It was all to work out rather differently. They further agreed that Octavian would give Antony 20,000 men and 1,000 elite troops in return for 120 men-of-war and ten skiffs.114 The deal made sense, for Octavian vitally needed reinforcements for the fleet which Sextus had damaged so badly, while Antony had recently been unable to recruit Italian troops. But, from his viewpoint, there was one drawback. He left the ships there and then. Octavian merely promised the troops. They never came.
There was a further problem, of a constitutional sort. The triumvirate had formally expired at the end of 38, leaving the triumvirs' position uncomfortably vague. Probably nobody knew whether their power was now illegal. The triumvirate was an irregular magistracy: to which regular magistracy should it be regarded as analogous? To the consulship, which had a fixed term of one year, but formally ended when the consuls abdicated their office on the last day? On the one hand, the term had passed; on the other, the triumvirs had not abdicated.115 Or perhaps it was closer to a provincial governorship, normally assigned by senatus consultum, which continued until a successor was appointed and arrived? Here there were no successors. In some ways the vast task rei publicae constituendae left the triumvirs more closely analogous to a dictator, who was similarly appointed for a specified purpose and held his office until he abdicated on completion of the task: now the res publico was certainly not yet constituta. But the early, traditional dictatorship had also had a maximum duration of six months, and that had been scrupulously observed:116 what would have happened had a dictator outstayed that
App. ВСя>.9з. 390-1,96.397; Dio xlviii. 54. j;and especially Plut. Ant. 35. Wallmann 1989(0 243) 181-2 thus explains Octavia's prominence on coins of 37-36 celebrating the accord (CRR 12 56, 1262, 1266).
App. BCiv. V.9J.396-7; cf. (with slightly different, less credible numbers) Plut. Ant. 35.7; Brunt 1971 (a 9) J02.
The constitutional puzzle certainly exercised the minds of contemporaries: cf. the elaborate treatment of similar issues at Livy, ш.36.9, 38.1, И-5-6 (decemvirs not laying down their office when their term expired; the decemvirate was an irregular magistracy like the triumvirate); ix.33—4 (similar behaviour by a censor). 116 Cf. Mommsen 1887 (a 6;) n.i3 161.
period? No one knew. Admittedly, the more recent (and very uneasy) precedents of Sulla and Caesar furnished a dictatorship without any such legal maximum term.117 But those dictatorships had been voted in those terms, without any time-limitation. Now it was precisely the specification of a limit which differentiated the triumvirate: how crucial was this difference, and who was to say? Perhaps the closest analogy was to those few provincial commands assigned by lex rather than s.c., such as Caesar's command in Gaul. That had carried a fixed term - but the events of 51-50 had shown that the legal implications of its expiry were tangled and unclear. Were further confusion required, it was offered by the triumvirs' provincial commands. They had assigned these to themselves by virtue of their triumviral powers, but had also had them ratified by s.c.; it was not at all clear that their provincial imperium lapsed when their triumviral powers lapsed.118 The analogy with a regular proconsul, assigned a province by s.c., was close.
In short, the legal position was hopelessly confused. Perhaps it did not matter very much: the realities of power were clear enough. But the events of 51-50 had shown that legal issues could be important, at least in propaganda terms; and, anyway, the triumvirs had recently been making a show of their constitutionalism. It would certainly be comfortable to give their status more clarity. Reassuringly, the triumvirate was now formally renewed for another five years, very probably to expire on the last day of 33,119 and a little later this was ratified by the people of Rome.120 But the constitutional tangle was to return.
viii. the year 36 b.c.
While Antony and Octavian had been engaged at Tarentum, their lieutenants had been busy. Agrippa, consul in 37, had considerably strengthened Octavian's fleet; he had also recruited vast numbers of new seamen — 20,000 slaves were freed to allow them to serve.121 Most impressively of all, he had constructed the portus Iulius in Campania by linking the shallow Lucrine lake by a canal to the much deeper Avernus, then removing the dyke separating the Lucrine lake from the sea. The work was completed by two tunnels connecting the Avernus with
1,7 Cf. Mommsen 1887 (a 65) ii.i3 703-), 714-16. Caesar's dictatorship had originally been annual, then formally extended to ten years and then 'for life': MRR n »72, 285 n.i, 294-5, 30;, 317-18. 118 Cf. p. 20 and n.8o; Girardet 1990 (c 97). 119 See Endnote pp. 67-8.
130 Thus App. III. 28.80,... Ktu о Siĵ/ios (irtKtKvpwKci. There is no inconsistency here (as is often suggested) with BCiv. v.95.398, where the triumvirs agree the renewal oiStv tr 1 той Srjfiov Вет/ветте;. In BCiv. Appian is simply contrasting the procedure in 37 with that of November 43, when the triumvirs needed a lex to establish them in office (BCiv. iv.7.27). Their powers now authorized them (it could be claimed) to renew their own term: it still suited their current policy to obtain ratification for their acts from the Senate (cf. p. 20 and n. 80) or, as here, the people.
121 Suet. Aug. 16. i; cf. Brunt 1971 (a 9) 508.
Cumae and the beach.[63] Sextus had recently been concentrating his attacks on the Campanian coast:[64] now the tunnels would allow Agrippa to convey supplies safely, while the double lake would afford a protected expanse of water for training crews.
In the East, meanwhile, Herod at last received effective aid. C. Sosius, Antony's governor of Syria and Cilicia, first subdued the Aradians (a Syrian people who were still disaffected), then arrived in Palestine. The war had been dragging on through 3 8, with Antigonus having much the better of it; Herod himself had been absent for a good part of the summer, pressing Antony at Samosata for more energetic help. In late 3 8 two legions had been sent ahead under Herod's direct command (a most irregular procedure): he promptly won a considerable victory at Isana. The rest of Judaea, except for the capital, quickly fell to him, and in spring 3 7 he resumed the siege of Jerusalem itself. Sosius' new force then arrived, and in July the city fell, very bloodily.[65] Herod became king; Antigonus was captured, and when Antony returned to the East he yielded to Herod's pressure and had him publicly executed at Antioch.
Herod was not specially loved by his countrymen, but his decisive victory still added to the stability of the East. What is more, the Parthian threat seemed to have disappeared. Indeed, there was a new dynastic crisis within Parthia itself. Orodes abdicated in late 3 8 or 3 7, and from his thirty sons he unwisely selected Phraates as successor, who promptly killed his father, all his brothers, and his son. The Parthian nobility soon revolted: the prospects for a Roman invasion had seldom been better.
But there was no time to exploit the crisis in 37: Antony did not arrive back in the East until autumn. He spent the winter at Antioch, continuing his new administrative arrangements, and this time the reorganization was more extensive. In 39 he had already given hints of what was to come, when he had strengthened the kingdom of Pontus and begun to favour new men like Amyntas and Polemo. Now these policies were taken much further, and the East began to fall into a number of large client kingdoms, each ruled by an efficient and loyal prince. The newly enlarged kingdom of Pontus would more or less do, but the king would not; Darius was replaced by Polemo, who in his small dominion of 39 had evidently proved himself worthy of promotion.[66]Castor in Galatia was similarly replaced. (It is possible that Darius and Castor had both conveniently died; but the coincidence is suspicious, and it is more likely that both were deposed.) Castor's son Deiotarus
Philadelphia was allowed to inherit Paphlagonia,[67] but Galatia passed to Amyntas;[68] and the realm was greatly expanded, to include parts of Pamphylia and Polemo's former domain in Lycaonia.[69] The old boundaries of Cappadocia would serve adequately, but there had been dynastic unrest there for years. On Ariobarzanes' death in 42 the kingdom should have passed to his brother Ariarathes, a man of dubious loyalty to Rome; Antony preferred a certain Archelaus Sisines from Pontic Comana, and probably made his favour clear from the outset.[70]But in 42—41 it was not yet time to overthrow the legitimate heir in favour of an outsider. By 37—36 Antony's policy of favouring such men was more securely established, and Archelaus was duly confirmed as king.[71] Not that the great kings controlled everything: for instance, the priest-kings in southern Pontus, at Comana, Megalopolis and Zela, were retained and strengthened; several other minor princes were created, Cleon in Mysia, Adiatorix in Heraclea Pontica; in Upper Cilicia Tarcon- dimotus, a pirate in his youth, was encouraged in his small kingdom.[72]But it was Amyntas, Polemo and Archelaus who along with Herod would keep Asia Minor safe. It was a wise policy, and Antony chose his men well. The system, together with most of the individual kings, was to be continued by Octavian after Antony's fall: Archelaus, for instance, reigned for a full fifty years.[73]
Another monarch, too, had her realm increased. Cleopatra was given parts of coastal Phoenicia and Nabataean Arabia, and also the rich balsam woods around Jericho in Judaea.[74] Lysanias of Ituraea was executed, and she took over his kingdom along with some adjoining territory;[75] perhaps she had her dominion in Cilicia extended, and, now or earlier, she also became mistress of Crete and Cyrene.[76] Not all of this served Rome's interests - for instance, now or in 34 both Herod and Malchus of Arabia leased back from Cleopatra the land she now gained. The rent was vast, 200 talents apiece: Cleopatra rather than Rome was clearly the beneficiary of that arrangement. But the grants still fitted Antony's policy of strengthening loyal monarchs, and so far nothing suggests that Antony was favouring her unduly. Amyntas and Polemo did better out of this reorganization than she did, and indeed Antony now as later refused to give her parts of Judaea, Phoenicia, Syria and Arabia which she coveted.136 But he seems to have advertised their union in other ways. She travelled to meet him in Syria in late 37; in 36 she bore him another son, Ptolemy Philadelphus. He also acknowledged paternity of the twins born in 40. This was not yet clearly a marriage - at least, not in Roman eyes, though Egyptians themselves may not have known quite what to make of it.137 But it was still a scandal, and one which left Antony peculiarly vulnerable to Octavian's propaganda. The Parthian War afforded Antony the chance of a propaganda triumph, one which might impress Italian sentiment much more than Octavian's continuation of the civil war with Sextus.138 That was now compromised.
Why did Antony do it? Perhaps Cleopatra needed her position within Egypt strengthened (we know little of the internal history of her reign, but Ptolemies were often insecure on their thrones); but this seems an extreme method. More likely, Antony was hoping to strengthen his own position in the East, at least within Egypt itself. This festive connexion with an eastern queen — almost indeed a sacred marriage of Dionysus- Osiris and Isis - might be as popular there as it turned out to be unpopular in Italy. Glamour was important to Cleopatra in articulating her style of leadership; it was a style which Antony could naturally share; and eastern support would be crucial if it came to war with Octavian - that, surely, was already clear. But it is still surprising that he risked outraging Italian opinion quite so much; was Italy yet such a lost cause? Perhaps he thought he was doing nothing more outrageous than Caesar had done; Caesar had even installed Cleopatra at Rome; but Caesar did not have a master of propaganda to oppose him, and Antony should have sensed the danger. We rarely see Antony's political naivety so clearly, and it does remain quite possible that the personal factor was indeed important, with Cleopatra leading Antony against his political judgment. Not that he was infatuated beyond control: his refusal of the territory she desired is enough to show this; and he was shortly to leave her again, for a Parthian War which (he must have expected) would keep them apart for several years. But romance could still have been there.
Still, romance did not impede the preparations for Parthia. The signs
Joseph. A] xv.79, 91-4, 95, 258; cf. 24-5, 74-9.
