Stalin

133. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 355–6.

134. Churchill, Second World War, II: 230–1. Ciano, who met with Ribbentrop that day before the speech, recorded it as “a last appeal to Great Britain.” The next day, he met with Hitler and recorded: “He would like an understanding with Great Britain. He knows that war with the English will be hard and bloody, and knows also that people everywhere today are averse to blood.” Gibson, Ciano Diaries, 277 (July 19, 20, 1940).

135. “Telegramma I. F. Dergacheva I. I. Proskurovu,” 220 (June 6, 1940).

136. Dietrich, The Hitler I Knew, 124–5; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 306–7; Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 107–8; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 91 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22434, d. 4, l. 261: “Meteor,” July 9, 1940).

137. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 440–1 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1305, l. 438s), 443–5 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9171, d. 4, l. 61–9: July 20, 1940).

138. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 442 (RGVA, f. 29, op. 35, d. 98, l. 11ss–12ss: July 16, 1940).

139. Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I: 81; Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion, 43 (quoting naval staff diary, July 21, 1940).

140. Halder, as a result of hearing from Brauchitsch about the July 21 meeting, noted in his diary: “reasons for continuance of war by Britain: 1) Hope for a change in America . . . 2) Puts hope in Russia.” He added that “crossing the channel appears very hazardous to the Führer. On that account, invasion is to be undertaken only if no other means is left to come to terms with Britain. . . . Stalin is flirting with Britain to keep her in the war and tie us down, with a view to gain time and take what he wants. . . . Our attention must be turned to tackling the Russian problem and prepare planning.” Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 515–8 (July 22, 1940), I: 519 (July 24, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 30–4, 35–6.

141. By fall 1940, this would take the form of Germany declaring Japan’s “preeminence” in East Asia. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 396 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22425, d. 3, l. 668).

142. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 28; DGFP, series D, VIII: 631–3. Jodl’s original memorandum on the peripheral strategy dated to Jan. 1940. By the end of June, with France defeated, he fleshed it out. “England’s will must be broken,” he wrote, via “a) Warfare against the British isles. b) Extension of the war to the periphery.” Trial of the Major War Criminals, XXVII: 301. See also Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 109–10.

143. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 30–4.

144. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 294–337 (at 306).

145. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 112.

146. Leach, German Strategy, 63.

147. Halder noted in his diary: “Russia’s aspirations to the Straits and in the direction of the Persian Gulf need not bother us. On the Balkans, which falls within our economic sphere of interest, we could keep out of each other’s way. . . . We could deliver the British a decisive blow in the Mediterranean, shoulder them away from Asia, help the Italians in building their Mediterranean empire and, with the aid of Russia, consolidate the Reich which we have created in Western and Northern Europe. That much accomplished, we could confidently face war with Britain for years.” Brauchitsch agreed. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 527–30 (July 30, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 46 (July 30, 1940); Leach, German Strategy, 60–71. Halder as well as Jodl could see that the navy was proposing a force inadequate to an invasion of Britain. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 523–4 (July 28), I: 527–30 (July 30); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 39–40, 43–6.

148. Attendees were Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Brauchitsch, Halder, and Puttkamer (naval adjutant at Hitler’s headquarters). The Luftwaffe was not represented.

149. This represented a change: from “prepare a landing” (July 16) to “prepare the ground” for a landing. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 106–7; Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 510–2 (July 19, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 26–8.

150. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 47–8 (July 31, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 530–4. Fabry quotes a letter (Oct. 5, 1954) from Halder to the historian Hillgruber stating that neither Halder nor Brauchitsch had understood the July 31, 1940, conference as an “irrevocable decision” to invade the USSR, only as the “start gun for foreseeable possibilities.” Fabry, Der Hitler-Stalin Pakt, 498n272.

151. Keitel ordered planning for production of armaments for 180 divisions on Aug. 17; within four days planning was under way for 200 divisions. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 119.

152. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 120.

153. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 109–17; Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 111–4; DGFP, series D, X: 321; Vishlev, Nakanune, 11.

154. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 305–6.

155. Pravda, Aug. 11, 1940; Paletskis, V dvukh mirakh, 346.

156. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 451–4 (RGVA, f. 33988, op. 4, d. 35, l. 134ss–135ss, 138ss–141ss).

157. Leach, German Strategy, 80 (citing Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv N 22/7, Fedor von Bock, “Tagebuchnotizen,” Aug. 18, 1940). The Germans also now had confiscated French oil stocks.

158. Pavlov, Anastas Mikoian, 121–2 (citing RGASPI, f. 84, op. 1, d. 150, l. 1–5).

159. RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1592, l. 4–7. In July 1940, after the two sides had hashed out a new demarcation of the Mongolia-Manchukuo frontier, the Japanese had proposed a neutrality pact, but Molotov told Ambassador Tōgō that “the Japanese had committed serious violations, and as a result we cannot consider the [1905] Portsmouth Treaty to be valid in its entirety.” Molotov sought to terminate Japanese oil and coal concessions on Soviet-controlled Northern Sakhalin, and reclaim Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, restoring Russia’s pre-1905 position in the Far East. After Nov. 1940, the Japanese would propose a bilateral nonaggression pact, but Molotov remained adamant. Another five months of negotiations would ensue. Presseisen, Germany and Japan, 273–7.

