Stalin

250. Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 1918–1966, 20.

251. Timber exports, which had only resumed in 1927, would attain 18 percent of the world market in 1931; imperial Russia had had 15 percent of the world timber market in 1913. The USSR targeted the United States, Italy, Germany, and Britain; the British market for Soviet raw materials opened in April 1930.

252. Potocki, Polityka państwa polskiego, 262–72; Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War, 102 (citing CAW I/303/4/6982).

253. To pay for this new expense, he instructed Molotov to “raise the money through an increase in the production of vodka.” Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 209–10; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 208–10; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 31. In short order, the politburo enacted his will. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 796, l. 7 (Sept. 25, 1930).

254. An estimated 3,000 engineers had been arrested in the Donbass in 1928–29. “Over the last several years we liquidated counterrevolutionary organizations almost in every sphere of the economy,” the OGPU reported in May 1930. Sevost’ianov et al., “Sovershenno sekretno,” VIII/ii: 1140 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, por. 435, l. 169–241).

255. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 178–9 (Aug. 2, 1930); Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 199–200; Kommunist, no. 11 (1990): 96 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 5275, l. 1). In Oct., after Stalin returned from holiday, he sacked Pyatakov from the state bank.

256. Stalin singled out the tsarist-era economists Vladimir Groman and Nikolai Kondratiev (of “long wave” fame), insisted they were linked to Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov, and wrote that “Kondratiev, Groman and a few other scoundrels must definitely be shot.” Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 193–6; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 200–1 (Aug. 6), 201n8 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 793, l. 3).

257. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 211–3 (Sept. 2, 1930); Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 210–1. Stalin worried whether the trial would come off as scripted (“Are we ready for this? Do we consider it necessary to take the ‘case’ to trial?”). Finally, in March 1931, fourteen members of a supposed Menshevik party were publicly tried and convicted of attempting to restore their party and overthrow the Soviet regime. Litvin, Men’shevistskii protsess 1931 goda; Menshevik Trial. See also Evdoshenko, “Delo neftianikov-’vreditelei’ 1929–1931 gg.,” 331–89.

258. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 216–8 (Sept. 13, 1930), 218, n2 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 798, l. 12); Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 213–5.

259. Pravda, Sept. 25, 1930; Sevost’ianov et al., “Sovershenno sekretno,” VIII/ii: 1184–5 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 658, l. 106–12: Sept. 28, 1930).

260. RGANI, f. 89, op. 48, d. 1, Hoover Institution Archives; Prystaiko and Shapoval, Sprava “Spilky Vzvolennaia Ukrainy,” 236; Sevost’ianov et al., “Sovershenno sekretno,” VIII/ii: 1148 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, por. 435, l. 169–241: late May 1930).

261. ‘voeno-fashistskii zagovor,’ 103–4; Lebedev, “M. N. Tukhachevskii i voenno-fashistskii zagovor,” at 247–8.

262. Minakov, Voennaia elita, 114–5.

263. Isserson, “Sud’ba polkovodtsa,” 189 (Todorovsky, head of Red Army training). The book in question was Triandafillov, Kharakter operatsii sovremennoi armii. Triandafillov, an ethnic Greek who had been born (1894) in tsarist Kars province (later ceded to Turkey), would die in a military plane crash in a fog on July 12, 1931. The politburo forbade the regime’s highest officials from flying. Stalin would not get on an airplane until 1943.

264. Aptekar’ and Uspenskii, Marshal M.N. Tukhachevskii (RGVA, f. 7, op. 10, d. 1047, l. 2–8ob., Jan. 11, 1930); Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 91–3 (l. 10ob.–140b, 22–3: Shaposhnikov analysis, Feb. 15). See also Biriuzov, “Predislovie,” 12; Erickson, Soviet High Command (3rd ed.), 326–30, 349–57; and Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planiriovanie, 83.

265. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 97 n7, 8 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 10, l. 125: Voroshilov to Stalin, March 5, 1930).

266. Samuelson, Soviet Defence Industry Planning, 126 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 155: March 5, 1930). Voroshilov was angling for greater military expenditures. Pravda, Feb. 23, 1930.

267. Ken, “‘Moia otsenka byla slyshkom rezkoi,’” 150–1 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 38, l. 58: March 23, 1930); Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 113. See also Stone, “Tukhachevskii in Leningrad,” 1379; Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 99–112. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 446, l. 13–18.

268. On Aug. 14, the OGPU arrested a former tsarist colonel, Ivan Troitsky, who taught at the Frunze Military Academy and called himself “the agitator for Tukhachevsky’s achievements,” and, on Aug. 19, Nikolai Kakurin, a former tsarist staff officer who had served in various White armies but gone over to the Reds, taught at the military academy, too, and fought under Tukhachevsky’s command. Olga Zajonczkowska-Popova—the daughter of the former tsarist general and nobleman Andrzej Zajonchkowski, who had died in 1926 and had served as a secret-police informant—was herself a secret police informant, making use of her famous father’s name to mix in the highest military circles, and she had denounced Kakurin, who was her first cousin. Tinchenko, Golgofa, 114–5 (citing GA SBU, fl. D. 67093, t. 54, delo Kakurina N. E.: 40).

