Stalin

231. Hess’s flight likely was unassisted by German electronic systems. Deighton, “Hess the Aviator,” 121–38. One of the Luftwaffe’s best pilots would claim, after the war, that on May 10, 1941, Göring had called and ordered him to intercept Hess, who was already in the air. Adolph Galland, the pilot, would also claim that he implemented the order only perfunctorily, having no idea how to find Hess’s Messcherschmitt Bf 110 amid all the others in the sky at that time. Tolliver and Constable, Fighter General.

232. Fox, “Propaganda,” 88 (citing FO 1093/10: Medical Research Council report); Rees et al., Case of Rudolf Hess, 16; Pick, Pursuit of the Nazi Mind, 42. See also Hess, Prisoner of Peace, 31–8.

233. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 246–9 (citing WO 199/3288/A: May 11, 1941, and FO 1093/11 fols. 152–5).

234. Heiden, “Hitler’s Better Half.”

235. Schellenberg, Schellenberg Memoirs, 201. Churchill would later assert that Hess denied Germany was planning an invasion and asserted that Germany had certain demands the USSR would have to satisfy—i.e., the ultimatum. Churchill, Second World War, II: 46.

236. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 103 (May 11, 1941); Schmidt, Statist, 549; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372, citing Heinz Linge, “Kronzuege Linge: der kammerdiener des ‘Führers,’” Revue, Munich, Nov. 1955–March 1956, 60; Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 117–8 (May 15, 1941); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 412–5. Hess left four letters: the others were for his wife, Ilse, Willy Messerschmitt (whose plane he took), and Helmut Kaden (whose flight suit he took).

237. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372–3.

238. Fest, Face, 292; Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 375–6.

239. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 372. When Hitler summoned Mussolini on June 2, 1941, to the Brenner Pass they talked, among other matters, about Hess. The Führer was said to have had tears in his eyes. Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 174.

240. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 309–10 (May 13, 1941). See also Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 274. The next day the Germans issued a fuller statement, calling Hess’s mission a result of “mental confusion” that would change nothing in German-British relations. Goebbels had objected, to no avail (“It’s rightly being asked how such an idiot could be the second man after the Führer”). Domarus, Hitler: Reden, IV: 1716; Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 311 (May 14). See also Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, IV: 532 (Leipzig SD report, May 17, 1941).

241. Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, 375; Gamm, Der Flüsterwitz, 36; Vassiltchikov, Berlin Diaries, 51 (May 18, 1941).

242. The British interrogator (Ivone Kirkpatrick) concluded: “Hess does not seem . . . to be in the near counsels of the German government as regards operations; and he is not likely to possess more secret information that he could glean in the course of his conversations with Hitler and others.” See also Schmidt, “Der Hess-Flug,” 14. Goebbels (May 15) intuited that the British had chosen to “let the lies run free” and became gleeful that the British had failed to play this trump card properly, and said the German people were comparing the incident to “a razor cut on the face” that would heal quickly and be forgotten. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 317–9 (May 17, 1941); Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 165 (May 19).

243. Tsarev, “Poslednii polet,” III: 433–40. On May 18, Philby, after a conversation with a foreign office press department contact, reported that Hess had not given away any valuable information, remained loyal to Hitler, and called the German-British war a crime. Tsarev, “Poslednii polet,” III: 435–7; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 200–1 (May 14, 1941).

244. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 272; Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 116. The Soviets also believed the British secret services had been involved in luring Hess. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, 157; and Erickson, “Rudolf Hess.” Roosevelt doubted the official British story as well, and feared there was substance to the rumors of a substantive peace mission. Kimball, “Hess Distraction”; Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, I: 184–6; Pick, Pursuit of the Nazi Mind, 45 (citing PPF3716, letters from John Coar and Ambassador William Dodd). Dekanozov sent Molotov a comprehensive analysis (May 21, 1941) of the Hess mission, based on the German press and hearsay in Berlin, asserting that it proved the existence of divisions within the German leadership and a tendency toward an agreement with Britain. It was forwarded to Stalin on May 26. Nauomv, 1941 god, II: 261–6 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 689, l. 64–74).

245. Cripps, in some desperation back on April 23, 1941, had telegrammed London about Soviet-German negotiations (which did not exist), speculating that Hitler could get what he wanted from Moscow by blackmail without war, and that the Soviets feared a separate deal between Britain and Germany, which could be used by London to prevent a Soviet-German deal. He stressed that only the fear of a separate peace would bring the Soviets around to the British side. This had been intercepted and decrypted, and forwarded by Fitin on May 5 to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 152–3 (TsA FSB, f. Zos, op. 8, d. 56, l. 1160–3). Cadogan noted in his diary (May 30, 1941), effectively repudiating Cripps, that because of British military weakness, its diplomacy was “completely hamstrung. For instance—Russia. You can’t do anything nowadays with any country unless you can a) threaten b) bribe it. Russia has a) no fear of us whatever and b) we have nothing to offer her.” Dilks, Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 382.

246. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, I: 614–5; Gorodetsky, Mission to Moscow, 134–5.

247. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 262–7 (citing AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 352, d. 2402, l. 174, and The Times, May 27, 1941). See also Görtemaker, “Bizarre Mission,” 75–101; Kettenacker, “Mishandling a Spectacular Event,” 19–38; and Fox, “Propaganda.” On June 5, Maisky insisted to Eden that no German-Soviet negotiations were under way; Eden replied that he knew they were. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 273 (citing AVP RF, f. 059, op. 1, pap. 352, d. 2402, l. 149–52: Maisky to Moscow); Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 359. Woodward gives the date of this encounter as June 10: British Foreign Policy, I: 620.

248. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 123. See also Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 221–2. The Japanese ambassador to Moscow complained to Tokyo that Soviet counterintelligence was smothering, adding that “they steal suitcases from military attachés.” Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 289 (TsA FSb, f. 3, op. 5, d. 82, l. 51), 304 (TsA FSB, f. 66, op. 1, d. 391, l. 55). Schulenburg reported to Berlin (May 24, 1941) that he had been received by Molotov with the familiar degree of confidence and in the same office as previously, albeit with the nameplate altered (to deputy chairman), but that Molotov effectively held the same position of power as previously—Stalin’s top deputy. The ambassador added that Soviet policy remained “directed at avoidance of a conflict with Germany,” which was “proved by the attitude taken by the Soviet government in the last few weeks, the tone of the Soviet press, . . . and the observance of the trade agreements concluded with Germany.” Nonetheless, he began to resign himself to having failed in his larger mission. He had finally acquired his dream castle, the Burg Falkenberg in the Upper Palatinate, in the late 1930s, and, after Molotov’s disastrous Nov. 1940 visit to Berlin, Hitler had ordered that the count be given a humongous bribe, 200,000 reichsmarks, which the count had used to renovate it. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 95–6; Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 344–5; Fleischhauer, Diplomatischer Widerstand, 312, 404n; DVP SSSR, XXIII/ii: 521 (Soviet assessment of Schulenburg, from the former KGB archive).

249. Fleischhauer, Diplomatischer Widerstand, 194.

250. Some have speculated that the aircraft delivered a letter from Hitler for Stalin, supposedly a response to an earlier Stalin letter requesting an explanation for the German troop build-up. Zhukov, in interviews in 1966, said: “Sometime in early June I decided that I should again try to convince Stalin of the accuracy of the intelligence reports on the approaching danger. . . . Together with Defense Commissar Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko we brought along general staff maps with the locations of enemy troops. I reported. Stalin listened attentively but silently. After my report he sent us away without giving us his opinion . . . A few days passed and Stalin called for me. When I entered he was seated at his desk. I approached. Then he opened the middle drawer and took out several pieces of paper. ‘Read,’ said Stalin. I began to read. It was a letter from Stalin to Hitler in which he briefly outlined his concern over the German deployments, about which I had reported a few days earlier.” Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 472. Zhukov told Simonov around the same time (1965–6) that at a Jan. 1941 meeting Stalin said he had “turned to Hitler in a personal letter advising him that this was known to us, that it surprised us, and that it created the impression among us that Hitler intended to go to war with us.” Hitler’s supposed reply: Yes, there are large military formations on the frontier, but they “are not directed against the Soviet Union.” Simonov, “Zametki k biografii G. K. Zhukova,” 50–1 (published twenty-one years after the conversation). No such documents have emerged from Soviet or German archives. Hitler did have a secret archive, but in the bunker on April 22, 1945, he would order his adjutant to liquidate the contents of two safes; other such safes were found in Berghof and in his Munich apartment; their contents would be destroyed, including Hitler’s correspondence with heads of state. But even so, copies would be expected to be in Soviet archives.

251. Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 339–41; Fel’shtinskii, SSSR-Germaniia, II: 164–5. That same evening, Schulenburg received instructions from Berlin to inform the Soviets that the alleged seventy-one border violations by Germans were “being investigated,” and that the investigation would “require some time.” Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 341–42. According to Zhukov, sometime in May 1941 Stalin told him and Timoshenko that German ambassador Schulenburg had requested that German officers be allowed to reconnoiter the Soviet border in what they presented as a search for the graves of German soldiers who went missing in World War I. Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 346–7; Ivanov, Shtab armeiskii, 98–9.

252. Mawdsley, “Crossing the Rubicon,” 849–53. See also Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarsossy,” 309–10.

