The Augustan Empire 43 BC

j. Ideology

The act of creative policy, however, that was Augustus' abiding legacy to Rome was the bringing into being of an ideology of rule, parallel to the careful traditionalism of most of what has been spoken of so far — surprising, in that it manifests itself quite early in Augustus' reign, and multifaceted, so that to describe it even summarily involves consider­ation of many phenomena, of which the 'imperial cult' is only one. Glorification of the personality of the ruler, advertisement of his role, proclamation of his virtues, pageantry over his achievements, visual reminders of his existence, and the creation of a court and a dynasty: those are,par excellence, the things that make a.d. i 4 different from 30 b.c.

It is a difficult question how far the pattern of ideas and symbols that pervades the culture of Augustus' age was 'orchestrated'. Scholars do make such a claim,[267] and, however great the need to resist exaggeration, at least some of the broad lines of the pattern must have been someone's deliberate contrivance. Augustus was probably entirely sincere when he said he wanted to be remembered as the creator of the 'best possible condition' (optimus status), and in his delight when the crew and passengers of a ship from Alexandria put on festal dress and poured libations and cried that 'because of him they had their livelihood, because of him they sailed the seas, they enjoyed freedom and prosperity through him';[268] but into that broad river flowed many channels, some the result of more deliberate channelling than others.

The public cult of the ruler bulks large in the ideology of the Roman empire. Augustus began it - though Iulius Caesar and Antony would have done the same. Cult means, strictly, performing acts of worship to the ruler as a god, but, broadly conceived, it is about people's percep­tions and descriptions of the ruler and his role, and also about the practical business of securing and rewarding adherents in positions of importance in the cities and regions. The cult of the ruler as founder, saviour and benefactor was well established in the Greek-speaking world, and such honours had been bestowed, from time to time, on Roman commanders in the late Republic; even 'Roma', as a divinity, had come to be an object of cult in the East.[269] But it was the rival claims of the triumvirs to influence in the cities that raised the stakes in the game,⁹² and hence the cult and symbolism of the ruler were promoted and financed in the East by Augustus and by his wealthier supporters.[270] In Rome, the plebs had offered worship to Scipio, Marius and Iulius Caesar, but its betters had been too strongly principes inter pares for that, and Augustus behaved carefully. A gesture used by his successors, but no doubt deriving from him,⁹⁴ was the refusal of public divine honours for his person in his lifetime: we have seen how he declined to allow Agrippa's temple in the Campus to be called' Augusteum'. On the other hand, there were by now many Roman citizens about the world: the colonizations of Iulius Caesar had made a big difference. For them, the answer was an official cult of 'Rome and Augustus'. The West and North (except for Provence, southern Spain and Africa, long the home of cives Romani) were still under conquest and first-stage reorganization, and had no traditions offering precedent: Augustus promoted there major centres of cult and ceremony, the 'Altar of the Three Gauls' at Lugdunum and the 'Altar of the Ubii' at Cologne. For the Roman plebs there was yet another expedient in this rich fund of devices, the setting of a new cult of th& genius, or 'abiding spirit', of the ruler amongst the little tutelary gods of the 'blocks' of urban Rome, the lares compitales: their cult was in the charge of the 'block leaders', magistri vicorum.^9b Those magistri were freedmen; Augustus took account more globally of the fact that large numbers of Roman citizens were actually of that status, promoting another novelty: collegia of freedmen devoted to the cult of the ruler came into being in the cities under the title of 'Augustales', forming a freedman elite parallel to the municipal elites of the freeborn.[271]

No account on the scale here available can do justice to this vast subject. The antiquarian revival of cults, temples and ceremonies in Rome, and the harnessing of the major priesthoods to the new order, are part of the story;[272] so, too, the inclusion of Augustus' genius in oaths sworn by the divinities; so, too, the additions to the religious calendar celebrating his important dates. We have been bidden, rightly, to develop an imagination for the enormous visual impact of it all, with images of the ruler everywhere, in endless profusion, both actual and portrayed on the coinage. In summary, the whole complex was meant to serve as an ecumenical unifying force: citizens and non-citizens, classes and statuses, language- and culture-groups enmeshed in a common, though varied, symbolic network, and the cult acts of Gallic magnates, leading bourgeois of Asia, successful freedmen in the municipia, the plebs of Rome, and the legions,[273] all focussed on the ruler, legitimizing his rule on the charismatic plane, while ministering at the same time to their own desire for social prominence.

The 'divine family' must return into consideration here, from a more conceptual viewpoint. Should we, for example, see Livia Drusilla as an 'empress', or Gaius and Lucius Caesar as 'princes'? Did Augustus inhabit a 'palace', and was he surrounded by a 'court'? The best answer to all those questions would be 'hardly, yet', and, as in the constitutional sphere, comparison with the Severan or Diocletianic age shows how far there was to go. Yet transition was certainly occurring, as can be neatly seen in the matter of Augustus' house.[274] Its nucleus was the house of the republican orator, Hortensius, on the south-western slope of the Palatine, and it remained modest in type and scale, though neighbouring properties were added to it[275] to an extent that is yet uncertain (and the well-known 'House of Livia' presumably came to count as part of it). But the symbolic significance of the dwelling was played upon with insist­ence.¹⁰¹ Augustus' temple of Apollo was built not merely adjacent to it but connecting directly with it. Then, in 27 B.C., the civic crown of oak was placed permanently above its doorway, and laurels were planted to flank the entrance.¹⁰² When Augustus became pontifex maximus in 12

B.C., a shrine of Vesta was consecrated in the house.[276] After a fire on the Palatine in a.d. 2 or 3, in which the house of Augustus and the temple of the Magna Mater suffered badly, a public subscription was got up, of which Augustus graciously accepted part; but he then declared the house public property, as being the residence of thepontifex maximus.^m A few years later, Ovid, describing how his books from exile might approach the ruler, shows - if we discount a degree of understandable sycophancy - how much more than a mere house the 'Caesaris domus', though still so called, had become.[277]

The association of the ruler's family with him took no long time to develop.[278] We have seen the 'divine family' on exhibition in the frieze of the Ara Pacis of 13 B.C., and can see it at a later stage in the inscriptions recorded in the Codex Einsiedlensis as coming from statues that adorned a gateway at Ticinum, dated to Augustus' thirtieth tribunician power, a.d. 7-8.[279] Honours, even cult, were paid in the cities to members of the family besides Augustus. To what extent the group associated, or even lived, together is uncertain;[280] but there sound like the makings of a 'court' when we hear of Augustus' views about the younger members appearing for dinner with their elders and whether young Claudius could be allowed to make public appearances,[281] and there is rather more evidence about the education of the 'princes' and other youngsters who belonged to the charmed circle.[282] The house of a princeps vir of the republican time had never been solely a haven of privacy, so it was not new for the ruler to live his life in the public gaze, but Augustus wanted his domus to serve as a universal exemplar of the values he aimed to promote.

Most of the evidence about imperial insignia and ceremonial[283]concerns developments later than Augustus: till well after his day, accessibility of the ruler and primacy inter pares remained the ideal. The orb and sceptre carried by the 'emperor', the sacred fire carried before the 'empress', belong to an ideology that was to lead to the remote and hieratic emperorship of late antiquity, and hardly began before the middle of the second century a.d. Yet some seminal elements can already be traced, for example, in the oak-leaf crowns and laurel wreaths, and the symbolism of victory-on-the-orb on the coinage and elsewhere; and

Augustus was accorded the right to wear at any time the triumphal costume, which was the dress of Jupiter himself, and included a sceptre.

In any case, ceremonial in a wider sense was of the first importance. Augustus was a supreme showman (or someone was on his behalf), and made a perpetually inventive use of the 'parallel language' to maintain himself and his achievements in the public consciousness. The games and shows are one part of the story, valuable to him to establish a relationship to his plebs, to preside over its pleasures and expose himself to its demonstrations. Augustus provided generously, adding ludi Actiaci and ludi Martiales to the traditional regular series; and there were regular games on his birthday from 11 B.C. onwards. Triumphs, the irregular spectacle par excellence, reserved after 19 в.с. for members of the 'divine family', were pretty rare, but they were complemented by the great funerals, often also with games: Marcellus, Octavia, Agrippa, Drusus. As for the posthumous honours for Gaius and Lucius Caesar, their complexity and comprehensiveness are revealed in detail by inscriptions[284] (which show, incidentally, that such ceremonies were not laid on only at Rome, but took place in the municipalities and provinces).

The reign was punctuated by other colourful excitements; Augustus' pride in them is attested by the attention given to them in the Res Gestae. There was the journey of Senate and people to Campania to meet the returning ruler in 19 B.C., with the ceremonies at the altar of Fortuna Redux: 'returns' became a standard occasion for pageantry. The ludi saeculares in 17 b.C., the thronged assembly for Augustus' assumption of the role of pontifex maximus in 12 b.C., the full triumph of Tiberius in 7 B.C., the successive installations of Gaius and Lucius as principes iuventutis, reached a culmination in 2 в.с. with the bestowal of the title pater patriae on Augustus and the dedication of the temple of Mars Ultor, accompanied by gladiatorial combats and the long-remembered 'Naval Battle of the Greeks and Persians'. Perhaps creativity ran out after 2 B.C., but activity did not, for the games of a.d. 8 in honour of Germanicus and (astonishingly) Claudius were notable, and it must not be forgotten that it was intended for Augustus and Tiberius to hold full triumphs after the defeat of the Pannonian rebellion in a.d. 9, and Tiberius did celebrate one on 23 October of a.d. 12 or 13. The whole was, in any event, a remarkable calendar of novelties to keep the images of victory and peace simultaneously before the public eye.

Commonly related to the process of image-building are the legends and pictures on the Augustan coinage. It is wise to be cautious about calling them 'propaganda', not least because much uncertainty and disagreement persists as to whom the coinage was supposed to influence and who decided on the types and legends.[285] Gold coinage, and even silver, down to the denarius (the 'tribute-money') will not often have been in the hands of ordinary people; and some of the best-known 'speaking' types and legends are portentously rare and must have been struck in relatively tiny issues, while, conversely, some very large emissions have relatively uninformative material on them. New money probably went first to the troops, so the influence of the coins may have been intended primarily for them; certainly, an explosion of vivid and dramatic, plainly propaganda, types is a feature of the years after Julius Caesar's assassination, and they were part of the armoury of the triumvirs and Sextus Pompeius. In the new age after Actium that momentum was maintained for a while, but it then diminished. Augus­tus' 'saving of the citizens' and the crown of oak leaves, and the Shield of the Virtues, achieved celebration, as did festivals and buildings and cult

Fortuna Redux, the ludi saeculares, Actian Apollo, the Altar of the Three Gauls and the temple of Rome and Augustus at Pergamum. The collegiality of Augustus and Agrippa was also given some emphasis. But the only specific promotional campaign run by the official coinage was bestowed on Gaius and Lucius Caesar (though the successes of Tiberius late in the reign did not go quite without mark). At least, however, the Augustan coinage was, even in terms of types, as well as scale, a world- coinage, with Lugdunum and Nemausus, Ephesus and Pergamum, all striking to recognizably similar effect, and as a dissemination of the image of the ruler that was tremendous.

Buildings also (to return to that important theme) were part of the image-making.¹¹⁴ The public heart of the city of Rome was transformed: everyone knows how Augustus boasted that he had 'taken over a Rome of brick and left a Rome of marble',[286] and Ovid, justifying the soignee look for ladies, exclaims 'Before, all was country plainness: now Rome is of gold'.¹¹⁶ The transformation was not just in grandeur, but in symbolic orientation towards the ruler. It is, indeed, unfair to see the programme solely in that context: improvement and amenity went hand in hand with symbolism. Sewers and water supply, markets and porticoes, theatres and an amphitheatre, improvements to the race-course, parks, baths and libraries now adorned Rome, and Agrippa's part was the more brilliant in that it combined the prosaic and the charismatic. But improvement stopped short when it paid no dividends in prestige (and when Agrippa was no longer there), so that some of the recurrent scourges of the plebs

floods, fires and collapses - were tackled with less than total commitment. About the transformation of Augustus' house enough has been said, and about his new Forum; but even the Forum Romanum took on the symbolism of the ruler and his divine ancestry, and Jupiter Tonans on the Capitol stole some of the limelight of the Capitoline god himself.¹¹⁷ Agrippa adorned the middle Campus, Augustus the northern part, with the Mausoleum, the Ara Pacis and the Horologium. Buildings were erected by, or in the name of, many members of the 'divine family'; as for the republican tradition by which triumphing generals embel­lished the capital and built roads 'out of spoils' (ex manubiis), Augustus was keen for it to continue, and for a while it did, endowing Rome with such important structures as Asinius Pollio's Atrium Libertatis, with the first Roman public library, Cn. Domitius Calvinus' marble rebuilding of the Regia, T. Statilius Taurus' amphitheatre in the Campus and the major temples of C. Sosius (Apollo Sosianus in the Campus) and C. Cornificius (Diana on the Aventine). That tradition only died out because the triumphs and the independent commands on which they rested died out: the last major such building was the theatre of Balbus, and he was, precisely, the last person outside the 'divine family' to celebrate a full triumph.

It hardly needs saying that building programmes advertising the ruler were not confined to the capital. Nor, in the Roman world in general, were they confined to structures erected at government expense, for there was a great mass of building on local and private initiative, as the municipal wealthy responded to the stability of the 'Augustan Peace'. Much was, however, inspired from the centre, such as the Augustan arches that still stand in testimony to the construction of roads, city-walls and harbours, and other imposing structures still to be seen - the Pont du Gard, the Maison Carree, the public buildings of Merida: enough for the imagination to grasp how new a visual world had been created by a.d. 14. In the Roman Forum stood the Golden Milestone,¹¹⁸ and the Chorographic Map of Agrippa stood in his sister Vipsania's portico.¹¹⁹

Of such elements was composed the great assault on the psychology of a generation. A consistent ideology is conveyed, an 'Augustan synthe­sis', the visual monuments being echoed by the literary monuments: it may be summarily spelt out, under three or four heads. First, this is a 'new age', novum saeculum - the keystone of Virgil's Aeneid,¹²⁰ the theme of the ludi saeculares and of the architectural transformation of Rome. It is an age in which the Hellenic and Roman cultural heritages are to be no longer enemies but partners,¹²¹ a partnership symbolized by Actian Apollo, the god combining arms and arts, with his temple and libraries on the Palatine. The gift of the new age is the 'Augustan Peace'; and the

¹¹¹ On the Forum Romanum, Simon 1986 (f 5 77) 84-91; on Jupiter Tonans, Zanker 1987 (f6j2) 44. »» Dio liv. 8.4. ¹¹⁹ Strab. 11.5.17 (120C); Pliny, HN 111.17.

120 Virg. Aen. vi-791-853. ¹²¹ Bowersock 1965 (c 59) ch. 10.

prerequisite of that peace is the ruler's untiring devotion to his cura, by reason of his virtus, dementia, iustitia and pietas. But it demands an answering devotion from others, a willingness to constitute a nation of stern morality and stable family life: that comes out best in the most overtly moralizing of all the literary monuments, the Carmen Saeculare of Horace. And amongst the duties demanded is untiring militarism. For Roman victory and supremacy to be maintained the Romans must keep faith with their long history. That is the message of the Fasti Trium- phales and the busts of Rome's heroes in the porticoes of the Augustan Forum, of the triumphal arches placed about the Roman world, and of the importance attached to the 'return of the standards' in the symbolic nexus. Virgil's 'Be it thy care, О Roman, to rule the peoples with thy sway' is the formal repudiation of the Epicureanism of Lucretius: 'Better to obey in quiet than wish to rule things with your sway and control kingdoms.¹²²

4. Resistance

The 'Augustan synthesis', thus summarized, is a rich diet and a heady brew; historical therapy demands that it be countered, in conclusion, by more astringent and sobering reflections. The historian must ask how successful the mystique was. To what extent can we perceive scepticism, rejection, an alternative ideology,¹²³ a revoludonary temper, even? 'Resistance' is an insistent modern theme;¹²⁴ how much of it is to be found beneath the confident surface of the 'Augustan synthesis'?

A distinction can properly be made between political and ideological dissent within the Roman people (which is really our theme) and the resistance of conquered peoples to Roman imperialism. Of the latter there was enough and to spare, but the only question about it needing to be raised here is how Augustan rule was viewed in the Greek half of Rome's dominions. For the Greek world too, was a conquered world. Most of it, indeed, had been conquered already under the Republic, and the 'intellectual opposition' (a well-worn topic)¹²⁵ was rather to Rome in general than to the Augustan rearrangements — though it was them that Alexandria long bitterly resented.¹²⁶ By and large, the ruling classes, to whom the Augustan effort was mainly addressed, were glad of the 'Augustan Peace', which perpetuated their own local predominance; and there was no shortage of leading families eager for Roman citizenship. If

Virg. Aen. vi.8ji; Lucr. v.1129-30.

D'Elia 193 5 (в 41); La Penna 1963 (в 102).

'M See the collections of papers in Pippidi 1976 (а 72л) and Yuge and Doi 1988 (a i i i).

Bowersock 1965 (c 39) ch. 8.

Hence the 'Acts of the Pagan Martyrs': for the Augustan items that may belong to them, see Musurillo 1954 (в 381) no. 1; POxy 3020; POxy 2435, verso ( = EJ² 379).

they did not 'rally to the support of the Principate',¹²⁷ they did not rally against it. The two expatriate Greek intellectuals in Rome of the Augustan time of whose writings the most survives today, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Strabo of Amaseia, were enthusiastic supporters; if the rest of the Greek world was cooler, it was not estranged.

Coming, however, to Roman opposition to Augustus, we should first remember that there were conspiracies, numerous, it appears,¹²⁸ and spanning his whole reign. Heads of state are, notoriously, at the mercy of plain and simple assassination attempts by individuals, but it was - presumably - Augustus' triumph not to bring upon himself a conspiracy of an entire section of the governing class, as Iulius Caesar had done. As to conspiracy by factions within the 'divine family', reasons have been given for wariness in the face of some sensational hypotheses; in so far as such conspiracies existed, they seem to have been directed against the succession of Tiberius, and, in the end, by him against residual rivals.

More generally, however, we have to do with what was described earlier as resistance to playing the game by Augustus' rules and subscribing to the Augustan ethic. Modern studies place emphasis on the 'crisis of recruitment' of the senatorial class and Augustus' continual battle against the apathy of senators towards attendance in the Curia; they invite attention, too, to the 'crisis of recruitment' of the armed forces in the last decade of the reign. And, lastly, recent studies of Augustan Latin literature have dwelt upon the themes of resistance to tyranny, revolt against crude demands for panegyric and conformity, and covert undermining of the official ethic and promotion of an alternative ideology of 'love, not war' - with the fates of Cornelius Gallus, at one end, and Ovid, at the other, as the real, and damning, historical symbols of the 'Augustan Peace'.

As to the 'crisis of recruitment' in the governing elite, something has been already said, and a distinction has been insisted on: from the top parts of the cursus honorum and the valuable and prestige-enhancing offices of state there was no such flight, and leading dignitaries from the provinces would soon be eager for a place in the system. In the case of the armies, conscription was certainly needed at the military crisis, which shows that the envisaged system was over-stretched; the reduction of the legions to twenty-five after the Varian disaster may have brought the size of the citizen army into balance with what the recruiting possibilities were as well as what the treasury could afford. Already in a.d. 5 the length of service of legionary rank-and-file was raised from sixteen to twenty years, because time-expired soldiers were not staying on;¹²⁹ that implies that there were not plenty of citizens queuing to take over from

¹²⁷ Bowersock 196) (c 39) 104; he is talking specifically about a.d. 6.

¹²¹ Suet. Aug. 19.1; Dio liv.ij.i. ¹²⁹ DioLV.23.1.

them. But the undoubted eventual decline of recruitment in Italy was a very long-term process, hardly to be attributed to discontent with Augustus. He did not, after all, find himself constrained to raise the pay of the troops, he gave only two army donatives, and he was able to impose a prohibition of iustum matrimonium upon serving soldiers.[287] At his death the northern armies were just about to mutiny; but they had not, nor had the rest, simply melted away.

Finally, as to social and moral attitudes, in literature and life: Augustus proposed, in certain matters, standards stiffer than those to which part, at least, of the leading class were accustomed. Resistance to the legislation about sexual behaviour, marriage, celibacy and childlessness (and to the direct taxation of cives Romanil) was vociferous. On the other hand, the very practical case of high-status people engaging in theatrical and gladiatorial performances, and of the attempts by the Senate as well as Augustus to prohibit such conduct,[288] brings out the feature that the elite had motives for maintaining its own cohesion by drawing the bounds of accepted standards more tightly. Nevertheless, we can appreciate why, more than anything else, it was Augustus' daughter who broke the spell of Augustus' vision - the candid and caustic Iulia, who did every bit of her duty in her dynastic role but refused to bound her life with demure domesticity.

Some bons mots of Iulia survived, as did some of her father's[289] - and of his opponents. It is not right to imply (though that is sometimes done) that the voice of opposition was somehow suppressed from the historical record, for plenty of it has come down to us, not only in anecdotes but in whole passages in the chief historians where editors point out that the writer is 'following a hostile source'.

