Vengeance

27 WASHINGTON, D.C.

The journey from CIA headquarters into the District was only a few miles. During the short trip, Christine O’Connor pulled a folder from her satchel and reviewed the information related to Russia’s shipment of advanced centrifuges to Iran. The president’s administration had been wrestling with the issue — how best to deter Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons — but had been convinced they had time to sort things out. Iran’s centrifuge fabrication facility at Natanz had been destroyed and its replacement was not yet producing new centrifuges, handicapping Iran’s enrichment effort with an insufficient quantity of older and less efficient centrifuges. That assessment had changed earlier this morning.

After Christine’s SUV rolled to a stop beneath the West Wing’s north portico, she passed between two Marines in dress blues guarding the White House entrance, then descended to the West Wing basement and entered the Situation Room. Inside the conference room, seated at the rectangular table, were Secretary of State Marcy Perini, acting Secretary of Defense Peter Seuffert, and Thom Parham, the president’s national security advisor. Also attending today’s meeting were Chief of Staff Kevin Hardison and Vice President Bob Tompkins. Hardison buzzed the secretary, informing her that they were ready for the president, who arrived a moment later for the meeting Christine had requested.

“How serious is this?” the president asked after taking his seat, having been notified of the meeting’s topic — Iran’s ability to enrich uranium to weapon-grade purity.

Christine understood the issue and its impact quite well, having spent two years as the Director for Nuclear Defense Policy prior to her assignment as the president’s national security advisor. Given that today’s situation involved agency intelligence gathered on a foreign country, Christine was involved due to her current assignment as CIA director.

“Iran has just received a shipment of one thousand advanced gas centrifuges from Russia,” she explained. “It triggers the breakout-time trip wire.”

Christine passed out paper copies of her brief to the attendees, then took a moment to recap the efforts to limit Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons, since the current cabinet members might not have been familiar with the details.

“The president and several previous administrations adopted a policy and implemented sanctions to limit the breakout time — the time it would take Iran to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon — to a minimum of twelve months. Despite sanctions, Iran’s enrichment efforts had significantly reduced that time interval. To reset the breakout time back to the one-year requirement, George W. Bush authorized a cyber-warfare operation code-named Olympic Games, which sabotaged Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts by infecting Iran’s centrifuge-control software with a virus called Stuxnet. The virus caused the rotors to overspeed, destroying the centrifuges.

“President Obama continued the program, destroying over one thousand of Iran’s most advanced centrifuges before the Iranians eventually detected and deleted the software virus. With Stuxnet neutralized, more direct action was taken by the first Trump administration with Israeli assistance, planting an explosive device in Iran’s centrifuge fabrication facility at Natanz, which destroyed their centrifuge manufacturing capability.

“These measures kept Iran’s breakout time at greater than twelve months and bought us enough time, we believed, to deal with Iran’s construction of a replacement centrifuge fabrication facility in their new underground complex at Natanz. That assessment has just changed with Russia’s shipment of one thousand gas centrifuges to Iran. Not only is the quantity a concern, but these centrifuges are eight times more efficient than anything Iran has fabricated to date. The quantity and quality of these new centrifuges, once fully operational, will reduce Iran’s breakout time to approximately two weeks.”

“My God!” Secretary of State Perini exclaimed. “Twenty-six nuclear weapons per year.”

“That’s correct,” Christine replied, “assuming Iran has a sufficient stockpile of low-grade uranium to enrich. We believe they have enough uranium for fifty nuclear weapons.”

“What are our options?” the president asked.

“Another cyberattack such as the Stuxnet virus is unlikely to succeed. The Iranians have implemented significant cyber-warfare prevention measures that have eliminated all known virus-introduction mechanisms. Destroying the new centrifuge fabrication facility will be much harder than before since the new facility is being built inside Iran’s new underground complex at Natanz, as opposed to the previous aboveground facility.”

“What about the MOP?” Vice President Tompkins asked, referring to the Air Force’s thirty-thousand-pound bunker-busting bomb with a unique fuze design, detonating only after coming to a stop, allowing the ordnance to penetrate deep below the surface before exploding.

Acting Secretary of Defense Seuffert replied, “That depends on how deep underground the new Iranian complex is.”

“Turn to page five,” Christine said, directing the group to a satellite view of the mountain complex.

“The new complex is built into Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā, sometimes referred to as Pickaxe Mountain. Based on the location of the entry tunnels in the side of the mountain, we believe there are two main levels within the complex. If the entrance tunnels are built horizontally, that places one level at two hundred fifty feet beneath the mountain surface and a lower level almost five hundred feet deep. The two levels could be even deeper if the tunnels slope downward from the entrance instead of staying level.”

Seuffert shook his head. “Not even a one-two punch with the MOP would destroy a reinforced concrete complex that deep.”

“What other options do we have?” the president asked. “We can’t let these centrifuges operate for long.”

There was momentary silence in the Situation Room. The issue of Iran’s uranium enrichment had come up during previous White House meetings, and the president’s position had been consistent up to now. He had been reluctant to implement sabotage, preferring diplomacy instead, since Iran could just replace whatever had been destroyed, simply delaying the inevitable unless a diplomatic solution was forged. However, Iran seemed intent on developing nuclear weapons, and Russia’s supply of advanced centrifuges had changed the calculus.

“I think it’s time for direct intervention,” Seuffert offered, “but a covert mission. Something that can’t be directly traced back to the United States.” He glanced at Christine, who took the cue.

“We can put together a CIA mission with former special operations personnel — all civilians, no active-duty military. A clandestine insertion into the Natanz facility to destroy the centrifuges.”

The president canvassed the others present, obtaining their opinion on the recommendation. After receiving universal concurrence on a covert sabotage mission, the president announced his decision.

“Draft a plan and brief me when you’re ready.”