Экономические истоки диктатуры и демократии (Экономическая теория). 2015

Библиография

Abrams L. Bismarck and the German Empire, 1871-1918. N.Y.: Routledge, 1995.

Acemoglu D. Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market // Journal of Economic Literature. 2002. Vol. 40. P. 7-72.

Acemoglu D. Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? // Journal of Comparative Economics. 2003a. Vol. 31. P. 620-652,

Acemoglu D. Patterns of Skill Premia // Review of Economic Studies. 2003b. Vol. 70. P. 199-230.

Acemoglu D„ Johnson S., Robinson J.A. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation // American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 91. P. 1369-1401.

Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J.A. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2002. Vol. 118. P. 1231-1294.

Acemoglu D„ Johnson S„ Robinson J.A. The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth // American Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 95. P. 546-579.

Acemoglu D., Johnson S„ Robinson J.A. Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. NBER Working Paper No. 10481, forthcoming // Handbook of Economic Growth / ed. by Ph. Aghion, S. Durlauf. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2004.

Acemoglu D„ Johnson S„ Robinson J.A., Yared P. Income and Democracy. 2004. Unpublished Paper.

Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A. Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Growth, Inequality, and Democracy in Historical Perspective // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2000a. Vol. CXV. P. 1167-1199.

Acemoglu D„ Robinson J.A. Repression or Democratization? // European Economic Review. 2000b. Vol. 44. P. 683-693.

Acemoglu D„ Robinson J.A. A Theory of Political Transitions // American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 91. P. 938-963.

Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A. The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve // Review of Development Economics. 2002. Vol. 6. P. 183-203.

Acemoglu D., Zilibotti F. Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth // Journal of Political Economy. 1997. Vol. 105. P. 709-751.

Acemoglu D„ Zilibotti F. Information Acquisition in Development // Journal of Economic Growth. 1999. Vol. 4. P. 5-38.

Ades A. Economic Development with Endogenous Political Participation // Economics and Politics. 1995. Vol. 7. P. 93-117.

Ades A., Verdier Th. The Rise and Fall of Elites: A Theory of Economic Development and Social Polarization in Rent-Seeking Societies. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1495. 1996.

Aguilera P.M. Los Comuneros: Guerra Social у Lucha Anticolonia. Bogota: Uni-versidad Nacional de Colombia. 1985.

Alesina A. Credibility and Political Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters // American Economic Review. 1988. Vol. 78. P. 796-805.

Alesina A., Perotti R. Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment // European Economic Review. 1996. Vol. 40. P. 1203-1225.

Alesina A., Rodrik D. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1994. Vol. 109. P. 465-490.

Alesina A., Glaeser E„ Sacerdote B. Why Doesn’t the United States Have a Europe-an-Style Welfare State? // Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Fall 2001. P. 187— 278.

Alesina A., Glaeser E. Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Almond G.A., Verba S. The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Alonso P. Between Revolution and the Ballot Box: The Origins of the Argentine Radical Party in the 1890s. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Altimir O. Estimaciones de la Distribucion del Ingreso en la Argentina, 1953— 1980 // Desarollo Economico. 1986. Vol. 25. P. 521-566.

Aminzade R. Ballots and Barricades: Class Formation and Republican Politics in France, 1830-1871. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Andre C„ Platteau J.-Ph. Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap // Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 1997. Vol. 34. P. 1-47.

Arcinegas G. Los Comuneros. Bogota: Editorial ABC, 1938.

Arrow K.J. Social Choice and Individual Values. N.Y.: Wiley, 1951 (Эрроу К. Коллективный выбор и индивидуальные ценности. М.: ГУ ВШЭ, 2004).

AscherA. The Revolution of 1905. Vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.

AscherA. The Revolution of 1905. Vol. 2. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Attanasio O., Goldberg P.K., Pavcnik N. Trade Reforms and Wage Inequality in Colombia // Journal of Development Economics. 2004. Vol. 74. P. 331-366.

Austen-Smith D. Income Redistribution under Proportional Representation // Journal of Political Economy. 2000. Vol. 108. P. 1235-1269.

Austen-Smith D., Banks f. S, Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preferences. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.

Austen-Smith D„ Wallerstein M. Redistribution in a Divided Society / Northwestern University, J.L. Kellogg School of Management. CMS-EMS Discussion Paper No. 1362. 2003.

Baloyra E.A. El Salvador in Transition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

Barro R.J. On the Determination of the Public Debt // Journal of Political Economy. 1979. Vol. 87. P. 940-971.

Barro R.J. The Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1997.

Barro R.J. The Determinants of Democracy // Journal of Political Economy. 1999. Vol. 107. P. 158—S183.

Barro R.J., Lee Jong-Wha. International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications. CID Working Paper No. 42. 2000.

Barzel Y. A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Bates R.H. The Economics of Transition to Democracy // PS: Political Science and Politics. 1991. Vol. 24. P. 24-27.

Bates R.H., Lien Da-HsiangD. A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government // Politics and Society. 1985. Vol. 14. P. 53-70.

Beard Ch.A. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1913.

Becker G.S. A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1983. Vol. 98. P. 371-400.

Benabou R. Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract // American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. P. 96-129.

Benabou R„ Efe Ok. Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2001. Vol. 116. P. 447-487.

Bergquist Ch. The Left and the Paradoxes of Colombian History. Department of History, University of Washington at Seattle. 2002. Unpublished Paper.

Bernheim B.D., Whinston M. Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1986. Vol. 1010. P. 1-31.

Berry A.R., Urrutia M. Income Distribution in Colombia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.

Bertola L. Ensayos de historia economica: Uruguay у la region en la economia mundial, 1870-1990. Montevideo: Ediciones Trilce, 2000.

Bertola L„ Williamson J.G. Globalization in Latin America before 1940. NBER Working Paper No, 9687. 2003.

