Наука, стратегия и война (Стратегия и история)

137 Piaget (1971), op. cit., p. 133.

138 O’Connor and McDermott, op. cit., pp. 140–1.

139 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline, The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization, London: Doubleday, 1992, p. 150. This book is a highly popular systems-theory based work on organizational learning.

140 Boyd would underline several citations of Senge in other books such as John Briggs and F. David Peat, Turbulent Mirror, An Illustrated Guide to Chaos Theory and the Science of Wholeness, New York: Harper & Row, 1989, pp. 176–80, 200.

141 Destruction and Creation, p. 5.

142 Coon, op. cit., pp. 386–9.

143 See Morgan, op. cit., p. 44. Chapters 3, 4 and 8 are based on evolution theory, systems theory and complexity theory and provide an early synthesis of these developments and apply them to organization theory.

144 See, of the books on management in his bibliography, in particular Masaaki Imai, Kaizen, The Key to Japan’s Competitive Success (1986), and also William Ouchi, Theory Z (1981), Rafael Aguayo, Dr. Deming (1990) and Richard Tanner Pascale and Anthony Athos, The Art of Japanse Management (1981).

145 This is adapted from David A. Garwin, Learning in Action, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000, p. 10.

146 Henry Mintzberg, Joseph Lampel and Bruce Ahlstrand, Strategy Safari, New York: The Free Press, 1998, p. 229.

147 Garwin, op. cit., p. 9.

148 Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective, Reading, MAs: Addison-Wesley, 1978, pp. 38–9, 143, 145.

149 Garwin, op. cit., pp. 28–43.

150 Adapted from J. Edward Russo & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions, New York: Doubleday, 2002, pp. 227–8.

151 Capra (1991), op. cit., pp. 328–33.

152 Piaget (1971), op. cit., p. 34.

153 Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, p. 144.

154 Boyd, ‘Strategic Game of ? & ?’, p. 28.

155 Boyd, Organic Design, p. 20. See also ‘Strategic Game of ? & ?’, p. 41.

156 Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, p. 184. Note how Boyd uses the Clausewitzian concept of friction not in the mechanical sense, as Clausewitz did, but in the thermo-dynamical sense, indicating that for Boyd friction refers to disorder.

157 Ibid., pp. 12–13.

158 Destruction and Creation, p. 3.

159 ‘Organic Design for Command and Control’, p. 13.

160 Ibid., p. 16. Underlining in original.

161 Ibid., p. 15.

162 Ibid., p. 18.

163 ‘Strategic Game of ? & ?’, p. 10.

164 Ibid., p. 45.

165 Ibid., p. 58.

4 Completing the shift

1 James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, New York: Viking Penguin, 1987, p. 304.

2 Jeremy Rifkin, Time Wars, The Primary Conflict in Human History, New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1987, p. 185.

3 ‘Organic Design for Command and Control’, p. 20.

4 This list was provided by Hammond.

5 Adapted from Eric B. Dent, ‘Complexity Science: A Worldview Shift’, Emergence, Vol. 1, issue 4 (1999), p. 8.

6 Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life, A New Understanding of Living Systems, New York: Doubleday, 1997, p. 85.

7 Ibid., pp. 86–9.

8 Ilya Prigogine and Isabella Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, London: Bantam, 1984, p. 287.

9 Capra, op. cit., p. 180.

10 Boyd, Strategic Game, p. 18. On page 19 Boyd included a section from Looking Glass Universe by John Briggs and David Peat which once more describes Pri-gogine’s concept of dissipative structures.

11 John Horgan, The End of Science, New York: Broadway Books, 1996, p. 182.

12 See Glenn E. James, Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995, for a good concise description.

13 Capra, op. cit., p. 123.

14 Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, Adventures in the Simple and the Complex, New York: Freeman & Company, 1994, p. 26.

15 This description is based primarily on Prigogine and Stengers, op. cit., Chapter V.

16 Several of the books Boyd read use this illustration. See for instance Coveney and Highfield (1991), p. 166; John Briggs and F. David Peat, Turbulent Mirror, An Illustrated Guide to Chaos Theory and the Science of Wholeness, New York: Harper & Row, 1989, p. 143; and Ian Stewart, Does God Play Dice?, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 200.

17 Jong Heon Byeon, ‘Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamic Approach to the Change in Political Systems’, Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 16, (1999), pp. 286–90. See also Kenyon B. Green, ‘Field Theoretic Framework for the Interpretation of the Evolution, Instability, Structural Change, and Management of Complex Systems’, in L. Douglas Kiel and Euel Eliot (eds), Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.

18 Capra, op. cit., p. 183.

19 G. Nicolis, Introduction to Non-linear Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 96.

20 Capra, op. cit., p. 95.

21 Ibid., p. 98.

22 Ibid., p. 267.

23 Ibid., pp. 218–19.

24 Ibid., p. 266.

25 Ibid., p. 220.

26 Gareth Morgan, Images of Organizations, New York: Sage, 1986, pp. 235–40, in particular pp. 239–40. See also Stuart Kauffman, The Origins of Order, Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, in particular Chapter 1.

27 Capra, op. cit., pp. 265–70.

28 Boyd, Organic Design, p. 16. Note the title of this presentation, which once more indicates Boyd’s frame of reference.

29 In Briggs and Peat, op. cit., Maturana’s ideas are discussed in some length.

30 See Strategic Game, pp. 16–17.

31 Ibid., both on p. 16.

32 Ibid., p. 28.

33 Peter Watson, A Terrible Beauty, The People and Ideas that Shaped the Modern Mind, London: Phoenix Press, p. 747. Watson refers to James Gleick’s Chaos, Making a New Science. See Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos, London: Viking, 1993.