269. Voennye arkhivy Rossii, 103–4. By Oct. 5, OGPU interrogators had Kakurin imagining that Tukhachevsky had indirectly revealed he was contemplating Stalin’s assassination. Voennye arkhivy Rossii, 104; Lebedev, “M. N. Tukhachevskii i ‘voenno-fashistskii zagovor,’ 248.

270. Zdanovich, Organy, 395–6 (citing TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 258, l. 248).

271. Chuev, Tak govoril Kaganovich, 60.

272. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 216–8, 220–2, 222–3; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 213–5, 216–7, 217–9. This frustration extended well beyond Stalin. Gregory and Markevich, “Creating Soviet Industry,” 802, citing RGAE, f. 7297, op. 38, d. 104, l. 2; Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 42; Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 439.

273. Syrtsov made some critical remarks at the 16th Party Congress in July 1930, but Stalin had permitted him to be reelected a candidate member of the politburo. Still, the dictator continued to grumble. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 214–6; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 212. On Sept. 25, the politburo dispatched Syrtsov to the Mid-Volga territory to expedite grain procurements. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 798, l. 4.

274. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 769, l. 37–8; Khlevniuk, “Stalin, Syrtsov, Lominadze,” 90–1 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 797, l. 1–2). Mężyński and Olsky, for their part, kept sounding alarms about planned “terrorist acts,” including against Stalin. Sevost’ianov et al., “Sovershenno sekretno,” VIII/ii: 1451–2 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 258, l. 236: Sept. 19, 1930).

275. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 40–52; Watson, Molotov, 99–104. On Rykov, see Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov; Oppenheim, Practical Bolshevik; Shelestov, Vremia Alekseia Rykova; and Senin, A. I. Rykov.

276. Voennye arkhivy Rossii, 103–4.

277. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 256–7 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 9, d. 388, l. 270–1: Oct. 1930); Kommunist, 1990, no. 11: 99–100 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 5276); Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 187–8; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 195–6.

278. Murin, Stalin v ob’iatiakh, 30 (l. 34–5: Sept. 5), 31 (36–7: Sept. 8). Fifteen and sixteen years earlier, Stalin had written to fellow revolutionaries asking for something to read in English or French while he was in remote Siberian exile. Ostrovskii, Kto stoial, 399–401, 409, 413.

279. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh, 31 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 1550, l. 36, 37), 32 (l. 41–2), 32–3 (l. 43–5), 33 (l. 38–40), 34 (l. 48–9). Stalin responded on Oct. 8: “You hint at some kind of excursions by me. I inform you that I have not traveled anywhere (anywhere at all!) and I have no intention of traveling.” Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh, 34–5 (l. 50–1).

280. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 738, l. 110.

281. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 144–6 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 765, l. 68a); Enker, “Struggling for Stalin’s Soul,” 172–5.

282. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 42–3.

283. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 30–3 (citing RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 769, l. 68a; d. 765, l. 55–58; d. 738, l. 110–1; d. 778, l. 43); Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 42–3. Kaganovich later in life recalled that he had supported Molotov, in the event Stalin declined to head the government. Chuev, Tak govoroil Kaganovich, 60.

284. Stalin is listed as meeting (with Nikolai Popov of Pravda) on Oct. 13, his first meeting since July 22. Na prieme, 34–5.

285. Stalin to Bukharin, Oct. 14, and Bukharin’s second letter of Oct. 14: Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 146–7 (RGASPI, f. 329, op. 2, d. 6, l. 78); 147–8 (l. 77).

286. Iakovlev et al., Reabilitatsiia: politicheskie protsessy, 242, 244. The politburo meeting also censured a pamphlet Syrtsov had published based on a presentation he had made on control figures for output in physical units for 1930–31, supposedly “among those series of questions that are not to be made public and disseminated.” Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 95 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 446, l. 2–4), 106n4 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 800, l. 7); Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 44. Syrtsov’s pamphlet is reprinted in Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, 323–46 (RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 53, l. 92–108).

287. The Soviets decided to reduce trade with the United States: it would fall during the period from Oct. 1930 to March 1931 by nearly half, compared with the same period the year before. This reflected a surmise that increased trade had diminished the argument for diplomatic recognition. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 38, 53–4; Ekonomicheksia zhizn’, Oct. 12, 1930.

288. Also present was Pavel Postyshev, a Central Committee secretary. Na prieme, 35. Lominadze, in Stalin’s mind, enjoyed the inexplicable protection of Orjonikidze, a source of friction between them. Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 162–3 (July 29, 1929); Khromov, Po stranitsam, 201–3 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 23, l. 81–8); Khlevniuk, In Stalin’s Shadow, 32.

289. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 801, l. 9. Complaining officials in Western Siberia were dismissed. Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 202n2 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 793, l. 7). Lih gives the date of the politburo session as Oct. 19.

290. Lebedev, “fraviashchaia portiia,” 94; Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, 353n93 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 54); Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 255–6. The politburo resolutions were approved by telephone poll (dated Oct. 25). At the session, Stalin evidently had ordered the windows closed, even though they were high up on the top floor of Old Square. Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 98n2 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 800, l. 7; d. 801, l. 12); Iakovlev et al., Reabilitatsiia: politicheskie protsessy, 242, 244.

291. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 39 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 801, l. 12; f. 589, op. 3, d. 9333, t. 2, l. 135).

292. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 205–9. Stalin passed it to Orjonikidze (party Control Commission) and Postyshev (CC secretary); Molotov and Kaganovich were away on holiday. Reznikov would soon be hired by Mekhlis.

293. Reznikov asserted that Syrtsov had called the Oct. 22 meeting. Other attendees were Vladimir Kavraisky, in whose apartment the meeting took place, I. Nusinov, and A. Halperin. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 209 (Reznikov), 272 (Kavraisky, according to the OGPU), 280 (Nusinov), 285 (Halperin).

294. Stalin received Syrtsov on Old Square on Oct. 22 at 2:40 p.m. Postyshev was present. Na prieme, 35.

295. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 121, 347n4 (RGASPI, f. 613, op. 1, d. 142, l. 105, 109).

296. Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 96–7 (RGASPI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 9333, t. 2, l. 134–5); Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 209–13, 25. See also Khlevniuk, “Stalin, Syrtsov, Lominadze,” 78–96; and Davies, “The Syrtsov-Lominadze Affair.”

297. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 231–2; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 223–4. Around this time, Stalin heard Mark Reizen (b. 1895), a lush, voluminous basso cantante, sing the role of Mephistopheles in a production of Charles Gounod’s Faust at the Bolshoi, and had the Leningrad-based artist relocated to Moscow. Reizen, Mark Reizen, Avtobiograficheskie zapiski, 135–53; Marshkova, Bol´shoi teatr, 824–38.

298. The episode would be revealed only in 1937: Voennye arkhivy Rossii, 104–5; Lebedev, “M. N. Tukhachevskii i ‘voenno-fashistskii zagovor,” 248–9. Not everyone vouched for Tukhachevsky: Shchadenko supported his arrest. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 131n25 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 59, l. 102–3: uncorrected stenogram of the June 2, 1937, Main Military Council). Troitsky was sentenced to three years and became an OGPU secret informant; Kakurin, who had been released, would be rearrested in 1932 and given a death sentence, which was commuted to ten years.

299. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 231–2; Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 223. Voroshilov did not desist, however: in Jan. 1931 he sent “Dear Koba” a letter with two compromising documents on Tukhachevsky (letters from Verkhovsky and Bergavinov). Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 131–2 n27 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 37, l. 24).

300. Khlevniuk, Stalin i Ordzhonikidze, 27–8 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 607, l. 270–1). Syrtsov was replaced on Nov. 3, 1930, as head of the RSFSR Council of People’s Commissars by D. E. Sulimov: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 803, l. 13.

301. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 119–93 (at 119: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, l. 1–218: corrected transcript). See also Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politburo, 99–100 (RGASPI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 9333, t. 2, l. 121).

302. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 123–4, 163–4.

303. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 178, 316 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1001, l. 182–208: the uncorrected transcript, which has Kalinin, Mikoyan, Molotov, and Orjonikidze interjecting some of the statements that would be incorporated as Stalin’s words).

304. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 125.

305. Kuromiya, “Stalin in the Politburo Transcripts,” 48.

306. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 193–4 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1003, l. 22–5). At one point, when Postyshev had admonished Syrtsov that he should have talked to Orjonikidze, Stalin interjected, “That’s all he does, talk to people.” Stalin removed this sneer from the transcript. But his frustration with Orjonikidze in the role of party disciplinarian was manifest. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 176.

307. He added that the mass violence in the Soviet Union was “the brutality of the self-defense of the people, surrounded by secret and open traitors, uncompromising enemies. This brutality is provoked and—by that—justified.” Of course, the brutality was being directed against the people by the Soviet state.

308. Pravda, Nov. 26, 1930; Za industrializtasiiu, Nov. 27, 1930; Shitts, Dnevnik, 250–1. When the marching workers reached the trial venue, their chants were said to be audible inside—“Death! Death! Death!” Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 370–80.

309. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 258–9 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 81–2: Nov. 25, 1930).

310. Copies were sent to Poskryobyshev for Stalin, as well as to Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, and Orjonikidze, but to no one else in the politburo or political leadership. Sevost’ianov et al., “Sovershenno sekretno,” VIII/i: 591–6 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 658, l. 268–73).

311. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 804.

312. This was Pyotr Palchinsky: Ramzin et al., Protsess “Prompartii,” 9, 13–4. See also Rothstein, Wreckers on Trial.

313. Sergei Kirov’s credulous notes on the supposed specific plans of the foreign intervention have survived: Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 154 (citing RGASPI, f. 80, op. 14, d. 16, l. 4).

314. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, II: 444–5 (June 26, 1930). France hosted a large anti-Soviet émigré community that got under Stalin’s skin.

315. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 43–5 (Oct. 3). Litvinov telegrammed Valerian Dovgalevsky in Paris to make an oral protest, which he did: DVP SSSR, XIII: 821 (Oct. 11), 566–9 (Oct. 14); Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, 231 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 48), 232–3 (l. 54, 56).

316. Ramzin et al., Protsess “Prompartii,” 531–7. “Among the ordinary public, especially among workers and the Communist herd, there prevails a conviction that there was a plot, there was a ‘party,’ others ‘believe’ even in the participation of Poincaré himself,” Shitts recorded in his diary. He deemed workers ready to “tear to shreds the entire intelligentsia,” in a kind of “dekulakization.” Shitts, Dnevnik, 254.

317. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 3–4; DBFP, 2nd series, VII: 153–5 (Strang to Henderson, referring to briefing by Arens, Aug. 30, 1930). “World imperialism is carrying on a policy of never-ending provocation for war,” Pravda had succinctly editorialized (Aug. 28, 1930).

318. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 184, l. 117 (Oct. 20, 1930).

319. DVP SSSR, XIII: 484–6 (Arosyev to Moscow: Sept. 4, 1930), 497 (Stomonyakov’s response to Arosyev: Sept. 6). Stalin refrained from public comment on the Industrial Trial until the summer of 1931. Sochinenia, XIII: 70–2.

320. Ramzin et al., Protsess “Prompartii,” 517–26 (Dec. 7, 1930), 527 (Dec. 8).

321. Samygin, “Prompartiia.”

322. In a prison institute, Ramzin conducted research on construction of boilers. Five years after the trial, he would be freed and awarded the Order of Lenin. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 263–72.

323. Sevost’ianov et al., “Sovershenno sekretno,” VIII/ii: 1210 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 8, d. 658, l. 398–408: Dec. 20, 1930).

324. An anonymous letter from the USSR printed in Trotsky’s Bulletin of the Opposition quoted workers’ dissatisfaction with the light sentences: “now for small infractions they punish all of us severely, but here, for a gigantic crime, their sentences are lightened.” Biulleten’ oppozitsii, no. 19 (March 1931): 18. Ciliga, who was in prison at the time the verdicts were announced, recalled that “this unexpected clemency did . . . strike a very suspicious note,” given that people were being shot for lesser crimes. Ciliga, Russian Enigma, 222.

325. Sotsialisticheskii vestnik [Paris], Dec. 20, 1930: 14. “The anger and indignation of the workers condemning the traitors’ acts have remained in my memory for life,” one worker at Moscow’s Red Proletarian factory recalled. Ermilov, Schast’e trudnykh dorog, 133.

326. Yaroslavsky, despite his proximity to Stalin, revealed his own naïveté during Syrtsov’s interrogation, dismissively stating that “Trotsky is a dead cat.” Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 224 (Oct. 23, 1930).

327. Yezhov was received during a meeting on foreign trade, and in the company of Postyshev. He was back again on Nov. 29, one-on-one. Na prieme, 37. Yezhov’s early biography can be found in Pavliukov, Ezhov, 6–100; and in Petrov and Jansen, Stalinskii pitomets, 10–33.

328. Lyons, “Stalin Urges U.S. Trade”; Lyons, “Stalin Laughs!”; Na prieme, 37. Lyons had worked at TASS offices in New York and might have been picked for the exclusive because of Stanisław Czacki, a former OGPU undercover intelligence operative in the United States and now head of the Anglo-American desk of OGPU foreign intelligence, who arrived in Stalin’s office twenty minutes beforehand and remained during the interview. Stalin’s office logbook does not specify which office; Lyons fixes it as Old Square (not the Kremlin). Lyons claimed that in media res Voroshilov entered; Voroshilov is quoted in the reportage, but his name does not appear in Stalin’s office logbook that day, showing that it can be incomplete.

329. Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 384–5, 387, 390; “Eugene Lyon Papers, 1929–1964,” Knight Library, Special Collections, University of Oregon, box 2, typescript; Lyons, Stalin, 197. Compare the leftist journalist Paul Sheffer’s dismissive characterization from around the same time (Sheffer never met Stalin, and relied on the writings of Trotsky). Sheffer, “Stalin’s Power.”

330. Duranty, “Stalin Sees Capitalists.” See also Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist, 169 (citing interview with Henry Shapiro, March 15, 1979). Duranty became one of the prime sources for the view that Stalin had become a revolutionary because of the “Jesuitic repression” at the Orthodox seminary. Duranty, “Stalin.”

331. RGASPI, f., 558, op. 11, d. 726, l. 161–5; Na prieme, 37 (in the company of Yakov Podolsky, head of the foreign affairs commissariat press department).

332. Keke was quoted as saying that Stalin had visited her in 1921 and “three years ago” (1926), and that she had stayed with him once in the Kremlin in Moscow (“I didn’t like it”). Knickerbocker, “Stalin Mystery Man,” in Hoover Institution Archives, Edward Ellis Smith papers, box 2. See also Smith, Young Stalin, 54.

333. “According to news from the West (which is conveyed secondhand from people who have been there or ‘from above’), over there they laugh at the nervousness of the Bolsheviks, and are not planning to fight,” Shitts, the encyclopedia editor, recorded in his diary in Nov. 1930. “But here people are sure of war.” Shitts, Dnevnik, 248–9. See also Anon., An Impression of Russia, 10.

334. Stalin struck this revealing outburst when editing the transcript. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1011.

335. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 36–7, 39; van Ree, Political Thought, 118–9.

336. Pravda, Dec. 2, 1930. The poll was recorded as a one-day “meeting” of the plenum.

337. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 735, l. 9–10, 12–3, 14–5. Stalin tasked Andreyev with reporting to the politburo—not to a Central Committee plenum—on Nov. 25 on collectivization in the North Caucasus and had the session, which emphasized success, transcribed to circulate it to party functionaries. Khlevniuk et al., Stenogrammy zasedanii politbiuro, III: 357–82 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1004, l. 1–64: uncorrected, l. 67–127: corrected, l. 128–45: printed; op. 3, d. 805, l. 3; d. 809, l. 40–5).