Pelling 1988 (в 138) 219-20. 13« See above, p. 26.
of unrest at the court continued to come; in 37 or early 36 one Monaeses, from a great Parthian family, arrived with promises of a wider defection among the nobility. Monaeses' role is hard to gauge, and possibly he was playing a double game;[77] still, his news was not implausible, given Phraates' barbarity - Parthians might after all be as ready to exploit Roman help in their internal conflicts as the Roman Labienus had been to exploit the Parthians. There was obviously much to be said for striking quickly; but Crassus' fate in 5 3 had shown the vulnerability of a Roman force in the open plains of Mesopotamia, and Antony preferred a plan on the lines of the one which (it seems) Iulius Caesar was intending to follow in 44[78] — to take the slower northern route through Armenia into Media Atropatene, a rougher and hillier terrain where the Parthian cavalry would be less effective. The long-standing bad feeling between the kings of Armenia and Media (both named Artavasdes) offered the further possibility of exploiting one against the other. Presumably the Armenian Artavasdes would be the Romans' natural ally as they attacked his Median enemy, and it seems that he was already urging Antony on;[79]but both kings were very uncertain quantities. In 37 or early 36 P. Canidius Crassus made a firmer understanding with the Armenian Artavasdes, then passed on in the spring to defeat the Iberi and Albani: this remarkably swift campaign protected what would now become the Roman rear left. In the event the rear would be more exposed than it now seemed, but that was because of Artavasdes' unreliability; and, without a much more extensive campaign, that was a risk the Romans had to take.
Antony had by now sent to Phraates demanding the return of the eagles captured at Carrhae: a firm statement that, whatever Octavian might be saying at Rome, Antony's agreed task of 'avenging Crassus' was still incomplete.[80] Phraates of course refused - the insecure new monarch could hardly make so humiliating a concession — and Antony's muster continued. He first marched with his Syrian army to Zeugma. That might suggest that he was planning to follow Crassus' policy and strike direct at Mesopotamia, but that strategy would only work if the advance was to be unopposed. In fact Phraates swiftly concentrated the Parthian army in Mesopotamia. That ruled out Crassus' plan, and
Antony struck north instead towards Armenia. There he linked with Canidius' army, perhaps at the plateau of Erzerum, perhaps at Artax- ata;143 he was also joined by contingents from the allied kings, including Polemo.144 As Armenia had evidently been selected as the mustering- point some months before, Antony must always have expected that the northern route would turn out to be the only practicable one; otherwise, indeed, Canidius' preliminary campaign would make little sense; and it looks as if the Zeugma exercise had been no more than an elaborate feint.145 In all Antony had perhaps sixteen legions and a mass of auxiliaries,146 and Artavasdes of Armenia supplied a large contingent of cataphracts and lighter-armed cavalry, perhaps as many as 16,000.147 It was a vast army indeed, distinctly greater than that with which Caesar had conquered Gaul.
Antony was later accused of wrecking the campaign for Cleopatra's sake. He had begun it too late in the season, they said, because he had dallied too long at Alexandria; then he had conducted the invasion itself too hurriedly, eager to return to her side.148 But the points were hardly fair. The muster in Armenia was perhaps in June or July; what with Canidius' preliminary campaign and the long preliminary marches,149 it was astounding it could be so soon. Perhaps there was still a case for waiting till 3 5, keeping the army concentrated in the East ready for an early strike in the spring;150 but there was also the Parthian dynastic crisis to consider, as well as the chance of outflanking the Parthian army by a swift advance now — a ploy in which Antony very nearly succeeded. Of course Parthia would not fall in a single campaign: Iulius Caesar had planned on three years,151 and that was reasonable. But it was also reasonable to hope for a solid victory or so in Media, bolstering the morale of the Roman army and Phraates' internal enemies; then, if necessary, Antony could withdraw and winter in Armenia (though hardly at Cleopatra's side). Antony's strategy made sense.
Erzerum: Kromayer 1896 (c 142) 82. Artaxata: Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 311.
Polemo: Plut. Ant. 38.6; Dio xlix.2ĵ.4. Other kings: Plut. Ant. 37.3.
So Kromayer 1896 (c 142) 100-1; contra, Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 309—10.
1« Brunt 1971 (a 9) 503-4, Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 311 n.37.
So Plut. Ant. 50.3, though at 37.3 he wrote of'6,000' at the initial muster in Armenia. Strab. xi.14.9—12 (530C) speaks of 6,000 cataphracts 'besides the other cavalry', which may explain Plutarch's confusion; or both Plutarch's figures may be right, if the mass of the cavalry joined Antony in eastern Armenia after the muster; or 16,000 perhaps represented the paper strength, 6,000 the force which materialized (Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 311 n.37).
Livy, Per. 130: cf. Plut. Ant. 37.5-58.1 with Pelling 1988 (в 138)adloc. The criticism probably derived from Q. Dellius, an eyewitness of the campaign (Strab. xi. 13.1-4 (5 23Q) and no friend of Cleopatra.
Itwassome 1,000 Roman miles from Zeugma to the Median border (Strab. xi. 13.4—6 (5 24C); Plut. Ant. 38.1), itself a march of three to four months, and Antony's troops first had to march from Antioch.
So Plut .Ant. 38.1, perhaps from Dellius; Sherwin-White 1984^89) 316-17 thinks the point fair. 151 Dio xli11.51.2.
But it went wrong. Things started well, and he drove deep into Media. He indeed reached the capital Phraata[81] before the main Parthian force could double back from Mesopotamia. The Median king Artavasdes had left his royal family in residence at Phraata: he at least was evidently taken by surprise by Antony's strategy and speed. But to get there in time Antony had to rush on ahead of his own siege-engines. That was an evident gamble, though not dissimilar to the risks Caesar himself had famously taken in Gaul and in the Civil War, and the swift arrival of a formidable army might indeed have carried the unprotected city. But it did not, and a siege was necessary. Without the engines, it was a curiously amateurish job.[82] And, crucially, the engines never arrived, for Phraates' cavalry overtook the wagon-train and destroyed it, together with its accompanying two legions.[83] Polemo himself was captured, though not killed - he would be more useful alive when it came to negotiations.[84] Artavasdes of Armenia promptly despaired of Antony's cause, and withdrew with his force: a severe loss, for the heavy Armenian cataphracts would have been particularly useful in defence. A series of engagements followed, with Antony successful in the most substantial of them;[85] but the swift Parthian cavalry fled most effectively, and Antony could not follow it up.
Before long Antony was forced to abandon the siege; and, predictably, his retreat turned out to be intensely difficult, with sickness and famine as great a problem as the harrying Parthian archers. The resilience and the valour of Antony and his army became famous, and the comparison with Xenophon's Ten Thousand was an obvious one.[86]Eventually, after an epic final night-time march across the foothills of the Kŭh-e-Sahand range,[87] the army reached the Talkheh, then the Araxes and Armenia. The retreat had taken twenty-seven days, and even now safety could not be taken for granted, given Artavasdes' earlier treachery. But Antony successfully made terms with him, and by mid-winter the remains of the army had reached Cappadocia: there were further deaths in this final section of the march. The total losses in the campaign were indeed catastrophic, some third of the entire army.[88]
So ended Antony's great attempt to emulate Alexander. Ironically, his best military qualities had seldom been clearer - his energy, his enterprise, his inspirational leadership; and yet it was disastrous. Plutarch later did well to make this campaign the centrepiece of his Life, but not only for those reasons. This was indeed the turning-point of the triumviral period. Till now Antony's military prestige and power had far outstripped Octavian, and he had consequently been the stronger partner in their diplomatic exchanges. This campaign should have raised his supremacy beyond challenge.
But instead the victories were being won elsewhere, and by Octavian. His war with the popular favourite Sextus was a delicate one to fight: it could much too easily seem Octavian's personal vendetta. Indeed, even while he was fighting it disturbances at Rome required urgent attention;[89] there were grumblings in the veteran colonies too;[90] Etruria was particularly restive.[91] Octavian could not afford to lose or delay - for all he knew, Antony was carrying all before him in Parthia - but the events of 38 had shown how formidable an enemy Sextus could be.[92] Now Agrippa's preparations were magnificent, but Sextus had been preparing too, and by 36 he had some 350 ships.[93] Just as he had in 38, Octavian even sent to Lepidus in Africa for help. In 38 Lepidus had made no response, content to leave Octavian with his own problems.[94] This time he decided to come in force. He eventually arrived with twelve legions and 5,000 cavalry, with a further four legions following as reinforcements (two were destroyed by Sextus' fleet before they could land).166 Perhaps Lepidus already had clear plans of his own, perhaps not; he at least knew that the great battle for the West should not be fought without him.
By July 36 Octavian was able to launch a triple-pronged attack on Sextus in Sicily. He would attack from the north and Statilius Taurus from the east; Lepidus would attack the western coast. The plan was good. The campaign itself was to show how difficult Sextus would find it to stretch his forces to meet several threats. But Octavian's forces were beset by storms; so many ships were lost that there were thoughts of delaying the campaign to 35. At first only Lepidus managed to land in strength, and he laid Sextus' lieutenant L. Plinius Rufus under siege in
Lilybaeum. In the east there were naval battles, with first Agrippa successful off Mylae, then Sextus defeating Octavian himself off Tauro- menium. Sextus' victory was more emphatic than Agrippa's, but at least Octavian established bridgeheads both by Cape Tyndaris and near Tauromenium: Sextus' resistance on land was surprisingly half-hearted, particularly at Tauromenium.167 Octavian soon had twenty-one legions on the island,168 besides Lepidus' army; Sextus had only ten.169 He was soon hemmed into the island's north-east corner, a triangle bounded by Mylae and Tauromenium, and Mylae itself fell soon afterwards. And now even Lepidus himself was approaching, rather tardily. His part in the whole campaign is indeed enigmatically lackadaisical: it is odd that he did not move eastwards earlier - that was clearly where he was needed, and perhaps expected.170 The sequel was to show him dissatisfied with his subordinate role. Was he perhaps content to let Octavian and Sextus weaken one another in the east, hoping by a last minute arrival to claim the authority he felt he deserved? The events of 44/3 had shown his capacity to bide his time before a decisive change of front.171 If Octavian distrusted him, it was not without reason.172
Sextus' last hope was to pit everything on a battle at sea. Perhaps unwisely, Octavian accepted battle (there was possibly even a formal challenge and acceptance, agreeing time, place and numbers):173 but the risk came off. The battle was fought off Naulochus (3 September 36), with 300 ships on either side. Agrippa, not Octavian, took command. By now brawn rather than skill was dominant in naval warfare, and Agrippa's heavier ships and more sophisticated grappling equipment carried the day. Only seventeen of Sextus' ships escaped. Sextus himself fled: his only slender hope lay with Antony in the East.
His land forces came over to Octavian with little demur. Plinius Rufus had moved eastwards to Messana, presumably following Lepidus. By now he had command of a large portion of Sextus' army, comprising eight legions.174 It was clear that they would surrender: but to whom? Agrippa and Lepidus appeared before the city: Agrippa insisted that they wait for Octavian, but Lepidus overrode him. His forces indeed linked with those of Plinius, and together they sacked Messina. Lepidus now seemed in control of the combined force, some twenty-two legions. He had not been so powerful for years. Now if ever was the time to assert
147 App. BCiv. v.i 10.457-9, Gabba 1970 (в 5 5) adloc.
168 App. BCiv. v.i 16.481; Brunt 1971 (a 9) 498. 169 Brunt 1971 (a 9) 499-500.
170 App. BCiv. v.io}.427 with Gabba 1970 (в 55) ad loc. 171 Cf. САН ix2 471, 482.4.
Dio xlix. 8.3-4 even suggests that Lepidus was in secret league with Sextus, and that Octavian suspected as much (cf. xlix. 1.4). That is implausible, and probably influenced both by Octavian's propaganda and by Dio's tendency to guess at motivation; but some distrust is possible enough.