34 See for a brief discussion of what complexity science is, also Kurt Richardson and Paul Cilliers, ‘What is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions’, Emergence, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2001), 5–22.

35 Jacco van Uden, Kurt Richardson and Paul Cilliers, ‘Postmodernism Revisited? Complexity Science and the Study of Organizations’, Tamara, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2001), 53–67. See also Michael Lissack, ‘Complexity: the Science, its Vocabulary, and its Relation to Organizations’, Emergence, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1999), p. 112.

36 Waldrop, op. cit., pp. 11–13.

37 See Waldrop, op. cit., pp. 225–35.

38 Capra, op. cit., citing Stuart Kauffman, p. 204.

39 Gell-Mann, op. cit., p. 17; Waldrop citing Holland, op. cit., p. 145.

40 Richard Pascale, ‘Surfing the Edge of Chaos’, Sloan Management Review, Spring 1999, p. 85.

41 Most of these are derived from John Holland, Hidden Order, How Adaptation Builds Complexity, Reading, Mass: Perseus Books, 1995. In addition see Russ Marion and Josh Bacon, ‘Organizational Extinction and Complex Systems’, Emergence, Vol. 1, No. 4 (2000), p. 76; and Gell-Mann, op. cit., p. 235.

42 See John Holland, op. cit., pp. 31–4 and Gell-Mann, op. cit., pp. 17–25.

43 Gell-Mann, interestingly, makes the comparison between schemata and scientific theories, noting how Popper’s falsification principle acts as a selection mechanism. However, he also notes that science does not progress this neatly and that theories are selected for other reasons as well, referring to Kuhn. See in particular Chapter 7.

44 Gell-Mann, op. cit., pp. 303–4.

45 Boyd, The Conceptual Spiral, p. 14.

46 Gell-Mann, op. cit., p. 25. In fact, similar to Boyd, Gell-Mann includes language, traditions, customs, laws and myths, all of which can be regarded as ‘cultural DNA’. All encapsulate the shared experience of many generations and comprise the schemata for the society which itself functions as a complex adaptive system.

47 Gell-Mann, op. cit., pp. 292–4.

48 Gell-Mann actually includes a military illustration here. See p. 293.

49 Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, pp. 273–4. Capra also discusses Gell-Mann’s first three modes of adaptation.

50 Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, p. 141.

51 Ibid., p. 143.

52 Ibid., p. 144.

53 Ibid., p. 143.

54 Ibid., p. 141.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Capra (1996), op. cit., pp. 301–3.

58 Ilya Progogine, The End of Certainty, New York: The Free Press, 1996, p. 73.

59 Holland in Waldrop, op. cit., p. 147.

60 For instance: Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack (1982), Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (1975); Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (1979); Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, Strategic Military Deception (1982); Michael Handel, ‘The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise’, International Studies Quarterly (September 1977); David Kahn, The Codebreakers (1967); R.V. Jones, Intelligence and Deception (1979); Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (1978); Amnon Sella, ‘Surprise Attack and Communication’, Journal of Contemporary History (1978).

61 Boyd, The Conceptual Spiral, p. 32.

62 Ibid., p. 22.

63 Ibid., p. 23.

64 Ibid., p. 24.

65 Ibid., p. 28.

66 Ibid., p. 38.

67 Ibid., p. 125.

68 See Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory, New York: The Guilford Press, 1991, Chapter 1, for a good archeology of postmodernism.

69 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, New York: The Guilford Press, 1997, pp. 195–6. Interestingly, they find the historical foundation for postmodern ideas in Kierkegaard, Marx, and in particular Nietsche. Boyd read Marx, but also Nietsche’s works Beyond Good and Evil, Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Twilight of the Idols. See also Damian Popolo, ‘French Philosophy, Complexity, and Scientific Epistemology: Moving Beyond the Modern Episteme’, Emergence, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2003, pp. 77–98, for the link between Foucault, Deleuze, Popper, Bergson and Prigogine.

70 Christopher Coker, ‘Post-modernity and the end of the Cold War: has war been dis-invented?’, Review of International Studies, 1992, Vol. 18, p. 189. See also Bradford Booth, Meyer Kestnbaum, and David R. Segal, ‘Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 319, where they assert that ‘the theoretical perspective of postmodernism has become commonplace in sociology’. See for an introduction into modernity and postmodernity also Kenneth Thompson, ‘Social Pluralism and Post-Modernity’, and Gregor McLennan, ‘The Enlightenment Project Revisited’, both in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew, Modernity and its Futures, Oxford: Polity Press, 1992.

71 Pauline Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 15. The first chapter provides a concise overview of both various interpretations and meanings of postmodernism as its intellectual lineage and history.

72 Darryl Jarvis, ‘Postmodernism: A Critical Typology’, Politics and Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1998), p. 98.

73 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti War, Survival at the Dawn of the Information Age, London: Little Brown, 1993. See for a landmark text also Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society, New York: Basic Books, 1973. See for instance Charles Jencks, Post-Modernism, the New Classicism in Art and Architecture, London: Academy Editions, 1987 for a discussion of cultural aspects of postmodernism.

74 Jarvis, op. cit., p. 126.

75 Ibid., pp. 108, 114–15.

76 See for instance Jean-Paul Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984 [1979]; K.R. Dark, The Waves of Time, London: Pinter, 1998; and Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, London: Routledge, 1998, for similar observations.

