Stalin

129. Germany, Greece, and Hungary would default in 1932. Reinhart and Rogoff, This Time Is Different, 96 (table 6.4). The real value of the ruble would drop by perhaps 60 percent during the Five-Year Plan. Mozokhin, VChK-OGPU, 213.

130. Dohan, “Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky,” 606–7; DBFP, 2nd series, VII: 222 (Strang to Marquess of Reading); Davies, Crisis and Progress, 121n80. Strang surmised that a stable capitalism was a sine qua non for the success of socialism in the USSR. See also New York Times, Dec. 6, 1931, and Jan. 10, 1932. Some foreigners knew better: Le Temps, Nov. 23, 1931 (L. Vitin). The British came to understand that the Germans would not let the Soviets default: British Documents on Foreign Affairs, part II, series A, X: 377, XVI: 4–5.

131. The year 1931 would mark a peak for Soviet industrial imports, when the USSR accounted for 27.5 percent of U.S. industrial exports and 80 percent of German engineering exports. Dohan, “Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky.” Cloth imports fell from more than 10 million meters to under 1 million. Lewis, “Foreign Economic Relations,” 208. The year 1932 would turn out to be the worst in the history of Soviet foreign trade because of higher tariffs abroad and decreased credit availability.

132. Dohan, “Economic Origins of Soviet Autarky,” 626–7. See also Tauger, “1932 Harvest,” 88n52.

133. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 86 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 119). On Sept. 4, Stalin complained to Kaganovich that “you are putting every kind of pressure for the export of grain when they pay pennies for grain,” suggesting instead they export butter; Kaganovich recommended no changes for now. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 80–1 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 16–9), 83–6 (f. 558, op. 11, d. 739, l. 76–87: Sept. 6).

134. Kurliandskii, Stalin, vlast’, religiia, 233–463, 610–28.

135. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 54–7 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 739, l. 28–39), 60 (d. 76, l. 30–1); Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 85 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 128, 153), 88–91 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 479, l. 267; d. 484, l. 43, 47ob., 45, 53, 53ob., 54, 55, 55ob., 61; d. 481, l. 123); Kondrashin and Penner, Golod, 116 (RGAE, f. 7496, op. 37 d. 159, l. 98).

136. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 69 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 484, l. 60).

137. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 75 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 484, l. 53–5: Stalin mocking V. V. Ptukha). Pravda’s coverage of the plenum did not mention the discussion of grain procurement, in which regional party bosses condemned incompetence in harvest gathering and mass theft of the grain. Mikoyan interjected that collective farmers needed to be told: “first, satisfy the state plan, then satisfy your own plan.” Oskolkov, Golod 1932/1933, 17–9 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 484, l. 119).

138. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 88, 90–1 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 481, l. 123, 55ob., 61), 96–7.

139. In 1926–27 the average market price per centner for rye had been 7.53 rubles while the state price had been 4.31. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 93 (citing Tovarooborot, 1932: 140–45).

140. Kondrashin and Penner, Golod, 121 (citing RGAE, osobaia papka Kolkhoztsentra). No date is given.

141. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 255–6 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 54). Stalin received twenty people that day, an unusually large number; the last departed at 5:10 p.m. He was back in the office the next day. Na prieme, 79–80.

142. The incident occurred near Ilinka 5/2 across from the Old Gostinny Dvor. Ogarev’s real name was said to be Platonov-Petin, and he was identified as an aide to the British intelligence station chief responsible for the border states that used to be part of imperial Russia. On the OGPU report, Molotov wrote: “To the members of the politburo: comrade Stalin needs to cease walking on foot in Moscow.” Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, and Rykov affixed their signatures. This might have helped accelerate Stalin’s own move permanently into the Kremlin. “Agent angliiskoi razvedki sluchayno vstretil Vas . . . ,” 161–2 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 226, l. 18, 19: Nov. 18, 1931); Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 286. APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 200, l. 147.

143. Japanese patriots extolled their country as a liberating conqueror, while the army leadership and many civilian supporters cast Manchuria’s takeover as a matter of national survival. Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity. It took “more than ministers and generals to make an empire.” Young, Total Empire, 8. Japanese casualties occurred mostly in a diversionary action over Shanghai.

144. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 161–3 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 38, l. 48–51). See also Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 185 (citing l. 52–3). Japan’s military was effectively dictating the country’s foreign policy with an aggressive strategy that asserted a need to “protect” investments in China from China’s protracted civil war and from perceived Soviet encroachment, while actually forcing into being a self-sufficient empire in Asia. Paine, Wars for Asia.

145. Soviet anxiety about appearing either belligerent or too weak was evident in a speech by Molotov on Dec. 22, 1931, at the central executive committee (repeating Stalin’s words of June 1930): “We need no one else’s land, but not one inch of our land will we cede to anyone else.” Molotov, “O vypolnenie pervoi pitaitletki: doklad na vtoroi sessii IsIK SSSR o narodno-khoziaistvennom plane na 1932 god,” Pravda, Dec. 25, 1931, reprinted in DVP SSSR, XIV: 725–8, and in Molotov, V bor’be za sotsializm (1935), 236–76 (at 262–3); Sochineniia, XII: 269. Molotov’s speech might have been the regime’s first public statement on Japan’s action in Manchuria. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 79, 81; Thorne, Limits of Foreign Policy, 133.