338. Dubinskaia-Dzhalilova and Chernev, “‘Zhmu vashu ruku, dorogoi tovarishch,’” 183 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 32, l. 100–1ob.).

339. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 729, l. 36. On Nov. 20, 1930, Pravda had published a statement by Bukharin, edited by Kaganovich, again admitting his mistakes, condemning the Syrtsov-Lomoindze “right-left bloc,” and calling for unity. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 147n1 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 805, l. 6).

340. The repeated delays of the plenum sparked rumors: the Menshevik Socialist Herald speculated about a rift between Stalin and other members of the politburo over the right deviation; Trotsky’s Bulletin of the Opposition imagined a break between Stalin and Molotov, with Stalin blaming Molotov for the failures in industry. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 21–2 (citing Biulleten’ oppozitsii, 1930, no. 17–18: 3, and Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, 1930, no. 24: 15); Artizov and Naumov, Vlast’, 134–7 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 2939, l. 1–6); Sochineniia, XIII: 23–7 (excerpts). The last such joint plenum had been April 1929, for the assault on Bukharin. Rykov’s fate, formally, was not included on the agenda.

341. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 735, l. 81–3, 87. See also Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 28–37. Molotov’s appointment took effect that day. His two deputies were Kuibyshev and Nikolai Voznesensky. Platon Kerzhentsev (Lebedev) became business manager of the Council of People’s Commissars, moving over from agitprop in the party apparatus and succeeding Nikolai Gorbunov.

342. Molotov, V bor’be za sotsializm, 76.

343. Getty and Naumov, Road to Terror, 45–50 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 453, l. 53–61, 70–4, 77–8, 87–92).

344. Shepilov, Kremlin’s Scholar, 9.

345. Besedovskii, Na putiakh k terimodru, 294. The memoir of Besedovsky, a Soviet diplomat who defected, contained fanciful nonsense (for example, that Stalin used Lenin’s old dacha at Gorki and Lenin’s Rolls-Royce), but also correctly explained the crucial roles of Molotov and Kaganovich. Besedovskii, Im Dienste der Sowjets, 219. Besedovsky had defected in Paris on Oct. 2, 1929. The next month, Kaganovich told a Central Committee plenum, “Besedovskys are not few, unfortunately.” In fact, by then seventy-two Soviet officials had refused to return from abroad since late 1928. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 441, l. 110, 113.

346. At the time of Lenin’s fatal illness, the politburo had had seven members and six candidates, but now only four of those remained: Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, and Rudzutaks (now a full member). The new full members besides Orjonikidze were Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Kirov, and Kosior; the new candidate members were Mikoyan, Vlas Chubar, and Petrovsky. All were Stalin loyalists. VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh (1933), II: 669–73.

347. “Blizhaishee okruzhenie diktatora,” Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, Nov. 10, 1933: 3–10. “If we have used the word ruthless for Kaganovich,” Robert Conquest wrote, “it must be taken quite literally—there was no ruth, no pity, at all in his make-up.” Conquest, Reassessment, 13. “There was no question about his devotion to the party and to the cause,” Kaganovich’s protégé Khrushchev would recall. “He never flagged in strength or energy. He was as stubborn as he was devoted.” Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 65.

348. Rees, “Stalin as Leader, 1924–1937.” Rees, Iron Lazar, 123–43.

349. Chuev, Tak govoril Kaganovich, 53.

350. Stalin entrusted the party’s Central Control Commission and the workers’ and peasants’ inspectorate to his young protégé Andreyev. By party rules, the chairman of the Central Control Commission could no longer be a member of the politburo. On Oct. 2, 1931, however, Stalin would name Andreyev transport commissar; Rudzutaks got the Central Control Commission. On Feb. 4, 1932, Andreyev became a full member of the politburo, replacing Rudzutaks.

351. Fitzpatrick, “Ordzhonikidze’s Takeover.” Trotsky misjudged Orjonikidze, too. Trotsky, Stalin, 348.

352. Orjonikidze added that the Magnitorgorsk Iron and Steel Works, Nizhny Novgorod Auto Plant, and other well-under-way highest-priority constructions projects still “lacked blueprints.” RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 145, l. 43–54.

353. Another example: In Dec. 1931, Amayak Nazaretyan, Stalin’s first top aide in the party secretariat, proposed publishing the impressions of the foreign workers who had participated in the socialist construction. “Correct. To the politburo,” Stalin wrote on the memo. On the fifteenth anniversary in Nov. 1932, a 700-plus-page book, Through the Eyes of Foreigners, with testimonies of more than 100 people, would be published. Glazami inostrantsev; Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 210 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 920, l. 126).

354. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 144–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 765, l. 68a); Enker, “Struggling for Stalin’s Soul,” 172–5.

355. Stalin’s personal secretariat appears to have moved from party HQ on Old Square to Government HQ in the Kremlin at the beginning of the 1930s. Rosenfeldt, “‘The Consistory of the Communist Church,’” 318n31, citing Robert Tucker, personal communication. The move displaced some offices of the central executive committee from the Kremlin to the GUM department store across Red Square. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 136–7 (RGASPI, f. 667, op. 1, d. 17, l. 25–6), 141 (f. 78, op. 1, d. 376, l. 107). See also Balashov and Markhashov, “Staraia ploshchad’, 4 (20-e gody),” 183.

356. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 851, l. 15.

357. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 4, d. 667. See also Kolesnik, Khronika zhizni sem’i Stalina, 58–62.

358. Ilizarov, Tainaia zhizn’ Stalina, 310. Stalin departed Kureika in late 1916 (when summoned to the draft board), more than nine months before the boy’s birth was officially registered (Nov. 6, 1917); the registration could have been delayed by remoteness or falsely reported. Pereprygina (b. 1900/1) went on to marry Yakov Davydov and become a hairdresser in Igarka (100 miles north of Kureika); she would die around 1964. In 1956, Ivan Serov of the KGB would send a report to Khrushchev based on an interview with Pereprygina-Davydova, attributing paternity to Stalin; it contains obvious errors and reflects lazy police work. Izvestiia, Dec. 8, 2000; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1288; Gelii Kleimenov, O lichnoi zhizni Iosifa Stalina, chast’ 2, glava 9 (2013): http://www.proza.ru/2013/05/11/894. The boy, Alexander, later fought in WWII, lived in Siberia, and died in 1987. In 1934 the log cabin in Kureika became a Stalin museum.

359. “Chto dal’she,” Biulleten’ oppozitsii, no. 17–18 (Nov.–Dec. 1930): 22.

360. In another private letter of March 1930, Bakhmeteff foresaw the consequences as well (“agricultural catastrophe . . . famine on a great scale”). Bakhmeteff also understood that Stalin would succeed in asserting state control over the countryside, whatever the human and economic costs (“that is second order from the point of view of Communist political goals”). He concluded: “A regime that forms in such conditions can only be compared with a military occupation by an armed external enemy.” Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel’no!,” III: 420–1 (Feb. 12, 1929), 433 (April 19, 1929), 466 (Feb. 1930), 468–73 (March 4, 1930).

361. Trotsky would later write in his diary that back in 1926, Kamenev had warned him that his life was in danger, and that Zinoviev had told him, “Do you think that Stalin has not discussed the question of your physical removal?” Trotsky did not record these alleged conversations at the time, and neither Kamenev nor Zinoviev ever stated as much publicly. Trotskii, Dnevniki i pis’ma, 72–74 (Feb. 18, 1935).

362. Khlevniuk rightly pointed out that Stalin’s victory over Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky required significant effort, but he did not specify whether another outcome was possible.

363. Mikoian, Tak bylo, 289. “The Right Opposition was more a state of mind than an organization,” observed Victor Serge. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 253.

364. Tomsky conceded to the 16th Party Congress: “Any opposition, any struggle against the party line under the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . will inevitably find a response outside the party. And whatever the opposition’s platform may be . . . it will become the organizational nucleus for a third force, for the enemies of the proletarian dictatorship.” Rykov told the delegates: “Any utilization of our difficulties for criticism of the party general line must automatically include an appeal for the support of the petit bourgeois elements against the socialist elements of the countryside.” XVI s”ezd VKP (b), 145 (Tomsky), 152 (Rykov). The Russian-speaking American journalist William Reswick, who met with Rykov in his Kremlin apartment, has him stating: “Only a year back, we still had the situation in hand. Even six months ago we still could have forced a showdown and won. But there was always a haunting fear of an interparty fight turning into a civil war and now it is too late.” The conversation is undated, but from the context it seems this was Nov. 1929. Reswick, I Dreamt Revolution, 253–4.

365. Cohen, Bukharin, 315, 60–106; von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, 335. Bukharin, according to his biographer, perceived that Voroshilov wavered, at least in 1930. But if so, that passed. Cohen, Bukharin, 287, 289. Voroshilov, at the 16th Party Congress, on July 2, 1930, found it necessary to deny that any wavering had taken place inside the Red Army (“not one, not one case”). XVI s”ezd VKP (b), 504–16, reprinted in Voroshilov, Stat’i i rechi, 434–50 (at 444). According to Reese, many lower-level Red Army party cells sympathized with the right’s program of voluntary collectivization and higher state prices for grain, though it is unclear whether they also supported individual household farming. Reese, “Red Army Opposition,” esp. 37. On rumors about the army, see Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 121–2.

CHAPTER 2. APOCALYPSE

1. Starkov, Martem’ian Ryutin, 259. “O dele tak nazyvaemogo ‘Soiuza Marksistov-Lenintsev,’” 103–15; “Platforma ‘Soiuza Marksistov-Lenintsev’ (‘Gruppa Riutina’): ‘Stalin i krzis proletarskoi diktatury.’” There are some hints that the texts underwent changes as they were circulated from hand to hand (105). The party archives contain no originals of either document. The version that is extant is purported to be a copy of the original “certified” and signed by “First Operational Commissar of the Special Political Department (SPO) of the OGPU, Bogan.” Whether the police made insertions cannot be established.

2. Bix, Hirohito, 209–10 (citing Bonner F. Fellers Collection, Hoover Institution Archives: Answer to Japan, Southwest Pacific Area, July 1, 1944: 9).