Besley T, Burgess R. Land Reform, Poverty Reduction and Growth: Evidence from India // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2000. Vol. 115. P. 389-430.

Besley T.F., Coate S.T. An Economic Model of Representative Democracy // Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 112. P. 85-114.

Besley T.F., Coate S.T. Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis // American Economic Review. 1998. Vol. 88. P. 139-156.

Binswanger H.P., Deininger K., Feder G. Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations // The Handbook of Development Economics / ed. by

J. Behrman, T.N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995. Vol. 3.

Black D. On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making // Journal of Political Economy. 1948. Vol. 56. P. 23-34.

Blackbourn D. The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Blume L„ Simon C.P. Mathematics for Economists. N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co, 1994.

Boix C. Democracy and Redistribution. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Boix С, Rosato S. A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-1999. Department of Political Science, University of Chicago. 2001. Unpublished Paper.

Bollen K.A. Political Democracy and the Timing of Development // American Sociological Review. 1079. Vol. 44. P. 572-587.

Bollen K.A. Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps // Studies in Comparative International Development. 1990. Vol. 25. P. 7-24.

Bollen K.A. Cross-National Indicators of Liberal Democracy, 1950-1990.2ndICPSR version. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1998; Ann Arbor, WI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2001.

Bollen K.A., Jackman R. W. Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income // American Sociological Review. 1985. Vol. 50. P. 438-457.

Bollen K.A., Jackman R.W. Income Inequality and Democratization Revisited: A Comment on Muller // American Sociological Review. 1995. Vol. 60. P. 983-989.

Bourguignon E, Verdier Th. Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality, and Growth // Journal of Development Economics. 2000. Vol. 62. P. 285-313.

Bourguignon F, Morrisson Ch. Data Sources for Inequality among World Citizens, 1820-1992. 2001. Unpublished Paper. .

Bourguignon E, Morrisson Ch. Inequality among World Citizens, 1820-1992 // American Economic Review. 2002. Vol. 92. P. 727-744.

Bowman L.W. Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Brainard L„ Verdier Th. The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited // Journal of International Economics. 1997. Vol. 42. P. 221-238.

Bratton M., Walk N. van de. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Brenner R. Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Preindustrial Europe // Past and Present. 1976. Vol. 70. P. 30-75.

Brenner R. Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and Londons Overseas Traders, 1550-1653. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Briggs A. Chartist Studies. L.: Macmillan, 1959.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce D„ Morrow J.D., Siverson R."M., Smith A. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2003.

Bunce V. Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience // World Politics. 2003. Vol. 55. P. 167-192.

Burkhart R.E., Lewis-Beck M.S. Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis // American Political Science Review. 1994. Vol. 88. P. 903-1010.

Bushnell D. The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Calvert R.L. Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence // American Journal of Political Science. 1985. Vol. 29. P. 69-95.

Calvo E„ Torre J.C., SzwarcbergM. The New Welfare Alliance. Department of Political Science, Universidad di Telia, Buenos Aires. 2001. Unpublished Paper.

Cardenas A., Pablo Е. El Movimiento Comunal de 1781 en el Nuevo Reino de Granada. 2 vols. Bogota: Editorial Kelly, 1960.

Case W. Politics in South-East Asia: Democracy or Less. Richmond: Cruzon Press, 2002.

Cavarozzi M. Political Cycles in Argentina since 1955// Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America / ed. by G. O’Donnell, Ph.C. Schmitter, L. Whitehead. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Chalker C.H. Elections and Democracy in Costa Rica // Elections and Democracy in Central America Revisited / ed. by M.A. Seligson, J.A. Booth. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.

Coate S„ Morris S.E. Policy Persistence // American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. P. 1327-1336.

Coatsworth J.H. Notes on the Comparative Economic History of Latin America and the United States // Development and Underdevelopment in America: Contrasts in Economic Growth in North and Latin America in Historical Perspective / ed. by W.L. Bernecker, H.W. Tobler. N.Y.: Walter de Gruyter, 1993.

Cohen Y. Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoners Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Cole A., Campbell P. French Electoral Systems and Elections since 1789. Aider-shot: Gower Press, 1989.

Collier D. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Collier D„ Levitsky S. Democracy with Adjectives // World Politics. 1997. Vol. 49. P.430-451.

Collier R.B. Paths Towards Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Colomer J.M. Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.

Conley J.P., Temimi A. Endogenous Enfranchisement When Groups’ Preferences Conflict // Journal of Political Economy. 2001. Vol. 109. P. 79-107.

Coughlin P.J. Probabilistic Voting Theory. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Couyoumdjian J.R., Millar R„ Tocornal}. Historia de la Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago, 1983-1993. Un siglo del mercado de valores en Chile. Santiago: Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago, 1992.

Cowling M. Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

Cox G.W. Making Votes Count. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Cox Th.S. Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1976.

Cragg M.I., Epelbaum M. Why Has Wage Dispersion Grown in Mexico // Journal of Development Economics. 1996. Vol. 51. P. 99-116.

Crescenzi M.J.C. Violence and Uncertainty in Transitions // Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1999. Vol. 43. P. 192-212.

Dahl R.A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971 (Даль P. Полиархия, участие и оппозиция. М.: Изд. дом ГУ ВШЭ, 2010).

Darvall F.O. Popular Disturbances and Public Order in Regency England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934.

Des Forges A. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. N.Y.: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

Diamond L.J. Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered // American Behavioral Scientist. 1992. Vol. 35. P. 450-499.

Diamond L.J. Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Diaz-Alejandro C. Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

Di Nardo J.E., Fortin N.M., Lemieux Th. Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach // Econometrica. 1996. Vol. 65. P. 1001-1044.

Di Palma G. To Craft Democracies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Di Telia G„ Dornbusch R. The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989.

Dixit A.K. The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1996.

