Stalin

82. Yagoda had proposed nine death sentences (for “Trotskyites”), eighteen sentences of ten years in camps for key figures, and for the rest, three to five years in camps or exile; three were to be released. Stalin wrote in ten years instead of five for Irina Gogua, and freed three more of the hundred and twelve. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 663–9 (APRF. F, 3, op. 58, d. 237, l. 37–49), 681 (d. 238, l. 1: July 17).

83. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 963, l. 37.

84. The circular threatened local party bosses with expulsions for failures to restore order, giving a deadline of two to three months. Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b): povestki dnia zasedanii, II: 645; Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 240; Pavlov, Kommunistichskaia partiia, 51. In Oct. 1934—before Kirov was murdered by a holder of a party card—the regime had decided on a universal re-registration of party members in 1935. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 963, l. 3.

85. Getty, Origins of the Great Purges, 60–1 (citing Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, 1935, no. 4: 32–6); Pravda, May 16, 1935. Another 340,000 Communists had been expelled in the 1934 purge, which mostly targeted those who had recently joined. Total membership as of January 1, 1935, was 2.35 million. Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, 212, 224; Bol’shevik, 1934, no. 15: 9.

86. “We have a lot of Americans,” Yezhov stated during a meeting connected to the party document verification. “Traditionally our people take the view that these are wonderful people. Relations with Germany have worsened, so you need to keep an eye on them, Poles as well, and you need to watch the English . . . Keep in mind, that Americans, as a rule, are almost all spies.” Pavliukov, Ezhov, 159–60 (RGASPI, f. 671, op. 1, d. 32, l. 20–1: July 1, 1935).

87. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 86 (RGASPI, f. 671, op. 1, d. 273, l. 700).

88. Iakovlev et al., Reabilitatsiia: politicheskie protsessy, 175.

89. Biulleten’ oppozitsiia, no. 1–2 (July 1929): 2; Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1929, 61–2. When Radek asked Stalin (June 4, 1935) whether he should be republishing Trotsky’s writings in the regime’s internal Bulletin of the Foreign Press for high officials, the dictator told him “to liquidate” the publication. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 86 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 420, l. 4ob.). By contrast, when Tal (head of the Central Committee press and publications department) queried the politburo about which émigré subscriptions he should take for the next year, Stalin commanded: “Order the lot!” Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 228 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d, 273, l. 36: Dec. 1935).

90. Getty and Naumov, Road to Terror, 161–6 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 542, l. 55–86), 177–71 (l. 125–41), 172–3 (l. 175–8).

91. The usual chorus had followed the dictator’s lead and remained reticent. Getty and Naumov, Road to Terror, 161–7 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 542, l. 55–86).

92. Getty and Naumov, Road to Terror, 176 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 547, l. 69), 177 (d. 544, l. 22, l. 70); Pravda, June 8, 1935. The regime abolished the Society of Old Bolsheviks (which had its own publishing house) on May 25, 1935, and the Society of Political Prisoners on June 25.

93. No new charges were brought in the Kirov case, despite Yezhov’s ominous speech, which Stalin alone could have authorized. Pravda (June 16 and 19, 1935) issued follow-up fulminations, by Zhdanov and Khrushchev, over “former princes, ministers, courtiers, Trotskyites, etc. . . . a counterrevolutionary nest.”

94. DBFP, 2nd series, XIII: 364–71 (June 5, 1935), 477–84 (E. Drummond in Rome to Samuel Hoare, June 25); XIV: 329–33 (Drummond in Rome to Hoare); DGFP, series C, IV: 253–62 (June 4), 262–6 (June 4), 269–71 (June 5), 271 (June 5), 272–3 (June 5); Weinberg, Foreign Policy, I: 213. Germany’s Admiral Raeder had caught British attention in April 1935 when he had announced, in an obvious negotiating ploy, that Germany had begun to build twelve submarines. To London, it appeared to be a choice between a deal to get the Germans to proceed more slowly, as Hitler claimed he was inclined to do, or to build up the British fleet even more rapidly. But even beyond financial straits, the British admiralty rightly anticipated that between 1936 and 1941 their ship building capacity would be sufficient to replace the existing fleet but not to expand it. The British also reasoned, conveniently, that resistance to approving German rearmament of any kind (the French position) would only elicit a far stronger German action. And British naval intelligence concluded that Hitler needed a fleet for use against the Soviet Union in the Baltic Sea, not against Britain. Wark, Ultimate Enemy, 134–9, 141–2.

95. The battleship plans originally dated to Nov. 1934. Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, 570. In May 1936, Germany laid the keels for five instead of the agreed two A-cruisers. Hildebrand, Foreign Policy, 43. The Bismarck would be laid down in July 1936 (and finished in Sept. 1940), while the Tirpitz would be laid down in Oct. 1936 (and finished in Feb. 1941). The Germans reported the Bismarck to Britain as 35,000 tons displacement; in reality, the design was for 41,000. See also R. Ingrim, Hitlers Glücklichster Tag: London, den 18 Juni (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1962).

96. Aubrey Kennedy, the journalist, replied that Baldwin was more the kind of man to hear political proposals than expositions of ideas. Martel, Times and Appeasement, 180. Kennedy had written a book calling early for Versailles treaty revision. Kennedy, Old Diplomacy and New.