77 Watson, op. cit., p. 668.

78 Lyotard, op. cit., p. xxiii. See also Gregor McLennan, ‘The Enlightenment Project Revisited’, in Hall, Held and McGrew, op. cit., pp. 328–30. Writers Boyd was familiar with, such as Geertz, Bronowski, Rifkin and Capra, shared these views.

79 McLennan, op. cit., pp. 332–3.

80 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, cited in Kenneth Thompson, ‘Social Pluralism and Post-Modernity’, in Hall, Held and McGrew, op. cit., p. 261.

81 McLennan, op. cit., p. 333.

82 Cilliers, op. cit., p. 118.

83 For an introduction to Giddens, see McLennan, op. cit., pp. 342–7. McLennan positions Giddens as a happy compromise between Enlightenment and (the more extreme and nihilistic versions of) postmodernism.

84 Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of Conservativism in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6(2) (2000), p. 152.

85 Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, ‘The Gordion Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: a neo-Gramscian Perspective’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7(1) (March 2001), p. 22.

86 Ibid., p. 27.

87 Giddens employs the terms reflexive modernization, radical-modernity, high-modernity and post-traditional society.

88 Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization, Stanford: Sage, 1994, p. 87.

89 Ibid., pp. 86–8.

90 Ibid., p. 184.

91 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 38.

92 Ibid., pp. 53–4.

93 See Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984, p. 284.

94 Guzzini, op. cit., p. 162.

95 See Kurt A. Richardson, Graham Mathieson and Paul Cilliers, ‘The Theory and Practice of Complexity Science: Epistemological Considerations for Military Operational Analysis’, SysteMexico, 1 (2000), pp. 19–20, and Cilliers, op. cit., p. 22, and Chapters 3 and 7.

96 Boyd, Strategic Game of ? and ?, p. 58.

97 Richardson, Mathieson and Cilliers, op. cit., p. 22.

98 Jarvis, op. cit., p. 105.

99 This is based on Steve Smith, ‘The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years’, in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff (eds), Critical Reflections on Security and Change, London: Frank Cass, 2000; John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1990); and David Mutimer, ‘Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies’, in Craig Snyder, Contemporary Security and Strategy, London: Macmillan, 1999.

100 Theo Farrell, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’, International Studies Review, 4/1 (2002), p. 49. See also Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, 20, No. 1 (1995); and Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics’, International Organization, 46/2, 1992, pp. 391–425. For a elaborate argument about the constructed nature, and the role of language and discourse, of US deterrence policy, see also Bradley Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. See also Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 172–3.

101 Keith Krause and Michael Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies, Concepts and Cases, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 49.

102 After Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 372. For a critical account see Dale C. Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 187–212.

103 Hopf, p. 177.

104 Wendt (1999), pp. 92–138.

105 Farrell, op. cit., p. 50.

106 Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash, Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 142–3.

107 Ibid., p. 313.

108 Horgan, op. cit., p. 192.

109 Jay Forrester in L. Douglas Kiel and Euel Elliott (eds), Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences, Foundations and Applications, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996, p. 2. See for other examples of investigations on the relevance of chaos/complexity theory and social sciences for instance David Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, An Introduction, London: Routledge, 1998, and Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernity, London: Routledge, 1998; and Raymond Eve, Sara Horsfall and Mary Lee (eds), Chaos, Complexity and Sociology, Myths, Models and Theories, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997.

110 Brian Arthur, ‘Positive Feedback in the Economy’, Scientific American (February, 1990), 131–40.

111 See for instance William McNeil, ‘History and the Scientific Worldview’, History and Theory, Feb. 1998, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Feb. 1998), pp. 1–13; and ‘The Changing Shape of World History’, History and Theory, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May 1995), pp. 8–26. Coveney and Highfield (1995), op. cit., p. 338; James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, pp. 47, 58. Chapter 3 deals entirely with chaos and complexity theory. He likens the transformation of the interstate system to a Prigoginian bifurcation point, for instance. See also James Rosenau, ‘Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs’, in Davids and Czerwinski (1997), Chapter 4.

112 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 90.

113 For an in-depth account of the working of tightly coupled and non-linear effects see in particular Robert Jervis, System Effects, Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.

114 Perrow, op. cit., pp. 93–4. See also Perrow, Complex Organizations; A Critical Essay (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1972; and Jos A. Rijpma, ‘Complexity, Tight coupling and Reliability: Connecting Normal Accidents Theory and High Reliability Theory’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 15–23.

115 Perrow, op. cit., pp. 331–4.

116 See Michael Lissack, ‘Complexity: the Science, its Vocabulary, and its Relation to Organizations’, Emergence, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1999), pp. 110–26.

117 Russ Marion and Josh Bacon, ‘Organizational Extinction and Complex Systems’, Emergence, 1(4) (1999), p. 76.

118 Ibid.

119 Susanne Kelly and May Ann Allison, The Complexity Advantage, How the Sciences Can Help Your Business Achieve Peak Performance, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999, p. 5.

120 Henry Coleman, ‘What Enables Self-Organizing Behavior in Businesses’, Emergence, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1999), p. 37.

121 Ibid., p. 40.

122 The literature on complexity theory and its relevance for the humanities, social sciences, and management theory is burgeoning. See for instance: Shona L. Brown and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Competing on the Edge, Strategy as Structured Chaos, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998; Uri Merry, Coping With Uncertainty, Insights from the New Sciences of Chaos, Self Organization, and Complexity, West-port, CT: Praeger, 1995; Raymond A. Eve et al., Chaos, Complexity, and Sociology, London: Sage, 1997; Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald N. Sull, ‘Strategy as Simple Rules’, Harvard Business Review, January 2001, pp. 107–16; Eric D. Beinhocker, ‘Robust Adaptive Strategies’, Sloan Management Review, Spring 1999, pp. 95–106; Michael Church, ‘Organizing Simply for Complexity: Beyond Metaphor Towards Theory’, Long Range Planning, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1999), pp. 425–40.