And the poets?[290] They have been seen by some as purveyors of propaganda, drafted in detail by someone for them to versify: for how else could their images correspond so well with those of the visual monuments? Patronage certainly demanded its quid pro quo, and it was open and explicit in that age: the frankest statement is the preface of Vitruvius' De Architectural We must beware of hypocrisy: we find no difficulty about accepting that the epigrammatists Crinagoras and Antipater wrote to order for the 'divine family' and others, or that the panegyrist of Messalla or the writer of the Consolatio ad Lit/iam were clientes, so why should we doubt it of the patriotic purple passages in the Aeneid, the 'Roman Odes' of Horace, the Carmen Saeculare, or Propertius' celebrations of Roman legend? Tibullus, precisely because he never belonged to the crucial salon, could stay cool and aloof from the Augustan mystique, and Ovid was able to take on the role of cynic and 'debunker' for the same reason, while Propertius trod a complicated middle ground. It is in Ovid and Propertius that we meet most explicitly the 'alternative life style', the cult of the clandestine love-affair, the theme of militia amoris, or 'love, the true enlistment', and the cry that 'there shall no soldier be born of thee and me'.¹³⁵ Yet even among the 'establish­ment' poets there occurred recusatio, the elegant refusal of commissions: Augustus never got the simply conceived epic of his Res Gestae that he would have liked, nor the revival of good old native drama.¹³⁶ A recent tendency goes further, detecting concealed sniping even in the most panegyrical works. Is fulsomeness of praise, then, a form of deliberate 'overkill'? Is the Aeneid, actually, a condemnation of Augustan trium- phalism (since it is, admittedly, not a naive affirmation)? Some recent claims may come to be thought exaggerated: what it is certainly important not to forget is that, with the exception of Ovid, the minds and hearts of the major poets — and of Livy — were formed before Augustus ever became Augustus, and so were his mind and heart. Their praise of peace and the unity of Italy and Rome's mission, their vision of the 'new age', grew out of the experiences of the late Republic and the triumviral age, and Augustus, their coeval, was the fortunate inheritor of those sentiments: he did not have to drum them up. It may be that all of them, includinghimselj, as time went on, came to perceive only too well the price that had to be paid for the 'Augustan Peace'.

For the Augustan creation perpetuated some of the ruthlessness of its origins. Certainly, in the 'police states' that we nowadays know, the ordinary folk as well as their betters are under fear and compulsion - the informer in the pub and the apartment block, the exclusion of the dissident from employment and of his children from education, the bloody suppression of meetings and arrest of popular leaders. The Augustan regime did not possess the apparatus of ideological tyranny to operate on that global scale, though every provincial governor's duty of 'maintaining the peace' included keeping a sharp eye on public meetings, and both abroad and in Rome the collegia were anxiously controlled. In Rome, too, the Egnatius episode shows that the government would not tolerate a successful demagogue; and the city was heavily policed at the crisis of a.d. 6.

But if we stick to the ambience of the governing elite at the political centre, there, particularly, though not exclusively, in Augustus' later years, things were done that we do associate with the behaviour of 'police states': the widening of the range of offences counting as treason

¹³⁵ Prop. 11.7.14. ¹³⁶ If that is what he wanted, as argued by La Penna 196} (в 102).

(with the inevitable encouragement of informers); banishments and exiles without trial; the sudden courier and the enforced suicide; the suppression of literature and the banning, and worse, of authors. And those things were a legacy: they formed part of the apparatus of rule of Augustus' successors, used from time to time as raison d'etat demanded.

Yet, though they were a characteristic, they were not the dominant characteristic, nor even the dominant ultimate weakness, of Augustus' creation. The work known as the Dialogus, attributed to Tacitus, contains, through the mouth of an 'opposition' writer, a well-known expression of the view that the ending of the creative phase of, at least, Roman eloquence was directly due to the loss of freedom.¹³⁷ That was not the only view then,¹³⁸ nor need it be now; but historians are not wrong to perceive a general loss of momentum supervening on the Augustan triumphs. The late Republic had been moving fast; the very fact of Augustus' rule, let alone his ideals and policies, applied a brake that brought his whole society to a relative standstill. The 'New Age' was conceived of as a 'return to the Age of Saturn', not a great leap into the future; and just as the Greek literature of the age swung back from 'Asianism' to 'Atticism', so did the visual arts return from Hellenistic 'baroque' to serene Classicism and even a curious cult of the Archaic.¹³⁹ It is likely that to most of the upper classes in the Roman world, in most respects, that result was welcome rather than otherwise, for their interest was in stability, and Augustus had to fit in with their career ambitions and social expectations as much as they with his proddings and exhortations. Certainly, his revolution was no social revolution: the maintenance, and strengthening, of status hierarchy was high on its priorities,¹⁴⁰ and some historians have seen its principal historical effect as the consolidation of the 'slave society'. Be that as it may, 'it is a fair criticism of the new order, that its temptation was to be static in high matters',¹⁴¹ and stability is, of the political virtues, the least heart­warming to read about.

/. An estimate

Tacitus offers an appraisal of Augustus, in contrasting paragraphs: what can be said in his favour and what against.¹⁴² For Tacitus, as for many historians after him, the bad outweighed the good. Nevertheless, whether for good or ill, Tacitus lived in a political world of which Augustus had been the principal architect; and for an estimation of

K. Heldmann, Antikt Tbeoritn ŭbtr EntwUkhmgund Vtrjallier Redthmst vi.i, Munich, 1982, esp. 271-86.

It is not even the only view in the Dialogur, and in 'On the Sublime', ch. 44, expressed more broadly, it is rejected by the author of that work himself; see Heldmann, Antikt Tbeorien vi.2.

Literature: Gabba 1982 (в 57); visual arts: Simon 1986 (f 577) 110-36, with the illustrations.

^IW Rawson 1987 (f 56). ^1,1 Adcock, САН x" 606. ¹⁴² Tac. Ann. 1.9-10.

Augustus' achievement, for good or ill, it is as necessary to look at what followed him as at what preceded him. For we can then see that his was not a 'blueprint' creation, but experimental, and that it underwent much further change. Neither was it in all respects successful, even in his own time and terms:¹⁴³ there was more propaganda than reality about some of the military enterprises, and the programme of social reform probably had little good effect and certainly had some bad. As for the subsequent changes, some represent practical breakdowns in his scheme of things. For instance, the transmission of power broke down with Nero, and it is doubtful whether Augustus envisaged the rise of any of the new equestrian officials to formal political influence, and virtually certain that he would have been appalled at the political power of freedmen.

But if we look from the political world of Cicero to that of Tacitus, we ought to be able to discern what structures Augustus left (in principle, at least, and for good or ill) to the Roman world after him. First, the ideology, as well as the reality, of a single ruler (supported, it might be, by a collega imperii). Secondly, a system for the transmission of power and authority, namely dynasty, by birth or adoption, coupled with the bringing of the chosen successor into proper relation with the legitimiza­tions of power as early as possible, which, though sometimes nullified in practice, was always, in principle, revived and never supplanted. Thirdly, a rule of law - for the ruler was not, in principle, 'above the law' — intended normally to prevail, although raison d'etat overrode it all too readily in crises.[291] Fourthly, the preservation of strict social hierarchy, the leading role being still assigned to the senatorial order, the governing class of the empire remaining a tiny elite. Fifthly, unchanged also from the Republic, the principle of 'government without bureaucracy',¹⁴⁵ by which the local management of the vast empire was left to the municipalities and imperial administration could remain unprofessiona- lized and economical of manpower and cost. Sixthly, by contrast, armed forces that were, in the lower ranks, professional. They were composed partly of Roman citizens and partly of non-citizens, and by careful budgeting they were supported on a scale enabling them to achieve some modest further expansion of Rome's dominions down to the time of Trajan — though they were destined, in the 'Year of the Four Emperors', to be the vehicle of renewed civil war. Lastly, it would be unfair to rob Augustus of his part in turning the city of Rome into a monumental imperial capital.

'Achievement', however, may seem too biographical a term in which to estimate the place of Augustus in history: more neutrally, we could substitute 'results' or 'effects', and the observed effects may have had a multiplicity of causes, amongst which Augustus was only one. He stands between what we recognize (or have created for our own convenience) as two ages of European history, the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire. But was he, after all, the 'architect' of the Empire? Or was he just the culminating 'dynast' thrown up by the 'Roman Revolution',¹⁴⁶ a process of change that began with Sulla, or even the Gracchi, and had its own momentum, so that even if Antony had won at Actium or Augustus had died in 23 в.с. the Roman Republic would still have been succeeded by the Roman Empire? What specific contribution is it possible to attribute to Augustus within that massive historical process? Perhaps just this much (if only by slipping back into biography): if Julius Caesar or Antony had been the culminating dynast there would, very likely, still have been a Roman Empire, but it would, very likely, have had a different face. The characteristic structure of the Empire, in which so much of what was new was based so firmly on what was old, is likely to have owed something to the particular cast of mind of its first ruler - narrow, pragmatic and traditionalist. Augustus was equated, in his time, with most of the gods of the Roman pantheon; today, we might think him best fitted by one he was not equated with, Janus, as he steered the Roman world into the future with his eyes fixed on the values of the past. Plutarch records a saying of his (it matters little whether vero or ben trovato): when somebody told him that Alexander, after his conquests, had been at a loss what to do next, Augustus said he was surprised that Alexander had not realized that a greater job than acquiring empire was getting it into shape when you had acquired it.[292] The shape of the Roman Empire was his contribution.

THE EXPANSION OF THE EMPIRE UNDER AUGUSTUS

ERICH S. GRUEN

The contemporaries of Augustus delivered high praise for conquest and empire. The poet of the Aeneid has Jupiter forecast a Roman rule that will know no bounds of time or space, and Anchises' pronouncement from the underworld previews Augustus extending imperial power to the most remote peoples of the world. Livy characterizes his city as caput orbis terrarum and its people as princeps orbis terrarum populus. Horace asserts that the maiestas of the imperium stretches from one end of the world to the other.¹

The phrases echo sentiments and expressions of the Roman Republic. Militarism marked much of its history. And the exploits of the con­queror were envied, honoured and celebrated. Those precedents stimu­lated and helped shape the character of the Augustan years. Wars dominate the era, victories were repeatedly gained (or claimed), and the humbling of external foes became a prime catchword of the regime.

The successes of Augustus abroad suggest a drive to consolidate the empire, to create a united dominion under Roman rule.² The princeps, it can be argued, conceived a broad-gauged military strategy, based on economy of force, which, through a combination of mobile troops and loyal dependencies, provided both for internal security and frontier stability.³

Theoretical formulations in retrospect, however, fail to catch the dynamics of a volatile situation. And they slight the diversity of geographical, political, diplomatic and cultural considerations that faced Augustus in the vast expanse of the Roman world. One need not assume that the princeps had a structured blueprint for empire. Nor did his actions adhere to a uniform pattern imposed on all sectors of the imperium Komanum. Different circumstances in different areas provoked a variety of responses, sometimes cautious, sometimes bold, occasionally calculated, often extemporaneous. Augustus was less concerned with a systematic plan for world dominion than with a systematic construct of his image as world conqueror.

Virg. Лея. 1.278-9; Livy, xxi.30.10, xxiv.)8.8; Hor. Carm. iv.13.13-16.

Cf. Kienast 1982 (c 136) 366-70, 406-20. ³ Luttwak 1976 (a 37) 13-50.

•47

i. egypt, ethiopia and arabia

The deaths of Antony and Cleopatra left Octavian as master of Egypt. He would not permit that land to slip from his grasp again. Its wealth and resources in the hands of a rival would constitute a serious menace, and its role as a granary could be critical. Egypt became a province in 30 B.C., but no ordinary province. Octavian took full responsibility for gover­nance. He appointed an equestrian prefect to administer the nation, and allowed no Roman senator or high-ranking eques even to visit it without his authorization. The princeps reckoned Egypt a place apart and kept close surveillance over its affairs.⁴

The prefect of Egypt supervised collection of revenue in the highly centralized fiscal system, exercised judicial duties, and commanded the three legions and auxiliary troops stationed in the country.⁵ The forces seem adequate for the preservation of security and the entrenchment of Roman control.

Yet Octavian did not content himself with the acquisition of Egypt. His first appointee as praefectus Aegypti, C. Cornelius Gallus, both poet and military man, pressed for expansion from the start. He quelled revolts in Heroonpolis, east of the Delta, and in the Thebaid. That was an appropriate and expected part of the job. But Gallus had no intention of stopping there. He took his forces southward, beyond the First Cataract of the Nile, where, so he claimed, neither Roman nor Egyptian arms had ever penetrated before. Gallus received representatives of the king of Ethiopia, accepted the king under his protection, and installed a dynast to rule over Triacontaschoenus, evidently as buffer zone between the realms of Egypt and Ethiopia. All this had been accomplished by the spring of 29 B.C. when Gallus erected a trilingual inscription in Latin, Greek and hieroglyphics to celebrate his exploits.⁶ The prefect's pen­chant for self-display eventually proved fatal. He had images of himself set up all over Egypt and a record of his achievements inscribed even on the pyramids. Such hybris, combined with a host of other alleged misdeeds, brought about Gallus' recall, renuntiatio amicitiae by Augustus, accusation, conviction and suicide perhaps in 26 в.с.⁷ But nothing in the charges raised objections to Gallus' pushing Roman authority beyond the First Cataract and obtaining the homage of Ethiopian princes. Augustus may have frowned on his prefect's over-zealousness in taking personal credit for Roman expansion — but he did not disavow the

Tac. Ann. 11.59; Hist, i.ii; Dio li.17.1-5. See the recent treatments, with bibliography, by Geraci 1983 (e 924) 128-46 and 1988 (E926), who rightly questions the common idea that Augustus treated Egypt as a 'private preserve'. It was considered as one among Rome's revenue producing provinces; Veil. Pat. 11.39.2; Strab. xvn.1.12 (797C); Tac. Ann. xv.36; Huzar 1988 (c 277) 370-9.

On his position, see Geraci «983 (E924) 163-76; Huzar 1988 (c 277) 352-62; and below, ch. 14b.

ILS 8994, 8995; Strab. xvii.i.] 5 (819Q. ⁷ Dio Lin.23.j-7; Suet. Aug. 66.

149

egypt, ethiopia and arabia

expansionism. Installation of a client prince and acceptance of the Ethiopian ruler under Roman protection appealed to the pride — and probably stemmed from the policy — of Augustus.

The intentions of the princeps emerge with greater clarity in the actions of the next prefect, Aelius Gallus. First-class testimony survives from the pen of his friend and confidant Strabo. Augustus instructed his prefect to investigate the peoples and topography of Ethiopia and to explore the situation in Arabia. The plan formed a prelude to Gallus' invasion of Arabia Felix, the land of the Sabaeans in the north-west corner of the Arabian peninsula. The economic advantages did not escape Augustus' notice: the Sabaeans were key suppliers or middlemen in the lucrative commerce of spices, gems and perfumes from the East. Gallus' invasion may have had in view some Roman involvement in that traffic. But the move forms part of a larger pattern. Roman power was to extend into both Arabia and Ethiopia and the Sabaeans would be the first step. Augustus expected to coerce them into alliance, or to add to his reputation as conqueror.[293]

As it happened, Aelius Gallus' venture proved calamitous, and the plan abortive. Numerous vessels were wrecked in a long and unnecess­ary voyage from Arsinoe in 26 or 25 в.с. Worse followed when the troops marched into the interior of Arabia from Leuke Kome, a six month trek to Marib, major city of the Sabaeans. There were victories, or alleged victories, along the way, but also disease and death. And the siege of Marib ended in failure: lack of water dictated the abandonment of the whole campaign. The humiliated Roman legions returned through the desert, recrossed the Red Sea and made their way back to Alexandria. Interested sources did their best to obscure the ignominy. The Res Gestae of Augustus speaks only of advance into Arabia, to the land of the Sabaeans and the town of Marib. Not a word about the outcome. And Strabo, though he does not conceal the failures, places the blame on the treacherous Nabataean minister Syllaeus who purportedly misdirected and sabotaged the Roman enterprise.[294] The fault, however, lay with Aelius Gallus, or perhaps with Augustus.

The princeps nevertheless refused to be deflected from his scheme. Arabia no longer seemed inviting, but Ethiopia still beckoned. Augus­tus' new prefect of Egypt, P. Petronius, headed the invasion in 2 5 or 24 в.с., an undertaking whose groundwork had been prepared by Aelius

Gallus. In Strabo's version, Ethiopians took the initiative, crossed the First Cataract, and attacked the towns of Syene, Philae and Elephantine, thus provoking retaliation by Petronius. There may be truth in that: the Ethiopians perhaps learned that they had been marked out as next victims, thus anticipating Rome and taking advantage of the temporary absence of Roman forces (they were with Aelius Gallus in Arabia). Petronius' assault, in response, was vigorous and effective. His troops drove the Ethiopians out of the places they had seized, pushed them well back into their own territory, regained the cities and trophies captured by the Ethiopians, and penetrated all the way to Napata, chief northern city of the kingdom, which they stormed and destroyed. Only the forbidding terrain prevented further advance. This was much more than a retaliatory campaign. Petronius installed a garrison at Primis between the First and Second Cataracts, dispatched Ethiopian prisoners to Augustus as token of new conquest, and imposed tribute upon the people as sign of Roman rule.

An Ethiopian attempt to break the yoke came a year or two later, under the energetic queen Candace: an attack on the garrison at Primis which brought Petronius back swiftly from Alexandria. The second campaign re-established Roman supremacy in a hurry in zz B.C. Candace sought terms, and Petronius sent her representatives to the princeps at Samos, where he magnanimously offered a remission of tribute.¹⁰

Peaceful relations prevailed thereafter. Petronius' campaigns had secured the southern borders of Egypt, rendering that land largely invulnerable to external menace. But this was no mere defensive mission. Roman suzerainty now extended over the Dodecaschoenus, the zone between the First and Second Cataracts. And Augustus boasted in the Res Gestae of military conquest stretching to Napata: Roman power now reached almost to the great Ethiopian city of Meroe.¹¹

Aelius Gallus' ill-fated expedition had thwarted Roman aims in Arabia Felix. But Augustus maintained interest in the Nabataean Arabs and even meddled in the internal affairs of that kingdom. Intrigue and rivalry between the Nabataeans and the realm of Herod the Great in Palestine kept the princeps repeatedly involved in hearing and judging competitive claims. Augustus briefly considered adding the Nabataeans to the dominion of Herod, but decided instead to confirm Aretas IV on the throne c. 8 в.с. After the death of Herod in 4 B.C., however, Rome may actually have annexed Nabataea for a short time, subjecting it to direct rule before relinquishing it again to Aretas. The latter act can be

¹⁰ Strab. xvn.1.5 3-4(819-210); Dio li.5.4-6; Pliny, HN vi.i81; see Jameson 1968 (£939)72-6, 79-82; Torok 1988 (e 976) 275-9. O" the name P. Petronius, see Bagnall 1985 (e 889). Additional bibliography in Burstein 1988 (c 258) 16—20, who argues that the tribute was first imposed by Cornelius Gallus and that Augustus' remission of it represented abandonment of his aggressive policies in the region. ¹¹ Aug. RG 26.

associated with a military expedition by C. Caesar, grandson of the princeps, in a.d. i, who fought a campaign in or near Arabia, out of which perhaps came the reinstatement of Aretas as Roman client king over the Nabataeans.¹² Augustus kept in touch with affairs of the Near East - and made certain to manifest Roman authority in the area.

ii. asia minor

The Greek East had been a mainstay for Antony. But the battle of Actium, followed in the next year by the suicides of Antony and Cleopatra, tipped the balance decisively. Rulers and dynasts in the hellenistic world faced a crisis. Earlier support for Antony, once a source of authority, now became a perilous liability. The new shape of the East would be at the command of Octavian, a fact that prompted hasty shifts of allegiance and spread alarm among the leadership.

Octavian, however, knew better than to conduct a wholesale overturn of the old order. Men of experience and established influence could be valuable instruments in preserving stability in the Greek world. They served to illustrate the conqueror's clemency, to deliver a comforting sense of continuity, and to transmit the advantages of loyalty to the new regime.¹³

Octavian confirmed the ex-Antonian Polemo in place in Pontus. The king subsequently gained formal recognition as friend and ally of Rome.¹⁴ He had to yield up Armenia Minor, but only because Octavian wished to award it to another ex-Antonian, Artavasdes of Armenia.¹⁵ Polemo collaborated loyally and faithfully with the Augustan regime. When rebellion broke out in the Bosporan kingdom, headed by an obscure usurper named Scribonius, Agrippa, who oversaw Rome's eastern interests in Syria, commissioned Polemo to restore the situation in 14 b.c. Polemo carried out the task, though it required Agrippa's forces to intimidate the rebels. The Pontic dynast, with Augustus' approval, went on to marry Dynamis, widow both of Scribonius and the previous Bosporan king, and to add the Bosporan realm to his own holdings.¹⁶ The combination of royal houses and kingdoms evidently appealed to Augustus: it permitted him to hold the allegiance of a broad area under a tested client prince. As it happened, the marriage soon foundered. Dynamis regained control of her dominion on the Bosporus, Polemo selected a new bride, Pythodoris from Tralles, and hostilities resumed between the kingdoms. Polemo fell in battle while endeavour-

¹² Pliny, HN 11.168, vi.160; Strab. xvi.4.21 (779Q, with the discussion of Bowersock 1983 (e 990) 5 3-6; cf. Romer 1979 (c 301) 204-8; Sidebotham 1986 (c 310) 130-3. On the Nabataean kingdom in this period, see Negev 1978 (c 292) 549-69. Gaius' martial accomplishments are celebrated in 1LS, 140, lines 9-12; EJ² 69. ¹³ See Levick's account below, ch. 14a.