97. Most of the rest of the seats had to be purchased. Many of the attendees were political émigrés, such as Bertolt Brecht, Heinrich and Klaus Mann, Anna Seghers, and Robert Musil. Stalin evidently wanted to prevent an anti-German eruption, for though Shcherbakov had been dispatched to keep a watchful party eye on the proceedings, the dictator sent him a telegram to “harmonize all reports and speeches with our envoy Potyomkin.” Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 386n7 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 52, l. 114: June 20, 1935). Shcherbakov wrote privately in his diary, “there is not one tractor or motorcar on the roads of Poland . . . And Vienna loses its past greatness, and withers, and is dying.” Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 145 (citing RGASPI, f. 88, op. 1, d. 467, l. 1, 3–4); Golubev, “Esli mir obrushitsia na nashu Respubliku,” 13 (citing RGASPI, f. 88, op. 1, d. 467, l. 1).

98. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 384–6, n1 (RGASPI, f. 329, op. 2, d. 4, l. 160–161ob.), n2 (f. 17, op. 163, d. 1059, l. 186), n3 (d. 1063, l. 131; f. 558, op. 11, d. 52, l. 108), n5, n7; Artizov and Naumov, Vlast’, 256–7 (RGASPI, f. 88, op. 1, d. 472, l. 1–2: Shcherbakov to Stalin, May 27), 264–5 (f. 17, op. 3, d. 965, l. 42: June 19). A giant Gorky likeness was set up in the hall. Ehrenburg, living in Paris with a Soviet passport, had written worriedly to Bukharin (editor of Izvestiya, which published Ehrenburg) that “there will be few stars and many Bohemian wretches of the Trotskyite-anarchist type. Our delegation is peculiar: none speak foreign languages, and out of eighteen souls just five are even a bit known in the West as writers.” Voroshilov voted against Babel’s inclusion.

99. Ehrenburg’s denunciation: Literaturnaia gazeta, June 17, 1933, published in French translation in his essay collection Dumael, Gide, Malraux, Mauriac.

100. Mezhdunarodnyi kongress pisatelei; Klein, Paris 1935; Teroni and Klein, Pour le défense de la culture. A joint report to Stalin by Shcherbakov and Koltsov deemed this “the biggest event in the sphere of the consolidation of antifascist forces,” but added that “not a little difficulty in our work was caused by the ambiguous behavior of Ehrenburg,” whom they accused of wanting to “appear neutral,” rather than influencing the French or defending Soviet interests. Ehrenburg in a report that reached Stalin called Koltsov a journalist rather than a writer. Stalin, for his part, advised Kaganovich not to allow Soviet Communists to “finish off” Ehrenburg. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 382–6 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 710, l. 25–9: July 20, 1935), 387–9 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 710, l. 30–4: July 21).

101. Artizov and Naumov, Vlast’, 255 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 964, l. 14: May 19, 1935). The timing with the congress in Paris might have been a coincidence; Rolland had delayed the trip for reasons of health.

102. Remark dating to 1928, as cited in Drabovitch, Les Intellectuels français et le bolchévisme, 151–2. An internal Soviet evaluation (1934) of Rolland cited his “individualistic humanism” and pacifism as detriments. David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment, 243 (citing RGALI, f. 631, op. 14, d. 716).

103. Yagoda had commissioned a twenty-volume Russian translation of Rolland’s collected works and assigned oversight of the task to the Russian-French Maria Kudryashova; Rolland had married her, and she accompanied him as interpreter. “Stalin did not look anything like his portraits,” Rolland wrote in his diary. “He is neither large nor stocky, as he is imagined . . . His characteristic coarse dark hair is beginning to turn gray and lighten . . . But as before he has a direct and vigorous visage and enigmatic smile, which is (or can be) cordial, impenetrable, indifferent, good-natured, implacable, amused and mocking. In all situations, a perfect self-control. He speaks without raising his voice, with a timber a bit nasal and guttural at times (a Georgian accent, I’m told), with long pauses, to think things through. He listens still better than he talks, noting the principal points of what I said, scribbling with blue and red pencil on a piece of paper while I spoke. (I greatly regret not having asked him for that sheet.)” Rolland, Voyage à Moscou, 126–34; “Moskovskii dnevnik Romena Rollanda,” 217.

104. Stalin did not let on that he had personally edited the draft of the law. “Moskovskii dnevnik Romena Rollanda,” 221–2. That night, after returning to the Savoy hotel with his wife, Rolland was approached by Antonio Gramsci’s two sons, aged nine and eleven, who thanked him for all he had done for their father (imprisoned in Mussolini’s Italy). On the law, see Izvestiia, April 8, 1935; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 962, l. 32, 57; Khlevniuk, Politbiuro, 145–6 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1059, l. 23–4, 27); Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 144–5 RGASPI, f. 78, op. 1, d. 550, l. 7, 7a: (Voroshilov, March 18, 1935). See also Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 325.

105. Besides a certain hero-worship, Rolland’s purpose had included inquiring about the fate of the writer Viktor Kibalchich, known as Viktor Serge, who had been born in Brussels to Russian Jewish political émigrés from tsarism, emigrated after the revolution to the Soviet Union, and had been arrested in Leningrad (March 9, 1933) and internally exiled for “Trotskyite” propaganda. (Rolland would leave without being satisfied.) Serge’s case had been forced into the discussion at the international gathering in Paris. Vinogradov, Genrikh Iagoda, 428–31 (TsA FSB, f. N-13614, tom 2); Mikhailov, M. Gor’kii i R Rollan, 313–5; Bialik, Gor’kii i ego epokha, III: 190–2 (Gorky to Yagoda, July 29, 1935), 191–2 (Gorky to Yagoda, March 7, 1936), 206; Comédie, August 30, 1933; Flores, L’immaginare dell’URSS, 235–42; Stern, Western Intellectuals, 27–8; Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 317–8.

106. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 775, l. 1–16 (unedited). Both Stalin and Rolland edited the text. Rolland, Voyage à Moscou, 237–47. Rolland recorded the session in his diary immediately, and noted that it lasted from 4:10 to 5:50 p.m. Pravda (June 29, 1935) also reported a duration of one hour and forty minutes, while the logbook for Stalin’s office has two hours. “Moskovskii dnevnik Romena Rollanda,” 215–6; Na prieme, 168. Alexander Arosyev, the head of all-Union society for cultural ties with foreigners, who was present (and made the transcript), reported to Stalin that Rolland “repeated several times to me that he had not expected anything like that and that he had never in his life imagined Stalin that way.” Stalin wrote: “into my archive.” Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 377–8 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 795, l. 60–1). Rolland would also pepper Gorky with queries about Soviet repression.

107. “Moskovskii dnevnik Romena Rollanda,” 226–8 (July 9, 1935). Rolland read out a greeting on Soviet radio that July. “It’s a wonderful thing, to laugh . . . Genuine joy is . . . in us, comrades, in a well dispositioned spirit, in a proud consciousness, in any beloved labor, joy is in the work in the cornfield of all humanity.” Goriaeva, “Veilkaia kniga dnia,” 300–1 (GARF, f. 6953, op. 15, d. 53).

108. Rolland, Voyage à Moscou, 149–54 (July 4, 1935); “Moskovskii dnevnik Romena Rollanda,” 238–40. Stalin’s pipe, by now, had become a significant part of his iconography. Pravda (April 17, 1935), for ex., had run a caricature by Viktor Deni called “peace pipes” contrasting Stalin’s with that of a fat bulldog-faced bourgeois.

109. Hitler received Beck again in the afternoon, with Göring, Neurath, and Ribbentrop, but skipped Beck’s third and final conversation on July 4, when the Polish foreign minister summoned the courage to mention Germany’s freight arrears and the currency exchange problems Germany caused in Danzig. DGFP, series C, IV: 398–407 (July 3), 410 (July 4); Wojciechowski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie, 205; Beck, Przemówienia, 164–5; Beck, Final Report, 92–9. A British Foreign Office summary mentioned deep Soviet fears of becoming simultaneously the object of Western and Japanese ambitions, as well as smaller countries’ opportunism. Lensen, Damned Inheritance, 465 (FO 371/19460–881, Colonel Ismay to Collier, July 8, 1935). The NKVD’s Prokofyev wrote to Stalin (July 11, 1935) about the arrest of a saboteur parachuted in by Japan; two of three were killed, one fled but was captured, and the politburo resolved to stage a public trial in Irkutsk. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 679–81 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 247, l. 105–7), 681 (l. 104), 683 (l. 157).

110. It is not clear the German foreign ministry even knew of Schacht’s proposal. Kandelaki wanted the offer in writing. Litvinov warned against it as a German “maneuver.” Weinberg, Foreign Policy, I: 221; DVP SSSR, XVIII: 646–7 (Litvinov to Potyomkin, June 26, 1935), 647 (Litvinov to Surits, June 27); Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 85–6, 127; Na prieme, 169.

111. On the unexpected twists and turns concerning finance and cash in a “planned” economy, see Arnold, Banks, Credit and Money; Nakamura, “Did the Soviet Command Economy Command Money?”; and Gregory, Political Economy, 213–42.

112. Stalin had played a key role in the moderation of investment targets in 1932–4, which proved important for stabilization. Davies et al., “The Politburo and Economic Decision Making,” 113–4. The state planning commission did have a few line-management functions, but mostly it served in an advisory capacity, and tried to counter the systemic prevarication of commissariats and factories. Gregory and Harrison, “Allocation under Dictatorship.”

113. Na prieme, 170.

114. The 22 billion included 6.5–6.7 billion for Orjonikidze’s heavy industry (vs. the proposed 6, and a requested 9), and 3.5 billion for Kaganovich’s railroad commissariat (vs. the proposed 3, and a requested 4.5).

115. Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 241–2; Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b): povestki dnia zasedanii, II: 673.

116. Davies et al., Years of Progress, 264 (citing GARF, f. 5446, op. 26, d. 66, l. 266, 264–6), 266 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 769, l. 159–60, 162–3); RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 969, l. 1, 31–8; Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 249–50 (Aug. 2, 1935); Davies, “Making Economic Policy,” 64–80.

117. Narodno-khoziaistvennyi plan 1936, 269, 280. In July 1936, the investment plan introduced for 1937 would, again, be relatively moderate. Davies and Khlevnyuk, “Stakhanovism.”

118. Following much back-and-forth, the agreed amount was 112.75 billion in July, but the battles were refought and the numbers rose again to 133 billion. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro: mekhanizmy, 136–7 (RGAE, f. 4372, op. 92, d. 17, l. 366; d. 18, l. 76–8); Davies, Crisis and Progress, 292–301. Stalin wrote to Molotov (Sept. 12, 1933), “I agree that capital investment should not be fixed at more than 21 billion rubles for ’34, and that the growth of industrial output should not be more than 15 percent. That will be better.” Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 248–9.

119. DVP SSSR, XVIII: 646–7n157 (Litvinov to Potyomkin, June 26, 1935); Abramov, “Osobaia missiia Davida Kandelaki,” 147 (citing AVP RF, f. 010, op. 10, nap. 51, d. 45, l. 136). Schacht advised Kandelaki to have the Soviet ambassador approach the foreign ministry. DGFP, series D, IV: 453–4. Kandelaki was received by Stalin on July 5 and July 7, 1935. Na prieme, 169.