146. Ken, Moskva i pakt. The Soviets interpreted France’s diplomatic efforts to manage its predicament vis-à-vis Germany as directed against the USSR. Kun, Kommunisticheskii internatsional v dokumentakh, 966–72; Eudin and Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy, I: 324–31. In the eyes of Paris, a nonaggression pact with Moscow promised to loosen Soviet-German ties and secure genuine Soviet neutrality in the event of any Franco-German conflict, but after initialing a draft agreement the French had backed off signing it, preferring instead to try to get Germany to freeze frontiers and forswear rearming in exchange for aid. (The Weimar Republic chancellor would decline.) After the Nazi party electoral success in Sept. 1930 and a German government announcement (March 1931) of a pending customs union with Austria, Paris conveyed to Moscow a willingness for exploratory talks on both a nonaggression pact and credits for trade, but mutual suspicion continued to undermine efforts. DVP SSSR, XIV: 452–6 (Dovgalevsky to Moscow, Aug. 8, 1931), 573–581 (V. L. Mezhlauk to Moscow: Oct. 16, 1931); Coulondre, De Staline à Hitler, 12; Herriot, Jadis, II: 312–3; Scott, Alliance against Hitler, 24–5; Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on International Affairs, 1931, 3–6; Scott, Alliance against Hitler, 8–9; Steiner, Lights that Failed, 553; Carley, “Five Kopecks,” at 36. France would turn out to be the only country in the world that increased its imports from the USSR in 1931–32. Williams, Trading with the Bolsheviks, 142. In 1932, the Nazis would win 230 seats, the most by any party during the entire Weimar period. That same year, 90 percent of German reparation payments would be canceled.

147. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 163n6 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 11, l. 64); Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetskikh-pol’skikh otnoshenii, V: 502–5 (AVP RF, f. 05, op. 11, d. 5, l. 157–62: Nov. 14, 1931); Izvestiia, Nov. 22, 1931; Lechik, “‘Vo frantsuzsko-pol’sko-rossiiskom treugol’nike,” 120–3; Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 98.

148. Izvestiia, July 26, 1930 (Litvinov interview). Stalin had hesitated to promote the rightist-leaning Litvinov, telling Chicherin, “You should be the commissar, even if you work only two hours a day,” but Litvinov had filled the vacuum anyway. Cherniavskii, “Fenomenon Litvinova”; “‘Diktatura iazykocheshyshchikh nad rabotaiushchimi’: posledniaia sluzhebnaia zapiska Chicherina,” 112n7; Farnsworth, “Conversing with Stalin,” 958 (citing RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 749, l. 80–3); Carley, Silent Conflict, 410–1 (citing AVP RF, f. 05, op. 9, pap. 43, d. 1, l. 130–2: Sept. 7, 1929); Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, (Dec. 3, 1929); Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 100; Besedovskii, Na putiakh, 385–6. See also Kennan on Chicherin, Russia and the West, 205–6. Mikoyan would recall that “the arguments between Chicherin and Litvinov at politburo meetings . . . helped us figure out the most difficult issues of world politics.” Those who worked with both judged them equivalent in quality of mind and breadth of horizons. Sheinis, Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov, 4; Sheinis, “Polpred B. E. Shtein,” 108. Rumors in Moscow on Chicherin’s likely replacement had run the gamut (Chicherin’s farewell memo seems to have had Kuibyshev in mind). See also Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 14–5; Ken and Rupasov, Zapadnoe iogranich’e, 562–3; and O’Connor, Diplomacy and Revolution, 157–64.

149. Chicherin added: “The OGPU leaders have blind faith in the words of every idiot and cretin they make their agent.” ‘Diktatura iazykocheshyshchikh nad rabotaiushchimi’: posledniaia sluzhebnaia zapiska G.V. Chicherina,” 108–10. Chicherin had effectively failed in his Stalin-supported quest to forge a genuine alliance with Germany, but had prevented an anti-Soviet coalition, a version of Soviet strategy he had enunciated in a note to Stalin in 1929: “Any sharpening of the antagonisms between Germany and the Entente, France and Italy, Italy and Yugoslavia, England and America means a strengthening of our position, a lessening of the various threats to us.” V. V. Sokolov, “Neizvestnyi G. V. Chicherin: iz rassekrechennykh arkhivov MID RF,” 12 (citing AVP RF, f. 08, op. 12, pap. 74, d. 55, l. 86). The Germans suspected that because of his British wife, Litvinov was secretly pro-British-French. Von Dirksen, Moscow, Tokyo, London, 81.

150. Stalin both criticized and praised Litvinov. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina-Molotovu, 167–8 (Oct. 7, 1929), 169–71 (Dec. 5, 1929); Ken and Rupasov, Zapadnoe prigranich’e, 568 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 62: March 1931). Litvinov, according to his daughter, had preferred Stalin to Trotsky. Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West, 109 (citing Tatyana Litvinova).

151. Stalin expanded the number of the commissariat’s departments responsible for the West and promoted strong officials to lead them, to curb Litvinov’s powers. The foreign affairs collegium now consisted of Litvinov and his three deputies: Krestinsky (first deputy), Boris Stomonyakov (an ethnic Bulgarian), and Lev Karakhan (a Chicherin protégé). Eventually, however, Stalin would grant abolition of the collegium and a reduction in deputy commissars, strengthening Litvinov’s grip over that body. Dullin, Men of Influence, 58–9; Sokolov, “Zamestitel’ narkoma inostrannykh del B. Stomoniakov,” 120.