App. BCiv. v.i 16.489 with Gabba 1970 (в j 5) ad loc.; cf. Gabba 1977 (C94).
App. BCiv. v. 122.505 with Gabba 1970(8 55) ad loc.
himself, to show how unfairly he had been excluded from all those diplomatic dealings at Brundisium, Misenum and Tarentum. He laid claim to all Sicily, though he magnanimously offered to exchange Sicily and Africa for all his former portion, Narbonensis and Nearer and Further Spain.175 At first Octavian's friends remonstrated gently, then Octavian himself more fiercely; Lepidus was adamant. The legions were unamused. But the delusion could not last. Octavian entered his camp, almost unaccompanied — though there was a sizeable force of cavalry just outside. The troops at least knew where the balance of power lay: with only a little scuffling, they joined Octavian. Lepidus was allowed to keep his property and his life, and he even remained pontifex maximus. But Octavian stripped him of membership of the triumvirate and his provincial command.176 There were no thoughts of consulting Antony first. Octavian took over Africa and Sicily into his own domain. Lepidus retired into exile and anonymity.
That effectively concluded the elimination of Sextus and Lepidus. Antony and Octavian remained; and Antony was beginning to look a little tattered.
IX. 35-33 B.C.
Politics now looked simpler: the reckoning would surely come, and we might expect Antony and Octavian to spend the next few years in preparation. But it was not quite like that. Octavian, it is true, seems to have seen the future clearly enough. He soon intensified his battle to win Italian public opinion, with fierce propaganda against Cleopatra and Antony; he may even have been in contact with Antony's enemy Artavasdes of Armenia (unless that charge is simply a fiction of Antony's propaganda);177 and he was soon battle-hardening his troops in Illyri- cum, suggestively close to the dividing-line with Antony's dominion. But Antony was slow to respond. He may have talked of joining Octavian in an Illyrian campaign178 — in self-defence, that would have been no bad ploy, if it were practicable: but really his focus lay on the East - indeed, on the Jar East, and for several years he was preoccupied with vengeance on the perfidious Armenian king Artavasdes. Of course an Armenian success would do something to mend the shame of the Parthian debacle, but in Roman eyes Armenia lacked the glamour of Parthia; a new Alexander should be more glorious than that, and Armenia could only be the beginning; but a clearer-sighted man would have realized that now Parthia itself was a lost cause. With Octavian preparing in the West, there simply would not be time for the years a
"5 Cf. САН ix2 4g6. 176 MRR II 400.
177 Dio xux.14.6. 178 App. BCiv. v.132.549.
second Parthian invasion would demand. Yet in 3 } nearly all Antony's legions were still in the extreme east of his domain; only then, very slowly, did they begin the long march west. War with Octavian was scarcely foremost in Antony's mind. Perhaps he was peaceable, content by now to share the world; perhaps he was simply naive. But it is clear which of the two was seeking the breach, and which had his thoughts elsewhere.
The fall of Sextus involved both in temporary embarrassments. Octavian found himself with forty-five legions, but confronted by a mutiny. Uncomfortably enough, his troops were beginning to believe his own propaganda. He had concluded the civil wars and brought peace on land and sea, so he said:179 well, in that case there was no need for further service, and they demanded immediate demobilization. That would hardly do. Octavian knew he would need them again soon. But at least the longest-serving could be released, those who had fought for Octavian since Mutina and Philippi, some 20,000 men.180 There were delays, but land was found for most of them, largely in Italy but partly in Gaul.181 The others were promised 500 denarii, and, rather surprisingly, soon received it;182 they were also induced to expect lucrative spoils in Illyricum — not very plausible for any who knew the land, but probably few did, and the ploy passed. Octavian could now return to Rome and acclaim. He celebrated an ovatio, and the other honours included a grant of tribunicial sacrosanctity,183 interestingly presaging a conspicuous feature of his later constitutional facade. And there was more talk of restoring the Republic when Antony returned - how could he refuse, now Octavian had ended the civil wars? Peace and security would shortly be restored at home as well: Calvisius Sabinus was appointed to put down Italian brigandage, and a police force of some sort was established in Rome itself.184 There was even a remission of some taxes, and the regular magistrates were ostentatiously allowed more freedom.185 This was not the first time that the triumvirs had portrayed themselves as champions of Roman tradition, even a sort of constitutional normality.186 But Octavian was beginning to steal the mask for his own.
In Antony's case, the embarrassment was Sextus himself. In the winter of 36/5 he arrived at Mytilene, hoping to ally himself with Antony; when
App. BCiv. v.i 28.5 50, 130.540-2, 132.546-8; cf. Dio xlix.15.2.
App. BCiv. v. 129.534 ('since Mutina or Philippi'); Dio xlix. 14.1 specifies those who had served'since Mutina or for ten years'; cf. Reinhold 1988(b i )o)njloc.\ Brunt 1971 (a 9) 3 31; Keppie 1983 (e 65) 69-73. Some of them soon re-enlisted: Dio xlix.54.3.
Keppie 1983 (e 65) 70-3; cf. Dio xlix.34.4.
Dio xlix. 14.2, with Reinhold 1988 (в 150) alloc.-, App. BCiv. v. 129.536.
See Endnote, p. 68.
ш App. BCiv. v.132.547; cf. Suet. Aug. 32; Dio XLix.15.1j Palmer 1978 (c 184) 320-1.
App. BCiv. v.150.540, 132.548; Dio XLIX.15.3; cf. Nicolet 1976(0104)95.
See above, pp. 19-21, 27.
he heard of the Parthian disaster, he began to intrigue against him instead. Either way, he was a problem. Not that he was very strong: he was raising troops again, but even at the end he had little more than three legions and a handful of ships.[95] But he would be an awkward ally: with Italy being encouraged to celebrate his downfall, it might now seem to be Antony rather than Octavian who was refusing to let the civil wars die. And it would be awkward to kill him too. There were enough people in Rome who still recalled wistfully the hopes they had placed in him:[96]Octavian himself, outrageously, was later to make capital of this, and attack Antony for his faithless treatment of him.[97] Antony appointed M. Titius to take charge of the problem. Titius' father had been among the proscribed who fled to Sextus, and Titius himself had been spared by Sextus when captured by Menodorus in 40.[98] Antony probably selected Titius precisely because of these earlier favours, to smooth any dealings which proved necessary. But in the event no dealing proved possible, for Sextus' faithlessness became too apparent. By the spring of 3 5 the pursuit was tying up the governors of both Asia and Bithynia, C. Furnius and Domitius Ahenobarbus, as well as a sizeable fleet; King Amyntas too was involved. That was too much. When Sextus was finally captured by Amyntas in Phrygia, he was brought to Titius in Miletus and executed there. Antony may or may not have authorized his death. If he did, he covered his tracks: some said that Plancus, not he, had given the order; other stories were told of two letters, one ordering the execution and one countermanding it, which of course arrived in the wrong sequence.[99]
Antony himself was more concerned with Armenia. He was clearly determined to exact vengeance from Artavasdes; and he doubtless considered he was being prudent as well as vindictive, for he still dreamed of a second Parthian campaign. (He was indeed to embark on one two years later.) For this a secure Armenia was essential; but that could never be, as long as Artavasdes was king. Matters now took an unexpected turn, for an envoy arrived in Alexandria from the Median Artavasdes, Antony's enemy of the previous year: an envoy in fact of peculiar distinction, King Polemo himself. Antony's designs on Armenia would seem no surprise, and Median Artavasdes offered Antony an alliance. Antony accepted, and set out from Egypt during the summer.
Perhaps he pretended that he was attacking the Parthians; but his immediate goal was surely Armenia.[100]
For the present it came to nothing, for a different sort of crisis supervened. Octavia arrived in the East. Whatever people were saying about her husband and Cleopatra, she was still his wife. (Her journey indeed demonstrates that Italians at least could not yet think of Antony as married to Cleopatra: otherwise she would surely have divorced him by now.)[101] It may well be that Octavian himself had encouraged his sister in the mission, as some suspected;[102] it was certainly deeply embarrassing to Antony — and not just because of Cleopatra, who was away from Antony's company at present, tactfully at home in Alexandria.[103] The real problem was that Octavia was bringing with her 2,000 elite troops from her brother, besides money and supplies to replace those lost in Parthia, and perhaps some Italian cavalry.[104] Octavian in fact owed Antony far more than this, all the 20,000 troops that he had promised at Tarentum in return for Antony's 140 ships.[105] Those ships had been most useful in the war against Sextus, and since then Octavian had returned half of them; but that was hardly enough.[106] It would be a triumph for Octavian if Antony accepted the troops, but insulting to Octavia if he refused - and probably politically damaging as well, for Octavian was soon to show himself adept at building propaganda from his sister's maltreatment.[107] Sensibly, Antony accepted. But that was all the annoyance he was prepared to take from Octavia's presence for the moment, and he told her to stay in Athens, perhaps even to return to Rome.[108] He himself retired to Alexandria for the winter of 3 5 /4. (It was evidently too late in the season to resume the Armenian expedition.) Cleopatra was more congenial company than Octavia; Octavian could make of that what he wished. In fact, he would make a great deal.
In early 34 Antony turned to Armenia again. First, during the winter, came diplomacy: he sent Dellius to ask the Armenian Artavasdes for the king's daughter, pretending he wished to marry her to his son Alexander Helios. She would of course make a splendid hostage. Artavasdes was shrewd enough to refuse. In the spring Antony appeared suddenly at
Nicopolis on the Armenian border, and sent for the Armenian king to discuss a new Parthian campaign; Artavasdes again refused. While Dellius travelled once more to ask Artavasdes to a conference, Antony himself marched quickly on Artaxata; Artavasdes was finally forced by his own nobility and soldiers to come to Antony, despite his suspicions of such curious friendliness. Antony took him captive, and quickly occupied the whole country: he left his troops there for the winter, and within a year at least sixteen legions would be there.[109] His enemies, first among them Octavian, might claim that the victory was all dishonourable, won through perfidy; his friends would retort that Artavasdes' own treachery justified it quite sufficiently.[110] At least, it was something to restore Antony's paling prestige. On coins he could celebrate a conquest at last: ARMENIA DEVICTA.[111]
Artavasdes himself was conveyed to Alexandria. The thing could be done in style: his chains were silver, or perhaps gold.[112] And the victory merited celebration. A great Dionysiac procession took place in Alexandria in late 34, as was only fitting for Antony as Dionysis-Osiris, and amply precedented in the city. Not everything went according to plan: Artavasdes and his fellow captives refused to pay obeisance to Cleopatra. But it was still a ceremony in which Antony could bask.
Unfortunately, it was also uncomfortably close to a Roman triumph, which itself had many Dionysiac associations;[113] and it was all too easy for Octavian to represent it as a sacrilegious transfer of the Roman ceremony to Egypt.[114] And that was not all. At around the same time, perhaps indeed at the same ceremony,[115] came the 'Donations of Alexandria'. In the Alexandrian Gymnasium were set up high golden thrones for himself and Cleopatra, and lower ones for their children: and he declared Cleopatra monarch (along with her son Caesarion) of Egypt, Cyprus and Koile Syria. Armenia, Media and - when conquered - Parthia were to fall to their six-year-old son Alexander Helios; Libya and Cyrene to his twin Cleopatra Selene; and Ptolemy Philadelphus, still only two, was to have Phoenicia, Syria and Cilicia. Then the children appeared themselves, Alexander with Median clothes and head-dress, Ptolemy with the distinctive Macedonian boots, cloak and cap — but
55-33 в.с.