120. Kommunisticheskii Internatsional pered VII Vsemirnym kongressom: materialy (Moscow: Partizdat, 1935), 116.

121. Dimitrov, “Nastuplenie fashizma,” 12–1; Dimitroff, Against Fascism and War, 14. Manuilsky spoke of the victories of socialist construction in the USSR, Thorez about how the USSR’s very existence had radicalized capitalism’s crisis and contradictions, and Togliatti about Soviet foreign policy (“Can one imagine a more remarkable achievement than a great capitalist country having to sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, involving defense against an aggressor and a willingness to defend peace and the borders of the homeland of the dictatorship of the proletariat?”). This was the only Comintern Congress for which a complete stenographic record was not published. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, 403–27. See also Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 52–9.

122. There was speculation that the photograph in Pravda of Stalin and the delegates was faked. Peschanski, Marcel Cachin, IV: 111 (July 26, 1935).

123. Clark, “Germanophone Exiles.” At a meeting with the scholars at the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, Yezhov “said that he does not trust political émigrés and those who have been abroad.” By Sept. 1935, he would come to the (inevitable) conclusion that spies were rampant among the political émigrés. Solov’ev, “Tetradi krasnogo professora 1912–1941 gg.,” IV: 178. See also Zhuravlev and Tiazhel’nikova, “Inostrannye kolonii,” 181. On Feb. 28, 1936, a politburo decree would restrict the movement and further arrivals of political émigrés. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 79, l. 98–100; Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK, 738–41 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 248, l. 115–8: March 9), 823n171. In 1935–6, of the 9,965 arrests for espionage, 7,100 were accused of espionage on behalf of Germany (1,322), Japan (2,275), or Poland (3,528). Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 46 (TsA FSB, f. 8 os, op. 1, d. 79). 317).

124. One person died before sentencing. “O tak nazyvaeomom ‘Kremlevskom dele’”; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1062, l. 167–9; Zhukov, Inoi Stalin, 133–72. Abroad, a Ukrainian-language newspaper published in the then Romania-controlled city of Cernăuți (Chernivtsi/Czernowitz) imagined with the Kremlin Affair that Soviet elites could not be bought off with a return to bourgeois private property or reinvigorated with an influx of youth. “Dictatorship in Soviet Russia is seriously reeling,” the article fantasized. “Stalin already is no longer master of the secret police . . . Stalin—whose name makes 160 million quake with fear—is already staggering.” “Propast’ radianskogo soiuzu i nezaleshna Ukraina!” Chas, July 6, 1935, courtesy of Cristina Florea.

125. Bediya did not write the text; he oversaw the working group (P. Butyrina, G. Khachapuridze, V. Mertskhulava), whose draft Merkulov edited. Sukharev, “Litsedeistvo,” 112 (citing PA IIP pri TsK KPSS, f. 8, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1; f. 8, op. 2, chast’ 1, d. 32, l. 117; f. 8, op. 1, d. 39., l. 3, 11–12). See also Beria’s remarks (Jan. 1934): VII s”ezd Kommunisticheskikh organizatsii Zakavkaz’ia, 29–30. Dawn of the East also published “responses” confirming the narrative. Bediya would be arrested on Oct. 20, 1937; Beria would have him admit Beria’s authorship in his presence. Popov and Oppokov, “Berievshchina” (1989, no. 7), 82–7; “Plenum TsK KPSS, iiul’ 1953 goda: stenograficheskii otchet,” 181.

126. Pravda, July 29 to August 5, 1935. Pravda then praised it in a separate editorial (Aug. 10, 1935). See also RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 704–5; op. 4, d. 662, l. 428.

127. Beria, K voprosu ob istorii bol’shevistskikh organizatsii na Zakavkaz’e (Moscow: Partizdat, 1935); Maslov, “‘Kratkii kurs istorii VKP (b),’” 53n15.

128. Zaria vostoka, Sept. 2, 1935. The Soviet envoy to Hungary, Alexander Bekzadyan, an ethnic Armenian, while giving a mandatory report about the Central Committee plenum to embassy party members, was said to have remarked, “They took down Yenukidze wrongly, he’s a big-time revolutionary of the Caucasus, and they swallowed him on the basis of settling personal scores.” He said in reference to Beria, “I know him.” APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 324, l. 84–8 (a denunciation by I. D. Ovsiannikov later sent by Yezhov to Stalin: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/61210).

129. Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 94–100 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1077, l. 62–5), 100–7 (l. 67–73), 108–10; Pravda, Aug. 2, 1935.

130. Menning has noted that in Dec. 1935, “a special group of the party Control Commission would report to Stalin that an investigation had revealed that railroads along the Baltic, western, and southwestern strategic directions ‘were unprepared in a full sense for a mobilization period.’” Voroshilov pointed out that on the right bank of the Dnieper, Poland’s throughput capacity exceeded the Soviet Union’s, 195 trains against 156, and he requested massive construction, and special appropriation of 387 million rubles. Bruce W. Menning, “Soviet Railroads and War Planning,” unpublished ms., 19–20 (citing RGUA, f. 4, op. 14, d. 1452, l. 27, 30–33, 2–3).

131. Nevezhin, Zastol’nye, 94–100 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1077, l. 62–5), 100–7 (67–73—a second variant). Stalin removed from the transcript Kaganovich’s phrase “for the victory of the world revolution.” It became just “toward victory.”

