Stalin

114. One account claims Golikov met with the despot only twice following his appointment in July 1940. Lota, Sekretnyi front, 6, 46–7. Stalin’s office logbook lists five meetings, the last on April 11, 1941. Na prieme, 595. “It is quite true that Golikov was a misinformer—but that is not the point,” Gnedich, who delivered Golikov’s reports to Stalin, would recall. “All the ‘reliable’ parts of Golikov’s regular reports appeared in one form or another in the official press. Stalin, however, on principle, was interested in anything deemed by Golikov as ‘doubtful.’” Erickson, “Threat Identification,” 377 (citing a photostatic copy of the transcript of the discussion in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, 1966, with Gnedich’s reminiscences); Petrov, “June 22, 1941,” 257; “Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny,” 27. In 1965, the historian Viktor Anfilov asked Golikov in the archives about his March 20, 1941, report. Golikov responded: “Did you know Stalin?” Anfilov: “I saw him up on the mausoleum when I stood in the parade columns.” Golikov: “Well, I was subordinated to him, I reported to him and was afraid of him. He had formed the opinion that as long as Germany had not finished its war with England it would not attack us. Knowing his character, we constructed our conclusions to conform to his point of view.” Anfilov, Doroga k tragedii, 193; Naumov, 1941 god, I: 42–3. According to Novobranets, Golikov issued imprecise orders; then later, if something went wrong, he would say, “I did not give such a directive,” or “You misunderstood me.” “We did not respect him.” Novobranets, “Nakanune voiny,” 172.

115. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 776–80 (TsAMO, op. 14750, d. 1, l. 12–21: March 20, 1941); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 568–71; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 178–84 (citing TsAMO, op. 14750, d. 1, l. 12–21). “ABC” reported (March 26, 1941) that he had spoken with an adviser in the German embassy in Romania, who claimed Mihai “Antonsecu told me that his grandfather—the head of state, [Ion] Antonescu—already in January had a meeting with Hitler supposedly devoted by Hitler himself to plans for a war between Germany and the USSR, and that a detailed conversation about this subject also took place during a meeting between Antonescu and Göring in Vienna.” Mihai considered the month of May to be “critical.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 573–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 468–9).

116. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 61–2 (TsA FSK); “Iz istorii Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny,” 207. Also on March 24, “Yeshenko” reported further information from “ABC” about a meeting in Vienna where Göring supposedly told Antonescu to coordinate mobilization of the Romanian army with the German army. Naumov, 1941 god, 788–9 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 452–5). That same day Stalin received Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka (791–3: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, pap. 404, l. 83–8), and Vysheinsky received Schulenburg (793–6: AVP, f. 07, op. 2, pap. 9, d. 22, l. 44–7).

117. Berezhkov, S diplomaticheskoi missiei, 79.

118. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 804 (AVFRF, f. 082, op. 24, pap. 106, d. 8, l. 307). According to a Moscow NKGB summary of a report from Berlin sent by Kobulov on April 2, 1941, “Elder” met with “Corsican,” telling him “about the complete preparation and working out of a plan for an attack on the Soviet Union by his agency.” “Elder” was conveyed numerous details of German targets, German discussions concerning the involvement of Romania and Finland, and the opinion of German air ministry officers that an attack would take place. “‘Elder’ himself is not completely sure that the action will take place.” Kobulov’s report also included conversations with “Lycée-ist.” Naumov, 1941 god, 13–5 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 236–41). On March 31, the NKGB reported that “from December 1940 to the present time the movement of German troops to our borders has strengthened.” “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 208.

119. Sergeienko, Sinteticheskii kauchuk; Lewis, “Innovation in the USSR”; Sutton, Western Technology, II: vii.

120. The upshot would be a commissariat for rubber. Patolichev, Isptytanie na zrelost’, 84–5; Na prieme, 329. Patolichev had studied at a rabfak, and in 1937 graduated from the newly established Military Academy of Chemical Defense (one of his classmates was Sorge). By Jan. 1939, still only thirty years old, he was named party boss of Yaroslavl province (replacing Shakhurin) and that year earned the Order of Lenin. In 1940, General Khrulyov introduced Patolichev to Stalin—the name clicked: Patolichev’s father, Semyon, had been a friend of Stalin’s and died in the Polish-Soviet War in 1920. The son declined Stalin’s invitation to assume leadership of the Communist Youth League. Patolichev did manage to get a protégé appointed as first secretary of the Communist Youth League in the Karelo-Finish Soviet Socialist Republic formed in March 1940—a young enthusiast by the name of Yuri Andropov (b. 1914), a graduate of the Rybinsk Water Transport School and, like his mentor in Yaroslavl, an orphan.

121. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 369–70.