152. Officials who had joined the foreign affairs commissariat in the early NEP years occupied about one-third of the senior posts dealing with Europe, but an influx during the Great Break, under Litvinov, brought people with fewer than five years of service, some filling entirely new posts, many replacing defectors or those purged. Of diplomats who joined before 1925, around 48 percent were Russian; 33 percent were Jewish; another 4.5 percent were Balts. Of those who joined after 1929, 56 percent were Russian, nearly 30 percent were Jewish, and 6 percent were Ukrainian. At the very top, few were ethnic Russians. Litvinov, Sokolnikov, Surits, Khinchuk, Dovgalevsky were all Jewish. Some of the Russians were the wrong class (of noble descent): Kollontai, Alexandrovsky. Old-line diplomats, with foreign-language and -country expertise, were hostile to the “neophytes” mobilized into the corps by the Central Committee. The arrivistes looked askance at the “bourgeois” habits and mentality of the old guard. Dullin, Men of Influence, 52–3 (comparing the diplomatic yearbooks of 1925 and 1933–6); Sostav rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov i spetsialistov Soiuza SSR, 296–303.

153. Ken, Moskva i pakt, 44–6; Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 71–3 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, l. 12–4: Aug. 30, 1931), 88–9 (l. 21–3: Sept. 7). To ensure timely exchange of information and control over decision making, Stalin created a standing politburo commission for foreign affairs (Nov. 22, 1931) consisting of himself, Molotov, and Kaganovich (Orjonikidze would be added a month later). Litvinov helped initiate the establishment (Nov. 26) of a lesser, separate commission just for Poland. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 84–5; Watson, “The Politburo and Foreign Policy,” 134–67 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 11, l. 68, 98, 99, 111); Ken and Rupasov, Zapadnoe prigranich’e, 589–90 (l. 73; AVP RF, f. 010, op. 4, pap. 21, d. 63, l. 635–6).

154. It was not just Stalin who voiced this view. Chicherin, speaking to the Afghan king Amanullah Khan in May 1928, had noted “whether England is preparing a war for us, we shall see later. England is always striving to push others instead of itself into military actions against us. She could push Poland against us.” DVP SSSR, XI: 301–7 (at 303). Stalin also knew that Piłsudski had offered his services to the Japanese as early as 1905, promising to lead an uprising in Russian Poland.

155. Kaganovich exploded at the foreign affairs commissariat to Stalin, writing that “they have no serious materials” in support of their opposition. To Kaganovich’s mind, Litvinov showed himself given to Germanophilia, seeking to build Soviet security one-sidedly on the relationship with Germany while dismissing Poland; Kaganovich also complained of Litvinov’s self-satisfied smugness. But the entire foreign affairs commissariat was united in opposition to a Soviet pact with Poland, even Litvinov’s enemy Karakhan, suspecting that Warsaw’s probes with Moscow were mere ploys to frighten Berlin into deals with Poland and France. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 76–7 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 739, l. 65–7: Sept. 3, 1931), 105–8 (l. 14–22: Sept. 16), 114n1 (f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, l. 177–8; op. 162, d. 11, l. 1, 9); Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-pol’skikh otnoshenii, V: 490–2 (Karakhan, Aug. 4, 1931); DVP SSSR, XIV: 488–9 (Aug. 6, 1931); Izvestiia, Aug. 30, 1931, Jan. 26, 1932; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, III: 517–9, III: 519–20, 556–8; Dyck, Weimar Germany, 240; Adibekov et al., Politbiuro Tsk RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, 259 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 11, l. 9: Sept. 20, 1931), 261–2 (l. 17: Sept. 30, 1931); Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 69. On Nov. 22, 1931, TASS published a communiqué on the resumption of Polish-Soviet negotiations. DVP SSSR, XIV: 647–50, 675; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 11, l. 64. See also Budurowycz, Polish-Soviet Relations, 8–9.

156. Dyck, Weimar Germany, 242–9 (citing 9187/H249372–8: Dirksen memo, Nov. 10, 1931); RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 76, l. 75–75ob. German ambassador Herbert von Dirksen wrote in a report on a meeting with Voroshilov (Dec. 12, 1931)—which was intercepted by Soviet intelligence and passed to Voroshilov (Dec. 21)—that “Voroshilov said that, of course, under no circumstances can one speak about any guarantees of the Polish western border; the Soviet government is a principled opponent of the Versailles Treaty; it will never undertake anything that would somehow contribute to strengthening the Danzig corridor or Memel border.” Duraczyński and Sakharov, Sovetsko-Pol’skie otnosheniia, 64 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 70, l. 264–5); Zeidler, Reichswehr and Rote Armee, 262; D’iakov and Bushueva, Fashistskii mech kovalsia v SSSR, 128–9 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 70, l. 253–8).

157. A declaration by Litvinov, after he had met with Kōki Hirota, was published in the Soviet press: the USSR “affords great significance to the maintenance and strengthening of existing relations with Japan. The Soviet government observes a policy of strict noninterference in the conflicts among various countries.” DVP SSSR, XIV: 668–72; Izvestiia, Nov. 21, 1931. On Nov. 23 the two countries signed a long-completed convention on postal exchange. DVP SSSR, XIV: 675–6. On Nov. 26, Karakhan in Tokyo began negotiations with Hirota on a fisheries agreement. DVP SSSR, XIV: 680–3.

158. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 291–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 185, l. 1–9). Soviet military intelligence also obtained a copy of a secret Japanese brochure for their officer corps, The Red Army and the Methods of Struggle With It, whose sixteen points included: “at the outset of a war it is necessary to inflict a decisive strike,” because the Red Army was weak in the face of strength; “the goal should be not to seize territory but to destroy the functioning field army”; “the most advantageous area of the front is where there are units of different nationalities”; “it is necessary to use anti-Soviet Russians.” Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, VII/i: 47–9 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1233, l. 339–45).

159. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 291–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 185, l. 1–9: Dec. 19, 1931). In a second intercepted memo sent to Stalin on Feb. 28, 1932, Kasahara again emphasized that “the military might of the Soviet Union” would reach great heights “in ten years.” Stalin underlined this passage, too. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 298–308 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 185, l. 15–36).

160. Stalin added: “Those comrades who remained in Russia, who did not go abroad, of course, are far more numerous in our party and its leadership than former émigrés, and they, of course, had greater opportunities to contribute to the revolution than those who were located in the foreign emigration.” Leushin, “‘Schitaiv nizhe svoego dostoinstua’: fragment zapisi besedy U. V. Stalina c E. Liudvigom,” 216–17 (RGASPI. f. 558, op. 1, d. 2989, 1.17–8).

161. Stalin added: “‘Fate’ is something that is not part of the laws of history, something mystical. I do not believe in mysticism.” On Feb. 8, 1932, he had a transcript circulated to members and candidate members of the politburo and Central Committee (“for your information”). In April 1932 the party journal Bolshevik published a version he edited. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 2989, l. 1. Stalin would authorize its publication as a standalone pamphlet in 1938, and allowed it to be included in Collected Works in 1951. “Beseda s nemetskim pisatelem Emilen Liudvigom,” Bol’shevik, 1932, no. 8: 33–42 (at 41); Sochineniia, XIII: 104–23 (at 114–5, 120–1); Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, II: 517–8.

162. Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japan’s newly named foreign minister, returning home from his ambassadorial post in Paris via the Trans-Siberian, received a “princely welcome” in Moscow on Dec. 30–31, 1931, according to British observers. Two days after Yoshizawa reached Tokyo, Moscow forced the issue by having Izvestiya (Jan. 16, 1932) publish news that a nonaggression pact had again been proffered. Both Yoshizawa and Ambassador Hirota claimed to be surprised. DVP SSSR, XIV: 746–8 (Litivinov-Yoshizawa conversation); Lensen, Damned Inheritance, 337–41; Sokolov, Na boevykh postakh, 157; Grechko et al., Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny, I: 277.

163. Voroshilov was especially skeptical of rumors about the ranks of White Guard émigrés ready to enlist for Japan. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 167–8 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 44, l. 53–5). Japanese officials continued to engage in open talk about annexing Northern Sakhalin, the Soviet Far Eastern coastline and Kamchatka. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 79–80.

164. Artuzov judged the French general staff to be against a Franco-Soviet nonaggression pact, but noted that French military intelligence “is of the opinion that the USSR at the present time will avoid a conflict with Europe and Japan and not react to provocations.” Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 296–8 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 185, l. 11–4). The French general staff was focused on Germany, not the USSR. Vidal, Une alliance improbable.

165. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 98. The OGPU were also reporting delight among peasants, angry at collectivization, at rumors Japan would seize Siberia, and Poland or Germany would take advantage in the West. Golubev, “Esli mir obrushitsia na nashu Respubliku,” 141–5; Vernadskii, Dnevnik, 1926–1934, 240, 256, 271, 275; Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 15–16 (citing RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 235, l. 12–10: Jan. 19, 1932).

166. Johnston, New Mecca, 122, citing Vozrozhdenie, March 5, 1932. See also Besedovskii, Na putiakh k termidoru, 286.

167. XVII konferentsiia VKP (b), 156.

168. According to the same hostile witness, when Stalin appeared at the Bolshoi on Feb. 23, 1932, at a celebration of the Red Army’s fourteenth anniversary, he was met with “cold silence.” Biulleten’ oppozitsii, 28 (July 1932): 3–5. Davies surmises that the letter writer was Ivan Smirnov: Davies, Crisis and Progress, 133 n1, 136, 145. On the conference resolutions, see: VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh (1933), II: 728–46.

169. The regime also mandated mobilization plans for each major factory. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 175. Still, even now, Tukhachevsky failed once more to force the creation of a separate army industrial research and development empire. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 42–7, 55–9, 162 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 2, d. 280, l. 7–8); Harrison and Simonov, “Voenpriemka,” 230.

170. Drobizhev, Glavnyi shtab, 171–2; Davies, Crisis and Progress, 204–9; GARF, f. 5446, op. 15, d. 15, l. 13; Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 192 (RGAE, f. 7297, op. 41: intro); Davies, Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 241, 243; Seiranian, Nadezhneishii voennyi rabotnik, 138. On Jan. 12, 1932, the politburo appointed party organizers in military factories who were responsible to the Central Committee. Poltaev, Industrializatsiia SSSR, 608.