160. Volkogonov, Trotsky, 454–69.

161. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 182–4. Stalin further inserted into the Pravda report of Trotsky’s demise a hint of the biblical Cain and a reference to the old saw of Trotsky as Judas, making him not just a supposed murderer (à la Cain) but a traitor. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 521–4 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 63–6). Stalin had also edited the Pravda editorial about the Soviet-Finnish Friendship Agreement (Dec. 4, 1939) and the Izvestiya editorial (Oct. 9, 1939) about a Reichstag speech by Hitler. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 516–21 (citing RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1123, l. 41–51), 513– (d. 1124, l. 32–7).

162. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 254–9.

163. Biulleten’ oppozitsii, no. 81 (1940): 5; Volkogonov, Trotsky, 342–4. “Whatever the circumstances of my death,” Trotsky had written in his will, “I will die with unshakeable faith in a Communist future.” Trotskii, Dnevniki i pis’ma, 167–8. On July 17, 1940, just weeks before his murder, Trotsky’s personal archive was shipped to the United States by train, arriving at Harvard University. Trotsky, Stalin, rev. ed., 863.

164. Deutscher, Prophet Outcast, 419–21.

165. Langer, Undeclared War, 129–46.

166. Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 470–4 (Sept. 21, 1940); McMurry, Deutschland und die Sowjetunion, 214.

167. Watts, Romanian Cassandra, 217.

168. Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 48–55.

169. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 198 (citing RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2077, l. 56: May 7, 1940). Other coveted dachas also changed hands, sometimes in unorthodox fashion. Sartakova, “Nash pisatel’skii les,” 25; Antipina, Povsednevnaia zhizn’, 156–7 (citing RGALI, f. 631, op. 15, d. 457, l. 19).

170. Babichenko, Pisateli i tsenzory, 41. Many writers worked at factory clubs or publishing houses and were paid bureaucratic salaries, which in some cases exceeded their honoraria (royalties). Not many could count on reissues of their works, which paid 60 percent of the normal honorarium. Alexei Tolstoy, who had become chairman of the administration for protection of authors’ rights, got the latter organization’s staff to award him an advance of 83,000 rubles—an act that precipitated a special meeting in Sept. 1940. “His receipt of such an advance cannot in any way be justified,” stated Lev Nikulin, a member of the writers’ union apparatus. “This is when his average monthly earnings are 9,745 rubles.” Tolstoy answered that he had no savings, and that the theatrical season had ended. “I think there is nothing to be surprised about here,” he asserted. “Every month I pay 6,000 rubles to my first family.” The writers’ union decided to sack the functionary who had signed off on the advance. Antipina, Povsednevnaia zhizn’, 72–3 (RGALI, f. 631, op. 15, d. 451, l. 80, 85, 99, 4).

171. Antipina, Povsednevnaia zhizn’, 20 (citing RGALI, f. 631, op. 15, d. 501, l. 61: July 3, 1940).

172. Pravda, Aug. 15, 1940 (unsigned); RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 907, l. 1–5; Miller, Soviet Cinema, 67. The film was based upon a screenplay by Avdeyenko, who was subjected to withering criticism at the meeting. He was expelled from the writers’ union and the party, but not arrested.

173. Anderson et al., Kremlevskii kinoteatr, 573–604 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 134–45; f. 77, op. 1, d. 907, l. 12–82); Artizov and Naumov, Vlast’, 450–5.

174. Anderson et al., Kremlevskii kinoteatr, 587–9, 597.

175. Anderson et al., Kremlevskii kinoteatr, 599–600 (RGASPI, f. 71, op. 10, d. 127, l. 391, 396).

176. Na prieme, 311.

177. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 123–6, 134–6.

178. Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 69; Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 143. At the time, the journalist William Shirer remarked upon Hitler’s dependency on Stalin: Berlin Diary, 173–4.

179. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 459–62 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9181, d. 7, l. 17–23). See also Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 107–8, 119; Trial of the Major War Criminals, VII: 263 (Brauchitsch); Deitrich, The Hitler I Knew, 124–5; and Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 306–7. Altogether, between 1937 and 1940, five military intelligence chiefs had been arrested: Uritsky, Berzin, Nikonov, Gendin, and Alexander G. Orlov; Proskurov would be arrested in 1941. Golikov (b. 1900), a former member of the flying “Red Eagles” of the civil war, had been a commander in the 1939 Polish campaign and Finnish Winter War; in summer 1940 he commanded the Sixth Army, based in Lvov. He had never worked in military intelligence before; no one had spoken with him prior to the announcement of his appointment on July 11, 1940. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 718 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 19, d. 71, l. 278–9), 719 (op. 15a, d. 496, l. 7: July 26, 1940). Military intelligence—officially the fifth department of the Red Army—was formally transferred to the army general staff, but Stalin had Golikov report directly to him. In 1939–1940, 326 new people were hired, the majority of whom did not know foreign languages and had little or no experience of the outside world. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 57.

180. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 546–7 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 156, l. 96–8), 552–3 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 316, d. 2176, l. 180), 553–4 (l. 185–7).

181. Izvestiia, Sept. 3, 1940.

182. Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 109 (Aug. 17, 1940); Lota, Sekretnyi front, 155–6. See also Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 443–5 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9171, d. 4, l. 61–9: July 20, 1940).

183. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 216–7; Schramm, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando, I: 973.

184. Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, II: 17–21, 22–23.

185. Cherkasov, IMEMO, 31–3 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 716, l. 26: facsimile of Stalin’s letter). Stalin was encouraging designs for bombers with payloads weighing a ton that could travel 2,000 miles, even 3,000, while the distance from Minsk to Berlin was all of 600 miles, and Vladivostok to Tokyo, 750. These weapons made sense only in terms of attacking far-off British colonies, and possibly the United States.

186. Bismarck, Mysli i vospominaniia. Mikhail Gefter, a professional historian who came upon Stalin’s pencil edits, deemed them “reasonable editing, pointing to quite a good taste and an understanding of history.” Gefter, Iz etikh i tekh let, 261–2. The Central Committee propaganda department was raised at this time to a directorate.

187. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 113; Na prieme, 312 (Malyshev wrongly dates it to Sept. 21).

188. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 188–9 (Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Sept. 16, 1940), 198–9 (Tippelskirch to Ribbentrop, Sept. 26, 1940), 202 (text of German-Finnish diplomatic agreement on transit of German troops and equipment: Sept. 22, 1940), 201–2 (Ribbentrop to Tippelskirch, Oct. 2), 203–4 (Tippelskirch to Ribbentrop, Oct. 4).

189. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 247 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 5, d. 67, l. 28).

190. Iklé, German-Japanese Relations, 181–2 (citing International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Documents Presented in Evidence, exhibit 1215: privy council, Sept. 26, 1940); Chihiro, “Tripartite Pact 1939–1940,” and Ikuhiko, “Japanese-Soviet Confrontation,” 191–257.

191. Hosoya Chihiro, “The Tripartite Pact 1939–1940,” “Japanese-Soviet Confrontation,” 256 (citing Japanese Foreign Ministry archives, “Nichi-Doku-I sangoku jōyaku,” 228). In 1940, Japan celebrated the 2,600th anniversary of its empire, traced to mythical origins. Ruoff, Imperial Japan.

192. Trefousse, Germany and American Neutrality, 69.

193. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 24–5. “There is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies of the West.” Fest, Hitler, 589–90.

194. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 197–9 (Tippelskirch to Ribbentrop, Sept. 26, 1940).

195. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 136, citing NG–3074: 1–2 (memorandum).

196. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 129. Moscow did not know but on that very day—the two-year anniversary of the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the Border—Hitler issued a directive to ramp up military outlays. Thomas, Geschichte, 432; Leach, German Strategy, 72. Stalin had begun to talk about disbanding the Comintern as early as spring or summer 1940, when the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states; he would raise the issue again in April 1941. Dallin and Firsov, Dimitrov and Stalin. The Comintern would be dissolved in May 1943.

197. Bezymenskii, “Vizit V. M. Molotova v Berlin,” 126–7 (citing APRF, f. 56, op. 1, d. 1161, l. 3). Molotov also received a clarification on Sept. 26, 1940, from Tippelskirch. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 627–30 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 328, d. 2253, l. 144).

198. Elleman, International Competition, 131 (citing Gaimushō, file B100–JR/1, 2.1.00–23).

199. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 466–70 (Sept. 1940), 474–5 (RGVA, f. 29, op. 35, d. 98, l. 149ss–152ss: Oct. 2, 1940); Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/i: 245–6 (TsA FSK). See also van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 69–72; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 41. Germany was also moving its troops through Finland to other locations, such as Norway.

200. Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, 133–6.

201. DGFP, series D, IX: 40–1 (Ribbentrop to embassy in Moscow, March 28, 1940), VIII: 53–4 (Schulenburg reply, March 30). Fabry, Die Sowjetunion und das Dritte Reich, 227; DBFP, 3rd series, V: 544 (Seeds to Halifax, May 19, 1938); Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 145. Ribbentrop sincerely strove to bring about a Hitler-Stalin meeting, “but this came to nothing because Hitler said that Stalin could not leave Russia and he could not leave Germany.” Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 148; Davidson, Trial of the Germans, 162.

202. Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 402. On May 31, 1940, in light of the German successes in the West against France and Britain, Sorge had offered views on the basis of conversations with Germans in Tokyo, including some who had had contact with Ribbentrop. One group, according to Sorge, consisted of “young fascists” who wanted to follow a victory in the West with an immediate settling of scores with the USSR. Another group (“more important people”) sought continued peaceful relations with the USSR, given its political, economic, and military superiority over Germany. Of course, Hitler was the decider. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 433–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22425, d. 3, l. 359, 357).

203. Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 244.

204. “Iz istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” 200.

205. Berling, Wspomnienia, I: 103–13, 168–76; The Katyń Forest Massacre: Hearings, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., March–April 1952, Part 3: 431–3, 488–90 (Henryk Szymanski), Part 4: 1233–4 (Józef Czapski). There is some discrepancy over the date of the meeting concerning the list; Berling gives Jan. 1941, Czapski and Szymanski, who heard about it, give fall 1940.