122. Stafford, “SOE and British Involvement.” The Soviet role in the coup remains murky. Soviet intelligence had dispatched an NKVD operations group to Belgrade headed by Solomon Milstein and including the ace Vasily Zarubin; they arrived on March 11, 1941. Sudoplatov, Razvedka i kreml’, 136–7. German military intelligence suspected Soviet collusion with Britain in the coup. Vishlev, Nakanune, 25 (PA AA Boon: I. M. Akten betr. Abwehr allgemein, Bd. 12 [R 101997], Bl. Ohne Nummer [April 15, 1941]. Geheim. Aus vertraulicher Quelle. Betr.: Russland-Juogoslavien; betr. Balkan: Politischer Stimmungsbericht; Büro RAM, betr.: Schreiben des V.A.A. beim OKH vom 28.4.41).

123. Churchill, Second World War, III: 144. As in the case of Norway, Britain had helped embroil a neutral country in the war. Unlike Norway, Yugoslavia would be dismembered and descend into civil war. Catherwood, Balkans in World War Two, 157.

124. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 804–5 (TsAMO, op. 7237, d. 2, l. 79–81).

125. This was accompanied by an admission that Barbarossa would be delayed by up to four weeks, which might have happened anyway. DGFP, series D, XII: 372–3; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 248. See alsao Dedijer, “Sur l’armistice.” Erwin Rommel, head of Germany’s Afrika Corps, independently launched a desert offensive on March 31, 1941, unaware of Hitler’s Yugoslavia directive, the pending invasion of Greece, or Barbarossa, from which his successful actions drained resources. Higgins, Hitler and Russia, 104, 108–9; Goerlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad, 30–3; Rommel, Rommel Papers, 119.

126. Germany, Hitler added, could not count on its allies: the Finns were too few, the Romanians “cowardly, corrupt, depraved.” Förster and Mawdsley, “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective,” 72–8; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 335–8 (March 30, 1941); Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 160–1.

127. Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 50–1.

128. The discussions, in which Colonel Dragutin Savić and Bozin Simić, of the air force, also took part, had begun on April 2, with Vyshinsky. On April 3, Vyshinsky denied that the Soviets had ever mentioned a political and military pact. Stalin played the role of meliorator to obtain the signing. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 68–9 (citing Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia University, Prince Regent Paul papers, box 14: Gavrilović to the foreign ministry, April 4, 1941). Soviet-Yugoslav relations dated from June 24, 1940.

129. Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 121–2.

130. Gavrilov, Voennana razvedka informiruet, 578–9 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 4, l. 279–80).

131. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 304; Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 581 (no archival citation). “Yeshenko” out of Bucharest also confirmed the pending German invasion of Yugoslavia (581–2: TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 521–4).

132. Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 122–3. Hilger speculated: “Nothing the Russians did between 1939 and 1941 made Hitler more genuinely angry than the treaty with Yugoslavia; nothing contributed more directly to the final break.” Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 326–7.

133. Gavrilović conveyed the gist of the meetings to Cripps and the American envoy Laurence Steinhardt. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps in Moscow, 120 (citing FO 371 29544 N1401/1392/38, Cripps’s telegram April 6, cabinet min. April 7); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 149–51; FRUS, 1941, I: 302 (Steinhardt to Hull, April 6), 311.

134. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 316–20; Fel’shtinskii, SSSR-Germaniia, II: 156; Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 123–4.

135. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 71 (citing European War 1939/9712, RG 59, NA, file 740.0011: Steinhardt to Sec. of State, no. 703, April 7, 1941; and FO/371/29544: Cripps to Foreign Office, April 6, 1941).

136. This is what Krebs reported from Moscow to Berlin. Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 296. See also Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 75 (citing National Archives, German foreign ministry archives, microfilm T120, serial 36, frame 26013–14: Rudolf Likus, April 8, 1941; and Dept. of State Special Interrogation Mission, RG 59: interrogation of Gustav Hilger); Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 74–7 (quoting Gavrilović, no citation); and Narochnitskii, “Sovetsko-iugoslavskii dogovor.” The defensive possibilities of the mountains were mentioned in the Pravda editorial (April 6, 1941). Churchill, too, vastly overestimated the Serbs’ fighting capacity. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, 369.

137. The NKGB operative Sudoplatov recalled: “We didn’t expect such total and rapid military defeat of Yugoslavia. We were shocked.” Sudoplatov added that Gavrilović, presumed by all and sundry to be a Soviet agent, was not fully trusted by the Soviets; he was seen to be meeting with the British every week. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 119. Parts of Yugoslavia were annexed by Italy, Bulgaria (Macedonia), Hungary (the Banat), and Germany, which set up a puppet government in Croatia. King Petar fled into exile, making his way to Britain.

138. Vishnevskii, “‘Sami peredem v napadenie,’” 105, 107–8; Nevezhin, “Sobiralsia li Stalin nastupat’,” 81; Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 127–8. Samuilovich pleaded with Dimitrov (April 12) for instructions on how to characterize the German-Yugoslav war. Dimitrov approached Stalin, who allowed that it was a just war against German aggressors, but at the same time the larger “imperialist” nature of the war held. Lebedeva and Narinskii, Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia voina, 524–6 (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 73, d. 99, l. 23).

139. Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece, 132–3. The Nazi invasion of Greece had been planned for April 1, but was briefly delayed because of the coup in Yugoslavia. Disastrously, Britain sent a force to rescue the Greeks in Feb. 1941: the political authorities in London were moved by what they thought Britain’s Near East military commanders desired, while the latter proffered the advice that they thought the politicians in London wanted. Britain’s Balkan commitment of 1941 would become a commitment, in 1945, to defend Greece, while in parallel Britain would abandon Poland, the country for which it had gone to war in the first place. Lawlor, Churchill and the Politics of War, 165–256, 259.

140. Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy. On the limited, essentially defensive nature of German aims in Greece, see also Schramm-von Thadden, Griechenland, 143–4. Göring was among those who wanted to finish off Britain by continued bombing and or seizure of Gibraltar and the Suez. Overy, Göring, x.

141. Through most of the 1930s, German and Soviet ciphers remained essentially impregnable to British cryptanalysts, except for what was sent using only low-grade codes (instructions during training exercises, for ex.). The German-manufactured Enigma machine was a system of electro-mechanical rotor ciphers invented by a German engineer, which had been put on the commercial market in the 1920s, but which the German military had progressively made more secure, including going from three to five wheels, making decryption very labor- and resource-consuming. But the Poles reverse-engineered and reconstituted the Enigma, passing a replica to the British. By Aug. 1939, Britain’s code and cipher school had moved to Bletchley Park, to a secluded country house some fifty miles north of London, which was where the Enigma was brought. Finally, in spring 1940, the British broke German naval Enigma communications. The decryption was called “Ultra Secret” or “Ultra.” Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 53–4, 487–95; Hinsley, British Intelligence, Abridged Version, 14–5; Bertrand, Enigma. See also Winterbotham, Ultra Secret, 10–1.

142. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 604; Churchill, Second World War, III: 320–1. On March 30, the JIC concluded that the Enigma evidence indicated a large-scale operation against the Soviet Union “either for intimidation or for actual attack.” Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 451–2 (citing CX/JQ/S/7).

143. Gorodetsky, “Churchill’s Warning”; Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 118–9.

144. “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 206–7. On March 24, Cripps advised indirect disclosure to Moscow of the coming German-Soviet war via the Turkish or Chinese ambassadors to the Soviet ambassador in London, Maisky, but his proposal was not immediately acted upon.

145. According to the Soviet report, Cripps also stated that if faced with possible U.S. entry into the war on Britain’s side, Germany might seek a peace deal with London involving the restoration of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, in exchange for German capture of the USSR. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 472–3 (TsA FSB).

146. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 155–78. Soviet self-isolation was severe: whereas in 1937, Intourist, the Soviet state travel agency, had handled just 13,000 foreign passport holders who came to the USSR and in 1938, 5,000; in 1939–41 it had 3,000 customers, the majority of them from Germany. Dvornichenko, Nekotorye aspekty funktsionirovaniia industrii turizma, 23; Orlov and Kressova, “Inostrannyi turizm v SSSR,” 163. Zhdanov noted at a meeting at Intourist that wherever foreigners could be expected to congregate, such as hotels and restaurants, “the general course of the Central Committee is not to allow Soviet inhabitants [grazhdan] into these places.” Golubev, “Esli mir obrushitsia na nashu Respubliku,” 80 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 11, l. 1).

147. Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 123 (citing FO 371 29479 N1573/78/38 Cripps to London, April 12, 1941).

148. Cripps was informed by Vyshinsky on April 23 that the message had been passed to Stalin. Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 124 (citing FO 371 29480 N1725/78/38 Cipps to London, April 22, 1941); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 155–78; Churchill, Second World War, III: 316, 319–23; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 606–7; Zhilin, Kak fashistskaia Germaniia gotovila napadenie, 219.

149. Cripps did write that “at the moment there is no question whatever if the possibility of such a negotiated peace as far as His Majesty’s Government are concerned.” Still, his frustration-filled unauthorized memo contradicted government policy. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 607–9; Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 126–7 (citing FO 371 29465 N1828/3/38); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 91–6 (AVP RF, f. 07, op. 2, pap. 9, d. 20, l. 34–6); Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, 119–22. The Soviets, by April 26, had a copy of Eden’s telegram to Cripps (sent April 17, received at the British embassy in Moscow the 18th): Primakov, Ocherki, III: 473–5 (TsA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 56, l. 903–6). On May 5, the NKGB sent to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria the April 30, 1941, telegrams from Cripps to the foreign office (obtained in London) in which Cripps alluded to Hitler’s likely forthcoming demands on the Soviet Union.

150. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 416–7 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 198–9: March 11, 1941). Matsuoka’s rivals would have seen his trip as reckless grandstanding at a dangerous moment. Such a trip was facilitated by the Trans-Siberian (otherwise a trip by boat, via the Suez, would have lasted many months).

151. Presseisen, Germany and Japan, 291, citing International Military Tribunal, XXIX: 292–3. Hitler did not inform Japan of the timing of Barbarossa and did not consider Japan’s assistance necessary. He would learn from Ott’s reports, partly based on Sorge’s information, that Japan would not fulfill his wishes of attacking Singapore. Menzel, “German-Japanese Relations,” 57; DGFP, series D, XII: 931–2 (May 18, 1941, 967–70 (June 6).