132. Leibzon and Shirina, Povorot v istorii Kominterna, 93–102.

133. Rosenfeldt, Knowledge and Power, 181. On Sept. 29, 1935, the Central Committee decreed the founding of the Central Museum of Lenin in Moscow. All documents and other materials were ordered sent to Moscow (local museums were supposed to make do with photo duplications, even if the original had been generated in their locale). RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 971, l. 72; Shul’gina, “Teoretiko-metodoligicheskie osnovy deiatel’nosti museev.” In 1936, the Lenin Museum would be given the building of the old Moscow city Duma.

134. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 1, d. 5089, l. 1; Brandenberger, “Stalin as Symbol,” at 257–8. Tovstukha, rebuffing Yarosvalsky’s request for assistance, had rudely stated: “It will not turn out as a biography of Stalin—it will just be another history of the party and Stalin’s role therein.” Sukharev, “Litsedeistvo,” 105–7, 110–1, 116; RGASPI, f. 89, op. 8, d. 1001, l. 7, 23–4; f. 155, op. 1, d. 88, l. 1; d. 90, l. 1–1ob. On Aug. 19, on the dictator’s instructions from Sochi, the politburo forbade Beria to republish Stalin’s writings from 1905–10 without his express authorization. Beria responded that there had never been a plan to republish without authorization. The politburo also resolved to publish Stalin’s collected works, projected at eight volumes. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 526 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 88, l. 21–2, 23; f. 17, op. 3, d. 970, l. 50); Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 394 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 905, l. 6, 10; d. 1164, l. 113); Artizov and Naumov, Vlast’, 745n17. Ilizarov, Tainaia zhizn’ Stalina, 138; Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 405–6 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 905, l. 11–3: Nov. 13, 1935). The second edition of Lenin’s Collected Works was being completed in thirty volumes: Sochineniia, 30 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1926–35).

135. Despite the secrecy and lies of the regime surrounding Stalin’s life, Souvarine managed thorough, judicious research in published sources. He wrote a classic political history of the regime rather than a biography per se, but attained an insight into Stalin’s character. Souvarine, Stalin, with a new chapter added to the 1937 French re-edition. See also Lyons, “Stalin, Autocrat of all the Russias.” In France, Gallimard had rejected the manuscript. Panné, Souvarine, 222–6. Adam Ulam, and many others, would largely follow Souvarine’s template. Ulam, Stalin.

136. The breakout to the Long March occurred on Oct. 16, 1934. Radio contact with the Comintern had already been lost the month before. Wilson, Long March; Yang, From Revolution to Politics; Shuyun, Long March; Braun, Kitaiskie zapiski. The Japanese had demolished Chinese Communist organizations in Manchuria by 1934. Lee, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria, 231; in Krymov, “Istoricheskie portrety,” 65–6.

137. Kosheleva, Pis’ma Stalina Molotovu, 252–3 (Aug. 5, 1935). Trotsky predicted from exile that the gathering would “pass into history as the liquidation congress.” Biulleten’ oppozitsii, no. 46 (Dec. 1935): 12.

138. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 18, l. 110. Kaganovich and Yezhov telegrammed from Moscow that they had spoken to Pyatnitsky and Knorin, both of whom were being moved out of the Comintern. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 523 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 88, l. 9: Aug. 14, 1935), 523 (l. 9: Aug. 15), 523 n1 (f. 17, op. 3, d. 970, l. 42: Aug. 16).

139. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 141–3 (TsA FSB, ASD P-4497, t. 1, s. 24, ASD p-4574, t. 1, l. 31: Baumanis). Kaganovich’s profile had risen higher still thanks to the successful metro construction. He would receive a thunderous ovation at the Central Committee plenum in Dec. 1935. After a Dec. 1936 banquet for the wives of engineers, Galina Shtange would write in her diary that Kaganovich was simple, expressive, and handsome, with “above all, enormous serenity and intelligence, then firmness of purpose and an unyielding will; but when he smiles, his basic goodness shows through.” Garros et al., Intimacy and Terror, 184.

140. Pravda, Aug. 21, 1935.

141. Bullitt had conveyed the same warning to Litvinov. FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, 111, 131, 156–7, 221–3. U.S. complaints were already frequent about Soviet violations of the no-domestic-interference clause. The Nov. 16, 1933, agreement on noninterference in internal affairs did not specifically mention the Comintern, but the Soviet government had promised “not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives of any organization or group—which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for an overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States.” FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, 29. Louis Fischer, who on July 2, 1935, had passed to Bullitt the probable dates of the Comintern Congress, lobbied him not to protest, given the spread of fascism in Europe and the Comintern’s intention to take up the question of how to stop it. Fischer, Autobiography, 305; Bennett, Search for Security, 63.

142. VII Congress of the Communist International, 83–8, 245–8; Maddux, Years of Estrangement, 41 (citing Bullitt to Washington, Aug. 21, 1935).

143. From Washington, Troyanovsky wrote that the Aug. 25 note could be seen as a threat of war. On Aug. 27, Krestinsky handed Bullitt a response (approved by Stalin) maintaining that the Americans had not cited one fact of the supposed interference in their domestic affairs. In a new telegram to Washington, Bullitt additionally recommended expulsion of the Soviet military navy and air attachés. FRUS, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, 242–3, 249, 250 (Bullitt to Hull); DVP SSSR, XVIII: 474, 476–7; Sevost’ianov, “Obostreniie sovetsko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii,” 27 (citing APRF, f. 05, op. 15, pap. 113, d. 126, l. 85, 1, 11); Maddux, Years of Estrangement, 149 (citing National Archives, 711.61/541: Bullitt to Hull, Aug. 29, 1935); Bishop, Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, 50; Hull, Memoirs, I: 305.

