Stalin

99. Paasikivi later recalled, “The proposals Stalin made to us in the fall of 1939 were completely different from those to the Baltic countries . . . Stalin from the very beginning backed off discussing with us a mutual assistance pact.” Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 238.

100. Tuominen, Bells of the Kremlin, 154–5.

101. Upton, Finland, 30–2.

102. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1094, citing V. Vladimirov, Kohti talvisotaa (Helsinki, 1995), 163–4; Rentola, “Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” 598n27; Kolpakidi, Entsiklopediia sekretnykh sluzhb Rossii, 711–2. Unexpectedly, a report by the general staff for the Leningrad military district (Nov. 10, 1939) praised Finnish military training and judged “the morale of the Finnish army, despite the class difference between the officers and soldiers,” as “sufficiently steadfast.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 205–7 (RGVA, f. 25888, op. 11, d. 17, l. 194–200). Stalin finally posted a new military intelligence officer to Helsinki, Colonel Ivan Smirnov, who replaced the man executed in the terror. Sinitsyn, in his posthumously published memoir, would claim he had conveyed the opposite of what he had actually reported.

103. They took along Nikolai Voronov, the artillery specialist. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 134; Na prieme, 279–80. The Main Military Council in Moscow, with Stalin in attendance (Nov. 21), approved a plan for an expansion to a peacetime army of 2.3 million. Glavnyi voennyi sovet RKKA, 269–86 (RGVA, f. 4, op. 18, d. 49, l. 1–26), 440–53 (RGVA, f. 40442, op. 2, d. 128, l. 120–39: Smorodinov and Gusev).

104. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 140.

105. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1090.

106. Meretskov reported to Stalin that the deadly attack had originated from the Finnish side. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 182; Dvoynikh and Eliseeva, Konflikt, doc. 8 (RGVA. F. 33987, op. 3, d. 1240, l. 115).

107. Manninen, “Vystreli byli” (citing the recollections of a Soviet officer who took part). See also Zhdanov’s cryptic but suggestive notes: Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” I: 137 (RGASPI, f. 77, op. 3, d. 163, l. 3120). Khrushchev recalled that “Kuusinen and I . . . found out when we were at Stalin’s apartment that the first shots had been fired from our side. There’s no getting around that fact.” Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 254.

108. Na prieme, 282; Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 200–3.

109. Balashov, Prinimai nas, 23; Pravda, Nov. 29, 1939.

110. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096 (citing KrA, FST/Und E II: 15); Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 37 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 188, l. 22–3, 26).

111. Dvoynikh and Eliseeva, Konflikt, doc. 16 (RGVA, f. 34980, op. 1, d. 794, l. 1). See also Azarov, Osazhdennaia Odessa, 5.

112. Vehviläinen, “Trudnaia doroga k miru,” I: 228. See also Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 142.

113. For a top-secret Finnish intelligence assessment (Nov. 25, 1939) translated into Russian, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 195–200.

114. Upton, Finland, 50 (citing J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 116); Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations, 72–3; Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” 135 (citing Finnish officials).

115. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 227–9 (GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 528, l. 228–30: Dec. 1, 1939).

116. Na prieme, 279. On Stalin’ s corrections of Kuusinen dating back to Aug. 1928, see Adibekov et al., Politbiuro TsK RKP (b)—VKP (b) i Komintern, 545–6 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 755, l. 116–7); RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 755, l. 164.

117. Tuominen judged Stalin’s humor offbeat (mostly from stories he heard from Kuusinen, with whom he had shared a flat in the House on the Embankment). Tuominen, Bells of the Kremlin, 158, 166, 173.

118. A few days after Tuominen’s initial summons by Kuusinen, the Soviet embassy in Stockholm followed up; again he refused. On Nov. 21, he claimed, he received a third order, this one delivered by a courier; Tuominen still refused. He also claimed that he decided not to inform the Finnish regime in Helsinki of the sensational news of a pending Soviet attack. Tuominen, Bells of the Kremlin, 315–8; Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 147. After seeing the Finnish resistance, Tuominen would issue feelers to Finland’s Social Democrats and publicly break with Moscow in spring 1940.

119. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 38 (citing AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 18, d. 192). More broadly, see Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second Word War, 30–73; and Kirby, Concise History of Finland, 197–216.

120. Pravda, Dec. 1, 1939.

121. Dongarov, “Voina, kotoryi moglo ne byt’,” 39 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1380, l. 3; f. 25888, op. 13, d. 76, l. 1).

122. DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 351–2 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 1, d. 4, l. 75–8: Molotov to Schulenburg, Nov. 30, 1939).

123. Bor’ba Finnskoogo naroda, 11. The protocols of the first official meeting of the “government” were recorded in Russian by Kuusinen’s son. RGASPI, f. 522, op. 1, d. 46, l. 1, as cited in Baryshnikov and Baryshnikov, “Pravitel’stvo v Teriioki,” 179.

124. Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 261 (citing RGVA, f. 25888, op. 1, d. 17, l. 199: report of the Leningrad general staff); Volkogonov, “Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov,” 316. Krasnaia zvezda, Nov. 30, 1989 (A. M. Noskov); Volkogonov, “Drama of the Decisions,” 32; Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?” 100n2 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 889, l. 1–10, 15–6; d. 891, l. 1–3). See also Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?,” 100n2 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 889, l. 18–25: Dec. 26, 1939).