Alexander had a regal tiara too, and Ptolemy a diadem.[116] It was all show. The gestures made no difference to the administration of the East.[117] But it was a show with style, and it doubtless went down very well in Alexandria.
It was still an extraordinary thing to do, and Octavian clearly relished it. Just as in 36 when he flaunted his liaison with Cleopatra, Antony surely underestimated the dangers of such behaviour before the Roman public: and once again we see a substantial political error centring on Cleopatra — perhaps indeed inspired by her persuasion. At that time, Antony was still concerned about Italian opinion. He responded to Octavian's constitutional talk by writing grandly himself to the Senate about restoring the Republic.[118] But the antics in Alexandria belied the republican pretence. The gestures may have meant little, but if they meant anything they meant a dynastic succession: Antony was indeed a second Hercules, but in fathering a new race of monarchs, and fathering them from a foreign woman. He would even issue coins with his head on one side and Cleopatra's on the other. It was unthinkable, a foreign woman on a Roman coin![119] True, his Roman children were not forgotten either: at around this time he was issuing coins with his head and that of his eldest son Antyllus, his principal heir in Roman law.[120]But there too the suggestions were all too close to a dynasty; and that was not the Roman way.
4i
Still, one should not overstate the damage. Octavian certainly fastened on this, and Antony's friends in Rome were certainly discomfited:[121] that is enough to demonstrate its unwisdom. But still in early 3 2, when he sought ratification in Rome for his acta, the Antonian consuls Sosius and Ahenobarbus believed they could hush up the affair of the Donations, some fifteen months earlier:[122] hardly credible, if they had been as public and spectacular as our sources Plutarch and Dio suggest.
Other propaganda mattered more. Of course, Antony and Octavian had been exchanging public abuse for years, with particular ferocity during the early stages in 44—43 and the Perusine War of 40.[123] Butduring the last few years Octavian had rather been directing his fire at Sextus — the champion of the slaves and pirates, or so Octavian could pretend.216 With Sextus' fall, the propaganda battle with Antony recommenced, and they were soon exchanging public letters and manifestos. Part of it was simply the competition to outbid one another in constitutionalist protestation; but much was more personal. That of course followed the traditions of Roman invective, but it also suited the times. To be successful, propaganda needs to find a willing public, with prejudices it can subtly mirror and exploit. Now it was easy to see civil war and fraternal bloodshed as the index of the collapse of the old virtues. The public was ripe for believing what it was told about Antony's morality, and for thinking that it mattered. By winter 35/4 Octavian was probably making capital out of his sister's treatment: surely she was entitled to a divorce — but she was of course too noble to seek one.217 Then there was all the eastern degeneracy, the debauchery, the infatuation (as of course it must be) with Cleopatra. All could be painted in the most lurid colours. Horace's ninth Epode, written a few years later in 31, gives some of the flavour:
Future generations will not believe it - a Roman soldier, bought and sold, carrying stakes and bearing arms for a woman, even bringing himself to serve under withered eunuchs! And amid the army's standards the sun glimpses a shameful mosquito net.
(Hor. Epodes ix. 11—16)
Tales could be told of Antony anointing Cleopatra's feet in public, or reading love-letters as he delivered judgments - even springing from his tribunal to hang on to Cleopatra's litter as she passed!218 Antony's entourage too came in for picturesque attack: stories were told of a banquet where Plancus danced, naked and painted, as a sea-god.219 And Cleopatra herself: she evidently wished to rule in Rome - why, her favourite form of oath was 'so may I give my judgments on the Capitol'! But Rome might then be nothing: were they not scheming to move the capital to Alexandria?220
Cf. above, p. 20; Wallmann 1989 (c 243) 163-77, 185-220. Even after Sextus fell, this public front was maintained: cf. RG 25.1, 'mare pacavi a praedonibus', and 27.3, 'bello servili'; and in late 36 Octavian made a great show of restoring his 'slaves' to their owners for punishment (RG 23.1; App. BCiv. v.i 30.544-5 with Gabba 1970 (в j 5)ad loc.; Dio xlix. 12.4—5).
Plut. Ant. 54.1, 57.4, with Pelling 1988 (в 138) ad loc. In 35 sacrosanctity was extended to include Li via and Octavia (Dio xlix. 38.1 with Rcinhold 1988 (в 1 )o)adloc.;cf. Endnote 2): that was doubtless a related ploy. Octavian's women should have a solemnity to offset the awesome but shameless Cleopatra.
Plut. Ant. 58.9-11, the stories of Octavian's friend Calvisius Sabinus: Plutarch did not believe them, 59.1. 219 Veil. Pat. 11.83.2.
220 Dio l.4.1-2, j, 26.5; Veil. Pat. 11.82.4; Livy, Per. 132; cf. Prop. 111.11.31-50, esp. 46; Hor. Carm. i.37.5-12; Ov. Met. xv.826-8; Scott 1933 (c.212) 43-4; Fadinger 1969 (в 42) 115-18, 163. Augustus himself included such material in his Autobiography, published in the twenties: cf. fr. 16M.
Antony of course responded. Octavian's battle-record was frivolous and cowardly; now his treatment of Lepidus was outrageous. What had happened to Antony's share of Sicily? Or to the troops he was owed? Now Octavian had found land for all his own troops, what would be left for Antony's? And Octavian's behaviour was pretty outlandish too: he had had his affairs with consular wives, indeed his friends were carefully inspecting unclothed matrons and virgins to pick for his pleasure; and had people not heard of that strange banquet of the twelve gods, when Octavian had taken the role of Apollo?[124] It was not just Antony who dealt in foreign marriages, either; Octavian had offered his daughter Iulia to Cotiso, king of the Getae - indeed, promised to take Cotiso's own daughter in return.[125] (One wonders what Livia might have said to that.) Octavian was much too fond of gaming, too.[126] But many of Antony's lines, far too many, had to be defensive. He wrote a work de sua ebrietate, On his own drunkenness, for instance[127] — presumably less entertaining than it sounds, not a tippler's memoir but an earnest insistence that he was less drunken than Octavian alleged. But the attacks on Cleopatra were clearly the most damaging. In a public letter of 53 he remonstrated with Octavian:
What has changed your view towards me? Because I'm screwing the queen? Is she my wife? [Of course not!][128] And I've been doing it for nine years anyway. And what about you? Is Livia the only woman you screw? I bet, when you read this, you'll just have been inside some Tertulla or Terentilla or Rufilla or Salvia Titisenia — or all of them. Does it matter where and in whom you have your erections? (Suet. Aug. 69)
The tone as well as the content has its point. This is the broad, coarse language of the soldier, the thoroughly masculine Roman. A man like this would not waste his time with effeminate mosquito nets.
There was another medium, too, that of visual art: and here Antony found it even more difficult to hold his own. Particularly striking was the treatment of the gods. Antony might have his Dionysus, and a few years earlier he had been emphasizing Hercules. Both could seem all too appropriate to an Italian audience. That Dionysiac blend of excess, drunkenness and eastern menace was hardly reassuring. And Hercules, it was recalled, had fallen unmanned before Omphale: a suggestive model for Antony, indeed, and one that duly recurs in contemporary art. Octavian countered with more comfortable gods, especially Apollo with his civilized order, discipline, calm and restraint. Here too Octavian found a willing audience: Apolline themes, portrayed with delicate restraint, swiftly become favourites in private dwellings, sometimes in rooms which would not be open to any public gaze: that must reflect genuine Italian taste, a spontaneous welcoming of the new moral climate. But it was not just Apollo. On beautifully minted coins, Venus, Jupiter, Hermes and Victoria were all shown in association with Octavian. If the gods were taking sides, no one could doubt which divine entourage was the weightier.[129] And here Antony could do little to reply: religion worked differently in the East, and he could hardly be more than Dionysus incarnate. A plurality of gods would simply blur the picture, and no wonder that even Hercules was dropping from view.
So propaganda flourished. At whom was it all aimed? Really, at everyone, or at least everyone in Italy. We might expect the veteran colonies to be most important: after all, the veterans had refused to fight one another in 40,[130] and the recent mutiny had shown that Octavian's control of them was insecure. Doubtless they did matter, and Antony's coarse language would strike a particular chord with them; but perhaps they mattered less than we naturally assume. For one surprising omission from the catalogue of propaganda themes is the memory of Iulius Caesar himself. Was Antony or Octavian his true heir? In 44-43 that theme had been vital.[131] Now there was certainly a little of this: Antony for instance made something of Caesarion — Caesar's true son, as he claimed in a letter to the Senate (not merely adopted, like Octavian);[132]while Octavian toyed publicly with the idea of invading Britain again, and — very slowly — was building a temple to Divus Iulius in the Forum Romanum.[133] Still, this is surprisingly little. To judge from the propaganda now, Caesar was out of date; just as there had been no particular concern to portray the war with Sextus as a rehash of the old civil war, with a young Caesar and a young Pompey reliving their fathers' destinies. Yet surely, in the colonies themselves, Caesar's name was no irrelevance, and his veterans would not have been impervious to the battle-cry. Soldiers would surely be less moved by all this talk of oriental excess: Caesar too had had his women; soldiers, and their captains, were simply like that. Those themes had more appeal for the propertied classes of the Italian towns, where traditional morality was strong. These, probably, were the people whom Augustus was to eye a few years later with his moral legislation,231 and a constituency to which he was always alert. Even the Senate, the rich, the cultured would not be unmoved by the themes; we might expect them to be more sophisticated — after all, they turned out too sophisticated to stomach the moral reforms — and it is true that many of the most republican and traditional stayed loyal to Antony;232 but even the most urbane find propaganda hard to escape, if it is repeated often and insistently enough, and if it appeals sufficiently sharply to their pre-existent assumptions and prejudices. More senators eventually took Octavian's part than Antony's.233
Octavian anyway knew better than to bludgeon the cultured too crudely. 'Propaganda' is too crass a word to apply to the literary production of his followers. Horace, for instance, was hardly disloyal. When he was writing an Epode, the tone would be appropriately Archilochean and abusive. But he was also writing his Satires, where Lucilius had set the generic pattern of personal attack and derision; yet, very self-consciously, Horace turned away from the tradition, dwelling instead on the delicate portrayal of his life and his values, especially the value of friendship. Remarkably, Antony and Cleopatra escape attack; Horace's personalia are different, warmer and more intimate. If Octavian is in the background, the suggestions are gentle ones: these are his friends, and this is how they live. A few years earlier Virgil too had complimented Octavian in the first Eclogue — 'deus nobis haec otia fecit' (1.6), and there can be little doubt that the god is Octavian. Coming so early in the first poem, that is almost an informal dedication of the whole collection. But the tone is anything but bluntly propagandist. The final emphasis of the first Eclogue rests more on the emptiness faced by the dispossessed Meliboeus; and the whole book explores the different registers of tragedy one found in the Italian countryside, an idyllic land now wracked by a devastation for which, if one thought about it, Octavian himself took much of the blame. In the late thirties Virgil was at work on the Georgics, and there too he wrote warmly of Octavian. But once again the tone is often sombre, dwelling on the vast work that was needed to restore the beauty that had been marred and lost.234 As in the first Eclogue, Octavian can certainly offer hope: 'hunc saltern everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo|ne prohibete' (G. 1. 500—1). But still not all of these are the emphases Octavian would have favoured himself. Guided doubtless by Maecenas, he was already seeing the value of a patronage which was notably loose and free, and the poets responded with writing
231 See below, ch. 18 pp. 883-93. 232 See below, pp. 49-50. 233 See below, p. 5 3.
234 That is a suggestion even of the proem to the third Gcorgic, where Virgil promises Octavian a poetic temple in the manner of Pindar. The 'temple' will be in Mantua. After G. 11.198-9, and indeed Eel. ix.27-9 (see above, p. 14), Mantua's suggestions are tragic; its idyllic description at G. 11.12-15 must now seem bland, with the tragedy artificially muted.
which meshed with his propagandist themes without always crudely echoing them. He already knew better than to confuse independence with subversion: knowledge which he was to retain for many years to come.