253. The proposed surprise attack of 152 divisions and 3,000–4,000 aircraft against German positions in former southern Poland carried timetables and maps of the theater (one map carried a date, the lone one on the document). Gor’kov, “Gotovil li,” 40–5; Gor’kov, Kreml’, 303–9; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 215–20 (TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, d. 237, l. 1–15); Bobylev, “Tochku v diskussii stavit’ rano”; Zakharov, General’nyi shtab, 219–21. A partial, misleading version of the Vasilevsky plan was published: Kiselev, “Upriamye fakty nachala voiny,” 18–22. There has also been misleading commentary: Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/i: 136. For an analysis, see Bezymenskii, “O ‘Plane Zhukova.’” Bezymensky was Zhukov’s interpreter during the war. He reproduced a facsimile of some pages of the May 15 war plan (showing the quality penmanship). Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 478–9. The April 1941 local version of the war plan stated: “The USSR does not contemplate attacking Germany and Italy. These states are probably also not contemplating attacking the USSR in the near future.” Solonin, “Tri plana tovarischa Stalina,” 45–49.

254. Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina,’” 40–1; Forster and Mawdsley, “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective,” 86. There is a third-hand account of a blow-up between Stalin and Zhukov and Timoshenko. Bezymenskii, “O ‘Plane Zhukova,’” 61–2, 62n27 (citing General Nikolai Liashchenko, a major in 1941, who recorded conversations with Timoshenko in the 1960s); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 299 (citing the same source). A less dramatic version appears in Svetlishin, Krutye stupeni, 57–8 (interviews with Zhukov).

255. Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina’,” 41. Stalin also met with Timoshenko and Zhukov, but not Vatutin, on May 23, for two hours and fifty-five minutes. Na prieme, 333–4.

256. Molotov cautioned in connection to those such as Vasilevsky who claimed to know Stalin’s thinking: “‘Stalin believed this, Stalin thought that.’ As if anyone knew what Stalin thought about the war.” Chuev, Sto sorok, 42, 45.

257. Anfilov, “‘Razgovor zakonchilsia ugrozoi Stalina’,” 41; Anfilov, Doroga k tragedii, 166; Svetlishin, Krutye stupeni, 57–8. The document’s authenticity is beyond question, but in addition to the lack of signatures, there are no markings by Stalin on it. The document was apparently locked in the personal safe of Vasilevsky until 1948, and not kept in Stalin’s archive or Zhukov’s. From Vasilevsky’s safe it went to the military archives (TsAMO RF, f. 16a, op. 2951, d. 237). Danilov, “Stalinskaia strategiia nachala voiny.”

258. Gor’kov, “Gotovil li,” 40–1. A May 15 special communication by Golikov on the dislocation of German forces estimated 114–19 divisions in the frontier zone, and concluded: “The strengthening of German forces on the border with the USSR continues. The main territories of concentration are the southern part of the General-Gouvernement, Slovakia, and the northern part of Moldavia.” Lota, Sektretnyi front, 205–9 (citing TsAMO, op. 7237, d. 2, l. 109–13); Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 518. Vasilevsky would later show hindsight appreciation of German force concentrations, which had not been reflected in the May 15 war plan text. Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym, 232–3. See also Anfilov and Golikov, Zagadka 1941 goda, 251; Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 310.

259. A special inspection (May 23–June 5, 1941) of western military districts found their combat readiness unsatisfactory. Volkogonov, “German Attack,” 80.

260. Gareev, Neodnoznachnye stranitsy, 96. Only at the end of May 1941 had the general staff organized a war game to test the viability of covering plans under conditions of surprise attack. Nothing is known of the game’s results. Denisova and Tumash, Nakanune, 391. See also Murin, “Nakanune,” 9 (Arkhiv politbiuro TsK KPSS, f. 73, op. 2, d. 3, l. 30–44).

261. Mawdsley, “Crossing the Rubicon,” 836–44. Mawdsley, whose analysis is the best in print, notes that the late amendations by Vatutin were defensive, not preemptive, suggesting confusion or compromise even in the drafting, although these changes might have been written in Stalin’s presence. The assertion that Hitler’s invasion preempted an imminent Soviet attack, a baldfaced German lie circulated to justify their invasion, was shredded by Gabriel Gorodetsky, Mif “Ledokola.”

262. Preemption bordered on the preposterous. The May 15 war plan envisioned 196 Soviet divisions concentrated in the West; as of June 22, first and second strategic echelons numbered 56 rifle and cavalry divisions on the western frontier and 52 at a distance of 60–250 miles from the frontier. Many of these divisions were under-strength in personnel and equipment. Moreover, whereas MP-41 stipulated 6.5 million troops in the west, on June 22 there were 3 million. In the Western special military district—“special” meant the district was supposed to be able to battle without added reserves—a significant number of Pavlov’s divisions were made up of reservists, who had almost no training; the district had only a single mechanized corps. It relied on the civilian communications network. It was expected to complete its combat preparations in the first half of 1942. Mawdsley, “Crossing the Rubicon,” 855; Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, XII (I): 339–40 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 15, d. 27, l. 575–607); Gareev, Neodnoznachnaye stranitsy, 12; Murin, “Nakanune,” 10 (Vasilevsky); “GKO postanovliaet . . . ,” 20–1; Nekrich, Pariahs, 242–3. See also Nikulin, Tukhachevskii, 194. Soviet military districts were converted to “fronts” for war. This had happened on Sept. 11, 1939, for Poland (six days in advance); on Jan. 7, 1940, for Finland (in media res, reflecting the change in the war strategy); on June 9, 1940, for Bessarabia (nine days in advance); and in March 1941: northwest, west (central), and southwest. On May 27, Timoshenko would order that field command points be set up for the “fronts.” Vishlev, Nakanune, 29, 42–3; Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 119.