144. DVP SSSR, XVIII: 507 (letter to Warsaw, B. G. Podolsky, Sept. 8, 1935).

145. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 532–3 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 88, l. 87, 88–91: Aug. 25, 1935), 534–5 (l. 81–3: Aug. 26), 535 (l. 81: Aug. 27), 536–7 (l. 110–110ob.: Aug. 27), 546 (d. 89, l. 4, 5–8: Sept. 2); Khromov, Po stranitsam, 205. Soviet press accounts were restrained: Pravda and Izvestiia, Aug. 28 and Sept. 3, 1935.

146. G.N. Sevost’ianov, “Sud’ba soglasheniia Ruzvel’t—Litvinov o dolgakh i kreditakh”; Maddux, Years of Estrangement, 27–43; Browder, Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy, 204–13.

147. Dodd and Dodd, Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 277–8 (Nov. 19, 1935). Bullitt would return to Moscow in Feb. 1936, but leave for good in April 1936 without informing Soviet officials that he was not coming back.

148. No meetings are recorded in Stalin’s office from Aug. 10, 1935, through Nov. 2, 1935. Na prieme, 171.

149. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 527 (RGAPSI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 100, l. 89–90: Aug. 19, 1935).

150. Kaganovich and others sent a telegram to Sochi with a recommendation to make the funeral broader than just a Comintern event, and to send the ashes to Paris. Stalin agreed, pending the wishes of Barbusse’s relatives. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 83, l. 139.

151. Barbusse, Stalin. Barbusse’s book contained numerous names of people who would turn out to be enemies of the people, and within two years, all copies would be pulled. Medvedev, Let History Judge, 817–8.

152. The regime would claim a harvest of 90 million tons, based on inflated yield estimates. Davies et al., Years of Progress, 254–5 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 977: April 29, 1936; RGAE, f. 4372, op. 35, d. 467, l. 85–6), 258; Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, IV: 615 (Oct. 18, 1935); Sochineniia, XIV: 93–9.

153. Kaganovich added that “the smartest of the foreign correspondents, Duranty, had written: ‘in America they make noise about the Comintern Congress and do not see the most decisive main thing that was published yesterday in the newspapers—the report of the Azov–Black Sea territory about the completion of grain procurements.’” Khlevniuk et al., Stalinskoe politbiuro, 145–6 (RGASPI, f. 85, op. 27, d. 93, l. 1–11). See also Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 553–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 743, l. 29–36: Sept. 5).

154. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 553–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 743, l. 29–36), 558 (f. 81, op. 3, d. 100, l. 91–4: Sept. 8, 1935), 558n3 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 663, l. 128–9: Kandelaki to Stalin, Sept. 3).

155. “Since Yenukidze does not admit his fall, and does not suffer from humility, he is trying to control the local organizations, assigning them tasks, distributing holidaying comrades among the sanatoriums, giving them their residences,” Stalin explained, adding that this had spurred talk Yenukidze had not been sent to Kislovodsk “as punishment but on holiday.” Stalin also noted that local comrades Yevdokimov and Sheboldayev had objected to Yenukidze’s appointment in Kislovodsk, and that Kalinin and Shkiryatov (head of party control), holidaying in Sochi, agreed. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i kaganovich, 557–8 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 89, l. 71–76). Agranov (Sept. 5, 1935) wrote to Stalin about an anonymous letter sent early in the summer to “the Moscow party organization, Khrushchev personally,” which stated of the Kremlin Affair that “the whole plan consists in removing that odious figure who now blocks even the sun.” Stalin wrote in “Stalin” next to the words “odious figure.” In another passage, which referred to “that cook,” he also wrote in “Stalin.” The letter blamed Lominadze’s suicide (still not publicly announced) on “the new tyrant” and expressed concern that Yenukidze would commit suicide, too. The NKVD checked hundreds of people via handwriting analysis and arrested B. I. Shilikhin, who until 1930 had worked in Kalinin’s reception office and in 1935 was a jurist in the metal import office. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChk, 683–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 238, l. 86–93), 821n163. The letter to Khrushchev was dated June 4, 1935.

156. The decree was dated Sept. 10–11, 1935, but Yenukidze stalled his relocation from Kislovodsk. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 557–8 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 89, l. 71–76), 558 (RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 100, l. 91–4: Sept. 8, 1935), 560 (f. 558, op. 11, d. 89, l. 89; f. 17, op. 3, d. 971, l. 30), 580 (f. 558, op. 11, d. 90, l. 41: Sept. 22), 583 (l. 55: Sept. 23). Yenukidze would be arrested on Feb. 11, 1937. Much later Stalin would state, “I recommended that he be expelled from the party already back then, but they did not believe me, thinking that as a Georgian I am severe toward Georgians. But the Russians, you see, they decided to defend ‘this Georgian.’” RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1120, l. 28–57 (at 46–7: Stalin, June 2, 1937, Main Military Council).

157. Yezhov sought permission to conspire behind Yagoda’s back with Yagoda’s first deputy Agranov to get to the bottom of things. Agranov, it seems, fell ill, so Yezhov schemed with others in the NKVD. Pavliukov, Ezhov, 162–3, 170–1 (citing RGASPI, f. 671, op. 1, d. 28, l. 177–81); Pavliukov, Ezhov, 172; Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 91.

158. The politburo decreed that Yezhov take a two-month holiday, and approved hard currency worth 3,000 rubles for him to go abroad for medical treatment with his wife. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 572n5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 743, l. 37–9; d. 755, l. 39; d. f. 17, op. 163, d. 1079, l. 63; op. 3, d. 971, l. 57).