¹⁴ Strab. xn.8.16 (578Q; Dio Liii.25.1. is Dio Liv.9.2. ¹⁶ Dio liv.24.4-6 ing to regain the Bosporan realm in 8 B.C., and his wife Pythodoris inherited power in Pontus.[295] Augustus remained aloof from the contest, hoping to encourage stability without intervention. Dynamis obtained recognition as friend and ally of the Roman people. The princeps preferred to endorse continuing regimes rather than to undermine or destabilize them. Dynastic ties unravelled between Pontus and the Bosporan kingdom, but gained new strength between Pontus and Cappadocia when Polemo's widow Pythodoris wed Archelaus of Cappa- docia, thus linking the two kingdoms.[296] That arrangement too was doubtless orchestrated by Augustus, thereby to bind together the royal houses of Anatolia as surrogates for Roman suzerainty.

Archelaus, beneficiary of Antony, kept his throne through the favour of Caesar Octavianus. Indeed, he would soon increase his holdings with Roman encouragement. Archelaus obtained Cilicia Tracheia, parts of the coast, and Armenia Minor by 20 в.с., a move to build a more solid shield against Parthia.¹⁹ The king experienced less success with his subjects, some of whom lodged an accusation against him in Rome - to no avail.[297] And at some point Augustus was induced to install an overseer in Cappadocia.[298] Nevertheless, Archelaus' connexions and machinations kept him on his throne through the reign of Augustus.[299]

Deiotarus Philadelphus ruled Paphlagonia with Antony's approval, switched sides at Actium, and earned the gratitude of the conqueror. Octavian confirmed him in power.[300] The kingdom may have been enlarged later with parts of Phazemonitis. Deiotarus enjoyed an un­troubled dominion until his death in 6 B.C.²⁴

Amyntas of Galatia too changed allegiance hastily before Actium, and profited. He remained sovereign in his realm and received further territorial grants in Pisidia, Lycaonia, Isauria and Cilicia Tracheia.²⁵ The new dominions brought added responsibilities. Amyntas undertook to subjugate the fiercely independent and troublesome mountain tribes sheltered in the Taurus range and menacing the southern fringes of Galatia. The king made admirable headway, up to a point, capturing a number of mountain fastnesses. But terrain favoured the guerrillas. Amyntas fell victim to the formidable tribe of the Homonadenses and was executed in 25 B.C.[301] Augustus moved swiftly and decisively. He would leave no vacuum in central Anatolia that might tempt marauders or rebels. Galatia was annexed as a Roman province. The region encompassed Isauria, Pisidia, Lycaonia and part of Pamphylia, in addition to Galatia proper. It would henceforth come under the supervision of a Roman governor.[302] Reasons for Augustus' sudden shift of policy are not easy to discern. Amyntas had sons but Augustus ignored their claims. It would be hazardous to infer that theprinceps had a long-standing and deliberate design to convert client states into pro­vinces, once their rulers had prepared them for incorporation. Nor would provincialization of the land provide the glory of imperial expansion that came with conquest. An ad hoc decision seems more likely. Death of the king at the hands of rebellious tribes threatened the region and challenged the efficacy of Roman overlordship. Augustus would now make a display of direct Roman rule. The new province included a number of military colonies dispatched by Augustus to Pisidia. The annexation of Galatia served to solidify the area, overawe recalcitrant mountaineers, and provide a buttress for client princes in Pontus, Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, as well as for the provinces of Bithynia and Asia.

Augustus had no commitment to provincialization as a matter of policy. In fact, he detached the area of Cilicia Tracheia from Galatia and bestowed it upon Archelaus, the loyal ruler of Cappadocia.[303] When circumstances called for it, he would alter arrangements and reorganize territory accordingly. The death of Deiotarus Philadelphus in 6/5 B.C. gave occasion for incorporating his realm into the province of Galatia. Three years later came a further addition to the province, the region of Pontus Galaticus.[304] A preserved oath of allegiance from Gangra under­scores the new order: the inhabitants swore fealty to Augustus and included his name among the gods and goddesses by whom the oath was sanctioned.³⁰ Improvisation rather than elaborate design appears to characterize Roman decisions in Asia Minor. The Homonadenses had brought about the demise of Amyntas and provided the impetus for provincialization. Yet Roman governors of Galatia, whose appoint­ments began in 25 B.C., conducted no campaign against that people for two decades. The tribe had presumably been quiescent in the mean time. It can be inferred that Augustus ordered an offensive only when the Homonadenses stirred trouble again. The legate P. Sulpicius Quirinius headed forces that engaged the mountaineers, perhaps c. 5-3 B.C., gradually reducing their strongholds and starving out the defenders, a lengthy and arduous process.[305] One other uprising demanded Rome's attention a few years later: the turbulent Isaurians challenged her authority and had to be quelled in a.d. 6. The province had now been effectively pacified.[306]

Elsewhere in Asia Minor petty dynasts ruled in cities or lesser principalities. Some had served the cause of Antony and were removed, others kept in place. And even where Augustus deposed, a dynast he might subsequently restore the dynasty. He left tyrannies in power in Mysia, at Caranitis and Amasia, and in the Bosporan kingdom. He removed rulers from Hierapolis Castabala in Cilicia Pedias and from Olba in Cilicia Tracheia, only to reinstate the ruling houses later. At Pontic Comana he overthrew one Antonian supporter and replaced him with another. Tarsus, where Octavian replaced a client of Antony with one of his own partisans, was exceptional rather than representative. And in Commagene, Augustus expelled more than one dynast before turning the principality back to a previous ruling line.[307] The ad hoc character of these dispositions stands out clearly. Some changes took place after Actium, and some dynasties suffered interruption. In general, however, Augustus preferred continuity or reverted to earlier dynastic houses which could bring experience and promote stability.

iii. judaea and syria

Syria held Rome's principal military installation in the East. Three, later four, legions were stationed there, a show of strength to Parthia, and a garrison to intervene at need in Asia Minor or Palestine. Expansionism was not the aim here, rather the maintenance of order and the entrench­ment of control. Internal security took precedence.

Syria had become a Roman province after Pompey's campaigns in the 60s and remained a centre for implementation of eastern policy. Antony of course controlled it in the 30s, and Octavian made certain to establish his dominion there shortly after the fall of his rival. The governor of Syria, Q. Didius, was among those who made timely transfer to Octavian after Actium; and Octavian himself spent some time in Syria in late 30 в.с. His presence alone underscored the importance of the area.[308]In the settlement of 27 в.с. Augustus acquired formal responsibility for the province of Syria and thereby for Rome's defence system in the East. The princeps kept close surveillance on the region through his appoin­tees. Roman troops quelled an uprising of the Ituraeans in Lebanon. And the loyalty of minor dynasts like Dexandros at Apamea helped keep the region under control.³⁵ Augustus gave his chief deputy M. Agrippa general supervision of the East based on Syria in 23 B.C., an office he discharged for ten years, though usually in absentia, with trusted legates in place.³⁶ A similar duty seems to have been exercised by Augustus' grandson Gaius, in association with his eastern expedition c. 1 B.C., thus reaffirming the central significance of Syria for Rome's position in the East.³⁷

On the Syrian flanks Augustus relied on client princes to serve as buffers and to cushion the province. The petty kingdoms of Emesa and Ituraea provided protection against Bedouin tribes from the desert.³⁸ And supervision over much of Palestine was entrusted to a remarkable man, Herod the Great.

The extensive testimony of Josephus affords a more intimate glimpse into the affairs of Herod than we possess for any other dependent ruler. Herod has thus become the client prince par excellence, a prime exhibit for the relationship between Rome and vassal kings.

This half-Jewish Idumaean had been a chief beneficiary of Antony, confirmed and supported in his authority by the triumvir. And he sided loyally with Antony right down to Actium itself. Herod was not at Acdum, engaged instead in fighdng with the Nabataeans. But for Herod, as for so many others, the battle represented a decisive turning point. No pretence of hidden sympathies for Octavian was possible. Herod sought out Octavian in Rhodes in 30 B.C. and took a straightfor­ward line: the same sort of unswerving fidelity he had shown to Antony he could now offer to Antony's conqueror; he could be trusted to serve Octavian's interests — as he served his own. Octavian recognized the mutual benefits inherent in this relationship, reaffirmed Herod's royal status and expanded his holdings along the coast, in Samaria, in the Decapolis and around Jericho. Herod put his loyalty on display by visiting Octavian in Egypt and accompanying the Roman on his return trip as far as Antioch.³⁹ The events of 30 B.C. set a pattern for the relationship between princeps and client king.

Herod discharged or anticipated obligations. He supplied soldiers for Aelius Gallus' campaign in Arabia c. 26 B.C., refounded and renamed cides in Augustus' honour, dispatched two of his sons to Rome for their education in 23 B.C., and had his subjects swear an oath of allegiance to

³⁵ Crushing of the Ituraeans: ILS168 j; Dexandros and in general, Rey-Coquais 1978 (e 1054)47- 9. ³⁴ Dio 1.111.3г.1; Joseph. AJ xvi.3.3.

³⁷ Oros. vii.3.4. For the evidence on Roman governors of Syria under Augustus, see Schŭrer 1973 (e 1207) 253-60.

^M Augustus appears to have deposed and later restored the dynasty of Emesa; Sullivan 1977 (e 1065)210-14. ³⁹ Joseph. AJ xv.183-201, 218; BJ 1.386-97.

the emperor.⁴⁰ And the king profited. Augustus enlarged his territorial holdings twice more in the decade after Actium: in 23 в.с. Herod's friendship with the princeps' son-in-law and chief helpmate M. Agrippa only enhanced his status further. The king orchestrated an elaborate tour and a lavish reception for Agrippa during his stay in the area in 15 B.C. and performed numerous services for him on a mission to Asia Minor.⁴¹ The tighter the bonds, however, the greater the dependency. The kingdom of Herod was evidently not liable for tribute to Rome.⁴² The obligations were subtler and more ambiguous, and thereby, in some ways, more demanding. Augustus gave to Herod some responsibility for supervision in Syria, thus, no doubt, to co-ordinate efforts with the princeps legate in that province.⁴³ He also awarded to Herod the privilege of appointing his own successor.⁴⁴ The princeps presumably intended that gesture as a sign of esteem and an encouragement to independent behaviour. But the very fact that such a privilege had to be explicitly articulated is the most telling indicator of the true relationship. And the outcome only intensified subordination. Herod more than once thrust upon Augustus the burden of adjudicating disputes within the royal family. The sordid tale of intrigues in the court, domestic discord, and Herod's morbid suspicions which led to the execution of three sons need not be recounted here. The pertinent fact is that Herod declined to settle matters even in his own household without seeking the emperor's directions. His reign was long and memorable - but always precarious. Conflict between Herod and the Nabataeans led to recriminations in Rome, as the king alternately fell out of and was restored into the favour of Augustus.⁴⁵

Herod's will, twice rewritten during his lifetime, drew Augustus still further into the affairs of the realm after the Idumaean's death in 4 B.C. The document parcelled Herod's holdings among three sons. But it also provided for vast sums of money for Augustus, Livia, the imperial children, amici and freedmen, and it further specified that none of the provisions could take effect without ratification by the princeps.*⁶

Troops for Aelius Gallus: Joseph. AJxv.} 17; the naming of Sebaste and Caesarea: Joseph. AJ xv.296, xv.339; the sending of sons to Rome: Joseph. A] xv.342; oath of allegiance: Joseph. A J xvii.42.

Territorial acquisitions: Joseph. AJxv.343-8, 360; BJ 1.398-400; Dio Liv.9.3; cf. Bietenhard 1977 (e 988) 238-40. Herod and Agrippa: Joseph. AJxv.350, xv.361, xvi.i 2-16, xvi.86; BJ, 1.400. Cf. Schalit 1969 (e 1206) 424-6; Smallwood 1976 (e 212) 86—90; Braund 1985 (c 254) 79—80, 85; Roddaz 1984 (c 200) 450-5.

As argued by Schiirer 1973 (e 1207) 1.399-427; contra, Applebaum 1977 (e 1074) 373. But note the cash gift on a trip to Rome in 12 b.c.; Joseph. A J xvi. 128.

Joseph. AJ xv.360; BJ 1.399. ⁴⁴ Joseph. A] xv.343, xvi.i29.

⁴⁵ Smallwood I976(e 1212)96-104; Schiirer 1973 (e 1207) 320-6; Schalit 1969^ 1206) 563-644; Bammel 1968 (e 1083) 73-9; Piatelli (e i 189) 323-40; Bowersock 1983 (£990)49-53; Baumann 1983 (e 1091) 221-37; ^and ^see below ch. i5

Joseph. AJ xvii.146, xvii.188-90, 195; BJ 1.646,1.664-5,1.669.

Herod's privilege of appointing a successor had thus been transformed into a recommendation rather than a directive; Augustus would have the final say. That clause invited discord. The sons of Herod brought conflicting claims to Rome, complicated by a separate Jewish delegation which requested abolition of the monarchy. Augustus decided matters with even-handedness: he endorsed Herod's territorial dispositions, in effect dividing his realm into three parts, but withheld the royal title from all three sons. Archelaus would rule Judaea, Samaria and Idumaea as ethnarch, Antipas and Philip obtained the designation of tetrarch, the one over Galilee and Peraea, the other over Batanaea, Trachonitis and Auranitis. The will and its sequel allowed Augustus both to exercise beneficence and to re-assert his ultimate authority.⁴⁷ Further, the princeps' chief appointee in the East, P. Quinctilius Varus, the governor of Syria, intervened with force to quell a Jewish rebellion which had arisen in the wake of Herod's death. The limits of autonomy gained clear expression.⁴⁸

What Augustus gave he could also take away. The precedent of asking the emperor to redress grievances created in Palestine had been firmly set in the reign of Herod. A logical step followed in a.d. 6. Complaints registered in Rome against the misrule of Archelaus led Augustus to depose the Herodian dynast, banish him to Gaul, and convert his domain into a Roman province. The smaller principalities under Antipas and Philip remained 'autonomous', but the key districts of Judaea, Samaria and Idumaea would now come under direct Roman rule, governed by an equestrian prefect and under the general surveillance of the imperial legate in Syria. A census directed by the Syrian legate P. Sulpicius Quirinius marked the new order in a.d. 6. It signalled the imposition of Roman taxes and the official subordination of Judaea.⁴⁹

Consolidation rather than expansion characterized Augustan policy in Syria and Palestine. Syria contained the major Roman garrison in the East and provided the pivot for the defence of Rome's position and enforcement of her authority. The history of Judaea under Augustus exposed the fragility of 'independence' for client states which served as buffers for Roman interests. Herod earned imperial favour by tying his realm more closely to the emperor, thus bolstering power but increasing dependence. The transition from client kingdom to province repre­sented a logical stage in the development. Taxation and direct rule only formalized a continuing process of implementing Roman authority in the East.

⁴⁷ Joseph. A]xv11.219-49, xvii.ĵ00-23; Д/ ".14-38,11.80-100; Braund 1984 (c 234) 139-42.

** Joseph. Д/xvn.250-99; BJ 11.39-79.

⁴⁹ Joseph. Л/xvii.342-4,xvii.354-5; В_/и.111-13,11.i i7;DioLV.27.6;Pani 1972(0 295) 133-7. The census of Quirinius is wrongly dated to the reign of Herod by Luke 2:1-5. Oo the new province, see Smallwood 1976 (E 1212) 144-56; Ghiretti 1985 (e 1119)751-66.

iv. armenia and parthia

M. Antonius had invested heavily in warfare against Parthia. Contests with the great eastern power entailed substantial costs in men and prestige. Parthia had inflicted defeat upon Roman armies, and Rome's influence in Armenia had proved ephemeral. The humiliation left deep scars. Standards of the Republic's army captured at Carrhae and hostages taken in Antony's abortive campaign remained in Parthian hands.⁵⁰ After Antony's demise, the burden of restoring Rome's honour rested with the victor of Actium. But Octavian resisted the temptation to retaliate. More urgent tasks of consolidation took priority after Actium. And the restraint set a pattern: the princeps recognized that prudent diplomacy and discreet display of force were preferable to expensive and hazardous ventures across the distant Euphrates. Indirect suzerainty in Armenia and a modus vivendi with Parthia represented the means to preserve prestige and protect security.

Octavian exercised caution from the outset with Parthia. Dynastic rivalry, as so often, plagued the Parthian ruling houses. Even before Actium Phraates IV and the pretender to his throne Tiridates both sought to enlist Octavian's assistance in their respective causes. Octavian wisely refrained from taking action. After Actium, when Phraates expelled his rival, Tiridates sought refuge in the Roman province of Syria. Octavian permitted him to reside there, a useful card to play in diplomatic games with Parthia, while also maintaining amicable rela­tions with Phraates at an official level.⁵¹ In similar fashion, he declined the request of the Armenian ruler Artaxias to restore his brothers, held as hostages in Rome. They too would serve as insurance and potential counter-weight. And he installed the Mede Artavasdes as king of Armenia Minor, thus to provide further check on any Armenian aspirations.⁵²

A reserved cordiality toward Parthia continued through the next decade. In the mid 20s Tiridates left Syria and made his way to Augustus, having in tow the young son of Phraates IV, whom he had managed to kidnap. Phraates sent envoys to the emperor, asking for the surrender of Tiridates and the release of his son. Tiridates, in turn, advertised himself as philorhomaios and promised unswerving loyalty as client king if Rome should put him on the Parthian throne. Augustus again delivered an even-handed decision. He would neither turn over the rebel for punishment nor promote his designs on Parthia. Tiridates remained in Rome, his wants amply provided for, and his ambitions circumscribed by Augustus' needs. Phraates got his son back — a magnanimous gesture

On Antony and Parthia, see above, ch. i.

Dio li.18.2-3. ⁵² Dio li.16.2, Liv.9.2; Strab. xii.3.29 (55 5C); Magie 1950 (e 853) 443.

by Augustus - but no more. Amicable relations held, so long as the princeps could make the decisions.⁵³

Restraint and quiet diplomacy kept the peace during the 20s. Other matters occupied Augustus' attendon: the working out of constitutional arrangements and the entrenchment of Rome's position in the West. But the princeps did not rest content with the status quo in the East. Parthia's retention of standards and captives taken from Roman armies remained an open sore and an implicit denial of Rome's omnipotence. The year 20 B.C. proved to be the year of reckoning. Augustus travelled personally to the East, adjudicated disputes, made territorial dispositions and setded internal quarrels in cities of Greece, Asia Minor and Syria. He further exhibited the authority of the suzerain by reassigning lands to dynasts in Cilicia, Emesa, Judaea, Commagene and Armenia Minor.[309] The princeps' presence in the Near East may have provided the occasion for upheaval in Armenia. The citizenry, or a significant portion thereof, rose against Artaxias II, protege of the Parthian monarch, and requested a new ruler, namely Artaxias' brother Tigranes, then resident in Rome. Augustus, who had given refuge to the brothers for just such a contingency, readily complied. The emperor directed his stepson Tiberius to install Tigranes at the head of a Roman army. Mobilization alone sufficed. The Arme­nians assassinated Artaxias, and Tiberius could deliver Tigranes to a vacant throne without use of force.[310] Presentation of the event in Rome, however, simulated military victory. The coinage blared slogans of Armenia capta or Armenia recepta.[311]

In the East Augustus affected war but practised diplomacy. The celebrated arrangement with Phraates IV in 20 b.c. cannot be disasso­ciated from the princeps' presence in Syria and the settlement in Armenia. Phraates yielded up at last the standards and captives held for a generation as Parthian prizes, thereby allowing Augustus to claim credit for wiping out a long-standing stain on Roman honour.⁵⁷ Negotiations had brought about that result. Phraates evidently received assurances of non-interference in his own realm (the pretender Tiridates is not heard from again), while Parthia acknowledged the Roman interest in Arme­nia. The king allegedly supplied hostages to Rome as well. An informal accord arose from the bargaining, perhaps even an overt acceptance that the Euphrates would serve as boundary between the zones of

influence.[312] But here again Augustus proclaimed victory, conquest and martial supremacy for consumption at home. The Res Gestae declared that he had 'compelled' the Parthians to surrender trophies and beg for Roman friendship. The Senate offered to vote a triumph, and a triumphal arch was erected in the Forum. Numismatic representations repeatedly called attention to signis receptis. And the central scene of the cuirass on the Prime Porta statue depicted the transfer of the standards.[313] Augustus made the most of his diplomatic success. A compact of mutual advantage and mutual agreement took on the glow of military mastery.