263. One goal was to create a second strategic echelon along the Dnieper and Western Dvina Rivers but beyond the range of Luftwaffe aerial reconnaissance. (The first strategic echelon was already deployed within the boundaries of the frontier military districts at sixty or fewer miles from the border.) Gorkov, “Gotovil li,” 40–5; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 345–6; Ivanov, Nachal’nyi period voiny, 211–2; Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 114.

264. On the night and early morning of May 14–15, Stalin met with Timoshenko and Zhukov yet again, along with Kaganovich, railways commissar, a crucial aspect of mobilization. Na prieme, 333. Soviet railway capacity limits on mobilization were a long-standing subject of Soviet analysis. Naumov, 1941, god, I: 545–8 (RGAE, f. 1884, op. 49, d. 1247, l. 1–6: Jan. 17, 1941). On these problems in the Imperial Russian Army, see Fuller, Strategy and Power, 303–6. On May 24, Stalin gathered more than twenty military men and other officials in the Little Corner from around 6:00 p.m., for three and a half hours. Na prieme, 334. Almost no information on this meeting has been adduced by Soviet military historians with access to the archives. Even the politburo special files contain no information on what was discussed or decided. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 34–5. Stalin next saw Timoshenko and Zhukov in the Little Corner on June 3, and again on June 6, 7, 9, 11, 18, and 21. The regime sought to get this stance across in the provincial press and the Red Army’s army political-propaganda directorate. Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 110 (citing RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 128, l. 36). Vishnevsky had attended Stalin’s May 5 speech and the closed door sessions of the army political-propaganda directorate. He wrote in his diary (May 13, 1941): “the struggle against Germany,” . . . “against fascism, against the most dangerous military neighbor, in the name of revolutionizing Europe and, of course, Asia.” Vishnevsky also mentioned Stalin’s words at the Tajik banquet (April 22): “about Lenin, about a new ideology, about the brotherhood of peoples, about the ruinous and dead ideology of racism.” Golubev et al., Rossiia i zapad, 118 (citing RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2079, l. 31).

265. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 628–9 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24119, d. 4, l. 435).

266. Meissner, Staatssekretär unter Ebert, Hindenburg, Hitler.

267. Berezhkov, S diplomaticheskoi missiei, 73; Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 53; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 23, p. 95, d. 6, l. 141–2 (Nov. 19, 1940); Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 150–9.

268. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 333–5. Werner Wächter, chief of staff in Goebbels propaganda ministry, would later call this “the age of whispering propaganda,” and boast about the flood of rumors, “all of which were equally credible, so that in the end there wasn’t a bugger left who had any idea what was really up.” Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 174 (1942).

269. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 270–1 (PA AA Bonn. Dienstelle Ribbentrop. UdSSR-RC, 7/1 R 27168, BI26041–26043); Vishlev, Nakanune, 153–4. Hilger would later write that “we thought the stories were being circulated deliberately, to exert pressure upon the Soviet Union” for extortion. Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 328–9. See also Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 198, 225.

270. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 124–7 (TsA FSB, f. 03os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1500–4); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 259–60; Primakov, Ocherki, III: 483–5. On May 27, British forces approached the outskirts of Baghdad, and German personnel prepared to evacuate. That same day the British sank the battleship Bismarck. In East Africa, Italy had capitulated to British forces (on May 18); Rommel, in North Africa, was faring poorly; Germany was suffering high casualties in efforts to seize Crete. (Of course, Germany had vast unused forces coiled to attack the USSR that were not being used against Britain.) All this could be considered to have put a definitive end to the concept of a German “peripheral strategy” attack in the Near East.

271. A Soviet counterintelligence profile (June 1940) noted: “Köstring has perfect command of Russian . . . an experienced and cunning person . . . commands an enormous tactical horizon, undergirded by rich practical experience.” The profile added: “At every occasion Köstring uses personal observations, conversations with the local population to compose wide-ranging overviews, reports and so on about the situation of the population, new construction sites etc.” Pogonii, Lubianka, 2, 225. Hitler had briefed Köstring about his intention to attack the USSR already on Sept. 3, 1940, in the company of Halder, but the specifics of Barbarossa do not appear to have been known to him. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 86.

272. This account comes from Vasily Ryasnoi, a Samarkand-born (1904) ethnic Ukrainian and the head of the German department in Soviet counterintelligence (abruptly inducted in 1937 from party work). Pogonii, Lubianka, 2, 224.