152. Izvestiia, April 15, 1941; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 549–51; Chihiro, “Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact”; DVP SSSR, XXX/i: 403, XXX/ii: 111–2, 118. Tikhvinskii, “Zakliuchenie sovetsko-iaponskogo pakta o neitralitete”; Slavinskii, Pakt o neitralitete mezdu SSSR i Iaponiei, 91–5; Slavinsky, Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact. In the Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact, Moscow had promised not to sign a nonaggression pact with Japan until Sino-Japanese relations were normalized. Ledovskii et al., Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia, IV: 583 (AVP RF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 355, l. 42).

153. Japan and the USSR had signed a protocol again extending the 1928 fisheries agreement on Jan. 20, 1941, through year’s end, after Japan had made concessions. Izvestiia, Jan. 21, 1941; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR IV: 539–42.

154. Matsuoka, according to information Sorge gleaned from German ambassador Ott, sent a telegram to U.S. secretary of state Hull inquiring about improved bilateral relations. He hoped the United States could be persuaded to cease its support for Chiang Kai-shek, and not be drawn into trade to assist Nazi Germany. The same Soviet intelligence report observed that the new German military attaché in Tokyo “is extremely pessimistic and expects open Japanese treachery, and asked to be released from his post.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 425 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 5840, d. 7, l. 87). On April 22, 1941, Soviet military intelligence reported to Moscow that the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army (Takahashi) told a group of journalists that “the USSR, acknowledging the might of Japan, concluded a neutrality pact in order to concentrate its forces in the West.” He added that “now Japan’s fundamental task is to conclude the Chinese war.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 423 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 321: April 26, 1941).

155. The diminutive Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, the former head of Japanese military intelligence for the USSR, waved his handkerchief and was heard to say in Russian, “Spasibo, Spasibo (Thank you, thank you).” DGFP, series D, XII: 537; Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 300–1; Sipols, Tainy, 389; Scott, Duel for Europe, 234–7 (an eyewitness); Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 190; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 198. See also Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia, 350–1.

156. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 31–2 (TsA FSB, f. 3o, op. 8, d. 56, l. 789–91). The full report from Kobulov also stated, based on another source, that Matsuoka had signed the Neutrality Pact on German orders, to win the later time. He concluded that this showed that “not only was Germany intending a march against the USSR, but also is taking all necessary diplomatic measures for it.” Naumov, 1941 god, 82–4 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 236–301: April 16).

157. “Yeshenko” wrote of Welkisch: “‘ABC’ reports: ‘people are speaking openly and without the least doubt about the pending German military actions against the USSR, Antonescu’s meetings more and more concretely concern military preparations against the USSR.’” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 586–7 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 606–9).

158. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1305, l. 79; Pravda followed the activities on its front page (April 19 and 21).

159. Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 259–61 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1125, l. 17–18); Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 155–7. Pravda (April 23) published a short notice about the Kremlin reception and a long essay (April 24), “One Thousand Years of Tajik Literature,” by Iosif Braginsky, the Persian language specialist, stressing that the Tajiks were an Iranian people and culture.

160. Izvestiia, March 15, 1941; Vestnik AN SSSR, no. 4 (1941): 15–6; “Prazdnik sotsialisticheskoi kul’tury,” Iskusstvo, 1941, no. 6: 3–10.

161. Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 266–70 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 15–20). The following day (April 23), in the Little Corner, at 7:10 p.m. for fifty minutes, Stalin received the Tajik party boss (Dmitri Protopopov) and government head (M. Kurbanov), as well as Khrapchenko, the head of USSR committee for artistic affairs, evidently to finalize the state wards for the artists. Kalinin, handing out the state awards to the Tajik participants in the Kremlin, quoted Stalin on Tajik culture: “ancient, with a grand reserve among the people, this culture is distinguished by special subtlety.” Pravda, April 26, 1941; Na prieme, 331.

162. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 38–9 (citing War Department, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, report 17,875: Jan. 17, 1941, by Colonel B. R. Peyton, MID file 2016–1326/7, MID, correspondence, 1917–1941, box 634, RG 165, NA), 40–4; Laquer and Breitman, Breaking the Silence, 282n; Long, War Diary of Breckinridge Long, 182–4; Hull, Memoirs, II: 967–9; Welles, Time for Decision, 170–1; FRUS, 1941, I: 712, 714 (Hull to Steinhardt, March 4, 1941), 723; Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka, 262–3. Whaley has the timing and source a bit crossed. Whaley, Codeword, 37–40, 45, 227–8, 277–8. The U.S. commercial attaché, the Texan Sam Woods (b. 1892), mischaracterized as “a genial extrovert whose grasp of world politics and history was not striking,” fooled everyone. Shirer, Rise and Fall, 843n; Dippel, Two Against Hitler.

163. Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant, 21 (citing NSA, RG 457, SRH-252: 30); Damaskin, Stalin i razvedka, 262–3. See also Shirer, Rise and Fall, chapter 23. Ōshima had been recalled from Berlin in Sept. 1939, after the unpleasant surprise of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. When Laurence Steinhardt, U.S. ambassador, “very confidentially” told foreign affairs commissariat deputy head Lozovsky (April 15) that “according to trustworthy information received from the embassy in Berlin Germany’s position is getting worse and worse and it is preparing an attack on Ukraine,” Lozovsky said, “I do not think that Germany will attack the USSR . . . In any case the USSR will always be ready and will not allow itself to be captured by enemies.” Lozovsky reported that Steinhardt “pledged that in the event of a German attack on the USSR the USA would provide aid to the USSR.” Naumov, 1941 god, 80–1 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 3, pap. 4, d. 35, l. 173–7); “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” 80. Welles leaked to Umansky, whose government had him leak to the German ambassador in Washington, that the United States had broken the Japanese codes, and were deciphering Ōshima’s communications, on April 28, 1941. DGFP, series D, XII: 661 (Hans Thomsen from D.C. to Berlin). The Americans intercepted and decoded this message.

164. “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” 71–2.

165. The Germans were still demanding the plane’s return as of May 15. Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 330–1 (Ritter to Schulenburg); Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 342; Rokossovskii, Soldatskii dolg, 31–2; Bezymenskii, Osobaia papka “Barbarossa,” 276.

166. Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 344–5 (April 22, 1941).

167. Stalin suddenly began overfulfilling his trade obligations, even though the Germans had fallen way behind in reciprocal deliveries. May 1941 would be the peak month for two-way trade. DGFP, series D, XII: 282–3 (March 12, 1941), 826 (May 15); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 318–9 (report of Schnurre, April 5, 1941); Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 326. See also Von Strandmann, “Appeasement and Counter-Appeasement,” 164. Stalin also made gestures to Hungary, returning banners and flags from the 1848 revolution (which tsarist troops had put down), and to Romania, with which he settled one border dispute.

168. DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 572 (April 15, 1941), 661–3, 714. But Stalin had also jacked up the freight rates for the transhipment of goods to Germany across Soviet territory, pocketing the windfall. Sipols, Tainy, 387; Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 47 (citing Ministry of Economic Warfare, Trans-Siberian Railway: Freight Rates, April 3, 1941, FO/371/29497). See also Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 608.

169. Soviet capabilities should not be exaggerated. Its advance warning system (VNOS) did not always warn of approaching German aircraft, and Soviet interceptors could not follow them across the frontier so well, while the Red Army lacked sufficient antiaircraft artillery to shoot them out of the sky.

170. Dilks, “‘We Must Hope for the Best’”; DBFP, 3rd series, II: 686 (Chamberlain to Halifax, Aug. 19, 1938); Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 291, 347.

171. Osokina, Za fasadom, 272–7.

172. Sipols, Tainy, 389–90. Between March 21 and April 17, a German delegation was shown the major Soviet aviation factories (Moscow, Rybinsk, Molotov). The Germans had let the Soviets see the Heinkel and Junkers aircraft production facilities in Nov.–Dec. 1940, following Molotov’s trip to Berlin.

173. Schwendemann, Die Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, 329; Sudoplatov, Razvedka i Kreml’, 135; Vishlev, Nakanune, 30–1.

174. Too many scholars have wrongly interpreted Stalin’s behavior in spring 1941 as abject appeasement, without acknowledging the attempted deterrence. Lisann, “Stalin the Appeaser.”

175. Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 297.

176. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 131–2; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 122, 128. See also Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 187–8.

177. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 117.

178. Below, At Hitler’s Side, 92.

179. Rittersporn, Anguish, 56 (citing RGVA, f. 501k, op. 3, d. 534, l. 7ob.–15); Buchheit, Der deutsche Geheimdienst, 253; Plotnikova, “Organy,” 31. The existence of a major Luftwaffe air reconnaissance program had been confirmed out of Berlin by “Elder” as early as Dec. 1940. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 550 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 199–201), I: 769–70 (TsA SVR), II: 89–91 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 269–74), II: 179–80 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 762–3). Stalin was also sending reconnaissance flights over German lines, with German knowledge. Whaley, Codeword, 32; DGFP, series D, XII: 602–3, 1061–3; Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, appendix 3; Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 329.

180. Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 104 (May 7, 1941); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 400–2.

181. Sorge noted: “in Himmler’s circles and the general staff there is a strong tendency for launching a war against the USSR, but this tendency is not yet predominant.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 585–6 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 300). On April 29, Kegel (“X”), deputy head of the economics section of the German embassy in Moscow, correctly reported that Germany intended to have transferred all the necessary synthetic rubber from Asia by May 15. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 710; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 230–4. In April 1941, Korotkov, having returned from Moscow, discussed with Kobulov setting up ciphered radio communications for “Elder” and “Corsican” in the event of war; the effort got bogged down. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 394–6.

182. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 100 (TsAMO, op. 24122/1, l. 178), 105–4 (APRF, f. 93: April 23, 1941), 506; Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 330, 362–3; Gareev, Neodnoznachnye stranitsy, 115.