125. Jakobson, Diplomacy of the Winter War, 144–8; Spring, “Soviet Decision for War,” 217; Balashov, Prinimai nas, 43.

126. Dongarov, “Pravitel’stvo Kuusinena,” 74–5, 76–9 (facsimile).

127. A Feb. 1, 1940, “Appeal to the soldiers of the Finnish army,” issued in the name of the “People’s Government” and written by Zhdanov, initially declared that “the Soviet Union does not want anything other than a government in Finland that would not fashion intrigues with the imperialist powers threatening the security of Leningrad.” Zhdanov excised this passage in the final draft. Mel’tiukhov, “‘Narodnyi front’ dlia Finliandii?,” 100 (citing RGASPI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 891, l. 14–5).

128. Rentola, “Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” 600 (citing RGASPI, f. 495, op. 269, d. 134, 1. 36: autobiography of Esa Kuusinen, Aug. 1, 1940). See also Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen, 316.

129. Kuusinen, Rings of Destiny, 225, 230, 231. Aino last saw Otto in 1935.

130. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 77, l. 178–212, in Rzeshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II: 272–83; Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 268; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 46.

131. Na prieme, 282–94; Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 179.

132. Kuznetsov, Nakanune, 309, 328.

133. Zakharov et al., 50 let Vooruzhenykh Sil SSSR, 230; Baryshnikov, “Sovetsko-Finliandskaia voina,” 33 (citing RGVA, f. 25888, op. 14, d. 2, l. 1). Mekhlis and Kulik, both deputy defense commissars, mocked Voronov, the artillery specialist, in the presence of Meretskov when Voronov said the Soviets would be fortunate to achieve their combat aims in two to three months; they told him the war plan was for ten to twelve days. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 136. Meretskov later admitted that the forces under his command were not ready to attack. Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 171, 173–4, 179, 181–2.

134. Shaposhnikov would learn of the outbreak of hostilities from the press. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moeogo pokoleniia, 442–3; Simonov, “Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia,” 79.

135. Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” I: 133 (RGVA, f. 37977, op. 1, d. 233, l. 4: telegram to Shaposhnikov, Nov. 19, 1939); Meretskov, Serving the People, 100–1.

136. Mannerheim, Memoirs, 366. See also Tillotson, Finland at Peace and War, 121–75. During only 10 of the 105 days of the campaign was the temperature above freezing. The record low was on Jan. 16, 1940.

137. Chew, White Death; Trotter, Frozen Hell.

138. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 252.

139. Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU, 112.

140. Rittersporn, Anguish, 235 (citing GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 87, l. 17).

141. Davies, Popular Opinion, 100 (citing TsGAIPD SPb, f. 24, op. 2v, d. 3723, l. 62, 50).

142. Zenzinov, Vstrecha s Rossiei, 37, 138. Zenzinov’s book includes the full text of 277 out of the 376 surviving letters.

143. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 253–61 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 185, l. 454–71: Dec. 7, 1939).

144. Bernev and Rupasov, Zimniaia voina, 115–266.

145. “The pessimist Mannerheim raised his marshal’s baton, the would-be appeaser Tanner emerged as the most resolute political leader, and workers and peasants, who had voted the Centre-Left government into power, fulfilled their duty as soldiers,” as one historian aptly remarked. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096.

146. Maisky recorded in his diary (Dec. 1): “The British reaction is rabid. The press, the radio, the cinema, Parliament—all have been mobilized.” Maiskii, Dnevnik diplomata, II/i: 75; Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 243. See also Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, 40; Carley, “‘Situation of Delicacy,’” 195–6; and Stalin’s comments to the chief of the Estonian armed forces, Dec. 11–12, 1939, as recorded by Rei, in Sotsialisticheskie revoliutsii v Estonii, 109. In Dec. 1939, Kollontai wrote from Stockholm to Molotov (a copy went to Voroshilov), calling the working situation “difficult and serious” and concluding, “I cannot fail to point out I still have no aide, and no one even to consult with, since everyone is new and they all need to be taught.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 218–20 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1202, l. 99–101ss). On the lack of experienced staff in Moscow, see Kraminov, V orbite voiny, 79.

147. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 134; Philbin, Lure of Neptune, 61, 129.

148. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 361 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22407, d. 2, l. 586), 363 (op. 22410, d. 2, l. 196: Dec. 8, 1939), 372–3 (RGASPI. F. 495, op. 74, d. 618, l. 12, 13–4, 16). See also Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, XVIII (VII/i): 162.

149. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1096, citing Paasikivi’s notes from the Government of Finland foreign affairs committee, Dec. 2 and 3, 1939, in O. Manninen and K. Rumpunen (eds.), Murhenäytelmän vuorosanat: Talvisodan hallituksen keskustelut (Helsinki, 2003).

150. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 230–3. Molotov refused to meet with the Swedish mediator to hear the Helsinki government’s proposed concessions; Molotov told the American mediator that the Soviets would have no dealings with the Finnish government in Helsinki, especially since Tanner (the Social Democrat) had become foreign minister. FRUS, 1939, I: 1008–9, 1014–5.

151. The NKVD leadership demanded and received an accurate picture of the Red Army. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 406–7 (Dec. 31, 1939).

152. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 324 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. f, d. 351, l. 212-6).

153. DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 57–61, 77–78. These German officials do not appear in the logs for Stalin’s office.

154. Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 251–2.

