MITI and the Japanese miracle

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though he never exercised any personal administrative control over the ministry. It was instead, as Okochi * Shigeo stresses, a final attempt to overcome the structural disunity of the Japanese government that had been imposed on it by the Meiji Constitution. Tojo* was attempting to achieve elementary coordination of his government by assuming a one-man dictatorship, despite the fact that he could never achieve control over the navy.

²³

But in order to make Kishi effective, although Tojo was the formal minister, Tojo had to adopt an expedient that ultimately made his own political problems worse. He appointed Kishi both vice-minister of munitions and state minister with cabinet rank (

gunju jikan kokumu daijin

), thus making him the de facto head of MM.

Kishi himself has commented on this strange arrangement, as have numerous outside observers. Kishi says that he told Tojo that as vice-minister he would have to obey Tojo as his minister and superior, but that as minister of state he did not have to obey him because they would both have equivalent ranks. Tojo certainly understood this point, but he appointed Kishi state minister anyway in order to give him sufficient authority to command the generals and admirals who would be working in Kishi's ministry. Tojo remarked to Kishi that military men are trained to take orders according to the number of stars a person wears; a vice-minister has only two stars, but a minister has three.

²⁴

Kishi's becoming minister and vice-minister simultaneously set up and conditioned his clash with Tojo less than a year later. This clash was of much greater significance historically than Kishi's earlier ones (over the pay cuts and with ministers Ogawa and Kobayashi), and it contributed one of Kishi's nicknames, the "quarreler" (

kenka

), and added to his reputation as a man of principle.

²⁵

Trouble between Tojo and Kishi began almost at once. The secret appointment of Fujihara as Kishi's watchdog barely three weeks after the new ministry had been launched caused Kishi to tender his resignation. He argued that it was hard enough to run MM with two ministers; three was impossible. Tojo refused to accept his resignation, accused Kishi of being irresponsible, and said that Fujihara was necessary to keep the zaibatsu quiet. However, six months later, in July 1944, Tojo asked for Kishi's resignation, and this time Kishi refused to give it, citing his independent responsibility as a minister to the throne. This impasse could not be resolved, and the Tojo government fell.

The ostensible cause of the resignation of the Tojo cabinet was the American capture of Saipan. Kishi forthrightly expressed his opinion that Japan had no chance of winning after Saipan and should there-