206. Kenez, “Picture of the Enemy,” 104. Other indications of war preparation included a secret inventory of films compiled in Oct. 1940, which listed some 200 titles, including the “particularly recommended” Circus (1936)—seen by more than 40 million Soviet inhabitants—Chapayev (1934), and Lenin in October (1938), to be relied upon for shoring up morale. Fomin, Kino na voine, 60–3. See also Salys, Films of Grigorii Aleksandrov, 295 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 908: Zhdanov complaints, Sept. 1940).

207. Saraeva-Bondr’, Siluety vremeni, 199; Aleksandrov, Epokha i kino, 220. See the review by Grigory Roshal, “Melodiia i dissonans,” Kino, 1940, no. 44: 1–3. Alexandrov had seen a Soviet version of the Cinderella story, Zolushka, by Viktor Ardov, at the Moscow Satire Theater in 1938. Salys, Films of Grigorii Aleksandrov, 281–340.

208. Pravda, June 18 and Oct. 31, 1940; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 147–8 (letter to Bolshakov, Oct. 11, 1940), reprinted in Sochineniia, XVIII: 199–204, 205. See also Artizov and Naumov, Vlast’, 460–1 (RGASPI, f. 71, op. 10, d. 127, l. 399–400).

209. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 57 (citing Gafencu, Misiune la Moscova, raport 2384, 69–78: Gafencu to Sturdza, Sept. 21, 1940); Gibson, Ciano Diaries, 299–303 (Oct. 8, 12, 14, and 22, 1940).

210. Pravda, Oct. 16, 1940.

211. New York Times, Oct. 16, 1940.

212. It is said that Stalin disliked The Great Dictator. In any case, it was never released in the USSR. Konchalovsky, Inner Circle, 27.

213. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 674–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 341, l. 80–4: Vyshinsky); Dilks, Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 331 (brackets).

214. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 677–9 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 3, d. 17, l. 50–5).

215. DGFP, series D, XI: 291–7; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 148 (Oct. 15, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 622–6; Fabry, Der Hitler-Stalin Pakt, 343–5.

216. DGFP, series D, XI: 291–7 (Ribbentrop to Stalin, Oct. 13, 1940); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 207–16; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 302–5 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 157, l. 47–51), 305–10 (Russian version, APRF, f. 45, op. 1., d. 296, l. 9–20), 317–8 (Stalin’s reply, APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 1); “‘Ia pochtu za udovol’stvie vnov’ priekhat’ v Moskvu’: obmen poslaniiami mezhdu I. Ribbentropom i I. V. Staliym v oktiabre 1940 g.” 21), 141–5 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 296, l. 31–3: Ribbentrop, Oct. 21); DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 680–2 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 1576, l. 47–51: Schulenburg-Molotov conversation); Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 474–5; Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 321; Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor, 120.

217. DGFP, series D, XI: 508–10. Ribbentrop later quoted Hitler to the effect that “Ribbentrop, we have achieved many things together; perhaps we shall also pull this one off together.” Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 151.

218. Santa Olalla, at Himmler’s invitation, would lay plans for joint study of Visigoth tombs in Spain. Treglown, Franco’s Crypt, 246–7.

219. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 41. See also Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 124 (Aug. 3, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 538.

220. Preston, Franco, 392–400; DGFP, series D, IX: 311. The account of Hendaye by Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, is fraudulent: Schmidt was not there. Pike, “Franco and the Axis Stigma,” 377–9.

221. The Germans were put off by the Guardists’ indiscipline. Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, 59–63. Germany had inserted economic (not military) advisers into the Romanian state in spring 1939.

222. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 154 (Oct. 29, 1940), 158 (Nov. 1, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 641–2, 669–71; Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, II: 32–6; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 185–8, 193–9; van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 47 (citing German Foreign Ministry 1247/337515: H. von Etzdorf note, Oct. 28); Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 131–41; Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 199.

223. Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 137 (citing Ciano).

224. Schmidt, Statist, 516–7.

225. Schramm, Kriegstagebuch der Oberkommando, I: 148–9 (Nov. 1, 1940), 150–1 (Nov. 4, 1941), 152, 157, 158 (Nov. 7, 1940), 160 (Nov. 8, 1940), 182 (Nov. 19, 1940); Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, 39–43.

226. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 163–4 (Nov. 4, 1940); Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 672–5.

227. Seidl, Die Beziehungen, 239 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Oct. 19, 1940), 243 (Schulenburg to Dörnberg, Oct. 30), 243–4 (Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, Oct. 31), 244–5 (Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, Nov. 1).

228. Rossi, Deux ans, 173n3; Rossi [Tasca], Russo-German Alliance, 163.

229. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 62–5. Germany had become the number-one trading partner with southeastern Europe, accounting for between 30 and 60 percent of each country’s trade, paying above world market prices for agricultural goods, preferring the stable, long-term market access, which also did not require hard currency (they used clearing accounts). The Yugoslav and Romanian prime ministers understood this dependence on German markets, and refused to listen to French or British political pitches. Despite their racial condescension, the Germans did not view the Balkans through a Lebensraum prism. Gross, Export Empire. On Oct. 25, 1940, NKVD transport secretly reported the construction of border fortifications and a concentration of pontoon bridges on the frontier with Ukraine. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 324–6.

230. Berezhkov would meet Stalin in 1941. He would claim that in Berlin he observed “the same idolization of the ‘leader,’ the same mass rallies and parades . . . Very similar, ostentatious architecture, heroic themes depicted in art much like our socialist realism . . . massive ideological brainwashing,” but that he did not recognize this at the time (1940). Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 7, 72.

231. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 311–4 (AVPRF, f. 06, op. 2, pap. 15, d. 157, l. 55–60), 316–7 (l. 61–2), 326–7 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 686, l. 120–4). Gorodetsky stresses the Balkan dimension: Grand Illusion, 67–75.

232. Bezymenskii, “Vizit V. M. Molotova v Berlin,” 125. Stalin, in the company of Molotov, had spent five full hours with the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, on Oct. 1, 1940, discussing a mutual assistance pact, which Turkey wanted, but only if Ankara was not obliged to act in the event of a Soviet conflict with Britain and France. DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 12, 49–51.

233. All this information emanated from the Latvian journalist Berlings. Internally, Nazi circles had discussed how Hitler would try to push Moscow out of Europe and toward a clash with British interests in India. Sipols, Tainy, 273–4 (citing ADAP, XII/i: 255, XI/i: 212–3).

234. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 248 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 342, l. 21).

235. Stalin also stated, “We are not prepared for the sort of air war being waged between Germany and England.” Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 131–4 (italics and ellipsis in the original). On Stalin feeling alone, especially with the weight of military matters, see also Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 273. See also Genkina, Bor’ba za Tsaritsyn; and Melikov, Geroicheskaia oborona Tsaritsyna, which was reissued in 1940.

236. Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 291 (no citation); Nevezhin personal communication.

237. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 349–51 (APRF, f. 36, op. 1, d. 1161, l. 147–55); Bezymenskii, “Direktivy I. V. Stalina V. M. Molotovu pered poezdkoi.” See also “Poezdka Molotova v Berlin v noiabre 1940 g.”

238. Ehrenburg, Post-War Years, 276–8; Fischer, Life and Death of Stalin, 56; Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West, 166–7.

239. The rumor had been that Litvinov would be tried as a British-U.S. spy. Vaksberg, Alexandra Kollontai, 407; Gnedin, Katastrofa i votoroe rozhdenie, 148–51; Vaksberg, Hôtel Lux, 154–7.

240. Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: kak eto bylo, II: 499 (Beria’s Aug. 1953 interrogation).

241. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 121 (Nov. 7, 1939).

242. Cripps had continued to try to see Molotov and had finally done so on Aug. 7, 1940. But when Cripps had broached the possibility of a British-Soviet nonaggression pact, Molotov made no direct reply. Internally, Cripps continued to urge his own government to recognize Soviet annexations of the Baltic states. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps in Moscow, 74–90.

243. Churchill, Second World War, I: 353 (Oct. 1, 1939).

244. Halifax wrote to A. V. Alexander, the First Sea Lord at this time: “If there were reason to think that immediate recognition would cause an appreciable change in Soviet policy towards us, I might have felt inclined to recommend a derogation in this case from the general principle that political changes produced during this war and as a consequence of the war situation should not be recognized pending the final peace settlement.” Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps,” 65.

245. Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps,” 66 (citing TNA, FO 371/29464 1604: Oct. 22, 1940). “I think we have managed to avoid losing this war,” confided Harold Nicolson in a private letter of Nov. 8, 1940. “But when I think how on earth we are going to win it, my imagination quails.” Overy, Battle of Britain, 113, citing Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 126 (to Vita Sackville).

246. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 492–4.

247. Solodovnikov, “My byli molodye togda,” 209. Solodovnikov deemed the Bolshoi’s Yakov Leontyev, who served as impresario at the banquets in the St. George’s Hall for the Ten-Days, “a person of tremendous charm, with vast experience, deeply cultured” (207–8).

248. Osborn, Operation Pike, 210 (citing Cripps to Distribution B, nos. 985 and 986, Nov. 12, 1940, N7165/40/38 and N7166/40/38, FO 371/24848); Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 495–6; Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps,” 66.

249. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 329. Berezhkov recalled Amayak Kobulov as “the exact opposite of Bogdan, a repulsive, short, fat, and creepy character. Amayak—a tall, slim, handsome Caucasian, sprouting a well-trimmed little mustache and a shock of black hair, urbane, even charming—was the life of any party.” Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 196.

250. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 338–9, 420–1.

251. Beria wrote: “I heard that the leadership of intelligence is dissatisfied with Zakhar’s work and has simply washed its hands of him. Perhaps one should not pay attention to this chatter, but when it concerns responsible comrades with whom I personally maintain contact, such corridor conversations must not take place.” Primakov, Ocherki, III: 444.

252. Berlings first appeared in Soviet files in Aug. 1940, when Kobulov reported that through the Soviet intelligence operative posing as the TASS correspondent, Ivan Filippov (“the Philosopher”), he had met a young journalist for a Latvian newspaper and proposed paying him a retainer in German marks for secret information. Fitin warned Kobulov that because Berlings had yet to be verified, “we suggest you show reasonable caution in working with him and on no account put him into contact with any operatives of the station.” But Kobulov could bypass Fitin and report straight to Merkulov. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 74 (citing Bundesarchiw, Abt. Potsdam: Film 14467, Bl. 25091 ff.); Vishlev, Nakanune, 49 (PA AA Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop. UdSSSR-RC, 7/1 (R27168, Bl. 25899–25902), 132. The SS officer Rudolf Likus, who was detailed to the Ribbentrop bureau, recruited and handled Berlings. In 1947, the Soviets would discover as a result of interrogations of the Gestapo officer Siegfried Müller that Berlings had been a plant, passing information that had been reviewed and approved by Hitler personally. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 441–51. See also Roewer, Die Rote Kapelle, 62.