123 See for instance Alvin Saperstein, ‘Chaos – A Model for the Outbreak of War’, Nature 309, pp. 303–5. See also ‘The Prediction of Unpredictability: Applications of the New Paradigm of Chaos in Dynamical Systems to the Old Problem of the Stability of a System of Hostile Nations’, in L. Douglas Kiel and Euel Elliott, pp. 139–64; and Roger Beaumont, War, Chaos, and History, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

124 Robert Jervis, ‘Complexity and the analysis of Political and Social Life’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, No. 4 (1997–98), p. 593; and ‘Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions’, Chapter 3, in Paul Davis and Thomas Czerwinski, Complexity, Global Politics and National Security, Annapolis: NDU Press, 1997.

125 Jervis (1997), op. cit., p. 10.

126 Ibid., p. 17.

127 Ibid., p. 18.

128 Jervis includes the example of the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive during World War II. When the Allied Bombers attacked the German railroad system industry was able to divert rail traffic along the widely developed rail system. But doing so after a period of bombing created bottlenecks in response to which individual industries began to take individual measures, which took away the flexibility of the system and subsequently paralyzed it.

129 Ibid., p. 261.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid., p. 194.

133 Steven Mann, ‘Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought’, Parameters, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (Autumn 1992), pp. 54–68.

134 Alan Beyerchen, ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992), pp. 55–90. This section is a very concise summary.

135 Pat Pentland, Center of Gravity Analysis and Chaos Theory, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April 1993. Interestingly, he also incorporates Boyd’s OODA loop, acknowledging that this model and the essay, although developed in the 1970s, anticipated many of tenets of chaos theory, and is consistent with it.

136 Ibid., p. 25.

137 Ibid., p. 17.

138 Ibid., p. 31.

139 Ibid., pp. 11–12.

140 Ibid., pp. 34–6.

141 The literature on military applications of chaos and complexity theory has burgeoned in the 1990s. To illustrate this, an inventory of articles dealing with non-linearity and military affairs drawn up by the US National Defense University in 1999 listed 144 entries. Available at: www.clausewitz.com (accessed 10 July 1999). For some accessible papers see for instance Glenn E. James, Chaos Theory, The Essentials for Military Applications, Newport: Naval War College Press, 1996; Linda Beckerman, ‘The Non-linear Dynamics of War’, online. Available at: www.belisarius.com/ modern_business_strategy/beckerman/non_linear.htm (accessed 27 April 1999). This article, though technical, is often referred to. She regards attrition style warfare as a linear process and, interestingly, refers to Boyd’s OODA loop as a model which captures the dynamics of non-linear systems; and Jason B. Tanner, Walter E. Lavrinovich and Scott R. Hall: ‘Looking at Warfare Through a New Lens’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 82, No.. 9 (September 1998), pp. 59–61; David S. Alberts and Thomas Czerwinski, Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1998; and Thomas J. Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds, Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1999. For a recent study relating Clausewitz to chaos see Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Chaos, Friction in War and Military Policy, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, in particular Chapters 1 and 7.

142 Ibid., pp. 12–13.

143 James Burton, The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993, pp. 46–7.

144 Boyd, Strategic Game of ? and ?, p. 12.

145 Hammond, op. cit., p. 15.

146 Boyd, A Discourse, Abstract, p. 2.

147 Alberts and Czerwinski (1998), op. cit., Preface, p. 1.

148 Boyd, The Essence of Winning and Losing, p. 5;

149 Hammond, op. cit., p. 12; Coram, op. cit., p. 330.

150 On the merit of metaphors see for instance Morgan, op. cit., Chapter 11. The first three metaphors I mention here are directly from this book, Chapters 3, 4 and 8.

5 Core arguments

1 Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001, p. 118.

2 Grant T. Hammond, ‘The Essential Boyd’, unpublished paper. Online. Available at: www.belisarius.com (Accessed 4 June 2000), p. 8.

3 In the essay Boyd frequently inserts a number that refers to the number of a book listed in the bibliography attached to Destruction and Creation, and indicates the source for a particular insight. For clarity, here both the number and the works referred to are given. The entire bibliography can be found in Annex A. The sources Boyd refers to here are books number 11: Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process; and 13: Robert Heilbronner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect.

4 Ibid.

5 Here Boyd refers to sources 28: Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being; and 24: Alex F. Osborne, Applied Imagination.

6 Boyd refers to Osborne again.

7 Again Boyd refers to Polanyi.

8 Here Boyd refers to sources 14 and 15: two works of Werner Heisenberg: Physics and Philosophy, and Across the Frontiers.

9 Boyd refers to source 27: Jean Piaget, Structuralism; as well as to both works of Heisenberg listed above.

10 Besides the two works of Heisenberg, Boyd here refers to source 19: Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

11 This description of the dynamics of normal science Boyd derived from Kuhn.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Boyd refers to sources 12: Kurt Gödel, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of the Principia Mathematica and Related Systems, pages 3–38, ‘The Undecidable’; and 23: Ernest Nagel and James Newman, Gödel’s Proof.

16 Boyd derived this insight from sources 29: Jagjit Singh, Great Ideas of Modern Mathematics; and 27: Jean Piaget, Structuralism.