Dixit A.K., Londregan J.B. Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency // American Political Science Review. 1995. Vol. 89. P. 856-866.

Dixit A.K., Londregan J.B. The Determinants of Success of Special Interest in Redistributive Politics // Journal of Politics. 1996. Vol. LVIII. P. 1132-1155.

Dixit A.K., Londregan J.B. Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. CXIII. P. 497-530.

Dixit A.K., Norman V. Theory of International Trade: A Dual, General Equilibrium Approach. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Dobson R.B. The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381. 2nd ed. L.: Macmillan, 1983.

Dollar D„ Kraay A. Growth Is Good for the Poor // Journal of Economic Growth. 2002. Vol. 7. P. 195-225.

Downs A. An Economic Theory of Democracy. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1957.

Drake P.W. Labor Movements and Dictatorships: The Southern Cone in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Drake P.W. The International Causes of Democratization, 1974-1990 // The Origins of Liberty / ed. by P.W. Drake, M.D. McCubbins. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Dumke R. Income Inequality and Industrialization in Germany, 1850-1945 // Income Distribution in Historical Perspective / ed. by Y. Brenner et al. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Dyer Ch.C. The Social and Economic Background to the Rural Revolt of 1381 // The English Rising of 1381 / ed. by R.H. Hilton, T.H. Aston. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Easterlin R.A. Why Isn’t the Whole World Developed? // Journal of Economic History. 1981. Vol.41.P. 1-19.

Ellman M., Wantchekon L. Electoral Competition under the Threat of Political Unrest // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2000. Vol. 115. P. 499-531.

Eltis D. The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Engerman S.L., Sokoloff K.L. Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Growth Paths among New World Economies // How Latin America Fell Behind / ed. by S. Haber. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.

Engerman S.L., Mariscal E., Sokoloff K.L. Schooling, Suffrage, and the Persistence of Inequality in the Americas, 1800-1945. Department of Economics, UCLA. 1998. Unpublished Paper.

Epstein D.L., Bates R.H., Goldstone }., Kristensen /., O’Halloran Sh. Demo-cratic Transitions. Harvard University, J.F.K. School of Government. CID Working Paper No. 101.2004.

Ertman Th. Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Evans E.J. The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain, 1783-1870. 2nd ed. N.Y.: Longman, 1996.

Feenstra R.C. Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Feinstein Ch.H. The Rise and Fall of the Williamson Curve // Journal of Economic History. 1988. Vol. 48. P. 699-729.

Feng Yi, Zak P.K. The Determinants of Democratic Transitions // Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1999. Vol. 43. P. 162-177.

Finer S.E. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. 2nd ed. Baltimore: Penguin, 1976.

Fitch J.S. The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Flora P. State, Economy, and Society, 1815-1975. Frankfurt: Campus-Verlag, 1983.

Fogel R. W. Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery. N.Y.: Norton, 1989.

Fogel R. W., Engerman S.L. Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974.

Fudenberg D„ Tirole J. Game Theory. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1991.

Fukuyama F. The End of History and the Last Man. N.Y.: Free Press, 1992 (Фукуяма Ф. Конец истории и последний человек. М.: Изд-во ACT, 2004).

Galor О., Moav О. Das Human Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure. 2003. Unpublished Paper. .

Galor 0., Zeira J. Income Distribution and Macroeconomics // Review of Economic Studies. 1993. Vol. 40. P. 35-52.

Garrard J. Democratization in Britain: Elites, Civil Society, and Reform since 1800. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.

Garrett G. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Gasiorowski M.J. Economic Crises and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis // American Political Science Review. 1995. Vol. $9. P. 882-897.

Gates S„ Humes B.D. Games, Information, and Politics. Ann Arbor (MI): University of Michigan Press, 1997.

Gavin M., Perotti R. Fiscal Policy in Latin America // NBER Macroeconomics Annual / ed. by B. Bernanke, J. Rotemberg. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1997.

Geddes B. What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? // Annual Review of Political Science. 1999a. Vol. 2. P. 115-144.

Geddes B. The Effect of Regime Type on Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument. Department of Political Science, UCLA. 1999b. Unpublished Paper.

Gerschenkron A. Bread and Democracy in Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943.

Gibbons R. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Goldin C. The Human Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past // Journal of Economic History. 2001. Vol. 61. P. 263-292.

Goldstein R.J. Political Repression in Nineteenth Century Europe. L.: Croon Helm, 1983.

Gosnell H.F. Why Europe Votes? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.

Gradstein M. Political Inequality and Institutional Quality. Ben-Gurion University. 2002. Unpublished Paper.

Grandmont J.-M. Intermediate Preferences and Majority Rule // Econometrica. 1978. Vol. 46. P.317-330.

Green E.J. On the Emergence of Parliamentary Government: The Role of Private Information // Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. 1993. Vol. 17. P. 1-12.

Green J.R., Mas-Colell A., Whinston M.D. Microeconomic Theory. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Grossman G., Helpman E. Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics // Review of Economic Studies. 1996. Vol. 63. P. 265-286.

Grossman G„ Helpman E. Special Interest Politics. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2001.

Grossman G., Helpman E. Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production. NBER Working Paper No. 9403. 2002.

Grossman H.I. A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections // American Economic Review. 1991. Vol. 81. P. 912-921.

Grossman H.I. Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform // American Economic Review. 1994. Vol. 84. P. 705-712.

Grossman H.I., Suk Jae Noh. Proprietary Public Finance and Economic Welfare // Journal of Public Economics. 1994. Vol. 53. P. 187-204.

Grossman S.J., Hart O.D. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration // Journal of Political Economy. 1986. Vol. 94. P. 691-719.

Gudmundson L. Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern Central America // Agrarian Structure and Political Power / ed. by E. Huber, F. Safford. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995.