183. Ehrenburg, Liudi, gody, zhizn’, II: 228.

184. Baranov, Goluboi razliv, 86–7.

185. In fact, from April 1941, the German deployments shifted to a qualitatively new level. Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy, 150. Tupikov added: “If it happens that, in laying out these conclusions, I am pushing at an open door, this will in no way discourage me. If it happens that I am mistaken, you will correct me—and I shall be grateful.” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 113–8 (TsAMO, op. 7272, d. 1, l. 140–52); Lota, Sekretnyi front, 44, 189–97. Only on June 3, 1941, did Golikov instruct his subordinate Kuznetsov that it was necessary to answer Tupikov.

186. Schulenburg and his embassy secretary were back at the Hotel Adlon in less than an hour. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 330–2. It seems that Hans “Johnnie” Herwath, the anti-Nazi who had divulged the Pact’s secret protocols to the American ambassador in Moscow, had quit Germany’s Moscow embassy to join the Wehrmacht and through contacts had evidently gotten wind of the firm decision for an attack on the USSR. During a military leave in Berlin, he claims to have used the pretext of visiting his wife, Pussi, who was still working in Moscow, to travel back and inform ambassador Schulenburg that plans for an attack on the USSR were well under way. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 182–4, 191; Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 328; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 203–17; Hinsley, British Intelligence, Abridged Version, 27–8. Stalin would get word of Schulenburg’s cold reception by the Führer from (Kegel) “X,” who pointed out that in 1939 Hitler had similarly lied to his ambassador to Poland, Hans-Adolf von Moltke.

187. Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 349 (Bernard Bracken). In March 1941, Moscow had ordered a secret police operative, Kyrill Novikov, to accompany Maisky to all official meetings. A telegram from Eden to Cripps (April 18, 1941) obtained by Soviet intelligence in London, inquired whether rapprochement with Moscow was still possible, but Soviet annexation of the Baltic states remained a stumbling block. Primakov, Ocherki, III: 474–5 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 8, d. 56, l. 903–6).

188. Stalin was sent the report the next day. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 130 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 349–51). “Elder” had asserted (April 17) that two groups existed, one, led by Göring, champing at the bit to attack the USSR, the other, led by Ribbentrop, dead-set against. This was likely true at the time. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 90 (TsA SVR RF, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 269–74). Hitler seems to have taken Ribbentrop into full confidence on Barbarossa only in April 1941. Weizsäcker would claim that he finally got Ribbentrop to admit it to him on April 21, in Vienna. Nonetheless, the foreign minister gave Weizsäcker approval to compose a memorandum, on April 28, stating that delivering a death blow to the Communist system was not in itself a necessary goal. “Only one thing is decisive: whether this undertaking would hasten the fall of England.” The memo further asserted that Britain was already close to collapse. “A German attack on Russia would only give a lift to English morale,” the memo predicted. “It would be evaluated there as German doubt of the success of our war against England. We would in this fashion not only admit that the war would still last a long time, but we could in this way actually lengthen instead of shorten it.” Weizsäcker, Memoirs, 246–7; Davidson, Trial of the Germans, 154–5.

189. Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy. Hitler would also shift the main thrust, ordering that following the seizure of Belorussia, Army Group Center was to pause to take the Baltics, resuming the advance on Moscow only after Leningrad and Kronstadt had been captured. He argued that it was necessary to cut the Russians off from the Baltic Sea, to deny them imports, but he envisioned the creation of a Greater Finland as well. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 138.

190. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 129–30 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 352–5).

191. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 518.

192. Völkishcher Beobachter, May 5, 1941. A Russian translation of Hitler’s May 4 Reichstag speech was conveyed to Soviet front line military districts on June 10, 1941. TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11 306, d. 5 (Volkogonov papers, Hoover, container 7). Colonel Kuznetsov writes that when he reported to the deputy head of the tank forces in the general staff (Panfilov) on German force concentration, “Panfilov said to me that we are being subject to disinformation, adding that only a few minutes ago Comrade Stalin had phoned and said, ‘the Germans want to frighten us, at the current time they will not move against us, they themselves are afraid of the USSR.’” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 476 (note to CC department head Silin, Aug. 15, 1941).

193. “Mars” reported out of Budapest (May 1) that German forces were leaving Belgrade for Poland, and that German troops were talking about “the inevitability of war against the USSR in the nearest term.” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 150 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 4, l. 381); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 613. On May 5, “Yeshenko” from Bucharest reported on conversations by “ABC” that German forces were being relocated from the Balkans to Romania and the Soviet frontier, as well as many other signs of impending war. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 612–4 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 1, l. 737–40, 744–5).

194. DGFP, series D, 723-5 (Ott, May 6). See also Sipols, Tainy, 392. On May 17, Weizsäcker misinformed Japanese ambassador Ōshima that “German-Russian relations were unchanged,” and that it was wrong to characterize them as “in a state of tension.” Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 342. See also Trial of the Major War Criminals, XII: 165 (“The Ministries’ Case”).