155. At the Johannisthal airfield outside Berlin Göring had paraded before them “twin-engine Junkers 88 and Dornier 215 bombers, single-engine Henkel-100 and Messerschmitt-110 fighters, Focke-Wulf-187 and Henschel reconnaissance planes, a twin-engine Messerschmitt-110 fighter, a Junkers 87 dive bomber, and other types of aircraft,” as Alexander Yakovlev described the scene. General Ernst Udet, Göring’s deputy, took Hovhannes “Ivan” Tevosyan, head of the Soviet delegation, up in a Fiesler Storch reconnaissance plane, then executed a “splendid landing, stopping exactly where it had started from.” Tevosyan was impressed. Later, Göring made him a gift of the aircraft. The delegation, according to Yakovlev, “returned to the Adlon strongly impressed.” Tarpaulins and ropes curtained off whole areas of the sites the Soviets visited—Messerschmitt in Augsburg, Focke-Wulf in Bremen, Junkers in Dessau, BMW in Munich, Henschel and Siemens in Berlin. Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, 117–8; Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 81–2.

156. DGFP, series D, VIII: 472–5 (shopping list), 513 (Ribbentrop, Dec. 11, 1939), 516–7 (Ritter to Schulenburg, Dec. 11, 1939).

157. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 289–91 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 35, l. 154–60: Dec. 12), 292 (d. 540, l. 266: Dec. 12), 312–4 (l. 225–9: Dec. 14), 319–21 (l. 276–9), 321–2 (l. 280–3), 326 (l. 290).

158. Na prieme, 9, 279, 284–5.

159. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 109–10.

160. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 122–3 (Dec. 21, 1939). Some guests at the banquets were known to carry home candies, nuts, fruit, and other portables for their families.

161. Raikin, Vospominaniia, 195–7.

162. Pirogov, S otsom, 133–4. Pirogov was not again invited to perform at Kremlin banquets, but escaped arrest.

163. Vladimir Orlov, “Prokofiev.”

164. I. S. Rabinovich, in Stalin i liudi sovetskoi strany, 3. See also Rabinovich, “Obraz vozhdia”; Grabar’, “Stalin i liudi sovetskoi strane”; and Kravchenko, Stalin v izobrazitel’nom iskusstve.

165. Pravda, March 18, 1939. The painting had first been exhibited at the show “Twenty Years of the Red Army.”

166. Stalin had also supposedly sat for the painter Dmitry Sharapov in the 1930s, but did not like the result; in any case, Sharapov was arrested. Medvedev, “O Staline i stalinzme.”

167. Chegodaeva, Dva lika vremeni, 152–8. Perhaps the most striking image of all appeared in USSR in Construction, a Stalin profile portrait formed from a vast abundance of tiny multihued flecks of millet, alfalfa, and poppy. USSR in Construction, 1939, no. 11–2; Margolin, “Stalin and Wheat.”

168. Pravda, Dec. 20 and 21, 1939; Heizer, “Cult of Stalin.” The thousands of congratulations in Pravda ran until Feb. 2, 1940.

169. Komsol’skaia pravda, Dec. 22, 1939.

170. For example: RGAKFD, ed. khr. 1–3553 (year 1939). A model of the hovel was on display in the Georgia pavilion at the all-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow.

171. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1499, l. 39–54. Yaroslavsky incorporated many “reminiscences” in his book, O tovarishche Staline (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1939), in English, Landmarks in the Life of Stalin (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), printed in some 200,000 copies, which, unusually, included a chapter on Stalin’s childhood. The work was based on a long speech on Stalin’s life that Yaroslavsky had delivered at a conference of agitprop cadres on Sept. 17, 1939, which had been published in two parts in the agitprop journal: “Vazhneishie vekhi zhizni i deiatel’nosti tovarishcha Stalina,” V pomoshch’ marksistsko-leninsokomu obrazovaniiu, 1939, no. 10: 33–61, no. 13–4: 22–92. Also, some of the “reminiscences” Beria’s minions had gathered and published in Tbilisi about Stalin’s youth were republished in the mass-circulation youth periodical Molodaya Gvardiya (1939, no. 12). In Sept. 1940, Stalin forbade publication in Russian of the Georgian-language book Childhood of the Leader, by the famed children’s writer Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, issued the previous year in connection with Stalin’s sixtieth birthday. Galleys had been readied. Maksimenkov, Bol’shaia tsenzura, 524–5 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 730, l. 190); d. 787, l. 1–2. See also Davies and Harris, Stalin’s World, 159.

172. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 3226, l. 1; d. 1281; Koniuskaia, “Iz vosponinanii,” 3; RGASPI, f. 629, op. 11, d. 55, l. 52.

173. K shestidesiatiletiiu, 177. See also Barmine, One Who Survived, 258. The regime published recommended readings for Stalin’s jubilee: Markovich, O Staline. See also O Staline: ukazatel’ literatury. Yaroslavky described the three earliest meetings between Stalin and Lenin: Dec. 1905 in Tampere, Finland at the 3rd Party Congress; April 1906 in Stockholm, at the 4th Party Congress; and in May 1907 in London, at the 5th Party Congress (the numbers were disputed by non-Bolshevik members of the Russian Social Democrat Workers Party). Iaroslavskii, “Tri vstrechi.”

174. Pravda, Dec. 23 and 25, 1939, reprinted in Iu. Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 170–1. Stalin’s name, one author wrote in a biographical note, “glows like a torch of freedom, like a battle flag of the toilers of the whole world.” Badaev, “O Staline.”