171. The wildly ambitious 10,000 number included 2,000 BTs (Christie chassis), 3,000 T-26s (Vickers six-ton), and 5,000 machine-gun carrier T-27s (Carden Loyd tankette). Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 193 (citing RGVA, f. 4, op. 17, d. 76, l. 10). Voroshilov, at a Jan. 1933 party plenum, would claim that Stalin had ordered to “take all measures, spend the money, even large amounts of money, run people to all corners of Europe and America, but get models, plans, bring in people, do everything possible and impossible in order to set up tank production here.” RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 514, part 1, l. 125; Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 193 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, l. 13, 18–9: Dec. 5, 1929); RGVA, f. 31811, op. 1, d. 1, l. 52–3 (Pavlunovsky).

172. The Soviet delegation chose the Vickers medium tank prototype from a commercial catalogue. Vickers refused to sell its heavy tanks, but a clever member of the Soviet delegation managed to outsmart the British and obtain specifications (which would eventually go into the T-28). Svirin, Bronia krepka, 136–7, 253. The French firm Citroën refused to sell the Soviets tanks with blueprints. Vereshchak, “Rol’ inostrannogo tekhnicheskoi pomoshchi,” 234, 236 (citing RGASPI, f. 85, op. 27, d. 65: Jan. 11, 1930).

173. Milson, Russian Tanks; Cooper, “Defence Production,” 13; Tupper, “Red Army and the Defence Industry,” 13–5, 359–60; Hofman, “United States’ Contribution”; Mukhin, “Amtorg,” no. 3: 34–41, no. 4: 37–53. See also Sutton, Western Technology, 240–2. In Nov. 1931, the Kharkov Locomotive Factory was designated a “super shock” plant, granting access to raw materials, transport, and daily life necessities. Christie reasoned that tanks should be light and move quickly to penetrate enemy lines, and his suspension system, a sprung bogie instead of a rigid system, afforded tanks a low center of gravity and a low silhouette, as well as an ability to move at high speeds. His original model-1928 or M-1928 had little firepower; it was the improved M-1931 that interested the Soviets. The M-1931 weighed 12 tons, had a 338–horsepower engine, room for a crew of three and a 37mm gun as well as a machine gun, and a speed of 50 mph without tracks (which were removable for travel on paved roads). (Later, the Soviets would thicken the armor and enlarge the guns without losing the mobility.) The Soviets bought the rights to the production, sale, and use of tanks inside the borders of the Soviet Union for ten years. Pavlov et al., Tanki BT chast’ 1. The Christie contract (signed on April 28, 1930) cost $164,000. Kolomiets, Legkie tanki BT, 10. In 1931, the Poles also agreed to buy the M-1931, but then Christie reneged (the deal was illegal without U.S. government permission); he returned the Polish government’s money. Christie’s advanced tank designs never went into mass production in the United States; he would die nearly penniless in 1944. The Soviets also worked on a tank from the experimental designs of German engineer Edward Grotte, of Rheinmetal, who was employed on a technical assistance contract at the Bolshevik Factory in Leningrad. “Do not by any means allow Grotte to go back to Germany,” Stalin told Poskryobyshev to inform Kirov (Aug. 25, 1931). “Take all measures up to arrest and compel him to prepare the tank for serial mass production. Do not allow him go to Germany after the tank enters serial production, because he might give away secrets. Establish thorough surveillance on him making [Filipp] Medved responsible. Do not let him out of sight for even an hour.” RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 76, l. 42–3. Grotte’s tank design never entered mass production, and in 1933 he was allowed to leave, but his work fed into other Soviet tank design efforts.

174. Stalin, in a letter to Voroshilov, singled out armor-plating as the most difficult aspect. Some 60 percent of armor plates that would be produced at the Red October factory in 1933 for the T-26 were unusable. Vereshchak, “Rol’ inostrannogo tekhnicheskoi pomoshchi,” 241 (citing RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 37, l. 49; RGAE, f. 7719, op. 4, d. 76, l. 228).

175. The final tank tally in 1932 would be 2,585 instead of 10,000; 800 of them had no turrets, 290 lacked treads, and even the “finished” T-26s had no turrets for mounting a 45mm gun (they carried only machine guns). By 1933 the number of tanks would leap to 4,700. Similar exponential growth would occur in military aircraft and artillery. And the BT—soon the fastest moving tank in the world—was world class. Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 192–202 (citing RGVA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 717, l. 11–2: Pavlunovsky to Voroshilov, Jan. 2, 1933; d. 896, l. 7: Yegorov, Jan. 26; d. 717, l. 9–10: Voroshilov to Molotov); Maiolo, Cry Havoc, 18–9.

176. Davies, “Soviet Military Expenditures,” 580–1, 594 (table 3); Davies, Crisis and Progress, 165. Already between Oct. and Dec. 1931, Soviet armaments production shot up by 75 percent, to claim more than one of four workers in machine building. Then, in the first weeks of 1932, the military procurement budget nearly doubled. The capacity to absorb that funding influx efficiently was another matter. Davies, Crisis and Progress, 111–8; Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 190–1 (citing RGVA, f. 4, op. 417, l l. 29, 31ff; op. 14, d. 603, l. 31). The Soviet Far Eastern Army had doubled in size between May and Feb. 1932, and would reach 152,000 by the end of that year, with more than 300 tanks, 300 armored vehicles, and 250 planes. Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 207 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 18, d. 39, l. 63ob.: Blyukher, Oct. 25, 1932; op. 14, d. 754, l. 26: Dec. 1932–Jan. 1933).