159. Chigirin, Stalin, 83 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1482, l. 51ob.).

160. Valedinskii, “Organizm Stalina vpolne zdorovyi,” 72. The incident is not dated; Shneiderovich saw Stalin in 1934–6.

161. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1479, l. 14–8.

162. Soviet diplomats noted cold, distant attitudes of the French officials with whom they interacted, while in Sept. 1935, a Soviet military mission to France received a favorable reception and were shown the Maginot Line (which was to be operational the next year) but came away unimpressed. Gamelin evaded being drawn into political discussions. Alexander Sedyakin (b. 1893), deputy head of the general staff responsible for Red Army training, concluded that the Soviets had next to nothing to learn from the French. DVP SSSR, XVIII: 505–6 (Potyomkin, Sept. 11, 1935), 659n212 (Hirschfeld to Krestinsky, Sept. 11); Castellan, “Reichswehr et armée rouge,” at 254–5; Orlov, “V poiskakh soiuznikov.” France had sharply curtailed military spending beginning in 1932. Jackson, “French Strategy,” 63.

163. Kievskii Krasnoznamenyi, 101–6 (citing RGVA, f. 25580, op. 74, d. 25, l. 12; d. 29, l. 332–3, 373–6); Dubynskii, “Bol’shie kievskie manevry,” 157–69; Eremenko, V nachale voiny, 7–13 (esp. 9 and 13, illustrations); Orlov, “V poiskakh soiuznikov,” 48; Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia, V: 121–2; Grechko et al., Istoriia Vtoroi mirovoi voiny, I: 299; Kokoshin, Armiia i politika, 95, 192–6; Ziemke, Red Army, 194; Erickson and Simpkin, Deep Battle.

164. Kvashonkin, Sovetstskoe rukovodstvo, 311–2 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 37, l. 94–6). Voroshilov studied the assembled foreign reactions. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 242n43 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 740, l. 193–208). On the Red Army’s internal assessment and subsequent extended discussion: RGVA, f. 4, op. 15, d. 5, l. 419–23 (Sept. 22, 1935); op. 18, d. 52 (Dec. 8–14, 1935). General Ludvík Krejčí, head of the general staff, led the Czechoslovak delegation.

165. Loizeau’s observations were reported in Le Temps, Sept. 20, 1935. See Loizeau’s meeting with Tukhachevsky: DVP SSSR, XVIII: 518–21 (Sept. 25, 1935); Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 242n44 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 687, l. 64–74: Sept. 25); Izvestiia, Sept. 27, 1935.

166. Dreifort, “French Popular Front,” 219, citing General Lucien Loizeau, “Une Mission militaire en U.R.S.S.,” Revue des Deux Mondes, Sept. 15, 1955: 275.

167. Habeck, Storm of Steel, 231 (citing RGVA, f. 4, op. 15, d. 5, l. 419–23: Sept. 22; l. 163, 165–6: Dec. 28, 1935).

168. Habeck, Storm of Steel, 231 (citing PA-AA, R31683K, pp. 134–39: report from Hagemeier, German Consulate in Kiev, “Inhalt: Herbstmanover der Roten Armee bei Kiew,” Oct. 2, 1935).

169. In his final remarks Hitler repudiated those who said, “The Führer, yes—but the party, that’s a different matter.” “No, gentlemen! The Führer is the party, and the party is the Führer.” Der Parteitag der Freiheit vom 10.-16. September 1935, 287.

170. It also forbade employment of German females under forty-five in Jewish households. Pätzold, Verfolgung, Vertreibung, Vernichtung, 113–4.

171. Kershaw, Hitler: 1889–1936, 569–71; Domarus, Hitler: Reden, I: 536–7.

172. Goebbels, Kommunismus ohne Maske, 5, 7. See also Bamsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda.

173. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 567 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 89, l. 122: Sept. 15, 1935), 569 (l. 114–7: Sept. 15). In response to Kaganovich’s and Molotov’s proposed list of Soviet journalists to be sent to Prague at the invitation of Czechoslovakia, Stalin wrote, “It is necessary to include . . . one or two female journalists, one more Ukrainian writer, one or two Belorussian writers; in that connection, it’s not required to send editors of newspapers, it’s possible to send just popular writers.” Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 567 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 89, l. 110–110ob.), 571 (l. 152: Sept. 17), 571 (l. 154: Sept. 17).

174. Holmes, Stalin’s School, 167 (citing interview of Krasnogliadova, who referred to conversations with Belogorskaya).

175. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh, 53–4 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 1553, l. 7–8).

176. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh, 183–4 (Svanidze diary: Nov. 17, 1935), 185 (Dec. 4).

177. Leushin, “Staliniada,” 105 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 754, l. 112–3).

178. The upshot was a drop between 1927 and 1935 in the ratio of dependents to earners from 2.5 to 1.6. Goldman, Women, the State and Revolution, 103. “I like good clothes,” Sophie Kienya, a technician of Shaft 82, Metro Construction, was quoted as telling a foreign resident. “At work underground I wear rubber waders, breeches, and tie up my hair in a handkerchief. But at home and on free days I want my dresses to be fashionable and pretty and to fit well. All our girls like pretty clothes. At the theater or at parties when you meet girls from the Metro you would never think that they spent their days working underground . . . Our shoes are now excellent, but our factories should pay more attention to producing elegant buttons, trimmings, bags, gloves.” Malnick, Everyday Life, 221.