175. Time, Jan. 1, 1940.

176. Mydans, More than Meets the Eye, 119.

177. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 77 (citing an unpublished essay by G. A. Kumanev).

178. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 332, 357.

179. Volkogonov, Hoover Institution Archive, box 1 (Voroshilov, Stalin, and Shaposhnikov order to frontline commanders); van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 103, citing N. F. Kuz’min, Na strazhe mirovogo truda, 1921–1941 gg. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), 238.

180. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 210–2 (RGVA, f. 33988, op. 4, d. 13, l. 197ss–200ss), 212–4 (l. 247ss–249ss), 215–16 (l. 244ss–246ss), 216–8 (239ss–243ss).

181. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 203. She sent the message on Dec. 8, 1939. When and in what form Stalin received this information remains unclear. On German troop positioning in the West, see Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 257–63 (Jan. 1940).

182. Semiriaga, Tainy stalinskoi diplomatii, 163–4; Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 185–7; Na prieme, 288.

183. Stalin also permitted selection of quality troops from various military districts for Finland. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 104 (citing RGASPI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 59).

184. RGVA, f. 33 987, op. 3, d. 1386, l. 169–71, Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 17; RGASPI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 6861, l. 411–4. On Jan. 13, 1940, Beria reported that Soviet military communication codes had been carelessly distributed on the battlefield and fallen into enemy hands. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 428–9 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 280, l. 18-20).

185. In Moscow Choibalsan also met with Voroshilov and Beria, who “helped” the Mongol leader reinforce his personal security detail, which increased Soviet surveillance. Baabar, Twentieth-Century Mongolia, 366–78 (citing sources with Mongol archives). After victory at the Halha River over the Japanese, Choibalsan had traveled again to the Soviet capital, arriving in Dec. 1939. He had last been there from Sept. 1938 through Jan. 1939, when Kremlin doctors diagnosed him with “physical and intellectual fatigue” and prescribed treatment at the Matsesta baths, after which, upon returning to Mongolia, he had Prime Minister Amar publicly tried and extradited to the NKVD in Siberia for execution.

186. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 157–61. Yakovlev indicates he met Stalin twice, in late Dec. 1939 and on Jan. 9, but the logbooks give dates of late Oct. 1939 and Jan. 8, 1940. Na prieme, 277, 288. Yakovlev’s father had worked for Alfred Nobel’s oil concern. Mikhail Kaganovich was removed on Jan. 10, and demoted to the directorship of a military aviation factory (no. 124) in Kazan. In Feb. 1941, after being told by his brother Lazar that Stalin had criticized him, Mikhail would shoot himself.

187. Emel’ianov, Na poroge voiny, 154–8; “Vospominaia Velikuiu Otechestvennuiu,” 56; Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 109. Yemelyanov recalls the meeting as taking place sometime in Dec. 1939, but the office logbooks indicate the Jan. date. Na prieme, 289.

188. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 431–2 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 189, l. 69–71: Beria, Jan. 13, 1940).

189. Finnish intelligence passed to the British a Soviet codebook that “bore the marks of a bullet.” Jeffrey, MI6, 371–2 (no citation).

190. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1098 (citing Brig Ling notes on Interview with Mannerheim on Jan. 8, 1940; Mannerheim to Ironside, Jan. 9: TNA War Office 208/3966; and Memo by Gen. Ironside, “Operations in Scandinavia,” Jan. 12: TNA, WO 208/3966).

191. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 431–2 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 7, d. 189, l. 69–71: Jan. 13, 1940), 409 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6: Jan. 1940); DVP SSSR, XXIII/i: 53–6 (Maisky to Molotov, Jan. 26, 1940); Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 195. Maisky feared British-Soviet diplomatic relations again would be severed and he himself deported. In the event, he remained in London but as a pariah. The British intended to publish a book of documents on the failed negotiations with Moscow, exculpating themselves, which would have exposed Maisky’s initiatives beyond his instructions. Maisky procured a microfilm of the never-published text, which would turn up in a search of his possessions and figure in his trial in 1955.

192. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1098–9.

193. Stalin had learned back on Oct. 13, 1939, that Paasonen, the Finnish military intelligence officer, had told Major Vrang, the Swedish military attaché, that, just as during the historic battle in 1808 against the invading Imperial Russian Army, the Finns would slowly withdraw toward the north and Sweden. Stalin had had the Soviet battle plan adjusted to include the goal of cutting Finland in two at Oulu (Oleaborg) on the Finnish far coast, to interdict Helsinki’s land contact with Sweden. The thought had sunk in so deeply that Stalin had reiterated the need to pay attention to the 1808 battle in a directive as late as Dec. 29, 1939. But by Jan. 8 the Finns had won what became known as the Battle of Suomussalmi, which protected the axis toward Oulu. The objective of slicing Finland in half appeared plausible on a map, but the territory was mostly forested marshland with only logging trails for roads. Nor had the Finns withdrawn the way Soviet intelligence had reported they would. The Soviets lost huge stores of war material and men. (It was in the drive toward the Oulu where Mekhlis had almost been killed.) Volkogonov Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, box 1 (Leningrad military district cipher telegram to the general staff, Nov. 29, 1939; order, Voroshilov to Shaposhnikov, Dec. 2).

