Blackmail

22 WASHINGTON, D.C.

It was midafternoon in the Oval Office, with SecDef McVeigh seated between Kevin Hardison and Colonel DuBose, across from the president’s desk. There had been a breakthrough in the investigation into Russia’s attack on USS Roosevelt, and a blue folder resting on McVeigh’s lap contained the critical snippet of information, along with the Pentagon’s assessment.

“What have you got?” the president asked.

McVeigh answered, “Cyber Command has been scouring Russian military and diplomatic message traffic — emails and official messages. We have the ability to decrypt the lowest level of Russian classified messages — those corresponding to our Confidential level — and we detected an important keyword in a weekly summary provided from the Russian Navy to its minister of defense.”

McVeigh opened the folder on his lap and read the pertinent sentence: “Unit TM85.1051 reports the order was executed flawlessly.” He looked up and added, “The unit designation TM85.1051 cross-references to an Oscar II submarine in the Russian Pacific Fleet, K-456 Vilyuchinsk.” McVeigh refreshed everyone’s memory about the significance of the Russian unit. “Vilyuchinsk was the submarine that launched twenty-four missiles at Roosevelt.”

The president replied, “You’re saying the attack on Roosevelt was intentional?”

“Yes, Mr. President. The date in the report coincides with the Russian attack. This is what we’ve suspected all along, and this evidence is enough to convince everyone in the Pentagon that the attack was deliberate.”

“I have to agree,” the president said, “which puts us in a difficult situation. We have to either ignore the attack despite what we know, or respond. Your thoughts, gentlemen?” The president turned first to his chief of staff.

“There has to be payback,” Hardison answered. “A quid pro quo.”

The president turned to Colonel DuBose, giving his new senior military aide the opportunity to weigh in on the first significant issue during his White House assignment.

DuBose replied, “A response is required, but we need to ensure it doesn’t spiral out of control, either in a tit for tat that ratchets up, or a response that escalates into a broader conflict.”

When the president turned his attention to McVeigh, the SecDef said, “I agree with Kevin and Colonel DuBose. A response is required, although I’m not sure we can prevent an increasing tit for tat. That decision will rest with Kalinin. However, as Colonel DuBose recommends, our response should be narrow, minimizing the possibility this blows up into a wider conflict.”

“What do you recommend?” the president asked.

“One option,” McVeigh offered, “is to damage a major Russian warship. The Russian Northern Fleet has entered the Mediterranean Sea, and most of their surface combatants have docked in the Syrian port of Latakia, loading food and fuel. Their aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, remains at sea with Russia’s other nuclear-powered combatants. This gives us a number of targets and options.

“Admiral Kuznetsov is the most appropriate choice as quid pro quo for Roosevelt. However, it also has the highest potential for escalating, depending on how we engage and the response from her escorts. A better target, perhaps, is Marshal Ustinov, a Slava class cruiser docked in Latakia. She’s the most formidable Russian warship in port, and the third most powerful in Russia’s Northern Fleet after Admiral Kuznetsov and the battle cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, both of which are nuclear powered and remain at sea.”

“How would we execute the attack?”

“You could order an air attack, hitting Marshal Ustinov with enough missiles to send her back to Russia for repairs. However, she’s tied up along the waterfront with several merchants nearby, and there’s the possibility of collateral damage if any missiles lock on to the wrong target. We could go with a torpedo. Michigan will enter the Mediterranean Sea soon, only a short distance from Latakia, but you’ve got the same problem: their torpedo could lock on to the wrong target with so many ships nearby.

“Another alternative,” McVeigh said, “is the SEAL detachment aboard Michigan. They’re trained to sink enemy combatants in port, which is the scenario we’re looking at, plus they can ensure we get the right target.”

“Is that too aggressive,” Hardison asked, “sinking one of their ships in return for damaging one of ours?”

McVeigh replied, “Marshal Ustinov won’t be a permanent loss. Sunk alongside the pier, the Russians will raise her, like we did for most of the ships sunk during Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the ships we lost in the Taiwan Strait last year. But we can put her out of commission for six months to a year, which is a reasonable response for what was done to Roosevelt.”

“Assuming we sink the Russian cruiser,” the president said, “what do we tell Russia when they imply our involvement?”

McVeigh suggested, “You could tell President Kalinin the same thing the Russian ambassador told you. That SEALs from Michigan were on a training mission, and accidentally attached real ordnance to the bottom of their cruiser.” McVeigh smiled.

After a moment of deliberation, the president replied, “Send the order to Michigan. Sink Marshal Ustinov.”