Vengeance

24 NATANZ, IRAN

On the western side of the new Natanz Underground Complex, Behrouz Khavari watched a stream of transport trucks passing through one of the facility’s entrances. Beside him stood Saeed Masud, director of the sprawling complex built deep beneath the Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā mountain peak. Although Masud wore a stoic expression, Khavari could sense the excitement radiating from the sixty-year-old man.

They were standing at one of four entrances to Natanz’s newest and most protected complex, built in response to several successful attempts to sabotage Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Within the complex were two critical facilities: the replacement Centrifuge Fabrication Center and a new Fuel Enrichment Plant, the latter of which would process uranium to weapon-grade purity.

Several years ago, the previous centrifuge assembly center, an aboveground facility in the main Natanz complex to the north, had been destroyed by an explosive device planted by saboteurs. Combined with the introduction of a computer virus that had caused thousands of Iran’s gas centrifuges to overspeed, tearing themselves apart, leadership had concluded that a more secure and protected nuclear complex was required — one that was immune to even the most potent cyber or conventional weapons.

After the last truck entered the underground complex, the massive steel doors slowly rumbled closed, encasing Khavari and Masud in a concrete tunnel illuminated by harsh white fluorescent lighting. The two men entered into a two-person transport vehicle and followed the trucks to the lower of two main levels in the underground complex, where the truck contents were being unloaded: one thousand Russian gas centrifuges, significantly more advanced than any centrifuge Iran had built to date. Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts, which had slowed to a crawl after the destruction of the aboveground centrifuge facility, would be jump-started by the Russian centrifuges.

Khavari and Masud’s vehicle stopped at the unloading dock, and the two men entered the main hall on the fuel enrichment level where they watched the installation of the first batch of Russian devices. On the concrete floor, spaced every five feet, were hexagon-shaped holes that would anchor the sixteen-foot-tall centrifuges. While Masud stood beside him filled with excitement, Khavari did his best to hide the dread gnawing at him. With these new centrifuges, Iran could process uranium to weapon-grade purity eight times faster than before.

Turning to Masud, Khavari asked, “How long before we have enough weapon-grade uranium for our first nuclear weapon?”

Masud didn’t reply, smiling instead.