The First Four Books of Xenophon's Anabasis

CHAPTER II.

The Greeks, joining Ariæus, form an alliance with him, and take

counsel with him in reference to their return. During the night

following the first day's march they are seized with a panic, which

Clearchus allays.

1. Phalinus and his companions departed; and there now returned, from their interview with Ariæus, Procles and Cheirisophus; Menon had remained there with Ariæus. They reported, "that Ariæus said that there were many Persians, of superior rank to himself, who would not endure that he should be king; but," he adds, "if you wish to return with him, he desires you to come to him this very night; if you do not, he says that he will set out by himself early in the morning." 2. Clearchus rejoined, "And we must certainly do as you say, if we determine to go to him; but if not, adopt for yourselves such measures as you may think most for your advantage;" for not even to them did he disclose what he intended to do.

3. But afterwards, when the sun was setting, having assembled the generals and captains, he spoke as follows: "My friends, when I offered a sacrifice with reference to marching against the king, the signs of the victims were not favourable, and indeed it was with good cause that they were not so; for as I now learn, there is between us and the king the river Tigris, a navigable river, which we could not cross without vessels; and vessels we have none. Yet it is not possible to remain here; for we have no means of procuring provisions. But for going to the friends of Cyrus, the sacrifices were extremely favourable. 4. We must accordingly proceed thus: when we separate, we must sup, each of us on what he has; when the signal is given with the horn as if for going to rest, proceed to pack up your baggage; when it sounds the second time, place it on your baggage-cattle; and, at the third signal, follow him who leads the way, keeping your baggage-cattle next the river, and the heavy-armed troops on the outside." 5. The generals and captains, after listening to this address, went away, and did as he directed; and thenceforth he commanded, and the others obeyed, not indeed having elected him commander, but perceiving that he alone possessed such qualifications as a leader ought to have, and that the rest of them were comparatively inexperienced.

6. The computation of the route which they had come from Ephesus in Ionia to the field of battle, was ninety-three days' march, and five hundred and thirty-five parasangs, or sixteen thousand and fifty stadia;[85] and the distance from the field of battle to Babylon was said to be three hundred and sixty stadia.

7. Here, as soon as it was dark, Miltocythes the Thracian deserted to the king, with about forty horse that he commanded, and nearly three hundred of the Thracian infantry. 8. Clearchus led the way for the rest, in the prescribed order; and they followed, and arrived at the first halting-place,[86] to join Ariæus and his troops about midnight; and the generals and captains of the Greeks, having drawn up their men under arms, went in a body to Ariæus; when the Greeks on the one hand, and Ariæus and his principal officers on the other, took an oath not to betray each other, and to be true allies; and the Barbarians took another oath, that they would lead the way without treachery. 9. These oaths they took after sacrificing a bull, a wolf,[87] a boar, and a ram, over a shield, the Greeks dipping a sword, and the Barbarians a lance, into the blood.

10. When these pledges of mutual fidelity were given, Clearchus said: "Since then, Ariæus, our route and yours is now the same, tell us, what is your opinion with respect to our course; whether we shall return the way we came, or whether you consider that you have thought of a better way." 11. Ariæus replied: "If we were to return the way we came, we should all perish of hunger; for we have now no supply of provisions; and for the last seventeen days' march, even when we were coming hither, we could procure nothing from the country through which we passed; or, if anything was to be found there, we consumed it ourselves in our passage. But now we propose to take a longer road, but one in which we shall not want for provisions. 12. We must make the first days' marches as long as we can, that we may remove ourselves to the greatest possible distance from the king's army; for if we once escape two or three days' journey from him, the king will no longer be able to overtake us; since he will not dare to pursue us with a small force; and, with a numerous army, he will not be able to march fast enough, and will probably experience a scarcity of provisions." "Such," he concluded, "is my opinion."

13. This scheme for conducting the army was calculated for nothing else than to effect an escape, clandestinely or openly, by flight.[88] But fortune proved a better leader; for as soon as it was day they began their march, with the sun on their right, expecting to arrive about sunset at some villages in the Babylonian territory; and in this expectation they were not disappointed. 14. But, in the afternoon, they thought that they perceived some of the enemy's cavalry; and those of the Greeks who happened not to be in their ranks, ran to their places in the ranks; and Ariæus (for he was riding in a waggon because he had been wounded) came down and put on his armour, as did those who were with him. 15. But while they were arming themselves, the scouts that had been sent forward returned, and reported that they were not cavalry, but baggage-cattle grazing; and every one immediately concluded that the king was encamped somewhere near. Smoke also was seen rising from some villages not far distant. 16. Clearchus however did not lead his troops against the enemy; (for he was aware that his soldiers were tired and in want of food; and besides it was now late;) yet he did not turn out of his way, taking care not to appear to flee, but continued his march in a direct line, and took up his quarters with his vanguard, just at sunset, in the nearest villages, from which even the wood-work of the houses had been carried off by the king's troops. 17. These, therefore, who were in advance, encamped with some degree of regularity; but those who followed, coming up in the dark, took up with such quarters as they chanced to find, and made so much noise in calling to each other, that even the enemy heard them; and those of the enemy who were stationed the nearest, fled from their encampments. 18. That this had been the case, became apparent on the following day; for there was no longer a single beast of burden to be seen, nor any camp, nor smoke anywhere near. The king had been alarmed, as it seemed, by the sudden approach of the Grecian army; and of this he gave proof by what he did on the following day.

19. However, in the course of this night, a panic fell upon the Greeks themselves, and there arose such noise and commotion in their camp as usually ensues on the occurrence of sudden terror. 20. Upon this, Clearchus ordered Tolmides, an Eleian, whom he happened to have with him, the best[89] herald of his time, to command silence; and proclaim, that "the generals give notice, that whoever will give information of the person who turned the ass among the arms,[90] shall receive a reward of a talent of silver." 21. On this proclamation being made, the soldiers were convinced that their alarm was groundless, and their generals were safe. At break of day, Clearchus issued orders for the Greeks to form themselves under arms, in the same order in which they had been when the battle took place.

[Footnote 85: As Xenophon, in the first book, has enumerated only 84 days' march, 517 parasangs, which make but 15,510 stadia, Zeune thinks that the 9 days' march, and 18 parasangs, here added, are to be understood as forming the route from Ephesus to Sardis. Krüger is inclined to think the passage an interpolation.]

[Footnote 86: [Greek: Eis ton prôton stathmon].] This is the [Greek: stathmos] mentioned in i. 10. 1, being that from which the army of Cyrus started on the day when the battle took place.]

[Footnote 87: Bornemann observes that the sacrifice of the wolf seems to have been the act of the Persians, referring to Plutarch de Is. et Os., where it is said that it was a custom with them to sacrifice that animal. "They thought the wolf," he adds, "the son and image of Ahrimanes, as appears from Kleuker in Append. ad Zendavestam, T. II. P. iii. pp. 78, 84; see also Brisson, p. 388."]

[Footnote 88: [Greek: Apodranai kai apophygein].] The first means to flee, so that it cannot be discovered whither the fugitive is gone; the second, so that he cannot be overtaken. Kühner ad i. 4. 8. "Fugâ vel clandestinâ vel apertâ." Weiske.]

[Footnote 89: [Greek: Arioston].] Best, apparently, on account of the loudness or clearness of his voice.]

[Footnote 90: The arms, as Kühner observes, were piled in front of the men's quarters. The affair of the ass was an invention of Clearchus to draw off the thoughts of the soldiers from the subject of their apprehension. Polyænus, iii. 9. 4, speaks of a similar stratagem having been adopted by Iphicrates.]