Haggard S., Kaufman R.R. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Hardin R. Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Hardin R. All for One. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Harrison R. Before the Socialists: Studies in Labour and Politics, 1861-1881. L.: Routledge Keegan and Paul, 1965.

Hart O.D. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Hayes W.A. The Background and Passage of the Third Reform Act. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Helpman E., Krugman P.R. Trade Policy and Market Structure. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1989.

Herbst J.l. Prospects for Revolution in South Africa // Political Science Quarterly. 1988. Vol. 103. P. 665-685.

Herbst J.L States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Heston A., Summers R., Atten B. Penn World Tables Version 6.1. Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). 2002.

Hilton R.H. Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Rising of 1381. N.Y.: Viking Press, 1973.

Himmelfarb G. The Politics of Democracy: The English Reform Act of 1867 // Journal of British Studies. 1966. Vol. 6. P. 97-138.

Hirschman A.O. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1970 (Хиршман А. Выход, голос и верность. М.: Фонд «Либеральная миссия»; Новое издательство, 2009).

Hirschman A.O. Exit, Voice, and the State // World Politics. 1978. Vol. 31. P. 90-107.

Hobbes Th. Leviathan. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (Гоббс T. Левиафан, или материя, форма и власть государства церковного и гражданского // Гоббс Т. Соч.: в 2 т. Т. 2. М.: Мысль, 1991).

Horowitz D.L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

Horowitz D.L. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

Hotelling H. Stability in Competition // Economic Journal. 1929. Vol. 39. P. 41-57.

Huff W. G. The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Huntington S.P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964.

Huntington S.P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 (Хантингтон С. Политический порядок в меняющихся обществах. М.: Прогресс-Традиция, 2004).

Huntington S.P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman (OK): University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 (Хантингтон С. Третья волна: Демократизация в конце XX века. М.: РОССПЭН, 2003).

Jack W„ Lagunojf R. Dynamic Enfranchisement. Department of Economics. Georgetown University. 2003.

Jennings I. Party Politics. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1961.

Justman M, Gradstein M. The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th Century Britain // Explorations in Economic History. 1999. Vol. 36. P. 109-127.

Kaufman R.R., Stallings B. The Political Economy of Latin American Populism // The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America / ed. by R. Dornbusch, S. Edwards. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Kendall M.G., Stuart A. The Law of the Cubic Proportion in Election Results // British Journal of Sociology. 1950. Vol. 1. P. 183-196.

Keyssar A. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States. N.Y.: Basic Books, 2000.

Kiser E„ Barzel Y. The Origins of Democracy in England // Rationality and Society. 1991. Vol. 3. P. 396-422.

Kolb G.L. Democracy and Dictatorship in Venezuela, 1945-1958. Hamden: Shoestring Press, 1974.

Kopstein Reilly D.A. Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World // World Politics. 2000. Vol. 53. P. 1-37.

Kraus F. The Historical Development of Income Inequality in Western Europe and the United States // The Development of the Welfare State in Europe and America / ed. by P. Flora, A.J. Heidenheimer. New Brunswick (NJ): Transactions Books, 1981.

Kreuzer M. Democratization and Changing Methods of Electoral Corruption in France from 1815 to 1914 // Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America / ed. by W. Little, E. Posada-Carbo. L.: Macmillan, 1996.

KrigerN.J. Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War: Peasant Voices. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Kubota K, Milner H.V. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries? Forthcoming // International Organization Winter Edition 2005.

Kuznets S.S. Economic Growth and Income Inequality // American Economic Review. 1955. Vol. 65. P. 1-28.

Kuznets S.S. The Distribution of Income by Size // Economic Development and Cultural Change. 1963. Vol. 11. P. 1-80.

Kuznets S.S. Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

LangS. Parliamentary Reform, 1785-1928. N.Y.: Routledge, 1999.

Lapp N.D. Landing Votes: Representation and Land Reform in Latin America. N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Learner E.E. International Trade Theory: The Evidence // The Handbook of International Economics. Vol. 3 / ed. by J. Levinson, G.M₄Grossman, K. Rogoff. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995.

Learner E.E. In Search of Stolper-Samuelson Effects on U.S. Wages // Imports, Exports, and the U.S. Worker / ed. by S.M. Collins. Washington (DC): Brookings Institution Press, 1998.

Lee S.J. Aspects of British Political History, 1815-1914. N.Y.: Routledge, 1994.

Legros P„ Newman A.F. Wealth Effects, Distribution and the Theory of Organization // Journal of Economic Theory. 1996. Vol. 70. P. 312-341.

Lehoucq F.E. Instituciones democraticas у conflictos politicos en Costa Rica. Heredia: Editorial UNA, 1998.

Leventoglu B. Social Mobility and Political Transitions. Department of Political Science, SUNY Stony Brook. 2003a. Unpublished Paper, .

Leventoglu B. Social Mobility, Middle Class and Political Transitions. Department of Political Science, SUNY Stony Brook. 20036. Unpublished Paper, .

Levine D.H. Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Levine D.H. Venezuela: The Nature, Sources and Prospects for Democracy // Democracy in Developing Areas: Latin America / ed. by L.J. Diamond, J.J. Linz, S.M. Lip-set. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989.

Lewis A.W. Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour // Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies. 1954. Vol. 22. P. 139-191.

Li Hongyi, Lyn Squire, Heng-fu Zou. Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in Income Inequality // Economic Journal. 1998. Vol. 108. P. 26-43.

Lichbach M.I. An Evaluation of ‘Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?’ Studies// World Politics. 1989. Vol. 41. P. 431-470.

Lichbach M.I. The Rebels Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.

Lijphart A. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

Lim L„ Pang Eng Fong Findlay R. Singapore // Five Small Open Economies / ed. by R. Findlay, S. Wellisz. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Lindbeck A., Weibull J. Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition // Public Choice. 1987. Vol. LII. P. 272-297.