195. In the same dispatch, forwarded by Merkulov to Stalin and Molotov, “Elder” reported that German officers had told him that Hitler had given a speech some days earlier at the Sports Palace during which he said “in the near future events will take place that will seem inexplicable to many. But the measures, which we will launch, are a state necessity, since the Red Menace has reared its ugly head over ‘Europe.’” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 152 (TsA SVR RF); Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 292–3 (TsA FSK); Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 65–6 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 56, l. 1157–8). On May 6, Admiral Kuznetsov wrote to Stalin that the Soviet naval attaché in Berlin (Vorontsov) reported that a Soviet inhabitant named Bozer (a Jew from Lithuania) told the naval attaché’s aide that according to one officer in Hitler’s HQ, the Germans were preparing to invade on May 14 through Finland, the Baltics, and Romania, but Kuznetsov added: “I suggest that this information is false and specially directed in this fashion to reach our government in order to test how the USSR would react.” Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 18.

196. Pechenkin, “‘Sovremennaia armiia,’” 31n9 (no citation); Muratov, “Shest’ chasov,” 283; Nevezhin, Sindrom, 169–70; Nevezhin, Zastol’ia, 278–9. Sivkov was sacked from the military academy directorship. Nevezhin, Sindrom, 180 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1039, l. 32).

197. Kuztesova, “Nachalo voiny.”

198. Further, Stalin claimed that each division numbered 15,000 troops (twice the actual number in many cases). Pechenkin, “‘Sovremennaia armiia,’” 26. Zhukov would remind Stalin on June 15, 1941, that “even 8,000-men divisions are practically twice weaker than German ones.” Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 427–33.

199. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 160 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 3808, l. 1–12); Pechenkin, “‘Sovremennaia armiia,’” 27–8; Nevezhin, Sindrom, 170 (citing RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2079, l. 31). Over the first six months of 1941, the Soviet Union would produce more than 1,100 T-34 medium tanks and 393 KV heavy tanks, not nearly enough to meet the general staff’s professed needs against a German adversary being supplied by all of Europe. In March 1941, Stalin was informed that industry had only enough parts to supply 30 percent of all the army’s tank and armored units. New aircraft models were running at 10 to 20 percent of the military’s needs. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph, 375–6 (citing TsAMO, f. 15a, op. 2154, d. 4, l. 224–33).

200. Pechenkin, “‘Sovermennaia armiia,’” 28–9; Banac, Diary of Gerogi Dimitrov, 159–60; Muratov, “Shest’ chasov,” 282.

201. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 116. See also Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina,’” 41.

202. Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 437.

203. Muratov, “Shest’ chasov”; Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 291–3. There is no stenographic account of the May 5, 1941, speech and no written notes by Stalin found in his personal papers. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 294n2. Malyshev and Dimtrov wrote accounts for their diaries. Nevezhin, Zatsol’nye, 273–93. Pechenkin, “‘Sovermennaia armiia.’” This is the so-called “brief record” made by K. V. Semenov, a staff person at the defense commissariat.

204. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 160.

205. Pechenkin, “‘Sovermennaia armiia,’” 29; Naumov, 1941 god, II; 161–2; Vainrub, Eti stal’nye parnii, 19; Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 287–8, 290–1.

206. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 115, 116–7; Muratov, “Shest’ chasov,” 284–5; Pechenkin, “‘Sovremennaia armiia,’” 29–30; Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 279–80.

207. Pravda, May 3, 1941.

208. Pechenkin, “‘Sovremennaia armiia,’” 29–30; Naumov, 1941 god, II; 161–2; Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 287–9 (at 289); Muratov, “Shest’ chasov,” 285; Nevezhin, Sindrom, 174–6.

209. Muratov, “Shest’ chasov,” 287; Zhipin, Kak fashistskaia Germaniia gotovila napadenie, 224; Liashchenko, “S ognem i krov’iu popolam”; Radzinskii, Stalin, 485 (quoting Chadayev, unpublished ms., “V groznye vremena,” GARF, without detailed citation). Sivkov was sacked a few days later. Nevezhin, Sindrom, 180 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1049, l. 32). Both of Sivkov’s brothers, Alexander and Pyotr, also military men, had been executed in 1938.

210. Schulenburg would send an account of the speech to Berlin only a month later, suggesting that Stalin seemed “anxious to prepare his followers for a new ‘compromise’ with Germany.” DGFP, series D, XII: 964–5 (June 4, 1941).

211. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 111 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 60, l. 58–9). The party apparatus held conferences on May 8 and 9, 1941, with editors of the major newspapers and journals and those responsible for the TASS news agency. Zhdanov, addressing a special gathering of fifty-four invited film industry personnel, directors, cameramen, actors, and studio heads, as well as twenty-seven top propaganda functionaries and newspaper editors, on May 14–15, blustered about the Baltics, Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, and Bessarabia, and how “if circumstances permit, we shall widen the front of socialism still more.” Alexander Zaporozhets, head of propaganda for the army’s political directorate, was ordered to revise propaganda for the troops. But draft decrees were not readied until late May or in the case of the military, June, and would not be approved prior to June 22. Nevezhin, Sindrom, 186–251; Nevezhin, “Dve direktivy 1941 g.,” 191–207; Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 105–7 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 115, l. 3–7, 124, 162). Kalinin gave a provocative closed speech (May 20, 1941) to a party and Communist Youth League meeting of the Supreme Soviet presidium staff, in which he castigated Britain and France for fighting poorly, noting “if the same thing were happening here, it would be judged a criminal unpreparedness for war.” Kalinin suggested that “the army should think: the sooner the fight starts, the better.” He received a rousing ovation. Nekrich, Pariahs, 231–3 (citing RGASPI, f. 78, op. 1, d. 84, l. 6–7, 20–1, 35–6). In May, Soviet radio broadcasts directed at German soldiers took on an antagonistic tone. Hoffman, “Podgotovka Sovetskogo Soiuza,” 27.

212. RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, d. 769, l. 176–176 ob.: April 28, 1941.

213. Stalin had the Central Committee approve the politburo recommendation by voice vote. “‘Naznachit’ tov. Stalina I. V.’ postanovelnie politbiuro TsK VKP (b) Mai 1941 g.”; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1039, l. 13; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 155–7 (RGASPI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 1a, l. 1, 3–4); Pravda, May 7, 1939; Izvestiia, May 7, 1939. The decree stated that Molotov was removed “in light of numerous declarations that he has difficulty fulfilling his duties alongside the duties of a people’s commissar.” Zhdanov arrived from Leningrad, and was the sole person Stalin received on May 5, for twenty-five minutes. A May 7 meeting in Stalin’s office evidently hashed out how a new Council of People’s Commissars would operate: present were Voznesensky, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Beria, and Shakhurin. Na prieme, 332.

214. Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe Politburo, 34–5 (citing APRF f. 3, op. 52, d. 251, l. 58–60); “‘Naznachit’ tov. Stalina I. V.’,” 222.

215. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 121. See also Petrov, “June 22, 1941,” 257 (Gnedich).

216. Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 158–9 (May 7). Alexander Kerensky told the New York Times that the formalization of Stalin’s power signified his active participation in the war on the Nazi side. New York Times, May 7, 1941.

217. DGFP, series D, XII: 791. See also Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU, 139–40.

218. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 151.

219. Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 100 (May 5, 1941); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 400–2. Halder also recorded Krebs’s opinion that the Russian upper officer corps was “decidedly bad” and that “compared with 1933, picture is strikingly depressing. It will take twenty years to reach her old level.” Krebs was also dubious about Soviet pilots.

220. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 167–9 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 158–62). Pavlov composed his record of the breakfast that same day. Voiushin and Gorlov, “Fashistskaia agressiia,” 22– (citing AVP RF, f. 082, op. 23, pap. 96, d. 16a, l. 120–4).

221. Lota, Sekretnyi front, 59. Also in May 1941, the Germans sent a group of Berlin opera soloists to perform in Moscow, and the NKGB operative Zoya Rybkina (b. 1907), posing as a representative of the Society for Cultural Ties Abroad, attended the reception at the German embassy, where she discovered a pile of suitcases, and walls emptied of paintings. Voskresenskaia, Teper’ ia mogu skazat’ pravdu, 10–16; Voskresenskaia, Pod psevdonimom Irina, 38–44; Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 123. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 166–8, 97–8 (d. 57, l. 1287–8: May 14). (“Rybkina” became a children’s writer under the name Voskresenskaya.) Also on May 7, Tito (“Walter”) sent two coded telegrams to Dimitrov reporting intensive German preparations for an attack. Lebedeva and Narinskii, Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia voina, 536 (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 184, d. 7 no. 412, l. 112), 537 (no. 423, l. 116).

222. This was forwarded by Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria on May 14, and included additional detail about Romania’s preparations for war. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 180–1 (TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 388–90); Primakov, Ocherki, III: 480–1 (TsA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1277–80). See also Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 89 (citing FSB archives).

223. Hilger speculated that Hitler perceived Soviet weakness, fear. Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 327.

224. Naumov, 1941 god, II; 181–4 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 162–8). See also Sipols, Tainy, 403.

225. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 243–4 (no citation); Khlevniuk, Stalin: Zhizn’, 251–2 (citing GARF, vospominaniia Ia. E. Chadaeva). On May 8, Stalin received Khrushchev, alone, for thirty minutes; nearly four hours later, he received Beria, alone, for five minutes. Those were the only people he saw that day. Na prieme, 333. As of May 10, Molotov was back in the customary position, entering the Little Corner before any other visitors. Na prieme, 333.

226. Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, VII: 3374, 2380, 2394.

227. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 305.

228. Whether it was noticed in Moscow remains uncertain.

229. DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 654–7, 664–7, 675–9; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 193 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 174: Molotov instructions to Dekanozov, May 12), II: 193–5 (l. 169–73: Dekanozov notes); DGFP, series D, XII: 734–5 (May 7, 1941); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 218–21 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 675, l. 169–73: Dekanozov notes on May 12 breakfast); Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 351. There is nonsense, from Mikoyan and Kumanev, that Schulenburg had warned Dekanozov, in the presence of Hilger and Pavlov, of the forthcoming invasion. Kumanev, “‘22ogo’ na rassvete,” 3. “He didn’t warn,” Molotov stated of Schulenburg, “he just hinted at it.” Chuev, Molotov Remembers, 29.

230. Na prieme, 332–3.