253. Zamoiskii and Nezhnikov, “U rokovoi cherty.”

254. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 9 (citing German Foreign Ministry Archives, Rudolf Likus, Confidential Report, November 22, 1940, microfilm T120, serial 36, frames 25933, 25938–9).

255. Stephan, Soviet Far East, 235.

256. Filippov, Zapiski, 142.

257. Schellenberg, Labyrinth, 137–8. Schellenberg—Heinrich Himmler’s personal aide (1939–1942)—was responsible for security and total surveillance over Molotov’s entourage during the Berlin visit.

258. Flannery, Assignment to Berlin, 37.

259. Schmidt, Statist, chapter 21.

260. Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 45.

261. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 356–61 at 357 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 21–30); DGFP, series D, XI: 533–41.

262. DGFP, series D, XI: 541–9; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 210–1. Schmidt did not speak Russian; he served as notetaker. Before meeting Molotov, recalled another confidant of the Führer, “Hitler totally underestimated him, declaring that he was a cipher, a typical bureaucrat.” Baur, Hitler’s Pilot, 122. The Germans had offered to send Hitler’s Condor to pick up Molotov, but the Soviets said their delegation was too large; they took the train.

263. Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 108–9 (citing Molotov aide I. I. Lapshov).

264. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 226–34 (at 232), and DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 30–2 (APRF f. 56, op. 1, d. 1161, l. 147–55); Naumov, 1941 god, I: 361–6 (at 365) (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 31–41). See also Schmidt, Statist, 520–1.

265. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 224–5; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 356–61 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 21–30); the German record has also been translated into Russian: Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 251–301. See also Schmidt, Statist, 517–26; Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 15.

266. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 384–5 (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes. Bonn, Bestand Dienstelle Ribbentrop, R 27168, bl. 25933, 25934, 25940); Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 235 (no citation).

267. Berlings would pass on a supposed internal German assessment of Molotov’s visit to Berlin as marking the onset of “a new era.” Primakov, Ocherki, IV: 447–8 (interrogation of Müller).

268. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 369 (AVPRF, f. 59, op. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 11–8). See also Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 323. On Nov. 12, Molotov had sent Stalin a brief cable after his first meeting with Ribbentrop, a two-hour-plus affair. Stalin replied with a correction of one of Molotov’s formulations. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 366–7 (AVPRF, f. 59, op. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 5–6, 7–9).

269. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 384 (AVPRF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 36). Molotov’s talks with Göring: Naumov, 1941 god, I: 370–3 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 84–92). Ribbentrop and Himmler were present when Göring received Molotov.

270. Eberle and Uhl, Hitler Book, 36–7.

271. Ullrich, Hitler: Ascent, 386. “I was expecting a thundering Jove in his castle and what I got was a simple, gentle, possibly shy man in his country home,” French ambassador Coulondre wrote of Hitler. “I had heard the rough, screaming, threatening, and demanding voice of the Führer on the radio. Now I became acquainted with a Hitler who had a warm, calm, friendly and understanding voice. Which one is the true Hitler? Or are they both true?”

272. In response to Molotov’s cable after the first meeting with Ribbentrop, Vyshinsky had called the Berlin embassy to read a message for Molotov correcting him—eliciting a Molotov apology—for having implied that the 1939 Pact had ceased to be in force [“ischerpan”]. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 367 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 339. D. 2315, l. 16–7).

273. Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 217.

274. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, VIII: 417–8 (Nov. 14, 1940).

275. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 234–47; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 375–83 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 49–57); DGFP, series D, XI: 550-62. Berezhkov writes: “Perhaps more important—and Molotov informed Stalin about this—Hitler was prepared to meet him face-to-face.” Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 48.

276. Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 219; Time, Nov. 20, 1940; TASS (Nov. 13, 1940), printed in Izvestiia, Nov. 14, 1940, and reprinted in Naumov, 1941 god, I: 392–3.

277. Waddington, “Ribbentrop and the Soviet Union,” 21–2.

278. DGFP, series D, XI: 533–41; Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 247–54.

279. Berezhkov, S diplomaticheskoi missiei, 48; Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 44–9. The line does not appear in the official record made by Pavlov: Naumov, 1941 god, I: 385–92 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 68–83, 92–3). British air raids deliberately coincided with Molotov’s visit to Berlin. Churchill, Second World War, II: 586. “How did he put up with you telling him all this?” Molotov recalled Stalin asking of his dealings with Hitler. Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 17.

280. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 394 (AVPRF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 339, d. 2315, l. 38–9), 393–4 (pap. 33, d. 2314, l. 41–4).

281. Pravda, Nov. 15, 1940; Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 476–7.

282. Pravda, Nov. 13, 14, 15, and 16, 1939. See also Werth, Russia at War, 106–9.

283. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 384–5 (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes. Bonn, Bestand Dienstelle Ribbentrop, R 27168, bl. 25933, 25934, 25940); Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 235.

284. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 508 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 3, l. 6–7: Jan. 4, 1941); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 125.

285. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 398 (AVPRF, f. 82, op. 23, p. 95, d. 6, l. 141–2).

286. Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 324. Hitler’s interpreter would note that “just as the march into Prague on March 15, 1939, signified the decisive turn in the break with the West, so the outbreak of the fateful clash with the East . . . had its prelude in the November 1940 encounter between Hitler and Molotov in Berlin.” Schmidt, Statist, 515; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 209.

287. The 1982 recollections of Yakov Chadayev have Molotov reporting on his Berlin trip at a meeting of the politburo on Nov. 14—but Molotov had not yet arrived back in Moscow. Chadayev’s recollections, moreover, have Stalin understanding at this point that the Pact had become worthless, a conclusion that does not comport in the least with Stalin’s actions. Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym, 399–406 (Chadayev); Sipols, Tainy, 274–5. Molotov first appears again in Stalin’s office logbook on Nov. 18, alone, for a mere thirty minutes. Na prieme, 317–8.

288. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 395–6 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 326, d. 2239, l. 113–4). Molotov also denied any agreement had been signed in Berlin.

289. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 76 (citing AMVnR, p. 42, op. 1sh, pop. 315, l. 34: Stamenov, Nov. 16, 1940).

290. News Chronicle, Nov. 16, 1940; The Times, Nov. 18, 1940; Hanak, “Sir Stafford Cripps,” 67n3; Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 83.

291. Simonov, “Zametki k biografii G. K. Zhukova,” 49. See also Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 64, 67.

292. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 357–8 .

293. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 77–8, citing DGFP, XI: 606–10, 652n2 (Nov. 19, 1940), 653–4 (Nov. 18); Filov, Dnevnik, 199.

294. Bartlett, “Embodiment of Myth”; Bartlett, Wagner and Russia, 227, 259–57, 271–2, 288–9. “Even now I can still hear the bewilderment with which Sergei Mikhailovich responded to my telephone call when, without any diplomatic ‘approaches,’ I asked him to stage Wagner’s ‘Walküre’ at the Bolshoi Theatre,” recalled the head of the Bolshoi (Samuil Samosud). “Wagner?!” Eisenstein told him. “But I’ve never put on any opera before . . . let alone Wagner.” Iurenev, Eizenshtein v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov, 310; Eizenshtein, “Tvorcheskaia vstrecha s Vagnerom,” 8. During the Wagner rehearsals, in Oct. 1940, Eisenstein had been appointed director of Mosfilm, the country’s leading studio.

295. It would, however, enjoy a mere six performances. For contrasting assessments, see Kuznetsov, “‘Val’kiriia’ Vagnera v Bol’shom Teatre SSSR,” 76–9; and Iurenev, Eizenshtein v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov, 311 (Sergei Prokofyev).

296. Eizenshtein, “Pered prem’eroi ‘Val’kirii,’” 3.3. On Wagner, see also “Voploshchenie mifa” [Oct. 1940], in Eizenshtein, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, Iskusstvo, 1964–71, IV: 23–4.

297. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 80–1 (citing AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 331, d. 2272, l. 167–8: Sobolev to Molotov, Nov. 25, 1940).

298. Na prieme, 319.

299. Dallin and Firsov, Dimitrov and Stalin, 126–34.

300. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 136; Lebedeva and Narinskii, Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina, 454; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 81–2 (citing AMVnR, PREII/i/3 pap. 1, op. 2sh, pop. 1, l. 19: anonymous pamphlet, Nov. 27, 1940).

301. DVP SSSR, XXXIII/ii: 135–7.

302. Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 50–1.

303. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 415–8 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 108–14); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 217–59; DGFP, XI: 714–5, 1124–5; DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 136–7 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 108–16); McMurry, Deutschland und die Sowjetunion, 296; Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, III: 477–8.

304. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 79–81 (citing AMVnR, d. 40, p. 34, op. 1sh, pop. 272, l. 246, 248: Stamenov, Nov. 26, 1940; l. 246: AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 331, d. 2272, l. 167–8: Sobolev to Molotov, Nov. 25, 1940).

305. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 139. “Consul General in Prague Kulikov came to see me,” Dimitrov also wrote in his diary (Nov. 27). “The Bat’a, Škoda, and other plants are working at full capacity for the German army. In the environs of Prague an enormous aviation factory is being built, which is to produce up to a thousand aircraft a month.” Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 138.

306. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 342.

307. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 669–71 (Nov. 1, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 157–9.

308. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 69–72.

309. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 91 (Nov. 15, 1940), 89–90 (Nov. 4, 1940).

310. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III: 442.

311. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 91 (November 15, 1940).

312. Fabry, Die Sowjetunion und das Dritte Reich, 243.

313. For Göring’s objections to an attack on the Soviet Union (at least in Nov. 1940) on economic grounds, see Irving, Hitler’s War, 181–2; Irving, Göring, 307–9. “The Führer is still inclined towards a showdown with Russia. The Commander in Chief, Navy, recommends postponing this until after victory over Britain, since demands on German forces would be too great, and an end to hostilities could not be foreseen.” Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, II: 41 (Nov. 14, 1940). “There are serious doubts as to the advisability of operation ‘Barbarossa’ before the overthrow of Britain” [the Navy’s responsibility]. Fuehrer Conferences, II: 70–1 (Dec. 27, 1940).