Lindert P.H. Unequal English Wealth since 1670 // Journal of Political Economy. 1986. Vol. 94. P. 1127-1162.

Lindert PH. The Rise in Social Spending, 1880-1930 // Explorations in Economic History. 1994. Vol. 31. P. 1-37.

Lindert P.H. Three Centuries of Inequality in Britain and America // Handbook of Income Distribution / ed. by A.B. Atkinson, F. Bourguignon. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2000a.

Lindert P.H. The Political Economy of Comparative Mass Education in Europe before 1914. University of California at Davis, Agricultural History Center. 2000b. Unpublished Paper.

Lindert P.H. Growing Public: Social Spending and Economics Growth since the Eighteenth Century. 2 vols. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Lindert P.H., Williamson J.G. Revising England’s Social Tables, 1688-1812 // Explorations in Economic History. 1982. Vol. 19. P. 385-408.

Lindert P.H., Williamson J.G. Reinterpreting Britain’s Social Tables, 1688-1913 // Explorations in Economic History. 1983. Vol. 20. P. 94-109.

Lindert P.H., Williamson J.G. Growth, Equality, and History // Explorations in Economic History. 1985. Vol. 22. P. 341-377.

Linz J.J. Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Linz J.J. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? // The Failure of Presidential Democracy / ed. by J.J. Linz, A. Valenzuela. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Linz J.J. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

Linz J.J., Stepan A. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Linz J.J., Stepan A. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Lipset S.M. Some Social Prerequisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy // American Political Science Review. 1959. Vol. 53. P. 69-105.

Lipset S.M., Marks G. It Didn’t Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States. N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000.

Lizzeri A., Persico N. Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s Age of Reform’ // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2004. Vol. 119. P. 707-765.

Llavador H., Oxoby R.J. Partisan Competition, Growth and Franchise. Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 2003. Unpublished Paper.

Lockhart J., Schwartz S.B. Early Latin America. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Londono J.-L. Distribucion del Ingreso у Desarollo Economico: Colombia en el Siglo XX; Fedesarollo: TM Editores, Bogota, 1995.

Londregan J.B. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Londregan J.B., Poole K.T. Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power // World Politics. 1990. Vol. 42. P. 151-183.

Londregan J.B., Poole К. T. Does High Income Promote Democracy? // World Politics. 1996. Vol. 49. P. 1-30.

Loveman B. For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America. Wilmington: SR Books, 1999.

Luebbert G. Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Lundahl М, Apartheid in Theory and Practice: An Economic Analysis. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Maddison A. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992. Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995.

Maddison A. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001.

Mahoney J. The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

Manin B. The Principles of Representative Government. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1997 (Манин Б. Принципы представительского правления. СПб.: Изд-во Европейского ун-та в Санкт-Петербурге, 2008).

Markoff J. Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change. Thousand Oaks (CA): Pine Forge Press, 1996.

Marshall A. Principles of Economics. 8th ed. L.: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1920 (Маршалл А. Принципы экономической науки: в 3 т. М.: Прогресс, 1993).

Marshall M.G., Jaggers К. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. Polity IV Project, University of Maryland. 2004.

Matsuyama K. A Simple Model of Sectoral Adjustment // Review of Economic Studies. 1992. Vol. 59. P. 375-388.

Maxfield S. Capital Mobility and Democratic Stability // Journal of Democracy. 2000. Vol. 11. P.95-106.

Mazzuca S.L., Robinson J.F. Power and Proportionality. Department of Government. Harvard, 2004. Unpublished Paper.

McCreery D.J. Rural Guatemala, 1760-1940. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1994.

McGuire R.A. Constitution Making: A Rational Choice Model of the Federal Convention of 1787 // American Journal of Political Science. 1988. Vol. 32. P. 483-522.

McKelvey R.D., Schofield N. Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point // Econometrica. 1987. Vol. 55. P. 923-934.

McLaren J.E. Globalization and Vertical Structure // American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. P. 1239-1254.

Meltzer A.H., Richard S.F. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government // Journal of Political Economy. 1981. Vol. 89. P. 914-927.

Michels R. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. N.Y.: The Free Press, 1962 [1911] (Михельс R Политические партии: Социологическое исследование олигархических тенденций современной демократии. М.: Наука, 1994).

Milesi-Ferretti G.M., Perotti R„ Rostagno M. Electoral Systems and Public Spending // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2002. Vol. 117. P. 609-657.

Milne R.S., Mauzy D.K. Singapore: The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew. Boulder: West-view Press, 1990.

Milne R.S., Mauzy D.K. Singapore Politics under the Peoples Action Party. N.Y.: Routledge, 2002.

Mitch D. The Role of Human Capital in the First Industrial Revolution // The British Industrial Revolution: An Economic Perspective / ed. by J. Mokyr. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993.

Mommsen W.J. The German Revolution, 1918-1920: Political Revolution and Social Protest // Social Change and Political Development in Weimar Germany / ed. by R. Bessie, E.J. Feuchtwanger. L.: Croon Helm, 1981.

Moore B. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

Moore W.H. Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem // Political Research Quarterly. 1995. Vol. 48. P. 417-454.

Morrisson Ch. Historical Evolution of Income Distribution in Western Europe // Handbook of Income Distribution / ed. by A.B. Atkinson, F. Bourguignon. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2000.

Morrisson Ch., Snyder W. The Income Inequality of France in Historical Perspective // European Review of Economic History. 2000. Vol. 4. P. 59-84.

Muller E.N. Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality // American Sociological Review. 1988. Vol. 53. P. 50-68.

Muller E.N. Economic Determinants of Democracy // American Sociological Review. 1995. Vol. 60. P. 966-982.

Muller E.N., Seligson M.A. Inequality and Insurrections // American Political Science Review. 1987. Vol. 81. P. 425-451.

Mulligan C.B., Sala-i-Martin X., Gil R. Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies? NBER Working Paper No. 10040. 2003.