And, all this while, what was Octavian doing himself? He was in Illyricum, winning some glory for himself with cheap foreign blood. There had been campaigns there a few years earlier: in 39 Pollio had been involved with the Parthini in the south, and possibly with the Delmatae as well,235 at the same time an army of Octavian had apparently been active somewhere in the country.236 But little had been achieved, .and there was still plenty for Octavian to do. And, of course, Illyricum bordered Antony's dominion. It was not very likely that it would be strategically valuable if it came to war; at least, not unless Illyricum could be fully conquered, and that would hardly be practicable in the time. A civil war would probably be fought in Greece, and Greece would still be reached most readily by the sea-crossing from Italy. But, when war came, at least Octavian's troops would not have far to go. He could reasonably hope to make inroads into Antony's territory before Antony himself could return.
The campaigns themselves are described elsewhere in this volume.237 By summer 3 3 Octavian was back in Rome, sporting the eagles which Gabinius had lost in 48 and the defeated Delmatae had now returned.238 The achievements were modest but real, and Illyricum had certainly served its purpose: Octavian had secured his excuse for keeping his soldiers in arms, the men had been battle-hardened, and Octavian himself looked far more soldierly at the end than at the beginning. Why, he had even contrived to be wounded, though not always very satisfactorily: at Setovia, for instance, he was struck by a stone on the knee. And he might seem something of a disciplinarian as well. On one occasion he had gone so far as to order a decimation of his own troops.239 During his brief winter stays at Rome Octavian could inveigh against Antony, and contrast his own energy with Antony's sloth.240 Now
This is disputed, and is connected with the difficult question of Pollio's own political position during those years. For different views cf. Syme 1937 (d 67); Bosworth 1972 (c 34); and Woodman 1983 (в 203) on Veil. Pat. 11.78.2.
App. BCiv. v.80.538; Veil. Pat. 11.78.2; it is possible, but not perhaps very likely, that Octavian's army and Pollio's were one and the same (cf. Bosworth 1972 (c 34) 466-7; Woodman 1983 (в 203) on Veil. Pat. 11.78.2). App. BCiv. v.75.320 records an expedition sent by Antony against the Parthini in late 39; that campaign, pace Bosworth 1972 (c 34) 466, is much more likely to be identical with Pollio's. 237 See below, pp. 172—j, J49—JO.
App. ///. 28.82; RG 29.1. On the date of Octavian's return cf. Schmitthenner 1958 (c 304) 215-16.
Decimation was in fact rather in fashion: instances had been ordered by Caesar in 49 (Dio xli.3;.5, if that can be trusted), Domitius Calvinus in 39 (Dio XLViit.42.2), and Antony in 36 (Plut. Ant. 39 9, Dio xlix.27.1). But in each of those cases the punishment was rather more clearly deserved than on this occasion. 240 Cf. Plut. Ant. 55.1, App. 111. 16.46.
47
35-33 в с.
people might actually believe him. And in Rome itself celebration could be marked in other ways. It might be by triumphs. Admittedly, in 34 the Antonian Sosius celebrated his triumph over Judaea, possibly the most brilliant of them all - and celebrated it on, of all days, 3 September, the anniversary of Naulochus, when men's thoughts should have been with Octavian. For this to be allowed, Antony must still have had his influential friends. But at least Octavian's men could outdo Antony in numbers of triumphs: in 36 Domitius Calvinus over Spain, in 34 Statilius Taurus over Africa and Norbanus Flaccus over Spain, in 33 Marcius Philippus and Claudius Pulcher over Spain and L. Cornificius over Africa.[134] And in the Roman way triumph led to buildings ex manubiis, from the spoils of conquest. In the late thirties Domitius Calvinus was rebuilding the Regia, while in the Campus Martius Statilius Taurus was building a stone amphitheatre and Marcius Philippus restoring a temple of Hercules Musarum; on the Aventine Cornificius was rebuilding the temple of Diana. And it was not just the triumphators: Paullus Aemilius, apparently Octavian's partisan, completed and dedicated his Basilica in 34. Antony's followers responded. Domitius Ahenobarbus too built a temple of Neptune; Sosius planned a splendid temple to Apollo in the Circus, vainly hoping to impugn Octavian's exclusive claim on the god; but on their own they could hardly compete with Octavian's men. And though Octavian himself made a point of delaying his acceptance of an Illyrian triumph (he eventually celebrated it in 29), he certainly joined in the craze for construction: in 33 he rebuilt the Porticus Octavia, and put Gabinius' eagles on display there; in 32 he restored Pompey's theatre; work was also proceeding on the temples of Divus Iulius, Palatine Apollo and Jupiter Feretrius; and particular energy was spent on the Mausoleum, the material guarantee of Octavian's own eternal glory.[135]All of this would visibly attest the restoration of Rome's glory; nearly all pointed to Octavian. He was already turning Rome from brick to marble.
Sewerage mattered too; that fell to trusty Agrippa. He organized an extensive scheme of cleaning and repair; indeed, during these years he carried out a massive overhaul of the whole water supply.[136] In 34, it seems, he restored one aqueduct, the Aqua Marcia, then in 3 3 the Aqua Iulia; he also repaired others, the Aqua Appia and the Anio Vetus; and reservoirs and ornamental fountains were built all over the city. As aedile in 3 3 — an odd but significant appointment for so distinguished a man - Agrippa fostered the people in other ways, with spectacular games, free distributions of salt and olive oil, free admission to the baths, and a scattering of vouchers in the theatre for clothing, money and otherthings.[137] A more dignified step was Agrippa's revival of the lusus Troiae,[138] later to be celebrated in the Aeneid(v. 545-603). Octavian had been alert for some time to the possibilities of a tasteful antiquarianism. As early as 43 he had been hinting at a link with Romulus,[139] and in 38 there had been some ritual at the casa Romuli on the Palatine:[140] nor, probably, was it coincidence that he chose to live so close to the casa Romuli himself.[141] His traditionalism was gathering style. To emphasize the point, astrologers and magicians were expelled from the city.249 They were altogether too unroman.
And Antony? His thoughts were still far away. In 33 he planned a second Parthian campaign, this time with his new ally Artavasdes of Media: they were now more closely linked, with Alexander Helios betrothed to the king's daughter Iotape. Iotape had indeed been safely transported to Alexandria - an additional stimulus to loyalty, perhaps. In the spring of 33 Antony and Artavasdes met on the Araxes. All, or almost all, of Antony's eastern army was already in Armenia, a full sixteen legions.250 In 36, the need to concentrate his troops had delayed the invasion till uncomfortably late in the year; now, he was in a much better position for an early attack. But such thoughts were already out of date, and finally even Antony came to realize it. The defence of the eastern frontier was left to the Median king and to Polemo, to whom he now gave Lesser Armenia.251 Antony's own troops began the 2,500-km march back to the Ionian coast. At last, he had 'turned to the civil war'.252
x. preparation: 32 b.c.
Almost certainly, the second term of the triumvirate expired on 31 December 33.253 This time there would evidently be no question of renewing it, even as the duovirate it had now become. This would not leave the legal position of Antony and Octavian unsupportable,254 but it was certainly embarrassing, and more embarrassing for Octavian than for Antony. Octavian had lately been making so much of his respect for Roman tradition and the Roman republican constitution; and Octavian would be in Italy, where legal questions could awaken more interest. In the East Antony simply ruled - as god, monarch, proconsul, or triumvir, it hardly mattered. In Italy , it might. And Octavian's position was delicate in other ways, for if the triumvirate had expired the consuls might matter more; and the consuls of 3 2 were to be C. Sosius and Cn.
preparation: 32 b.c.
Domitius Ahenobarbus — not merely Antonians but peculiarly impressive ones, particularly Domitius with his record of republican political commitment and all the weight of an ancient family. Nor was he the only old republican to prefer Antony to Octavian. So did Cato's grandson, L. Calpurnius Bibulus, and there were others too.255 Not that the issue would be decided simply by the credentials of one's Roman followers. It would depend on martial strength: and Antony's army and Antony himself were infinitely more formidable a force than anything Octavian had yet confronted. In retrospect, we too readily think of Octavian as already marked out for victory. History may have been on his side, but many of the crucial factors were not. Since 37 Octavian had certainly done much to redress the odds, which till then had heavily favoured Antony: Octavian's politics had been much the shrewder, his campaigns the more triumphant; his supporters increasingly included persons of family and achievement.256 But to a measured observer those odds were still on Antony.
The pleasantries soon started. The consuls were armed with a dispatch from Antony, recounting his acta and asking for ratification — something he did not legally need,257 but knew it was tactful to seek; it may also have included some further offer to lay down the triumvirate.258 True, in January little was heard of all this; the experienced Domitius held the fasces, and thought some of the acta better suppressed. But on 1 February259 Sosius took over the fasces and launched a public attack on Octavian. Most interestingly, his motion of censure was vetoed by a tribune: the institutions of the Republic might seem alive once more. If that suggests that the motion would otherwise have passed, it is eloquent testimony for the degree of senatorial sympathy Antony still enjoyed. But the inference is precarious. The motion was an extreme step; if Sosius had doubted whether it would pass, a prearranged veto would have been a shrewd device.
For the moment, Octavian himself was sensibly absent from the city. But a few weeks later he responded with a show of force in the Senate: he was surrounded by an armed guard, and, whatever his legal status, he took his seat on a chair of state between the consuls. Rome was accustomed to violent displays, but this was not the sort of tradition that Octavian wished to be seen reviving; still, it was immediately effective, for the consuls fled to Antony. Many senators, possibly several
255 Syme 1959 (a 93) 222, 239, 266—70, 282; Syme 1986 (a 95) 206-7, 264.
г» Syme 1939 (a 93) 234-42.
All the triumviral acts had already been ratified in advance: cf. above, p. 20 with n.80.
Cf. p. 41 and n. 210.
49
Cf. Gray 1975 (c 102) 17; Reinhold 1988 (в i jo) on Dio L.2.3. For the alternative view, that Sosius launched an attack on 1 January, cf. Fadinger 1969 (в 42) 19; n.i.
hundred,[142] accompanied them. Antony organized them into a 'counter- senate', reflecting his claim that the constitution was on his side. In the presence of the consuls, driven out by arrant force, the claim was not ridiculous. But their flight left Italy an open field for the completion of Octavian's propaganda, and his final transformation of a selfish war into a national crusade. It was a travesty, of course. The consuls might after all have been more useful in Rome itself, providing a visible reminder that there was more to Antony's side than eastern effeminacy.
They found Antony in Ephesus,[143] organizing the transport of his troops to Greece. It was a massive task. His army was eventually more than 100,000 strong, at least as large as for the Parthian campaign.[144] He had clearly been recruiting in the East, presumably both native orientals and resident Italians.[145] His fleet numbered 800, nearly 300 of them transports;[146] but that was surely not enough to carry the whole army, and they must have crossed the Aegean in several waves. Shortly Antony and his staff moved to Samos. As usual on campaign, there was time to kill: Cleopatra and Antony characteristically did so in style. The festivities became famous.[147] They also, of course, afforded a further diet for Octavian to feed his public.