A sign of continuing cordiality between Rome and Parthia came in 10 в.с. Phraates IV sent four sons to live in Rome. The gesture did not signify deference or subordination, as sometimes portrayed; rather, it provided a means whereby the Parthian king could defuse opposition at home and stabilize his hold on the throne. Augustus was pleased to comply. He could both grant a favour to Phraates and take possession of potentially valuable instruments of diplomacy.[314]

Relations between the empires remained smooth and undisturbed for nearly two decades after Phraates relinquished the standards. Trouble arose, as so often, in the client state and buffer region of Armenia. The death of Augustus' appointee Tigranes II c. 7 в.с. ushered in a turmoil of which our sources preserve only a few confused fragments. A struggle for the throne evidently gripped Armenia, pitting Tiridates III against - another Roman nominee Artavasdes, and prompting the princeps to dispatch Tiberius to settle affairs. But Tiberius, for motives that remain forever hidden, abandoned his commission and took up residence in Rhodes. Rome's influence over subsequent events in Armenia suffered sharp decline.[315]

The situation in Parthia soon complicated matters, dealing Roman interests a further blow. Phraates IV perished, perhaps murdered, in 2 B.C., and his successor Phraates V (or Phraataces) took the occasion to meddle in Armenia.[316] Augustus could not permit Rome's prestige in the East to suffer further deterioration. His own prestige at home was at

stake. The princeps then staged a public demonstration to reassure the citizenry that Roman power would again make itself felt, undiminished, in the lands of the East. Augustus' grandson (and adopted son and heir) Gaius took command of troops to head for the Euphrates, intimidate Parthia, and settle accounts in Armenia. The young prince received a handsome send-off. Elaborate pageantry marked the occasion, with talk in the air of conquest, vengeance against Parthia, new triumphs and spoils for the imperial house, and expansion of the Roman empire.⁶³

Augustus' intentions, in fact, were rather more modest. But public perception, as ever, counted. Gaius took an extensive detour, to Arabia and elsewhere, in part to add to his distinctions, primarily to show the flag.[317] News of his achievements and of his arrival in Syria had the desired effect. Tigranes III of Armenia sent a conciliatory message to the princeps, seeking Roman endorsement for his claims on the throne, and received a friendly response. Phraataces also prepared to negotiate. His letter to Rome probed for an accommodation, but simultaneously requested the return of his brothers, now under the princeps' protection. Augustus fired off a sharp reply, demanding that Parthia refrain from interference in Armenia and leaving off the royal title in his address, a deliberate affront — not a slight on Parthian sovereignty but on Phraataces' legitimacy. The king responded in kind: his letter addressed the princeps merely as Caesar and identified himself as 'King of Kings'. The exchange of messages plainly directed itself to a domestic constitu­ency — on both sides. The whole sequence of events supplied more show than substance. No fighting was necessary, not even a hostile confron­tation. The encounter, when it came, was amicable and fruitful. It too had been carefully programmed in advance. In a.d. 2 Gaius and Phraataces, each with impressive and equal entourage, met on an island in the Euphrates. Mutual pledges and a recognition of formal equality ensued. The king dined with Gaius on Rome's side of the river and then Phraataces hosted a banquet on the Parthian side. The scene was well orchestrated. Phraataces now officially acknowledged Rome's interests in Armenia and dropped his request for restoration of his brothers. Augustus, in effect, consented to leave Phraataces undisturbed, renewed amicitia, and implicitly designated the Euphrates as a frontier between spheres of influence. But his retention of the Parthian princes left the critical diplomatic leverage in his hands.[318]

The arrangement in a.d. 2 ought to have settled matters. But

Ov. ArsAm. 1.177 86,1.20i-iz;cf. Dioi.v.ioa.3; Hollis 1977 (в 86)65-73; Syme 1978 (в 179) 8—i i. Gaius' appointment is recorded also by Tac. Ann. 11.4; Dio lv.10.18-19; Veil. Pat. 11.101.1.

Cf. Romer 1978 (c 300) 187-202, 1979 (c 301) 203-8.

Dio lv. 10.20—i, lv.ioa.4; Veil. Pat. 11.101.1-3. Among modern discussions, see e.g., Ziegler 1964 (c 327) 5 3-6; Chaumont 1976 (a i 5) 77-80; Romer 1979 (c 301) 203-4, 208-10; Pani 1972 (c 295) 45-6; Cimma 1976 (d 120) 324-8.

Armenian affairs followed their own path, regardless of agreements between Rome and Parthia. Tigranes III died, probably in a.d 3, setting off a chain of events no longer recoverable in detail or in precise sequence. Gaius installed a new ruler, the Mede Ariobarzanes, thus to reiterate Rome's role in the indirect governance of that client kingdom. But Armenian nationalist sentiment resisted once more, and upheaval followed in which Gaius himself suffered a wound that would prove fatal. Two or three more changes of rulers came in Armenia during the lifetime of Augustus. The princeps claimed credit for the appointments, but the real extent of his influence cannot be ascertained. Internal struggles for power in that land reduced it for a time to anarchy.[319]

Comparable struggles for the throne occurred in Parthia during the final decade of Augustus' reign. The princeps neither promoted nor abetted them, but he did profit from them. In the midst of this turmoil, c. a.d. 6, a delegation of Parthian leaders arrived in Rome to seek release of Vonones, one of the sons of Phraates IV who had resided in Rome for the past decade and a half, in order to install him as Parthian ruler. The prospect appealed to Augustus who sent off Vonones with handsome gifts - as if setting his own appointee on the throne of Parthia.[320]Augustus welcomed the opportunity to have an indirect hand in ordering Parthian affairs - or at least to appear to be doing so. In fact, the Roman connexions and upbringing proved to be more a liability than an asset for Vonones. The Parthians themselves eventually found him unacceptable, summoned Artabanus of the Arsacid line to the throne, and expelled Vonones in a.d. 12. Augustus, who had played only a passive role in the installation of Vonones, took no steps to support him. It was not part of Rome's policy to provoke Parthia; rather she aimed to maintain her interests in Armenia and to keep Parthian influence on the far side of the Euphrates. Those aims could even be seen as advanced by the flight of Vonones: he made his way to Armenia and there took the throne made vacant by recent upheavals. So, the Parthian prince, raised in Rome, now held the crown in Armenia.[321] Such was the situation, quite acceptable from the Roman vantage-point, at the death of Augustus. The reliance on diplomacy, with occasional brandishing but only rare exercise of force, continued as standard policy throughout most of the Julio-Claudian era.

The pattern of the emperor's policy in that region maintained consistency throughout. He pursued the twin goals of hegemony via client rulers in Armenia and amicable reladons, including mutually acknowledged spheres of influence, with Parthia.⁶⁹ The behaviour was marked by restraint, but the public posture was one of aggressiveness. So Augustus presented endorsement of a client king as capture of Armenia, recovery of the standards as Parthian submission, and the assignment of Gaius as an imperialist venture. The princeps knew the limits of Rome's effective authority in the East and kept within them. But keeping up appearances was no less important than keeping within limits. Augustus projected the image of a conqueror who extended Roman sovereignty to the East.

V. SPAIN

The reputation of the princeps also played a major part in determining the extension of imperial power to north-west Spain. That region, home of the fierce Cantabrians and Asturians, remained outside Rome's control, despite more than two centuries of Roman presence in the Iberian peninsula. Augustus led his forces in person, the last dme he was to do so. The matter was evidently deemed to be of high importance.

The campaigns proved long and arduous, as so often in Spain. Augustus headed the effort in one year only, 26 B.C., but resistance continued at intervals until 19 B.C., perhaps even beyond. The princeps was determined to subjugate the area.

Strategic motives do not account for the thrust. Roman commanders regularly claimed triumphs in Spain - six of them had been awarded in the decade just prior to Augustus' invasion itself. Raids by the Canta­brians upon neighbouring tribes might have supplied a pretext. But hardly enough to warrant the emperor's own presence at the head of the army. Nor do economic motives provide an answer. Spanish mines and other resources had long been exploited by Rome; the wealth of the north west was an afterthought rather than an incentive.⁷⁰ Our sources offer little by way of explanation: Cantabrian harassment of neighbours, Augustus' intent to regulate affairs in Spain, or simply irritation that after 200 years a corner of the peninsula still held itself independent of Roman rule.⁷¹ Concrete goals take second place here; propaganda counted for more.

The provinces of Spain (Baetica was soon to be removed) were among the overseas territories assigned to Augustus at the beginning of the year

" Sherwin-White 1984 (a 89) 322—41, sees a more menacing posture by Augustus toward Parthia. ⁷⁰ Cf. Flor. 11.33.60.

⁷¹ On the triumphs, see Fasti Triumph, for the years 36, 34,33,32, 28, and 26; Il/a/xm p. 57o;cf. also Oio li.20.5; ILS 893. Raids by Cantabrians: Flor. 11.33.47; regulation of affairs: Oio lin.22.5; subjugation of independent peoples: Oros. vi.21.1. For discussions of these motives, see Schmitt- henner 1962 (c 303) 43-33; Santos Yanguas 1982 (e 237) 7-10, with further literature.

27 B.C. He announced his resolve to bring them firmly under Roman authority. Since most of the peninsula already fell in that category, the intended targets were plainly the Cantabrians and Asturians. Tales made the rounds of their ferocious nature and fanatic resistance to any infringement on autonomy. Augustus threw open the gates of Janus' temple, a symbolic means to proclaim a crusade against the foe. And his personal leadership of the army would reinforce martial credentials, a check on actual or potential rivals with military claims of their own.[322] As the opening of the gates declared Augustus' purpose, so their closing advertised its accomplishment. The princeps made certain to have that ceremony conducted to commemorate his success in 25 B.C., only the fourth time in Roman history that Janus' gates were shut — but the second time in five years.⁷³ The occasion in 29 had marked official termination of civil war; this time the ritual signified pacification of the empire. Augustus declined to celebrate a triumph, a display of moderatio, but accepted a more enduring distinction: the privilege of wearing garlands and triumphal dress on the first day of every year.[323] He plainly intended to make the event memorable, a fact underscored by the composition and publication of Augustus' own autobiography. The work concluded with the successful close of the Cantabrian War.[324] It memorialized a capstone of the princeps' career. In light of later accomplishments, the bellum Cantabricum et Asturicum may not have seemed so momentous. Augustus gives it only brief mention in the Res Gestae, among a number of regions which he brought to submission.[325]The earlier and more emphatic presentation, however, is reflected in the Livian tradition and picked up by Velleius Paterculus: after two centuries of bloodshed in that violent and savage land, Caesar Augustus' campaigns imposed a lasting peace that not only crushed armed resistance but even wiped out brigandage.⁷⁷ The conquest of north-west Spain rounded off control of the entire peninsula.

As in the case of Parthia, battlefield exploits in Spain did not match their publicity in Rome. Confusion in the sources prevents a confident reconstruction of events, geography, or chronology. It is clear, in any case, that Augustus' personal intervention was anything but decisive. The princeps was at Tarraco at the beginning of 26 B.C., there to inaugurate his eighth consulship.⁷⁸ He participated in the campaign of that year, but in what area and for how long remain unknown. Florus and Orosius record only Roman victories in Cantabria, with the princeps directing a three-pronged attack from the base camp at Segisamo: the Romans inflicted a defeat on their foes at Bergida (or Velleia), starved them out at Mt Vindius and captured the city of Aracelium (or Racilium). Names of the sites and their locations have long been disputed. Nor is it clear whether the campaign of 26 confined itself to Cantabria or included Asturia. The question connects to a further one: did the three Roman assaults occur serially or simultaneously? No definitive answers are possible.⁷⁹ Cassius Dio's account, however, discloses setbacks: the Romans made little headway under Augustus, illness felled the princeps who withdrew to Tarraco, and successes came only through the exertions of C. Antistius Vetus, legate of Tarraconen- sis.⁸⁰ Augustus, it may be safely surmised, did not return to the battlefield after the campaigning season of 26 в.с. Roman forces penetrated into Asturia and gained a dramatic victory over besieged and desperate Spaniards at Mt Medullius in 26 or 2 5.⁸¹ A concerted assault by the Asturians followed in 25, nearly overwhelming Roman forces in the region, thwarted only by a last-minute betrayal of their plan and a march to the rescue by the army of P. Carisius, legate of Lusitania. Carisius' capture of the Asturian stronghold Lancia concluded the fighting. Romans had gained the upper hand, but the struggle had been bloody and the cost in lives heavy.⁸²

The victories prompted Augustus to direct the closing of Janus' doors, an announcement of thorough pacification, and generated the award of triumphal honours. The princeps even authorized the establish­ment of a veteran colony, colonia Augusta Emerita (Merida), to mark the settled status of the land.⁸³ An ode of Horace welcomed home the returning conqueror, comparing him to Hercules and rejoicing in a new security.⁸⁴ But the conquest was superficial and the celebration prema­ture. Both Cantabrians and Asturians exploded into revolt as soon as Augustus left the province in 24, thus exposing the fragility of his achievement. The legate of Tarraconensis, L. Aelius Lamia, resorted to brutality in suppressing the rebellion.⁸⁵ Two years later the Cantabrians

⁷⁹ Flor. 11.33.48—50; Oros. vi.21.3-5. Among numerous scholarly discussions, see Magie 1920(0 285) 325-39; Syme 1934 (c 313) 293-317; Schuten 1943 (e 238); Horrent 1953 (c 276) 279-90; Schmitthenner 1962 (c 305) 54-60; Syme 1970 (c 314) 83-103; a recent summary of scholarship in Santos Yanguas 1982 (e 237) 16-26. See also Santos 1975 (c 503) 531-6; Lomas Salmonte 1975 (e 230) 103-27; Solana Sainz 1981 (e 259) 97-119; Tranoy 1981 (e 244) 132-44; Martino 1982 (c 287) 41-104. ⁸⁰ Dio liii.25.5-8; cf. Flor. 11.33.51; Suet. Aug. 81.

Flor. 11.33.50; Oros. vi.21.6—8. The location of Mt Medullius, whether in Asturia or in Callaecia, is uncertain; Santos Yanguas 1982 (e 237) 18-26; Martino 1982 (c 287) 105-24.

Flor. 11.33.54-8; Oros. vt.21.9-10; Dio liii.25.8. For the deployment and identification of the legions, see testimony collected by Lomas Salmonte 1975 (e230) 135-9; Jones (£226)48-51; Solana Sainz 1981 (e 239) 120-42; Santos Yanguas 1982 (e 237) 26-45. ⁸³ Dio liii.26.1.

⁸⁴ Hor. Carm. in.i4;cf. iv. 14.50. A darker interpretation of the poem by Sholz 1971(0 307) 123­37. ⁸⁵ Dio Lni.29.1-2. For the legate's name, see AE 1948, 93.

rose against their new governor, C. Furnius, and the Asturians against the increasing cruelty of Carisius, bringing still more ruthless repression and subjugation.[326] Yet another insurrection by the redoubtable Canta- brians in 19 B.C. provoked the dispatch of M. Agrippa himself who subdued them, but only at heavy cost and severe losses, declining even to accept the triumph voted him at Augustus' urging.[327] Agrippa's campaign which flushed the Cantabrians out of their strongholds and compelled them to settle in the plains finally brought a measure of stability to the region.[328] The princeps was able to make a more peaceful tour of Spain in 15-14 B.C., organizing colonial foundations and exhibiting generosity.[329]

Here as elsewhere propaganda and reality diverged. Augustus entered Spain to claim victory and announce pacification. And so he did. His autobiography saluted the achievement, Velleius Paterculus embellished it, the tradition followed by Florus and Orosius reiterated it. The conquest of north-west Spain rounded off Roman suzerainty in the Iberian peninsula. But the real victory did not match Augustus' boast. It came slowly, a bloody and brutal process that endured well beyond the princeps' declaration of success. The Ara Pacis was duly decreed to herald Augustus' return from Spain. Not, however, in 25 в.с. when Janus' doors were closed and triumphal honours bestowed; rather in 13 в.с. after more than a decade of intermittent insurrection, costly casualties and terrorism.

VI. AFRICA

In Africa entrenchment of control rather than expansionism predomi­nated. The region served as an important granary for Rome and its security held a place on the imperial agenda. The provincia Africa, once the realm of Carthage, had been in Roman hands for a century. Iulius Caesar added to the empire's holdings, annexing the kingdom of Numidia, henceforth Africa Nova, with the former province becoming Africa Vetus.[330] The fall of Sextus Pompeius in 36 в.с. brought both provinces under Octavian's authority. He strengthened Roman presence in both, sending new settlers to Carthage in 29 в.с. and to Cirta in 26 в.с.⁹¹ Confidence in their security allowed him to transfer responsibility for the area, whether as one or as two provinces, to the Senate in the dispositions of 27 в.с.⁹²

Not that calm had descended altogether. Nor did Rome abandon aggression and content herself with consolidation. A series of procon­suls earned triumphs ex Africa, five of them in the period 24—19 B.C.[331]Details of the campaigns escape us for the most part, as do motives, location and the identity of the foe. Evidence does not permit characteri­zation of them either as defence of the frontier or as extension of empire. The southern boundaries of the provinces were fluid. One can hardly draw a distinction between protection of Roman interests and intimida­tion of semi-nomadic tribes. The legio III Augusta remained as a continuing presence even after the Senate took official responsibility in 27 B.C. Of the triumphs recorded, details survive only for the campaign of L. Cornelius Balbus who gained his reward in 19 B.C. Balbus, a friend and loyal lieutenant of Augustus and a man experienced in Africa, drove deeply into the territory of the Garamantes, the restive Berber people who dwelled south of the Roman province. Pliny describes the triumph, with a catalogue of the towns and tribes whence came the spoils displayed by Balbus. The extent of his victories indicates carefully planned campaigns with a number of columns to penetrate the present Fezzan and its environs. Balbus' well-earned triumph suggests a syste­matic thrust to intimidate the Berber. And Augustus could take credit for his subordinate's accomplishment. Virgil's homage to the princeps' imperialism makes special mention of the subjugation of the Garamantes.[332]

The intimidation apparently took effect. Two decades passed with no evidence of trouble from the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes on the fringes of the province. The stationing of legio III Augusta at Ammaedara no doubt helped to keep matters under control.[333] Troubles did not recommence until c. a.d. 2: another imperator, L. Passienus Rufus, gained triumphal honours for victories in Africa.[334] The triumph presupposes rebellion and upheaval. And other fragmentary evidence confirms it: the Gaetulians and Musulamii in the region of the Syrtes engaged in guerilla warfare against Roman rule and against Rome's commanders, until subdued in a.d. 6 by Cossus Cornelius Lentulus who would pass to his son the commemorative title of Gaetulicus.[335] It may have been during these same years that the Garamantes rose again, together with the

Marmarides, providing occasion for another Roman military success, that of Sulpicius Quirinius, who with modesty uncharacteristic of imperatores, declined the honorific name of Marmaricus.⁹⁸ Testimony is thin and woefully inadequate. But it is plain that the stability imposed by Balbus' successes did not endure through the reign of Augustus. Native resistance to Roman rule resurfaced when opportunity arose, a periodic rejection of the pax Augusta.

Roman influence, limited on the southern borderlands, spread along the Mediterranean coast of Africa. The ruler of Mauretania, Bocchus, died in 3 j в.с. and Octavian took charge of his kingdom, keeping it out of the hands of any native prince and transforming it into a direct Roman dependency." Precisely how the region was administered in subsequent years remains obscure. Mauretania does not appear among the provinces enlisted on Octavian's side in 32 B.C., nor among those assigned in the settlement of 27 в.с.¹⁰⁰ The nature of its governance eludes inquiry, but Rome directly or indirectly, took responsibility for it. In 25 B.C., however, the arrangement gave way to a new solution: Augustus turned the realm over to Juba II, son of the former king of Numidia whose dominion had been annexed by Caesar.¹⁰¹ The transfer had perhaps been anticipated from the start, or else Augustus gradually recognized the undue burden of extending Roman resources to administer north Africa all the way to the Atlantic. In any event, the scholarly Juba, now accorded a new throne and assigned new duties, accepted the role of loyal and dependent client.¹⁰²

The princeps, however, did not pin his faith entirely upon the client king in Mauretania. Nor exclusively on military force in the border regions of Africa Vetus and Africa Nova. Augustus embarked on a systematic policy of colonization. In addition to restocking Carthage and Cirta, he planted three or four colonies in Africa Vetus, at least two in Africa Nova, and twelve in Mauretania. And he further setded veterans and other colonists in rural districts, the pagi outside the towns.¹⁰³

Roman presence in north Africa increased markedly under Augustus. A garrison at Ammaedara, military action in the frontier zones, a dependent ruler in Mauretania and, perhaps, twenty colonial founda­tions all reinforced that presence. The need to secure an area which

SEG IX.6.65; Flor. 11.31.41. The date is quite uncertain; Rachet 1970 (c 297) 77, n. 4.