Murphy K.J., ShleiferA., Vishny R. W. Industrialization and the Big Push // Journal of Political Economy. 1989. Vol. 97. P. 1003-1026.

Myrdal G. Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions. L.: Duckworth, 1957.

Namier L. The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III. L.: Macmillan, 1961.

Newman A.F., Robinson J.A. Globalization and Democracy. Department of Government, Harvard University. 2002. Unpublished Paper.

Nolan B. Economic Crisis, State Policy and Working_rClass Formation in Germany, 1870-1900 // Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States / ed. by I. Katznelson, A.R. Zolberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Nordlinger E.A. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice-Hall, 1977.

North D.C. Structure and Change in Economic History. N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co, 1981.

North D.C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1990 (Норт Д. Институты, институциональные изменения и функционирование экономики. М.: Фонд экономической книги «Начала», 1997).

North D.C., Thomas R.P. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1973.

North D.C., Weingast B.R. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England // Journal of Economic History. 1989. Vol. 49. P. 803-832.

Nugent J.B., Robinson J.A. Are Endowments Fate? CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3206. 2002.

Nurkse R. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1953.

O’Brien RK. Political Preconditions for the Industrial Revolution // The Industrial Revolution and British Society / ed. by P.K. O’Brien, R. Quinault. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

O’Donnell G. Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. Berkeley: University of California, Institute for International Studies, 1973.

O’Donnell G. Permanent Crisis and the Failure to Create a Democratic Regime: Argentina, 1955-1966 // The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America / ed. by J.J. Linz, A. Stepan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

O’Donnell G. Delegative Democracy// Journal of Democracy. 1994. Vol. 5. P. 55-69.

O’Donnell G., Schmitter Ph.C., Whitehead L. (eds). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

O’Meara D. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996.

O’Rourke K.H., Taylor A.M., Williamson J.G. Factor Price Convergence in the Late 19th Century// International Economic Review. 1996. Vol. 37. P. 499-530.

O’Rourke K.H., Taylor A.M., Williamson J.G. Globalization and History. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1999.

O’Rourke K.H., Taylor A.M., Williamson J.G. From Malthus to Ohlin: Trade, Growth and Distribution since 1500. NBER Working Paper No. 8955. 2002.

Oatley Th. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy // American Journal of Political Science. 1999. Vol. 43. P. 1003-1027.

Okun A.M. Equality and Efficiency, The Big Trade-off. Washington (DC): Brookings Institution Press, 1975.

Olson M. C. The Logic of Collective Action: P ublic Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1965 (Олсон M. Логика коллективных действий: Общественные блага и теория групп. М.: Фонд экономической инициативы, 1995).

Olson М.С. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982 (Олсон M. Возвышение и упадок народов. Экономический рост, стагфляция и социальный склероз. Новосибирск: ЭКОР, 1998).

Olson М.С. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development // American Political Science Review. 1993. Vol. 87. P. 567-575 (Олсон M. Диктатура, демократия и развитие // Теория и практика демократии: избр. тексты. М.: Ладомир, 2006. С. 375-382).

Oman Ch. The Great Revolt of 1381. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906.

Osborne M.J., Rubinstein A. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1994.

Osborne M.J., Slivinski A. A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1996. Vol. 111. P. 65-96.

Paige J.M. Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1997.

Palacios M. Coffee in Colombia, 1850-1970: An Economic, Social, and Political History. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Papaioannou E„ Siourounis G. Economic and Social Factors Driving the Third Wave of Democratization. London Business School. 2004. Unpublished Paper.

Perotti R. Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say // Journal of Economic Growth. 1996. Vol. 1. P. 149-187.

Persson T. Consequences of Constitutions. NBER Working Paper No. 10170. 2003.

Persson T, Tabellini G. Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? // American Economic Review. 1994. Vol. 84. P. 600-621.

Persson T, Tabellini G. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2000.

Persson T, Tabellini G. The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say? Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2003.

Persson T, Roland G„ Tabellini G. Comparative Politics and Public Finance // Journal of Political Economy. 2000. Vol. 108. P. 1121-1161.

Phelan J.L. The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.

Philip G. Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge (UK): Polity, 2003.

Piketty Th. Income Inequality in France, 1901-1998 // Journal of Political Economy. 2003. Vol. 111. P. 1004-1042.

Piketty Th., Postal-Vinay G„ Rosenthal J.-L. Wealth Concentration in a Developing Economy: Paris and France, 1807-1994. CEPREMAP. 2003. Unpublished Paper. .

Plessis A. The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 1852-1871. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Plott Ch.R. A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule // American Economic Review. 1967. Vol. 57. P. 787-806.

Popkin S.L. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.

Potter A.L. The Failure of Democracy in Argentina, 1916-1930: An Institutional Perspective // Journal of Latin American Studies. 1981. Vol. 13. P. 83-109.

Powell R. The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information // American Political Science Review. 2004. Vol. 98. P. 231-241.

Prasad E., Rogojf K„ Shang-Jin Wei, Rose M.A. Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence // International Monetary Fund. 2003. March 17. .

Price R.M. The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Price R. Napoleon III and the Second Empire. N.Y.: Routledge, 1997.

Przeworski A. Democracy and the Market. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1991 (Пшеворский А. Демократия и рынок. Политические и экономические реформы в Восточной Европе. М.: РОССПЭН, 1999).

Przeworski A., Alvarez М„ Cheibub J.A., Limongi F. What Makes Democracy Endure? // Journal of Democracy. 1996. Vol. 7. P. 39-55.

Przeworski A., Alvarez M„ Cheibub J.A., Limongi F. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being in the World: 1950-1990. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Przeworski A., Limongi F. Modernization: Theory and Facts // World Politics. 1997. Vol. 49. P. 155-183.