194. Hastings, Inferno, 36–7 (no citation).

195. Pospelov, Istoriia Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, I: 275; Richardson, “French Plans.”

196. RGVA, f. 33988, op. 4, d. 35, l. 35ss, in Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 227.

197. Rentola, “Intelligence and Stalin’s Two Crucial Decisions,” 1100 (Jan. 20, 1940).

198. APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 177, l. 116–36.

199. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 124–5, 144–5. In a lecture on June 26, 1940, at the Frunze Military Academy concerning the lessons of the Finnish war, Meretskov would claim that the Finns had built 150 airfields to receive foreign aircraft. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 31n55 (citing RGVA, f. 34980, op. 14, d. 6, l. 1).

200. Na prieme, 290.

201. Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 481 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 6, d. 12, l. 59). See also Tanner, Winter War, 125–63.

202. West and Tsarev, Crown Jewels, 144 (citing an inaccessible secret History of the London Rezidentura, in Russian, file no. 89113, I: 434).

203. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1509, l. 82–4. Stalin was responding to E. Gorodetsky’s article in Pravda (Feb. 4, 1940), which was a summary of M. Moskalev’s article in Istorik-Marksist (Jan. 1940). Later, on April 27, 1940, when Yaroslavsky sought to rebut Stalin by citing many sources, Stalin again exploded (“sycophancy is incompatible with scientific history”). RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 842, l. 35–44.

204. Zhukovskii, Lubianskaia imperiia NKVD, 214–5.

205. http://alya-aleksej.narod.ru/index/0-181; Voronov, “Palach v kozhanom fartuke”; Nikita Petrov, “Chelovek v kozhanom fartuke lichno rasstrelial bolee desiati tysiach chelovek” http://discussiya.com/2010/08/26/blokhin-executioner. Stalin signed the list, containing 457 names, including Yezhov’s, on Jan. 17, 1940: APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 177, l. 116–36. Another principal executioner was the Latvian Pēteris Mago, Russified as Pyotr Maggo (1879–1941), who would soon die of cirrhosis of the liver.

206. Ushakov and Stukalov, Front voennykh prokurorov, 75 (USSR deputy military procurator Nikolai Afanasev, who was present). Among the many rumors that would circulate inside the NKVD about Yezhov’s execution, one had Beria ordering that Yezhov undress and be beaten before being shot, just as Yezhov had done to humiliate his predecessor Yagoda. Kamov, “Smert’ Nikolai Ezhova.”

207. “Poslednee slovo Nikolai Ezhova,” Moskovskie novosti, Jan. 30–Feb. 6, 1994; Petrov and Jansen, Stalinskii pitomets, 536 (citing TsA FSB, sledstvennoe delo No. N-15302, t. 1, l. 184–6); Getty and Naumov, Road to Terror, 560–2.

208. Iakovlev, Tsel’ zhizni (6th ed.), 212.

209. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 153; Solovev, My Nine Lives, 119; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 13; Baryshnikov et al., Istoriia ordena Lenina, 137.

210. Valedinskii, “Vospominaniia,” 124. Vyborg fell roughly three weeks later. On Stalin’s illness and treatment in mid-February 1940, see also Chigirin, Stalin, 115–20 (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1482, l. 101–5ob.).

211. In Nov. 1939, thanks to Gerhard Kegel, the Soviet agent, the NKVD managed to photograph a long document on the German negotiating strategy in the talks, including the maximum prices the Germans would pay for various Soviet goods. “The negotiations were difficult and lengthy,” the German trade negotiator Karl Schnurre wrote in an internal memorandum, adding that, because “the Soviet Union does not import any consumer goods whatsoever, their wishes concerned exclusively manufactured goods and war materiel. Thus, in numerous cases, Soviet bottlenecks coincide with German bottlenecks, such as machine tools for the manufacture of artillery ammunition.” On top of that, “psychologically the ever-present distrust of the Russians was of importance as well as the fear of any responsibility. And people’s commissar Mikoyan had to refer numerous questions to Stalin personally, since his authority was not sufficient.” DGFP, series D, VIII: 752–9 (economic agreement), 814–7 (Schnurre memorandum); Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 131–4; Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 97–106; Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 439.

212. Pravda did not crow in its announcement. Pravda, Feb. 18, 1940. See also Werth, Russia at War, 62–71.

213. After his Dec. 1939 offensive quickly petered out, Chiang, in Feb. 1940, had convened a military conference in Liuzhou (Guangxi). He attributed Japan’s strength to its surprise attacks (on poorly defended places), stout defense of occupied positions, and disguise of movements. He saw its weakness in a failure to deploy sufficient forces, sustain its operations for sufficient time, and prepare sufficient reserves. Ryōichi, “Japanese Eleventh Army,” 227–8, citing Dai Tōa Sensō (Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan, 1977), in the series Shō Kaiseki Hiroku, XIII: 47–8.

214. Taylor, Generalissimo, 171 (citing Chiang Diaries, Hoover Institution archives, box 40, folder 15: Dec. 30, 1939).

215. The Chinese Communists were receiving $110,000 to support their armed forces from the Nationalist government and themselves collected some $200,000 in local currency via local governments under Communist control in northern regions, likely through traditional land taxes. Party dues amounted to another $40,000. But they were spending around $700,000 per month. Dallin and Firsov, Dimitrov and Stalin, 123–5 (RGASPI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 317. l. 53–5).

216. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 126 (Feb. 23 and 25, 1940). On Feb. 25, 1940, Yan Xishan, the warlord ruler of small, poor, remote Shanxi region, who had an off-again, on-again collaboration with the Communists against the Japanese, halted his offensive against the Communists. The Eighth Route Army was based there.

