Blackmail

43 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Less than a day after departing Brussels, Christine was seated at the Situation Room conference table between Hardison and Colonel DuBose, with McVeigh and Dawn opposite them. The president, sitting at the head of the table, listened as McVeigh delivered an update.

“Russia’s Northern and Pacific Fleets are stationed in the Gulf of Oman, where they can block the entrance to the Persian Gulf if desired. However, two Russian fleets aren’t as formidable as it sounds, at least when it comes to surface combatants. Russia has only nineteen in the gulf: one aircraft carrier, three cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and two corvettes. Not exactly quake-in-your-boots forces, considering we should be able to muster four carrier strike groups comprising four aircraft carriers and forty cruisers and destroyers in opposition. We have two problems, however.

“The first is that Russia has apparently struck a deal with the Iranians, allowing the deployment of Russian military units inside their country. Over a hundred Russian missile batteries are being positioned along the north shore of the Gulf of Oman, which will eliminate our surface combatant advantage and threaten our aircraft once launched. Additionally, several Russian tactical fighter squadrons, totaling over four hundred aircraft, have been deployed to Iranian air bases. With the additional missile batteries and fighter aircraft, they’ve leveled the playing field against four carrier strike groups.

“An even bigger problem is the subsurface picture. After our war with China, we have only twenty-four operational fast attack submarines, with twenty in the Pacific. Russia, on the other hand, has combined the submarines from its four fleets and has forty-eight attack and guided missile submarines in the Gulf of Oman. We’re significantly outnumbered, which places our carriers at risk when they engage the Russian surface combatants.

“At the end of the day, to ensure free passage of oil and natural gas tankers in the Persian Gulf area, we’ll have to eliminate all Russian surface combatants and submarines in the gulf, along with the missile batteries and air squadrons in Iran. We’re working on the details and when we’re further along, we’ll provide a formal operations brief.”

“Thanks, Bob,” the president said. “Anything else?”

McVeigh answered, “Dawn has some worrisome news.”

Turning to SecState Cabral, the president asked, “What have you got?”

Dawn answered, “It’s obvious that Russia made arrangements with Belarus and Iran, and we wondered who else might be involved. We reviewed the itineraries of high-level Russian officials and identified meetings between Russia’s minister of defense and the presidents of Belarus and Iran. Additionally, the defense minister met with the Indian prime minister and the president of China in the following two days.”

The president’s eyes narrowed as he turned back to McVeigh.

“This is bad news,” McVeigh said. “India and China have the most powerful navies in the Pacific besides ours and Russia’s. India has two carrier strike groups, with a new carrier undergoing sea trials, and although we wiped out China’s submarines, their surface Navy is still intact. If Russia builds a coalition of the three largest navies besides our own, we won’t be able to engage at our current strength. It’ll be two years before all five aircraft carriers in the shipyards return to service, along with the cruisers and destroyers under repair.”

The president asked, “What if only one country joins Russia?”

“If either country joins Russia, the outcome would tip in Russia’s favor.”

“We know China’s no friend,” the president said. “Where do we stand with India?”

Dawn answered, “India plays on both sides of the fence. Historically, they’ve had strong ties with Russia, although they’ve been warming up to the United States lately, increasing their procurements of our military hardware. For example, India bought ten Kilo class submarines and is leasing an Akula II nuclear attack submarine from Russia, but procures anti-submarine hardware — the P-8A aircraft and the torpedoes they drop — from us. They seem unwilling to commit to a relationship with the West or with Russia, keeping their options open.”

The president said, “Arrange meetings with India and China. If possible, find out what deal Russia offered them and if there’s anything we can do to influence their decision. Don’t bother with Iran. They’ve already committed, and we can’t trust a damn thing they say anyway.”

Dawn replied, “Meeting with the Indians shouldn’t be a problem. However, China is still giving us the silent treatment on all diplomatic overtures. They haven’t responded to a single request to meet at any level since the war ended.”

“Keep trying,” the president said, then turned to Christine and Hardison, who had been working on Kalinin’s natural resource threat. “How bad is this oil and natural gas pipeline issue?”

Christine answered, “It doesn’t look good, sir. We’ve verified Kalinin’s claim. Michigan’s SEALs discovered explosives attached to a natural gas pipeline pumping station, which if detonated, would take out the Arish-Aqaba section of the Arab Gas Pipeline. Additionally, Russia provided several coordinates so we could verify Kalinin’s claim. Our Special Forces have checked, and in each case, explosives are wired to oil and natural gas pipelines or pumping stations.”

“Can we remove or disarm the explosives?”

“No, Mr. President. The detonator attached to each explosive charge has motion sensors to detect if it’s being removed. Each detonator is activated remotely via satellite signal, and it cannot be jammed. If the detonator loses the satellite signal for too long, it’ll activate.”

“How long are we talking about?” the president asked.

“Probably about a minute.”

“What’s the impact if Russia destroys these pipelines?”

Kevin Hardison, who had pulled the requisite data, replied, “Every major oil and natural gas pipeline in the Middle East and Western Europe has been wired with explosives. Russia has also wired our Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, mostly on principle rather than for impact, since taking out the Alaskan oil pipeline would cut off only fifteen percent of our oil supply. It’d put a dent in our flow of natural resources, but it wouldn’t be catastrophic.

“Western Europe, on the other hand, is in a different situation. Overall, Europe gets thirty-three percent of its oil and almost forty percent of its natural gas from Russia, and many countries are critically dependent. Four countries receive one hundred percent of their natural gas from Russia: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland; Bulgaria and Hungary receive eighty to ninety percent; and Austria, Poland, Turkey, the Czech Republic, and Greece are sixty percent dependent. Germany receives forty percent, and Italy — thirty percent. And that’s just what Russia can turn off.

“If Russia destroys the oil and natural gas pipelines and blockades the Persian Gulf, Western Europe will receive almost no oil or natural gas. Kalinin didn’t deliver an empty threat; the Western European economies would crumble, and do so much faster than we could harm Russia with economic sanctions.”

The president absorbed the somber information, then asked, “What if we prevent a Persian Gulf blockade, but Kalinin destroys the pipelines?”

Hardison answered, “We can’t withstand either one.”

“Got it,” the president said. “McVeigh is working the Persian Gulf issue. What are our options regarding the pipelines?”

“We have none at the moment,” Hardison answered. “There’s no way to override these detonators.”

“Every explosive device has a built-in safety,” the president replied. “There must be a way to deactivate these detonators. Any ideas?” he asked, canvassing the four men and women at the table.

“Ask the designer,” Christine replied.

“What?” Hardison said. “Just knock on his door and ask him for the master override code?”

“Something like that.” Christine smiled.

“That…,” the president said, “isn’t a bad idea.” To McVeigh he said, “Find out who designed these detonators, and arrange a—conversation.”