273. Several examples of purported transcripts of eavesdropping in April and May 1941 have been published: Istoriia Sovetskhikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, 313 (internal use only); Pronin, “Nevol’nye informatory Stalina,” 1–2 (citing unspecified FSB archives); Naumov, 1941 god, I: 598; Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 52–5 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 56, l. 1011–5: April 30), 109–12 (d. 57, l. 1346–51: May 18; a slightly different version with names omitted). NKGB counterintelligence did not know the extent to which Stalin read or extracted useful information from the bugged conversations. Pogonii, Lubianka, 2, 225. erik, op. 45, d. 29, l. 246.

274. Matveev and Merzhliakov, “Akademik kontrarazvedki,” 7; Karpov, “Vo glave komiteta informatsii,” 53.

275. Moritz, Fall Barbarossa, 160; Halder, Halder Diaries, II: 943 (May 30, 1941); Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 435–6.

276. Military intelligence HQ supposedly responded to Sorge: “We doubt the veracity of your information.” Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 224 (no citation).

277. Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, 184. Soviet military intelligence had evidently sent a military attaché to Tokyo to check into his behavior and work, which exposed Sorge to risk. The young operative who checked him became quickly and utterly convinced of Sorge’s reliability. Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 173–5 (Kh. D. Mamsurov).

278. Clausen began to lose faith in Communism, as he would tell Japanese interrogators after his arrest on Oct. 18, 1941. Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, 119–22, 292; Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 18. Clausen’s radio had no outside aerial, for security purposes, but at night he could still broadcast more than 2,000 miles. (Although Japanese counterintelligence picked up the unauthorized signals, it could not pinpoint their source or decrypt the code.) Normally, the radio operator was not allowed to encrypt or decrypt the messages. But Sorge had had a motorcycle accident on May 13, 1938, and he had had to teach Clausen the cipher code and delegate to him the task of putting the material into code before sending it. Once Clausen (b. 1899) could read the content of Sorge’s messages, he was in a position to decide what to transmit (or not).

279. Sipols, Tainy, 397.

280. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 617–8 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 340–1); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 175; Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 116; Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, 146–7, citing Obi, Zoruge jiken, I: 248, 274. See also “Tiuremnye zapiski Rikharda Zorge.” Sorge’s messages via Clausen had not only to be decoded but translated from the German. Evidently, Sorge’s raw material, after being received at HQ in Moscow, was not always promptly processed and forwarded to the information (analytical) department.

281. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 627 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 381); Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 117–8; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 252. Golikov wrote on the document: “ask ‘Ramsay,’ corps or armies?”

282. Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 137–9 (Sudoplatov); Zhukov, “Iz neopublikovannykh vospominanii”; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 380. At the time, Zhukov recalls, Stalin did not name the suspected double agent to him, but later Zhukov concluded it must have been Sorge. “Sorge’s tragedy,” Sudoplatov later surmised, “was that with the authorization of Artuzov, Uritsky, Berzin, Karin, and Borovich (his communications officer) he cooperated with German intelligence in Japan. This put him a position of less than full trust.” Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 137.

283. Zhukov would later claim he was not informed by Stalin about the intelligence the regime was receiving. This was only partially true. Naumov, 1941 god, I: 378, 380. There is a story that during a showing to senior Soviet officers of a Franco-German film, Who Are You, Dr. Sorge? (1961), a retired Zhukov lost his composure, stood up in the cinema, and shouted out in the dark to Golikov, “Why did you at that time, Filipp Ivanovich, hide everything from me? Not report about such a document [Sorge’s report on an imminent German attack] to the chief of the general staff?” Golikov was said to have replied, “And what, should I have reported to you if this Sorge was a double, ours and theirs?” Vorob’ev, “Kazhdaia piad’ zemli,” 165–6. After Khrushchev saw the foreign film about Sorge, the story goes, he asked Mikoyan and then Soviet intelligence whether the USSR had had such an agent. A commission was formed under Kosygin and, posthumously, Sorge was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union on Nov. 5, 1964; his paramour/wife in Japan, Hanako Ishii, began receiving a Soviet pension.

284. Back in 1937, when Zhukov had been stationed in the Belorussian military district, Golikov had been sent there as a member of its military council, evidently on assignment for Mekhlis to help annihilate the local military elite. Golikov accused Zhukov, among others, of friendship with enemies of the people, interrogated Zhukov over his associations, and built a dossier on him (his wife had had his daughter christened in a church; he treated his subordinates rudely). But one of Zhukov’s accusers, it seems, was arrested (“he dug a pit for another, but fell into it himself,” in the popular saying, Zhukov wrote). Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 109; Spahr, Zhukov, 22–3.

285. This was partly based on having learned that transport of Far Eastern rubber to Germany via the Trans-Siberian Railroad was to be minimized. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 657–8 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 422); Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 119–20; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 303–4.

286. Whymant, citing Sorge’s testimony to his Japanese captors, surmises that some or all of the messages were not transmitted to Moscow. For ex., Sorge claims to have told Moscow: “Lieutenant General Scholl conveyed clearly to Ambassador Ott, in total secrecy, that Germany and the USSR were finally to go to war and he should take the necessary measures; and he told me various details about it.” Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, 164–5, citing Obi, Zoruge jiken, III: 183.