Dio xux.45.7. ¹⁰⁰ Aug. RG 25.2; Dio l.6.3-4, lin.12.4-7.

Dio uu.26.2; Strab. vi.4.2 (288Q; xvii.3.7 (828Q. It is unlikely, despite Dio, li.ij.6, that Numidia had been restored to Juba II in the meantime and was now exchanged for Mauretania. See the arguments of Romanelli 1959 (e 760) 1 j6—8; Ritter 1987 (c 299) 137-42.

On Mauretania between 3 3 and 2 3 B.C., see Pavis d'Escurac 198 2 (c 296) 219-2 5; Mackie 1983 (e 753) 333-42 - highly conjectural. On Juba, see Romanelli 1959 (e 760) 162-74; Pavis d'Escurac 1982 (c 296) 225-9.

Evidence and discussion in Romanelli 1959 (e 760) 187-226; Benabou 1976 (e 715) 50-7; Kienast 1982 (c 136) 395-7; Pavis d'Escurac 1982 (c 296) 229-30; Mackie 1983 (e 753) 332-38.

served as an important source of grain supplied prime motivation. But the measures also provoked resentment and retaliation, guerrilla warfare and disruption by native peoples. The shoring up of Roman authority had at the same time generated challenges to that authority and stirred sentiments that would lead to even more explosive reaction in the reign of Augustus' successor.

VII. THE ALPS

The Alps loomed over northern Italy, a haven for fierce tribes and violent folk who might menace the Roman hold on Gaul and disrupt communications from Italy. For Augustus, ready access through that barrier and containment of restive tribes who could obstruct movement were important desiderata. And he made certain to achieve those goals. That larger motives held - a prelude to comprehensive conquests in the Balkans and Germany - would be a hasty conclusion and premature judgment.

The young triumvir recognized early the importance of controlling the Little and Great St Bernard passes, the routes to Helvetia and the Upper Rhine. His officer Antistius Vetus attacked the Salassi in 34 в.с., tough warriors who inhabited the higher reaches and represented constant danger to that region. Initial efforts miscarried, as the Salassi first surrendered and then expelled a Roman garrison with scorn and glee. The imperial legate Valerius Messalla retaliated a few years later, but success again was short-lived. Subjugation of the recalcitrant Salassi came only in 25 в.с. when Augustus' appointee Terentius Varro forced them to capitulate and sold the able-bodied into slavery. The military colony of Augusta Praetoria (Aosta) soon rose on the site of Varro's camp and facilitated Roman access to central Gaul.¹⁰⁴

Determination to command the Alps did not slacken thereafter. Military installations gradually multiplied in strategic places during the next decade: Zurich, Basel, Vindonissa, Oberwinterthur and else­where.¹⁰⁵ That provincial penetration prepared the way for outright conquest.

Campaigns began in earnest in 17 or 16 в.с. when P. Silius Nerva, proconsul of Illyricum, subdued two Alpine tribes, the Camunni and the Vennii, the first at least and perhaps both in the region between Como and Lake Garda.¹⁰⁶ Roman sources, of course, held the enemy respon-

App. III. 17; Dio XLIX.34.2, xlix.38.3, Lin.25.2-5; Strab. iv.6.7 (205-6Q.

Wells 1972 (e 601) 40-6; Fcei-Stolba 1976 (e 616) 350-5.

Dio liv. 20. i. Debate continues over the identity and location of the Vennii. If they are identified with the Vennonetes of the upper Rhine, then Silius' assaults were quite wide-ranging; cf. van Berchem 1968 (£605)4-7; Wells 1972 (e 601)63-6. But the matter remains uncertain; Overbeck 1976 (e 633) 665-8; Kienast 1982 (c 136) 295; Waasdorp 1982/3 (e 639) 39-40.

sible for provoking the conflict. More probably, it represents a stage in Augustus' drive to bring the Alpine regions under Roman dominion. It can hardly be coincidence that a two pronged assault followed in the next year of 15 B.C., headed by the princeps' stepsons. Tiberius marched eastwards from Gaul, Drusus northwards through the Brenner and Reschenscheideck passes to the valley of the Inn. Blame was once again fastened upon the foe: Dio describes the Raeti of the central Alps as savages who plundered Gaul and northern Italy, preyed upon travellers, and murdered all male captives, even unborn babies divined to be male.[336] But the Roman purpose went beyond retaliation. Silius' campaign had served as prelude; Drusus and Tiberius then carried out a systematic design, moving into Raetia from two directions and with various columns emerging at different points simultaneously.[337] Augus­tus determined to clear out hostile elements in the central Alps and to extend Roman control throughout the Alpine regions. The brothers achieved their goals, subduing the formidable Raeti and Vindelici of eastern Switzerland, the Tyrol and southern Bavaria.[338] Roman domi­nion in the Alps would be secure.

The victories of Augustus' stepsons were followed in 14 в.с. by subjugation of the Ligurians and annexation of the Maritime Alps.[339]The native dynast Cottius gained recognition as praejectus to rule over the Cottian Alps in Roman interest.[340] Occupation of strategic sites in the lands of the Raeti and Vindelici came in subsequent years. Augustus stationed two legions in the area and appointed an equestrian prefect to make Raetia an administrative unit of the empire, thus bringing under control all the major passes of the central Alps and allowing Roman influence to stretch through the Voralpenland to the Danube. Strabo attests to peaceful acquiescence by the once savage tribes in Roman rule and taxation a generation later.[341]

The Alpine campaigns in 16 and 15 B.C. included fighting against peoples further east, branches of the Norici, inhabitants of the regnum Noricum that linked Raetia to Pannonia.[342] That fighting later served as pretext for Дотап occupation of Noricum. At what point the region became formally annexed remains in dispute. But a Roman presence in the land under Augustus and as consequence of the Alpine conquests admits of little doubt. Noricum, a generally peaceful acquisition, supplied a vital communication between the forces in Raetia and the army of Illyricum.[343] Roman influence now spread all along the middle Danube.

What prompted pacification of the Alps? A long-range imperialist plan is often conjectured: the Alpine campaigns merely set the stage for major offensives against Germany, the expansion of Roman power across both the Rhine and the Danube to effect the subjugation of that land all the way to the Elbe.[344] Perhaps. But that ambitious scheme need not have been in prospect at the time of the Alpine conquests. Other motives sufficed. The opening of the Great St Bernard and the route through Helvetia gave swifter access from Italy to the Rhine and thus greater protection to Gaul. Reduction of Raetia and occupation of Noricum provided essential links between legions on the Rhine and the armies of Illyricum.[345] The Upper Danube as yet contained no fortresses, a zone of influence, not a fixed frontier.[346] Ease of communications rather than the prospect of further expansion may have been the immediate stimulus.

Concrete objectives coincided with political motives and public relations. Augustus utilized the Alpine campaigns to hone the talents and advance the claims of his stepsons. The advertisement of victory came in varied forms and reached a wide constituency. Horace sang of the exploits in two carmina, celebrating Drusus' routs of Alpine tribes and Tiberius' decisive conquest of the Raeti.[347] The Consolatio ad Liviam, composed later in the reign of Augustus, also extolled the accomplish­ments of the brothers and the thorough defeat of the barbarians.¹¹⁹ A monument was erected to commemorate these events, the Tropaeum Alpium, installed at La Turbie in the Maritime Alps and listing no fewer than forty-five tribes brought under subjection by the princeps.¹²⁰ And Augustus boasts in the Res Gestae that he had pacified the Alps all the way from the Adriatic to the Tuscan Sea — adding the questionable corollary that every campaign had been legitimate and justified.¹²¹ The princeps, as ever, cultivated the image of the successful and rightful conqueror.

VIII. THE BALKANS

Strategy and politics combined to motivate Roman action in Illyricum. Octavian recognized the region's importance at an early stage and led the campaigns in person during the triumviral period. That proved to be just a prelude. Major expansion took place between 13 and 9 b.C., and then the imposition of a new and more permanent arrangement after suppression of the Pannonian revolt in a.d. 9. Augustus prepared the ground for two provinces, Dalmatia and Pannonia, extended Roman control to the Danube, and secured the land route between northern Italy and the Balkans.

The result had not been forecast from the outset. Octavian's thrust into Illyricum from 35 to 33 в.с. had more specific ends in view. He looked to his own needs - and to those of his soldiers. The rugged lands across the Adriatic would provide good training and discipline, a hardening of the sinews that might otherwise grow soft with idleness.[348]Weapons would now be trained on the barbarian, a conspicuous turning away from the civil strife that exhausted and demoralized the troops. They could look forward to enrichment from the spoils of the enemy, so Octavian alleged. Campaigns against foes of the empire would restore morale to the forces and allow their commander to claim leadership in the national interest instead of a factional struggle.[349] The memoirs of the princeps expounded at length on the Ulyrian adventure, reproduced in part by the historian Appian a century and a half later. They provided due justification for the war: Illyrians had periodically plundered Italy, they had damaged the cause of Iulius Caesar, had destroyed the armies of Gabinius and Vatinius in the 40s, and held the captured standards of Roman legions — enough reason for retaliation and restoration of national honour.[350] A harsher assessment comes from the pen of Cassius Dio, drawing on a tradition outside Augustus' memoirs. Dio notes correctly that no Illyrian provocation prompted the war: Octavian lacked legitimate complaint and sought pretext to give practice to his legions against a foe whose resistance was likely to be ineffective.¹²⁵

Neither the cynical judgment nor the self-serving explanation gets to the heart of the matter. Octavian needed to enhance his military reputation, an effort to match the accomplishments of his partner and rival Antony. It is no accident that Octavian took conspicuous personal risks and twice suffered injury in Illyricum. Those badges of courage could be useful. And upon completion of the contest he delivered a speech to the Senate making pointed contrast between Antony's idleness and his own vigorous liberating of Italy from incursions by savage peoples.¹²⁶

Larger strategic considerations have also been postulated. Perhaps Octavian sought to secure Italy to the north east in order to prevent a march by Antony via that route, as had once been contemplated by Philip V and Mithridates, or else to seize the area in preparation for a future offensive against his fellow triumvir. Or perhaps Octavian already contemplated a broad strategic design that would push the borders of Illyricum to the Danube and forge a link with imperial defences on the Rhine.¹²⁷ But military conflict with Antony was not yet imminent in 3 5; nor had any eastern ruler yet employed such a path to invade Italy. As for the eventual push to the Danube, Augustus himself ascribes that plan to the campaigns of his stepson Tiberius more than two decades later. Octavian had more immediate needs: establishment of a military reputation through punishment of tribes that had sullied Roman honour. He could thus contrast solid accomplishment with the sloth of Antony. Octavian would unfurl the Roman standards regained from the barbarian. And he would suggest even greater conquests in store for the future: victories in Illyria, it was reported, might lead to bold offensives against Dacians and Bastarnae.¹²⁸ Not that Octavian actually considered such offensives at this time. But here, as elsewhere, he sedulously advanced the pose of the conqueror.

Actual accomplishments in the Illyrian War of 35 to 33 в.с. were modest. Octavian opened the fighting in 3 5 B.C. with a thrust against the Iapodes, bringing their forces to surrender, and besieging their principal city and citadel at Metulum which was soon destroyed by fire.¹²⁹ Roman armies pressed on to assault Segesta (Siscia) at the confluence of the Save, blockade the city, and force it to submission. Octavian could take pride in the achievement and returned to Rome for the winter, intending to resume operations in Illyria in the following spring.¹³⁰ That next season, however, saw him transfer attention to Dalmatia. Talk of advance against Dacia was evidendy given up - or never meant seriously. Octavian did not intend to go beyond the Save. Instead, he could earn further laurels by punishing the tribes that had defeated Roman armies and held Roman standards. The princeps' forces stormed the Dalmatian stronghold of Promona and destroyed Synodium at the edge of the forest where Gabinius' troops had been cut down. Early in the next year, 3 3 B.C., the chastened and desperate Dalmatians, cut off from outside supplies, yielded up themselves and the Roman standards, pledged payment of arrears in tribute, and vowed obedience to Roman power. Other tribes also offered submission, and Octavian brought the three- year Illyrian War to a conclusion.¹³¹

Territorial gains were relatively limited. But territory had not been the

On the motives, see Syme 1971 (E702) 17,157; Wilkes 1969 (£706)48-9. A healthy scepticism is expressed by Schmitthenner 1958 (c 504) 193-200.

Aug. RG 29.1, 30.1; App. III. 22; Strab. vii.5.2 (313Q. ¹²⁹ App. HI. 18-21.

App. III. 22-4; Dio xLix.37.1-xLix.38-1.

App. III. 25-8; Dio XLIX.38.3-4, XLIX.43.8; Strab. vn.5.5 (315Q.

objective. Octavian had driven as far as Siscia on the Save and displayed Roman power to the Dalmatians, thus retaliating against peoples who had raided Roman territory or vanquished Roman troops in the past. What mattered was the presentation of events in Rome. Octavian spoke to the Senate and rattled off the names of nearly thirty tribes which his forces had coerced into submission, surrender and payment of tribute. He proudly set up the recovered standards in the portico of Cn. Octavius, thus linking his success to earlier republican victories. And he elevated the prestige of his family through the award of statues and the privilege of tribunician sacrosanctity for Livia and Octavia. Propaganda value, as so often, counted for more than tangible achievement.¹³²

Another barbarian people also held Roman standards in their posses­sion: the Bastarnae on the Lower Danube. They had captured the trophies from a defeated Roman army thirty years before. Octavian would restore Roman honour here as well. The proconsul of Macedonia, M. Licinius Crassus, marched north in 29 B.C. to engage the Bastarnae who, it was reported, had crossed the Haemus mountain range and had overrun parts of Thrace wherein dwelt allies of Rome. Crassus con­ducted campaigns over a two year period, driving back the Bastarnae, gaining victories over other Thracian tribes from the lower Danube, including the Moesi, the Getae and perhaps the Dacians, slaying a prince of the Bastarnae in hand to hand combat, and regaining the Roman eagles. He celebrated a well-earned triumph in 27 B.C.[351] Nothing suggests that these campaigns actually extended the boundaries of Macedonia. But the punishment of unruly tribes and the recovery of lost military emblems served to demonstrate and reinforce Roman authority.

Major advance in the region awaited a decade and a half. The provincial distributions of 27 в.с. assigned responsibility for Dalmatia and Macedonia to the Senate, two separate and independent proconsular commands. That formal situation remained unchanged through the 20s and for some years thereafter. But the advantages of a link between these domains and a push to the Danube that would control the land route from northern Italy to the lands of the East became increasingly evident. Restive Pannonian tribes attacked Istria in 16 B.C., Thracians ravaged Macedonia, and an uprising in Dalmatia had to be quelled in the same year. The Pannonians rose again in 14 B.C., calling forth yet another ad hoc suppression.¹³⁴ Augustus now made plans in earnest for subjugation.

M. Vinicius, probably proconsul of Illyricum, undertook operations in 14 b.c., but Augustus soon entrusted overall direction of the war to Agrippa with broad powers, a maius imperium, in the following year.¹³⁵ The princeps obviously took the matter very seriously. After Agrippa died in 12 b.c., he appointed his stepson and new son-in-law Tiberius to the post. More than just suppression of tribal incursions was at stake here. Roman forces advanced against the peoples between the Save and the Drave, presumably the war-like Breuci. Tiberius, with the aid of the Scordisci who had already been brought under Roman authority, earned triumphal honours for a vigorous campaign against Pannonians in 12 b.c. and then continued against both Dalmatians and Pannonians in 11. The operations evidently gave Rome control of the Save valley and allowed for the initial penetration of Bosnia.[352] Parallel campaigns were conducted in Thrace where L. Piso subjected hostile tribes in three years of fighting and secured Roman mastery by 11 b.c.[353] The Augustan regime had now made a major commitment in the Balkans. The former proconsular command of Illyricum came directly under Augustus' authority, to be governed by the princeps' legates. It encompassed an area that would soon stretch from the Adriatic to the Danube.[354] Tiberius led campaigns for two more seasons in 10 and 9, reducing tribes that resisted domination, pacifying the region, and winning an ovatio. Augustus himself paid signal tribute to his stepson's achievements in the Res Gestae-, he had subjugated the previously unconquered peoples of Pannonia and extended the frontier of Illyricum to the banks of the Danube.[355]

Evidence largely fails for the next fifteen years. Those years, it may be presumed, constituted the time of real pacification, the securing of the middle Danube, and the intimidation of tribes beyond it in order to assure control of the frontier. Augustus' legate Sex. Appuleius com­pleted coercion of the Pannonians in 8 b.c. Excursions across the Danube followed in subsequent years: L. Domitius Ahenobarbus resettled the Hermunduri as a check on the Marcomanni and even brought his troops to the far side of the Elbe; epigraphic testimony records another Augustan legate, perhaps M. Vinicius, who routed the Bastarnae and entered into relations with a number of trans-Danubian tribes; Aelius Catus transplanted 50,000 Getae from the far side of the

Danube to Thrace, where they took on the name of Moesians; and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus successfully drove Dacians and Sarmatians back from the vicinity of the Danube, thus to solidify further Rome's hold on the river.[356] A legionary command was installed in Moesia during these years.[357] Augustus boasts hyperbolically of smashing the Dacians and compelling them to submit to Roman orders, a claim echoed but modified by Strabo.[358] The situation seemed secure.

But that confidence proved to be premature. In a.d. 6 Tiberius assembled troops for a decisive thrust against the Marcomannic leader Maroboduus in Bohemia. The Roman imperator summoned recruits from the ostensibly compliant Illyrians for the purpose. The assemblage itself, however, gave the indigenous forces a sense of their own strength and numbers. National pride came to the surface, intensified by resent­ment at harsh exactions of tribute by Roman officials and the fierce spirit of a new generation of Illyrian warriors. Bato, a chieftain of the Daesitiates in central Bosnia, took the lead in whipping up hostility. And the rising of the Daesitiates was soon matched by rebellion of the Breuci in Pannonia, headed by Pinnes and another Bato. Thus erupted the great Pannonian revolt which would endure from a.d. 6 to 9 and nearly shake the empire to its foundations. Suetonius labelled it, without much exaggeration, the most serious external threat to Rome since the war with Hannibal.[359]

The rebels assaulted legionary detachments and massacred Roman merchants. The Breuci headed for the key Roman garrison at Sirmium and would have taken it but for the timely arrival of A. Caecina Severus, legate of Moesia who turned back the Pannonian threat while suffering heavy losses. Tiberius immediately cancelled operations against Maro­boduus and dispatched the Illyrian legate M. Valerius Messalla to secure the other critical Roman fortress at Siscia which guarded the route to north-eastern Italy. The rebel forces in Pannonia and Dalmatia had been slow to combine efforts; otherwise, the entire Roman position in Illyricum might have collapsed. As it was, the insurgents controlled most of the territory from the Save to the Adriatic and had gathered forces, so it is reported, of 200,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry. Caecina Severus returned to his own provincia of Moesia to protect it against incursions of Dacians and Sarmatians. Sirmium was still vulnerable, and

Tiberius could not afford to move far or fast from his base at Siscia. Grave anxieties gripped Rome. Augustus, now severely alarmed, ordered extraordinary levies, impressed veterans back into service, imposed new taxes, called upon the patriotic instincts of senators and equites, and enrolled freedmen into the ranks as reinforcements for the army of Illyricum. The princeps sent recruits with Velleius Paterculus who would then gain an eyewitness's view of the war for his future history, dispatched additional troops with a trusted member of his own household, young Germanicus the nephew of Tiberius, and even moved his personal entourage to Ariminum where he could keep in closer touch with developments.[360]

Rebuilding of the Roman position began in earnest in a.d. 7. Reinforcements from Italy brought Tiberius' army up to five legions. M. Plautius Silvanus led two legions from the east and joined forces with Caecina's army of Moesia. Both commanders, together with the Thra- cian cavalry under Rhoemetalces, now headed west to link with Tiberius. They survived near calamity at the Volcaean Marshes, an ambush by troops under the combined leadership of the two Batos. Old- fashioned discipline, as Velleius describes it, repaired ranks that were broken, stemmed panic, and turned defeat into victory.[361] By the winter of a.d. 7/8 an immense assemblage of ten legions had converged at Siscia, swollen further by seventy auxiliary cohorts, fourteen cavalry units, and no fewer than 10,000 veterans recalled to the colours from Italy - the largest military concourse since the civil wars. Yet the giant gathering once effected, Tiberius almost immediately dissolved it again, escorting the reinforcements from Moesia and the east back to Sir­mium.[362] A perplexing decision. Perhaps the assemblage had been Augustus' idea, the product of impatience and anxiety, without consul­tation of Tiberius.¹⁴⁷ More likely, it was a tactic of intimidation: such a concentration of power could overawe the resistance of rebels.