17 Ibid.

18 Boyd refers to source 14 again (Heisenberg (1962)); and source 9: George Gamow, Thirty Years That Shook Physics.

19 Gamow is referred to again.

20 Here Boyd refers to source 3: Spencer Brown: Laws of Form.

21 Gamow.

22 Heisenberg (1962).

23 Brown.

24 For this introduction to thermodynamics Boyd consulted Georgescu-Roegen and source 20: David Layzer, ‘The Arrow of Time’, an article in Scientific American of December 1975.

25 Layzer is referred to as the source.

26 Ibid.

27 As before, these are Boyd’s own words.

28 Here Boyd refers to sources 27: Jean Piaget, Structuralism; and 28: Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being.

29 Patterns of Conflict, p. 2, underlining as in original. Where used in the following chapters, underlining directly follows Boyd’s text.

30 Ibid., p. 5.

31 Ibid., p. 7.

32 Ibid., p. 10. In the essay Boyd shows an awareness that various other survival strategies exist. Cooperation as the optimal mode for long-term survival often overrides the short-term strategy of direct conflict. Interestingly, Darwin actually stated that ‘it’s not the strongest who survive, but those most responsive to change’, a message Boyd would strongly agree with. Survival is the consequence of differences in fitness, resulting in greater reproduction, along with persistent variation in heritable traits that make for fitness differences. See Robert Brandon and Alex Rosenberg, ‘Philosophy of Biology’, in Peter Clark and Katherine Hawley, Philosophy of Science Today, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, in particular pp. 167–75.

33 Ibid., p. 11.

34 Ibid., p. 12.

35 This refers to the use of ‘the orthodox and the unorthodox’ methods of employing troops, as discussed in Chapter 3.

36 Ibid., p. 16.

37 Ibid., pp. 19, 24.

38 Ibid., p. 24.

39 Ibid., p. 25.

40 Ibid., pp. 27–8.

41 Ibid., p. 28.

42 Ibid., p. 31.

43 Ibid., pp. 30–1.

44 Ibid., pp. 33–4 for the following section.

45 Ibid., p. 31. Here he obviously followed the contentious views of Liddell Hart, Lawrence and Fuller. As Azar Gat makes clear, Liddell Hart too made the mistake of missing the points that (1) the allied forces learned during the protracted wars against Napoleon and (2) that the blatant aggression led to their adoption of several tactical and stragical methods of Napoleon, including mass mobilization. So Napoleon’s failure cannot be attributed to his tactical concepts. See Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War, Fuller, Liddell Hart, and other Modernists, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 165.

46 Ibid., p. 40.

47 Ibid., p. 41. Clausewitz actually mentions several other centers of gravity as well. It can be an alliance, a capital, a political leader, and other ‘focal’ points of power. See for a detailed recent corrective Antulio Echevarria II, Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine-Again, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

48 Ibid., p. 42.

49 Ibid., pp. 44–5.

50 Ibid., p. 46.

51 Ibid., p. 48.

52 Ibid., p. 49.

53 Ibid. Like Fuller in The Conduct of War, after this slide Boyd makes a brief excursion to Marxist revolutionary thought, noticing, however, that at this point in his presentation it is not clear how revolutionary strategy and guerrilla tactics fit in his argument, and he tells his audience that this will become evident after his discussion of World War I.

54 Ibid., p. 55.

55 As Azar Gat has recently convincingly argued, and as Michael Howard did before him, there certainly were genuine efforts to counter the increased lethality of the battlefield. See Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, in particular Chapter 3, and Michael Howard, ‘The Influence of Clausewitz’, in Karl von Clausewitz, On War, (transl.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. For the German efforts in this vein, and a similar corrective message, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz, German Military Thinkers Before the Great War, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

56 Ibid., p. 57.

57 Ibid., p. 59.

58 Ibid., p. 60.

59 Ibid., p. 62.

60 Ibid., p. 63.

61 Ibid., p. 62.

62 Ibid., p. 65.

63 Ibid., p. 64.

64 Interestingly, in selecting these concepts Boyd ignored developments some consider also of prime importance such as the development of (strategic) air power theory (with well known names such as Guilio Douhet and Billy Mitchell) or the introduction of carriers which transformed the face of sea power.

65 Ibid., p. 66.

66 Ibid., pp. 67–8.

67 Ibid., p. 69.

68 Ibid., p. 70.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., p. 71.

71 Ibid., p. 72.

72 Ibid. Note the use of the term ‘organism’.

73 Ibid., p. 74.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid., p. 76.

76 Ibid., p. 78.

77 Ibid. Note how Boyd quietly moves to a higher level of abstraction when he asserts that the Schwerpunkt helps in establishing an advantage in adaptability.

78 Ibid., p. 79.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., p. 86.

81 Ibid., p. 87.

82 Ibid.

83 See p. 89.

84 Ibid., p. 88.

85 Ibid., p. 90.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid., p. 91.

88 Ibid., p. 93.

89 Ibid., p. 94.

90 Ibid., p. 95.

91 Ibid., p. 96.

92 Ibid., p. 98.

93 Ibid., p. 101.

94 Ibid., p. 99.

95 Ibid., pp. 104–6.

96 Ibid., p. 105.

97 Ibid., pp. 107–8.

98 Ibid., p. 111.

99 Ibid., p. 113.

100 Ibid., p. 112. Notice the specific Cold War and post-Vietnam era elements.

101 Ibid., p. 114.

102 Ibid., p. 115.

103 Ibid., p. 117.

104 Ibid., p. 119.

105 Ibid., p. 120.

106 Ibid., p. 121.

107 Ibid., p. 124.

108 Ibid., p. 125.

109 Ibid., p. 128.

110 Ibid., p. 128.

111 Ibid., p. 129.

112 Ibid., p. 130.

113 Ibid., p. 131.

114 Ibid., p. 132.

115 Ibid., p. 133.

116 Ibid., p. 134.

117 Ibid., pp. 135–6.

118 Ibid., p. 137.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid., pp. 138–9.

121 Ibid., p. 140.

122 Ibid., p. 141.

123 Ibid., p. 142.

124 Ibid., p. 143.

125 Ibid., p. 148.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid., p. 149.

128 Ibid., p. 150.

129 Ibid., p. 151. This strongly suggests there is more than only ‘OODA looping faster’ than the opponent.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid., p. 152.