217. A memo from the Comintern’s personnel department to Dimitrov denigrated Wang Ming, Mao’s rival, as possessing “no authority among the old cadres of the party,” and recommended that he not be given “leading positions,” while proposing promotion of a long list of Mao loyalists (including a young military leader in the Eighth Route Army named Deng Xiaoping). “Mao Zedong is certainly the most important political figure in the Chinese Communist party. He knows China better than the other CCP leaders, knows the people, understands politics and generally frames issues correctly.” Pantsov and Levine, Mao, 333–4 (citing RGASPI, f. 495, op. 225, d. 71, t. 3: l. 186–9).

218. Taylor, Generalissimo, 172; Suyin, Eldest Son, 170.

219. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 384–90 (APRF, f. 3, zakrytyi paket no. 1, with facsimile). Between late Sept. 1939 and March 1940, the Soviets and the Nazis had held a series of meetings (apparently four in total) to discuss anticipated Polish resistance, coordination of the respective occupations, POWs, and refugees. Contrary to some claims, the Feb. 20, 1940, meeting (at the Pan Tadeusz villa of the Zakopane spa, in the Tatra Mountains) did not coordinate or precipitate the Soviet Katyn massacre. Vishlёv, Nakanune, 119–23; Bór-Komorowski, Secret Army. Beria’s March 1940 report and recommendation to Stalin is in Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 476–8.

220. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 390–2 (APRF, f. 3, zakrytyi paket no. 1); Cienciala et al., Katyn, 118–20; Ubyty v Katyni; Kozlov et al., Katyn’ mart 1940–sentiabr’2000 g. The total includes approximately 14,500 POWs held in NKVD camps in Kozelsky, Ostaskhovsky, and Starobelsky, and more than 7,300 in remand prisons in the western regions of the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics. The execution sites included Smolensk city, Kalinin, Kharkov, and other places, as well as Katyn forest. Documents establishing the fact of Soviet culpability survived, but the full story will never be known because the files were purged. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 42n21.

221. Pikhoia and Gieysztor, Katyn’: plenniki, 16. See also Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 276–7, 295.

222. Osborn, Operation Pike, 92–6. Overflowing camps and prisons placed a strain on NKVD resources in the western regions. Of course, the inmates could have been deported eastward to labor camps rather than executed without trial.

223. In Nov. 1939, Mekhlis, as head of the army’s political administration, had told a gathering of Soviet writers that Polish officers held as prisoners of war could form the leadership of Polish legions of up to 100,000 men, which were being constituted in France, and therefore that they should not be released. Jasiewicz, Zagłada polskich Kresów, 175 (Vishnevsky diary, Nov. 11, 1939). This passage was not included in Vishnevskii, Stat’i, dnevniki, pis’ma, 372.

224. Boiadzhiev, Maretskaia, 100; Kalashnikov, Ocherki istorii sovetskogo kino, II: 169–84.

225. Izvestiia, March 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1940; Pravda, March 9, 1940. That month, a “short biography” of Molotov, barely ten pages, went to press in a print run of half a million. It recounted his days in the underground, the 1917 revolution, and the civil war, and stressed his orthodox Leninism, organizing prowess, and close association with “the Supreme Leader of peoples comrade Stalin.” Tikhomirov, Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, 15.

226. Shvarts, “Zhizn’ i smert’ Mikhaila Bulgakova,” 126. Pasternak, having learned Bulgakov was terminally ill, had paid a last visit.

227. Upton, Finland, 140 (citing J. K. Paasikivi, Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–1941 [Porvoo: Werner Söderström, 1959], I: 187, 191); Tanner, Winter War, 235. For brief excerpts of the Finnish record of the March 12 discussions, in Russian translation, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 497–503.

228. For a Finnish police summary (March 15, 1940) of the domestic shock from the peace terms, see Khristoforov et al., Zimniaia voina, 519–22.

229. Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 190.

230. Vakar, “Milukov v izgnan’e’,” 377.

231. “The USSR, to be sure, received strategic gains in the northwest, but at what price?” Trotsky wrote in March 1940. “The prestige of the Red Army is undermined. The trust of the toiling masses and exploited peoples of the whole world has been lost. As a result the international position of the USSR has not been strengthened but weakened.” He added that Stalin “personally has emerged from this operation completely smashed.” Trotskii, “Stalin posle finliandskogo opyta [March 13, 1940],” in Portrety revoliutsionerov, 162–66 (at 166). Trotsky later clarified that “it does not follow from this that the USSR must be surrendered to the imperialists but only that the USSR must be torn out of the hands of the bureaucracy.” Trotsky, “Balance Sheet of the Finnish Events.” See also Trotsky, “A Petty-Bourgeois Opposition in the Socialist Workers Party” (Dec. 15, 1939), published posthumously in In Defense of Marxism, 44–62 (at 56–9).

232. This concession appears to have been connected to Finland’s efforts to sign a defensive alliance with Sweden and Norway, which Molotov warned Helsinki would be considered a violation of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty. Dallin, Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 196; van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, 190.

233. Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 263–75.

234. Waltz, Theory of International Relations, 194–5; Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas.”

235. Solodovnikov,”My byli molodye togda,” 210.

236. Timoshenko told the Finnish military attaché in Moscow, “the Russians have learnt much in this hard war in which the Finns fought with heroism.” Mannerheim, Memoirs, 371. Altogether, from Sept. 1939 through March 12, 1940, Red Army call-ups had amounted to 3.16 million. About half were demobilized, leaving an army of 1.547 million. Mikhail Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 360 (citing RGVA, f. 40443, op. 3, d. 297, l. 128).