314. Halder, Halder Diaries, I: 691–3 (Nov. 16, 1940); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 182–3. Similar sentiments remained in the foreign ministry (Weizsäcker noted to himself on Nov. 28, “War against Russia is impossible as long as we are busy with England, and afterward it will be unnecessary”). Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere, 227. See also ibid., 226 (Nov. 17, 1940).

315. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 184–8 (Nov. 18, 1940).

316. DGFP, series D, XI: 606–10 (Nov. 19, 1940), 63–43 (Nov. 20). Ciano would observe that “I will immediately state that after Molotov’s visit we speak very little of Russia, and in a somewhat different tone than that used by Ribbentrop during my recent visit. . . . Russia is once again a country not to be trusted.” Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 213n74 (citing Ciano, L’Europa verso la catastrofe, 616).

317. Schramm, Kriegstagebuch der Oberkommando, I: 179.

318. DGFP, series D, XI: 632–6 (Nov. 26, 1940).

319. Van Crefeld, Hitler’s Strategy, 82. Martin Bormann would later state that, in Feb. 1945, Hitler had told him, “my decision was made immediately after the departure of Molotov . . . I decided . . . to settle accounts with the Russians.” Trevor-Roper, Le Testament politique de Hitler, 95–6.

320. The Soviet Union’s modern technology was highly concentrated in just a few sectors. The railways remained steam-powered, not incorporating electricity on a mass scale, and the construction industry still used bricks and timber, not reinforced concrete. Above all, Soviet factories had far more workers, and lower productivity per worker, than their American or German prototypes, suffering from gigantomania and the lack of legal market mechanisms. The Soviets failed to exercise their option to purchase the Ford Co.’s V-8 engine, and Soviet trucks (the GAZ model) remained relatively primitive. Lewis, “Technology and the Transformation of the Soviet Economy,” 190. The number of women working outside the home between 1928 and 1940 increased from 2.8 million to 13.2 million and constituted 39 percent of the labor force in 1940. Drobizhev, Industrializatsiia i izmeneniia, 4–5. Nearly 20 million peasants had relocated to towns and industrial construction sites over the past decade.

321. Ganson, “Food Supply, Rationing and Living Standards,” 70.

322. Nekrich, Pariahs, 203; Weinberg, World at Arms, 201. Stalin again was privy to the German strategy in bilateral economic negotiations, thanks to Gerhard Kegel (“X”). Naumov, 1941 god, I: 334–9 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 437, l. 1–12: Nov. 2, 1940).

323. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 179, 188; Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 75–106. See also Sobolev and Khazanov, Nemetskii sled. Goring had again interceded to get Krupp to treat contracts with the Soviet Union as equivalent to those with the German military and to accelerate a Soviet deal for six battleship turrets and 38-cm guns, giving the impression that the overall bilateral relationship could be salvaged. Von Strandmann, “Appeasement and Counter-Appeasement,” 168–9 (citing HA Krupp, WA 40, B 381, October 4, 1940; WA 4, 2925, Oct. 8, 1940, Nov. 31, 1940).

324. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 374–5 (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, p. 339, d. 2315, l. 35, 35 a, 36, 38, 39).

325. This was a far cry from Ribbentrop’s statement in the Pact negotiations that Germany was “politically disinterested” in southeastern Europe. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 155–63. See also Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 298–9. It must be said that by 1940, some in the Nazi regime feared that the Soviets could not be contained in the role of junior partner because of their leverage in being the key repository of raw materials. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 20–14.

326. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 252–4; DGFP, series D, XI: 562–70. Hitler appears not to have informed Ribbentrop about his intentions at this point. Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 151–2; Waddington, “Ribbentrop and the Soviet Union,” 25–6.

327. “Two things became clear in the discussions: Hitler’s intention to push the Soviet Union in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and his unwillingness to acknowledge any Soviet interest in Europe.” Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 324.

328. Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher, XXXIV: 469 (Hitler. Jan. 20, 1941); Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 343. In 1940, Greater Germany produced only a quarter of the oil it consumed. By mid-1941, Germany’s oil resources would total 10 million tons; of these, 500,000 were produced by Germany proper, 800,000 by countries occupied by Germany, and 8.7 million tons by Germany’s allies, primarily Romania.

329. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 332. Jold evidently told Wehrmacht High Command planners on Dec. 5, 1940, following a “Führer Conference”: “The Führer is determined to carry through this operation in the East since the Army will never again be as strong as it is at this moment and Soviet Russia has recently given one more proof that she will always, whenever possible, stand in Germany’s path.” Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 137.

330. Ribbentrop, Memoirs, 152.

331. Trial of the Major War Criminals, X: 291, 314–5 (Ribbentrop).

332. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 80–1.

333. Nekrich, Pariahs, 229–30 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 913, l. 62, 65–6, l. 119). See also Nekrich, “Dynamism of the Past,” 232–3.

334. Mueller-Hildebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia Germanii, 596 (Nov. 15, 1940). Reports of heavy German troop concentrations in Romania as of Nov. 1940 turned out to be fictitious, possibly part of a disinformation campaign. The actual stationing order was issued only on Dec. 13, 1940. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 492–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 9181, d. 6, l. 17–9).