The manoeuvre achieved its end. In the following year, without further show of force, the Pannonians offered full surrender and received terms. A final flurry occurred late in the year, when the Dalmatian chieftain Bato captured and killed his treacherous Breucian namesake and rekindled revolt among the Pannonians. But the Roman garrison at Sirmium under Silvanus crushed the uprising and restored order. The Save valley was once again safely in Roman hands.¹⁴⁸

Dalmatia remained to be reduced in a.d. 9. Tiberius returned to Rome in the winter, but three commanders held responsibility for completing the reconquest: M. Lepidus, left as legate in Siscia, Silvanus at Sirmium and Germanicus on the Dalmatian coast itself. But the combination proved inadequate. The inexperienced Germanicus made little headway, and Augustus sent back Tiberius himself to resume command. That decision sealed the fate of Dalmatia. Lepidus forced his way through hostile territory to join with Tiberius. And the redoutable Bato, though eluding capture and resisting siege, finally came to terms - and was spared by the admiring Tiberius.¹⁴⁹

Four bloody years had been consumed in suppressing this mighty challenge to Roman authority.¹⁵⁰ Military success, as usual, would be translated into political distinction. Augustus exploited the victory to bestow honours on his family. Germanicus made public announcement of the result. The princeps and his stepson both celebrated triumphs in a.d. 10 and received triumphal arches in Pannonia, as well as other distinctions. Germanicus gained triumphal insignia and praetorian rank. And even Tiberius' son Drusus, though he played no part in the war, obtained the right to attend the Senate and to hold praetorian status as soon as he reached the quaestorship.¹⁵¹ The geopolitical consequences, however, were greater still. The process of consolidation and organiza­tion lay in the future. But conquest was complete. Roman power extended to the middle Danube, a critical link in the connexion that now ran from northern Italy through the Balkans to the provinces of the East. At some time after a.d. 8 the princeps set in place the two great military commands that would become the new provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia.¹⁵² It was a solid and enduring achievement.

ix. germany

The confrontation of Rome and Germany created high drama in the time of Augustus - and heated debate in the modern era. What were the objectives of Rome's crossing the Rhine, how far did she intend to go, and how firm a hold did she expect to exercise? The penetration of Germany was no isolated event. It must be considered in close conjunc­tion with Roman presence in Gaul.

Caesar had conquered Gaul but had not fully pacified it. Octavian took the matter in hand, an item of the first priority in consolidation of the western empire. In the early 30s в.с. he commissioned his most trusted collaborator, M. Agrippa, to campaign against rebellious peoples in Aquitania in the south west and against tribes in the north

^1,9 Dio lvi.11—16; Veil. Pat. 11.115.1-4. See the analysis of Koestermann 1953 (c 281) 368-76; Wilkes 1965 (E70J) 111—25■

On the war, in general, see the thorough treatment of Koestermann 1953 (c 281) 345-78; also Mocsy 1962 (e 675) 544-8; Wilkes 1969 (e 706) 69-77.

Dio lvi.17.1-3. 'и Cf. Braunert 1977 (c 25 5) 21 j-16.

east.¹⁵³ Unrest persisted. The years 31 to 28 B.C. witnessed three uprisings requiring Roman military acdon: against the Morini, the Treviri and the Aquitani, each issuing in triumphs or imperial salu­tations for the victorious commanders.¹⁵⁴ Those episodes drove home the lesson that the policing of Gaul could not be divorced from control of Germanic tribes across the Rhine. Caesar had experienced the problem, having faced large scale migrations by Germans like the Sugambri, the Usipetes and the Tencteri who dwelled near the river and who felt the pressure of the potent Suebi.¹⁵⁵ It is noteworthy and revealing that Gallic disturbances in the 30s and early 20s b.c. repeatedly involved assistance or provocation from peoples across the Rhine. Agrippa had to fight on the other side of the river; the Treviri got support from trans-Rhenane tribes; and the Suebi came to the aid of the Morini.¹⁵⁶ Augustus effected a settlement in Gaul in 27 B.C., conducting a census and perhaps implementing the tripartite division of the land.¹⁵⁷ But administrative arrangements did not avert upheaval. The legate M. Vinicius brought an army against Germans in retaliation for their murder of Roman citizens who practised trade in their lands.¹⁵⁸ Agrippa returned to Gaul in 20 and 19 b.c. and encountered a familiar scene: conflicts among the Gauls compounded by intervention of the Ger­mans.¹⁵⁹ The situation had changed little from the time of Caesar's Gallic Wars a generation earlier. The Rhine was an artificial and largely ineffectual barrier. Germanic peoples dwelled on both sides of the river. It represented at best a frontier zone rather than a demarcated border. And harassment of Roman Gaul by trans-Rhenane intruders was a continual menace.

Diplomatic measures proved unsatisfactory. Rome reached friendly accords with the Chatti and perhaps others, thereby to use them as counter-weight to other peoples who might enter the Roman pro­vince.¹⁶⁰ To no avail. In 17 or 16 B.C. Sugambri, Usipetes and Tencteri spilled over the Rhine, plundered Gallic territory, ambushed Roman forces, and inflicted an ignominious defeat on the legate M. Lollius.¹⁶¹ The princeps himself hastened to Gaul in 16 B.C. to repair the damage. The cost in prestige outweighed any material losses. By the time Augustus reached Gaul, the Germans had withdrawn and there was no one to fight. A peaceful settlement followed.¹⁶² But it is no accident that

^,u App. BCiv. v.92; Dio xLvn1.49.2-j; Eutrop. vii.j; Roddaz 1984 (c 200) 66-75.

Dio Li.20.;, Li.21.5-6; App. BCiv. iv.j8; Tib. 1.7.3—12, " i-Ji-6; ILS 893; CIL I².jo, 77.

Caes. BGall. iv.iff; cf. Timpe 1975 (c 321) 125—9.

¹⁵⁴ Dio xlviii.49.2-}, li-20.5_f li.2I.6.

¹⁵⁷ Dio Lin.22.5; Livy, Per. 134; cf. Drinkwater 1983 (E326) 20-1, 95. ¹⁵⁸ Dio Lin.26.4—5.

Dio liv.11.2. On Agrippa's activities, see Roddaz 1984 (c 200) 383-402.

Dio liv.56.3; Timpe 1975 (c 321) 135-9.

Dio liv.20.4-5; Veil. Pat. 11.97.1; Suet. Aug. 23; Tac. Ann. 1.10; Obsequens, 71.

Dio Liv.19.1, Liv.20.6; Veil. Pat. 11.97.1; Suet. Aug. 25.

Augustus appeared in the region, prepared to lead forces in person. A Roman defeat, however minor, could not be tolerated. It was essential to present a bold face to the public. Hence the appearance of the emperor in the field. The image of Roman authority had to be advanced.

Augustus stayed in the West for three years.[363] That period marks the beginning of a more aggressive Roman posture to assure ascendancy in Gaul and to intimidate tribes across the Rhine. It represents a logical time for establishment of legionary forts on the river. Six camps eventually arose on the lower and middle Rhine: Fectio, Noviomagus, Vetera, Novaesium, Oppidum Ubiorum and Moguntiacum.[364] Once again the close association of this development with new administrative arrangements to strengthen Roman governance in Gaul is plain.[365]

The princeps stepson Drusus took over in Gaul when Augustus returned to Rome in 13 B.C.[366] In the following year Drusus launched the first four major offensives against tribes on the far side of the Rhine. The campaigns have stimulated speculation on Roman motives and inten­tions for conquest to the Elbe or beyond. It would be more prudent to recognize the continued connexion between suppression of Gallic unrest and the terrorizing by Rome of Germanic peoples who had contributed or might contribute to that unrest. The sources make the connexion explicit. Drusus established an altar of Augustus at Lugdunum (see p. 98 above for the view that this was in 10 B.C.), thereby to rally Gallic loyalty to the regime. But his conduct of a census, presumably associated with financial exactions, sparked new upheaval, aggravated by interference from German tribes on both sides of the Rhine.[367] Drusus' campaigns in Germany, therefore, grew out of familiar circumstances. They intensi­fied pressure on the Germans in order to strengthen the Roman dominion in Gaul.

The campaigns spread over four years, gathering in momentum, and displayed might to the barbarian to an extent not previously exper­ienced. Drusus began in 12 B.C. with assaults on the Sugambri whom he caught on the Gallic side of the Rhine and on the Usipetes across the river. He proceeded to an amphibious operation along the North Sea coast, gaining the Frisii as allies and invading the land of the Chauci.[368]Notable advances came in the following year. Drusus subdued the Usipetes, bridged the Lippe, and passed through the land of the

Sugambri into that of the Cherusci as far as the Weser river. The coming of winter again induced him to return to the Rhine, but not before he installed a garrison on the junction of the Lippe and the Eliso, perhaps at Haltern, and another near the Rhine in the region of the Chatti. The achievements earned Drusus triumphal honours.[369]

Augustus himself accompanied Drusus to Gaul in winter i i/io B.C., there to inspect the altar at Lugdunum and to observe the German situation. The linkage between defeat of Germans and consolidation of Gaul remained close. Another season in ю B.C. saw Drusus gain further victories over the Sugambri and Chatti who abandoned lands awarded them in an earlier diplomatic settlement by Rome.[370]

More far reaching successes marked the fourth and final campaign in 9 в.с. Drusus commenced the invasion, it appears, from Moguntiacum, attacked the Chatti once more, defeated the Marcomanni on the upper Main after stiff resistance, turned northward to the realm of the Cherusci, crossed the Weser again, and got as far as the Elbe. That, however, proved to be the terminus. Drusus turned back, suffered the misfortune of a broken leg, and died en route to the Rhine.[371] What stayed his advance at the Elbe is unspecified. But Augustan policy demanded that the best face be placed upon the events. Drusus, like Alexander the Great at the Hyphasis, set up trophies at the Elbe to signify progress rather than setback. And a story conveniently surfaced that Drusus was halted by a vision delivering divine pronouncement about the fate of the mission.[372]The gods, not any Roman failures, accounted for withdrawal. And elaborate honours were showered upon the memory of Drusus and his deeds.[373] Whatever the reality of the situation, Augustus, here as elsewhere, insisted on the appearance of success.

What had been accomplished? Drusus' campaigns had been invasions rather than conquests, the Germans intimidated rather than subdued. But these were more than hit and run raids. Drusus left tangible reminders of Roman power. Cassius Dio reports two garrisons planted in 11 B.C.; Florus, with obvious exaggeration, speaks of numerous forts and guard posts installed all along the Maas, the Weser and the Elbe.[374]Archaeology discloses the existence of important legionary bases at Haltern and Oberaden on the Lippe, and other garrisons elsewhere, but does not permit a precise chronology that would fix them to the time of

Drusus' incursions.[375] Nor can one assume that the garrisons signalled a permanent and a full-scale occupation. Tiberius rushed to the scene upon the death of his brother and, if Tiberius' panegyrist Velleius Paterculus is to be believed, he overran all of Germany as victorious commander in 8 B.C. without sustaining any losses. Other sources supply some specifics: Tiberius induced all Germans but the Sugambri to agree to peace terms, but Augustus then refused to embrace a peace without the Sugambri — a convenient pretext to keep options open and maintain a presence in Germany. Tiberius proceeded to deport 40,000 Germans to the Gallic side of the Rhine.[376] The exhibition of Roman power is clear, a necessary demonstration in the wake of Drusus' death. But it is rash to speak of Germany organized as a province of the empire, with Roman authority extended to the Elbe.[377] In fact, even Velleius, who would hardly minimize Tiberius' accomplishment, speaks only of reducing Germany 'almost to the form of a tributary province'. And Florus acknowledges that Germans were defeated rather than subdued.[378] Rome held only selected portions of German soil.[379] As so often, the appearance of Roman success outstripped the reality of Roman control.

The need to maintain a posture of strength in Germany continued to mark Augustan policy. An altar to Augustus was erected among the Ubii who had settled on the Rhine bank, at what later became Colonia Agrippina (Cologne). Appointment of a priest to the cult from the Cherusci was clearly meant to signal German allegiance to the princeps and his regime.[380] Periodic Roman military incursions gave repeated reminders of the empire's authority. Tiberius snuffed out some minor troubles in 7 в.с.¹⁸¹ At some time before a.d. i L. Domitius Ahenobar- bus undertook a more significant venture. He took troops from the Danube, encountered the tribe of the Hermunduri whom he settled on the upper Main, an area evacuated by the Marcomanni, crossed the Elbe without any resistance, made alliance with people on the further bank of that river, and planted a new altar to Augustus on the site, a symbol that loyalty extended even to that distant region. The idea that this expedition prepared the way for a Roman invasion of Bohemia is unnecessary conjecture. It supplied a means to reassert Roman influence without taking undue risks. Domitius even became embroiled in intra-tribal disputes among the Cherusci. But he made sure to winter his men back in the safer quarters on the Rhine.¹⁸² Domitius' successor M. Vinicius found it necessary or advantageous to engage in hostilities with German peoples beginning in a.d. 1, a massive war, so it is described. The sources preserve no record of location or details. But Vinicius did obtain triumphal honours and a public decree inscribed with his exploits.¹⁸³ The presentation at home of continued success and ascendancy in Germany remained consistent.

An ostensibly more vigorous expedition was launched in a.d. 4. Tiberius had come back into his stepfather's good graces, gained adoption by him, and was forthwith appointed to Germany. His laudator Velleius Paterculus describes the events with excessive adulation. Tears of joy allegedly filled the eyes of soldiers in greeting the much decorated commander under whom many had already served in various sectors of the empire. Tiberius, so Velleius reports, subdued the Cananefates, Attuarii and Bructeri, regained dominion over the Cherusci, crossed the Weser, and set up winter quarters at the source of the Lippe.¹⁸⁴ Velleius waxes even more rhetorical on the second campaigning season in a.d. 5: Tiberius' armies traversed all of Germany, beat down the Chauci once again, snapped the power of the fearsome Langobardi, and then capped his success by having his fleet sail up the Elbe. In two years, according to Velleius, Tiberius had been victorious everywhere, his army unscathed. The victories left nothing unconquered in all Germany except the Marcomanni.¹⁸⁵ Exaggeration is patent. The outbursts of Velleius do not warrant full confidence. Among other things, he calls Tiberius the first Roman general to reach the Elbe and the first to winter in Germany.¹⁸⁶ Cassius Dio provides a curt and sober assessment: Tiberius advanced to the Weser and the Elbe, but accomplished nothing worthy of record.¹⁸⁷ Only peace treaties resulted, whereas the legate got triumphal honours and the princeps and his son were hailed as impera- tores.^m The contrast between appearance and reality persists.

An assault on the Marcomanni was next on the Roman agenda. They had abandoned their ancestral lands in the Main valley under pressure of Drusus' attacks in 9 в.с. and had now carved out a kingdom under their formidable ruler Maroboduus.¹⁸⁹ The realm sat in an area bordering on

¹⁸² Dio Lv.10a.2-j; Tac. Ann. iv.44. The conjecture on Domitius' purpose in Syme 1954(0 312) 365-6. The starting-point of his expedition remains in dispute; Syme 1934 (c 312) 365-6; Timpe 1967(0 317) 280-4; Wells 1972 (e601) 158-9; Christ 1977(0 260) 181-3. ¹⁸³ Veil. Pat. 11.104.2.

Veil. Pat. 11.104.5-105.3.

Veil. Pat. 11.106.1-3, n.107.3, n.108.1. Similarly, Aufidius Bassus, in Peter, HRR, ii, 96, 3.

Veil. Pat. 11.105.3,11.106.2.

Dio lv.28.5j cf. Timpe 1967 (0317) 284-88. Note that after the campaigns of a.d. 5 Tiberius evidently returned to winter quarters on the Rhine; Veil. Pat. 11.107.3. ¹⁸⁸ Dio lv.28.6.

¹⁸⁹ Veil. Pat. 11.108.1-2; Strab. vn.1.3 (290Q; Tac. Germ. 42; cf. Flor. 11.30.23-4; Dio Lv.1.2. On Maroboduus, see Dobias i960 (c 264) 15 5-66.

regions subject to or linked with Rome: Pannonia, Noricum and neighbouring German tribes. Maroboduus brought some of these tribes under his authority, and induced others into alliance. He made no moves to threaten Rome, but his position and his prestige represented an embarrassment.[381] The Roman high command designed a two-pronged operation in a.d. 6. Tiberius was to lead the army of Illyricum from Carnuntum on the Danube, and the legate Sentius Saturninus would bring the Rhine legions from the west through the land of the Chatti, thus to close the vice on Maroboduus.[382] The plan never came to fruition. News of a Pannonian revolt arrived to panic Augustus and cancel the assault on Bohemia when the two Roman armies were within days of effecting a junction.[383] Peace negotiations ensued instead, and Maroboduus became a friend and ally of Rome. The outcome, of course, was interpreted differently by each party, as suited respective tastes. Maroboduus represented the agreement as putting him on equal terms with his opponents.[384] From the Roman vantage-point, however, the Marcomannic prince had been obliged to keep the peace.[385] That version appropriately accommodated public opinion.

The great rebellion in Pannonia pinned down the bulk of Rome's forces for more than three years from a.d. 6 to 9. Germany was surprisingly quiet during those years. Maroboduus held to his treaty, and the rest of the land seemed untroubled. Five legions remained in the Rhine command, but the hand of Rome, it appears, was felt only lightly in Germany. Roman authority extended to parts of the nation, but by no means to all. The process of urbanization, establishment of markets, and encouragement of peaceful assemblies that came with Roman presence advanced without apparent resistance.[386] The new legate P. Quinctilius Varus, related by marriage to the houses of Augustus and Agrippa, was a man more accustomed to peace than to war, more comfortable with administration than with fighting.[387] Varus' activities, therefore, con­centrated on the imposition of rules, the exercise of judicial powers, and the collection of revenues — a practice not hitherto implemented in Germany. Cassius Dio appropriately notes that Varus acted as if the Germans were subject peoples. Other sources, eager to blame the legate for future calamity, stress his combination of greed and ineptitude.¹⁹⁷ The actions provoked a subversive movement among the Germans, nourished perhaps as much by scorn as by resentment. Their leaders despised the symbols of Roman authority, the rods, axes and togas - and the emptiness that they masked.¹⁹⁸

Details of the insurrection can here be omitted. A young warrior from the ruling house of the Cherusci, Arminius, inspired and headed the rebels. They lulled Varus into complacency, then lured him into an ambush. In the vicinity of the Teutoburg Forest in September, a.d. 9 Varus lost his life and Rome lost three legions, a disaster unparalleled in the Augustan years.¹⁹⁹

The news shocked and dispirited the princeps. Augustus reportedly let his hair and beard grow for months as a sign of mourning, and more than once broke into the celebrated lament 'Varus, give me back my legions!'²⁰⁰ Those histrionics buttress the common view that Varus' defeat marked the major turhing point in Augustus' German policy: the plan to pacify all of Germany to the Elbe was given up and the empire's borders were withdrawn to the Rhine.²⁰¹ It might be more revealing, however, to point to the continuities than to stress the caesura. Augustus made no public move to surrender Germany. Quite the contrary. The princeps forthwith dispatched Tiberius, fresh from his victory in the Pannonian War, to resume command of forces on the Rhine. Indeed those troops were soon built up with reinforcements from elsewhere to reach a total of eight legions, a far larger army than had been gathered in that region before. Augustus would not give even a suggestion of retreat. Tiberius reconfirmed allegiance in Gaul, distributed armies and fortified garrisons.²⁰² The veteran commander knew better than to venture much beyond the Rhine in a.d. 10 and 11. He restricted himself to cautious raids and demonstrations. But the demonstrations them­selves were important. In the presentation of Velleius Paterculus, they were vigorous offensive manoeuvres and aggressive warfare - and that is doubtless the impression that Augustus wished to deliver.²⁰³ Evidence fails on the years a.d. 12 and 13, but Roman troops clearly did not huddle behind a Rhine frontier. Forces remained in or were sent to the land of the Chauci.²⁰⁴ And Augustus appointed young Germanicus, who had served with Tiberius on the Rhine in a.d. i i , to supreme command in the region in a.d. 13. This was no mere holding action. Germanicus would lead vigorous offensive campaigns into the interior of Germany. Tacitus pinpointed the motive with accuracy: war on the Germans derived less

^,9e Tac. Am. 1.59.

^1И Veil. Pat. II.118.1—119.5; Dio Lvi.18.4-22.2; Tac. Am. 1.(7-61; Suet. Aug. 25; Tib. 17. The account of Florus, 11.jo.j2-8, is unreliable. On the site of the battle, see Koestermann 1957 (c 282) 441-j. On Arminius, see Timpe 1970(0 j 19) 11-49; Dyson 1971 (л 25) 25 j-8. Tacitus'description of Arminius as liberator Germaniat (Am. 11.88) does not imply that Rome had previously annexed the land as a province. ²⁰⁰ Suet. Aug. 2J.2; Oros. vi.21.27. ²⁰¹ Cf. Flor. 11.jo.j9.

^ш Veil. Pat. 11.120.1; Dio LV1.2j.2-4. The eight Rhine legions are listed in Tac. Ann. 1.j7.

²⁰³ Veil. Pat. 11.120.1-2,11.121.1; Lvi.24.6, Lv1.25.2-j; Suet. Tib. 18. ²⁰⁴ Tac. Ann. i.j8.

from desire to extend the empire or to achieve tangible gain than to wipe out the disgrace of Varus' defeat.²⁰⁵ The princeps would not allow that calamity to stain Rome's reputation.