237. Krivosheev, Grif sekretnosti sniat’, 93–126 (esp. 125); RGVA, f. 34980, op. 15, d. 200, 203, 204, 206, 208, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219; f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1301, l. 165–8; Rossiiskaia Federatsiiia, Kniga pamiati; Manninen, “Moshchnoe Sovetskoe nastuplenie,” I: 324–35; “O nakoplenii nachal’stvuiushchego sostava Raboche-Krest’ianskoi Krasnoi Armii,” 181; Balashov, Prinimai nas, 182, 186. Neither Hanko nor the islands would prove to be any protection for Leningrad, since the future Nazi onslaught against the city would not come from the Baltic Sea/Gulf of Finland but from overland.

238. Bialer, Stalin and His Generals, 130. In early spring 1940, right after the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, the Soviet ambassador to Paris, Surits, would be declared persona non grata after sending a telegram to Moscow, intercepted by the French, in which he referred to the French and British as warmongers. It was payback.

239. The German ambassador to Finland (Wipert von Blücher) sent a report to Berlin in Jan. noting that “the Red Army has such shortcomings that it cannot even dispose of a small country and the Comintern does not even gain ground in a population that is more than forty percent socialist.” Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, 411; Semiryaga, Winter War, 63–4 (no citation). German circles were said by a Swedish Soviet agent to be stunned by the dismal Soviet effort, and wondered about the necessity of abiding by the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 220–1, 224–8.

240. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI: 981–2 (Dec. 31, 1939).

241. Förster and Mawdsley, “Hitler and Stalin in Perspective,” 68. See also Förster, “German Military’s Image of Russia,” 123–4.

242. Van Dyke, Soviet Invasion, xii-xiii, 103–27, 189–193.

243. Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War.”

244. Mannerheim, Memoirs, 367. See also Liddell-Hart, Expanding War, 72. One Soviet political commissar observed, “Regiments and divisions were sometimes given to incompetent, inexperienced, and poorly trained people who failed at the slightest difficulty in battle.” Rzheshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II: 21–2. The inadequacy of the Soviet officer corps was a long-standing point of critique. Zaitsev, “Krasnaia armiia,” 12.

245. This testimony is second-hand, from Vasilevsky, Shaposhnikov’s top subordinate at the general staff. Vasilievskii, Delo vsei zhizni, I: 102; Bialer, Stalin and his Generals, 132.

246. Vasilevsky, Lifelong Cause, 108–9. Vasilesvsky was in the Little Corner between March 2 and 17, 1940, on all the days Stalin received visitors except one—thirteen visits total. Na prieme, 293–5.

247. Murin, Stalin v ob”iatiakh sem’i, 64–5 (APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 1553, l. 38–9).

248. They would marry on New Year’s Eve 1940–1, just before Vasily would be scheduled to return to his officers’ study courses in Lipetsk, where they would live together in the dormitory. In May 1941, they would return to Moscow; Stalin would order that they move into his Kremlin apartment, which would be subdivided for them. Mamaeva, “Vasily Stalin.”

249. Sheinis, Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov, 367–8; Haslam, “Soviet Foreign Policy,” 116–7; Watson, Molotov, 180.

250. Voroshilov, “Uroki voiny s Finliandiei.” Much of the lively discussion of operations and strategy, prominent through 1936, had been killed off by the terror, but the disastrous Finnish war experience forced its revival. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 500–7.

251. Supposedly, Stalin privately fumed of Voroshilov, “He boasted, assured us, reassured us, that any strike would be answered by a triple strike, that everything is good, everything is in order, everything is ready, Comrade Stalin.” Simonov, “Zametki k biogfraii G. K. Zhukova,” 50. This conversation evidently transpired when Timoshenko was sent to Finland and after Zhukov was put in charge of the Kiev military district.

252. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 128 (March 28, 1940); Rubtsov, Alter ego Stalina, 135 (quoting, without citation, recollections of General Khrulev); Voroshilov, “Uroki voiny s Finliandiei” (APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 261, l. 114–58); Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 426–49 (RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 121, l. 1–35: Voroshilov report).

253. Banac, Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 128. See also Gorodetsky, Grand Illusion, 117–8.

254. Malyshev, “Dnevnik narkoma,” 110.

255. Stalin, Schulenburg added, could at most be expected to meet Hitler in a border town. Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 134–6.

256. Pravda, March 30, 1940.

257. Duraczyński and Sakharov, Sovetsko-Pol’skie otnosheniia, 153–4 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1305, l. 210–1). Tevosyan’s sister (Yuliya) was married to Levon Mirzoyan, the Armenian party official, who fell afoul of Beria. She was arrested. “Stal’noi narkom” (Jan. 15–31, 2011): http://noev-kovcheg.ru/mag/2011-02/2363.html.

258. The first issue of the KFSSR newspaper Pravda in Finnish came out on April 10, 1940. Bol’shevistskaia pechat’, 1940, no. 8: 71.

259. For the complete proceedings, see Rzheshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II (excerpts in Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 450–516, and Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 235–48); Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War.

260. Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 450–5, 464–5. See also Meretskov, Na sluzhbe, 182. Later, Khrushchev, citing a conversation with Timoshenko, said that “every pillbox the Finns had built on the whole Mannerheim line—all that was well known and even mapped out.” Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 253.