179. Kaganovich assured Stalin that “many workers made a calculation and themselves pointed out that, since previously they were buying supplementary meat and butter at markets, now they were gaining. Now, it seems, we will need to pay attention to shops and organizing sales.” Davies et al., Years of Progress, 174–6; Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 589–90 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 743, l. 40–4: Sept. 26, 1935). See also Davies and Khlevniuk, “Otmena kartochnoi sistemy v SSSR,” 127.

180. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 34.

181. Osokina, Ierarkhiia potrebleniia; Osokina, Za fasadom; Hessler, Social History of Soviet Trade; Randall, Soviet Dream World.

182. “Moscow restaurants left nothing to be desired,” wrote Juri Jelagin, a violinist at the Vakhtangov Theater, of an evening meal that, with entertainment, could easily cost two weeks of a worker’s salary. “Magnificent, live Volga sturgeons swam in a pool in the center of the dining room at the Metropol on Theater Square. The patrons could select the fish they wanted in the clear water.” Ziegler’s Czech jazz band played at the Metropol and Tsafman’s and Utyosov’s bands at the National, while gypsies sang at the Prague on the Arbat. Jelagin, Taming of the Arts, 136–8. Charles Thayer, the U.S. embassy official, recalled, “a good dinner at the Metropol or the Medved Restaurant was cheap enough.” Thayer, Bears in the Caviar, 106.

183. Martelli, Italy Against the World; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis; Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder; Strang, Collision of Empires. See also Durand, Crazy Campaign.

184. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 545 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 89, l. 2–2ob.: Sept. 2, 1935). The Abyssinian invasion also did not inhibit Soviet participation in Milan’s first international air show (Oct. 12–28, 1935), where the Soviets exhibited their well-designed Il-15 biplane, which impressed as best in show. Their Il-16, a low-wing cantilever monoplane, was then the fastest fighter in the world, but the international audience dismissed its performance data as too good to be true. 1 Salone Internazionale Aeronautico; Ziemke, Red Army, 193. The story would make the rounds that Stalin mischievously ordered one of his NKVD attendants to get Ras Kasa—a tribal leader in the resistance to Italian forces—on the phone, and when the operative returned distraught, unable to connect to the mountain Ethiopian, Stalin was said to have replied, “And you are still working in security?” Gromyko, Memoirs, 103 (no citation).

185. The USSR had lost to Mexico by a single vote. Stalin added that “now you couldn’t chase Litvinov from the assembly presidium with a broom.” Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich, 561–2 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 89, l. 92–3: Sept. 11, 1935), 562–3 (l. 93: Sept. 11), 563 (l. 103: Sept. 12), 563–4 (l. 99–102: Sept. 12). See also DVP SSSR, XVIII: 523–4 (telegram to Litvinov, Oct. 4, 1935), 525–6 (Potyomkin speech Oct. 10), 661 (Potomykin telegram, Oct. 11); Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, 329–30 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 18, l. 173), 330 (l. 175), 330–1 (l. 178), 332 (l. 187), 333 (op. 162, d. 19, l. 14), 334 (l. 32), 337–8 (d. 20, l. 4, 8); and Walters, History of the League of Nations, I: 358–9. Stalin allowed Litvinov to support sanctions against Italy, but the politburo instructed him to “follow an independent Soviet line . . . and avoid anything that could be interpreted as a subordination of our line to the position of Britain.” Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Evropa, 331 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 18, l. 178: Oct. 15, 1935).

186. DGFP, series C, IV: 778–9 (Oct. 29, 1935).

187. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh, 183 (Svanidze diary: Nov. 17, 1935).

188. She was either 75 or 77 (Keke’s birth year remains uncertain because of a possible effort to increase her age at marriage). Stalin had visited her, briefly, in 1921 and in 1927.

189. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh, 16–7 (l. 45–6: March 24, 1934). “I. V. profoundly suffered from the loss of his wife and friend,” Vlasik would recall. Loginov, Teni Stalina, 97. Artyom recalled an incident when Vasily told his father that he and his buddies had seen old women crossing themselves and praying, and how they threw a firecracker at their feet. Stalin erupted: “Why, why did you do that?! Vasily: “Why were they praying?!” Stalin: “Do you respect grandmother? Do you love her? She prays. Because she knows something that you do not know!” Sergeev and Glushik, Besedy o Staline, 89–96; Moskovskii komsomolets, Aug. 3, 2004.

190. Sukharev, “Litsedeistvo,” 106 (citing PA IIP pri TsK KP Gruzii, f. 8, op. 1, d. 17, l. 20, 24: G. V. Khachapuridze, 54).

191. A visiting Moscow inspector had just approved the plans. Sokolov, Beriia, 97–8 (Sept. 1935).

192. Stalin, in a letter to his mother (June 11, 1935), mentioned she was ill (“Do not be afraid of illness, get strong, it shall pass”). Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh, 18 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 1549, l. 55–6). Beria had had a journalist transcribe and edit what were purported to be Keke’s “memoirs,” which he evidently intended to use to flatter Stalin. (Instead, they were buried in the Georgian party archive.) The interviews took place on Aug. 23, 25, and 27, 1935. Dzhugashvili, Moi syn Iosif Stalin. See also the hearsay about Stalin in Georgia at this time: Blagoveshchenskii, “V gostiakh u P. A. Sharii,” 472n28.

193. The same source has Stalin saying, “Mama, do you remember our tsar? Well, I’m something like the tsar.” “You’d have done better to become a priest,” Keke is said to have replied. Radzinsky, Stalin, 24 (recollections of N. Kipshidze, a doctor who treated Keke, quoted without citation).

194. On the supposed lingering influence of Georgian literary styles on Stalin, see Vaiskopf, Pistael’ Stalin, 130–1, 181–98.

195. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 92, l. 22–3.