132 Ibid., pp. 152–3.

133 Ibid., p. 156.

134 Ibid., p. 174.

135 Ibid., p. 175.

136 Ibid., p. 176.

137 Ibid., p. 177.

138 Ibid., p. 178.

139 Ibid., p. 184.

6 Exploration and refinement

1 Various sources have already been mentioned in footnotes in the previous chapter. Here it is worthwhile to note the following works that appear in Boyd’s bibliography: David Downing, The Devil’s Virtuosos: German Generals at War 1940–1945 (1977); T.N. Dupuy, The Military Life of Genghis, Khan of Khans (1969) and A Genius for War (1977); J.F.C. Fuller, Grant ands Lee, (1932); Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, Crisis in Command (1978); Richard Gabriel and Reuven Gal, ‘The IDF Officer: Linchpin in Unit Cohesion’, Army (January 1984); John Gardner, Morale (1978); Simon Goodenough and Len Deighton, Tactical Genius in Battle (1979); Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (1952); Richard Humble, Hitler’s Generals (1974); Albert Kesselring, Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units (1952); Harold Lamb, Genghis Khan (1927); Kenneth Macksey, Guderian, Creator of the Blitzkrieg (1976); S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (1947); Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks (1937); Charles Whiting, Patton (1970); and importantly, Martin van Creveld, Command in War (1982). Boyd’s C2 concept is one among many but he does not dwell on alternatives. See for a discussion of six different command arrangements for instance Chapter 6 of David Alberts and Richard E. Heyes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations, Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, CCRP publications, 1995.

2 ‘Organic design for Command and Control’, p. 2.

3 Ibid. It is not difficult to see the influence of The Tacit Dimension in this.

4 Ibid., p. 3.

5 Ibid., p. 4.

6 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

7 Ibid., p. 8.

8 Ibid., p. 9.

9 Ibid., p. 10.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 11.

12 Ibid., p. 15.

13 Ibid., p. 16.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 17.

16 Ibid., p. 18.

17 Ibid., p. 19.

18 Ibid., p. 20.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., p. 21.

21 Ibid., p. 22.

22 Ibid., p. 23.

23 Ibid., p. 24.

24 Ibid., p. 25.

25 Ibid., p. 26.

26 Ibid., p. 28.

27 Ibid., p. 30.

28 Ibid., p. 29.

29 Ibid., p. 31.

30 Ibid., p. 32.

31 Ibid., p. 35.

32 Ibid., p. 34.

33 Ibid., p. 37. The definitions of command and control are here contrasted deliberately against those of understanding, monitoring, appreciation and leadership. Boyd actually listed them together in one sequence.

34 Ibid., p. 36.

35 Strategic Game of ? and ?, p. 1.

36 The ‘approach’ Boyd takes in this presentation and described here is on p. 4.

37 Ibid., p. 3.

38 Ibid., p. 6.

39 Ibid., pp. 7–9.

40 Ibid., p. 10.

41 Ibid., p. 12.

42 Ibid., p. 14.

43 Ibid., p. 15.

44 Ibid., p. 16. Quotations are presented here as in the presentation.

45 Ibid., p. 17. Erie was Boyd’s former hometown.

46 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

47 Ibid., p. 20.

48 Ibid., p. 21.

49 Ibid., p. 22.

50 Ibid., p. 23.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., p. 25.

53 Ibid., p. 28.

54 Ibid., p. 29. Italics are mine.

55 Ibid., p. 30.

56 Ibid., p. 33. Italics are mine.

57 Ibid., p. 34.

58 Ibid., p. 35.

59 Ibid., p. 36.

60 Ibid., p. 37.

61 Ibid., p. 46.

62 Ibid., p. 38.

63 Ibid., p. 39.

64 Ibid., pp. 40–3.

65 Ibid., p. 44.

66 Ibid., p. 45.

67 Ibid., p. 46.

68 Ibid., p. 47.

69 Ibid., p. 48.

70 Ibid., p. 49.

71 Ibid., p. 50.

72 Ibid., p. 51.

73 Ibid., p. 54.

74 Ibid., p. 55.

75 Ibid., p. 56.

76 Ibid., p. 57.

77 Ibid., p. 58.

78 Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 70.

79 Ibid., p. 177.

80 Boyd, The Conceptual Spiral, p. 2.

81 Ibid., p. 4.

82 Ibid., p. 5.

83 Ibid., pp. 9–12.

84 Ibid., p. 14. The next section almost literally follows Boyd’s text on p. 14.

85 Ibid., p. 16.

86 Ibid., p. 17.

87 Ibid., p. 18.

88 Ibid., p. 19.

89 Ibid., p. 20.

90 Ibid., p. 21.

91 Ibid., p. 22.

92 Ibid., p. 23.

93 Ibid., p. 24.

94 Ibid., p. 25.

95 Ibid., p. 26, italics are mine.

96 Ibid., p. 27.

97 Ibid., p. 28.

98 Ibid., p. 29.

99 Ibid., p. 30.

100 Ibid., p. 31.

101 Ibid., p. 32.

102 Ibid., p. 33.

103 Ibid., p. 34.

104 Ibid., p. 35.

105 Ibid., p. 36.

106 Ibid., p. 37.

107 Ibid., p. 38.

108 Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War, John Boyd and American Security, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001, p. 188.