261. Baryshnikov and Manninen, “V kanun zimnei voiny,” I: 133 (RGVA, f. 37977, op. 1, d. 722, l. 410–1); Elliston, Finland Fights, 142 (citing German military attaché in Finland, General Arniké).

262. Baryshnikov, Ot prokhladnogo mira, 264 (citing RGVA, f. 37977, op. 1, d. 722, l. 411). Meretskov claimed he asked but could not get the necessary information on what to expect in the war. Meretskov, “Ukreplenie severo-zapadnykh granits SSSR,” 123.

263. Akhmedov, In and Out of Stalin’s GRU, 109.

264. Novobranets, “Nakanune voiny,” 170.

265. Proskurov added that “If on the paper it is written ‘secret,’ then people will read it, but if it is just a simple publication, they’ll say it’s rubbish. (Laughter). I am convinced that big bosses treat materials thusly.” Volkovskii, Tainy i uroki, 464–5, 492–504.

266. Stalin received Proskurov, alone, on July 7, 1940, for an hour. Four days later came the announcement that he had been replaced by Golikov. Proskurov was transferred to command of the Far East military district.

267. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 602 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 165, d. 77, l. 178–211).

268. Chubarian and Shukman, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 267, 268; “Zimniaia voina”: rabota nad oshibkami, 36. See also Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/1: 47; Volkognov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 365–6 (citing TsAMO, f. 132, op. 264 211, d. 73, l. 67–110). Stalin would also criticize army political work. “It is not enough that the political worker in the army will repeat ‘the party of Lenin-Stalin,’ it is no more than repeating ‘Hallelujah, Hallelujah,’” he complained of the Finnish war campaign. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1124, l. 27.

269. Khrushchev added, “It was the only time I have ever witnessed such an outburst.” Khrushchev, Vospominaniia, I: 257; Khrushchev, Memoirs, I: 256. Khrushchev is the only source for this incident. He gives no date, though it seems likely to have occurred in 1940 after the Finnish war debacle.

270. “Military history—especially Russian—is being studied poorly,” Mekhlis, head of the army’s political directorate, complained in a speech to the Main Military Council (May 10, 1940). “We have a lot of unfair ridiculing of the old army despite the fact that we had such notable tsarist army generals as Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Bagration . . . All of this leads to the ignoring of concrete historical experience despite the fact that history is the best teacher.” Brandenberger and Dubrovsky, “The People Need a Tsar,” 881 (citing “O Voennoi ideologii,” RGVA, f. 9, op. 376a, d. 4252, l. 121, 138–40). In 1940, the war of 1812 against Napoleon once again became known as the Fatherland War: Nechkina, Istoriia SSSR, II: 76.

271. More than twenty top officials received copies of these top-secret documents. Rybalkin, Operatisia “X,” 105–6. Stalin had received a long analysis, forwarded by Orlov and dated Dec. 31, 1938, on the performance of Soviet aviation in Spain. The analysis was written by F. A. Agaltsov (b. 1900), a commissar of the Red Air Force in the Spanish Republic army. Stalin wrote on the cover letter, questioning why Orlov and not Loktionov was sending him materials on aviation. Kudriashov, SSSR i grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii, 433–53 (APRF, f. 3, op. 65, d. 228, l. 38, 39–84), 532n585.

272. Helmuth Klotz, an émigré German writer living in France, argued of Spain that the tank had been overtaken by the new German anti-tank guns. Klotz, Les leçons militaires de la guerre civile en Espagne (Paris, Édité par l’auteur, 1937); Militärische Lehren des Bürgerkrieges in Spanien (Paris, Selbstverlag des Verfassers 1938); Uroki grazhdanski voiny v Ispanii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1938). In the preface to the Russian translation, Soviet editors took Klotz to task for wrongly minimizing the role of the air force in Spain.

273. Roberts, Stalin’s General, 64 (citing RGVA, f. 32113, op. 1, d. 2). Stern wrote up a report, too. “In many ways, this operation resembles Hannibal’s campaign at Cannae,” he would boast, comparing Khalkin-Gol to Carthage’s battle against the Romans (216 B.C.). “I think it will become the second perfect battle of encirclement in all history.” Vorozheikin, Istrebiteli. Stern would later complain officially that Zhukov and his men were gossiping that Stern had had nothing to do with drawing up the battle plan. Krasnov, Neizvestnyi Zhukov, 121–2.

274. Rzheshevskii et al., Zimniaia voina, II: 276.

275. For example, Russian observers of the Crimean War (1853–6) had come to see the necessity of replacing the .70-caliber smoothbore musket, in use since Peter the Great. In 1857, Russia decisively opted for the .60-caliber muzzle-loader (manufactured abroad) and, by 1862, had acquired more than a quarter million of these shoulder rifles, nicknamed the vintovka. But in a head-snapping turnabout, the 1866 Austro-Prussian War demonstrated the inferiority of muzzle-loaders to breechloaders. Here was a very expensive decision for Russia: junk its huge stock of rifles, or try, somehow, to adapt them. After emotional debate, experiment, and testing, Russian strategists could not make up their minds and pursued both replacement and adaptation, which were at cross-purposes. Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, 30–3.

276. Despite failing to obtain approval, Gorky Factory No. 92 began producing the superior 76.2-mm F-34 guns, and they ended up being available for inclusion on the tank. Zaloga and Grandsen, Soviet Tanks, 130.

277. Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 600.