3. On July 25, 1930, the politburo had decreed that by late Sept. 1931, collectivization would reach 65–70 percent in the chief grain growing areas, and 35–40 percent elsewhere, but just 15–20 percent in the grain deficit territories. The regime significantly raised taxes on individual family farms and curtailed the land available to them. Officials also engaged in arbitrary confiscations of seed grain, implements, and other property “for the good of the collectives.” Many peasants just gave up and headed for the factory construction sites. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 1 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 790, l. 13), 14 (RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 193, l. 99).

4. Pravda, Dec. 22, 1930; VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh (1933), II: 675–92; Davies, Socialist Offensive, 380–1. On the plenum’s eve, Kaganovich had exhorted the Moscow party organization to “struggle against excesses, but in that lies the whole trick, the whole art of the Bolshevik leadership’s Marxism-Leninism, to be able, without excesses, to double and triple collectivization.” Kir’ianov, “Kollektivizatsiia tsentra Rossii,” 79 (citing RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 139, l. 74: Dec. 1930).

5. Ivnitskii, Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie, 167 (citing former politburo archive, without details).

6. VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh (1933), II: 677–8; Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution, 263. The 1931 plan itself was printed in just 1,200 copies, for internal circulation only: Narodno-khoziaistvennyi plan na 1931 god: kontrol’nye tsifry (Moscow: 1931).

7. Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution, 109–13. Benito Mussolini, in 1912, then a member of the Italian Socialist Party, had written: “We want to believe in [socialism], we must believe in it, humanity needs a credo. It is faith which moves mountains because it gives the illusion that mountains move. Illusion is perhaps the only reality in life.” Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle, 43 (citing Avanti! June 18, 1912, reprinted in Mussolini, Opera Omnia, IV: 173–4).

8. Lyons was most impressed with the pithy slogans, such as “Five-in-Four,” which he noted was instantly understood to refer to the Five-Year Plan and its early attainment, and judged “as effective as our 4-out-of-5 for toothpaste.” Lyons, Moscow Carrousel, 209. See also Mikhutina, “SSSR glazami pol’skikh diplomatov,” 46; and Sukhanov, Zapiski, III: 214.

9. Following Mekhlis’s graduation in May 1930 from the Institute of Red Professors, Stalin had appointed him head of the Central Committee press department and, concurrently, to Pravda’s editorial collective; he took over as editor-in-chief in 1931, and would help boost Pravda’s circulation to 1.8 million, but Stalin worried about his ability to handle the load. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovic, 37 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 100, l. 115–8: earlier than Aug. 6, 1931). See also Avtorkhanov, Tekhnologiia vlasti, 109–10, 116; and Rubtsov, Teni vozhdia, 81–2.

10. Stalin had stopped bothering to attend formal meetings of the party secretariat or orgburo. The latter functioned as a kind of permanently empowered commission of the politburo, while the former, from 1931, did not even refer questions to the politburo. Detached from even nominal politburo oversight, the central apparatchiks all reported to Stalin. Rosenfeldt, “Special” World. By 1933, secret department salaries were 30–40 percent higher than in the rest of apparatus. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 53. At the government (Council of People’s Commissars), procedures stipulated “only in matters of special importance to refer them to the politburo,” but Molotov sought approval for all “sensitive” issues at the politburo. Rees, “Stalin as Leader, 1924–1937,” 33–5; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 823, l. 9.

11. The melding of zeal (“You will be masters of the whole world!”) and opportunism was often intense. But some speakers at the Communist Youth League Congress in Jan. 1931 mentioned a “desertion rate” of nearly half among Communist Youth assigned to the Donbass coal mines. Davies, Crisis and Progress, 10 (citing Ekonomicheskaia zhizn’, Jan. 22, 1931); Fisher, Pattern for Soviet Youth, 162, 257; IX Vsesoiuznyi s”ezd VLKSM.

12. Viola, “Peasant Nightmare,” 762; Davydenko et al., Put’ trudovykh pobed, 270–5.

13. Globally, learning how to mechanize production in concrete cases was easier said than done, and mass production was not readily achieved in some industries, or even in some countries. Kinch, “Road from Dreams,” 107–36. Soviet mass production, even more than in Germany, would be associated with producer (or capital) goods. There were fierce internal debates in the USSR about proper industrial organization, with references to American and German production experiences. Shearer, Industry, State, and Society.

14. Istoriia industrializatsii SSSR, 1926–1941. Stalin had offered a threefold justification for the crash Five-Year Plan the month after it launched: to catch and overtake capitalist countries; to ensure the Soviet Union’s ability to remain independent in the international system; and to furnish agriculture with machines because industry could not move forward without agriculture being modernized. Stalin, “Ob industrializatsii strany i o pravom uklone v VKP,” Sochineniia, XI: 245–90 (at 247–53).

15. Sutton, Western Technology, II. On Feb. 14, 1931, Mężyński reported to Stalin that at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant “extensive housing construction is being done completely unconnected to when the factory goes into production,” and that “not a single factory shop will be completed during the year.” Such a state of affairs was typical. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 261 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 9, d. 18, l. 162–3).

16. Lewis, “Technology and the Transformation of the Soviet Economy,” 196.

17. Davies et al., Years of Progress, xiv.

18. During the first Five-Year Plan, the urban labor force would rise from around 11.9 million to 22.9 million. Heavy industry would count more than 6 million employees in 1932, as against perhaps 3 million in 1928. Most newcomers came from villages. By 1932–33, between 45 and 60 percent of industrial workers had begun factory work in 1926 or later. Drobizhev, Industrializatsiia i izmeneniia, 4–5.