177. Soviet propagandists huffed that Tokyo presented itself as “the apostle of peace” and asserted that China had “insulted” Japan and threatened it with “chaos.” Conversely, an Osaka newspaper fumed (March 3, 1932), “Why is the American annexation of the Philippines justified, while the Japanese seizure of Formosa [Taiwan] is not?” Tanin and Kogan, Voenno-fashistskoe dvizhenie v Iaponii, 251–62; Paine, Wars for Asia, 24.

178. Kasahara and his Polish contacts were clearly trying to spur Tokyo. Stalin underlined passages in the text suggesting a need to study the technical development of the Red Army, and wrote on the document: “From hand to hand. To the members of the politburo (to each individually). With the obligation to return to the politburo.” Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i glavnoe upravlenie, 298–308 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 185, l. 15–36), 807.

179. Blyukher had given orders to fire at the overflights, and Stalin vented his anger when he found out. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 43, l. 116. Voroshilov had instructed Blyukher in a secret order (Feb. 28, 1932) to annihilate anyone who violated the Soviet border. Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 187 (citing RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 88, l. 9–10).

180. The regime also created a special collective farm corps “to reinforce Soviet Far Eastern frontiers,” and directed seven tank battalions with infantry escorts, armored trains, antiaircraft machine guns, and antitank weapons to the Soviet Far East. Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 187–8 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 11, l. 196–7); Grechko et al., Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny, I: 110 (March 16, 1932); Dmitriev, Sovetskoe podvodnoe korablestroenie, 71, 240–55; Isaev, “Meropriiatie KPSS po ukrepleniiiu dal’nevostochnykh rubezhei”; Zakharov, “Krasnoznamennomu Tikhookeanskomu flotu”; Dmitriev, “Stroitel’stvo sovetskogo podvodnogo flota.”

181. For monitoring and subverting the USSR, the Kwantung Army had already deployed a vast intelligence apparatus through Manchuria (Harbin, Manchouli, Mukden, Jilin), which they expanded (to Qiqihar, Hailar, Heihe) after the formation of Manchukuo. Japanese intelligence personnel were also deployed at their consulates in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Novosibirsk, and at the Manchukuo consulate in Chita (and soon, a Manchukuo consulate in Blagoveshchensk). The Japanese legation in Tehran was also used against the Soviet Union. Kuromiya and Pepłoński, “The Great Terror,” citing, among other works, Tsutao Ariga, Nihon riku kai gun no jōhōkikō to sono katsudō (Tokyo: Kindai Bungeisha, 1994), 84–100. Japanese police in Manchuria enlisted local bandits for assassinations and kidnappings, set up rings for prostitution and drug trafficking, and concocted subterfuges to fool a League of Nations fact-finding mission. Vespa, Secret Agent of Japan.

182. The original plan dated to 1927, and had been reworked (to Stalin’s approval) in summer 1930: RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 490, l. 19–23.

183. Puyi was converted to “emperor” in 1934. Most of Japan’s conquests, beginning with Taiwan (1895) and followed by Korea (1905), had not been driven primarily by economic concerns—trade between China and Japan, for example, dwarfed that between Korea and Japan—but Manchukuo was seen as a vast settler colony, a solution to Japan’s rural poverty.

184. Lensen, Damned Inheritance, 210–1; Izvestiia, March 22, 1932.

185. Lensen, Damned Inheritance, 225–6; RGSAPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 12, l. 36, 68 (March 26, 1932), 94 (April 6), 107–8 (April 17). Into summer 1932, international observers noted Moscow’s “extreme forbearance” toward Japan bordering on “pusillanimity” (in the words of the British consul in Harbin). Lensen, Damned Inheritance, 373 (citing FO 371/16173–665: Garstin to Ingram, Harbin, June 11, 1932); Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 81.

186. It was Romania, not the Soviet Union, that refused to sign the bilateral pact. Lungu, “Nicolae Titulescu.” The Soviets refused to recognize Bessarabia’s annexation by Romania. According to Louis Fischer, however, Litvinov was long ready to relinquish Soviet claims to Bessarabia to normalize relations with Romania. Elleman, “Secret Soviet-Japanese Agreement”; Fischer, Men and Politics, 135. When Tukhachevsky had reported on the 1932 Poland war plan to Voroshilov, he had noted that “a similar operation would be very easy to prepare against Bessarabia.” D’iakov and Bushueva, Fashistskii mech kovalsia v SSSR, 131–2 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 342, l. 179–80), 132n2 (d. 400, l. 14–29). See also Ken, Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie, 127–8.

187. Le Temps, Nov. 30, 1932; Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 98.

188. The OGPU’s Balytsky and Artuzov reported to Stalin (March 19, 1932) on new intelligence from an informant in Warsaw regarding the French general staff’s preparation for a military intervention against the USSR that relied on Poland and Japan while attempting to draw in Britain. The report was filled with misspellings of the principal actors (Polish general staff chief Janusz Gąsiorowski listed as Gonsiarowski, French Marshal Pétain as Lecien). Khaustov et al., Glazami razvedki, 329–32 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 185, l. 65–70).