Putnam R.H., Leonardi R., Nanetti R. Making Democracy Work; Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993 (Патнэм P. Чтобы демократитя сработала. Гражданские традиции в современной Италии. М.: Ad Marginem, 1996).

Quinn D.P. The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation // American Political Science Review. 1997. Vol. 91. P. 531-551.

Quinn D.P Democracy and International Financial Liberalization. Department of Political Science, Georgetown University. 2002. Unpublished Paper.

Randall L.J. An Economic History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1978.

Ranger T. Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika: The Invention of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe // The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa / ed. by L. Vail. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Rawson D.C. Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Reynolds A. Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Ringer F. Education and Society in Modern Europe. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1979.

Roberts K. W.S. Voting over Income Tax Schedules // Journal of Public Economics. 1977. Vol. 8. P. 329-340.

Robins N.A. Genocide and Millennialism in Upper Peru: The Great Rebellion of 1780-1782. Westport: Praeger, 2002.

Robinson J.A., Sokoloff K.L. Historical Roots of Inequality in Latin America // Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History? Ch. 5. World Bank. 2003.

Rock D.J. Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Rodan G. Singapore in 1996: Extended Election Fever // Asian Survey. 1997. Vol. 37. P. 175-180.

Rodan G. Singapore in 1997: Living with the Neighbours // Asian Survey. 1998. Vol. 38. P. 177-182.

Rodrik D. Has Globalization Gone too Far? Washington (DC): Institute of International Economics, 1997.

Rodrik D. Democracies Pay Higher Wages // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1999. Vol. CXIV. P. 707-738.

Rodrik D„ Rodriguez F. Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptics Guide to the Cross-National Evidence // NBER Macroeconomic Annual / ed. by B.S. Bernanke,

K.S. Rogoff. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2000.

Roemer J.E. Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology: A Tale of Lenin and the Tsar // Econometrica. 1985. Vol. 53. No. 1. P. 85-108.

Roemer J.E. Why the Poor Don’t Expropriate the Rich in Democracies // Journal of Public Economics. 1998. Vol. 70. P. 399-424.

Rogowski R. Democracy, Capital, Skill, and Country Size: Effects of Asset Mobility and Regime Monopoly on the Odds of Democratic Rule // The Origins of Liberty / ed. by P.W Drake, M.D. McCubbins. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Rokkan S. Citizens, Elections, Parties; Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development. N.Y.: McKay, 1970.

Romalis J. Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade // American Economic Review. 2004. Vol. 94. P. 67-97.

Romer Th. Individual Welfare, Majority Voting and the Properties of a Linear Income Tax // Journal of Public Economics. 1975. Vol. 7. P. 163-168.

Romer Th, Rosenthal H. Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo // Public Choice. 1978. Vol. 33. P. 27-43.

Romero L.A. A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.

Rosendorff B.P. Choosing Democracy // Economics and Politics. 2001. Vol. 13. P. 1-29.

Rosenstein-Rodan P. Problems of Industrialization in Eastern and Southeastern Europe // Economic Journal. 1943. Vol. 53. P. 202-211.

Ross J.I., Gurr N.R. Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States // Comparative Politics. 1989. Vol. 21. P. 405-426.

Rothschild M., Stiglitz J.E. Increasing Risk I: A Definition // Journal of Economic Theory. 1970. Vol. 4. P. 225-243.

Rothschild M„ Stiglitz J.E. Increasing Risk II: Its Economic Consequences // Journal of Economic Theory. 1971. Vol. 5. P. 66-84.

Rouquie A. The Military and the State in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Rueschemeyer D., Stephens E.H, Stephens J.D. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Rustow D.C. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model // Comparative Politics. 1970. Vol. 2. P. 337-363.

Sachs J.D., Warner A. Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration // Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1995. P. 1-118.

Safford Е, Palacios М. Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Sargent Th.J. Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1987.

Schedler A. What Is Democratic Consolidation? // Journal of Democracy. 1998. Vol. 9. P.91-107.

Schmitter Ph.C. Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1967 // On Military Intervention / ed. by M. Janowitz, J. van Doom. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971.

Schumpeter J.A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. N.Y.: Harper 8c Brothers, 1942 (Шумпетер Й. Капитализм, социализм и демократия. М.: Экономика, 1995).

Scott J.C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.

Searle G.R. Entrepreneurial Politics in Mid-Victorian Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Selten R. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games // International Journal of Game Theory. 1975. Vol. 4. P. 25-55.

Sen A.K. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1970.

Shepsle K.A. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibria in Multidimensional Voting Models // American Journal of Political Science. 1979. Vol. 23. P. 27-59.

Shepsle K.A., Weingast B.R. Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions // American Journal of Political Science. 1984. Vol. 28. P.49-74.

Shin Don Chull. On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research // World Politics. 1994. Vol. 47. P. 135-170.

Siavelis PM. The President and Congress in Postauthoritarian Chile: Institutional Constraints to Democratic Consolidation. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

Singer H. W. Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries // Social Research. 1949. Vol. 16. P. 1-11.

Smith F.B. The Making of the Second Reform BiH. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Smith PH. The Breakdown of Democracy in Argentina, 1916-1930 // The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America / ed. by J.J. Linz, A. Stepan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Soderberg J. Trends in Inequality in Sweden, 1700-1914 // Historical Social Research. 1987. P. 58-78.

Soderberg }. Wage Differentials in Sweden, 1725-1950 // Income Distribution in Historical Perspective / ed. by Y. Brenner et al. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Starr H. Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System // Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1991. Vol. 35. P. 356-381.

Stasavage D. Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Stavig W. The World of Tupac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999.

Stepan A. State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America // Bringing the State Back in / ed. by P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, Th. Skocpol. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Stepan A. Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations // Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives / ed. by G. O’Donnell, Ph. Schmitter, L. Whitehead. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Stepan A. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Stevenson J. Popular Disturbances in England, 1700-1870. N.Y.: Longman, 1979.