19. The first decree forbidding free movement of labor (Oct. 1930) was followed by one forbidding factory directors from hiring workers who had quit their previous employ without authorization. Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 419–30; Davies, Crisis and Progress, 26–7; Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 44; Friedman, Russia in Transition, 218; Izvestiia, Jan. 14, 1931; Za industrializatsiiu, Feb. 14 and 16, 1931.

20. The number of peasant households would plunge from 25–26 million to 19 million by 1937. Many of those who left the village were young males, those most in favor of the regime’s social transformation, including early stalwarts of the collective farms. Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, 81; Wheatcroft and Davies, “Population,” 69.

21. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 72–105.

22. The regime used “taxation” against private traders. NEPmen were also being systematically evicted from their apartments. Davies, Development of the Soviet Budgetary System,112; Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 97–101, citing Kontrol’nye tsifry narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR 1929/30 (1930), 188; Pravda, Oct. 12, 1929; and Ekonomicheskaia zhizn’, Feb. 14, 1930; Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 78. On Feb. 9, 1930 Stalin would criticize those “trying to ‘supplement’ the slogan of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class with the slogan of the liquidation of the urban bourgeoisie,” a mistake given that the latter, unlike the kulaks, had no control over the means of production. But the “dekulakization” of the NEP-era “bourgeoisie”—the majority of whom were petty traders—proceeded apace, and would further unhinge the supply of food and other goods in cities. Sochinenia, XII: 186; Ianvarskii ob” edinennyi plenum MK i MKK, 31 (Bauman); Rukeyser, Working for the Soviets, 217.

23. Tikhomirov, Promyslovaia kooperatsiia, 15–7. On June 28, 1931, the Council of People’s Commissars issued a directive to shore up enforced artisan “cooperatives.” Kiselev and Shchagin, Khrestomatiia po otechestvennoi istorii, 401–5 (RGAE, f. 3429, op. 1, d. 5249–6, l. 42–6).

24. Fitzpatrick, “After NEP.” NEPmen and other “non-laboring elements” were denied access to state-owned housing and to rationing—but not if they reinvented themselves.

25. Lih et al., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 207–8; Rubinstein, Razvitie vnutrennei torgovli, 290; Randall, Soviet Dream World, 19–21, 24–6; Hessler, Social History of Soviet Trade, 177–82.

26. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 225.

27. Of perhaps 2 million functionaries, around 160,000 were subjected to investigation as of mid-1931 and at least 5,000 in the central economic administration and 4,500 on the railways were arrested, mostly for “sabotage.” Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 117–8, 134–5, 533; XVI s”ezd VKP (b) (2nd ed.), 316; Chistka sovetskogo apparata, 22.

28. Werth, “Stalin’s System,” 50 n25 (no citation).

29. Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel’stvov SSSR, 344–5; Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 126–7. As a side effect, the number of students in secondary schools plummeted from around 1 million in 1928–30 to a mere 4,234 in 1931–32. Before the end of 1932, secondary students would shoot up again, to 1.2 million, although their preparation left much to be desired. Nove, Economic History of the USSR (1992), 199. On March 15, 1931, the politburo decreed an end to worker advancement into administration and ordered those recently advanced to be returned to where they were actually needed: as skilled workers in factories. Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika, VIII: 386.

30. In 1929–30, only 3,166 people graduated from engineering and technical schools, but that was compared with just 1,282 in 1928–29; the education of the graduates was not comprehensive. Soviet engineers-in-training learned mostly on the job, including while working alongside European and American specialists employed in the USSR. Davies, Socialist Offensive, 123 (citing Pravda, May 11, 1930), 124–5; Hoover Institution, AER, box 4, R. W. Stuck ms., 29.

31. Ordzhonikidze, Stat’i i rechi, II: 284–301. There were 728 attendees. Pervaia vsesoiuznaia konferentsiia rabotnikov sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti. Stalin crossed out or softened barbed references to bourgeois specialists from the original draft of his speech to the conference of industrialists on Feb. 4, 1931; a politburo resolution of Feb. 20 would indicate concern about the number of engineers arrested and their disposition. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 22960, l. 7, 9, 23; f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 139. On April 10, the politburo would allow industrial specialists convicted of wrecking to work in prison institutes, which would play a significant part in Soviet industrial design. Viktorov, Bez grifa “sekretno,” 169; Westwood, Soviet Locomotive Technology, 88–9, 163. On June 23, 1931, in a speech to industrialists (“New Conditions, New Tasks”), Stalin would belatedly absolve bourgeois specialists as a class, though not specific individuals, a turnabout echoed by Pravda (June 25). Sochineniia, XIII: 51–7; Kuromiya, Stalin’s Industrial Revolution, 263–86; Sochineniia, XIII: 72–3. A note to Stalin (Nov. 26, 1931) would list 1,087 imprisoned specialists who had been handed over to economic agencies; industry had placed requests for another 700. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 287–8 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 143, l. 15–6: Akulov). By fall 1931, many “bourgeois” specialists were amnestied, and the police began to restore specialists who had not been executed to work. Dzanovich, Organy, 438.