109 Robert Polk, ‘A Critique of the Boyd Theory – Is it Relevant to the Army?’, Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2000, p. 259.

110 Grant T. Hammond, The Essence of Winning and Losing, op. cit., p. 2.

111 Ibid., p. 4.

112 Ibid., p. 5.

7 Completing the loop

1 Cited in Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Scientific Inquiry, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1964, p. 303.

2 James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 2nd edition, 1980, p. 26.

3 Jay Luvaas, ‘Clausewitz: Fuller and Liddell Hart’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 9 (1986), p. 207.

4 In Introduction to Strategy, London: Preager, 1965, on p. 45 and p. 136 Beaufre for instance states that ‘strategy must be a continuous process of original thinking, based upon hypotheses which must be proved true or false as action proceeds’. Furthermore Beaufre recognizes that initiative and freedom of action are essential (p. 36).

5 John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 338.

6 See for instance Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, ‘The Postmodern Military’, in James Burk, The Military in New Times, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 142–4. Christopher Dandeker notes similar changes, but prefers the term ‘late-modernity’.

7 Christopher Dandeker, ‘A Farewell to Arms? The Military and the Nation-State in a Changing World’, in Moskos and Burk, op. cit., pp. 128.

8 See for instance Andrew Latham, ‘Warfare Transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the “Revolution in Military Affairs” ’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8 (2) (June 2002), pp. 231–66; Colin McInnes, Spectator-Sport Warfare, The West and Contemporary Conflict, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002; Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds), War in a Changing World, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001, in particular Edward Luttwak, ‘Blood and Computers: The Crisis of Classic Military Power in Advanced Postindustrialist Societies and the Scope of Technological Remedies’, and Azar Gat, ‘Isolationism, Appeasement, Containment, and Limited War: Western Strategic Policy from the Modern to the “Postmodern” Era’.

9 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 2–5. See also Martin Shaw, ‘The Development of “Common-Risk” Society: A Theoretical View’, in Jurgen Kulman and Jean Callaghan (eds), Military and Society in 21st Century Europe, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 2000, especially pp. 15–19. He liberally refers to postmodern theorists such as Giddens and Bauman. See also Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State, London: Demos, The Foreign Policy Centre, 1996 for use of similar typology.

10 Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War, the New Politics of Conflict, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 21–2. For a critique see Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, ‘ “New Wars” and rumours of “New War” ’, International Interactions, 28: 2002, p. 165.

11 Ibid., pp. 38–40

12 Ibid., p. 81.

13 Ken Booth, Meyer Kestnbaum and David Segal, ‘Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 333–4.

14 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, London: Penguin, 2000; Colin McInnes (2002), op. cit.

15 Booth, Kestnbaum and Segal, op. cit., p. 335. Emphasis is mine.

16 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Little Brown & Company, 1993, p. 81.

17 See for instance John Warden, ‘The Enemy as a System’, Airpower Journal, No. 9 (Spring 1995), pp. 40–55.

18 Zalmay M. Khalizad and John P. White (eds), Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare, Santa Monica: RAND, 1999.

19 This section is derived from Frans Osinga and Rob de Wijk, ‘The Emergence of the Post-Modern Warform: Assessing a Decade of Changes in Military Affairs’, in Alfred van Staden, Jan Rood and Hans Labohm (eds), Cannon and Canons, Clingendael Views of Global and Regional Politics, Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 2003; and from a series of articles on Network Centric Warfare, see Frans Osinga: ‘Netwerkend de oorlog in? Network Centric Warfare en de Europese militaire transformatie’, Deel I, Militaire Spectator, JRG 172, 7/8–2003, pp. 386–99; and Frans Osinga, ‘Netwerkend de oorlog in? NCW als product van de revolutie’, Deel II, Militaire Spectator, JRG 172, 9–2003, pp. 433–45.

20 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (eds), The Postmodern Military, Armed Forces after the Cold War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 5.

21 McInnes (2002), op. cit., p. 139.

22 This is not the place to discuss the merits of the RMA thesis. Several critical studies have been published that argue that there either is no RMA, it is irrelevant because it is only due to technical developments, or its effects are only very temporary in light of the enduring complexity of war. See for instance MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050, Cambridge: 2001; and Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History, Portland: Frank Cass, 2002.

23 Andrew Marshall, Testimony before the senate Armed Services Committee, subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, 5 May 1995. See for an early study also Andrew Krepinevich, ‘From Cavalry to Computer’, The National Interest, No. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 30–42.

24 Eliot Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (1996), p. 54.

25 Ibid., p. 37.

26 Andrew Latham, ‘Re-Imagining Warfare’, in Craig Snyder, op. cit., p. 219.

27 Ibid., p. 239.

28 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is Coming’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1993), p. 141. They elaborated on these ideas in an edited volume of studies on information war. See John Arquilla and David Ronfledt (eds), In Athena’s Camp, Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, Santa Monica: RAND, 1997. This volume includes the article ‘Cyberwar is Coming’.

29 Ibid., p. 146.

30 Ibid., p. 144.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 143.

33 Ibid., p. 144.

34 Ibid., p. 152.

35 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘Emerging Modes of Conflict’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1993), p. 158.

36 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, pp. 21–3.

37 Ibid.

38 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997, p. iv.