Antony also faced a more serious choice. It still seemed likely that the campaign would start before the end of 32. Should Cleopatra stay for it, or should she return to Egypt? Domitius Ahenobarbus and others urged Antony to send her away, Canidius Crassus said she should remain — so the story went, and probably it was more than a story, for Domitius had just been in Rome and knew what Octavian was making of Cleopatra there. Other experienced politicians, including Plancus, clearly took the same view. Equally Canidius, soon to command the land-army, would naturally stress the importance of Cleopatra's military aid — at least 200 ships (presumably including crews), and vast financial support as well.[148]It was not at all an easy choice, for there was also the question of the troops' and allies' morale. Just as Octavian encouraged Italians to see the war as a crusade against the East, so many easterners surely saw it as a chance to avenge themselves on Rome.267 Such men would fight for their queen, not for a Roman general. Cleopatra had to stay.
By early summer the slow western journey had reached Athens.268 The time was coming for decisiveness, and Antony sent a note of divorce to Octavia. Perhaps he had little choice. When war came, it was inconceivable that Octavia could remain his wife, demurely tending the house and family of a public enemy (for such he would very likely be declared). Octavian had, it seems, been publicly urging his sister to divorce her lecherous and unfaithful husband for some time;269 Octavia would hardly continue to refuse. At Athens the prospect was already the subject for public jokes.270 One could already foresee the grave and sorrowful speech where Octavia announced her decision — a moving and elegant culmination for her brother's propaganda. Far better for Antony to initiate the matter himself; far better to get it over with now.
Octavia had to be dismissed, Cleopatra had to stay. Both steps made sense; but both were hard decisions, which fuelled Octavian's attacks and alienated valuable Italian support. In earlier days, with Pompey and with Brutus and Cassius, the better cause had managed to draw on eastern support without losing its solid Roman respectability. This was different. Even to Antony's most valued captains, Octavian's derision might seem to have a core of truth. The womenfolk symbolized something deeper. Antony didlook more like a champion of the East, an uncomfortable figurehead. Opinions might differ on what to do about it. The most influential figure was Domitius, by now it seems leader of a sort of 'Roman party'.271 He confined himself to public rudeness to Cleopatra:272 that was harmless enough. Others were more decisive. Plancus was Antony's most senior consular;273 Titius, Plancus' nephew and the slayer of Sextus, was consul designate.274 It was about now275 that both fled to Octavian, who was doubtless delighted: with every Roman who transferred allegiance, especially men as distinguished as this, the lines of East and West became more plain. Still, Plancus and Titius as yet had no followers, or none of which we hear. Antony's men might be troubled, but most stayed firm.
Plancus derided Antony in the Senate; not everyone was impressed,276 and a more sensational ploy was needed. The two renegades suggested that Antony's will, which rested with the Vestal Virgins, might repay study. It was illegal, as it happened, to open the will of a living man; no matter — Octavian opened it, alone and unsupervised.277 Its provisions were extraordinary: when Antony died he was to be buried in Alexandria; Caesarion was recognized as Caesar's son (though it is hard to say why this quite fitted in Antony's will); vast gifts were to be made to the children borne by Cleopatra to Antony. It was all exactly what Octavian might have wished for. Why, he might almost have written it himself. Perhaps indeed he did, at least in part:278 the Vestals would not know the will's contents, and Octavian could claim what he wished. And he was skilful enough to allege provisions which Antony, eager to retain his eastern support, would find as uncomfortable to deny as to admit.
Even Antony's preparations, worryingly massive as they were, could be turned to account. Perhaps by early August, his force was on the west coast of Greece.279 Was he intending to invade Italy, the natural climax of such treachery to Rome?280 That was desperately unlikely, in fact. Octavian firmly held Tarentum and Brundisium, the two great harbours of southern Italy, and it would be no easy matter for Antony to transport large quantities of troops in several waves and land them on hostile beaches.281 Roman civil wars were always fought in Greece, for precisely this reason: it was natural for one side to flee to exploit the resources of the East, but then virtually impossible to force a passage back to a defended Italy.
Still, the Italian public were not strategists. They feared what they were told to fear. Evidently they needed a champion, and it could only be Octavian; but his status was still uncertain. He was no longer calling himself triumvir (Antony, incidentally, had no such compunctions);282 though it would be hard to doubt that Octavian retained his vast provincial imperium, he wanted something more, something which would clearly justify him as the defender of Rome and its traditions, and
Cf. the cutting remark of one Coponius, Veil. Pat.11.83.).
Just as, alone and unsupervised in a temple, he found equally convenient material a few years later: the truth (so he claimed) about the consular status of old Cornelius Cossus. Cf. Livy 1v.20.5-11 with Ogilvie 196; (в ijj ) ad loc. and below, ch. 2 p. 80.
Cf. e.g. Syme 1939 (a 93) 282 n.i; Crook 1957 (c 68) 36-8; contra, Johnson 1978 (c 128); Wallmann 1989 (c 243) 310—13. 279 Kromayer 1898 (c 143) 57.
Cf. Livy, Per. 132; Dio l.9.2; Veil. Pat. 11.82.4; Plut. Ant. 58.1-3 with Pelling 1988 (в 138) ad be.
Cf. Plut. Ant. 62.3; Hermocrates at Thuc. vi.34.5. The strategic position is set out masterfully by Kromayer 1898 (c 143) 57-67- 282 MRR 11 417-18, cf. RRC 545-6.
render this the most moral of civil wars. The propertied classes of Italy came to his rescue. For much of summer 3 2 he was organizing an oath to follow his personal leadership:283 it was to be taken throughout Italy, and indeed all the western provinces (that probably meant little more than the Roman citizens in each).
Of its own free will, all Italy swore allegiance to me, and demanded me as its general for the war I won at Actium; the Gallic and Spanish provinces, Africa, Sicily and Sardinia took the same oath. (Rm Gestae 25.2)
The oath did nothing to improve Octavian's legal status, but its moral implications were extraordinary. It was taken to him personally. There were a few civilian precedents,284 but the nearest analogies were in fact military, the oath taken by soldiers to their general: and it was appropriate that Italy and the provinces were 'demanding Octavian as their general' for the war. Besides the backing it gave Octavian, this was also one way of preparing Italy psychologically for conflict. There were doubtless others too - for instance, the Res Gestae passage goes on to speak of more than 700 senators 'serving under Octavian's colours',285 and such language probably goes back to the events themselves. Of course, there had been appeals to consensus Italiae, the united sentiment of all Italy, many times before.286 Now, as usual, the public's feelings were doubtless more complex. For one thing, Italy was growling at Octavian's new financial exactions, severe even by the standards of the last twenty years.287 And it would be naive to think that the oath was wholly voluntary. Some communities were indeed 'excused' from taking it, for instance Antony's own veteran colonies.288 Still, the claim of harmony was not mere hypocrisy. A great many senators, for instance, seem to have come over to Octavian during these final stages;289 and it seems likely that only a few of Antony's colonists exploited Octavian's dispensation.290 In 40 the veterans had refused to fight one another, but this time it would be different. At last, Italy was almost solid for Octavian.
Cf. esp. von Premerstein 1957 (a 74) and, briefly, Brunt and Moore 1967 (в 2t;)on RG 25.2; Syme 1939 (a 93) 284-92; Herrmann 1968 (c 117) 78-89; Linderski 1984 (c 164); Girardet 1990 (c 97) 345—50. The evidence for the oath's dating is set out by von Premerstein 1937 (a 74) 41; Syme 1939 (a 93) 284-5 suggests, probably rightly, that the Italian cities took the oath not simultaneously but in sequence.
Von Premerstein 1937 (a 74) 27-36; for important qualifications, Herrmann 1968 (c 117) 50-89.
RG 25.3, cf. n.260 above. The phrase is often taken to imply that all the senators accompanied Octavian on his campaign: that need not follow. 286 Syme 1939 (a 93) 285-6.
2,7 Plut. Ant. 58.2; Dio l. 10.4-5, '6-3, 20.3, liii.2.3; Pliny, HNxxxvti.io; cf. Syme 1939 (a 93) 284; Nicolet 1976 (d 104) 95; Yavetz 1969 (a i 10) 25-6.
Especially Bononia, Suet. Aug. 17.2; but it seems that even here Octavian made attempts to win them over (Dio l.6.3).
Cf. Wallmann 1976 (c 242). »0 Dio l.6.3, cf- li.4.6 with Keppie 1983 (e 65) 76.
The time for action was approaching, though the summer was wearing on, and it did not now look as if the decision would be reached this year. That was in Octavian's interests, in fact: Antony had his vast army ready, backed by all the wealth of the East; Octavian's treasury was worryingly empty.291 But Octavian's political preparations, at least, were almost complete, and in late summer he could declare war. That too should be done in the right style. War was declared on Cleopatra alone: she after all was the real enemy. And it was declared in the most Roman of fashions: Octavian disinterred, perhaps even fabricated, an ancient fetial rite — a picturesque affair of casting a spear into a symbolically hostile patch of land.292 Not of. course that Antony was ignored: he was stripped of the consulship he was to hold the next year, and also of 'the rest of his power'293 — presumably the triumvirate which he was still claiming and, on one possible view, he still held. But he was not yet declared a public enemy. The moment for that would soon come.294 For Antony would surely stand by Cleopatra: and then, would he not be a self-confessed enemy of Rome?
XI. ACTiим, 31 B.C.
During winter 32/1 Antony's force stood ready in Greece. His main fleet was in the harbour of Actium; but Greece's western coast is pitted by natural harbours, and it was best to defend them all. Pockets of ships were distributed fairly widely - in Methone, for instance, Leucas, Corcyra, Taenarum and probably Corinth.295 Antony himself wintered in Patrae, with yet another contingent of ships and men. The next summer would clearly see the critical campaign, and he could still be sanguine. True, Italy was lost, and lost more conclusively than he would have hoped; that was disappointing. But he could reasonably reflect that, once Octavian had survived the buffeting of the Perusine War, he would always have the advantage there. In Italy Octavian was the man in possession: far less adept politicians would have been able to capitalize on that. Anyway, the politics were virtually over. Antony might still go through the motions of offering to resign the triumvirate, after he had won his victory (as he now had to specify): two months later, or possibly six.296 It all hardly mattered now.
Cf. p. 5 3 and n. 287.
DioL.4.4-5 with Reinhold 1988 (в i jo);cf. Livy, 1.3 2.4 with Ogilvie 196) (в ad be.; Rich 1976 (a 81) 56-7, ioj-6; Wiedemann 1986 (f 237).
rf/v aAAr/v tЈovoiav vaaav, Dio L.4.3 with Reinhold 1988(8 150) ad be.; cf. Plut. Ant. 60.1.
Antony certainly was declared a bottis at some point (App. BCiv. iv.4 j. 193, cf. iv.38.161; Suet. Aug. 17.2): probably later in 32 or in early 31 rather than after Actium, as Fadinger 1969(842) 2435 2 argues.
Cf. Dio l.11-13; Oros. vi. 19.6-7; Strab. viii.4.1-4 (359Q; Veil. Pat. 11.84.1, Plut. Ant. 67.5; Kromayer 1898 (c 143) 60. 256 Dio L.7.1-2.