Stigler G.J. Directors Law of Public Income Redistribution // Journal of Law and Economics. 1970. Vol. 13. P. 1-10.

Stokey N.L., Lucas R.E., Jr., Prescott E.C. Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1989.

Sutter D. The Transition from Authoritarian Rule: A Game Theoretic Approach // Journal of Theoretical Politics. 2000. Vol. 12. P. 67-89.

Tarrow S. Aiming at a Moving Target: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe // PS: Political Science and Politics. 1991. Vol. 24. P. 12-20.

Tarrow S. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Tawney R.H. The Rise of the Gentry, 1558-1640 // Economic History Review. 1941. Vol. 11. P. 1-38.

Therborn G. The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy // New Left Review. 1977. Vol. 103. P.3-41.

Thoenig M., Verdier Th. A Theory of Defensive Skill-Biased Innovation and Globalization // American Economic Review. 2003. Vol. 93. P. 709-728.

Thompson E.P. The Making of the English Working Class. N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1963.

Thompson E.P. Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1975.

Thompson L. A History of South Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

Ticchi D., Vindigni A. On Wars and Political Development. The Role of International Conflicts in the Democratization of the West. Department of Politics, Princeton University. 2003a. Unpublished Paper.

Ticchi D., Vindigni A. Democracies and Armies. Department of Politics, Princeton University. 2003b. Unpublished Paper.

Tilly Ch. Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990 (Тилли Ч. Принуждение, капитал и европейские государства, 1990-1992 гг. М.: Изд. дом «Территория будущего», 2009).

Tilly Ch. Popular Contention in Britain, 1758-1834. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1995.

Tilly Ch. Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2004 (Тилли Ч. Борьба и демократия в Европе, 1650-2000. М.: Изд. дом ГУ ВШЭ, 2010).

Tilton Т. Social Origins of Liberal Democracy: The Swedish Case // American Political Science Review. 1974. Vol. 68. P. 561-571.

Trefler D. The Case of Missing Trade and Other Mysteries // American Economic Review. 1995. Vol. 85. P. 1029-1046.

Trevelyan G.M. British History in the Nineteenth Century and after, 1782-1919.

L.: Longman, Green and C° Publishers, 1937.

Trudeau R. Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

Tullock G. The Paradox of Revolution // Public Choice. 1971. Vol. 11. P. 89-99.

Turnbull C.M. A History of Singapore, 1819-1988. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Verner A.M. The Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and The 1905 Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Verney D. Parliamentary Reform in Sweden, 1866-1921. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.

Waisman C.H. Argentina: Capitalism and Democracy // Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America / ed. by L. Diamond, J. Hartlyn, J.J. Linz. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

Wallerstein M. Wage Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies // American Journal of Political Science. 1999. Vol. 43. P. 649-680.

Wantchekon L. Strategic Voting in Conditions of Political Instability: The 1994 Elections in El Salvador // Comparative Political Studies. 1999. Vol. 32. P. 810-834.

Weingast B.R. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law // American Political Science Review. 1997. Vol. 91. P. 245-263.

Weingast B.R. Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy // Analytic Narratives / ed. by R. Bates, A. Greif, M. Levi, J.-L. Rosenthal, B.R. Weingast. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Williams R.G. Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.

Williams R.G. States and Social Evolution: Coffee and the Rise of National Governments in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

Williamson D.C. Bismarck and Germany, 1862-1892. 2nd ed. N.Y.: Longman, 1998.

Williamson J.G. Did British Capitalism Breed Inequality? Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985.

Williamson J.G. Real Wages, Inequality and Globalization in Latin America before 1940 // Revista de Historia Economica. 1999. Vol. 17. P. 101-142.

Williamson J. Democracy and the Washington Consensus // World Development. 1993. Vol. 21. P. 1329-1336.

Williamson О.Е. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. N.Y.: Free Press, 1985 (Уильямсон О.И. Экономические институты капитализма. СПб.: Лениздат; SEV Press, 1996).

Wintrobe R. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Wittman D. Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories // American Political Science Review. 1983. Vol. 77. P. 142-157.

Wood E.J. Forging Democracy from Below: Contested Transitions in Oligarchic Societies. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Wood G. Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969.

Woodside D. Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976.

Wright R.D. Taxes, Redistribution, and Growth // Journal of Public Economics. 1996. Vol. 62. P. 327-338.

Yashar D.J. Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s-1950s. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.

Zeldin Th. The Political System of Napoleon III. N.Y.: St. Martins Press, 1958.

Научное издание

Серия «Политическая теория:

ДАРОН АСЕМОГЛУ,

ДЖЕЙМС А, РОБИНСОН

Главный редактор

ВАЛЕРИЙ АНАШВИЛИ Заведующая книжной редакцией ЕЛЕНА БЕРЕЖНОВА Редактор

МАРИНА КОВАЛЕВА Художник

ВАЛЕРИЙ КОРШУНОВ Компьютерная верстка и графика НАТАЛЬЯ ПУЗАНОВА Корректор

ВАЛЕРИЯ КАМЕНЕВА

НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ «ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ЭКОНОМИКИ» 101000, Москва, ул. Мясницкая, д. 20 Тел./факс: (499) 611-15-52

Подписано в печать 03.12.2014. Формат 70x100/16 . Гарнитура Minion Pro. Уел. печ. л. 41,6. Уч.-изд. л. 33,5 Тираж 1000 экз. Изд. № 1272. Заказ № 6532

Отпечатано способом ролевой струйной печати в АО «Первая Образцовая типография»

Филиал «Чеховский Печатный Двор»

142300, Московская обп., г. Чехов, ул. Полиграфистов, д. 1 www.chpd.ru, e-mail: sales@chpd.ru, тел.: 8 (499) 270-73-59