The campaigns of Germanicus after the death of Augustus belong to a later discussion. Suffice it here to point out that those campaigns in a.d. 15 and 16 follow a long familiar pattern rather than mark a conspicuous break with the past. They exemplify once again the repeated discrepancy between achievement and advertisement. Germanicus engaged naval and land forces, brought armies across the Weser, claimed major victories - and accomplished very little.²⁰⁶ Despite, or rather in conse­quence of, that fact, he enjoyed lavish honours. Germanicus celebrated a handsome triumph and his legates received ornamenta triumpbalia. The triumph specified as defeated tribes the Cherusci, Chatti, Angrivarii, and all other peoples dwelling west of the Elbe — assertions that went well beyond tangible reality.²⁰⁷ When Tiberius recalled Germanicus in a.d. 16, the young general expressed disappointment, and claims were made that another season's campaigning would have brought the war to an end.²⁰⁸ Whatever the plausibility of those claims, they were bound to be made — nor did Tiberius dispute them. Rome halted offensive operations across the Rhine. But she also let it be known that she could have subjugated Germany in a year, had she wishfed.²⁰⁹

Definition of a general Augustan 'policy' on Germany would be difficult to formulate and probably pointless to attempt. To designate it either as 'defensive' or as 'imperialistic' risks oversimplification.²¹⁰ And it would be erroneous to consider Roman actions in Germany as following a static plan.

Initial thrusts across the Rhine in the early Augustan years stemmed from the need to police and pacify Gaul. Rome experimented with both diplomacy and warfare, intimidating hostile tribes or winning the allegiance of some to neutralize others. A shocking defeat suffered by Lollius provoked sterner measures, not to satisfy imperialist urgings but to restore imperial prestige. Legions were brought up to the Rhine and forts installed at key sites along the river. Augustus himself returned to Gaul to implement administrative changes and dramatize the import-

Tac. Ann. 1.3.6; cf. Veil. Pat. 11.123.1. The motive is confirmed by Strab. vn.1.4 (291-2C).

On Germanicus'campaigns, see Koestermann 1957 (c 282); cf. the analysis by Telschow 1975 (c 315) 148-82.

Tac. Ann. i.j j.i, 1.72.i, 11.41.2-4; Strab. vn.1.4 (291Q; Timpe 1968 (c 318) 41-77.

Tac. Ann. 11.26.

Strab. vii.i.4 (291C), written after Augustus' death, implies that the princeps never relin­quished claims on Germany west of the Elbe.

For an extensive rehearsal of opinions through the early twentieth century, see Oldfather and Canter 191 j (c 294) 9-20, 3j-81. A more recent survey by Christ 1977 (c 260) 151-67. Add also Welwei 1986(0 323) 118-57.

ance he attached to the area. Defence of the Gallic provinces and expansion into Germany were complementary rather than contrasting policies. The princeps' stepsons, first Drusus, then Tiberius, carried Roman standards into the lands of the barbarian over the next several years, in campaigns that included impressive victories, advance to the Elbe, deportations of peoples, and the planting of garrisons at selected locations. No obvious ultimate goal had been announced or probably formulated. The successes represented more than a display of might, but rather less than the organization of a province. Altars at Cologne and on the Elbe signified German loyalty to the princeps, and Domitius' crossing of the Elbe to enlist new peoples in Roman amicitia put on show Rome's ability to influence events wherever she wished in that vast land. The garrisons in the interior implied that Roman presence would be neither brief nor superficial. But generals continued to withdraw the main body of their forces to the Rhine after almost every campaigning season. Augustus preferred to exhibit power than to put it to risk.

Tiberius' appointment to Germany in a.d. 4 signalled the restored confidence of the princeps in his newly adopted son and gave him the opportunity to add further laurels to his reputation. The campaigns were more notable for enhancement of prestige than for solid accomplish­ment. Conquest of the Marcomanni would have provided something solid but had to be abandoned for pressing needs elsewhere. As substitute came a movement toward more systematic application of judicial and financial authority by the new legate Varus. But the changes engendered reaction and calamity. Augustus had to adjust accordingly. If he could not replace Varus' three legions, he could shift forces from elsewhere in the empire to the Rhine. His appointment of Tiberius and Germanicus in the years that followed the Varian disaster served to controvert any suggestion of Roman weakness. And their campaigns proposed to show that Rome could resurrect her influence in Germany whenever circumstances required it.

Despite shifts in behaviour and action, continuities prevailed: the emphasis on Rome's international authority and her ascendancy over all rivals. That emphasis emerges in the swift retaliation after each chal­lenge, the timely appearance of the princeps and his stepsons, the establishment of garrisons, the promotion of the imperial cult, the expeditions (however brief and temporary) to the Elbe, triumphal honours and imperial salutations repeatedly awarded, the display of Roman magisterial symbols, the introduction of administrative regula­tions, and the drive to compensate publicly for every setback. Reference to Germany in the Res Gestae suitably completes the picture. Augustus ignores precision for propaganda: he includes Germany with Gaul and

Spain as evidence for his pacification of Europe from Gades to the Elbe.²¹¹

X. IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY

Assessment of Augustus' imperial policy has long divided scholars. Was he a relentless expansionist or a prudent leader who set bounds to the empire? Did he conduct aggressive imperialism or a defensive policy? Was he military conqueror or bringer of peace?

Pax Augusta has become the conventional characterization of the new order introduced by the princeps.²ⁿ Repetition by moderns, however, obscures the fact that the phrase rarely surfaced in the age of Augustus himself. It finds voice occasionally in dedications offered by individuals or officials in Italian or provincial towns.²¹³ But it does not represent a slogan emanating from the government.

Augustus, it is often alleged, placed limits on the extension of territory and advised that the empire be held within fixed bounds. But evidence for that conclusion is slim and dubious. Recovery of the standards from Parthia in 20 B.C. induced the princeps to announce that the realm could remain at its present extent - a posture that, at best, was only temporary and brief.²¹⁴ He issued instructions directing generals not to pursue enemies beyond the Elbe, but that too was a temporary restraint designed to allow concentration on another conflict, not a delineation of boundaries.²¹⁵ More significant, or so it would seem, was a document read to the Senate after Augustus' death and purporting to contain his advice that the empire be held within its present frontiers.²¹⁶ The authenticity of that item remains in doubt. Tiberius may have had cause to seek posthumous Augustan sanction for policies he intended to promote. And the statement attributed to Augustus by Dio that he had never added possessions from the barbarian world is preposterous.²¹⁷

The martial accomplishments of Augustus belie any systematic policy of limits or leanings toward pacifism. The princeps' appointees penetrated beyond the First. Cataract in Egypt, extended influence to Ethiopia and invaded Arabia. He converted Judaea into a province, rattled sabres at Parthia, and maintained an indirect hegemony in Armenia. Roman forces subjugated north-west Spain and carried campaigns against tribes in north Africa. Augustus or his surrogates fought Dalmatians and Pannonians, mounted a force against the Marcomanni, and laid the

²¹¹ Aug. RG 26.2. ²'² Cf e.g., Stier 1975 (a 91) 18-42; Fears 1981 (c 267) 884-9.

ILS 3787, 3789; 1GRR iv 1173; cf. Weinstock i960 (f 617) 47~i°-

Dio Liv.9. i; cf. Lin. 10.4-3. ²'5 Strab. VII.1.4 (291C).

²¹⁶ Tac. Ann. 1.11.4; Dio LVi.33.5-6.

^2,7 Dio Lvi.33.6. Suetonius'assertion that Augustus had no ambition for empire or martial glory (Aug. 21.2) is nonsense. On these matters, see now Ober 1982 (c 293) 306-28.

groundwork for Roman provinces along the Danube. He routed Alpine peoples, opened passes in the mountains, reduced Raetia, and occupied Noricum. Romans crossed the Rhine, established garrisons in Germany, and dispatched armies to the Elbe. The record of conquest eclipsed that of all predecessors. The regime thrived on expansionism - or at least the reputation of expansionism.

Augustus left the impression of aggressiveness even where he had no intent to undertake aggression. Britain is a prime example. On three occasions, so Cassius Dio reports, the princeps let it be known that he was on the point of mounting an expedition against that remote island: in 34, 27 and 26 B.C. Each time other pressing needs conveniently intervened to postpone the venture: a rising in Dalmatia, unsettled conditions in Gaul, and the Cantabrian War respectively.²¹⁸ In the eyes of contemporaries in the 30s and 20s, the invasion of Britain was a sure thing - as was its conquest. Repeated allusions in the poems of Virgil, Horace and Propertius attest to that public perception.²¹⁹ Augustus could later abandon the idea altogether by producing a plausible justification: British kings had sent embassies, made offerings on the Capitol, and formally acknowledged the princeps' authority. It was as good as a conquest — and much cheaper.²²⁰ Britain could subsequently be ignored, a matter of policy, as Augustus explicitly characterized it.²²¹ The earlier projection of an aggressive pose had equally been a matter of policy.

Reputation held pre-eminent place in the realm of Augustus. The precedents of the Republic helped shape the ideology of the Principate - not so much in constitutional matters as in the image of martial success. Pax rarely made an appearance as symbol of Republican aspirations. Victoria predominated as a numismatic slogan, triumphs represented the most coveted prizes, expansion of territory elicited ringing phrases from orators who trumpeted Roman mastery of the world.²²² That is the proper context for comprehending the imperial posture of Augustus.²²³

Defeat of Antony and Cleopatra placed unprecedented power in the hands of the victor. He may have sought to bind up the wounds of the civil war, but he also made certain to commemorate the victory — and to institutionalize reminders of it. Two new cities rose as memorials to the achievement, each bearing the imposing designation of Nicopolis, one on the site of Octavian's camp at Actium, the other to mark the battle

^2,1 Dio xlix.38.2, liii.22.5, liii.2;.2.

Virg. Eel. 1.67; G. 1.29, 111.25; Hor. Epod. vn.7; Carm. i.2i.ij, 1.31.29, m.4.34, 111.5.2-4, 1v.14.47; Prop. 11.27.J, iv.3.7; cf. Momigliano 1950 (c 290) 39—41.

Strab. iv.).3 (200C). These embassies need to be kept distinct from the arrival of British refugee princes as suppliants at the court of Augustus; RG 32.1. ²²¹ Tac. Agr. xiii.

E.g. Cic. Leg. Мая. j 3; Миг. 22; Off. 1.38,11.26; Pii/. vm.12.F0r Victoria »s a symbol, see Fears 1981 (c 268) 773-804. On Republican attitudes toward militarism and conquest, see Harris 1979 (c 273) 10-41; cf. Brunt 1978 (c 257) 162-72; Jal 1982 (c 279) 143-50.

On what follows, see the fuller treatment in Gruen 1986 (c 271) 51-72.

near Alexandria that completed the conquest. At Epirote Nicopolis the conqueror sponsored games, enlarged the temple of Apollo, erected a trophy, and displayed a huge inscription to memorialize the victory.[388]And in 29 в.с. Octavian celebrated a triple triumph, a spectacular event that stretched over three days, to signal his successes in Illyria, Actium and Alexandria.[389] The monuments and the ceremonies spelled out these messages clearly: they exalted not pax but the gloria of the conqueror.

Those celebrations set a pattern for the imagery, both written and visual, that characterized the self-representation of the princeps and his government. The Res Gestae makes the point without ambiguity. Augustus reels off his victories abroad and the distinctions which they earned him at home: ovationes, triumphs, salutations as imperator, the annexation of Egypt, advance against Ethiopia and Arabia, recovery of eastern provinces and captured standards, defeat of Pannonians and Dacians, pacification of the Alps, Gaul, Spain and Germany, and extension of the Illyrian frontier to the Danube.[390] He summarized the achievement with a claim that he had pushed the boundaries of every province as a lesson to peoples who did not acknowledge the imperium of Rome.[391] The princeps does indeed boast of bringing pax. But it is a pax achieved by victories. And he declared that the temple of Janus had been closed three times during his reign - a fact that signalled not permanent peace but repeated subjugation of enemies and pacification of empire.[392]The Res Gestae provides no apologia or justification. Augustus takes for granted the legitimacy of Roman conquest and expansionism.[393] The preamble of the document itself sums up the contents quite pointedly: 'The achievements of the divine Augustus whereby he subjected the world to the power of the Roman people.'

The poets of the era reinforce that impression. It need not be surmised that they wrote at Augustus' behest; nor, conversely, that their writings either provoked the princeps, exceeded his intent, or subtly criticized his ambitions.[394] One can, however, postulate with confidence that ideas and attitudes repeatedly voiced by the poets evoke the prevailing atmosphere of public discussion.

Virgil's verses supply pertinent illustrations. The Georgia portray the princeps as heir to Rome's hardiest warriors of the past: Decius, Camillus, Scipio and Marius. Actium made him victor in the furthest bounds of the East; Parthia is reckoned as already defeated and humbled; Octavian thunders on the banks of the Euphrates, imposing laws upon compliant peoples.[395] The Aeneid forecasts world dominion in the age of Augustus. Jupiter promises imperial holdings without limits. And the shield of Aeneas depicts the princeps as sitting in proud splendour while long rows of conquered peoples from Africa to the Euphrates pass in array before him.[396]

Comparable indications recur in the songs of Horace. The poet urges that Roman arms no longer be trained on fellow-citizens but be directed against foreign foes. He takes for granted Roman offensive thrusts against Parthians, Gauls, Scythians, Arabs and Britons. The drive for expansionism is simply a given. Horace foresees a universal dominance for his nation.[397] Parthia is the principal target: Augustus will avenge Roman honour, regain the standards lost by other generals, lead conquered Parthians in triumph, and,annex the land to Rome's empire.[398] The princeps did indeed obtain the standards in 20 в.с. but without battle, trophies, or triumphs. Horace, however, presents the outcome as fulfilment of his own prediction: Parthians are stripped of their spoils, bend to the dictates of Rome, and venerate Augustus. Capture of the standards is juxtaposed to the exercise of Roman sway throughout the world.[399] Whatever his personal predilections, Horace accurately reflects the dominant propaganda of the era.

Reflection can be found also in the lines of Propertius. The convention of the recusatio conveniently served the purpose. By disclaiming com­petence to sing of Augustus' martial feats, Propertius also calls attention to those feats. The poet alludes to victories abroad, kings led in triumph, distant lands trembling and obedient to the authority of the princeps-[400]Like Horace, Propertius projects campaigns to the extremities of empire and visualizes a humiliation of Parthia.[401] And when the standards were returned to Rome, Propertius duly represents the result as a Parthian confession of defeat.[402]

The cynical Ovid, both playful and serious, describes the heady excitement in Rome on the eve of young C. Caesar's departure to the East in 2 B.C. His Ars Amatoria characterized the intent of the expedition: Augustus to add to his dominions, Parthia to pay the price for her misdeeds, Crassus' shades to be avenged. The poet even envisions the future triumph of Gaius, bringing in its train captive Asians from exotic parts of the world.²³⁹ Gaius, in fact, never returned from that venture, and no triumph was earned. Ovid therefore recalls the language of his predecessors: recovery of the standards sufficed to make the point and Augustus had already coerced the Parthians into humble compliance.²⁴⁰ The Metamorphoses and the Fasti speak of the subjugation of barbarian peoples and the deep penetration of Roman power. Jupiter surveys a world where Roman dominion is universal. The earth lies under the heel of the conqueror.²⁴¹ Even in the poems from exile, late in Augustus' reign, Ovid's praise of the princeps places stress upon victory, the garnering of military laurels, the conquest of Pannonia, Raetia and Thrace, surrender by Armenia and Parthia, awe-struck Germany, and imperial holdings now at their greatest reach.²⁴²

The public manifestations of the regime tell much the same story. Coins, inscriptions and monuments converge in transmitting the picture of Roman might and dominance. Victoria, whether as bust or as figure, occurs frequently on the coinage, especially with the globe that exempli­fied world rule. Other martial symbols also prevail: triumphal chariots, the ornamenta triumphalia, trophies, a triumphal arch, the temple of Mars Ultor, victory laurels.²⁴³ Annexation, acquisition, or military reprisals are regularly on display. The numismatic legends trumpet Aegyptus capta, Armenia capta, Asia recepta and signa recepta.^w The inscribed trophy that recorded Augustus' pacification of the Alpine regions listed the names of nearly fifty tribes that had been subjected to Roman power.²⁴⁵

The city of Rome exhibited striking monuments that transmitted the image of conqueror, master and guarantor of security through force. As early as 29 B.C. Octavian installed a statue of Victory in the Curia lulia. A triumphal arch commemorated his successes abroad.²⁴⁶ Two years later the Senate appropriately voted Augustus the privilege of placing laurel trees before his residence and setting an oak crown above them — a gesture that symbolized his role both as perpetual victor over enemies and as saviour of citizens.²⁴⁷

The Forum Augustum gave the most visible and prominent display of Augustan ideology. The imposing temple of Mars Ultor, vowed by

²³⁹ Ov. Ars Am. 1.177-228. ²⁴⁰ Ov. Fast. v. 579-94.

Ov. Met. xv.820-31, xv.877; Fast. 1.85-6,1.717,11.684, iv.857-62.

Ov. Tr. 11.1.169-78, 225-52,111.12.45-8.

E.g. BMCRE Augustus, nos. 1, 68, 77-8, 101-2, 217-19, 224, et at.

E.g. BMCRE Augustus, nos. 10-19, 4°~4> S3². 4>o~²3, 647-5 5, 671-81, 703.

²« Pliny, HN in.136-7. ²⁴⁶ Dio u.22.1-2; Zanker 1972 (f 626) 8-12.

²⁴⁷ Dio lin. 16.4.

Augustus after Philippi but not completed until 2 b.c., held conspicuous place. It would be the locus of assemblage for the Senate for all declarations of war or award of triumphs, and the symbolic starting- point for every general to lead his troops abroad. The Forum Augustum served as repository for weapons of all sorts and for arms seized as booty from the defeated foes of Rome.²⁴⁸ The statue of the princeps himself stood in the centre of the Forum, set in a triumphal chariot which contained record of his conquests.²⁴⁹ The flanks of the Forum held two rows of statues. In the niches of one side Augustus installed representa­tives of the great men of Rome's past, with inscribed elogia attesting, among other things, to military achievements and triumphal honours. Opposite that array of heroes stood the figures of Aeneas and all the representatives of the Julian line.²⁵⁰ The princeps thus linked himself and his family to a gallery of republican duces, triumphatores and summi viri, as heir to the grandest martial traditions of the state.

Other items add to the impression. Among them the commanding statue of Augustus at Prima Porta takes pride of place. An elaborately engraved cuirass calls forth the martial image. The centrepiece of the breastplate displays the transfer of captured standards by the Parthians to Rome, emblematic of Roman supremacy in the East. And the figures of female barbarians in the middle zone of the cuirass, dejected and submissive, represent Roman humbling of the Celtic peoples of the West. Triumphal symbolism predominates. The mother earth figure, reclining at the bottom with cornucopiae and babies, projects prosperity and the bountifulness of the land. As is clear, the new and prosperous age depends upon armed force and constitutes the fruits of victory.²⁵¹ The Prima Porta figure signifies conquest of the empire and world-wide rule assured by the continual vigilance of the princeps.

The celebrated Ara Pacis, it might be thought, forms a counterpoint to this presentation. Not necessarily so. The altar, in fact, strikes a balance that parallels other verbal and visual productions of the Augustan era: a juxtaposition of the rewards of peace with the military success that made them possible. The Senate voted to consecrate the Ara Pacis in 13 в.с. as memorial to Augustus' return in that year from the subjugation of Spain and the pacification of Gaul.²⁵² The panel of Aeneas on the west side of the altar has him offering sacrifice to the Di Penates, a scene that evidently celebrates his homecoming, just as the monument itself celebrated Augustus' homecoming. But that panel is balanced by

²¹⁸ Ov. Fast. v.5 50-62; Suet. Aug. 29.2; Dio lv.io.2-j.

»» Aug. RG jj.i; Veil. Pat. 11.59.2.

Ov. Fast. v. 565-6; Suet. Aug. 51.5; Dio lv.10.5; SHA. Alex. Sev. 28.6; Zanker 1968 (f625); Frisch 1980 (в 251) 91-8; Zanker 1988 (f 6jj) 210-14; Luce 1990 (c 284) i2j-j8.

On the Prima Porta statue, see esp. Kahler 1959 (f 441); Zinserling 1967 (f 656) j27-j9; Pollini 1978 (f 551) 8-74; Zanker 1988 (f 6jj) 183-92. ²³² Aug. RG 12.2.

another, featuring the partially preserved Mars, father of the twins Romulus and Remus, and pre-eminent god of war. A similar balance occurs on the eastern panels of the Ara Pacis. One depicts a female deity with the attributes of fertility and bountifulness, calling attention to the blessings of a tranquil time. But its corresponding panel contains the goddess Roma resting, as often, on a pile of arms. The imagery takes on meaning in combination. The accomplishment of peace is inseparable from success in war.[403]

That association is reinforced by a recent discovery. Close connexion held between the Ara Pacis and the Egyptian obelisk that stood as the gnomon of the colossal sundial, the Solarium Augusti. The shadow of the obelisk pointed squarely at the centre of the Ara Pacis on 2 3 September, the birthday of Augustus himself.[404] The obelisk itself was set up to memorialize Augustus' subordination of Egypt to the control of the Roman empire. The collective message dramatically linked peace with military authority and imperial expansion.