In military terms Antony still looked ahead. He had been unable to recruit in Italy, but not all orientals were weaklings, and his forces were probably the larger, possibly 100,000 infantry against Octavian's 80,000. The cavalry was equally matched, but Antony's fleet of 500 men-of-war was more numerous than Octavian's and - almost as important — his were the larger ships.[149] The way naval battles were now fought, bulk was likely to count; certainly, it had counted at Naulochus. Antony's side was also the wealthier. Octavian's exactions had doubtless done something to replenish his treasury, but he could still hardly compete: for one thing, he had already had to give his troops a precautionary donative.[150]Last of all, there was Antony himself, still surely more effective a general than Octavian despite those Illyrian victories. Antony knew how little those meant. True, he must have heard impressive things of Agrippa, who was still virtually untried when last Antony was in the West; he might prove a worthier adversary. But, everything considered, Antony still looked to be the winner.
It was clear what his strategy should be. Invading Italy was not an option, for sound military reasons.[151] Antony would have to wait for Octavian to come to him, just as Pompey had waited in 49—48; and, again like Pompey, he would hope to harass Octavian's fleet during the crossing, when the ships would be terribly cumbersome, with cavalry, legionaries and baggage on board. Even if they could land, they might find it hard to support themselves if Antony could maintain his expected superiority at sea. The lesson of 48 was again there to be learnt, when Caesar had certainly found it very difficult to establish himself with sufficient numbers of troops.[152] It might still be disconcerting that Pompey had finally lost, and then in the next civil war the eastern side had lost again; but Antony could still reflect that Pompey should really have won at Dyrrhachium, while Brutus and Cassius had fought their battle too far east.[153] The eastern side should strategically be the stronger. Sulla was the more telling precedent.
Once again, it all went wrong.[154] The danger in Antony's position was simply the necessity to divide his army and fleet among so many harbours. These various forces could reasonably be expected to reinforce one another if threatened; besides, the main force at Actium could be expected to harry any invasion fleet as it sailed down the Adriatic, if any target further south were chosen for its landing. But Agrippa was too quick. Surprisingly early in the } i season, he struck with an advance force and took Methone, then launched surprise attacks elsewhere on the coast, even as far north as Corcyra. Meanwhile Octavian himself managed to cross, surprisingly unimpeded, to the mainland north of Corcyra; within a few days he had reached Actium, and occupied the tactical strongpoint in the area, the hill of Mikalitzi. Soon Octavian had linked his camp by earthworks to the harbour of Gomaros. We do not even hear of any resistance, which is astounding. Perhaps there were operations which our sources omit, perhaps the Actium land-force had been called away to meet one of Agrippa's sudden threats elsewhere. Anyway, the first tricks had fallen to Octavian, and they turned out to be decisive.
Antony soon arrived himself from Patrae, and pitched camp near Punta on the southern coast of the bay. Octavian naturally tried to bring him to battle before he could concentrate the rest of his fleet or army; Antony naturally declined. When his troops arrived from their various stations, Antony established a new camp on the northern side of the straits, near Preveza. Only the plain of Nicopolis now separated the two armies, but it was Octavian who refused a land-battle. Antony tried strenuously to cut Octavian off from the river Louros in his rear, vital to his water supply, and there was clearly a series of cavalry battles in the northern plain: the most substantial was won by Statilius Taurus and the renegade Titius, by now one of Octavian's commanders. Then, once again, a contribution of Agrippa was crucial. His fleet took the island of Leucas, just south west of the mouth of the harbour; this afforded Octavian a safer anchorage than Gomaros, and made it difficult for Antony's other scattered ships to reinforce him. A little later Agrippa also took Patrae, where there were still ships, and Corinth. Antony was now under virtual blockade.
The analogy with 48 must again have been felt. This was Dyrrha- chium over again, but the roles were strangely reversed: it was now the eastern force under Antony which, like Caesar then, was cut off on the coast by a stronger army and fleet. Antony naturally thought of breaking out to the interior of Greece: that was what Caesar had done, and had gone on to win at Pharsalus. Octavian had already sent his own men into Greece and Macedonia, while Antony sent Dellius and Amyntas into Macedonia and Thrace303 - to seek mercenaries, according to our source Dio, but probably their brief was a wider one. Soon Antony himself set out to overtake them. While he was away Sosius tried to break out at sea, but was beaten by Agrippa. On his return Antony lost another cavalry battle. By now it looked very bleak. Allied kings had been killed - Bogud of Mauretania at Methone, Tarcondimotus304 with Sosius. Others were
303 Dio l. 15.4. 304 See above, p. 29.
defecting. Deiotarus Philadelphus of Paphlagonia had gone to Octavian some time since, and at some point he was joined by Rhoemetalces of Thrace;[155] now the much more valuable Amyntas went too. That was cheering to Horace,[156] and doubtless to Octavian too. Antony's position was becoming desperate. Provisions were failing: disease was rife - particularly, perhaps, malaria and dysentery, worsened by the shortage of supplies and water. Antony had no option but to withdraw all his troops to the southern bank, but that is even more waterless than the north, and the deaths went on.
Romans too were defecting. The most dispiriting was that of Domitius Ahenobarbus, already mortally ill. Dellius too, notorious for picking the right moment to change sides, realized that it was now: with him he took Antony's battle-plans. Not that they were hard to divine. The break-out to the interior was a serious option, and it seems to have been urged by the land-commander Canidius Crassus. But it would have meant abandoning the fleet; and even if the army could break out to Thessaly, even if Octavian obliged by offering battle there rather than relying on attrition, Antony's army was so wasted by disease that it would barely be able to fight. Realistically, the battle had to be fought at sea. Later romantic fiction would represent this as a crazed decision, influenced by Cleopatra:[157] but that is absurd. Antony had already done all he could on land; only now, in late summer, did he decide that a naval battle was the only option left.[158]
At the outset of the campaign Antony's fleet had outnumbered Octavian's, but Agrippa had destroyed some of his squadrons, while others had been unable to force their way through to join the Actium fleet. And there was a manning problem as well, for death and desertion had reduced Antony's numbers considerably. By now he had no hope at all of matching Octavian's numbers: otherwise, indeed, he would have forced on the sea-battle earlier. He eventually put to sea with perhaps 200 or 250 ships, while Octavian had 400 or more.[159] Antony simply burnt the remainder of his ships: better that than to allow them to fall into Octavian's hands.
Antony's chances of victory were evidently very poor. The most he could realistically hope for was to break out with as many ships and men as possible, and this seems to have been in his mind from the beginning: he shipped his treasure-chest, for instance, an extraordinary thing to do unless he was planning flight; he also gave orders to carry sails, which was most unusual for an ancient battle. He could keep his mind a little open, perhaps: he knew he could not break out without a fight, sea- battles were often unpredictable, and if things went surprisingly well then of course he would try to fight it out to the end. The weather might even be rough - it had been for the last few days before the battle - and that might add some further unpredictability: his galleons might better survive a buffeting than Octavian's slightly lighter ships. Still, the chance of a break-out in force was always the more likely option. He may not have told too many of his own troops: it would of course be highly damaging to morale, for most of them would have to be left to the victor's mercy. One need not doubt their surprise and dismay when, in mid-battle, they realized the truth.310 But his own mind must have been clear enough. He must also have known that the break-out was not going to be easy. Outflanking Octavian's superior numbers would be impossible, and the only way was to drive a wedge through the centre. Even if that could be done, a flight southwards involved a technical difficulty. The island of Leucas juts out just south of Actium, and with prevailing winds from the west and north west it would be hard to clear it under sail.311 The best hope was to join the battle as far out to sea as he could (Octavian would in fact be unlikely to resist this, for he too would want open waters to exploit his superior numbers and manoeuvrability); and if possible to delay it till the afternoon, when the wind typically veers from west to west-north-west.
That indeed is exactly what happened. On the morning of 2 September 31, Antony's fleet took up its station outside the harbour mouth. Cleopatra's squadron of sixty ships rested behind his centre, ready (it seems) for a concentrated strike on any weak point in Octavian's line - a sort of maritime Panzer-tactic, in fact. Octavian's much longer line moved to hem them in. Then, most eerily, for hours nothing happened. Antony was waiting for afternoon; Octavian would be content to wait much longer, for it was Antony, not he, who needed to break the blockade by battle. Around midday there was at last some movement of both fleets to seaward; but still, no real action. The first decisive move came in early afternoon, for both northern wings — Antony's right and Octavian's left under Agrippa — began to drift further north. It is not clear who started it. Perhaps it was Agrippa, as our principal source Plutarch suggests: now that both fleets were in more open sea, he could reasonably begin an outflanking move. More likely it was Antony, trying to entice Octavian into leaving a critical gap in the centre of his line. Anyway, gaps began to open, at least in Antony's line and perhaps
3,0 Memorably described by Plut. Ant. 66.6-8. зп Carter 1970 (c 51) 215-27.
ALEXANDRIA, 30 B.C.
in Octavian's too. Cleopatra's squadron seized the moment: she hoisted sail and bore down on the enemy. It is hard to say which side was the more startled. The squadron forced its way through, perhaps surprisingly easily;312 Antony himself moved from his massive flagship to a quinquereme and followed. So did others, but perhaps not very many. It is hard to think that even a hundred ships escaped; these had some legionaries on board, perhaps one hundred apiece — but the bulk of the fleet, and over three-quarters of the army, remained.
Once Antony and Cleopatra had sailed away, the rest of their fleet saw little point in the battle. Some galleons made their way back to the harbour in a peculiarly undignified way, backing water in a halting crablike movement to port.313 There was perhaps a little fighting, but nothing very fierce. The whole battle produced only 5,000 casualties, an amazingly small number by the standards of a sea-battle. Octavian did his best to make it a little more spectacular: a few ships were fired;314 and he took the ostentatious precaution of spending the night on board ship.
But it was hard to disguise the truth. The Battle of Actium was a very lame affair. Such as it was, Antony and Cleopatra arguably won it: at least, they achieved all they could reasonably have hoped. But they had so decisively lost the campaign that the success made little difference. There was some talk of the surviving army saving itself on land, and some forlornly set out for Macedonia;315 but it was all highly unrealistic. They soon went over to Octavian, who gave generous terms.316 The Battle of Actium delayed the end for a year; nothing more.
XII. ALEXANDRIA, 30 B.C.
Antony had concentrated almost, but not quite, all of his legions for the Actium campaign. The exception was a force of four legions under L. Pinarius Scarpus in Cyrene, left probably to protect Egypt from political disorder, for like most of the Ptolemies Cleopatra had many internal enemies. Anyway, they were now Antony's only hope, and the remains of his fleet crossed not to Alexandria but to Paraetonium, the nearest port to Pinarius' force. But, all too predictably, the hope proved ill founded: Pinarius swiftly declared for Octavian; and the dispirited Antony returned to Alexandria. Cleopatra had already been there for
312 Or so Plut. Ant. 66. j-6 suggests: that is not necessarily reliable (cf. Pelling 1988 (в 158) on Ant. 6 j-6), but the low casualty figures do suggest that there was no fierce fighting.
3,3 Hot. Epod. ix. 19-10, 'hostiliumque navium portu latentIpuppes sinistrorsum citae', a striking epigram. These were probably the remains of Antony's right, whose northern movement would have left them uncomfortably far from the harbour mouth. Cf. Pelling 1986 (c 186).
314 Augustan poets made the most of this. It was the best they could do. Cf. Hor. Carm. i.J7-1}, 'vix una sospes navis ab ignibus ...'; and Virg. Aen. viii.694— 5; then Dio l.34, whose battle- description is as usual wholly unreliable. 315 Dio li.1.4; cf. Plut. Ant. 67.8.
59
316 Plut. Ant. 68.2-5, with Pelling 1988 (в 138) ad lot.-, Keppie 1983 (e 65) 79-80.
ALEXANDRIA, 30 B.C.
some time, acting decisively. Many of the suspected nobles were murdered, and Artavasdes too was hauled from his captivity and executed. She also plundered extensively to gather money for the armies: hopelessly enough, for by now no money was likely to retain their loyalty.