189. Ken, Moskva i pakt, 113–4; Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-pol’skikh otnoshenii, V: 492–4 (AVP RF, f. 08, op. 14, d. 137, l. 31–3), 494–6 (l. 13–5), 496–7, 497–8, 498–500, 501; Budurowych, Polish-Soviet Relations, 16–7; Karski, Great Powers, 109. See also Izvestiia, Aug. 27, 28, 30, 1931; DVP SSSR, XIV: 562–4 (Dovgalevsky to Karakhan, Oct. 6, 1931), 566 (Dovgalevsky to Moscow, Oct. 9), 570–2 (Litvinov and Zelezynski: Oct. 14); and Biegański et al., Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, I: 14–6.

190. D’iakov and Bushueva, Fashistskii mech kovalsia v SSSR, 131–2 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 342, l. 179–80 to Khinchuk). As late as Dec. 1932, the politburo approved the dispatch of four officers to German military academies. Stone, Hammer and Rifle, 198 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 14, l. 39: Dec. 16, 1932).

191. Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic, 159. German diplomats interpreted the Franco-Soviet and Polish-Soviet nonaggression pacts as “a complete change in the course of Soviet foreign policy.” Sluch, “Germano-sovetskie otnosheniia,” 103 (citing AVP RF, f. 082, op. 14, pap. 62, d. 2, l. 365).

192. On April 13, 1932, Piłsudski arrived in Romania, with plans to travel on to Japan, trips that the Soviets viewed as setting the stage for a long-anticipated military pact against USSR; in fact, the Polish president was trying (and failing) to induce his Romanian allies into ratcheting down tensions with Moscow and become part of the broad regional nonaggression commitments. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 104–5. On April 22, 1932, with Piłsudski in Tokyo, deputy foreign affairs commissar Stomonyakov speculated in a letter to Antonov-Ovseyenko that “in all likelihood he is holding specific military negotiations related to Far Eastern complications for the event of a war between Poland and Romania against the USSR.” Revyakin, “Poland and the Soviet Union,” 79–101 84 (no citation).

193. Stalin might have felt dissatisfied with the information at his disposal, for he had recently received Radek one-on-one for an hour and a half and then ordered creation of an “information bureau” on international affairs inside his secretariat (formalized on April 1, 1932). Effectively an extension of the foreign bureaus of Izvestiya, Radek’s bureau, in theory, had the right to make use of “all existing institutions concerned with economic, political, and military matters in the capitalist countries.” Na prieme, 64 (March 27, 1932); Ken and Rupaov, Politbiuro TsK VKP (b) i otnosheniia SSSR, chast’ 1: 196, 553–4, 574–5; Rupasov, Zapadnoe zagranich’e, 590–2 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 878, l. 5), 592–6 (op. 162, d. 11, l. 135, 143: May 16, 1932); Ken, “Karl Radek i Biuro.” On Radek’s value to Stalin, see Duda, Jenő Varga, 113–4. See also Gronskii, Iz proshlogo, 147. Radek managed to cast the Soviet Union as a champion of peace in Foreign Affairs, the journal of the American establishment, and in May 1932 he would work with Voroshilov on contacts with the American military over a possible common policy toward Japan—which, however, would prove fruitless. Radek, “War in the Far East”; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 12, l. 113; 173–4; Safronov, SSSR, 369. Stalin counseled Voroshilov on the proper way to engage with the U.S. military. Kvashonkin, Sovetskoe rukovodstvo, 173–4 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 37, l. 46–8: Voroshilov to Stalin, June 6, 1932), 175–6 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 38, l. 66: June 12), 176n3 (f. 17, op. 162, d. 12, l. 194–5: June 20).

194. Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, III: 277–82 (RGASPI, f. 631, op. 5, d. 52, l. 48–53: Feb. 10, 1932).

195. Some foods for those still on lists were derationed (no longer promised). Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 406–7 (March 23, 1932).

196. Davies, Crisis and Progress, 147–54.

197. Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, III: 312–5 (RGAE, f. 7486, op. 37, d. 236, l. 4–13); Zelenin, Stalinskaia ‘revoliutsiia sverkhu,’ 22–4.

198. “Otkrytoe pis’mo Prezidiumu Ts.I.K’a Soiuza SSR,” Biulleten’ oppozitsii, no. 27 (March 1932): 1–6 (at 5).

199. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 311 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 877, l. 9); Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 12 (1932): 29; Zelenin, “Byl li ‘kolkhoznyi neonep’?” 108–9 (citing GARF, f. 7486, op. 3, d. 237, l. 225–6); Davies et al., Years of Progress, 14. Stalin had crossed out a section in the draft of the decree that would have guaranteed feed to collective farmers for their personal animals. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 3016, l. 1. Another decree, a fortnight later, publicized the decision. Davies stresses that although Stalin did not initiate the relaxation on livestock, he would grab credit. Davies, “Stalin as Economic Policy-Maker,” 136–7. One scholar argues that Yakovlev and “bourgeois” specialists working under him had initiated a shift from extensive to intensive growth already in late 1931–early 1932. Tauger, “People’s Commissariat of Agriculture,” 157–9.

200. Sochineniia, XIII: 134. Stalin permitted a foreigner, James Abbé, to photograph him in the Little Corner on April 13, 1932, resulting in a sensational portrait on the New York Times front page. Abbé, I Photograph Russia; von Dewitz and Johnson, Shooting Stalin. Stalin attended the politburo meetings throughout April and May 1932: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 874–885. The same day Abbé got twenty minutes in the Kremlin, an infirm Mężyński wrote to Stalin pleading to be relieved of his position. Stalin refused. Molotov concurred. Kuibyshev wrote on the resignation request, “read it and understand nothing.” Mężyński had suffered a heart attack on Dec. 13, 1931, returning to work on Jan. 25, 1932.