39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997, p. 17. For a short description of JV2010 see Major-General Charles Link, ‘21st Century Armed Forces – Joint Vision 2010’, Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996, pp. 69–73.

40 Second Annual Report of the Army After Next Project, Headquarters US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 7 December, 1998, pp. 11–13.

41 Cited in Christopher Coker, The Future of War, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 41.

42 David Alberts, Information Age Transformation, Getting to a 21st Century Military, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defence, CCRP publications, June 2002, p. 18.

43 Ibid., p. 7.

44 David Gompert, Richard Kugler and Martin Libicki, Mind the Gap, Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1997, p. 4.

45 DoD Report to Congress on NCW, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, CCRP publications, July 2001, p. vii.

46 David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, CCRP publications, 1999, p. 90.

47 DoD Report to Congress on NCW, pp. 3–5 and 3–1.

48 Ibid., pp. 3–9 and 3–10.

49 These ‘tenets’ appear in several NCW publications. See DOD Report to Congress, p. i, v, or 3–10.

50 Steven Metz, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare, Carlisle Barracks: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, April 2000, p. 24.

51 Ibid., p. 87.

52 See for instance David Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, CCRP publications, 1995; David Alberts, John J. Gartska, Richard E. Hayes and David T. Signori, Understanding Information Age Warfare, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, CCRP publications, 2001; David Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge, Command and Control in the Information Age, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, CCRP publications, 2003; and Simon R. Atkinson and James Moffat, The Agile Organization, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, CCRP publications, 2005.

53 See for a good empirical survey, for instance, Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Warfare in the Third World, New York: Palgrave, 2001.

54 This is the contested but nevertheless pertinent argument that historians John Keegan, Martin van Creveld and some others make. See for a concise discussion and refutation Christopher Bassford, ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clause-witz’, War and History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (November 1994). For a recent study in military cultures which highlights the alternatives to the western instrumentalist view of war, see for instance Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors, The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.

55 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 14, 15. Others too have described this type of conflict. See for instance Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, London: Vintage, 1994; and The Warrior’s Honor, London: Vintage, 1999; or Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, New York: Vintage, 2001.

56 Holst, op. cit., p. 18.

57 Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars, Organized violence in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity, 1999.

58 Mary Kaldor, ‘Introduction’, in Mary Kaldor (ed.), Global Insecurity, London: Cassell/Pinter, 2000, pp. 5–6.

59 Ibid.

60 Kaldor, (1999), op. cit., p. 9.

61 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York: The Free Press, 1991, p. 221.

62 Ibid., p. 202.

63 Holsti, op. cit., pp. 36–9.

64 Kaldor (2000), op. cit., p. 6.

65 Ralph Peters, ‘The New Warrior Class’, Parameters, Summer 1994, p. 16. See also his book Fighting for the Future, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999.

66 Van Creveld, op. cit., pp. 142–3.

67 Ibid., p. 27.

68 See for instance Barry Posen, ‘The War for Kosovo; Serbia’s Political–Military Strategy’, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2000), pp. 39–84; I. Arreguin-Toft, ‘How the Weak Win; A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict’, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2001), pp. 93–128; R.H. Robert Scales, ‘Adaptive Enemies: Dealing With the Strategic Threat after 2010’, Strategic Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5–14; Steven Metz, ‘Strategic Asymmetry’, Military Review, July–August 2001, pp. 23–31, Stephen Biddle, ‘The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare’, Security Studies, 8, No. 1 (1998), pp. 1–74; Charles Dunlap, ‘Technology: Recomplicating Moral Life for the Nation’s Defenders’, Parameters, Autumn 1999, pp. 24–53.

69 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Beijing: 1999, p. 156. For an overview of the debate on this topic and some notable studies, see also my chapter titled ‘Asymmetric Warfare; Rediscovering the Essence of Strategy’, in John Olson (ed.), Asymmetric Warfare, Oslo: 2002.

70 See John Lynn, Battle, A History of Combat and Culture, Boulder, CO: 2003, West-view Press, in particular the Epilogue; Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors, London: IISS, 2002; and Phillip Bobbit, The Shield of Achilles, London: Penguin, 2002, in particular Prologue and Chapters 10–13; and any of the articles by Ralph Peters, for instance ‘The New Warrior Class’, Parameters, Summer 1994, pp. 16–26. For a lengthy rebuttal and an argument for continuity, see Colin Gray, ‘Clausewitz, History, and the Future Strategic World’, paper for a National Intelligence Council Workshop on ‘The Changing Nature of Warfare’, Washington, D.C., 25 May 2004. Online. Available at: www.cia.gov/NKIC_2020 (accessed 3 March 2005).

71 See William Lind, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph Sutton, Gary Wilson, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1989, pp. 22–6. See for a restatement in 1994 of this idea Thomas X. Hammes, ‘The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994. This is a much simplified rendering of the argument.

72 See for instance Grant T. Hammond, ‘The Paradoxes of War’, Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994, pp. 7–16; Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004; Gary Wilson, Greg Wilcox and Chet Richards, Fourth Generation Warfare & OODA Loop Implications of the Iraqi Insurgency, presentation, www.belisarius.com, site (accessed 5 January 2005); or Myke Cole, ‘Confronting the 4th Generation Enemy’, Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 22–4; or Tony Corn, ‘World War IV As Fourth Generation Warfare’, Policy Review, January 2006, for a small sampling of this strand of thought. For a timely balanced critical review of the 4GW school of thought, see the August 2005 issue of Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2, dedicated to this topic.

73 See Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold (ed.), Being Useful, Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998, pp. 25–6.

74 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 91.

75 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 [1976], p. xi.