Depressing news continued to arrive throughout the winter. The intelligent princes Antony had encouraged in Asia Minor were alert enough to know they should change sides. Amyntas had already gone at Actium, and Herod of Judaea shortly followed his example.317 So did lesser men, for instance the sons of Tarcondimotus of Cilicia;318 we do not hear when Archelaus and Polemo declared for Octavian, but that too was probably soon during the winter.319 Octavian himself had spent some time in Samos and Ephesus after the end of the Actium campaign, and was beset by embassies, for instance from Rhosus and probably Mylasa;320 for the cities too recognized who was their master now. By the end of 31 Octavian had effectively taken over Asia Minor, with his own man Q. Didius as governor of Syria. The loyalty Antony had always inspired still paid some slight dividends, for some gladiators were so determined to join him that they fought their way from Cyzicus through Galatia and Cilicia to Syria.321 But that was the only good news, and that was not much.
At the end of the year Octavian returned briefly to Italy, where there was a little trouble. Doubtless the financial discontent had not disappeared, though there were now some remissions; but a more immediate problem was presented by a large body of veterans, both his own and those who had come over to him after the battle. They had been sent back to Brundisium, and, just as their comrades had after Naulochus,322 they were insisting on their dispensability: for everyone knew that the war was virtually concluded. They wanted immediate demobilization, and that meant land. The obvious way to find it was to expropriate Antony's Italian partisans, yet it seems that there were precious few of those.323 Agrippa had been sent back to Italy soon after Actium, apparently because problems were already looming. Maecenas was already there.324 Octavian himself could afford only a month in Italy, and
311 Herod secured formal pardon from Octavian in Rhodes in spring, 30; but he had already given help to Q. Didius in resisting the Antonian gladiators. 31S Dio L.7.4; cf. above, pp. 29, 56.
3" Soon after Actium Archelaus was explicitly excused from any reprisals, along with Amyntas (Dio li.2.1). That suggests that he had gone over at once. Polemo, away on the eastern frontier, would take longer to hear of Actium, but nothing suggests that he delayed for long.
RDGE 58.III (= EJ2 301) and perhaps 60 ( = EJ2 303); cf. Millar 1973 (c 175) 58. Perhaps Samos too: Reynolds 1982 (в 270) doc. 13, with Badian 1984 (в 208) 168-9.
There they reluctantly made terms with Didius. Most soon met their deaths.
See above, p. 37. 323 See above, p. 53.
6l
324 It is just possible that Maecenas himself was at Actium, as Eltg. aJ Mate. 45-8 implies: so Wistrand 1958 (в 200) 16-19. If so, he returned very soon afterwards. But Dio Li.3.5 seems clearly to suggest that Maecenas had been left in charge at Rome during the campaign, and that is more likely to be right; so Symei939 (a 93) 292; cf. Woodman 1983 (в 203) on Veil. Pat. 11.88.2.
proceeded no further than Brundisium: large numbers of senators and knights, and many of the city plebs, poured forth from Rome to meet him. He was also met, somewhat less obsequiously, by the veterans. He made a show of asserting discipline, but in fact largely capitulated: those 'who had served him throughout' — probably that means those who had fought on his side at Actium - were to get land, the others (probably the Antonians) only money. Even this meant settling perhaps 40,000 or more.325 Where was the land to come from? Italy was quaking. The risk was all too clear that the trauma of the Perusine War would return. There was only one alternative, to buy the land rather than seize it, and that was what Octavian chose. Of course he did not have the money; but the treasure of Egypt beckoned, and the soldiers and the sellers of land had to be content with promises. There continued to be rumblings during Octavian's absence, including a mysterious 'conspiracy' led by young M. Lepidus, the former triumvir's son.326 But Italy would have to wait. Quite evidently, the final defeat of Antony and Cleopatra had to come first. Egypt's spoils were needed now.
It took a long time for Octavian's forces to reach Alexandria. With Syria safe, he might perhaps have shipped them to the Phoenician ports; but that too would take time, for they would need to travel in several waves, and Octavian preferred to march them overland from the Ionian coast. It was July before they approached Egypt. By then Antony and Octavian had been exchanging embassies for some time.327 Octavian offered nothing, though it does seem that he was more encouraging to Cleopatra. For one thing, he was worried that she might destroy her treasure, which Octavian needed so vitally: she was already making a great show of piling it together and packing it round with inflammable flax and tow. There was even some talk of allowing her children (presumably the younger ones, not the embarrassing Caesarion) to retain the throne, provided always that she surrendered Antony or killed him. All that was not unthinkable. Alexandria had seen mysterious deaths before; Rome had appointed many a surprising client king. Cleopatra herself may well have taken the proposals seriously, more seriously than Antony would have wished: certainly, Octavian's messengers seem to have been able to reach her and talk to her privately - very odd, unless she was giving them some encouragement. But such an outcome was never very likely, and it may be that Octavian never intended more than to sow mutual suspicions, or restrain Cleopatra from premature hopeless suicide. By July it was clear that it would be fought out to the end.
Dio li.4.2-8 with Reinhold 1988 (в 150) tut loc.; Keppie 1983 (e 65) 73-82, especially 85.
Veil. Pat. 11.88, cf.Livy, Per. 153; Dio liv. 15.4; Suet. Aug. 19.1: probably in 30 rather than 31 (as App. BCb. iv.50.217 clearly implies), even though inierat at Veil. Pat. 11.88.1 cannot give the precise dating that Woodman claims. Cf. Wistrand 1958 (в 200).
Plut. Ant. 72-3 with Pelling 1988 (в 138) ad loc.; Dio u.6-8.
ALEXANDRIA, JO B.C.
Octavian planned a simple pincer movement. Cornelius Gallus had taken over and reinforced Pinarius' legions, and he would attack from the west while Octavian's own troops completed their long journey from the east. Oddly, Antony himself moved to the western front (and was pretty ineffective there); yet the east was clearly the more important front. Octavian's difficult desert march to Pelusium turned out to be wholly unopposed, and Pelusium itself fell quickly, perhaps by treachery. Soon Octavian's army appeared before Alexandria itself. On 31 July there was a cavalry battle, which went quite well for Antony; but the storming of the city itself was clearly imminent.
During the night of 31 July came a most curious event, or so the story was later told — a mysterious sound of divine music, a strange procession as Dionysus himself abandoned the city.328 What really happened is not beyond conjecture. There was an ancient Roman custom, the evocatio of the gods of an enemy city before a battle: the Roman general would call them out and invite them to take up a new friendly Roman home. The rite was probably enacted before the fall of Carthage in 146;329 it was also used in the routine capture of a Cilician town, Isaura Vetus, in 75 B.C.330 Octavian was always sensitive to the use he could make of antique custom. The fall of Alexandria would be the greatest conquest of an enemy city since Carthage itself, and Cleopatra was the greatest threat to Rome since Hannibal. Octavian was the man who had solemnly recalled the old fetial formula for declaring war; he would hardly neglect an opportunity like this, and evocatio is exactly what we should expect. Antony had played Dionysus-Osiris for long enough. Now he was indeed to be deserted by his god.
On i August Octavian attacked, and Alexandria fell. First came a naval fiasco in the harbour: Antony's whole fleet deserted to Octavian. Then came an infantry exchange, which Octavian once again won decisively. Antony returned to the palace, and he died. Plutarch and after him Shakespeare tell the story magnificently - the false news that Cleopatra is dead, the slow removal of the armour, the slave who kills himself rather than strike his lord, the bungled death-blow, the wretched writhing as Cleopatra and her maids haul him into the mausoleum. At least we can believe that in the tumult Antony heard confused reports, and he may well have falsely believed that Cleopatra had taken her own life: it was the natural thing to do. But in fact Octavian's men took her captive first, and she lived on for nine more days.331
Octavian himself entered Alexandria without resistance, and in a careful speech announced his forgiveness of the city. But his mercy had
Plut. Ant. 7J.
Macrob. Sat. ш.9.6; Serv. ad Aen. xn.841; doubted by Rawson 1973 (f 203).
33° Hall 1972 (в 240); Le Gall 1976 (d 210).
63
331 For the date of her death (probably 10 August) cf. Skeat 1953 (c 219) 98-100.
its bounds. He took the treasure, of course. Caesarion was hunted down and killed; so was Antyllus, Antony's eldest son; there were other victims too, including Cassius Parmensis, the last of Iulius Caesar's assassins, and Canidius Crassus, the general of the Actium campaign. But many were spared, including Cleopatra's other children - at least for the present.[160] They were being kept for the triumph, and the taunts of the Roman crowd. And so, it seems, was Cleopatra herself: but here Octavian's plan went astray.
The story of her death is still more extraordinary than Antony's, and very hard to estimate. The ancient sources, especially Plutarch and Dio,[161] had no doubt that Octavian was trying to prevent her suicide, and used threats to her children to ensure that she stayed alive. This was, of course, to make certain that she would be displayed humiliatingly at his triumph in Rome; and, for the ancient sources, it was when Cleopatra realized the horror of this fate that she finally determined to kill herself. She bathed herself, and dressed in her finest regal attire - a strange version of the bathing and dressing that were important parts of a real funeral. Then she clasped the asp to her arm; she took her seat on the regal throne, flanked by the devoted maids Iras and Charmion who chose to join their mistress in death. The guards burst in to find them there in their tableau of death; Cleopatra had won her final marvellous victory. And it was the most appropriate of deaths, for the double cobra was an old Ptolemaic symbol, the uraeus-. on a Ptolemaic head-dress the cobras would rear up, as if to strike any enemy of the throne.[162] Now Cleopatra's very life had become hostile to her. It was right for the royal cobra to strike.
The version goes back very close to the events themselves. In outline it had taken shape by the time Horace wrote his Cleopatra Ode a few years later.[163] But modern scholars are sceptical.[164] They point to the advantages to Octavian of having her dead: even as it was, trouble continued in Egypt for some months,[165] and it would have been more perilous if Cleopatra had remained a potential figurehead. Would it not be better for Octavian to remove her? If actual murder was too crude, then at least he could leave poison, or indeed cobras, pointedly available — a glamorous equivalent of the revolver on the officer's table. Yet such a view raises more difficulties than it solves. It leaves it unclear why Octavian should have allowed her to live on for those nine days; we are even told that he foiled two earlier suicide attempts.[166] Octavian must have known his mind well before the city was taken. In the turmoil of the first day Cleopatra could readily have died, and it would have been easy to portray it as suicide, doubtless by a barbaric method. Octavian would have spoken regretfully of the mercy he would have shown: that sort of scene was to become commonplace in the early Principate. But the implications of the story we have are very different, and much less flattering to Octavian. No one could escape the inference that he was trying to keep her alive against her will, but was outwitted. Octavian was usually a more accomplished propagandist than this. It is surely better to assume that, if he kept her alive at all, he genuinely did want her for the triumph, just as his supporters wished.[167] Some of the details may well be fictional[168] - perhaps the famous story of the basket of figs, for instance. But, at least in outline, her splendid, serene, triumphant death is probably history, not legend.
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Свежие любовные романы в удобных форматах
Любовные романы
О психологии, саморазвитии и личностном росте
Саморазвитие
Детективы и триллеры, все новинки
Детективы
Фантастика и фэнтези, все новинки
Фантастика
Отборные классические книги
Классика
ВКОНТАКТЕБиблиотека с любовными романами, которая наверняка придётся по вкусу женской части аудитории
Любовные романы
Библиотека с фантастикой и фэнтези, а также смежных жанров
Фантастика
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