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"investment coordination" as an exception to the Antimonopoly Law in order to confront the threats coming from abroad.

10

Yamamoto justified these measures in terms of the need to improve the industrial structure before the full force of capital liberalization hit the economy. He was delighted when, in January 1968, Yawata and Fuji came to terms. It looked like the "merger of the century" and was, of course, also the recreation of the prewar and wartime Japan Steel Corporation.


On April 17, 1968, however, thanks to a slip of the tongue by President Nagano of Fuji Steel, the

Mainichi shimbun

and the

Nikkan

kogyo

* newspapers broke the story that a Yawata-Fuji merger was in the works. This scoop generated a public furor that was rivaled only by the controversy over the Special Measures Law four years earlier. A group of economists at Tokyo University led by Professor Uchida Tadao met and issued a formal statement arguing that the proposed steel merger was economically unsound and would lead to monopolistic price increases. Uchida also contended that "what is really significant about the case is the absence of concern for the legal, economic, and social implications of so large a merger, as well as the widespread belief that the acts of private enterprises are not based on their own independent decisions but on the administrative guidance of MITI."

11

Uchida was particularly concerned that the Japanese public did not understand the economic need for competition and for defending it through the legal system.


The Fair Trade Commission listened to all of this and on January 27, 1969, clarified its position on the legal requirements for mergers. The commission did not necessarily oppose mergers that resulted in the formation of the largest enterprise in an industryso long as it could be convinced that the new corporation would be unable to compel its competitors to follow its pricing decisions simply because of its size. On this basis, a month later (February 24) the commission formally declared that it would approve the Yawata-Fuji merger only if each company divested itself of certain key subsidiaries that, if retained, would give the new company price control over the steel industry. Inayama and Nagano resisted this decision, even though Sanken's Nakayama had already warned them that sales of some facilities would be unavoidable, and tried to mobilize political influence against the FTC. As a consequence, on May 7, 1969, the FTC for the first time in its existence went to the Tokyo High Court and got a restraining order against a merger. The fat was now definitely in the fire.


During June 1969 the Tokyo High Court held public hearings on the merger; the FTC presented its position, as did the professors, the companies, consumer groups, and related industriesand MITI in


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