287. Sorge added: “Scholl avers that the most powerful strike will be struck by the left flank of the German army.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 658 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 424); Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 119–20; Novoe vremia, 1990, no. 26: 32 (photocopy of the radiogram). Golikov asked for clarification on the nature of the “tactical mistake” and on Scholl’s revelation about a left flank strike. By the time Sorge would able to reply, it was July 3, 1941. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 714 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 527–9). Scholl had been a deputy military attaché in Tokyo (1938–1940).

288. Vishlev, Nakanune, 53–5 (PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretar. Aufzeichunungen uber Diplomatenbesuche. Bd. 8 [R 29833], Bl. Ohne Nummer; Russland, Bd. 5 [R 29716], Bl. 035 [113439], 091 [113495], Bl. 087 [113491]).

289. Beria wrote: “In many places along the border the Germans have concentrated pontoons, wooden and inflatable boats. The greatest number of them can be found on the Brest-Lvov salient. Work continues on the mounting of defensive installations near the borders, mostly at night. Leaves for soldiers of German army units have been forbidden. Moreover, information has been received about the relocation of German troops from Budapest and Bucharest on an axis toward the borders of the USSR.” Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 202–3 (TsA FSK).

290. “Nakanune voiny (1941 g.),” 206; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 200–1. Romania had accumulated excellent intelligence on Soviet forces in the south of the USSR, material that was passed to the head of German military intelligence Admiral Canaris during his visit in May.

291. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 206–7 (TsA FSK).

292. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 208–9 (TsA FSK: June 3, 1941).

293. Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 6 (Blokhin and Samoilovich). Kuznetsov requested more funding in connection with shifting the navy to combat footing from July 1. Solonin, “Tri plana tovarishcha Stalina,” 57 (citing GARF, f. R-8418, op. 25, d. 481, l. 32–33: June 4). Further, on June 4, Kaiser Wilhelm II died peacefully in Dutch exile at age eighty-two; the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands laid a wreath in Hitler’s name. “There is no doubt that the Kaiser had the best intentions,” Goebbels instructed the Nazi press, “but . . . the decisive factor in history is not goodwill but great ability.” Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 172.

294. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 324–5. Beria (June 5) reported that “between June 1 and 5, the Romanian general staff had ordered all military personnel who are on leave as well as all reservists up to forty years of age on farming duty to report to their units.” Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 138–9 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 9, l. 68–9).

295. Omsk would not get equipment or shelving until late 1944 (around the time some materials would begin to be returned to Moscow). Vinogradov, “Istoriia formirovaniia arkhiva VChK,” 37. Large numbers of files are still there.

296. Boelcke, Secret Conferences, 174 (June 5, 1941).

297. Cripps arrived in London on June 11, by way of Stockholm, where the general director of the Swedish foreign ministry, taken aback at Cripps’s insistence on secret German-Soviet negotiations, shared details of Swedish intercepts of Wehrmacht orders to troops in Norway for an invasion of the USSR. The Swedish official stressed a coming attack in the week of June 20–25. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 304 (citing FO 371 29482 N2680/78/38, Mallet: June 8, and CAB 65/22/59 (41)2: June 12); Boheman, Pä Vakt, 154–5.

298. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, 197–8. Also on June 6, Stalin received a report that the USSR had 5.7 million wired radio receiver points, more than 80 percent of all its radio equipment, but that the wires were in disrepair, subject to interruption and breakdown. The other 20 percent, wireless radios, were deemed below international standard. Altogether, whereas the United States had 343 receivers (wireless and wired) for every 1,000 people, and Nazi Germany 159, the Soviet Union had just 36. Lovell, Russia in the Microphone Age, 41 (citing GARF, f. 6093, op. 1, d. 56, l. 10–2, 13–4, 19).

299. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 308. This was her last meeting with Zaitsev (“Bine”), who was recalled to Moscow; she was assigned a new handler, Anatoly Staritsky (“Tal”), a radio specialist, who was to teach her cipher codes and met with her on June 12.

300. Pavlov, “Ot ‘Iunkersa’ 1941 k Tsessne 1987”; Kuznetsov, “Krutye povoroty,” esp. no. 6 (1993): 79; Stepanov, “O masshtabakh repressii,” no. 5: 62; Medvedev, Let History Judge, 473.

301. Stalin arrested the family members of the military men he executed, but when one of his behind-the-lines saboteurs was killed in the line of duty, the despot awarded a 25,000-ruble cash award to the family and a pension to the widow of 500 rubles per month (the salary of the deceased). Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 261–2 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 4, d. 105, l. 205).

302. Timoshenko and Zhukov reported that in the first quarter of 1941, there had been 156 crashes killing 141 crew and destroying 138 aircraft. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph, 375 (citing TsAMO, f. 75284, op. 1, d. 119, l. 18). From Sept. 1, 1939, through June 22, 1941, the Luftwaffe, in training at flight schools, lost 1,924 killed and another 1,439 injured. Additionally, units in combat in the same period, in accidents and disasters, lost 1,609 killed and 485 injured. On average, this was 248 people a month. Solonin, “Delo aviatorov.”

303. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 135, 381. Kulik had sidetracked the Soviets’ own superior F-34 tank gun, whose production had been initiated by others, and even got Stalin to cut production of the versatile 76-mm antitank gun. “Disorganized but with a high opinion of himself, Kulik thought all his actions infallible,” recalled his first deputy. “Holding his subordinates in a state of fear was what he considered to be the best way of working.” Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 163. See also Pospelov, Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, I: 414–6, 475–6; Zakharov, Nakanune velikikh ispytanii, reprinted in idem., General’nyi shtab, 391; “Nakanune voiny: iz postanovlenii vysshikh partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh organov (Mai 1940 g.—21 iiunia 1941 g.),” 201–3; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 367; Vannikov, “Iz zapisok narkoma vooruzheniia”; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 62–3. When Khrushchev overstepped his writ and questioned Kulik’s competence, Stalin exploded: “You don’t even know Kulik! I know him from the civil war when he commanded the artillery in Tsaritsyn. He knows artillery!” Khrushchev, Vospominaniia, I: 283–4.

304. Kuznetsov and Dhzoga, Pervye geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza, 54. Rychagov was succeeded by his deputy, the forty-one-year-old Pavel Zhigaryov. Rychagov had proven his mettle in Spain in 1936 and at Lake Khasan in 1938. During the Finnish War, his forces, the 8th Army, had been surrounded and practically annihilated. See also “Beseda s admiralom flota Sovetskogo Soiuza I. S. Isakovym [May 21, 1962],” in Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniiia, 372–9.

305. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 671–2 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 7237, d. 2, l. 120–1). The Germans were issuing knowingly false military radio reports, overheard by Soviet signals intelligence agents, about the movement of their troops into Romania and Hungary, as if they were preparing to strike Ukraine. Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 252, 296–7. See also Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 174, 178–82, 225–6.

306. The envoy was Anatoly Lavrentyev (b. 1904), who until 1939 had worked in the heavy industry commissariat. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe” (no. 2), 75: PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretär, Russland, Bd. 5 (R 29716), Bl. 081 (113485); Vishlev, Nakanune, 50. The Slovak envoy in Moscow, according to the Germans, surmised that Stalin would satisfy German demands for whatever goods its war economy needed, but would not consent to placing Soviet territories under German rule. Nekrich, Pariahs, 229 (citing Bundesarchiw-Militärarchiw. RMII/34: 238: German naval attaché to Berlin, May 21, 1941).

307. An NKGB agent traveled the border on the German side, finding it saturated with troops in full combat gear hiding in the forests, with special weapons depots and oil tanks stuffed, and bridges fortified and heavily guarded. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 276–7 (citing TsA SVR, d. 21616, t. 2, l. 372–5: Kobulov to Timoshenko, June 9, 1941).

308. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 148–50 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1841–5: June 9, 1941). See also Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 474.

309. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 212 (TsA FSK: June 9, 1941). A note with the published document states that “the Japanese shared intelligence about the USSR with the Swedish, Turkish, Bulgarian and other embassies.”

310. Kumanev, “‘22ogo’ na rassvete,” 3 (citing Timoshenko recollections, at the Institute of History, Feb. 19, 1967); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 296–7; Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, 184 (no citation). Timoshenko’s recollections came after the Moscow showing of the film about Sorge. The Kremlin meeting could have happened on June 6, 1941. Vatutin evidently was also present. Gordetsky gives the date as June 18.

311. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 151 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1846: June 11, 1941); “Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny.” See also Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 334–6.

312. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 219–20 (TsA FSK); Primakov, Ocherki, III: 486 (TsA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1853–55); “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 216. The NKGB First Directorate summary of Kobulov’s report for the leadership altered the paragraph structure slightly, emphasizing the sentence: “Whether there will initially be some kind of demands presented to the Soviet Union is unknown.” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 342–3. Kobulov stressed that the recommendation of “Elder” to preempt the Germans was “straight from the heart,” not a “provocation.” Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 296 (citing TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 430–1). On June 9, 1941, border intelligence reported that as of May 28 the concentration of all troops against the USSR, including on the territory of the former Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Greece, Romania, and Germany east of Berlin, reached approximately 4.5 million. “Furthermore, Major Wendel [the source at German HQ] said that this army is fully ready for war with the USSR.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 676–80 (TsAMO, f. 127, op. 12915, d. 16, l. 362–8).

313. Moritz, Fall Barbarossa, 192. All the German war updates for the USSR can be found in Whaley, Codeword, 251–6. Hitler had returned from the Berghof to Munich on June 11, 1941, and late the next day left for Berlin, arriving by train near noon on June 13. The next day, he delivered a final all-day briefing to his forty-five most senior commanders at the Reich chancellery. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 605–6; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 455 (June 14, 1941), 456 (June 14). On June 17 Hitler and then the High Command confirmed the timetable. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI: 1001; Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 508.

314. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 151–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1857–50). See also Sinitsyn, Rezident svidetel’stvuet, 117–8 (referring to the agent “Monk,” who does not appear in the published intelligence materials); and Beshanov, Leningradskaia oborona, 28. The Soviet London station had reported on how Finland would join a German invasion of the USSR. TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1178–9 (May 4), l. 1220–1 (May 7), l. 1373–4 (May 16); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 177 (TsA SVR, f. 23078, t. 1, l. 366: May 7). The NKGB reported a partial Finnish mobilization on June 13. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 156–7 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1861–2).

315. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 309.

316. Beria added that from Oct. 1940 through June 10, the NKVD recorded 185 planes violating Soviet air space. He further reported that from Jan. 1 through June 10, more than 2,000 border violators from the German side had been detained. Many had grenades and portable radio stations. There were worries of biological warfare terror (vials with epidemic-inducing diseases). Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 220–1 (TsA FSK: June 12, 1941), 228 (TsA FSK).

317. On June 13, Dekanozov telegrammed Molotov about Soviet agents having observed a massive transport of troops and equipment toward the Soviet frontier: heavy artillery, tanks, trucks, planes. “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” 76. On June 14, Dekanozov added that the Swedish and Danish military attachés in Berlin no longer believed troop concentrations constituted a tactic to force concessions but instead amounted to “genuine preparation for a war against the Soviet Union.” Sipols, Tainy, 398–9. Dekanozov had met “Elder” and “Corsican” and was evidently persuaded by them that this was war, not an ultimatum. Sokolov, “Novye dannye.”

318. Vishlev, Nakanune, 163 (PA AA Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop. Vertrauliche Berichte über Russland [Peter], 2/3 [R 27113], Bl. 462591–462594); Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 94–5. Hitler did not trust Berlings, and on June 18 ordered “close surveillance” on him and, after the onset of hostilities, his arrest. In fact, he would be sent to Sweden. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 74 (citing ADAP, XII/ii: doc. 639, 645). The Russian press frequently cites a report by Yankel “Jan” Chernyak (“Jean”) on June 12 that the attack would commence on June 22 at 3:30 a.m. This warning, if it occurred, has not been published in the various collections of intelligence documents.

319. “These rumors,” the bulletin stated, “are the clumsy product of the propaganda of forces inimical to the USSR and Germany, forces interested in the extension of the war.” Also, the Soviet embassay on June 10 had reported word that Simon had begun secret negotiations with Hess on June 10. Rozanov, Stalin-Gitler, 203–4.

320. Izvestiia, June 14, 1941; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 555–6. See also Werth, Russia at War, 125–6; Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, 207–8. “The affairs of the TASS communique was a last resort,” recalled Molotov late in life. “If we had been successful in delaying the war beyond the summer it would have been very difficult to start it in the autumn. So far, diplomacy had been very successful in delaying war, but no one could predict when it would fail.” Chuev, Sto sorok, 42–3.

321. Andreas-Friedrich, Berlin Underground, 67–8. Other rumors, however, indicated an impending attack that very month. Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, VII: 3374, 2380, 2394.

322. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 195.

323. Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 345–46.

324. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 78 (citing PA AA Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop, Vertaruliche Berichte über Russland [Peter], 2/3 [R 27113], Bl. 462597).

325. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 455–6 (June 14); Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 147.

326. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 76 (citing PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretär, Russland, Bd. 5 [R 29716], Bl. 051–054 [113455–113457], 066 [113470], 104–6 [113508–114510], 130–31 [113534–113535]; Jacobsen, Kreigestagebuch, I: 404.

327. Zhukov offers a colorful treatment of the call. Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 383; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 367. For restrictions on measures to improve military readiness, see also Anfilov, Krushenie pokhoda Gitlera, 98ff. Some Soviet commanders viewed the TASS communique as an indication that on high, somehow, they were averting war, despite the colossal buildup. But the general staff was told the TASS bulletin bore no relation to ongoing Soviet military preparations. Ivanov, Shtab armeiskii, 40; Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 108.

328. Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 43. The western military districts were also ordered to field headquarters. Mobilized units from Eastern Siberia and Mongolia, ordered west on May 22, were due to arrive in Ukraine (Berdichev, Proskurov, Shepetovka) between June 17 and July 10.

329. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 376–81; Taylor, Goebbels Diaries, 414–6. See also Vishlev, Nakanune, 26–9, 151. Concerning Hitler’s “silence” after the TASS bulletin, Gafencu, the Romanian envoy, telegrammed Bucharest (June 16) that “the war of nerves is at full blast, worsened by the news from Finland and Romania about more and more significant military preparations.” Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 307. Köstring wrote to Berlin (June 18) that “gossip and rumors here have reached unfathomable magnitude. To transmit them would take whole volumes.” Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 320.