XI. CONCLUSION

A survey of territorial expansion under Augustus tempts conclusions about strategic designs, empire-wide policy, and imperialist intent. It has been claimed, for example, that Augustus adopted and refined a military system of hegemonic rule, resting on a combination of client states and an efficiently deployed armed force stationed in frontier sectors but mobile enough for transfer wherever needed.[405] Many reckon the push to the north as a carefully conceived and sweeping plan that linked the Alpine, Balkan and German campaigns, and aimed to establish a secure boundary of the empire that ran along the line of the Danube and the Elbe.[406] Others, however, consider Augustus a determined imperialist, bent on expansion everywhere and motivated by dreams of world conquest. Only the Pannonian revolt and the defeat of Varus obliged him to check his ambition and bequeath a defence policy to his successor.[407]

Yet the very idea of an all-encompassing scheme, whatever its form, misconceives the diversity and flexibility of Augustus' foreign ventures. No uniform plan or articulated goal guided his acts. Location, circum­stances and contingencies determined decisions.

The eastern realms provoked varied responses. In Asia Minor and Judaea Augustus cultivated client princes, generally keeping in place those already established, regardless of prior allegiances. But he was not averse to deposing dynasts (e.g. in Commagene), intervening in royal dispensations (as with Herod), or even converting principalities into provinces (Galatia and Judaea) when unexpected developments called for it. Principal garrisons of Roman power in the East stood in Egypt and Syria - but for very different purposes. Egypt held a special place for Augustus, its economic resources a mainstay of empire and its territory a staging-ground for military adventures in Ethiopia and Arabia. Troops in Syria, by contrast, served to signal stability rather than advance, a means of showing the flag and discouraging Parthian ambitions. The princeps kept a hand in the dynastic affairs of Armenia and a careful watch on vicissitudes in the royal house of Parthia. Recovery of the standards took priority in policy and propaganda. But dealings with Parthia relied on diplomacy - alternate displays of resolve and negotiated settlements - rather than force. The kingdom supplied occasions for posturing, not a menace against which to devise a strategy.

Different motives and different actions prevailed in the West. The princeps or his generals conducted vigorous campaigns in Illyria and Spain in the 30s and 20s B.C. Strategic purposes, however, played at best a secondary role. Octavian used the Illyrian adventure to shore up his reputation vis-a-vis Antony, and brought north-west Spain under subjec­tion to demonstrate Roman might throughout the Iberian peninsula. Roman involvement in north Africa had still a different character (or characters): the princeps experimented with client kings, warfare and colonial foundations at various times and places in that area - with no consistent results.

The great northern campaigns may assume coherent shape in retros­pect - but hardly at the time. Divergent aims dictated action, Roman response occurred as often as Roman initiative, political and ideological purposes frequently took precedence over strategic goals. Control of the Alpine regions facilitated communications between the Rhine forces and the troops in Illyricum. The push to the Danube held out many advantages: the disciplining of recalcitrant tribes which had damaged Rome's repute, military laurels for members of Augustus' family, and opening of a land route from northern Italy to the eastern dependencies. The heaviest fighting, however, came in reaction to rebellion rather than as part of an imperial scheme. Advancement against Germans derived from security and administrative needs in Gaul. Strikes across the Rhine advertised Roman might and authority without establishing a perma­nent presence. Prestige may have counted for more than strategy. Exhibitions of force occurred after the Varian disaster as before.

Diversity stands out far more boldly than uniformity. There was uniformity, however, in one key respect. The princeps need not have felt commitment to relentless conquest and indefinite extension of territory and power. But he did feel commitment so to represent his aspirations.

Representation and reality often diverged. Augustus made certain to maintain consistency in the former. Pragmatic considerations might on occasion dictate restraint or withdrawal. And defeat could sometimes mar the achievement. But the public posture remained uniform: a posture of dynamism, success and control. Aelius Gallus' calamitous campaigns in Arabia were covered over in the Res Gestae which reports only Roman advance in the area; and aggressive thrusts served to compensate for the setbacks. Bloodless negotiations allowed Augustus to recover the standards from Parthia and diplomacy provided an acceptable setdement in Armenia; but the regime made menacing gestures, and the propaganda proclaimed defeat for Parthia and subjec­tion for Armenia. The closing of Janus' doors and triumphal honours awarded after a campaign in north-west Spain belied the superficiality of that achievement — to be followed by another decade of brutal fighting in the region and some heavy losses for Rome. Modest successes in Illyria during the triumviral period became exaggerated in report and announ­cement so as to elevate Octavian's reputation at the expense of his rival. Victories and the honours of victory marked advance to the Danube and even encouraged the mounting of a campaign against the Marcomanni; the Pannonian revolt, however, shattered the illusion of Roman mastery and required an enormous commitment of resources to restore control. Conquest of the Alps may have had strategic ends, but it also served to advertise the prowess of Augustus' stepsons and to summon public acclaim for the imperial house. Similarly, Drusus' thrusts across the Rhine called forth magnificent honours, out of proportion to solid accomplishments, and the termination of his advance at the Elbe was explained away as the consequence of divine intervention. In compar­able fashion Tiberius obtained high honours for victories in Germany, and his panegyrist Velleius rhapsodized about his successes, though litde of substance was accomplished. And when disaster did strike, in the form of Varus' crushing defeat, the princeps strove to stress continuity, appointing Tiberius and then Germanicus to resume aggressive campaigns across the Rhine, as if to deny any setback or interruption.

The imperial policy of Augustus varied from region to region, adjusted for circumstances and contingencies. Aggression alternated with restraint, conquest with diplomacy, advance with retreat. Acqui­sitions and annexations occurred in some areas, consolidation and negotiation in others. The insistence upon reputation, however, was undeviating. The regime persistently projected the impression of vigour, expansionism, triumph and dominance. Augustus reiterated the aspirations and professed to eclipse the accomplishments of republican heroes. The policy may have been flexible, but the image was consistent.

CHAPTER 5 TIBERIUS TO NERO

Т. E. J. WIEDEMANN

i. the accession of tiberius and the nature of politics under the j ulio-с l audians

Political history explores the ways in which the men (and very occasion­ally women) who wielded power over others chose to exercise that power. In every system of government there are dozens, if not hundreds, of individuals who have to use their initiative about the exercise of power in particular circumstances, or about the best way to implement decisions taken by their superiors. But Rome under Augustus and his successors was a monarchy: every exercise of political power had ultimately to be answered for to the emperor. The emperor's authority could not publicly be challenged (anyone who successfully did so would become the new emperor). The political, history of the Principate is therefore primarily an account of the relationship between the reigning emperor and the other individuals and groups who played a role in public life. Although some of the political figures of the Julio-Claudian period were descended from families that had been powerful under the Republic, it does not follow that the 'republican' aristocracy still wielded independent power. Such men - like the 'new men' who were prepared to put their military or rhetorical skills at the service of the Caesars - had only as much power as the emperor allowed them, and only for as long as the emperor needed to make use of them. They had a place in public life only because, and insofar as, they had the princeps' favour; they were what in Latin would be called his amici, friends. He who lost the emperor's friendship lost the basis for his public existence - and the effect of that was that his public life (and sometimes his personal existence) came to an end, whether he was a patrician or a novus homo or a freedman or even a close relative of the emperor himself.¹

From Augustus on, as Cassius Dio noted, politics had ceased to be 'public'. Important political choices no longer needed to be debated, or voted on, in public, but only in the private consilium of the emperor and

¹ For the nature of politics under the Principate, see chs. 2 and 3 above; Wickert 1974 (a 102) (with bibliography, pp. 5-8); Millar 1977 (a 59); Levick 1983 (c 371). Standard narrative histories of this period: H.H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero (London, 1st edn. 1939); Garzetti 1974 (a jj).

198

his amici. Consequently historians, ancient as well as modern, lack public records of how decisions came to be taken by the emperor, or of the different views held by his amici. As in modern dictatorships, the absence of reliable information meant that the decision-making process was portrayed through rumours, jokes, anecdotes, and the hostile reminis­cence of bitter and disillusioned men (and women) who hated the establishment largely because they felt it had not given them the rewards they deserved. The actions of emperors often baffled contemporaries; and what is baffling is liable to be dismissed as lunatic, or condemned as monstrous. Hence, as the poet Claudian was to write later,

The annals speak of the crimes committed by the men of old, And the stains will remain for ever. Who will not for all eternity Condemn the monstrous actions of the House of Caesar, Nero's dreadful murders, the disgusting cliffs of Capri, Inhabited by an aged pervert?²

The most fascinating source of such information about the Julio- Claudians is to be found in the surviving portions of Tacitus' Annals. They cover the periods a.d.14-29, 51-37 and 47-66. Archaeology and epigraphy may provide additional evidence to supplement the disap­pointingly meagre accounts of life outside the metropolis in the ancient literary sources; but the Annals are the point of departure for political history. There are other accounts by ancient writers; although often based on the same sources, they are sometimes not so reliable because of their particular literary format, but we can use them to modify the more obviously tendentious interpretations in Tacitus. Tacitus was writing a century after the death of Augustus, and many of his preoccupations were as much with the actions and attitudes (especially towards the Senate) of Trajan and Hadrian, under whom he lived, as with those of the Julio-Claudians.³

The relationship between emperor and Senate is a major concern of other senatorial writers beside Tacitus. The language in which they tend to express that concern is that of a contrast between 'tyranny' and 'freedom' (libertas), concepts inherited from the late Republic. But this republican vocabulary should not mislead us into treating the history of the Julio-Claudian period as similar to that of the Republic — as a chronicle of the magistracies and honours achieved by politicians as the result of competition with one another. There was competition, but it was for the emperor's favour. It was the emperor who took the decisions.

Cassius Dio on secret politics: liii.19. The consilium-, ch. 7 below. Claudian, IV Cons. Hon., 8.511-15.

Furneaux's edition of Tacitus' Annals remains the most accessible; for commentaries, see Koestermann 1963-8 (в 98); Goodyear 1972 and 1981 (в 62). On Tacitus, Syme 195 8 (в 176) remains basic; among others, see Christ 1978 (в 28).

In recent years historians have stressed that imperial 'policy' was often purely passive, that the decisions taken by emperors were often made in response to the actions of others. The emperor's most important activity was the exercise of gratia; as the most powerful of patrons, he was expected to distribute favours to senators and the plebs, to Romans and provincials who came and asked for them. The story of how imperial responses to such initiatives changed the nature of Mediterranean culture and society is traced in other chapters of this volume. We should be sceptical about earlier views of the emperors as great visionaries who sought to impose upon their officials policies of administrative central­ization, the systematic spreading of Roman culture, the systematization of Roman law, justice for provincials (let alone slaves), and even, as was once believed, a positive attitude towards agriculture, trade and indus­try. Nor should we put too much emphasis on the emperor's need to be a successful showman, like the leader of a modem mass democracy; an emperor certainly had to advertise his popularity, but that popularity itself was based on the care he took for his people as patron of rich and poor alike, pater patriae. But not all imperial policies were passive responses to the demands of others. Every emperor needed to have a minimal policy - to stay in command of the political process; to maximize his own prestige; and to maintain in his own hands the choice of whom to hand his power on to after his death. These aims had applied to Augustus as much as they applied to his Julio-Claudian successors.[408]

The events which followed the death of Augustus at Nola in Campania on 19 August a.d. 14 became a paradigm for the smooth transfer of power from an emperor to his successor; few future emperors found themselves in total control with as little difficulty as Tiberius did. Nevertheless the moment at which monarchical power is transferred from one man to his successor is a critical point at which the different elements that constitute a political system can be seen most clearly. Although Tacitus' record of these events at the opening of the Annals betrays his concern about the accessions of much later emperors (Trajan in 97 and Hadrian in 117), it reveals the control that a new emperor had to exercise over, first and foremost, the imperial household, the domus Caesarir, and then over the soldiers of the praetorian guard, magistrates, the Senate and people of Rome, and the Roman armies in the provinces.

Although the domus Caesaris was in law just another Roman house­hold, it gave its head (Lat. paterfamilias) access to material resources, services (via procurators managing estates throughout the empire) and informal social control on a scale with which no other household could compete. The emperor's domus contained not just those of his descen­dants who were under his legal control {in potestate), a definition much narrower than that of the word 'family' in English, but also their chattels and estates, including slaves (Lat. Jamilia), and dependants: freedmen, provincial magnates (including 'client kings'), and also those Roman amici who regarded themselves as owing their personal or political lives to the present Caesar or his predecessors. In this sense, every ex- magistrate had to consider that he had a personal duty to ensure the well- being of the current head of the imperial household.

Tiberius was Augustus' stepson; notwithstanding his marriage to Augustus' daughter lulia, it was not his birthright to succeed Augustus as 'Caesar'. But in a.d. 4 he had been formally adopted by Augustus as his son. The grant of tribunicia potestas awarded then and renewed in a.d. 1 j together with a grant of imperium maius meant that there was no doubt as to who would rule Rome after Augustus. Some of the men who might have been Tiberius' rivals had been disgraced along with lulia in 2 B.C.; others were sent into exile in connexion with the fall of her daughter, lulia the Younger, in a.d. 8. At the moment of Augustus' death, Tiberius was the only man who could seriously be considered as his political successor.[409] But there was someone else with a legitimate claim to a share in Augustus' personal estate: his grandson Agrippa Postumus, whom Augustus had adopted at the same time as Tiberius. Although Roman law gave a paterfamilias wide rights to dispose of his property as he pleased, it was customary for sons (together with the widow and daughters who were still in potestate) to inherit equal portions of the estate. Anyone who wished to disinherit a son had to do so explicitly in his will; even if he had been explicitly disinherited, a son could still appeal against the will as 'undutiful' {querella inofficiosi testamenti). Although Postumus had been sent into exile by his adoptive father, there is no clear evidence that he had been disinherited: in terms of Roman private law, he had the same claim to be 'Caesar' as Tiberius. However weak his political influence, the existence of Agrippa Postumus as an exile on the island of Planasia threatened the smooth transfer of power; it gave Tiberius' opponents the option of making use of him.

This made it imperative for Tiberius as heir to step into the persona of Augustus immediately that he died. He had to be on the spot to be recognized as the new paterfamilias, but Augustus' final illness came suddenly. Earlier in the year, the seventy-six-year-old emperor had still been in good health; on 11 May, he had completed a census revision, with Tiberius as his colleague. Early in August Tiberius left Augustus in Campania to return to the army in Pannonia. He hastened to Nola as soon as he heard that Augustus was ill, possibly in response to a summons by the emperor himself. Tacitus reports a rumour that when Tiberius reached Nola, he found Augustus already dead, and that Livia kept the truth hidden in order to facilitate the transfer of power to her son (more suggestive of the role played by Plotina at Hadrian's accession in a.d. 117). Tiberius himself claimed that he had spoken to Augustus before he died.

Tiberius' first reported acuon after Augustus' death was to write to all the Roman armies (not just his own in Pannonia). He did not style himself Augustus, since that was a title that had been bestowed by the Roman Senate, and he had no right yet to use it. But there was no need to wait for the Senate to confirm the manifest fact that following Augustus' death, Tiberius had become the new head of the imperial household. The next thing that happened was that Agrippa Postumus was put to death. Augustus had suggested that Postumus' rowdy character made him entirely unsuitable for public responsibility. But Tacitus reports rumours, presumably put about by those who did not wish to see Tiberius succeed, that the emperor had visited his exiled grandson at Planasia in the year before his death, and planned to reinstate him. Later, one of his freedmen pretended to be the dead Postumus, suggesting that there were those who might be expected to back his claims against Tiberius. He had to be killed. The fact that Postumus' name was not mentioned at all in Augustus' will suggests that the execution had been arranged by Augustus before his death, to facilitate Tiberius' accession; it might have been ordered by Livia, purporting to act for Augustus, for the same reason (or out of'stepmotherly spite', as Tacitus would have it); or by Tiberius himself. It was probably carried out by one of Augustus' advisers, Gaius Sallustius Crispus (a grand-nephew of the historian), as soon as he heard of the emperor's death. When Tiberius heard of the execution, he denied responsibility and said that the action would have to be answered for to the Senate. No further discussion occurred.⁶

By inheriting the imperial household, the domus Caesaris, Tiberius controlled greater material resources than were available to any other Roman, either in a private capacity or as a magistrate. Caesar owned property throughout the empire; he commanded procurators in every province to look after his interests (even when they conflicted with those of the governor, whether pro-magistrate or legate), and consequently was served by a more effective network for gathering information than

⁶ On the accession, Timpe 1962 (c 403). Tiberius writes to armies: Dio lvii.z.i. Postumus: Jameson 1975 (c 126). The 'false Postumus': Tac. Ann. 11.39.

was available to anyone else, including the magistrates at Rome. He also inherited the loyalty and gratitude which every Roman in public life owed to his predecessor in return for the patronage which Augustus had bestowed (and which Tiberius ensured would not be forgotten: see the Res Gestae Divi Augusti). That this made Tiberius the undisputed ruler of Rome from the moment of Augustus' death was beyond question. That fact was symbolically recognized by the oath to protect him and the rest of the domus whose paterfamilias he had now become, taken as soon as they heard the news by the consuls, and the prefects of the praetorian guard and of the corn supply, and then administered to the Senate, the equestrian or do and the Roman people. Similar oaths were subsequently sworn by communities elsewhere in the empire; a copy of an oath to Tiberius and his whole household taken by the cities of Cyprus survives. This oath illustrates the dependence of groups as well as individual magistrates on the head of the imperial family as the source of patronage, honour and decision-making. But — unlike the sacramentum, the military oath taken by a soldier to the emperor as his commander-in-chief — its force was private and personal, not public or constitutional. An emperor's power and influence as Caesar may be distinguished from the public powers conferred upon him by the Senate and people, the organs who alone had the right to grant him imperium, the power to command. Later imperial candidates realized that the moment they controlled the imperial household, the award of public titles and offices by Senate and people would be a formality; in a.d. 14, in the absence of any historical precedent, the distinction was very clear, and Tiberius took pains to act with complete constitutional propriety. He could not take public acquiescence in his accession for granted. Velleius Paterculus refers to fears of disorder, confirmed by the posting of large numbers of troops at Augustus' funeral.⁷

Tiberius accompanied Augustus' body on its ceremonial return to Rome, just as twenty-two years before he had accompanied the body of his brother Drusus on its long journey back from northern Germany. The ceremonial procession, and the funeral itself, were to set precedents for the treatment of other members of the imperial family after their deaths. The public funeral was decreed at a meeting of the Senate early in September, convoked by Tiberius in virtue of his tribunicia potestas rather than his imperium. This does not mean that Tiberius thought that the imperium maius he had been granted in the previous year did not suffice to make him a legitimate emperor; but it does suggest that there was uncertainty about whether Augustus' responsibility (referred to in Tacitus as his cura or munera) for governing the empire had lapsed at his

⁷ Ep ioj = AN } j i. Cf. Price 1984 (f 199) (and ch. 16 below). Fears for stability: Veil. Pat. 11.124.

death. Augustus' will was read to the Senate. It confirmed Tiberius as principal heir; he was awarded two thirds of Augustus' property, and the remaining third went to Livia. Historians have made much of the opening words of the will, stating that Augustus wanted Tiberius to be his heir because 'a cruel fate' had taken away his own (adopted) sons (and natural grandsons) Gaius and Lucius. This was not a calculated or even unintended insult to Tiberius, suggesting that he was only a second best as successor, but an explanation for why Augustus had adopted as his son and instituted as his heir someone from outside the Julian family. These words can only have been intended to strengthen further the legitimacy of Tiberius' position as head of the domus Caesaris — particu­larly since no mention was made of Agrippa Postumus.

On 17 September, after the funeral, there was a second meedng of the Senate, at which it was reported that Augustus' spirit had been seen rising to heaven in the form of an eagle while the body was being cremated. If the Senate chose to believe this testimony, it would be powerful evidence in favour of the proposidon that Augustus had now joined the Olympians; the Senate chose to believe, and accepted the consequence, that a cult ought to be formally established by the Roman state to worship the new god.

Turning next to the matters of this world, the Senate had to give its opinion on what was to happen to Augustus' responsibilities now that he had departed the scene. Tacitus does not explicitly tell us what modon was debated. It cannot have been to advise the people to grant Tiberius imperium, since he already had that; nor to define his provincia, since that had presumably been done when he was given maius imperium to equal that of Augustus in a.d. 13. Probably the point at issue was whether Tiberius should be asked to undertake the whole of Augustus' cura, his oversight of political (and especially foreign and military) affairs.⁸ Tiberius pointed out that these responsibilities were vast; he wondered whether there was any case for sharing them. Tacitus tells us that one of the senators, Asinius Gallus, was quick to agree with this suggestion.