201. Rudich, Holod 1932–33 rokiv, 148–50. Stalin received an OGPU report enumerating the mass flight out of villages region by region, and naming “food difficulties” as a prime motivator. Zelenin, Stalinskaia ‘revoliutsiia sverkhu,’ 25–6 (no citation).

202. Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 43 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 42, d. 26, l. 1–6).

203. The areas affected were better supplied than villages, but a low priority among industrial regions. Rossman, Worker Resistance under Stalin. On strikes, see also Gromtseva, Teni izchezaiut v smol’nom, 28–9.

204. Werth and Moullec, Rapports secrets soviétiques, 209–16 (at 214).

205. Davies, Crisis and Progress, 188–91 (citing APRF, f. 3, op. 22, d. 39, l. 6–7).

206. Rossman, Worker Resistance under Stalin, 231 (citing RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 213, l. 90); Danilov et al., Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni, III: 318–54 (TsA FSB, f. 2, op. 10, d. 53, l. 1–64: April 1932).

207. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. In Ivanovo in 1937, there would be a mere three work stoppages involving a very small number of people protesting rising norms and food shortages. Rittersporn, Anguish, 233 (citing RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 230, l. 87).

208. Later, while reading back issues of Pravda, Stalin would erupt at the loyalist Yaroslavsky over an article (May 31, 1932) admitting the fact of strikes in Ivanovo—even though the article blamed the already sacked local party leadership—because he felt that any admission handed ammunition to enemies to speak of “a ‘new Kronstadt.’” Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 120–2 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 77, l. 11, 12–12ob.: June 5, 1932), 139n1 (f. 17, op. 3, d. 887, l. 9); Khromov, Po stranitsam, 34–5. The politburo condemned Yaroslavsky’s article and removed him from the editorial position at Pravda.

209. Berson, Sowieckie zbrojenia moralne, 7. Berson, under the pseudonym Otmar, served as Moscow correspondent for the Polish Telegraph Agency and Gazeta Polska, until his expulsion in 1935.

210. Rassweiler, Generation of Power; Goriaeva, “Velikaia kniga dnia,” 256–7.

211. On May 3, Stalin received the International Herald Tribune correspondent to reiterate Soviet interest in expanded trade with the United States and told him that in the forthcoming second Five-Year Plan, “yes, light industry will develop to a much greater extent than before.” Sochineniia, XIII: 258 (Ralph Barnes). More broadly, see Mahoney, Dispatches and Dictators. Stalin played little role in drawing up the second Five-Year Plan, which was overseen by Molotov, Kuibyshev, and Orjonikidze, yet it could not go forward until he approved.

212. The Soviets also planned to import 10,000 breeding cattle from South America, Germany, and Britain. Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 138; Kondrashin et al., Golod v SSSR, I/ii: 290–1 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 12, l. 114, 124). That same day, the politburo decreed the expulsion of 38,300 “kulak” households, but ten days later, this would be circumscribed to individual arrests of “evil elements in the village.” Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, III: 367 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 12, l. 134). May 5, 1932, was the 30th birthday of Pravda, which was celebrated without mention of Bukharin, its editor for twelve years. Medvedev, Nikolai Bukharin, 49.

213. Soon, the regime clarified that such trade would be “carried out at prices formed on the market.” Davies and Wheatcroft, Years of Hunger, 138 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 883, l. 9), 140; Sobranie zakonov, 1932, no. 1: article 190; Sobranie zakonov, 1932, no. 33: article 195; Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, 1932, no. 11–2: 50; Kollektivizatsiia sel’skogo khoziaistva, 411–3, 416–7; Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 58–9 (no citation). An Oct. 1931 decree had legalized peasant trade of grain at “cooperative prices.” Additional decrees after May 6, 1932, reduced procurement targets for other agricultural products. Gorelik and Malkis, Sovetskaia torgovlia, 125; Whitman, “Kolkhoz Market,” 387. From Jan. 15, 1933, the regime would concede free trade in meat, too.

214. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 484, l. 36–46. “We still have bazaars that are not Soviet but purely private, in almost every village, almost every town,” North Caucasus party boss Sheboldayev complained at the 17th party conference. “Not only do these bazaars fail to make the individual peasant into a socialist, they sometimes prevent him from becoming a collective farmer.” XVII konferentsiia VKP (b), 210.

215. Davies, Crisis and Progress, 187–90. Whereas (black) market prices for grain in 1929 had been double the state procurement prices, in 1932 the multiple reached 28 times. Ellman, “Did the Agricultural Surplus Provide the Resources for Increased Investment in the USSR during the First Five-Year Plan?” Economic Journal 85 (1975): 844–63 (table 6); James R. Millar, “Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan: A Review Article,” Slavic Review 33/4 (1974): 750–66.

216. Davies, Crisis and Progress, xv.

217. Davies, Crisis and Progress, 51 (citing Za industrializatsiiu, March 15, 1931: Dukarevich). “You cry that you do not have this or that but you never say what is necessary to correct the situation,” Orjonikidze complained at a heavy industry commissariat meeting on June 6, 1932. “You are placing the blame on others when you yourself are to blame.” Gregory and Markevich, “Creating Soviet Industry,” 798 (citing RGAE, f. 7297, op. 38, d. 10, l. 4).